When Will the US Begin to Sanction China?

Last week, Defense Secretary Mattis said:

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis this week voiced new U.S. opposition to China’s continued militarization of islands in the South China Sea.

“We remain highly concerned with continued militarization of features in the South China Sea,” Mattis told reporters on Monday as he traveled to Vietnam.

Mattis also said China is using predatory economics to seek control over other nations.

The Chinese are engaged in a global infrastructure development plan called the Belt and Road Initiative that U.S. officials have said is being used by Beijing to expand influence and control abroad, and expand Chinese military bases around the world.

Mattis said the predatory economic policies include loans “where massive debt is piled on countries that fiscal analysis would say they are going to have difficulty, at best, repaying in the smaller countries.”

The defense secretary, echoing the new U.S. hardline policy toward China, said the United States is not seeking to “contain” China but wants more reciprocal relations.

USA: China's militarisation of the South China Sea ... In part from Newsweek:

“Beijing can now deploy military assets, including combat aircraft and mobile missile launchers to the Spratly Islands at any time,” said the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) on Monday in a report that included images of the three man-made islands—Fiery Cross reef, Subi, and Mischief. Its director Greg Poling told Voice of America that new antennas had been spotted on Subi and Fiery Cross, so he expected deployments there soon.

The Spratly Islands are around 500 miles from the coast of China, and Fiery Cross Reef about 740 miles from mainland China. It is approximately 170 miles off the coast of Vietnam. Why did China build these islands and how did they manage to make land out of sea?

***

But media is not paying attention.

It gets worse.

Researchers have mapped out a series of internet traffic hijacks and redirections that they say are part of large espionage and intellectual property theft effort by China.

China systematically hijacks internet traffic: researchers

The researchers, Chris Demchak of the United States Naval War College and Yuval Shavitt of the Tel Aviv University in Israel, say in their paper that state-owned China Telecom hijacked and diverted internet traffic going to or passing through the US and Canada to China on a regular basis.

Tel Aviv University researchers built a route tracing system that monitors BGP announcements  and which picks up on patterns suggesting accidental or deliberate hijacks and discovered multiple attacks by China Telecom over the past few years.

In 2016, China Telecom diverted traffic between Canada and Korean government networks to its PoP in Toronto. From there, traffic was forwarded to the China Telecom PoP on the US West Coast and sent to China, and finally delivered to Korea.

Normally, the traffic would take a shorter route, going between Canada, the US and directly to Korea. The traffic hijack lasted for six months, suggesting it was a deliberate attack, Demchak and Shavitt said.

Demchak and Shavitt detailed other traffic hijacks, including one that saw traffic from US locations to a large Anglo-American bank’s Milan headquarters being terminated in China, and never delivered to Italy, in 2016.

During 2017, traffic between Scandinavia and Japan, transiting the United States, was also captured by China Telecom, ditto data headed to a mail server operated by a large Thai financial company.

China Telecom is able to divert the traffic by announcing bogus routes via the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) that governs data flows between Autonomous Systems, the large networks operated by telcos, internet providers and corporations.

After the traffic was copied by China Telecom for encyption breaking and analysis, it was delivered to the intended networks with only small delays. Demchak and Shavitt said.

Such hijacking is difficult to detect as China Telecom has multiple points of presence (PoPs) in North America and Europe that are physically close to the attacked networks, causing almost unnoticeable traffic delivery delays despite the lengthened routes.

China in comparison does not allow overseas telcos to establish PoPs in the country, and has only three gateways into the country, in Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong. This isolation protects the country’s domestic and transit traffic from foreign hijacking.

BGP hijacking of internet traffic is a common phenomenon, one which requires the support of large network operators to exploit at scale.

While the US and China agreed in 2015 to not hack one another’s computer networks, the deal did not cover hijacking of internet backbones, Demchak and Shavitt pointed out.

The researchers suggest the allied democratic nations establish an “access reciprocity” policy for internet PoPs located in their countries, to address the traffic hijacking.

Under the access reciprocity policy US telcos and providers should be allowed to set up PoPs in China, Demchak and Shavitt said.

If access reciprocity is refused, “then an appropriate defence policy in response could state that no traffic to or from the US or ally is allowed to enter a China Telecom PoP in the US or in the ally’s networks,” the researchers suggested.

Such a policy could be inserted into BGP routing tables as required for automatic implementation.

U.S. Treasury Employee Arrested Charged with Leaking to Media

The official 18 page indictment is here.

US Treasury employee arrested, accused of leaking media secret information about suspicious financial transactions related to Paul Manafort, Russians

  • A U.S. Treasury employee has been arrested and charged with leaking to a BuzzFeed News reporter multiple secret reports about suspicious financial transactions.
  • The documents relate to former Trump campaign chief Paul Manafort, Trump campaign official Richard Gates, accused Russian agent Maria Butina, the Russian Embassy and suspected Russian money launderer Prevezon Alexander.
  • The accused employee, Natalie Mayflower Sours Edwards will face criminal charges in New York.

A U.S. Treasury employee has been arrested on charges that she leaked to BuzzFeed News multiple reports about suspicious financial transactions involving ex-Trump campaign chief Paul Manafort, law-enforcement officials said.

The highly confidential documents allegedly leaked by the employee also were related to former Trump campaign official Richard Gates, accused Russian agent Maria Butina, a suspected Russian money launderering entity and the Russian Embassy in Washington, according to a criminal complaint.

Natalie Mayflower Sours Edwards

Natalie Mayflower Sours Edwards, a 40-year-old senior advisor in Treasury’s financial crimes enforcement network who was arrested Tuesday, will face federal criminal charges in New York, officials said.

She is charged with unlawfully disclosing so-called suspicious activity reports, or SARS, and conspiracy to do the same. Both felony counts carry a maxmium potential sentence of five years in prison.

A Quinton, Virginia, resident, Edwards was released on a $100,000 personal recognizance bond after her presentment Wednesday afternoon in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Under the conditions of her release, Edwards is barred from contacting reporters or handling documents belonging to her Treasury division without approval.

A lawyer for Edwards did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

SARS are used to alert Treasury officials and other authorities about financial transactions that may be related to criminal conduct, such as money laundering. Treasury’s FinCEN division, for which Edwards works, manages the collection of SARS. It is illegal for a government employee to disclose a SAR or its contents outside of the scope of their work.

The complaint against Edwards says that she started leaking “numerous SARS in October 2017” to an unidentified reporter, and continued doing so until this month.

She had “hundreds of electronic communications” with the reporter, “many via an encrypted application,” the complaint said.

After Edwards began leaking SARS, the journalist wrote about a dozen articles which mentioned the details of those reports, according to the complaint.

Articles cited in the complaint carry the bylines of Jason Leopold and Anthony Cormier, two BuzzFeed reporters, as well as other journalists at that media outlet.

The articles cited documents transactions pertaining to Manafort and Gates, both of whom have since pleaded guilty to financial crimes related to their consulting work for a pro-Russia political party in Ukraine.

They also related to Butina, who is currently being held without bond on charges of being a Russian agent, the accused money launderering real-estate entity Prevezon Alexander, and the Russian Embassy in Washington.

At the time of Edwards’ arrest, according to federal prosecutors in Manhattan, she “was in possession of a flash drive” that appeared to be the same device “on which she saved the unlawfully disclosed” SARS.

Also in her possession was “a cellphone containing numerous communications over an encrypted application in which she transmitted [SARS] and other sensitive government information” illegally, prosecutors said.

“When questioned by law enforcement officials [Tuesday], Edwards confessed she has provided [SARS] to [the reporter] via an encrypted application, through falsely denied knowing that [the reporter] intended to or did publish that information” through a news organization, the complaint said.

BuzzFeed News declined to comment. Leopold and Cormier did not immediately return requests for comment.

 

DHS Concerns on Election Related Incidents, Facebook Doesn’t Care

The Department of Homeland Security notices an increase of election-related incidents, but thinks midterm voting will go off relatively unproblematically. Anomali reports a surge in black-market trafficking of voter records.

Voting Records of Over 40 Million Americans for Sale on ...

But you wont find out from Facebook if there are any issues….Facebook is going to block all posts regarding voting issues.

What could be the issues?

Anomali Labs researchers in close partnership with Intel 471, a leading cybercrime intelligence provider, have uncovered a widespread unauthorized information disclosure of US voter registration databases. To be clear, this voter information is made generally available to the public for legitimate uses. Anomali and Intel 471 researchers discovered dark web communications offering a large quantity of voter databases for sale. The databases include valuable personally identifiable information and voting history. The disclosure reportedly affects 19 states and includes 23 million records for just three of the 19 states. No record counts were provided for the remaining 16 states, but do include prices for each state. We estimate that the entire contents of the disclosure could exceed 35 million records. Researchers have reviewed a sample of the database records and determined the data to be valid with a high degree of confidence.

Of note, the seller indicates they receive weekly updates of voter registration data across the states and that they receive information via contacts within the state governments. Certain states require the seller to personally travel to locations in-state to receive the updated voter information. This suggests the information disclosure is not necessarily a technical compromise but rather a likely targeted campaign by a threat actor redistributing possibly legitimately obtained voter data for malicious purposes on a cybercrime forum.

To our knowledge, this represents the first reference on the criminal underground of actors selling or distributing lists of 2018 voter registration data, including US voters’ personally identifiable information and voting history. With the November 2018 midterm elections only four weeks away, the availability and currency of the voter records, if combined with other breached data, could be used by malicious actors to disrupt the electoral process or pursue large-scale identity theft. More here.

Meanwhile, over to Facebook…. (who are they to determine what is false? See something, say something and Facebook will punish us all.)

MENLO PARK, Calif. (Reuters) – Facebook Inc will ban false information about voting requirements and fact-check fake reports of violence or long lines at polling stations ahead of next month’s U.S. midterm elections, company executives told Reuters, the latest effort to reduce voter manipulation on its service.

The world’s largest online social network, with 1.5 billion daily users, has stopped short of banning all false or misleading posts, something that Facebook has shied away from as it would likely increase its expenses and leave it open to charges of censorship.

The latest move addresses a sensitive area for the company, which has come under fire for its lax approach to fake news reports and disinformation campaigns, which many believe affected the outcome of the 2016 presidential election, won by Donald Trump.

The new policy was disclosed by Facebook’s cybersecurity policy chief, Nathaniel Gleicher, and other company executives.

The ban on false information about voting methods, set to be announced later on Monday, comes six weeks after Senator Ron Wyden asked Chief Operating Officer Sheryl Sandberg how Facebook would counter posts aimed at suppressing votes, such as by telling certain users they could vote by text, a hoax that has been used to reduce turnout in the past.

The information on voting methods becomes one of the few areas in which falsehoods are prohibited on Facebook, a policy enforced by what the company calls “community standards” moderators, although application of its standards has been uneven. It will not stop the vast majority of untruthful posts about candidates or other election issues.

“We don’t believe we should remove things from Facebook that are shared by authentic people if they don’t violate those community standards, even if they are false,” said Tessa Lyons, product manager for Facebook’s News Feed feature that shows users what friends are sharing.

Links to discouraging reports about polling places that may be inflated or misleading will be referred to fact-checkers under the new policy, Facebook said. If then marked as false, the reports will not be removed but will be seen by fewer of the poster’s friends.

Such partial measures leave Facebook more open to manipulation by users seeking to affect the election, critics say. Russia, and potentially other foreign parties, are already making “pervasive” efforts to interfere in upcoming U.S. elections, the leader of Trump’s national security team said in early August.

Just days before that, Facebook said it uncovered a coordinated political influence campaign to mislead its users and sow dissension among voters, removing 32 pages and accounts from Facebook and Instagram. Members of Congress briefed by Facebook said the methodology suggested Russian involvement.

Trump has disputed claims that Russia has attempted to interfere in U.S. elections. Russian President Vladimir Putin has denied it.

WEIGHING BAN ON HACKED MATERIAL

Facebook instituted a global ban on false information about when and where to vote in 2016, but Monday’s move goes further, including posts about exaggerated identification requirements.

Facebook executives are also debating whether to follow Twitter Inc’s recent policy change to ban posts linking to hacked material, Gleicher told Reuters in an interview.

The dissemination of hacked emails from Democratic party officials likely played a role in tipping the 2016 presidential election to Trump, and Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats has warned that Russia has recently been attempting to hack and steal information from U.S. candidates and government officials. More here.

FBI Director Threat Assessment to Senate Committee

210 Billion Attacks in Q2 2018

Report Highlights Include:

  • Analysis of 151 million global cybercrime attacks and 1.6 billion bot attacks
  • 72 percent growth in mobile transactions year-on-year
  • One third of all attacks now targeting mobile
Related reading: Terrorists likely to attack U.S. with drones, says FBI director

Related reading: FBI director says bureau is investigating 5,000 terrorism cases across the world

_______________________________

Threats to the Homeland

Good morning Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the current threats to the United States homeland. Our nation continues to face a multitude of serious and evolving threats ranging from homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) to cyber criminals to hostile foreign intelligence services and operatives. Keeping pace with these threats is a significant challenge for the FBI. Our adversaries—terrorists, foreign intelligence services, and criminals—take advantage of modern technology to hide their communications; recruit followers; and plan and encourage espionage, cyber attacks, or terrorism to disperse information on different methods to attack the U.S. homeland, and to facilitate other illegal activities. As these threats evolve, we must adapt and confront these challenges, relying heavily on the strength of our federal, state, local, and international partnerships.

Counterterrorism

The threat posed by terrorism—both international terrorism (IT) and domestic terrorism (DT)—has evolved significantly since 9/11. Preventing terrorist attacks remains the FBI’s top priority. We face persistent threats to the homeland and to U.S. interests abroad from HVEs, domestic terrorists, and foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). The IT threat to the U.S. has expanded from sophisticated, externally directed FTO plots to include individual attacks carried out by HVEs who are inspired by designated terrorist organizations. We remain concerned that groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda have the intent to carry out large-scale attacks in the U.S.

The FBI assesses HVEs are the greatest terrorism threat to the homeland. These individuals are global jihad-inspired individuals who are in the U.S., have been radicalized primarily in the U.S., and are not receiving individualized direction from FTOs. We, along with our law enforcement partners, face significant challenges in identifying and disrupting HVEs. This is due, in part, to their lack of a direct connection with an FTO, an ability to rapidly mobilize, and the use of encrypted communications.

In recent years, prolific use of social media by FTOs has greatly increased their ability to disseminate their messages. We have also been confronting a surge in terrorist propaganda and training available via the Internet and social media. Due to online recruitment and indoctrination, FTOs are no longer dependent on finding ways to get terrorist operatives into the United States to recruit and carry out acts of terrorism. Terrorists in ungoverned spaces—both physical and cyber—readily disseminate propaganda and training materials to attract easily influenced individuals around the world to their cause. They motivate these individuals to act at home or encourage them to travel. This is a significant transformation from the terrorist threat our nation faced a decade ago.

Despite significant losses of territory, ISIS remains relentless and ruthless in its campaign of violence against the West and has aggressively promoted its hateful message, attracting like-minded extremists. Unlike other groups, ISIS has constructed a narrative that touches on all facets of life, from family life to providing career opportunities to creating a sense of community. The message is not tailored solely to those who overtly express signs of radicalization. It is seen by many who click through the Internet every day, receive social media notifications, and participate in social networks. Ultimately, many of the individuals drawn to ISIS seek a sense of belonging. Echoing other terrorist groups, ISIS has advocated for lone offender attacks in Western countries. Recent ISIS videos and propaganda have specifically advocated for attacks against soldiers, law enforcement, and intelligence community personnel.

Many foreign terrorist organizations use various digital communication platforms to reach individuals they believe may be susceptible and sympathetic to extremist messages. However, no group has been as successful at drawing people into its perverse ideology as ISIS, who has proven dangerously competent at employing such tools. ISIS uses high-quality, traditional media platforms, as well as widespread social media campaigns to propagate its extremist ideology. With the broad distribution of social media, terrorists can spot, assess, recruit, and radicalize vulnerable persons of all ages in the U.S. either to travel or to conduct an attack on the homeland. Through the Internet, terrorists overseas now have direct access to our local communities to target and recruit our citizens and spread the message of radicalization faster than was imagined just a few years ago.

The threats posed by foreign fighters, including those recruited from the U.S., are very dynamic. We will continue working to identify individuals who seek to join the ranks of foreign fighters traveling in support of ISIS, those foreign fighters who may attempt to return to the United States, and HVEs who may aspire to attack the United States from within.

ISIS is not the only terrorist group of concern. Al Qaeda maintains its desire for large-scale spectacular attacks. However, continued counterterrorism pressure has degraded the group, and in the near term al Qaeda is more likely to focus on supporting small-scale, readily achievable attacks against U.S. and allied interests in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region. Simultaneously, over the last year, propaganda from al Qaeda leaders seeks to inspire individuals to conduct their own attacks in the U.S. and the West.

In addition to FTOs, domestic extremist movements collectively pose a steady threat of violence and economic harm to the United States. Trends within individual movements may shift, but the underlying drivers for domestic extremism—such as perceptions of government or law enforcement overreach, socio-political conditions, and reactions to legislative actions—remain constant. The FBI is most concerned about lone offender attacks, primarily shootings, as they have served as the dominant mode for lethal domestic extremist violence. We anticipate law enforcement, racial minorities, and the U.S. government will continue to be significant targets for many domestic extremist movements.

As the threat to harm the U.S. and our interests evolves, we must adapt and confront these challenges, relying heavily on the strength of our federal, state, local, and international partnerships. The FBI uses all lawful investigative techniques and methods to combat these terrorist threats to the United States. Along with our domestic and foreign partners, we collect and analyze intelligence concerning the ongoing threat posed by foreign terrorist organizations and homegrown violent extremists. We continue to encourage information sharing, which is evidenced through our partnerships with many federal, state, local, and tribal agencies assigned to Joint Terrorism Task Forces around the country. The FBI continues to strive to work and share information more efficiently, and to pursue a variety of lawful methods to stay ahead of threats to the homeland.

Intelligence

Incorporating intelligence in all we do remains a critical strategic pillar of the FBI strategy. The constant evolution of the FBI’s intelligence program will help us address the ever-changing threat environment. We must constantly update our intelligence apparatus to improve the way we collect, use, and share intelligence to better understand and defeat our adversaries. We cannot be content only to work the matters directly in front of us. We must also look beyond the horizon to understand the threats we face at home and abroad, and how those threats may be connected. We must also ensure we are providing our partners, whether in the public or private sectors, with actionable, relevant intelligence to help them address their own unique threats.

To that end, The FBI gathers intelligence, pursuant to legal authorities, to help us understand and prioritize identified threats, to reveal the gaps in what we know about these threats, and to fill those gaps. We do this for national security and criminal threats, on both national and local field office levels. We then compare the national and local perspectives to organize threats into priorities for each of the FBI’s 56 field offices. By categorizing threats in this way, we place the greatest focus on the gravest threats we face. This gives us a better assessment of what the dangers are, what is being done about them, and where we should prioritize our resources.

Given the fast pace of technological evolution, we must also focus on ensuring our information technology capabilities allow us to collect and assess information as quickly and thoroughly as possible. We must continue to deploy superior technological capabilities and solutions for large data sets, such as those derived from digital media.

Integrating intelligence and operations is part of the broader intelligence transformation the FBI has undertaken in the last decade to improve our understanding and mitigation of threats. Over the past few years, we have taken several steps to improve this integration. The FBI’s Intelligence Branch, created in August 2014, provides strategic direction and oversight of the FBI’s intelligence program and is responsible for intelligence strategy, resources, policies, and operations. Our special agents and intelligence analysts train together at the FBI Academy, where they engage in joint training exercises and take core courses together, prior to their field deployments. As a result, they are better prepared to integrate their skill sets in the field. To build on the Quantico-based training, the FBI now offers significant follow-on training courses that integrate special agents, intelligence analysts, staff operations specialists, and language analysts. Additionally, our training forums for executives and front-line supervisors continue to ensure our leaders are informed about our latest intelligence capabilities and allow them to share best practices for achieving intelligence integration.

Counterintelligence

The nation faces a rising threat, both traditional and asymmetric, from hostile foreign intelligence services and their proxies. Traditional espionage, often characterized by career foreign intelligence officers acting as diplomats or ordinary citizens, and asymmetric espionage, often carried out by students, researchers, or business people operating front companies, are prevalent. Foreign intelligence services not only seek our nation’s state and military secrets, but they also target commercial trade secrets, research and development, and intellectual property, as well as insider information from the federal government, U.S. corporations, and American universities. Foreign intelligence services and other state-directed actors continue to employ more creative and more sophisticated methods to steal innovative technology, critical research and development data, and intellectual property in an effort to erode America’s economic leading edge. These illicit activities pose a significant threat to national security and continue to be a priority and focus of the FBI.

Our counterintelligence efforts are also aimed at the growing scope of the insider threat—that is, when trusted employees and contractors use their legitimate access to steal secrets for personal benefit or to benefit a company or another country. This threat has been exacerbated in recent years as businesses have become more global and increasingly exposed to foreign intelligence organizations. We are also investigating media leaks, when federal employees and contractors violate the law and betray the nation’s trust by selectively leaking classified information, sometimes mixed with disinformation, to manipulate the public and advance their personal agendas.

In addition to the insider threat, the FBI has focused on a coordinated approach across divisions that leverages both our classic counterespionage tradecraft and our technical expertise to more effectively identify, pursue, and defeat hostile state actors using cyber means to penetrate or disrupt U.S. government entities or economic interests.

We have also continued our engagement with the private sector and academia on the threat of economic espionage and technology transfer. We have addressed national business and academic groups, met with individual companies and university leaders, worked with sector-specific groups, and encouraged all field offices to maintain close, ongoing liaison with entities across the country that have valuable technology, data, or other assets.

Cyber

Virtually every national security and criminal threat the FBI faces is cyber-based or technologically facilitated. We face sophisticated cyber threats from foreign intelligence agencies, hackers for hire, organized crime syndicates, and terrorists. These threat actors constantly seek to access and steal our nation’s classified information, trade secrets, technology, and ideas—all of which are of great importance to U.S. national and economic security. They seek to strike our critical infrastructure and to harm our economy.

As the committee is well aware, the frequency and impact of cyber attacks on our nation’s private sector and government networks have increased dramatically in the past decade and are expected to continue to grow. We continue to see an increase in the scale and scope of reporting on malicious cyber activity, which can be measured by the amount of corporate data stolen or deleted, personally identifiable information compromised, or remediation costs incurred by U.S. victims. Within the FBI, we are focused on the most dangerous malicious cyber activity: high-level intrusions by state-sponsored hackers and global organized crime syndicates, and other technically sophisticated attacks.

Botnets used by cyber criminals are one example of this trend and have been responsible for billions of dollars in damages over the past several years. The widespread availability of malicious software (malware) that can create botnets allows individuals to leverage the combined bandwidth of thousands, if not millions, of compromised computers, servers, or network-ready devices to conduct attacks. Cyber threat actors have also increasingly conducted ransomware attacks against U.S. systems by encrypting data and rendering systems unusable, thereby victimizing individuals, businesses, and even public health providers.

Cyber threats are not only increasing in scope and scale, but are also becoming increasingly difficult to investigate. Cyber criminals often operate through online forums, selling illicit goods and services, including tools that can be used to facilitate cyber attacks. These criminals have also increased the sophistication of their schemes, which are more difficult to detect and more resilient. Additionally, many cyber actors are based abroad or obfuscate their identities by using foreign infrastructure, making coordination with international law enforcement partners essential.

The FBI is engaged in a myriad of efforts to combat cyber threats, from improving threat identification and information sharing inside and outside of government, to developing and retaining new talent, to examining the way we operate to disrupt and defeat these threats. We take all potential threats to public and private sector systems seriously and will continue to investigate and hold accountable those who pose a threat in cyberspace.

Going Dark

“Going Dark” describes circumstances where law enforcement is unable to obtain critical information in an intelligible and usable form (or at all), despite having a court order authorizing the government’s access to that information. As a technical matter, this challenge extends across several products and platforms, whether it involves “data at rest,” such as on a physical device, or “data in motion,” as with real-time electronic communications.

Going Dark remains a serious problem for the FBI across our investigative areas, from counterterrorism to child exploitation, gangs, drug traffickers, and white-collar crimes. The inability to access evidence or intelligence despite the lawful authority to do so significantly impacts the FBI’s ability to identify, investigate, prosecute, or otherwise deter criminals, terrorists, and other offenders.

Our federal, state, local, and international law enforcement partners face similar challenges in maintaining access to electronic evidence despite having legal authorization to do so. Indeed, within the last few months, the nation’s sheriffs called for “the U.S. Congress to exercise leadership in the nation’s public safety interest” to address the Going Dark challenge. Several of our closest law enforcement and intelligence partners (the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) similarly described this as a “pressing international concern that requires urgent, sustained attention and informed discussion.”

The FBI recognizes the complexity of the issue, but we believe there is a tremendous opportunity for responsible stakeholders to work together to find sustainable solutions that preserve cybersecurity and promote public safety.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

The FBI, along with its U.S. government partners, is committed to countering the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives) by preventing terrorist groups and lone offenders from acquiring these materials either domestically or internationally through preventing nation state proliferation of WMD sensitive technologies and expertise.

Domestically, the FBI’s counter-WMD threat program, in collaboration with our U.S. government partners, prepares for and responds to WMD threats (e.g., investigate, detect, search, locate, diagnose, stabilize, and render safe WMD threats). Internationally, the FBI, in cooperation with our U.S. partners, provides investigative and technical assistance as well as capacity-building programs to enhance our foreign partners’ ability to detect, investigate, and prosecute WMD threats.

Countering Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

The threat from unmanned aircraft systems in the U.S. is steadily escalating. While we are working with FAA and other agencies to safely integrate UAS into the national airspace system, the FBI assesses with high confidence that terrorists overseas will continue to use small UAS to advance nefarious activities and exploit physical protective measures. While there has been no successful malicious use of UAS by terrorists in the United States to date, terrorist groups could easily export their battlefield experiences to use weaponized UAS outside the conflict zone. We have seen repeated and dedicated efforts to use UAS as weapons, not only by terrorist organizations, such as ISIS and al Qaeda, but also by transnational criminal organizations such as MS-13 and Mexican drug cartels, which may encourage use of this technique in the U.S. to conduct attacks. The FBI assesses that, given their retail availability, lack of verified identification requirement to procure, general ease of use, and prior use overseas, UAS will be used to facilitate an attack in the United States against a vulnerable target, such as a mass gathering. This risk has only increased in light of the publicity associated with the apparent attempted assassination of Venezuelan President Maduro using explosives-laden UAS.

The FBI recently disrupted a plan in the United States to use drones to attack the Pentagon and the Capitol building. On November 1, 2012, Rezwan Ferdaus was sentenced to 17 years in federal prison for attempting to conduct a terrorist attack and providing support to al Qaeda. Ferdaus, who held a degree in physics, obtained multiple jet-powered, remote-controlled model aircraft capable of flying 100 miles per hour. He planned to fill the aircraft with explosives and crash them into the Pentagon and the Capitol using a GPS system in each aircraft. Fortunately, the FBI interrupted the plot after learning of it and deploying an undercover agent.

Last week, thanks in large part to the outstanding leadership of this Committee, the FBI and DOJ received new authorities to deal with the UAS threat in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. That legislation enables the FBI to counter UAS threats while safeguarding privacy and promoting the safety and efficiency of the national airspace system. The FBI is grateful to the chairman, the ranking member, and other members of this committee for championing this critical authority.

Conclusion

Finally, the strength of any organization is its people. The threats we face as a nation have never been greater or more diverse and the expectations placed on the Bureau have never been higher. Our fellow citizens look to the FBI to protect the United States from all of those threats, and the men and women of the FBI continue to meet and exceed those expectations, every day. I want to thank them for their dedicated service.

The Soros Working Group Spreadsheet

Soros working group spread sheet.

This is quite the research product and will demonstrate just how pervasive chaos and activism really is. Asra Nomani of the Wall Street Journal performed intensive investigations and her work was published by the WSJ with the title ‘George Soros’s March on Washington. Now the question becomes, does this information get some cultivation by the FBI, the IRS or the Justice Department to see what laws were broken or consequence should apply? No answer at this point.

But let’s check out just one of the Soros organizations shall we? Not only is money spread around in grant form but people are too….sheesh

Anti government, anti Trump activism is here to stay. It is political insurgency…maybe even terrorism. At least those like Senator Paul and Congresman Scalise are victims of physical harm. Hillary, what about that civility thing again?

How about Ultra Violet?

Kat Barr

Chief Operating Officer

Kat is the Chief Operating Officer at UltraViolet, overseeing the organization’s internal strategy and operations. Prior to UltraViolet, Kat worked as a Campaign Director at MoveOn.org, running efforts around health care reform, women’s rights, civil liberties, and LGBTQ equality. In addition, she helped launch MoveOn’s first text message organizing program and played a role in recruiting progressives interested in running for office. Before MoveOn, Kat was the Communications Director and then the Director of Political Outreach at Rock the Vote, where she helped increase young voter turnout to record levels in 2006 and 2008. After nine years in DC, Kat relocated to Colorado, where she lives with her husband and two dogs in a beautiful small town in the Rocky Mountains. Aside from work, most of her time is spent mountain biking, doing yoga, volunteering with a local dog rescue, and taking hundreds of photographs of the amazing local wilderness.

Emma Boorboor

Deputy Organizing Director

Emma Boorboor is the Deputy Organizing Director at UltraViolet. She works closely with the Chief Campaigns Officer to manage the day to day operations of UV’s campaigns team. Emma also leads UltraViolet’s campaigns related to ending violence against women.

Prior to joining the team, Emma ran national and state level campaigns for voting rights and campaign finance reform with U.S. PIRG. She has been hooked on organizing since her first job as a field organizer with Green Corps, the Field School for Environmental Organizing. She currently lives in Philadelphia where she enjoys lots of live music and biking around the city.

Lindsay Budzynski

Executive Administrator

Lindsay is the Executive Administrator at UltraViolet. She is a long-time clinic escort  and serves on the board of directors of Chicago Abortion Fund. Prior to joining the UV team she spent over eight years in fund administration. In her free time Lindsay can be found working in her art studio, hassling her cats, and poking around flea markets.

Nita Chaudhary

Co-Founder

Nita Chaudhary is a co-founder of UltraViolet. Before founding UltraViolet, Nita was the National Campaigns and Organizing Director at MoveOn.org Political Action. As a part of that role she oversaw and managed MoveOn’s national campaigns department, including the organization’s work on health care reform, the economy and Social Security, and she supervised MoveOn’s team of Campaign Directors. During her tenure at MoveOn, Nita oversaw the fundraising program for the 2008 election, and led some of the organization’s largest campaigns including MoveOn’s work to end the Iraq war, protect constitutional liberties, and address climate change. Prior to that she was the Democratic National Committee’s first Director of Online during the 2004 cycle. She started her career at People for the American Way where she held several positions, including Media Research Analyst, Web Editor, and Online Organizer. Nita’s a native New Yorker who loves the Yankees, the Knicks and cooking Indian food.

Anathea Chino

Advancement Director

Anathea Chino is the Advancement Director at UltraViolet and leads the development team for the organization. Anathea has more than 13 years of experience in politics and fundraising at the state and national level. In Washington, D.C., she served as an Investment Advisor at Democracy Alliance and prior to that, she was the Development Director at NARAL New Mexico and a Regional Field Director for the Democratic National Committee and Democratic Party of New Mexico. Anathea currently serves on the Board of Directors and Advisory Boards of Inclusv, Americans for Indian Opportunity, and PowerPac+. She is also a co-founder of Indigenous Women Rise and a senior advisor to a Women Donors Network-funded reflective democracy project called Advance Native Political Leaders. She was also a founding board member and President of Emerge New Mexico. Anathea is an enrolled tribal member of Acoma Pueblo, NM and divides her time between Texas and New Mexico.

Pam Bradshaw Fujii

Senior Grant Writer

Pam is the Senior Grant Writer at UltraViolet. Prior to joining the team at UV, she was the Grant Writer at the Center for Constitutional Rights. Pam has a decade of experience working in human rights and social justice, where she’s done everything from fundraising to video advocacy to media relations. Pam holds a MA in Media Studies from The New School and a BA in English Literature and Film Studies from Mount Holyoke College. If Pam could be anywhere, you’d find her by the ocean with her partner, their spirited toddler and teenage dachshund.

Natalie Green

Communications Manager and Spokesperson

Natalie Green is the Communications Manager and Spokesperson at UltraViolet. Prior to joining UltraViolet, Natalie was a campaigner at Change.org where she worked with petition starters to develop national campaigns around police accountability, human rights, and political prisoners. Natalie previously worked on digital rights and technology policy issues at Public Knowledge and the Open Technology Institute.

Natalie is a New Jersey native and currently lives in Washington DC.

Susan Hildebrand

National Field Director

Susan Hildebrand is the National Field Director at UltraViolet. Prior to joining the team they acted as a consultant to Thoughtwork Inc. where they worked with developers and organizers to build tech for campaigns. Susan cut their teeth in online to offline organizing as a National Field Organizer at MoveOn.org where they built teams of activists across the Midwest to take action on issues from the election to fair taxes to stopping the foreclosure crisis. They have a B.A. in Political Science from Grinnell College and are a graduate of Green Corps: The Field School for Environmental Organizing. Outside of work, Susan enjoys rock climbing and circus arts. They are based in Chicago.

Pilar Martinez

Director of Finance

Pilar Martinez is the Director of Finance at UltraViolet, managing daily accounting functions and staff.  Pilar has more than 23 years of progressive experience in finance and management, including 20 years in the non-profit sector.  She has been with Media Matters for America since 2008 and is the Chief Financial Officer.  Prior to Media Matters for America, Pilar worked as the Finance and Administrative Director at the Center for Clean Air Policy (CCAP), served as the Controller at the National Park Foundation, and worked as the Revenue Accountant at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.  Her accounting educational background includes M.A. from George Washington University, B.A. from Strayer University, and A.A.S from Northern Virginia Community College.

Kathy Plate

Senior Online Communications Director

Kathy is the Senior Online Communications Director at Ultraviolet. Prior to joining the team, she was Digital Strategies Director at the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force. While at the Task Force, Kathy grew and strengthened the organization’s online presence around issues including marriage equality, workplace discrimination, and access to healthcare. Kathy helped revolutionize online participation with the organization’s largest annual event, the National Conference on LGBT Equality: Creating Change by introducing livestreaming, developing a conference mobile app and facilitating more robust conversations on social media. Kathy previously managed online communications for Alliance for Justice, where she worked to engage progressives in the fight for a fair judiciary. She currently lives in Southern California where she loves to take advantage of the mountain biking, rock climbing, and hiking opportunities.

Ryan Rastegar

Associate Field Director

Ryan is the Associate Field Director at UltraViolet. He engages, trains, and mobilizes UltraViolet members to take offline action on our most pressing campaigns. Throughout his career, Ryan has worked on many different progressive issues – climate change, ecological restoration, eliminating nuclear weapons, LGBTQ rights, and more – always with a concentration on grassroots organizing and mobilization. He has dedicated his professional life to helping individuals to realize their political might and training them to take collective action in ways that shifts the balance of power from the very few to many. He also sits on the advisory board of UnKoch My Campus, a national campaign to end the Koch Brothers’ unethical corporate influence within academia, where he provides mentorship and strategic digital organizing guidance. He got his start as a field organizer in Green Corps in 2008 and has been organizing ever since.

Karin Roland

Chief Campaigns Officer

Karin Roland is the Chief Campaigns Officer at UltraViolet, a powerful and rapidly growing community of people who work to expand women’s rights. She oversees campaigns and programs on issues including economic security, preventing violence against women, and women’s reproductive rights and access to health care.

Previously, Karin spent a decade working in progressive politics and campaigns. She helped fight the Iraq war and advocate for the Affordable Care Act at MoveOn.org, campaigned for marriage equality in Maine, and used online tools to help Representative Chellie Pingree (D-Maine) make her Congressional office transparent and responsive, among other endeavors. Throughout her career, she has focused on using digital media and tools to advance progressive causes.

Audine Tayag

Campaign Director

Audine is a Campaign Director at UltraViolet. Audine leads campaigns related to economic security and immigration.

Prior to joining the team, she worked for the Alliance for Citizenship in its 2013 and 2014 Comprehensive Immigration Reform campaign. As a Communications Organizer for the Alliance, she helped organizers build a year’s worth of online and offline actions and worked on high-profile campaign, “Fast for Families: A Call for Immigration Reform and Citizenship.” Audine currently lives in Los Angeles where she also spends her time organizing for Filipino migrant rights.

Shaunna Thomas

Co-Founder & Executive Director

Shaunna Thomas is co-founder and Executive Director of UltraViolet. Shaunna has had a fifteen year career in progressive organizing, building progressive infrastructure projects and winning critical policy fights at the national level. Shaunna has appeared numerous times on network and cable TV including NBC, MSNBC, CNN, and CNBC as a political commentator. Before founding UltraViolet, Shaunna was the Executive Director of the P Street Project, a 501c4 nonprofit dedicated to organizing progressive members of Congress and connecting federal legislative strategy with online grassroots mobilization efforts. Prior to that, Shaunna was the COO of Progressive Congress, a nonprofit supporting the policy and organizing work of the Congressional Progressive Caucus. Shaunna was introduced to organizing and advocacy through the 2004 presidential election, which inspired the next five years of her work at Young People For, a Project of People For the American Way Foundation dedicated to identifying, engaging and empowering the next generation of progressive leaders. Shaunna–originally from Los Angeles–is a resident of Washington, D.C.

Melody Varjavand

Senior Accountant

Melody has over 13 years of progressive experience in finance and accounting, including over 6 years in the non-profit sector. She has worked as an auditor in public accounting, and has worked on the accounting teams of Planned Parenthood of Illinois and the Adler Planetarium in Chicago. She has successfully led initiatives to develop financial processes and improve financial reporting to end users. Melody is a graduate of the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign and is a CPA. In her free time, she enjoys seeking out great restaurants, biking, crafting, and travel, with a goal of visiting all the national parks someday.

Holly Witherington

Director of Human Resources & Organizational Development

Holly oversees organizational operations at UltraViolet, with a primary focus on human resources, organizational culture, and staff training and development.

Prior to working at UltraViolet, Holly worked at MoveOn.org as a lead organizer on the field team. She managed staff and created programs that trained MoveOn members across the country as organizers and helped them build council structures to carry out various strategies in the field. Before MoveOn, Holly was an internal organizer with the Service Employees International Union in San Francisco, CA and Portland, OR. Holly began her organizing career in New Orleans, after Hurricane Katrina, working with communities living on the fence line of oil refineries and chemical plants.