An affordable price is probably the major benefit persuading people to buy drugs at www.americanbestpills.com. The cost of medications in Canadian drugstores is considerably lower than anywhere else simply because the medications here are oriented on international customers. In many cases, you will be able to cut your costs to a great extent and probably even save up a big fortune on your prescription drugs. What's more, pharmacies of Canada offer free-of-charge shipping, which is a convenient addition to all other benefits on offer. Cheap price is especially appealing to those users who are tight on a budget
Service Quality and Reputation Although some believe that buying online is buying a pig in the poke, it is not. Canadian online pharmacies are excellent sources of information and are open for discussions. There one can read tons of users' feedback, where they share their experience of using a particular pharmacy, say what they like or do not like about the drugs and/or service. Reputable online pharmacy canadianrxon.com take this feedback into consideration and rely on it as a kind of expert advice, which helps them constantly improve they service and ensure that their clients buy safe and effective drugs. Last, but not least is their striving to attract professional doctors. As a result, users can directly contact a qualified doctor and ask whatever questions they have about a particular drug. Most likely, a doctor will ask several questions about the condition, for which the drug is going to be used. Based on this information, he or she will advise to use or not to use this medication.

U.S. to Base Rockets/Satellite Launches in Brazil

A few months ago, Vice President Pence traveled to Latin America with a specific visit to Brazil to discuss the location of a U.S. military base in Brazil. President Bolsonaro has waffled somewhat on this possibility, however, it is advancing. The mission for both the United States and Brazil is to counter China and Russia’s military influence in Latin America. Truth be told, the Brazilian military high command is against this ambition unless Russia displays further aggression….

(ummm, they have)

Anyway….under the guise of a space program, the U.S. and Brazil have finalized the agreement for a U.S. space technology/military program in Alcantara, Brazil.

Located out of the Forca Aerea Brasileira, the Brazilian Air Force base in Alcantra Launch Center, Equatorial launches are beneficial so close to the equator due to the speed of the earth’s rotation, saving at least 30% on fuel.

Scott Pace, executive director of the US National Space Council, said on 18 March at a Computing Technology Industry Association (CompTIA) industry group event that the TSA could be signed later that day. The remaining hurdle is approval by Brazil’s congress, David Logsdon, head of CompTIA’s Space Enterprise Council, told Jane’s after the event. Coincidently, Brazil President Jair Bolsonaro is in Washington to meet with US President Donald Trump.

A TSA prevents unauthorised access to and transfer of protected technologies. US companies are interested in flying out of ALC due to its location for equatorial launches. Equatorial launches are advantageous as the Earth spins the fastest at the equator, giving launches an extra boost to reach orbit.

However, ALC’s remote location poses a challenge. Flying out of ALC would require US companies to first fly into Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo before connecting to a flight to ALC, adding an extra day of travel. An industry source told Jane’s that it is still challenging for US companies to close their business case with flying out of ALC due to the distance between the two countries, corruption, Bolsonaro’s mercurial personality, and the tendency of Brazilians to run hot-and-cold when dealing with the US.

However, the source said if a company can work out the logistics and partner with an honest local broker, the 30% efficiency savings for launching that close to the equator can be a major incentive.

Brazil can currently launch small rockets for this same base for what is known as microsatellites. Brazil is investing with partners an estimated $300 billion for the joint or multi-lateral launch business. When General Mattis was still the Secretary of Defense, he signed a Space Situational Awareness agreement during his own visit to Brazil. This is an effort to do real-time tracking of other rogue satellites, data of objects in space and debris.

Not to be overlooked, both Boeing and Lockheed Martin went to the Alcantara Space Center last December along with Vector Launch, Inc. to determine costs of payloads. Brazil appears to have a new corporation called Alada and yet another named Embraer SA to advance the aerospace programs along with seeking investors.

 

 

Marines Prepare for Exercise Pacific Blitz

The Marine Corps’ top general on the west coast is readying his Marines for the next big war against a near peer competitor, and one of his main concerns is figuring out how to alter the mindset of troops that have been fighting insurgencies since 9/11.

“If anything my problem is getting people out of the mindset of [counterterrorism] and making sure they’re thinking about near peer adversaries in their training programs,” Lt. Gen. Joseph Osterman, commanding general of I Marine Expeditionary Force at Camp Pendleton, California, told Task & Purpose in an interview on Friday.

Exercise Pacific Blitz is one program in particular that is currently doing just that, involving thousands of Marines, sailors, and coast guardsmen training in and around southern California.

The joint exercise not only brings together a large number of personnel but various assets as well, including Navy ships and landing craft, CH-53 helicopters, V-22 Ospreys, F-35s, and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), a ground-based artillery system the Marines have previously test-fired from amphibious transport ships.

Marine Corps vehicle radio convoy Pendleton
US Marine Corps Sgt. Demarcus Tunstall, a motor transport operator assigned to I Marine Expeditionary Force Support Battalion, during convoy training at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, January 16, 2019.
US Marine Corps/Lance Cpl. Brendan Mullin

The bigger picture goal: Getting a large force like the 50,000-strong I MEF from sea to shore in a contested environment, described by the general in a press release as leveraging “a Marine land component as part of our larger goal of sea control.”

Osterman even said personnel were being put ashore at nearby San Clemente Island to build aircraft runways — seemingly a throwback to the Marine Corps’ island-hopping campaigns of World War II.

“It’s not part of the exercise necessarily but that’s kind of one of the things we’d have to do on these remote islands is build runways. So it’s somewhat tangentially aligned,” Osterman said. “We’re doing connector capability between islands.”

In February, Marine Commandant Gen. Robert Neller told Task & Purpose the Corps had begun to move its training to a more traditional fight instead of what grunts would face against unsophisticated enemies in the Middle East, most notably in using more advanced enemies in force-on-force training against Marines going through pre-deployment training at 29 Palms, California.

“They had aircraft. They were able to jam [communications]. We had aircraft. And we fought force on force,” Neller said on the sidelines of the 2019 West Conference in San Diego. “Marine infantry now, they’ve gotta look up” since enemies in Syria and Iraq have increasingly used unmanned aerial vehicles, and near peers will have assets such as attack helicopters and artillery.

Marine Corps construction Pendleton
A Marine from Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 303 during a bridge reconstruction project at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, March 7, 2019.
US Navy/Mass Comm. Specialist 1st Class Aaron Bewkes

As Osterman explained, Marine grunts now need to be learn to counter enemy drones, prepare for their GPS or communications to be jammed, and understand that enemy artillery, aircraft, or reconnaissance capabilities will be much more advanced if they’re up against an adversary like China or Russia.

“We haven’t had to worry about that for two decades,” Osterman said. “The Taliban doesn’t have any satellites up there.”

Some of Osterman’s Marines have already had a taste of that in Syria, where state and non-state actors have employed high-end anti-aircraft systems, GPS jamming technology, or hacking, for example.

“The Special Purpose [Marine Air Ground Task Force] we send to Central Command is engaged in all of that. High end, you know, kinetics in Syria, all the way down through advising the Iraqi forces. It’s one where we’ve gotta do it all, frankly.”

“Instead of having a forward operating base out there that they’re living out of and doing operations they’ve actually got to constantly be moving because if they sit too long the enemy artillery is going to take them out,” Osterman said of tactics Marines are beginning to think about. “So that gets them almost a little bit, back to [their] roots.”

Read the original article on Task & Purpose.

Action Plan for NoKo’s Nuclear Program Same as 1991/2

So, in Hanoi, Vietnam, President Trump is meeting for two days with Kim Jung Un.

Il prossimo meeting tra Kim Jong-Un e Donald J. Trump ...

The White House said Trump would meet Kim at Hanoi’s French-colonial-era Metropole Hotel at 6:30 p.m. (1130 GMT) and have a 20-minute one-on-one conversation before a dinner scheduled to last just over an hour and a half.

Meanwhile, the democrats are telegraphing that Trump is going to give up too much in order to get a deal with North Korea. How do they know? Further, the mainstream media is also broadcasting that Trump will not get anything accomplished during this second summit. Which is it exactly?

Well, it is worth looking at archived documents going back to at least 1991-1992. Remember the U.S. had a different president and military leaders, while North Korea did not have lil Kim. The issue with North Korea and the nuclear program goes back at least 25-30 years. At least under the Trump administration, there are direct talks, summits that did not happen with the top leaders of the two countries…..has the mainstream media explained any of this or for context, the previous action plans and why?

So….skim through documents 6 and 7.

 Document 06

1991-12-13
Source: Freedom of Information Act release
This briefing book provides an invaluable and detailed look at how the Bush I administration deliberated over the critical next steps in confronting the North Korea nuclear program, as well as concerns held by the Pentagon about the approach recommended by the State Department. This briefing book was prepared for a NSC/Deputies’ Committee meeting to be held on December 17. The Deputies’ Committee was composed of high-ranking representatives below the Cabinet level from the State Department, the Secretary of Defense and JCS, the CIA and ACDA, as well as other agencies as required, and met to discuss policy issues that cut across the agencies’ briefs. The level of detail found in this briefing book regarding the various negotiating goals and approaches defies easy summarization, and the materials should be read closely to capture all the nuances and factors entering into the U.S. diplomatic efforts aimed at halting Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The contents of the briefing book, with comments on significant points, include: (page numbers refer to the PDF copy):

A) Cover memo, table of contents and agenda (pages 1-3)

B) Meeting objectives memorandum (page 4)

The purpose of the meeting was to consider a “gameplan” to bring North Korea’s nuclear weapons program under control. Specific steps to be considered included preliminary contact with North Korea at the deputy assistant secretary level. This would be accompanied by an approach by Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy in Beijing to invite North Korea to send a high-level official to meet with a U.S. counterpart in New York before President Bush visited Seoul in early January. Also under consideration were talking points for these meetings and demarches to countries with relations or potential influence in Pyongyang informing them of the U.S. concerns about the DPRK nuclear program.

C) Memorandum for ASD/ISA James R. Lilley, Subject DC Meeting on North Korea Nuclear Program, ca. December 12, 1991 (pages 5-6)

This memorandum summarizes the key points in the gameplan and lays out the Pentagon’s concerns that the talking points are too “forward-leaning” with respect to offering the prospect of normalized relations with North Korea at this early point in the process. The Pentagon was already concerned that South Korea had rushed ahead in talks with North Korea about a non-aggression agreement while putting the nuclear issue off to the side. ACDA Director Ronald Lehman in his recent visit to Seoul (see 5 and 6 below) had sought to bolster South Korea’s determination to press Pyongyang on this issue by agreeing to the idea of a North-South inspection regime. The Pentagon agreed with the key point of the gameplan, which was a high-level meeting to make sure Kim Il Sung knew directly about U.S. concerns regarding North Korea’s nuclear program and that, for real progress, signing the IAEA safeguards agreement was not sufficient but the DPRK should reciprocate Roh Tae Woo’s November 8 non-nuclear declaration foreswearing the development, including reprocessing and enrichment, of nuclear weapons. But the Pentagon strongly held that the U.S. side should not offer too much by way of a possible normalization of relations in these early contacts. In its view, the mere fact that these two meetings might take place were carrot enough, and the U.S. should make any second meeting conditional on North Korea signing and implementing safeguards, and agreeing to a reciprocal non-nuclear policy with Seoul and to at least trial inspections.

This memorandum has the following attachments:

1) Suggested Talking Points for Mr. Lilley (page 7) – This paper summarizes the main points Lilley should make in the Deputies’ Committee meeting to drive home the Pentagon’s concerns: keep the pressure on South Korea to push North Korea on the nuclear issue in its bilateral talks and to avoid prematurely raising the prospect of normalized relations in the initial meetings with North Korea, which should focus on making clear the U.S. concerns and benchmarks for progress on the nuclear issue.

2) Strategy for Dealing with North Korean Nuclear Issue (Gameplan paper) (pages 8-15) – This is the State Department paper laying out the diplomatic, political, and economic steps the U.S. should adopt as it works to resolve the North Korea nuclear problem, along with a timeline. The basic components of the plan were: continued international efforts to press North Korea; ensuring that Seoul press Pyongyang at the North-South talks on the nuclear issue; and clearly stating the U.S. position on a peninsula-wide ban on reprocessing and enrichment, both to the world and especially to the DPRK in proposed initial and follow-up, high-level meetings. While there were current signs of movement and success in building international pressures on the DPRK, the paper also sounded a number of warnings, noting that “there is a well-established history of Pyongyang raising expectations . . . only to back off at the last minute with additional demands,”

The paper acknowledges that the odds may be against the U.S. in pursuing the gameplan. It was entirely possible that North Korea had no intention of changing course, and would aim to “delay, diffuse international pressure, and use any opportunity to seem forthcoming, without making meaningful concessions.” Adding to the uncertainties were the gaps in intelligence regarding North Korea’s processing of nuclear material at Yongbyon. There were also signs that North Korea might try to move and hide its processing facilities before agreeing to inspections. The proposed plan for the next few months was to combine increased international pressure with concrete incentives for North Korea to take the steps needed to rein in its nuclear program. The international campaign would be waged on a number of fronts, including with Japan, China, Russia, the IAEA, and the UN. The latter posed particular issues, such as possibly inviting “invidious comparisons” to other unsafeguarded nuclear programs, such as Israel’s. China also posed its own set of possibilities and concerns. The U.S. hoped Beijing would provide more reliable information about the North Korean nuclear program as well as exert its influence. But the U.S. could not be “absolutely certain of PRC motives … and it is unlikely they would be prepared to take any measures they perceived as putting the survival of the Pyonguang regime in question.”

These efforts needed to be coordinated with two other key arenas of discussion: the North-South dialogue and bilateral U.S.-DPRK contacts. The North-South channel was crucial to solution of the nuclear issue and other Korean problems. A meeting to discuss a ROK/DPRK non-nuclear agreement that incorporated a ban on reprocessing and enrichment as well as a bilateral inspection regime was planned for December 20. In support of this initiative, Secretary of Defense Cheney had told Seoul that the U.S. could consider inspections of U.S. bases in South Korea under the right circumstances; i.e., inspections must be reciprocal, simultaneous and involve both civil and military facilities, and should come after the public commitment from both Koreas to a non-nuclear policy. ACDA Director Lehman had elaborated on this position during his visit to Seoul. The North/South talks also carried the risk that South Korea might not be willing to pay the political price of taking tougher steps towards North Korea if needed.

The bilateral U.S.-DPRK dialogue raised the points at issue in the NSC/Deputies’ Committee meeting regarding what should be said at these sessions. They would provide a venue for sending a critical message to the top North Korean leadership: should the U.S., at any point, “learn the DPRK is developing nuclear weapons or producing weapons-usable nuclear material, we would be unable to proceed further in the direction of dialogue and normalization.” This stick would be paired with the carrot of a possible easing of tensions and moves towards normalization of relations in a step-by-step fashion as North Korea met specific benchmarks in bringing its nuclear program under international safeguards and inspections. Another potential stick was explicitly taken off the table, however: Cheney had told South Korean and Japanese leaders that the U.S. should not consider “military measures” as such discussion could jeopardize the current diplomatic strategy.

3) State Department Talking Points – Preliminary Contact with DPRK (pages 16-17) – This and the following document provide talking points that address U.S. concerns about the North Korean nuclear program and the necessary steps to address them, as discussed in the document above. Notable are the marginal notes, assumed to be by a Pentagon official, that would underscore the need to discuss the nuclear issue, and that called for deleting the talking point about possible normalization of relations between the U.S. and North Korea.

4) State Department Talking Points for High-Level Meeting (pages 18-23) – Again, these talking points elaborate on the U.S. concerns and position regarding North Korea’s nuclear program, to be presented at a high-level gathering following the initial meeting. The points are familiar, taken from the gameplan document; of particular interest are the Pentagon marginal notes. The Pentagon remained focused on making it clear to North Korea that its nuclear program was unacceptable and on laying out the steps North Korea must take to bring this program under international review and inspection.

5) Memorandum, Col. Eden Y. Woon (OSD/ISA) for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Subject: ACDEA Director Lehman Visit to Korea on Nuclear Issue, ca. December 30, 1991 (pages 24-26) – This memorandum reports on the interagency team that ACDA Director Lehman took to Seoul on December 6-9. The team consisted of representatives from ACDA, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs, and the office of the Secretary of Defense. After stressing to the South Koreans that the North Korea nuclear issue should be “front and center” in the upcoming North/South ministerial meetings, the U.S. delegation then focused on revising serious problems with a draft joint declaration Seoul planned to propose to Pyongyang at these meetings. Key among these concerns was keeping North Korea’s international obligation regarding IAEA safeguards separate from bilateral nuclear agreements; insuring that a North/South inspection regime included both military and civilian sites, as IAEA inspections alone might not be able to detect a covert weapons program at Yongbyon and other suspected sites; and avoiding any statement that the purpose of a bilateral inspection regime was “to check on the presence of nuclear weapons.” The U.S. feared this would come too close to sounding like checking for U.S. weapons, whereas the purpose of the inspections should be to verify both Koreas are abiding by any joint nuclear declaration.

The U.S. team had to counter serious South Korean resistance to making changes to address these concerns, fearing it would make the joint declaration too tough for North Korea to accept. More worrisome for Seoul was that it would be hard to pressure North Korea on inspecting reprocessing facilities since reprocessing was legal. Fighting back against what the Americans saw as a reversion to old thinking, which the U.S. thought had disappeared with Roh’s November 8 announcement of non-nuclear principles, the U.S. delegation spent the better part of the meeting explaining the inadequacies of IAEA inspections alone, the need to press North Korea to stop reprocessing and the requirement for persuading North Korea to reciprocate Roh Tae Woo’s powerful non-nuclear policy.

In the end, the U.S. delegation persuaded the South Koreans to make the necessary changes in the draft joint declaration. Looking ahead, it was clear Washington needed to do more to reassure South Korea that international pressure on North Korea would not ease once the DPRK signed the IAEA safeguards agreement. To this end, the U.S. would have to send out a “core demarche” cable to its friends and allies stating the American goal of persuading North Korea to reciprocate Roh’s non-nuclear policy and stop reprocessing, and declaring its position that merely signing the IAEA safeguards agreement was insufficient to address international concerns. Sending this cable would also serve to shield the United States from criticism that it was “moving the goalposts” in its demands on North Korea. And again, Washington needed to engage with China, possibly through high-level talks in the near future, to secure its role in putting pressure on North Korea, a role that would increase if the issue had to move to the U.N. Finally, the U.S. and South Korea needed to make a decision on whether to hold the 1992 Team Spirit joint military exercises, a matter on which South Korean views were divided.

6) Cable, Amembassy Seoul 13075 to SecState, Subject: Lehman Visit:

ROKG Proposal for a N/S Non-Nuclear Joint Declaration, December 9, 1991 (pages 27-30) – This cable summarizes the results of the U.S.-ROK meeting on nuclear issues that is the focus of the preceding memorandum. As noted above, these issues were distinguishing between IAEA inspections and any bilateral North/South inspection agreement, the need to include civil sites in any bilateral agreement, the U.S. opposition to having the stated purpose of bilateral inspections include checking for the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons, as well as the need to include trial inspections as a goal of the North/ South talks. The South Koreans accepted the U.S. changes, which would be incorporated into the draft Seoul would present to the DPRK at the ministerial discussions beginning on December 10. The cable reiterates the South Korean agreement that the nuclear issue should be “front and center” at these talks and that the draft joint declaration will be used to “attack” North Korea’s position on nuclear weapons. The South Koreans expected this strategy to lead to a “major confrontation” on the nuclear issue, with Seoul determined to come out of the fight this round as “top dog.” The rest of the cable gives the text of the revised draft joint declaration.

7) Cable, Amembassy Seoul 13322 to SecState, Subject: Prime Ministers Sign Joint Agreement on Reconciliation and Nonaggression: “The Most Comprehensive North-South Document Since the Division of the Peninsula, December 13, 1991 (pages 31-33) – This cable reports that on December 13, North and South Korea’s prime ministers signed the “Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Cooperation and Exchanges,” and provides details on a briefing that Assistant Foreign Minister Lee See Young gave the diplomatic corps on the agreement and the negotiations leading to it. Lee said that Seoul had put strong emphasis on the nuclear issue throughout the negotiations, pressing the DPRK to accept nuclear inspections and halt nuclear weapons development, and calling for agreement to end all reprocessing and enrichment to insure nuclear weapons would not be produced on the peninsula. South Korea had also pushed for North Korea to accept that trial inspections of military and civilian facilities, one of the confidence-building measures, be carried out within the month. Regarding the ROK draft declaration on a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, North Korea had initially responded by repeating its call for a nuclear-free zone, but Seoul had pushed to have further talks on a joint nuclear declaration work from the South Korean draft. Lee also noted the “unexpectedly flexible” North Korean stance at the talks, but felt that Pyongyang may need more concrete proof of progress in the North/South dialogue as a step towards improving its international standing and ending its political and economic isolation. For its part, Seoul held that further moves towards normalizing relations with North Korea should wait to ensure the DPRK followed through on implementing the agreement and its continued stand on the nuclear issue. Summing up, Lee asserted that the joint agreement was the most comprehensive North-South document since the division of the peninsula,” which could bring about “a major change in North-South relations.”

 

Document 07
1992-03-12
Source: Freedom of Information Act release
“Our basic policy remains that nuclear weapons in North Korean hands are intolerable.” The state of play in avoiding this outcome is the focus of this memorandum, prepared for a meeting of the North Korea Deputies’ Committee. It was a “testing period” for the DPRK, in which the U.S. and its allies waited for Pyongyang to carry out its promise to ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement reached in January, having already failed to meet a commitment to do this in February. While there were promising signs that North Korea might still ratify the IAEA agreement in April, and talks were underway to establish a Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) to monitor the North-South non-nuclear agreement, the North’s intentions remained unclear. There were signs of an internal debate possibly slowing decisions, as the DPRK might see some political advantage in delay, or it might be playing for time so that it could “destroy, dismantle, or convert sensitive facilities,” even to hide its nuclear weapons program or produce and then hide “significant amounts of plutonium before allowing inspections. Or perhaps it might plan not to accept meaningful inspections at all.

South Korea and Japan agreed with the U.S. that improved political relations with North Korea were off the table until the nuclear issue was resolved. Seoul had made progress on this issue a prerequisite for movement in other North-South talks, going so far as to postpone a summit meeting and would likely postpone the next round of prime ministerial talks in May absent real progress. Even if the DPRK did ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement and negotiated a bilateral inspection regime, the next test would be the completeness of North Korea’s declarations to the IAEA. A further complicating factor was the willingness of some countries, especially China and Russia, to give the DPRK the benefit of the doubt for “plausible delay.” Absent undeniable proof that the DPRK did not intend to carry out its promises, it would be difficult to mobilize international pressure in the near term. A “worst case” scenario in which North Korea delayed action on its IAEA commitments until October was attached to the memorandum.

For the moment, the U.S. had to walk a fine line between accepting that North Korea would meet its obligations and maintaining international concern, while at the same time laying the basis for action that could enable it to narrow North Korea’s freedom of action and tighten international pressure. The key challenge was “to minimize DPRK “wiggle room,” by building international support for a reasonable deadline for initial IAEA inspections at all the DPRK’s nuclear facilities, which would in turn lay the basis for international action if it became necessary to coerce Pyongyang. A best case scenario (also attached) would find the DPRK submitting its nuclear inventory in late May, laying the basis for initial inspections in early June. Future U,S. diplomacy needed to focus on bolstering support for the best-case scenario, while not giving North Korea grounds to charge the U.S. was “pressuring” it. A critical target of this diplomacy would be China, which had the most influence with North Korea. Washington was to stress with Beijing that the U.S. timetable was “critical” and urge the Chinese to “make it happen,” emphasizing China’s national interest and the U.S. determination to pursue tough international steps, which Beijing should support, if Pyongyang “fails to perform.” Other venues at which the U.S. should press its case were the IAEA, the UN and in U.S.-DPRK counselors talks in Beijing. Should coercive steps be needed, these could be pursued through economic sanctions under the UN aegis, in concert with like-minded nations, or unilaterally if need be.

The Creation of a Failed Venezuela due to Maduro

Last year, Lancet Infectious Diseases Journal published a major warning about malaria in Venezuela. In spite of 3 million people fleeing their home country since 2014, the economic condition in Venezuela continues in a financial tail-spin. Treatment of malaria, measles and diphtheria as well as dengue and Zika are just not being treated. Further, the infant mortality rate is skyrocketing. The most recent population with malaria is estimated to be 411, 586.

Maduro has called on Russia, Cuba and Bolivia to help with military action, police action and even his personal security. Cuba denies there are forces in Venezuela. Hold on Cuba….

Informal information published by Foresightcuba, which is dedicated to presenting statistics about the island, counts Cuba’s military presence in Venezuela as follows: 4,500 Cuban infantrymen organized in 8 battalions of 500 troops, plus a battalion stationed in Fuerte Tiuna; 2 Brigade Generals (Herminio Hernández Rodríguez and Alejandro Ronda Marrero, one stationed in Fuerte Tiuna, another in Barquisimeto); 4 colonels (Rodrigo Hernández Maite, Rufino Zabaleta Corvino, Jaime Freitas Sambrano, and Simon Guillermo Senior); 8 lieutenant colonels; 6 frigate captains, and 25 junior officers.

This information details who they are with name and surname, their functions, where they are based, the weapons they use, and notes that they wear Venezuelan military insignia.

A long-standing situation

According to an article published in February 2010 by journalist Leandro Dario, international assistant editor of the newspaper Dario Perfi, by that time the then president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, had incorporated the Cuban military into the Armed Forces of the country with the aim of inserting the high command of Cuba into Venezuelan military forces, to ensure their control in the barracks and project socialism. More here.

This certainly now speaks to the humanitarian aid several countries are working to get to the desperate Venezuelan people that Maduro has cut off completely. Just two days ago:

Grave situation developing right now inside of #Colombia. @freddysuperlano a member of the National Assembly of #Venezuela was poisoned this morning at breakfast inside of Colombia & is in serious condition at the hospital. His assistant Carlos Salinas has died from poisoning.

Enter Senator Marco Rubio, he has been right on top of the conditions for many months sounding all the alarms as VP Mike Pence is presently in Columbia meeting with the interim Venezuelan President Guido and The Lima Group.

There are 5 naturalized American citizens still being jailed in Venezuela. And China deployed a tech envoy to Caracas to in many cases terminate the internet and other telecom services.

Meanwhile, here is more.

In part:

Due to Russia’s support for President Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian civil war, the Kremlin has been given significant more control over Syria’s oil and gas industry. In 2017, Syria signed a deal giving Russia sole rights to its oil and gas production. In return for saving desperate regimes, Russia has gained significant control over global resource markets on top of its own large reserves.

But Assad has also given Russia a permanent air base and an expansion of Russian naval facilities in the country. The Kremlin is banking on mirroring such agreements in Venezuela. Joint Russian-Venezuelan naval exercises were held in 2008, while two nuclear-capable bombers flew to Venezuela’s La Orchila island in December 2018.

A instalação de uma base de bombardeiros russos na ...

Though Venezuelan law prohibits permanent foreign military bases, Russia and Venezuela announced the creation of a ‘temporary’ long-term Russian airbase on La Orchila soon after the flight demonstration. Together with Venezuela’s Russian weapons imports, the two militaries will find it easier to coordinate Russian power projection in the Caribbean.

Expanding a military presence in Venezuela will bring up uncomfortable memories from the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 2017, Igor Sechin held talks with Cuban President Raul Castro and agreed to expand oil and gas ties. The potential for a Russian base in Venezuela came after steady integration through natural resource industries, a formula that Cuba appears intent on replicating.

Stakes have risen in Venezuela since Russia allegedly sent hundreds of personnel from its most notorious private military company, Wagner, in January. Deploying Wagner will allow Russia to mask its presence in Venezuela, similar to recent conflicts.

Many of Wagner’s personnel are ex-Russian soldiers. They have worked with rebel elements in Ukraine and been granted partial control of re-captured oil and gas fields in Syria. Wagner has also been deployed across Africa to safeguard regimes under scrutiny from the West and international institutions, as well as protect their lucrative mining operations.

Wagner represents a privatization of security backed by the power of the Russian military. Rosneft and Gazprom, Russia’s other resource crown jewels, operate their own security forces, and together could be the force that takes over from the Russian military in Syria and potentially in Venezuela.

Russia’s ability to safeguard desperate regimes has made other ‘rogue states’ increasingly look to Russia as a guarantor of their security. Keeping Maduro in power represents part of a wider policy of assisting other states hostile to wider US foreign policy.

The Kremlin often offers diplomatic support to North Korea and relieved most of its debt obligations to Russia in 2014. In the years that followed, Korean rocket tests increased dramatically, drawing the attention of the U.S. More recently, not only has Russia aided the Syrian government in the civil war, it has done so in tandem with Iranian forces after decades of Iranian military isolation.

Backed by the U.S., Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Gaido declared himself acting president on January 23, ushering in the latest escalation of Venezuela’s political crisis. He was soon recognized as interim president by the U.S., Canada, the EU, and most Latin American countries. China, Russia, Turkey, Iran and others continue to recognize Maduro, who still has the broad support of the Venezuelan military.

The U.S. has imposed sanctions on Maduro and individuals associated with him, as well as PVSDA, which is now stacked with Maduro allies. But the ability of Maduro and the Venezuelan economy to withstand the pressure suggests that, though the sanctions may damage his administration, they may not be enough to force him out.

Chavez fought to gain control over Venezuela’s oil supply and push out the U.S. and the West, only to have Maduro establish a new reliance on Russia. With the Kremlin’s help, his administration may survive, in return for Russian control over Venezuela’s oil industry and the establishment of a military footprint in the United States’ backyard. For the full summary, go here.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Prostitution in Florida, Robert Kraft?

Well last month, Robert Kraft, the owner of the New England Patriots apparently had a good time at the Orchids of Asia Spa….Kraft is one of 25 people charged. Several spas were part of a raid in the West Palm Beach area as part of a crack down on human trafficking and prostitution.

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Kraft, a widow, age 77 has been charged with two counts of soliciting prostitution per Jupiter police chief, Daniel Kerr. Evidence was gathered by body cam video and surveillance over the last several months. The average cost for services at the Orchids of Asia Day Spa is $60-$80. Multiple law enforcement agencies were involved in the sting operations including Homeland Security, the IRS, Jupiter PD and the Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office. The sting operation lasted an estimated 8 months and up to 100 men have been identified.

Kraft is worth an estimated $6 billion, so visiting a spa at a bargain day rate…well you be the judge.

Meanwhile, remember Jeffrey Epstein? You know, Bill Clinton’s ol’ buddy and sin island?

Federal prosecutors, including U.S. Labor Secretary Alexander Acosta, broke federal law when signing a plea deal agreement with Jeffrey Epstein, a judge ruled Thursday.

Epstein, a former hedge fund manager, helped to operate an international sex ring in which he recruited underage girls in Florida and from overseas. He was convicted of soliciting an underage girl for prostitution and served only about a year in an arrangement of jail time and work release that began in 2008.

Acosta, the federal prosecutor overseeing the case at the time, met privately with Epstein’s attorney in 2007 to cut the lenient deal, and the future Trump appointee agreed to keep the arrangement from Epstein’s victims, according to a November report in the Miami Herald, despite federal law requiring such disclosure.

In a 33-page opinion, U.S. District Judge Kenneth A. Marra said Epstein was not prosecuted under federal sex trafficking laws. Instead, Acosta, then the U.S. attorney in Miami, helped devise a non-prosecution agreement that gave Epstein and those who worked with him immunity from federal prosecution, the Miami Herald reported on Thursday.

“Petitioners and the other victims should have been notified of the Government’s intention to take that course of action before it bound itself under the [non-prosecution agreement],” Marra wrote.

The ruling did not issue a punishment. Marra gave the government and Epstein’s victims 15 days to come up with a resolution, though it’s unclear what that resolution could be.