Russian Hacking, We knew Because we had an Inside Operative(s)

This Executive Order is in draft form and does not include Russia, which is quite curious. The question of ‘why’ must be asked based on information noted below.

The Trump administration’s draft of the executive order on cybersecurity obtained by the Washington Post by April Glaser on Scribd

Those people involved in internet forensics and that track hackers, malicious code, malware, ransomware and intrusions are all dedicated to finding the cracks in code and even more finding the hackers while further understanding their code and patterns. I get emails about this topic every day that include a variety of global companies operating in this realm.

Back in December of 2015, ODNI James Clapper announced Russian intrusions into several American infrastructure locations. This was before the announcement of Russian intrusions into the U.S. political apparatus. In can be presumed the United States has long had the help of operatives inside adversarial countries, most of all Russia. Spies are out there and further, it is estimated there are 100,000 foreign spies inside the United States as of this moment. Heh, before Barack Obama left his presidency, he did expelled many Russians and closed two Russian compounds.

IN 2014, U.S. Cyber operations quietly penetrated Russian systems without declaring in specific language the exact operations.

In 2014, National Security Agency chief Adm. Mike Rogers told Congress that U.S. adversaries are performing electronic “reconnaissance” on a regular basis so that they can be in a position to disrupt the industrial control systems that run everything from chemical facilities to water treatment plants.

“All of that leads me to believe it is only a matter of when, not if, we are going to see something dramatic,” he said at the time.

Rogers didn’t discuss the U.S.’s own penetration of adversary networks. But the hacking undertaken by the NSA, which regularly penetrates foreign networks to gather intelligence, is very similar to the hacking needed to plant precursors for cyber weapons, said Gary Brown, a retired colonel and former legal adviser to U.S. Cyber Command, the military’s digital war fighting arm. More here.

It is unclear if we have recruited people inside Russia to work on the behalf of the United States, but clues tell us we did, with success.

In part from RFEL: At the simplest level, two FSB officers working in cyberdefense, Sergei Mikhailov and Dmitry Dokuchayev, as well as Ruslan Stoyanov, a former Interior Ministry official who works for the cyber security company Kaspersky Lab, are reportedly being charged with espionage.

According to Russian media reports, Mikhailov is suspected of alerting U.S. intelligence to the FSB’s connection to a Russian server-rental company called King Servers.

Last year, the U.S.-based cybersecurity firm ThreatConnect had identified King Servers as the nexus for hacking attacks against the United States.

If U.S. intelligence did indeed have a highly placed source like Mikhailov, it would explain why it was able to conclude with such a high degree of confidence that Russia was behind the cyberattacks during the election campaign.

The timing of the arrests and the timing of the decision by former U.S. President Barack Obama to declassify and make public parts of the U.S. intelligence report on the alleged Russian hacking also makes sense.

Mikhailov was arrested in December. And the U.S. released the intelligence report a month later, in January.

If Mikhailov was indeed a source, then Washington would have been reluctant to declassify its intelligence for fear of compromising him.

After he was arrested, this, of course, would no longer be an issue.

So far, so straightforward. Until it isn’t.

Leaks to the Russian media have also connected Mikhailov and his subordinate Dokuchayev to a hacker group known as Shaltai-Boltai, or Humpty Dumpty, which in the past has released embarrassing material about top Russian officials.

Vladimir Anikeyev, the founder of Shaltai-Boltai, has also been arrested, but is not being charged with espionage.

Moreover, Russian media reports claim that Dokuchayev is actually a former hacker known as Forb, who was serving a prison sentence for credit-card theft when he was recruited by the FSB, where he held the rank of major.

As Leonid Bershidsky notes in his column for Bloomberg, “parallel to their official duties, officers often run private security operations involving blackmail and protection. If Mikhailov ran such a business out of the FSB’s Information Security Center, he wouldn’t stand out among his colleagues.”

And it’s also not unusual for the FSB to recruit former hackers. In fact, it’s pretty much standard practice.

This is where the story diverts into the murky world of FSB officers and their civilian collaborators monetizing their positions and forming protection rackets.

“An FSB officer, recruited from the hacking community, can use his rank and position to obtain compromising material and sell it to wealthy clients. A team profiting from these opportunities can include both officers and civilians,” Bershidsky writes.

“The Russian government can hire such a team through intermediaries if it needs something sensitive done — but so can foreign intelligence services. It’s a murky world in which actors are both predator and prey. The Kremlin enjoys access to brilliant and unscrupulous people; the downside, of course, is that they may be hard to control.”

If you follow this line of logic, then it’s easy to imagine that Mikhailov and Dokuchayev inadvertently or unwittingly sold information exposing King Server’s FSB connections to a front for U.S. intelligence.

But the fact of the matter is we simply don’t know.

And if things aren’t confusing enough yet, there is also the matter of the bitter personal and clan rivalries in the shadow world of the Russian security services.

In a recent post on his blog KrebsOnSecurity, Brian Krebs, author of the book Spam Nation: The Inside Story Of Organized Cybercrime, suggested the whole affair might be traced to a personal rivalry between Mikhailov and Pavel Vrublevsky, an Internet businessman whose partner owns King Servers.

Mark Galeotti, an expert on Russia’s security services and a senior research fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Prague, notes that the FSB’s Information Security Center, which Mikhailov headed and where Dokuchayev was his subordinate, has emerged as “a pivotal agency” and “a source of power.”

And this makes it a prime arena for fierce rivalries and power plays.

“This is probably an intelligence leak that is being cleared up. But the question is: why now? And I wonder if domestic politics explains the leaking of the information now. It could be a rebuke to the FSB for having messed up,” Galeotti said on last week’s Power Vertical Podcast.

 

 

Posted in Citizens Duty, Department of Homeland Security, DOJ, DC and inside the Beltway, FBI, NSA Spying, Presidential campaign, Russia, Terror, The Denise Simon Experience, Trump Administration, Whistleblower.

Denise Simon

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