Action Plan for NoKo’s Nuclear Program Same as 1991/2

Posted on February 26, 2019February 26, 2019 by Denise Simon

So, in Hanoi, Vietnam, President Trump is meeting for two days with Kim Jung Un.

Il prossimo meeting tra Kim Jong-Un e Donald J. Trump ...

The White House said Trump would meet Kim at Hanoi’s French-colonial-era Metropole Hotel at 6:30 p.m. (1130 GMT) and have a 20-minute one-on-one conversation before a dinner scheduled to last just over an hour and a half.

Meanwhile, the democrats are telegraphing that Trump is going to give up too much in order to get a deal with North Korea. How do they know? Further, the mainstream media is also broadcasting that Trump will not get anything accomplished during this second summit. Which is it exactly?

Well, it is worth looking at archived documents going back to at least 1991-1992. Remember the U.S. had a different president and military leaders, while North Korea did not have lil Kim. The issue with North Korea and the nuclear program goes back at least 25-30 years. At least under the Trump administration, there are direct talks, summits that did not happen with the top leaders of the two countries…..has the mainstream media explained any of this or for context, the previous action plans and why?

So….skim through documents 6 and 7.

Document 06

Briefing Book, Deputies Committee Meeting, ca. 12/13/1991 (Secret)

1991-12-13

Source: Freedom of Information Act release

This briefing book provides an invaluable and detailed look at how the Bush I administration deliberated over the critical next steps in confronting the North Korea nuclear program, as well as concerns held by the Pentagon about the approach recommended by the State Department. This briefing book was prepared for a NSC/Deputies’ Committee meeting to be held on December 17. The Deputies’ Committee was composed of high-ranking representatives below the Cabinet level from the State Department, the Secretary of Defense and JCS, the CIA and ACDA, as well as other agencies as required, and met to discuss policy issues that cut across the agencies’ briefs. The level of detail found in this briefing book regarding the various negotiating goals and approaches defies easy summarization, and the materials should be read closely to capture all the nuances and factors entering into the U.S. diplomatic efforts aimed at halting Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The contents of the briefing book, with comments on significant points, include: (page numbers refer to the PDF copy):

A) Cover memo, table of contents and agenda (pages 1-3)

B) Meeting objectives memorandum (page 4)

The purpose of the meeting was to consider a “gameplan” to bring North Korea’s nuclear weapons program under control. Specific steps to be considered included preliminary contact with North Korea at the deputy assistant secretary level. This would be accompanied by an approach by Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy in Beijing to invite North Korea to send a high-level official to meet with a U.S. counterpart in New York before President Bush visited Seoul in early January. Also under consideration were talking points for these meetings and demarches to countries with relations or potential influence in Pyongyang informing them of the U.S. concerns about the DPRK nuclear program.

C) Memorandum for ASD/ISA James R. Lilley, Subject DC Meeting on North Korea Nuclear Program, ca. December 12, 1991 (pages 5-6)

This memorandum summarizes the key points in the gameplan and lays out the Pentagon’s concerns that the talking points are too “forward-leaning” with respect to offering the prospect of normalized relations with North Korea at this early point in the process. The Pentagon was already concerned that South Korea had rushed ahead in talks with North Korea about a non-aggression agreement while putting the nuclear issue off to the side. ACDA Director Ronald Lehman in his recent visit to Seoul (see 5 and 6 below) had sought to bolster South Korea’s determination to press Pyongyang on this issue by agreeing to the idea of a North-South inspection regime. The Pentagon agreed with the key point of the gameplan, which was a high-level meeting to make sure Kim Il Sung knew directly about U.S. concerns regarding North Korea’s nuclear program and that, for real progress, signing the IAEA safeguards agreement was not sufficient but the DPRK should reciprocate Roh Tae Woo’s November 8 non-nuclear declaration foreswearing the development, including reprocessing and enrichment, of nuclear weapons. But the Pentagon strongly held that the U.S. side should not offer too much by way of a possible normalization of relations in these early contacts. In its view, the mere fact that these two meetings might take place were carrot enough, and the U.S. should make any second meeting conditional on North Korea signing and implementing safeguards, and agreeing to a reciprocal non-nuclear policy with Seoul and to at least trial inspections.

This memorandum has the following attachments:

1) Suggested Talking Points for Mr. Lilley (page 7) – This paper summarizes the main points Lilley should make in the Deputies’ Committee meeting to drive home the Pentagon’s concerns: keep the pressure on South Korea to push North Korea on the nuclear issue in its bilateral talks and to avoid prematurely raising the prospect of normalized relations in the initial meetings with North Korea, which should focus on making clear the U.S. concerns and benchmarks for progress on the nuclear issue.

2) Strategy for Dealing with North Korean Nuclear Issue (Gameplan paper) (pages 8-15) – This is the State Department paper laying out the diplomatic, political, and economic steps the U.S. should adopt as it works to resolve the North Korea nuclear problem, along with a timeline. The basic components of the plan were: continued international efforts to press North Korea; ensuring that Seoul press Pyongyang at the North-South talks on the nuclear issue; and clearly stating the U.S. position on a peninsula-wide ban on reprocessing and enrichment, both to the world and especially to the DPRK in proposed initial and follow-up, high-level meetings. While there were current signs of movement and success in building international pressures on the DPRK, the paper also sounded a number of warnings, noting that “there is a well-established history of Pyongyang raising expectations . . . only to back off at the last minute with additional demands,”

The paper acknowledges that the odds may be against the U.S. in pursuing the gameplan. It was entirely possible that North Korea had no intention of changing course, and would aim to “delay, diffuse international pressure, and use any opportunity to seem forthcoming, without making meaningful concessions.” Adding to the uncertainties were the gaps in intelligence regarding North Korea’s processing of nuclear material at Yongbyon. There were also signs that North Korea might try to move and hide its processing facilities before agreeing to inspections. The proposed plan for the next few months was to combine increased international pressure with concrete incentives for North Korea to take the steps needed to rein in its nuclear program. The international campaign would be waged on a number of fronts, including with Japan, China, Russia, the IAEA, and the UN. The latter posed particular issues, such as possibly inviting “invidious comparisons” to other unsafeguarded nuclear programs, such as Israel’s. China also posed its own set of possibilities and concerns. The U.S. hoped Beijing would provide more reliable information about the North Korean nuclear program as well as exert its influence. But the U.S. could not be “absolutely certain of PRC motives … and it is unlikely they would be prepared to take any measures they perceived as putting the survival of the Pyonguang regime in question.”

These efforts needed to be coordinated with two other key arenas of discussion: the North-South dialogue and bilateral U.S.-DPRK contacts. The North-South channel was crucial to solution of the nuclear issue and other Korean problems. A meeting to discuss a ROK/DPRK non-nuclear agreement that incorporated a ban on reprocessing and enrichment as well as a bilateral inspection regime was planned for December 20. In support of this initiative, Secretary of Defense Cheney had told Seoul that the U.S. could consider inspections of U.S. bases in South Korea under the right circumstances; i.e., inspections must be reciprocal, simultaneous and involve both civil and military facilities, and should come after the public commitment from both Koreas to a non-nuclear policy. ACDA Director Lehman had elaborated on this position during his visit to Seoul. The North/South talks also carried the risk that South Korea might not be willing to pay the political price of taking tougher steps towards North Korea if needed.

The bilateral U.S.-DPRK dialogue raised the points at issue in the NSC/Deputies’ Committee meeting regarding what should be said at these sessions. They would provide a venue for sending a critical message to the top North Korean leadership: should the U.S., at any point, “learn the DPRK is developing nuclear weapons or producing weapons-usable nuclear material, we would be unable to proceed further in the direction of dialogue and normalization.” This stick would be paired with the carrot of a possible easing of tensions and moves towards normalization of relations in a step-by-step fashion as North Korea met specific benchmarks in bringing its nuclear program under international safeguards and inspections. Another potential stick was explicitly taken off the table, however: Cheney had told South Korean and Japanese leaders that the U.S. should not consider “military measures” as such discussion could jeopardize the current diplomatic strategy.

3) State Department Talking Points – Preliminary Contact with DPRK (pages 16-17) – This and the following document provide talking points that address U.S. concerns about the North Korean nuclear program and the necessary steps to address them, as discussed in the document above. Notable are the marginal notes, assumed to be by a Pentagon official, that would underscore the need to discuss the nuclear issue, and that called for deleting the talking point about possible normalization of relations between the U.S. and North Korea.

4) State Department Talking Points for High-Level Meeting (pages 18-23) – Again, these talking points elaborate on the U.S. concerns and position regarding North Korea’s nuclear program, to be presented at a high-level gathering following the initial meeting. The points are familiar, taken from the gameplan document; of particular interest are the Pentagon marginal notes. The Pentagon remained focused on making it clear to North Korea that its nuclear program was unacceptable and on laying out the steps North Korea must take to bring this program under international review and inspection.

5) Memorandum, Col. Eden Y. Woon (OSD/ISA) for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Subject: ACDEA Director Lehman Visit to Korea on Nuclear Issue, ca. December 30, 1991 (pages 24-26) – This memorandum reports on the interagency team that ACDA Director Lehman took to Seoul on December 6-9. The team consisted of representatives from ACDA, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs, and the office of the Secretary of Defense. After stressing to the South Koreans that the North Korea nuclear issue should be “front and center” in the upcoming North/South ministerial meetings, the U.S. delegation then focused on revising serious problems with a draft joint declaration Seoul planned to propose to Pyongyang at these meetings. Key among these concerns was keeping North Korea’s international obligation regarding IAEA safeguards separate from bilateral nuclear agreements; insuring that a North/South inspection regime included both military and civilian sites, as IAEA inspections alone might not be able to detect a covert weapons program at Yongbyon and other suspected sites; and avoiding any statement that the purpose of a bilateral inspection regime was “to check on the presence of nuclear weapons.” The U.S. feared this would come too close to sounding like checking for U.S. weapons, whereas the purpose of the inspections should be to verify both Koreas are abiding by any joint nuclear declaration.

The U.S. team had to counter serious South Korean resistance to making changes to address these concerns, fearing it would make the joint declaration too tough for North Korea to accept. More worrisome for Seoul was that it would be hard to pressure North Korea on inspecting reprocessing facilities since reprocessing was legal. Fighting back against what the Americans saw as a reversion to old thinking, which the U.S. thought had disappeared with Roh’s November 8 announcement of non-nuclear principles, the U.S. delegation spent the better part of the meeting explaining the inadequacies of IAEA inspections alone, the need to press North Korea to stop reprocessing and the requirement for persuading North Korea to reciprocate Roh Tae Woo’s powerful non-nuclear policy.

In the end, the U.S. delegation persuaded the South Koreans to make the necessary changes in the draft joint declaration. Looking ahead, it was clear Washington needed to do more to reassure South Korea that international pressure on North Korea would not ease once the DPRK signed the IAEA safeguards agreement. To this end, the U.S. would have to send out a “core demarche” cable to its friends and allies stating the American goal of persuading North Korea to reciprocate Roh’s non-nuclear policy and stop reprocessing, and declaring its position that merely signing the IAEA safeguards agreement was insufficient to address international concerns. Sending this cable would also serve to shield the United States from criticism that it was “moving the goalposts” in its demands on North Korea. And again, Washington needed to engage with China, possibly through high-level talks in the near future, to secure its role in putting pressure on North Korea, a role that would increase if the issue had to move to the U.N. Finally, the U.S. and South Korea needed to make a decision on whether to hold the 1992 Team Spirit joint military exercises, a matter on which South Korean views were divided.

6) Cable, Amembassy Seoul 13075 to SecState, Subject: Lehman Visit:

ROKG Proposal for a N/S Non-Nuclear Joint Declaration, December 9, 1991 (pages 27-30) – This cable summarizes the results of the U.S.-ROK meeting on nuclear issues that is the focus of the preceding memorandum. As noted above, these issues were distinguishing between IAEA inspections and any bilateral North/South inspection agreement, the need to include civil sites in any bilateral agreement, the U.S. opposition to having the stated purpose of bilateral inspections include checking for the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons, as well as the need to include trial inspections as a goal of the North/ South talks. The South Koreans accepted the U.S. changes, which would be incorporated into the draft Seoul would present to the DPRK at the ministerial discussions beginning on December 10. The cable reiterates the South Korean agreement that the nuclear issue should be “front and center” at these talks and that the draft joint declaration will be used to “attack” North Korea’s position on nuclear weapons. The South Koreans expected this strategy to lead to a “major confrontation” on the nuclear issue, with Seoul determined to come out of the fight this round as “top dog.” The rest of the cable gives the text of the revised draft joint declaration.

7) Cable, Amembassy Seoul 13322 to SecState, Subject: Prime Ministers Sign Joint Agreement on Reconciliation and Nonaggression: “The Most Comprehensive North-South Document Since the Division of the Peninsula, December 13, 1991 (pages 31-33) – This cable reports that on December 13, North and South Korea’s prime ministers signed the “Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Cooperation and Exchanges,” and provides details on a briefing that Assistant Foreign Minister Lee See Young gave the diplomatic corps on the agreement and the negotiations leading to it. Lee said that Seoul had put strong emphasis on the nuclear issue throughout the negotiations, pressing the DPRK to accept nuclear inspections and halt nuclear weapons development, and calling for agreement to end all reprocessing and enrichment to insure nuclear weapons would not be produced on the peninsula. South Korea had also pushed for North Korea to accept that trial inspections of military and civilian facilities, one of the confidence-building measures, be carried out within the month. Regarding the ROK draft declaration on a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, North Korea had initially responded by repeating its call for a nuclear-free zone, but Seoul had pushed to have further talks on a joint nuclear declaration work from the South Korean draft. Lee also noted the “unexpectedly flexible” North Korean stance at the talks, but felt that Pyongyang may need more concrete proof of progress in the North/South dialogue as a step towards improving its international standing and ending its political and economic isolation. For its part, Seoul held that further moves towards normalizing relations with North Korea should wait to ensure the DPRK followed through on implementing the agreement and its continued stand on the nuclear issue. Summing up, Lee asserted that the joint agreement was the most comprehensive North-South document since the division of the peninsula,” which could bring about “a major change in North-South relations.”

Document 07

Memorandum: North Korea Deputies’ Committee. March 12, 1992 (Secret)

1992-03-12

Source: Freedom of Information Act release

“Our basic policy remains that nuclear weapons in North Korean hands are intolerable.” The state of play in avoiding this outcome is the focus of this memorandum, prepared for a meeting of the North Korea Deputies’ Committee. It was a “testing period” for the DPRK, in which the U.S. and its allies waited for Pyongyang to carry out its promise to ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement reached in January, having already failed to meet a commitment to do this in February. While there were promising signs that North Korea might still ratify the IAEA agreement in April, and talks were underway to establish a Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) to monitor the North-South non-nuclear agreement, the North’s intentions remained unclear. There were signs of an internal debate possibly slowing decisions, as the DPRK might see some political advantage in delay, or it might be playing for time so that it could “destroy, dismantle, or convert sensitive facilities,” even to hide its nuclear weapons program or produce and then hide “significant amounts of plutonium before allowing inspections. Or perhaps it might plan not to accept meaningful inspections at all.

South Korea and Japan agreed with the U.S. that improved political relations with North Korea were off the table until the nuclear issue was resolved. Seoul had made progress on this issue a prerequisite for movement in other North-South talks, going so far as to postpone a summit meeting and would likely postpone the next round of prime ministerial talks in May absent real progress. Even if the DPRK did ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement and negotiated a bilateral inspection regime, the next test would be the completeness of North Korea’s declarations to the IAEA. A further complicating factor was the willingness of some countries, especially China and Russia, to give the DPRK the benefit of the doubt for “plausible delay.” Absent undeniable proof that the DPRK did not intend to carry out its promises, it would be difficult to mobilize international pressure in the near term. A “worst case” scenario in which North Korea delayed action on its IAEA commitments until October was attached to the memorandum.

For the moment, the U.S. had to walk a fine line between accepting that North Korea would meet its obligations and maintaining international concern, while at the same time laying the basis for action that could enable it to narrow North Korea’s freedom of action and tighten international pressure. The key challenge was “to minimize DPRK “wiggle room,” by building international support for a reasonable deadline for initial IAEA inspections at all the DPRK’s nuclear facilities, which would in turn lay the basis for international action if it became necessary to coerce Pyongyang. A best case scenario (also attached) would find the DPRK submitting its nuclear inventory in late May, laying the basis for initial inspections in early June. Future U,S. diplomacy needed to focus on bolstering support for the best-case scenario, while not giving North Korea grounds to charge the U.S. was “pressuring” it. A critical target of this diplomacy would be China, which had the most influence with North Korea. Washington was to stress with Beijing that the U.S. timetable was “critical” and urge the Chinese to “make it happen,” emphasizing China’s national interest and the U.S. determination to pursue tough international steps, which Beijing should support, if Pyongyang “fails to perform.” Other venues at which the U.S. should press its case were the IAEA, the UN and in U.S.-DPRK counselors talks in Beijing. Should coercive steps be needed, these could be pursued through economic sanctions under the UN aegis, in concert with like-minded nations, or unilaterally if need be.

The Creation of a Failed Venezuela due to Maduro

Posted on February 25, 2019February 25, 2019 by Denise Simon

Last year, Lancet Infectious Diseases Journal published a major warning about malaria in Venezuela. In spite of 3 million people fleeing their home country since 2014, the economic condition in Venezuela continues in a financial tail-spin. Treatment of malaria, measles and diphtheria as well as dengue and Zika are just not being treated. Further, the infant mortality rate is skyrocketing. The most recent population with malaria is estimated to be 411, 586.

Maduro has called on Russia, Cuba and Bolivia to help with military action, police action and even his personal security. Cuba denies there are forces in Venezuela. Hold on Cuba….

Informal information published by Foresightcuba, which is dedicated to presenting statistics about the island, counts Cuba’s military presence in Venezuela as follows: 4,500 Cuban infantrymen organized in 8 battalions of 500 troops, plus a battalion stationed in Fuerte Tiuna; 2 Brigade Generals (Herminio Hernández Rodríguez and Alejandro Ronda Marrero, one stationed in Fuerte Tiuna, another in Barquisimeto); 4 colonels (Rodrigo Hernández Maite, Rufino Zabaleta Corvino, Jaime Freitas Sambrano, and Simon Guillermo Senior); 8 lieutenant colonels; 6 frigate captains, and 25 junior officers.

This information details who they are with name and surname, their functions, where they are based, the weapons they use, and notes that they wear Venezuelan military insignia.

A long-standing situation

According to an article published in February 2010 by journalist Leandro Dario, international assistant editor of the newspaper Dario Perfi, by that time the then president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, had incorporated the Cuban military into the Armed Forces of the country with the aim of inserting the high command of Cuba into Venezuelan military forces, to ensure their control in the barracks and project socialism. More here.

This certainly now speaks to the humanitarian aid several countries are working to get to the desperate Venezuelan people that Maduro has cut off completely. Just two days ago:

Grave situation developing right now inside of #Colombia. @freddysuperlano a member of the National Assembly of #Venezuela was poisoned this morning at breakfast inside of Colombia & is in serious condition at the hospital. His assistant Carlos Salinas has died from poisoning.

#ATENCIÓN Ciudadanos intentan salvar parte de la ayuda humanitaria que fue incendiada por funcionarios de la PNB en el puente Santander, Ureña #23Feb pic.twitter.com/tIyJiaJ8Vb

— NTN24 Venezuela (@NTN24ve) February 23, 2019

Enter Senator Marco Rubio, he has been right on top of the conditions for many months sounding all the alarms as VP Mike Pence is presently in Columbia meeting with the interim Venezuelan President Guido and The Lima Group.

There are 5 naturalized American citizens still being jailed in Venezuela. And China deployed a tech envoy to Caracas to in many cases terminate the internet and other telecom services.

Meanwhile, here is more.

In part:

Due to Russia’s support for President Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian civil war, the Kremlin has been given significant more control over Syria’s oil and gas industry. In 2017, Syria signed a deal giving Russia sole rights to its oil and gas production. In return for saving desperate regimes, Russia has gained significant control over global resource markets on top of its own large reserves.

But Assad has also given Russia a permanent air base and an expansion of Russian naval facilities in the country. The Kremlin is banking on mirroring such agreements in Venezuela. Joint Russian-Venezuelan naval exercises were held in 2008, while two nuclear-capable bombers flew to Venezuela’s La Orchila island in December 2018.

Though Venezuelan law prohibits permanent foreign military bases, Russia and Venezuela announced the creation of a ‘temporary’ long-term Russian airbase on La Orchila soon after the flight demonstration. Together with Venezuela’s Russian weapons imports, the two militaries will find it easier to coordinate Russian power projection in the Caribbean.

Expanding a military presence in Venezuela will bring up uncomfortable memories from the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 2017, Igor Sechin held talks with Cuban President Raul Castro and agreed to expand oil and gas ties. The potential for a Russian base in Venezuela came after steady integration through natural resource industries, a formula that Cuba appears intent on replicating.

Stakes have risen in Venezuela since Russia allegedly sent hundreds of personnel from its most notorious private military company, Wagner, in January. Deploying Wagner will allow Russia to mask its presence in Venezuela, similar to recent conflicts.

Many of Wagner’s personnel are ex-Russian soldiers. They have worked with rebel elements in Ukraine and been granted partial control of re-captured oil and gas fields in Syria. Wagner has also been deployed across Africa to safeguard regimes under scrutiny from the West and international institutions, as well as protect their lucrative mining operations.

Wagner represents a privatization of security backed by the power of the Russian military. Rosneft and Gazprom, Russia’s other resource crown jewels, operate their own security forces, and together could be the force that takes over from the Russian military in Syria and potentially in Venezuela.

Russia’s ability to safeguard desperate regimes has made other ‘rogue states’ increasingly look to Russia as a guarantor of their security. Keeping Maduro in power represents part of a wider policy of assisting other states hostile to wider US foreign policy.

The Kremlin often offers diplomatic support to North Korea and relieved most of its debt obligations to Russia in 2014. In the years that followed, Korean rocket tests increased dramatically, drawing the attention of the U.S. More recently, not only has Russia aided the Syrian government in the civil war, it has done so in tandem with Iranian forces after decades of Iranian military isolation.

Backed by the U.S., Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Gaido declared himself acting president on January 23, ushering in the latest escalation of Venezuela’s political crisis. He was soon recognized as interim president by the U.S., Canada, the EU, and most Latin American countries. China, Russia, Turkey, Iran and others continue to recognize Maduro, who still has the broad support of the Venezuelan military.

The U.S. has imposed sanctions on Maduro and individuals associated with him, as well as PVSDA, which is now stacked with Maduro allies. But the ability of Maduro and the Venezuelan economy to withstand the pressure suggests that, though the sanctions may damage his administration, they may not be enough to force him out.

Chavez fought to gain control over Venezuela’s oil supply and push out the U.S. and the West, only to have Maduro establish a new reliance on Russia. With the Kremlin’s help, his administration may survive, in return for Russian control over Venezuela’s oil industry and the establishment of a military footprint in the United States’ backyard. For the full summary, go here.

U.S. is Presently Under 31 National Emergency Orders

Posted on February 14, 2019February 14, 2019 by Denise Simon

Of particular note is during the peaceful transfer of power from Obama to Trump, Obama told Trump the number one threat to the United States and her interests is North Korea. Notice that Obama never made any declaration regarding North Korea. Notice too that under Obama, the Sinaola Cartel, the narco terror organization that killed thousands in Mexico and many in the United States was not part of any declaration. But….Obama did declare a national emergency due to the socialist revolution in Venezuela and hence that has caused 3 million Venezuelans to flee.

Oh yeah….nothing from Obama either regarding Islamic State and Syria or Iraq…..or Russia considering Moscow’s intrusion into our 2016 election systems…..

***

According to the Federal Register, 58 national emergencies have been declared since the National Emergency Act of 1976 was signed into law by President Gerald Ford.

And 31 have been annually renewed and are currently still in effect, as listed in the Federal Register.

Here’s a list of the presidents who declared still ongoing national emergencies.

President Jimmy Carter

Nov 14, 1979: The National Emergency With Respect to Iran, in response to the Iran hostage crisis.

President Bill Clinton

Nov 14, 1994: The National Emergency With Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, that combined two previous national emergencies focused on weapons of mass destruction.

Jan. 2, 1995: The National Emergency With Respect to Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process placed economic sanctions in response to the Jerusalem bombing.

March 15, 1995: The National Emergency With Respect to Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources was an effort to prevent potential deals between oil companies.

October 21, 1995: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions with Significant Narcotics Traffickers Centered in Colombia was declared after increased reports of drug cartels laundering money through American companies.

March 1, 1996: The National Emergency With Respect to Regulations of the Anchorage and Movement of Vessels with Respect to Cuba was after civilian planes were shot down near Cuba

November 3, 1997: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Sudan implemented economic and trade sanctions.

President George W. Bush

June 26, 2001: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans imposed sanctions on those aiding Albanian insurgents in Macedonia

Aug 17, 2001: The National Emergency With Respect to Export Control Regulations renewed presidential power to control exports in a national emergency since the Export Administration Act of 1979 lapsed.

Sept 14, 2001: The National Emergency with Respect to Certain Terrorist Attacks was in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States.

Sept 23, 2001: The National Emergency With Respect to Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism was in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

March 6, 2003: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Zimbabwe was an effort to punish associates of Robert Mugabe.

May 22, 2003: The National Emergency With Respect to Protecting the Development Fund for Iraq and Certain Other Property in Which Iraq has an Interest was issued following the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

May 11, 2004: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to Syria was in response to Syria supporting terrorist activity in Iraq.

June 16, 2006: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus was in response to charges of fraud in the Belarus presidential election.

Oct 27, 2006: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was in response to violence around the Congolese presidential election runoff.

Aug 1, 2007: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Persons Undermining the Sovereignty of Lebanon was in response to a breakdown of the rule of law in Lebanon.

June 26, 2008: The National Emergency With Respect to Continuing Certain Restrictions with Respect to North Korea cited the risk of proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material. President Trump renewed this June 22, 2018 citing the “existence and risk of proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material on the Korean Peninsula and the actions and policies of the Government of North Korea continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat.”

President Barack Obama

April 12, 2010: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Somalia was in respect to threats posed by Somali pirates.

February 25, 2011: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain Transactions Related to Libya froze the assets of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.

July 25, 2011: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Transnational Criminals was in response to the rise in crime by specific organizations: Los Zetas (Mexico), The Brothers’ Circle (former Soviet Union countries), the Yakuza (Japan), and the Camorra (Italy).

May 16, 2012: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Persons Threatening the Peace, Security, or Stability of Yemen addressed political unrest within the Yemen government.

March 16, 2014: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine was in response to the Russian invasion of Crimea.

April 3, 2014: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to South Sudan was in response to the ongoing civil war.

May 12, 2014: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in the Central African Republic was in response to violence towards humanitarian aid workers.

March 8, 2015: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela was in response to human rights violations.

April 1, 2015: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities was in response to Chinese cyber attacks on the U.S.

Nov 23, 2015: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Burundi was declared after a failed coup.

President Donald Trump

Dec 20, 2017: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption imposed sanctions on the Myanmar general for his role persecuting Rohingya Muslims.

Sept 12, 2018: The National Emergency With Respect to Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election attempted to prevent any meddling with the 2018 midterm elections amid the ongoing investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election.

Nov 27, 2018: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Nicaragua was declared by President Trump in response to violence and the Ortega regime’s “systematic dismantling and undermining of democratic institutions and the rule of law” that constitutes an “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”

The Lima Group vs. Maduro

Posted on February 11, 2019February 11, 2019 by Denise Simon

It is a matter of time that Maduro flees somewhere and likely with stolen money of which it appears the U.S. Treasury and the Swift Banking System is watching carefully. The United States is listing those rogue companies and countries and people evade sanctions and are helping Maduro move money for various reasons, money that belongs to Venezuela and to her people. Keep a watchful eye of South Africa, Russia, Cuba, Turkey, Syria and Iran. More punitive sanctions may be bubbling to the surface.

Contrary to many democrats, it was not President Trump that began is Venezuelan revolution or the eventual ouster of Maduro. In fact, it was The Lima Group joined by the Organization of American States.

PressTV-Mexico urges Lima Group not to meddle in Venezuela ...

Back in January of 2019:

Thirteen members of the Lima Group of nations said they will not recognize Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro as the legitimate leader of his nation when he takes office on Thursday for a new six-year term, threatening to ratchet up sanctions and international pressure.

Foreign ministers from the Lima Group said they will not recognize the presidency of Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro when he begins a new six-year term on Jan. 10. Missing from Friday’s group statement was Mexico, a founding member of the bloc of 14 nations.

In a statement issued Friday in Peru, the foreign ministers of the bloc said that Venezuela’s snap presidential elections on May 20, which led to Maduro’s disputed victory, did not “provide the guarantees or meet the international standards necessary for a free, just and transparent process.”

The group also said it would bar Venezuelan officials from traveling to their nations and might impose financial sanctions — including barring those officials from using the local banking system.

The Lima Group said Maduro should hand over the reins of government to the opposition-controlled National Assembly, the only branch of government it recognizes as legitimate.

Maduro, who came to power in 2013 after the death of his mentor Hugo Chávez, is unlikely to be moved by the new round of condemnation. He often accuses Washington and its allies in the region — particularly Colombia — of trying to topple his “socialist revolution” and waging an “economic war” against the once wealthy but now struggling nation. In recent years, more than 3 million people have fled Venezuela due to hunger, violence and political turmoil.

The countries that signed Friday’s statement are: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and St. Lucia.

No one is more current or has a more cogent assessment of Venezuela that Senator Marco Rubio. The Heritage Foundation hosted the Senator for his view, facts and summary of events in Venezuela.

Arrests Made of Chinese Birthing Hotels in California

Posted on February 1, 2019February 1, 2019 by Denise Simon

By the way, it is not just the Chinese in California, we also have a scandal of the same description in Miami of pregnant Russian women giving birth for US citizenship in Miami.

Any response from Senator Harris or Feinstein? How about Pelosi? Any? Nah….

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Feds Raid California 'Maternity Hotels' for Birth Tourists ...

Primer:

An Irvine-based immigration attorney has been sentenced to 21 months in federal prison for obstructing justice in relation to a scheme in which he agreed to help a Chinese national flee from the United States after the woman had been designated as a “material witness” in a criminal investigation into “birthing houses” operating in Southern California.

Ken Zhiyi Liang, 39, of Irvine, was sentenced Monday afternoon by U.S. District Judge Andrew J. Guildford. Liang was found guilty in September of conspiring to obstruct justice, obstructing justice, and tampering with a witness, who is referred to in court papers as “D.L.”

Liang “was caught on hours of video and audio recordings selling and marketing his abilities to D.L. to help smuggle her out of the United States in violation of court orders, in exchange for a $6,000 fee to himself and a $1,500 to $3,000 fee for three co-conspirators who would assist him,” prosecutors wrote in a sentencing brief filed with the court.

SANTA ANA, Calif. – Following the arrests this morning of three defendants who allegedly operated “birth tourism” outfits that catered to Chinese clients, federal authorities today unsealed indictments that charge a total of 19 people linked to three schemes that operated across Southern California and charged clients tens of thousands of dollars to help them give birth in the United States.

The indictments charge operators and clients of three “maternity house” or “birthing house” schemes that were dismantled in March 2015 when federal agents executed 35 search warrants, which resulted from international undercover operations.

The 17 cases unsealed today contain the first-ever federal criminal charges brought against operators and customers of birth tourism businesses. The birth tourism operations not only committed widespread immigration fraud and engaged in international money laundering, they also defrauded property owners when leasing the apartments and houses used in their birth tourism schemes, according to the indictments.

These cases were investigated by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Los Angeles. Substantial assistance was provided by IRS Criminal Investigation, as well as the Irvine Police Department and the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department.

The indictments describe birth tourism schemes in which foreign nationals, mostly from China, applied for visitor visas to come to the United States and lied about the length of their trips, where they would stay, and the purposes of their trips – which were to come to the U.S. for three months to give birth so their children would receive U.S. birthright citizenship.

“America’s way of life is not for sale,” said Joseph Macias, Special Agent in Charge of HSI Los Angeles. “HSI will aggressively target those who would make a mockery of our laws and our values to benefit and enrich themselves. No one needs to be reminded about the national security and public safety implications of visa fraud and the crimes associated with it. Anyone who would exploit our nation’s generosity and our legal immigration system should be on notice – they may end up being the ones to pay a very steep price.”

According to the indictments that charge the operators of the schemes, they coached their Chinese customers how to pass the U.S. Consulate interview in China by falsely stating that they were going to stay in the U.S. for only two weeks. Their clients were also coached to trick U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at ports of entry by wearing loose clothing that would conceal their pregnancies. The indictments also allege that the customers were directed to fly to Hawaii from China – instead of directly to Los Angeles – because it was easier to get by CBP in Hawaii. The indictments allege that many of the Chinese birth tourism customers failed to pay all of the medical costs associated with their hospital births, and the debts were referred to collection.

“These cases allege a wide array of criminal schemes that sought to defeat our immigration laws – laws that welcome foreign visitors so long as they are truthful about their intentions when entering the country,” said Nick Hanna, U.S. Attorney for the Central District California. “Statements by the operators of these birthing houses show contempt for the United States, while they were luring clients with the power and prestige of U.S. citizenship for their children. Some of the wealthy clients of these businesses also showed blatant contempt for the U.S. by ignoring court orders directing them to stay in the country to assist with the investigation and by skipping out on their unpaid hospital bills.”

Three indictments returned Wednesday by a federal grand jury charge the operators of large birth tourism operations based in Orange, Los Angeles and San Bernardino counties. Pursuant to this week’s indictments, federal authorities this morning arrested three defendants: Dongyuan Li (李冬媛), 41, of Irvine; Michael Wei Yueh Liu (刘维岳), 53, of Rancho Cucamonga; and Jing Dong (董晶), 42, of Fontana. All three are charged with conspiracy to commit immigration fraud, international money laundering and identity theft. Liu is also charged with filing three false tax returns.

According to the indictments charging the operators, all three businesses touted the benefits of giving birth in the U.S., rather than in China, with claims of the U.S. having “the most attractive nationality”; “better air” and less pollution; “priority for jobs in U.S. government”; superior educational resources, including “free education from junior high school to public high school”; a more stable political situation; and the potential to “receive your senior supplement benefits when you are living overseas.”

The indictment naming Li alleges that she operated an Orange County-based business named You Win USA that advertised its “100-person team” in China and the U.S. had served more than 500 Chinese birth tourism customers. Li allegedly used 20 apartments in Irvine, charged each customer $40,000 to $80,000, and received $3 million in international wire transfers from China in just two years. The indictment details communications in which Li referred to U.S. immigration authorities as “the foreigners” and also discussed whether to refund a down payment because, once the customer found out “the baby is a girl, her husband arranged abortion for her.”

“Receiving a tourist visa from the United States Government is a privilege, not a right,” stated IRS Criminal Investigation Acting Special Agent in Charge Bryant Jackson. “The indictments announced today confirm IRS Criminal Investigation’s commitment to following the money – from China to the United States – to help identify the promoters of this alleged illegal international birth tourism scheme. Using cash, fabricated financial documents, and nominee names for the transfer of money from China to the U.S., the promoters attempted to further their lucrative birth tourism enterprise.”

(The investigation into Li’s operation led to another investigation, which resulted in criminal charges against the 20th person to be charged in this matter. Attorney Ken Zhuyin Liang was sentenced to 21 months in federal prison for helping material witnesses flee to China in violation of court orders.)

Another indictment filed this week charges Wen Rui Deng (邓文瑞), 65, a former Irvine resident who is believed to now be in China, with operating Star Baby Care, a Los Angeles County-based operation that is believed to have been the largest birth tourism scheme in the U.S. On its websites, Star Baby Care boasted that it was founded in 1999 as the “number one designated maternity service to the pregnant mother from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan,” and had “provided services to 8,000 pregnant women (4,000 from China) since we established.” The indictment alleges that Deng’s scheme used 30 apartments in Rowland Heights and 10 properties in Irvine, including some houses. Deng’s scheme served many customers alleged to be Chinese officials, including some associated with Chinese Central Television, China Telecom, Bank of China, and two local taxation bureaus.

In the third indictment filed this week, Liu and Dong are accused of operating USA Happy Baby Inc., a San Bernardino County-based company that charged “VIP” customers as much as $100,000. Using apartments in Rancho Cucamonga and Irvine, USA Happy Baby allegedly also served Chinese officials, including people associated with the Henan People’s Radio Station in Zhengzhou, the Public Security Bureau in the Beijing Municipal Government, and the Harbin Medical University in Heilongjiang Province. Liu and USA Happy Baby are also charged with filing false tax returns that failed to report more than $1.9 million received over three years. The indictment also alleges that Liu and Dong used 14 different bank accounts to receive more than $3.4 million in international wire transfers from China during 2013 and 2014 alone.

There are 16 fugitive defendants whose indictments were unsealed today include. They are:

Qiang Yan (闫强), 42, who is Dongyuan Li’s husband, was indicted in December 2018 on three counts of visa fraud for filing an application for an “O” visa premised upon being an “alien of extraordinary ability,” which falsely claimed that he had co-authored two books and attached fake copies of those books. The indictment naming his wife notes that when Yan was interviewed during a search of Li’s multi-million-dollar residence in Irvine, he told the federal agents that his birth tourism business investment was “chump change,” because he had more than $10 million in his bank accounts in China.
Xiao Yan Liu (刘小燕), 39, who was indicted in November 2018 for two counts of visa fraud and one count of lying to federal law enforcement. According to her visa application, she was the “Chief Physician” at the Henan Shangqiu Power Supply Company Staff Hospital.
Jun Xiao (肖俊), 30, and LongJing Yi (易珑静), 30, who were indicted in February 2018 on charges of conspiracy, visa fraud, obstruction of justice, and criminal contempt. According to their indictment, Xiao and Yi made false statements on their visa applications, namely that they would be staying in the United States for only 15 days. According to court documents in their case, Xiao and Yi paid only $4,600 of the $32,291 in hospital charges related to the birth of their baby. The indictments detail communications from Xiao after he had fled to China, where he continued to denigrate the Court’s Order requiring him to stay in the U.S.: “Anyway, I’m already home. U.S. can’t do anything to me.”
Dongjiang He (贺东江), 46, was indicted in February 2018 for fleeing with his wife to China, in violation of a federal court order. On his visa application, He listed his occupation as “Government” and his position as “Project Manager and Secretary General” for the China Nonferrous Metals Techno Economic Research Institute, which is located in the Haidian District in Beijing. He’s wife, Zhichan Yu (余芝婵), 40, also was indicted in February 2018 on charges of visa fraud, obstruction of justice, and contempt of court after fleeing to China in violation of a federal court order.
Jia Luo (罗佳), 30, was indicted in February 2018 for fleeing to China in violation of a federal court order. According to court documents, Luo lied on her visa application and lied to U.S. Customs officers in Hawaii when asked her if she was planning on having a baby in the United States.
Renlong Chen (陈人龙), 34, and his wife Wei Wang (王伟), 33, were indicted in February 2018 for fleeing to China, in violation of federal court orders. Chen and Wang are accused of making false statements on their visa applications by stating they would be visiting the United States for only eight days, when they actually made arrangements to stay at a maternity house in Rancho Cucamonga for three months so that Wang could give birth in the United States.
Jie He (何洁), 29, was indicted in February 2018 for fleeing to China in violation of federal court order. He allegedly made false statements on her visa application, including that she planned to stay in the United States for only 20 days, when she actually entered into a contract to pay approximately $50,000 to obtain a visa and stay in the United States for several months to give birth. According to court documents, Jie He told HSI special agents that she flew into Las Vegas, rather than Los Angeles, because the Chinese maternity operator had advised her that it was easier to enter through Las Vegas.
Eryun Zhang (张尔芸), 25; her husband, Liang Ni (倪梁), 25; and her mother, Ji Xu (徐激), 50, were indicted in February 2018 for fleeing to China in violation of federal court orders. According to court documents, Ni admitted that, during an interview conducted at the U.S. Consulate in China, he falsely stated that the purpose of their trip was for their honeymoon, rather than the true reason for Zhang to give birth in the United States.
Chao Chen (陈超), 34, a partner in the You Win USA scheme, was indicted in December 2018 with one count of contempt of court for fleeing the U.S. while he was pending sentencing. Chen previously pleaded guilty to visa fraud, marriage fraud and tax fraud.
Ji Zhu (朱洁), 31, who was indicted in March 2018 for one count of marriage fraud, for allegedly marrying a U.S. citizen to obtain U.S. citizenship, even though she really was married to Chao Chen. Zhu fled to China with Chao Chen, where they remain fugitives from justice.

An indictment contains allegations that a defendant has committed a crime. Every defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The three defendants arrested this morning are expected to be arraigned on the indictments this afternoon in U.S. District Court in Santa Ana.

HSI’s investigation into Dongyuan Li’s You Win USA scheme has resulted in seizure and/or forfeiture proceedings against three real properties with millions of dollars in equity, including her $2.1 million residence in Irvine; six vehicles, including four Mercedes Benz vehicles; more than $1 million from bank accounts; and many gold bars and coins.