Category Archives: UN United Nations Fraud Corruption

Protests in Vienna, Aleppo, Syria is Burning

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Official State Department Summary: Meeting in Vienna on May 17, 2016, as the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), the Arab League, Australia, Canada, China, Egypt, the European Union, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, The Netherlands, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the United States reaffirmed the ISSG’s determination to strengthen the Cessation of Hostilities, to ensure full and sustained humanitarian access in Syria, and to ensure progress toward a peaceful political transition.

 

Cessation of Hostilities

Members, emphasizing the importance of a full cessation of hostilities to decreasing violence and saving lives, stressed the need to solidify the cessation in the face of serious threats, particularly during the past several weeks. The members welcomed the Joint Statement of May 9 by Ceasefire Task Force Co-Chairs, the Russian Federation and the United States, recommitting them to intensify efforts to ensure the cessation’s nationwide implementation. In this regard, they welcomed the ongoing work of the Task Force and other mechanisms to facilitate solidifying of the cessation such as the UN Operations Center and Russian-U.S. Coordination Cell in Geneva.

The ISSG Members urged full compliance of the parties to the terms of the cessation, including the ceasing of offensive operations, and undertook to use their influence with the parties to the cessation to obtain this compliance. Additionally, the ISSG called upon all parties to the cessation to refrain from disproportionate responses to provocations and to demonstrate restraint. If the commitments of the parties to the cessation are not implemented in good faith, the consequences could include the return of full-scale war, which all the Members of the ISSG agreed would be in no one’s interest. Where the co-chairs believe that a party to the cessation of hostilities has engaged in a pattern of persistent non-compliance, the Task Force could refer such behavior to the ISSG Ministers or those designated by the Ministers to determine appropriate action, including the exclusion of such parties from the arrangements of the cessation and the protection it affords them. Moreover, the failure of the cessation of hostilities and/or of the granting of access to the delivery of humanitarian relief will increase international pressure ‎on those failing to live up to these commitments.

Noting previous calls by the ISSG and the unanimously-adopted UNSCR 2254 of December 18, 2015, the ISSG reiterated its condemnation of the indiscriminate attacks by any party to the conflict. The ISSG expressed its serious concern about growing civilian casualties in recent weeks, making clear that the attacks on civilians, including attacks on medical facilities, by any party, is completely unacceptable. The ISSG took note of the March 2016 commitment by the Syrian government not to engage in indiscriminate use of force and urged the fulfillment of that commitment. The ISSG committed to intensifying its efforts to get the parties to stop any further indiscriminate use of force, and welcomed the Russian Federation’s commitment in the Joint Statement of May 9 to “work with the Syrian authorities to minimize aviation operations over areas predominantly inhabited by civilians or parties to the cessation, as well as the United States’ commitment to intensifying its support and assistance to regional allies to help them prevent the flow of fighters, weapons, or financial support to terrorist organizations across their borders.”

The ISSG, noting that Da’esh and the Nusra Front are designated by the UN Security Council as terrorist organizations, urged that the international community do all it can to prevent any material or financial support from reaching these groups and dissuade any party to the cessation from fighting in collaboration with them. The ISSG supports efforts by the co-chairs of the Ceasefire Task Force to develop a shared understanding of the threat posed, and delineation of the territory controlled, by Da’esh and the Nusra Front, and to consider ways to deal decisively with the threat posed by Da’esh and the Nusra Front to Syria and international security. The ISSG stressed that in taking action against these two groups, the parties should avoid any attacks on parties to the cessation and any attacks on civilians, in accordance with the commitments contained in the February 22 Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the United States.

The ISSG also pledged support for seeking to transform the cessation into a more comprehensive nationwide ceasefire in parallel with progress in negotiations for a political transition between the Syrian parties consistent with the Geneva Communique of June 2012, relevant UNSC Resolutions and ISSG decisions.

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Aleppo

 

 

 

& in protest letting Zarif in 2D meeting. is the source of problem in  Short video protest.

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Aleppo is burning, death is all too common while leaders after 2 days and after many meetings agree to nothing except more humanitarian action.

The US, Russia and other powers have pledged to use airdrops to deliver urgently needed humanitarian aid to Syrian civilians, but have failed to agree a date to resume stalled peace talks, underlining the depth of international divisions over the crisis.

John Kerry, the US secretary of state, and Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, chaired a meeting in Vienna of the International Syria Support Group, which promised to “solidify” an agreement reached in February on a cessation of hostilities.

The meeting’s one advance was to call for airdrops of supplies by the World Food Programme to besieged areas – an option the UN has seen as a last resort – if ground access is not granted by the Syrian authorities by 1 June. Last week government forces blocked a UN and Red Cross convoy from reaching Darayya, near Damascus.

Airdrops are fraught with technical and logistical difficulties, including high cost and a low volume of supplies compared with land convoys, as well as hazards for civilian aircrew operating over a country at war and for civilians on the ground. Aid can also fall into the wrong hands.

The ISSG reiterated that 1 August remained the target date for agreement on a political transition which would include a “broad, inclusive, non-sectarian transitional governing body with full executive powers”. That looks unattainable.

Arab and western officials had said earlier that they did not expect significant achievements from the Vienna talks. The conventional wisdom regarding the current situation in Syria is that Russia is calling the shots and that the US is working with it, despite the two countries’ ostensible disagreement about Assad’s fate. “We are dealing with tactical steps, but there is nothing beyond them,” one senior Gulf diplomat told the Guardian.

If the transition does not begin by August, Saudi Arabia has hinted that it may provide heavier weapons to rebel forces. Kerry has referred vaguely to a plan B, but few expect a dramatic change in Barack Obama’s final months in the White House. “We believe we should have moved to a plan B a long time ago,” said the Saudi foreign minister, Adel al-Jubeir.

“Kerry has been making noises about consequences for violations of the ceasefire, but I don’t think the Americans have much to offer, or anything that will change things in a significant way,” one opposition adviser said.

Salem al-Meslet, spokesman for the rebel High Negotiations Committee, said: “There can be no solution while our country is terrorised by a regime which turns back supplies of basic necessities, including even baby food, as happened in Darayya last week.”

Earlier this month, a surge in bloodshed in Aleppo wrecked the 10-week-old partial truce sponsored by Washington and Moscow that had allowed the UN-brokered talks to carry on. De Mistura said its earlier 80% effectiveness had now been reduced to 50%.

The opposition National Coalition also called on the ISSG to establish a taskforce to deal with the plight of thousands of detainees and “forcibly disappeared persons” who are assumed to be held by the Syrian government.

The Russian military was meanwhile reported to be constructing a new base in the Syrian town of Palmyra, within the protected zone that holds the archaeological site listed by Unesco as a world heritage site and without asking for permission. Read more here from the Guardian.

 

Contentious House Hearing on Iran Deal/Ben Rhodes

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The disdain the White House has for Republicans in Congress has a long history, but his week concerning the NYT’s interview with White House deputy security council advisor Ben Rhodes, Josh Earnest took the nastiness to a new level.

Must watch Gowdy above.

So, the hearing was held without Ben Rhodes as the White House lawyer gave Rhodes executive privilege.

Meanwhile, the Democrats in the hearing based their rhetoric and questions not on the subject at hand and the reason for the hearing but rather they all went on the collective attack of the witnesses over why the United States went into a war over a false claim on WMD.

Democrats turn Iran hearing into debate over Iraq invasion
The Iran-Iraq showdown in the House Oversight Committee probably wasn’t what GOP Rep. Jason Chaffetz intended when he arranged the session. And while Republicans made several attempts to turn the focus to the current presidential administration, not the previous one, Democrats weren’t dissuaded and the hearing degenerated into a back-and-forth. More details here from Politico.

For access to the full hearing, click here. The introduction testimony of one panelist, Mr. Hannah, go here.

FNC: Republican condemnation of a top White House aide who boasted about the administration’s success selling the Iran deal to the public reached new levels on Tuesday, as several senators urged President Obama to fire him and a House committee looking into his claims went forward with its hearing – even though he didn’t show up to testify.

The House Oversight Committee hearing was called to examine White House “narratives” on the Iran deal, after top adviser Ben Rhodes was featured in a New York Times Magazine profile claiming they built an “echo chamber” to sell the plan. Chairman Jason Chaffetz, R-Utah, had called Rhodes to testify, but the White House shielded him from the appearance.

Chaffetz, at the top of the hearing Tuesday, said “there’s still a shroud of secrecy” surrounding the Iran deal and he wanted to hear from Rhodes to seek “clarity.”

“I do not doubt his talents and his knowledge,” Chaffetz said. “But the deal that had been spun up and sold to the American public, I’m not sure it was as clear as it should have been.”

He said Rhodes, in the profile, showed “disdain” for the media and foreign policy circles.

Just hours earlier, the White House officially informed Chaffetz it would not make Rhodes available to testify, citing an executive privilege-related claim. Chaffetz did not go forward with plans to keep a seat open Tuesday for Rhodes, and instead called foreign policy analysts and scholars to testify on the deal. One of them, the American Enterprise Institute’s Michael Rubin, accused Rhodes of creating a “propaganda operation.”

The committee’s top Democrat, Rep. Elijah Cummings, D-Md., slammed Republicans for the hearing, criticizing the analysts they called while noting they didn’t invite military generals who support the agreement. He said Republicans rushed to hold the hearing “without even one week’s notice.”

Rep. Trey Gowdy, R-S.C., said at least Cummings would be able to question the witnesses present. Rhodes, he said, “didn’t bother to show up.”

Meanwhile, several GOP senators have written to Obama urging him to “dismiss” Rhodes “before he further tarnishes the Office of President.”

They wrote: “While members of the Executive and Legislative branches may sometimes deeply disagree on issues of vital importance to our nation’s security and prosperity, we should all agree, for the greater good of our Republic and the citizens whom we represent, to engage in our debates in a respectful, honest, and constructive manner. Mr. Rhodes’s disrespectful, deceptive, and destructive conduct has fallen appallingly short of this standard, however. Indeed, if he had conducted himself this way in a typical place of business outside Washington, where American taxpayers work, he surely would have been already fired or asked to resign.”

The Washington Free Beacon, which first reported on the letter, said it was signed by Sens. Mark Kirk, R-Ill.; John Cornyn, R-Texas; John Barrasso, R-Wyo.; and David Perdue, R-Ga.

Sources tell Fox News that the House committee was keen for Rhodes to appear voluntarily Tuesday so they avoid the territory of a possible subpoena.

The magazine article that touched off the controversy outlined how Rhodes created a narrative of the deal coming out of the 2013 election of “moderate” Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Iran’s subsequent “openness” and willingness to negotiate.

In fact, the story stated, the majority of the deal was hammered out in 2012, well before Rouhani’s election. However, the Rhodes narrative was politically useful to the administration as it presented them as reaching out to the moderates who wanted peace.

Beware: Lil Blue Men Militia, S. China Sea

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The only estimate of the size of the Maritime Militia obtained during the course of this research was from a source published in 1978, which put the number of personnel at 750,000 on approximately 140,000 craft.5 In its 2010 Defense White Paper, China stated that it had 8 million primary militia members nationwide.6 The Maritime Militia is a smaller unique subset since it performs many of its missions at sea. Since an accurate number is not available this chapter takes more of a grassroots approach and attempts to determine the average size of a unit at the local level. It is important to note that the Maritime Militia is distinct from both China’s coastal militia (shore based) and its naval reserve, although some coastal militia units have been transformed into Maritime Militia units. Full white paper is here.

While Russia has employed “Little Green Men” surreptitiously in Crimea, China uses its own “Little Blue Men” to support Near Seas claims. As the U.S. military operates near Beijing’s artificially-built South China Sea (SCS) features and seeks to prevent Beijing from ejecting foreign claimants from places like Second Thomas Shoal, it may well face surveillance and harassment from China’s maritime militia. Washington and its allies and partners must therefore understand how these irregular forces are commanded and controlled, before they are surprised and stymied by them.

China has long organized its civilian mariners into maritime militia, largely out of necessity. Recent years have seen a surge of emphasis on maritime militia building and increasing this unique force’s capabilities; however it is difficult to ascertain who or what entity within China’s government has ordered such emphasis. One can point to Xi Jinping’s visit to the Tanmen Maritime Militia in 2013, after which maritime militia building oriented toward the SCS has seen growth in places like Hainan, Guangdong, and Guangxi. Yet local militia training and organization plans prior to this date had already emphasized the training of maritime militia units.

Unit Composition and Organization

China’s militia has two major subcomponents: an “ordinary” reserve of registered male citizens akin to the U.S. Selective Service pool, and a “primary” force more readily mobilized to respond to various contingencies. The primary force receives dedicated resources, troops demobilized from active duty, and training. Within the primary force, maritime militia units—formed solely at the tactical level of organization—are smaller and more specialized on average than their land-based counterparts. Within the maritime militia, a small but growing elite set of units are the ones most likely to be deployed on more sophisticated operations that involve monitoring, displaying presence in front of, or opposing foreign actors. They do so in part by supporting China’s navy and coast guard in such efforts. Some cities with large mobilization potential—i.e., a large maritime industry or fishing community—will form battalion-sized units. Most localities create company-sized units, however. These companies are divided into platoons and squads, with the smallest grouping based on each individual vessel.

Chain of Command

Militia management begins broadly at the General Staff Department’s Mobilization Department, which oversees and formulates regulations for nationwide militia work. Uniquely a local military force, the maritime militia falls within the hierarchical People’s Liberation Army (PLA) army local force command structure that runs through all levels of local military organs. As stipulated in China’s “Militia Work Regulations,” real command of the militia begins at the Provincial Military District (MD) level and below. The thousands of county- and grassroots-level People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFD) established in county-level cities, townships, villages, and maritime enterprises (fishing companies, shipyards, etc.) directly execute the organizing and training of maritime militia. Grassroots-level PAFDs report to county-level PAFDs, which report to Military Sub-district (MSD) Headquarters, themselves reporting to MD Headquarters. Maritime militia building also receives attention by Military Region-level Command, albeit in a supervisory fashion. Higher levels of military commands likely view the maritime militia as a subset of military organization within the broader ecosystem of local militia, with particular focus on broader mobilization efforts. Additionally, militia battalions and companies form party branches to ensure Party control at the grassroots levels.

It must be emphasized that maritime militia command authority resides within multiple entities, including both the local military organs (MD, MSD, PAFD) and their government/party counterparts. This is referred to as “双重领导” in Chinese, connoting the “dual-leadership” system by the local military and government’s principal leaders. It is thus common to see a city party secretary acting in his role as first-party secretary of the local military party committee overseeing the PAFD’s efforts at managing the maritime militia. An easily visible example: Sansha City’s mayor/party secretary Xiao Jie and his military counterpart Commander Cai Xihong both attended the founding ceremony of Sansha City’s Maritime Militia Company. “Dual-leadership” is further reinforced by the fact that local governments fund militia construction.

Since both military and government leaders are involved in local armed forces building, the National Defense Mobilization Committee System (NDMC) established at each corresponding level plays the critical role in binding them into one decision-making body. The NDMC brings together these leaders to organize, direct, and coordinate nationwide national defense mobilization, ensuring that national resources can be rapidly mobilized for defense or emergency needs. Local NDMCs can also establish civilian-military joint command structures facilitated by national defense mobilization communications networks. As a militia force, the maritime militia would need a specified duration to mobilize and gather in the area designated by their superiors. Localized mobilization orders transmitted to the maritime militia could originate from a variety of sources. Regardless, they would be sent down the chain and delivered to the maritime militia via the PAFDs managing them.

While county-level PAFDs are manned by active duty PLA officers, grassroots-level PAFDs are manned by civilian government cadres. Training and education efforts target a “select group of militia cadres” (专职人民武装干部), units’ leaders (company, platoon, and squad) and “information personnel” (信息员). This group of personnel forms the backbone of the maritime militia and helps implement party control, command and control, and maintain unit cohesiveness. Essential to successful command and control of the maritime militia are the “boat captains”—often termed “船老大”—and the information personnel, which provide dedicated personnel for onboard leadership, identification, and communications. This is further facilitated by increasing incorporation of satellite communications technologies into the fishing fleet and thereby into the maritime militia.

Mission-based Command Authority

Although maritime militia are built out of the regular command structure of coastal military organs, they also serve naval and maritime law enforcement forces (MLE). The command relationships for the maritime militia may vary with the mission they are employed in. For example, maritime militia reconnaissance detachments report their findings directly to MD Headquarters, while another detachment summoned to assist with maritime law enforcement would be commanded by the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) “in cooperation with their MD.” Similarly, support detachments serving roles for China’s navy would be under the command of the PLA Navy in cooperation with the detachment’s MD. It is clear that the maritime militia are controlled by their land-based local military organs, an arrangement flexible enough to serve a variety of supporting roles for the Chinese Navy and MLE forces. Many Chinese sources use a phrase that succinctly states such arrangements: “the military organ expresses its requirements, the NDMC coordinates, and the government implements” (军事机关提需求、国动委搞协调、政府抓落实), referring to the cooperation that occurs between civilian and military leaders in building the maritime militia.

More than One Way to Tie the Knot

Organization and command of maritime militia likely varies by locality. This stems largely from a given locality’s maritime industry and its influence on militia composition, requiring local leaders to plan maritime militia missions from what is available. Making command and decision making arrangements based on local conditions is critical to the proper functioning of such a force. Many ad hoc leading small groups are formed to handle a certain issue area, or provide temporary guidance for certain missions. The multiple organizations supporting maritime militia building (e.g., the CCG, Fisheries Bureau, and Maritime Safety Administration) are likely to enter these command structures in some fashion.

The 300,000-troop reduction that Xi announced at Beijing’s 3 September military parade will likely send additional personnel to the maritime militia, and could even further shape their command and control. Specifically, efforts to streamline the current long reporting chain through land-based forces might ensue. All the more reason that it’s vitally urgent to understand how China’s “Little Blue Men” get their sailing orders, and what those orders might be.

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Millennium Challenge Corporation, Billions go Offshore

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President’s Budget Includes $1.25 Billion for Millennium Challenge Corporation

The current Millennium Challenge Corporation CEO is Dana Hyde.

Hyde grew up in a small town in eastern Oregon and received her undergraduate degree in political science from UCLA.

From 1989 to 1991, Hyde served as a legislative assistant for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). She subsequently worked on President Bill Clinton’s first campaign for the White House. After Clinton’s inauguration, Hyde served as special assistant to the president in the White House Office of Cabinet Affairs, coordinating policy initiatives with the chiefs of staff of national security agencies. She remained in that post until 1995. She later served as special assistant to the Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton Justice Department.

She received her law degree from Georgetown and passed the bar in 1997. From 1998 to 2000, Hyde worked as an attorney at the law firm Zuckerman, Spaeder. Then, from 2001 to 2002, she practiced law as part of the international arbitration group at WilmerHale. She also worked in London for the firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering.

One of Hyde’s most prominent roles was as counsel to the 9/11 commission, where she served from 2003 to 2004. She focused on crisis management issues and the immediate response of the White House, the Pentagon, and the Federal Aviation Administration to the attacks.

After leaving the commission, Hyde was executive director of the Partnership for a Secure America. This organization has as its goal the advancement of bipartisan work on national security and foreign policy issues.

In 2009, after serving on the Obama-Biden transition team, Hyde was named a senior advisor for management and resources at the State Department. Then, in 2011, Hyde moved to the Office of Management and Budget, becoming associate director for general government programs.

Justification document for Congress

Where We Work

MCC forms partnerships with poor countries that show they are committed to good governance, economic freedom, and investing in their citizens. Click here to see the countries and then remind yourself about the terror and corruption in each.

Initiatives

Aid Effectiveness

Since its creation in 2004, MCC has been advancing and accelerating the conversation on aid effectiveness.

Climate Change

MCC is committed to helping our partner countries adapt to climate change and mitigate emissions through climate resilient, low carbon economic development.

Country-Led Poverty Reduction

Country ownership—or country-led development—has been broadly embraced by the international donor community as a critical element of international development aid.

Democracy

One of MCC’s core principles is that aid is most effective in countries with a sound commitment to accountable and democratic governance.

Digital Strategy

MCC has been at the forefront of transparency in delivering aid.

Environmental and Social Performance

MCC works with partner countries to integrate internationally-accepted principles of environmental and social sustainability into the design and implementation of compacts.

Fighting Corruption

Controlling corruption a key indicator in selecting countries for compact eligibility and throughout the compact lifecycle. MCC—with the MCAs—promotes measures to prevent, detect and combat corruption before it occurs and to address problems after they emerge.

Food Security

With its partner countries in the lead, the MCC portfolio of investments has been on the forefront of addressing food security priorities since MCC’s first compact in 2005.

Gender and Social Inclusion

MCC recognizes that gender and social inequality are significant constraints to economic growth and poverty reduction.

Governance Data Alliance

MCC leads the charge to uncover the best data available to fight corruption by partnering with experts to form a Governance Data Alliance. MCC and the alliance are committed to filling the gaps for measuring governance.

MCC & The African Growth & Opportunity Act (AGOA)

MCC has obligated nearly $3 billion for trade capacity building in AGOA countries on infrastructure like roads and power, on upping productivity of small and medium-size businesses and export-heavy sectors, and leveraging policy and regulatory reforms.

MCC and Power Africa

Through its compacts in partner countries, MCC has committed approximately $1.5 billion to support Power Africa, the U.S. Government’s effort to double access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa.

MCC and the Sustainable Development Goals

MCC supports its partner countries in their efforts to achieve the SDGs and improve the lives of their people by fighting poverty through inclusive economic growth.

MCC and the U.S. Global Development Policy

MCC applies the principles of economic growth, strong policies, country-led plans and rigorous evaluation to create a more stable and prosperous future for the world’s poor.

MCC’s Public-Private Partnership Platform

Development needs around the world will not be met by foreign assistance alone. Official development assistance must increasingly catalyze other resources to finance development – including private-sector investment. Here’s one way MCC is doing just that.

Measuring Governance

In selecting partner countries, MCC relies on independent public data that captures as clearly as possible the actions governments take to fight corruption. MCC is seeking improved and expanded indicators from the institutions that produce this data.

NGO Consultations

NGO consultations are at the core of MCC’s compact development process. By listening to the voices and experience of the broader NGO community, MCC leverages all available expertise from others to maximize our investments.

Open Government

MCC has been at the forefront of transparency in delivering aid.

Partnership for Growth

MCC and other U.S. Government agencies have joined together to coordinate Partnership for Growth (PFG), a partnership between the United States and a select group of high-performing developing countries to accelerate and sustain broad-based economic growth.

Smart Aid Series

Since its founding, MCC has sought innovative ways to reduce poverty through economic growth. Smart Aid brings together development practitioners and MCC staff to share best practices, lessons learned, and engage in a dialogue to effectively move aid forward.

Country Scorecards

The country scorecards consolidate an individual country’s scores for each of the policy indicators MCC uses to determine eligibility for its assistance programs. By using information collected from independent, third-party sources, MCC allows for an objective comparison of all candidate countries.

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100 Years old, Sykes Picot Debate Heats Up

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The Islamic State (IS) group wilfully defies any frontier blocking its route to an Islamic caliphate. According to Tarek Osman, author of Islamism, we are only part-way through a revolution with no clear endgame.“Sykes-Picot was a pillar of a system in the Middle East that we are watching fall apart today, as something new is being formed. Right now, we’re in a fluid, chaotic phase and a new system will not emerge for a number of years,” Osman told Middle East Eye. More from MiddleEastEye.

More on Sykes-Picot: The Agreement as Written

As I noted in my first post on the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which was concluded a century ago this month, “Sykes-Picot” has become a convenient shorthand for the entire constellation of agreements and understandings that contributed to the postwar settlement, agreements spread out from as early as 1915 to as late as 1939, or even later if we include the partition of Palestine. In coming days I’ll be dealing with the actual agreements, but first let’s look at the real Asia Minor Agreement negotiated between Sir Mark Sykes and M. François Georges-Picot in 1916 and what borders it actually envisioned.

Britain and France began discussions of a post-Ottoman settlement on November 23, 1915, with Georges-Picot negotiating with Sir Arthur Nicolson, soon replaced by Sir Mark Sykes,. At that time efforts by David Lloyd George and Herbert Samuel to promote a Jewish state in Palestine were already under way, and Sir Henry McMahon in Egypt was already committing Britain to support an independent Arab state in correspondence with Sharif Hussein of Mecca. Another round of negotiations took place in December, and in February 1916 Sykes visited Petrograd to meet with Russian Foreign Minister Segey Sazonov. Negotiations with the Zionists and the commitments to Sharif Hussein were known to Sykes.

Sir Mark Sykes
F. Georges-Picot

The basic text was ready by May. On May 9, French Ambassador to London Paul Cambon transmitted it in a letter to British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, who returned it  with approval on May 16. Signed May 19 and with a formal exchange of notes May 2, the precise date that should be “celebrated” as the centenary is a little slippery.

The agreement’s text is below after the map. Although the agreement gives lip service to the idea of an “independent” Arab stste, it would be subordinate to British and French zones of influence, and both had zones in which they claimed direct control. Britain and France made a umber of guarantees to each other (Palestine would be under international control but with Britain controlling Haifa, Acre, a railway to Egypt and a future railway to Iraq.)

Both parties seemed to recognize that the agreement had potential conflicts, but it was a secret agreement, and intended to remain so. As I’ve tried to make clear, I’m not defending Sykes-Picot, which was imperialist arrogance at its worst;I’m simply saying that, except for a general roe for France in Syria (but then including Mosul) and Britain in Iraq. The status of Mosul and Palestine would be among the first things to change, and of course the whole disposition of Anatolia would change.

One thing that would speed the unraveling of the details of  Sykes-Picot was its sudden revelation by the Bolsheviks in November 1917, which we’ll discuss in Part 3.

Text of Sykes-Picot Agreement

It is accordingly understood between the French and British governments:
That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab states or a confederation of Arab states (a) and (b) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief.
That in area (a) France, and in area (b) great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (a) France, and in area (b) great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab state or confederation of Arab states.

That in the blue area France, and in the red area great Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab state or confederation of Arab states.

That in the brown area there shall be established an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other allies, and the representatives of the Shariff of Mecca.
That great Britain be accorded (1) the ports of Haifa and Acre, (2) guarantee of a given supply of water from the Tigris and Euphrates in area (a) for area (b). His majesty’s government, on their part, undertake that they will at no time enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus to any third power without the previous consent of the French government.

That Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade of the British empire, and that there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards British shipping and British goods; that there shall be freedom of transit for British goods through Alexandretta and by railway through the blue area, or (b) area, or area (a); and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against British goods on any railway or against British goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

That Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her dominions and protectorates, and there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards French shipping and French goods. There shall be freedom of transit for French goods through Haifa and by the British railway through the brown area, whether those goods are intended for or originate in the blue area, area (a), or area (b), and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against french goods on any railway, or against French goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.
That in area (a) the Baghdad railway shall not be extended southwards beyond Mosul, and in area (b) northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Baghdad and Aleppo via the Euphrates valley has been completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two governments.
That Great Britain has the right to build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway connecting Haifa with area (b), and shall have a perpetual right to transport troops along such a line at all times. It is to be understood by both governments that this railway is to facilitate the connection of Baghdad with Haifa by rail, and it is further understood that, if the engineering difficulties and expense entailed by keeping this connecting line in the brown area only make the project unfeasible, that the French government shall be prepared to consider that the line in question may also traverse the Polygon Banias Keis Marib Salkhad Tell Otsda Mesmie before reaching area (b).

For a period of twenty years the existing Turkish customs tariff shall remain in force throughout the whole of the blue and red areas, as well as in areas (a) and (b), and no increase in the rates of duty or conversions from ad valorem to specific rates shall be made except by agreement between the two powers.

There shall be no interior customs barriers between any of the above mentioned areas. The customs duties leviable on goods destined for the interior shall be collected at the port of entry and handed over to the administration of the area of destination.
It shall be agreed that the french government will at no time enter into any negotiations for the cession of their rights and will not cede such rights in the blue area to any third power, except the Arab state or confederation of Arab states, without the previous agreement of his majesty’s government, who, on their part, will give a similar undertaking to the french government regarding the red area.
The British and French government, as the protectors of the Arab state, shall agree that they will not themselves acquire and will not consent to a third power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian peninsula, nor consent to a third power installing a naval base either on the east coast, or on the islands, of the Red Sea. This, however, shall not prevent such adjustment of the Aden frontier as may be necessary in consequence of recent Turkish aggression.
The negotiations with the Arabs as to the boundaries of the Arab states shall be continued through the same channel as heretofore on behalf of the two powers.
It is agreed that measures to control the importation of arms into the Arab territories will be considered by the two governments.
I have further the honor to state that, in order to make the agreement complete, his majesty’s government are proposing to the Russian government to exchange notes analogous to those exchanged by the latter and your excellency’s government on the 26th April last. Copies of these notes will be communicated to your excellency as soon as exchanged. I would also venture to remind your excellency that the conclusion of the present agreement raises, for practical consideration, the question of claims of Italy to a share in any partition or rearrangement of turkey in Asia, as formulated in Article 9 of the agreement of the 26th April, 1915, between Italy and the allies.

His Majesty’s Government further consider that the Japanese government should be informed of the arrangements now concluded.