Category Archives: Cyber War

IAEA Just Gave up on Iran Nuclear Verification

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Oh my, Barack Obama lied…..not only in verbal form but in written form. Now other world leaders, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom, France, Israel and more will indeed have some forceful response to Barack Obama.

Then there is the issue of releasing the billions in frozen funds back to Iran and the further lifting of sanctions. But the biggest questions are still not answered: Exactly where is Iran with their nuclear weapons program, does it continue unimpeded and what with other threatened countries do now?

 this deal provides the best possible defense against Iran’s ability to pursue a nuclear weapon covertly — that is, in secret.  International inspectors will have unprecedented access not only to Iranian nuclear facilities, but to the entire supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program — from uranium mills that provide the raw materials, to the centrifuge production and storage facilities that support the program.  If Iran cheats, the world will know it.  If we see something suspicious, we will inspect it.  Iran’s past efforts to weaponize its program will be addressed.  With this deal, Iran will face more inspections than any other country in the world. (the full Barack Obama statement here as posted on the White House website)

President Obama sold his nuclear deal with Iran with promises that the accord would be based on “unprecedented verification,” and this week we were reminded of how much that promise was worth. Witness the latest report on Iran’s nuclear program from the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The IAEA is the U.N. outfit that is supposed to monitor Iran’s compliance with the agreement, which requires Tehran to answer the agency’s questions on its past nuclear work in order to obtain sanctions relief. On Wednesday the agency produced its “final assessment”—the finality here having mostly to do with the U.N. nuclear watchdog giving up hope of ever getting straight answers.

Hence we learn that “Iran did not provide any clarification” regarding experiments the agency believes it conducted on testing components of nuclear components at its military facility at Parchin. “The information available to the Agency, including the results of the sampling analysis and the satellite imagery, does not support Iran’s statements on the purpose of the building,” says the report. “The Agency assesses that the extensive activities undertaken by Iran since February 2012 at the particular location of interest to the Agency seriously undermined the Agency’s ability to conduct effective verification.”

This seems to be A-OK with the Obama Administration, which made clear it’s prepared to accept any amount of Iranian stonewalling in order to move ahead with sanctions relief. “We had not expected a full confession, nor did we need one,” an unnamed senior Administration official told the Journal. One wonders why they even bothered with the charade.

Still, the report is illuminating on several points, above all its conclusion that Tehran continued to work on nuclear weapons research until 2009. That further discredits the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, which claimed Iran’s weapons program had ceased in 2003, and which effectively ended any chance that the Bush Administration would use military force against Iran’s nuclear sites.

It should also inspire some humility about the quality of Western intelligence regarding closed and hostile regimes such as Iran’s. A 2014 report from the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board noted that at “levels associated with small or nascent [nuclear] programs, key observables are easily masked.” Yet the Administration keeps insisting that Iran’s nondisclosures don’t matter because the U.S. has “perfect knowledge” of what the mullahs are up to, as John Kerry claimed last summer.

The larger point is that the nuclear deal has already become a case of Iran pretending not to cheat while the West pretends not to notice. That may succeed in bringing the agreement into force, but it offers no confidence that Iran won’t eventually build its weapon.

ISIS in America, Retweets to Raqqa

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ISIS in America    Read the full study here.

IT IS APPARENT that the U.S. is home to a small but active cadre of individuals infatuated with ISIS’s ideology, some of whom have decided to mobilize in its furtherance.

This section attempts to provide an overview of this demographic by drawing on research that attempted to reconstruct the lives—both real and virtual—of U.S.-based ISIS supporters. The research effort was based on legal documents, media reports, social media monitoring, and interviews with a variety of individuals, though there were at times limitations to both the amount and reliability of publicly available information.

 

The 71 individuals charged for ISIS-related activities (as of November 12, 2015)

 

ƒ.WHILE NOT AS LARGE as in many other Western countries, ISIS-related mobilization in the United States has been unprecedented. As of the fall of 2015, U.S. authorities speak of some 250 Americans who have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria/Iraq to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and 900 active investigations against ISIS sympathizers in all 50 states.

ƒ. Seventy-one individuals have been charged with ISIS-related activities since March 2014. Fifty-six have been arrested in 2015 alone, a record number of terrorism-related arrests for any year since 9/11. Of those charged:

‚. The average age is 26.

‚. 86% are male.

‚. Their activities were located in 21 states.

‚. 51% traveled or attempted to travel abroad.

‚. 27% were involved in plots to carry out attacks on U.S. soil.

‚. 55% were arrested in an operation involving an informant and/or an undercover agent.

ƒ. A small number of Americans have been killed in ISIS-related activities: three inside the U.S., at least a dozen abroad.

ƒ. The profiles of individuals involved in ISIS-related activities in the U.S. differ widely in race, age, social class, education, and family background. Their motivations are equally diverse and defy easy analysis.

ƒ. Social media plays a crucial role in the radicalization and, at times, mobilization of U.S.-based ISIS sympathizers.

The Program on Extremism has identified some 300 American and/or U.S.-based ISIS sympathizers active on social media, spreading propaganda, and interacting with like-minded individuals. Some members of this online echo chamber eventually make the leap from keyboard warriors to actual militancy.

ƒ. American ISIS sympathizers are particularly active on Twitter, where they spasmodically create accounts that often get suspended in a never-ending cat-and-mouse game. Some accounts (the “nodes”) are the generators of primary content, some (the “amplifiers”) just retweet material, others (the “shout-outs”) promote newly created accounts of suspended users.

ƒ. ISIS-related radicalization is by no means limited to social media. While instances of purely web-driven, individual radicalization are numerous, in several cases U.S.-based individuals initially cultivated and later strengthened their interest in ISIS’s narrative through face-to-face relationships. In most cases online and offline dynamics complement one another.

ƒ. The spectrum of U.S.-based sympathizers’ actual involvement with ISIS varies significantly, ranging from those who are merely inspired by its message to those few who reached mid-level leadership positions within the group.

 

US Admits Iran Will Punk the World on the JPOA

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The US never really expected Iran to come totally clean about a key element of its nuclear program

 BusinessInsider: The Iran nuclear deal will clear a crucial milestone on December 15, when the International Atomic Energy Agency submits a report on the extent of Iran’s previous nuclear-weaponization activities.

The completion of that investigation into the possible military dimensions (PMDs) of Iran’s nuclear program is one of the major prerequisites for the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the landmark nuclear deal that Iran and a US-led group of six countries signed in July.

iran nuclearREUTERS

In theory, the JCPOA won’t be implemented unless Iran complies with a separate “roadmap” agreement with the IAEA. That agreement, which was signed the same day as the JCPOA, lays out the parameters of the agency’s weaponization investigation. The JCPOA isn’t supposed to go into effect unless the sides “fully implement” that roadmap agreement.

But “full implementation” doesn’t really have a fixed meaning within the JCPOA, an agreement that is voluntary and non-binding. And according to an Associated Press analysis out Monday, the IAEA’s investigation is likely going to have inconclusive results.

As the AP notes, the head of the IAEA has “been careful to diminish expectations, describing his upcoming report last week as ‘not black and white.'” And according to the AP, Iranian officials have spoken about the IAEA probe using similar language, “suggesting they already know that the agency’s conclusions won’t be damning.”

Iran has already threatened that it simply won’t comply with the JCPOA if it’s dissatisfied with the IAEA’s report. That might be more than just an empty ultimatum, since according to the AP the announcement is consistent with what Iranian diplomats are saying behind closed doors as well.

“Two Western diplomats familiar with the issue say those same threats have been made in negotiations with IAEA officials,” the AP reported.

The weaponization report is considered crucial to the successful implementation of the nuclear deal, as it will be used to formulate an inspection baseline for Iran’s nuclear program. There is extensive evidence that Iran had a nuclear weapons program until as late as 2003.  The IAEA needs to be able to identify key personnel, facilities, supply chains, and past activities to establish exactly how far along Iran’s weaponization activities really are and to recognize whether those activities have been restarted.

But as the AP’s analysis suggests, the roadmap is also contentious — and perhaps even inconvenient, given its potential to interrupt the smooth implementation of a deal that Iran and the US-led group spent nearly two years negotiating. There are already signs that the US wants to get past the investigation as smoothly as possible — even if the IAEA’s “roadmap” doesn’t result in Iran’s full disclosure of its past weaponization work.

Business Insider has obtained a State Department document submitted to congressional offices during the Congress’s review of the JCPOA in July.

The 18-page document, a “verification assessment report” that is essentially the department’s outline of the nuclear deal’s various stipulations, is unclassified. But congressional staffers were only allowed to read it inside of a SCIF, or a special area for viewing and storing classified or compartmentalized information.

The section entitled “Addressing ‘Possible Military Dimensions'” discusses the US’ interpretation of the IAEA “roadmap” and its requirements.

“Iran’s implementation of its commitments under the Roadmap will bring to an end the years-long delay in the IAEA’s ability to address PMD [Possible Military Dimensions] issues,” the document reads.

Two paragraphs later, it explains that even with this high level of confidence that the IAEA investigation will resolve the PMD issue, the US’ standards fall somewhat short of full Iranian disclosure on weaponization-related matters.

“An Iranian admission of its past nuclear weapons program is unlikely and is not necessary for purposes of verifying JCPOA commitments going forward,” the report reads. “US confidence on this front is based in large part on what we believe we already know about Iran’s past activities”

“The United States has shared with the IAEA relevant information, and crafted specific JCPOA measures that will enable inspectors to establish confidence that previously reported Iranian PMD activities are not ongoing,” it continued. “If credible information becomes available regarding any renewed Iranian efforts, it would be shared with the IAEA as appropriate, whether involving previous people, locations, entities, or otherwise. We believe other IAEA member states will do the same.”

This report was circulated in Congress not long after the deal was signed. From a relatively early stage, the State Department believed that the IAEA was capable of monitoring Iran’s nuclear program without Iran fully disclosing its past activities.

This wasn’t because of any particular US trust in the Iranians. Rather, it was due to State’s confidence that US intelligence already knew enough about the extent of Iran’s weaponization program to make such an admission of past weaponization work unnecessary.

Even so, State apparently never expected full Iranian transparency on weaponization. And the Obama administration believed that Iran had no responsibility to admit to a past weaponization program under the JCPOA.

Washington always intended to give Iran a pass on full disclosure — and the result may be a watered-down IAEA investigation that’s treated more as a formality than as an integral element of an arms control agreement designed to last for decades.

The United States has it’s own Task Force, that is IF the White House allows full technology to monitor Iran.

Task Force to assess technologies in support of future arms control and nonproliferation treaties and agreements. The Task Force, however, quickly realized that addressing this charge alone would be of limited value without considering a broader context for nuclear proliferation into the foreseeable future. That realization resulted from a number of factors which included:

 Accounts of rogue state actions and their potential cascading effects;

 The impact of advancing technologies relevant to nuclear weapons development;

 The growing evidence of networks of cooperation among countries that would otherwise have

little reason to do so;

 The implications of U.S. policy statements to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in international affairs, accompanied by further reductions in numbers, which are leading some longtime allies and partners to entertain development of their own arsenals;

 The wide range of motivations, capabilities, and approaches that each potential proliferator introduces.

 

Newest Emails Released, Hillary Told She Rocked

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Some samples of the recent released emails are here. Additional summaries are here.

An exchange with Sid-vicious Blumenthal, in the emails where it is suggested that investigative author Bob Woodward is an FBI asset?

 

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FNC: As the number of classified Hillary Clinton emails grew to nearly 1,000, they also reveal how freely she and her staff shared information on the Benghazi attacks, including confirming the death of Ambassador Chris Stevens – and even celebrating her controversial hearing appearance where she asked, “What difference, at this point, does it make” what led to the attacks.

The emails were part of the largest release yet of Clinton documents from the State Department.

The batch contained 328 emails deemed to have classified information. According to the State Department, that brings the total number with classified information to 999.

That alone drew outrage from Republicans, with the RNC saying the sheer number of emails with classified material “underscores the degree to which Hillary Clinton jeopardized our national security and has tried to mislead the American people.”

But the document dump also potentially creates more problems for Clinton in her attempt to move past the fallout from the Benghazi attacks.

Notably, the emails show her aides congratulating her after her initial January 2013 testimony on the attacks before Congress. During that hearing, she got into a dispute with Sen. Ron Johnson, R-Wis., over the conflicting narratives about the motivation for the attack and what preceded it – the State Department had come under fire for initially pointing to a protest over an anti-Islam film. Clinton told Johnson, expressively, “what difference, at this point, does it make?”

During and after the hearing, aides forwarded Clinton congratulatory messages.

“I’m being flooded with emails about how you rocked,” deputy chief of staff Huma Abedin wrote. “And you looked fabulous.” One supporter wrote a message with the subject line: “twitterverse abuzz with Hillary-kvelling,” using the Yiddish word for gushing praise.

Later, though, political consultant Mark Penn sent an email to Clinton gently suggesting that perhaps it wasn’t wise to lose her temper in the hearing. Penn suggested Republicans could use that moment as evidence that they had rattled her.

Aide Philippe Reines leaped to Clinton’s defense, writing:

“Give Me A Break. You did not look rattled. You looked real. There’s a difference. A big one.”

The emails from September 2012 also show her and her staff scrambling to respond the night of the attacks and later calibrating their public response.

On the night of the attacks, the communications show Clinton notifying top advisers of confirmation from the Libyans that then-Ambassador Stevens had died.

Early the next morning, Chief of Staff Cheryl Mills tells Clinton they “recovered both bodies” and were looking to get out a statement; Sean Smith, information management officer, was the other State Department employee killed that night.

After a controversy erupted over claims the attack was “spontaneous,” aide Jake Sullivan wrote to Clinton to assure her, “You never said spontaneous or characterized the motives. In fact you were careful in your first statement to say we were assessing motive and method. The way you treated the video in the Libya context was to say that some sought to *justify* the attack on that basis.”

Further, the emails show that shortly before 9 p.m. on Sept. 11, 2012, Clinton sent an email asking her daughter to call her at her office about the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya. The email was addressed to an account under the name “Diane Reynolds,” an alias Chelsea Clinton used for personal messages.

“Two of our officers were killed in Benghazi by an al-Qaida-like group: The Ambassador, whom I handpicked, and a young communications officer on temporary duty w(ith) a wife and two young children,” Hillary Clinton later wrote to her daughter. “Very hard day and I fear more of the same tomorrow.”

In October, that email was trumpeted by Republicans on the House Benghazi committee as evidence that Clinton knew very quickly the attack on the consulate was the work of Islamic terrorists, not a spontaneous street protest triggered by the release of a video considered an insult to the Prophet Mohammed.

Another exchange from early 2013 shows retired diplomat James Jeffrey appearing to do damage control over a Washington Post piece from him titled, “How to Prevent the Next Benghazi.”

Jeffrey starts the conversation by warning Mills he’d been contacted by the Post regarding his views and reluctantly agreed to comply. He warns it would be posted and “you may see this piece as critical of expeditionary diplomacy. It’s not; I’ve risked my life practicing it. But having lost over 100 personnel KIA and WIA (and two ARBs judging me) in my time in Iraq (and a son going back to Afghanistan on Department assignment this summer) I feel very strongly that we have to be prudent. If the media ask me if there is any daylight between me and you all I will cite the Pickering Mullen ARB and the Secretary’s testimony and say absolutely not.”

Forwarding the article, he adds, “(Title is not what I gave them and stupid as I state explicitly at the end that being in Benghazi was the right policy call).”

Its Iran and Russia, Where Obama/Kerry Willing Accomplices

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A review is in order where Iran and Russia are allowed to manage all events in the Middle East including the continued nuclear grace provided by Barack Obama and John Kerry.

The Persian Puppeteer: Iran pulling strings in Syria and across the Middle East

by: Tom Walpole

Russia’s intervention in Syria has pushed the war back to the forefront of international media and escalated violence on the ground. Yet for all the column inches detailing the end of American hegemony in the Middle East and psycho-analysing the motives of Putin, the ongoing participation of Iran in the conflict has been largely consigned to footnotes. Russian bombs lead the headlines, whilst the prospect of an Iranian–backed Government offensive into land cleared by Russian air superiority is often consigned to mid-article statements.

The high-profile death in early October of Hossein Hamedani, the most senior Iranian commander to be killed in a foreign operation for over 36 years, highlighted the presence of Iranian troops in Syria. Not that Iranian involvement in Syria is a new phenomenon. Despite denying the presence of conflict troops in Syria, 18 high-ranking officers in the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) have been killed in Syria in the last three years. Now Iranian troops are bolstering a Syrian state offensive on rebels in the Homs province. Before his death, General Hamedani was quoted as saying that a 130,000 strong force from the Basij (Iran’s paramilitary group) were ready to go to Syria if needed. Aside from the provision of troops, Tehran has also been funding the training of a new Syrian National Defence Force (NDF). IRGC commander-in-chief Mohammad Ali Jafari has stated that the NDF now comprises of 100,000 fighters.

It is clear that Iran continues to be one of the biggest supporters of the Assad regime, providing the troops and training needed to continue a civil war now four and a half years old.  Iranian wealth is also being diverted, in the forms of lines of credit and oil transfers, vital after Islamic State captured the last major government-controlled oil field in September.

Why is Iran invested in Syria?

As a close ally of Iran, losing the Assad regime would drastically curtail Iran’s influence in the Levant. The creation of a Sunni-led Syria would see the country align closer to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, Iran’s regional rivals. Supporting Assad is thus critical to maintaining the regional balance for Iran. Crucially, an allied Syria provides a secure passage for Iran to support Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shi’a movement armed with Iranian weaponry. Hezbollah forces have also fought hard in Syria to defend its Iranian lifeline, a decision that has caused sectarian tension within Lebanon itself. Hezbollah and the Assad regime have traditionally made up the centrepiece of Iranian foreign policy since the 1979 Revolution; the axis of resistance against Western and Israeli power in the Middle East. Losing Assad means losing one member of the axis as well as access to the second, a move leaving Iran hosting a party for one. Losing this influence would have real significance, leaving the Shi’a regime in Iran alone and at odds with the Sunni States of the Middle East led by Saudi Arabia.  Iran’s involvement in Syria is considerable, but it cannot be regarded as blind loyalty to a beleaguered ally. Iranian calculations have a much more international perspective.

An Iranian Resurgence

Punishing EU and UN sanctions on Iran reduced the Iranian rial to an all-time low against the US dollar in October 2012. Bans on oil imports particularly stung Tehran, whose uranium-enrichment strategy threatened to ostracise itself from the international community. Increasingly strained relations with Turkey, as well as the crisis in Syria, have all contributed to an internationally-isolated Iran.

So what has changed?

Russian and Iranian forces have taken the initiative in Syria, giving the imperilled Assad regime more security than it has enjoyed at any point during the war. The power vacuum of a post-Saddam Iraq has been readily capitalised on by Iran, who has increased economic ties with its neighbour and began to fund Iraqi Shi’a militias. A Shi’a dominated Iraqi government has been more receptive to Iranian influence, and Baghdad is now seen by some as a new member of the axis of resistance. In addition, the fight against ISIS has helped forge alliances between Sunni and Shi’a militias, a welcome turn for a country characterised by sectarian violence. Iran has, despite its own refutations, been accused of sending 30,000 of its own troops into Iraq to fight ISIS.

As well as gaining political traction in Baghdad, Iran has increased its support for the Houthis of Yemen after supporting the Shi’a group for several years with military aid and training. Joined by their hatred of Saudi Arabia’s blend of Wahhabism, the Houthis declared themselves part of the axis of resistance in 2015. However, Tehran did try to hold back the Houthis from attacking the Yemeni capital of Sana’a in 2014 for fear of invoking too great an international response. President Obama explained that Iran is:

“Making constant, calculated decisions that allow it to preserve the regime, to expand their influence where they can, to be opportunistic, to create what they view as hedges against potential Israeli attack, in the form of Hezbollah and other proxies, in the region. I think what Iran has been doing in Yemen is a perfect illustration of this.”

Through rational policies and calculated foresight, Iran has managed to establish influence in Iraq, secure its ally in Syria and fund proxies in Lebanon, Yemen and to a lesser extent Palestine, where it continues to provide weapons to Hamas despite disagreements over Syria. Added to this, Iran has managed to thaw its relationships with Jordan and Egypt, relations which had been frozen since the 1979 Revolution.

Paying the Bills

Funding campaigns and militias in Syria, Iraq and Yemen is not cheap. To finance their growing presence in the Middle East, Tehran has looked to the wider international community. In a bid to end the bitter sanctions, Tehran has sponsored a concerted ‘charm offensive’ at the UN, a process signalling an end to Iran’s more isolated past. The nuclear deal signed in the summer is a cornerstone of this new, diplomatic strategy. The deal, which sees Iran trade reduced nuclear capability for sanctions relief, has been heralded as a major diplomatic victory for the Obama administration. Agreements on the nuclear programme have led to the potential lifting of economic sanctions in early 2016, paving the way for international trade and investment. Indeed, the signing of the nuclear deal has opened the floodgates to a deluge of European trade missions to Tehran.

Aside from European investment, the easing of sanctions serves to release Iran from its main source of wealth: oil. Tehran now expects to increase oil production of 500,000 barrels a day by late November, with production to increase further in 2016. These developments will only build on the recent changes in Iranian economic fortunes, for, after two years of recession, the Iranian economy made a comeback in 2014. Ambitious Iranian development plans call for 8% annual growth from 2016-2021, but the World Bank does calculate that an Iran free from sanctions could see healthy GDP growth of 5.8 % and 6.7 % in 2016 and 2017 respectively. It appears that Iran is economically prepared for its more prominent role in the Middle East.

Consequences

In the perennial ideological and political battle between Saudi Arabia and Iran, a resurgent Iran only increases tensions. Characterised by an increase in hostile rhetoric, relations have soured even further in 2015. Iranian backed successes in Syria, Iraq and Yemen all directly impede the influence of the Kingdom. Indeed, Iran’s re-emergence on the oil-producing stage could further antagonise relations between Tehran and Saudi Arabia by biting into The Kingdom’s ability to control world prices.

Israeli-Iranian relations remain irrevocably bitter. The Syrian crisis serves as yet another messy point of conflict, with Israel even killing an IRGC General in an airstrike in January, despite claiming that the Iranian General was not the intended target. However, the nuclear deal did strain US-Israeli relations, with Obama ignoring Israeli lobbying against the deal. Creating cracks in the special relationship is another bonus for Iran.

In the last 3 years Iran has moved from a position of economic turmoil and political isolation to one of considerable regional power whilst normalising international relations, especially with Europe. There are hidden risks. Domestically, unemployment remains high and youth unemployment has frequently been the catalyst for political anger in the region. There is still no sight of victory for Assad in Syria, while the Islamic State continues to provide a source of extremist violence. The Houthis have not secured Yemen and a peace deal is now on the table. Sudan has also joined the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthi rebels. The presence of Sudanese troops in Yemen complicates the situation for Iran, with Tehran and Khartoum used to a close military relationship.

Nevertheless, it is clear that Iran can no longer be dismissed as a Persian Pariah, a rogue state akin to North Korea. Iran has successfully and astutely capitalised on dwindling Western presence in the region and looks economically sound enough to continue its larger role in the Middle East.

MEMRI: In a November 25, 2015 interview on Iranian television, Iran’s deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that he recently held talks with IAEA director-general Yukiya Amano on “closing the Possible Military Dimension (PMD) dossier”, and the latter filled him in about “some of the points he is to present” in the upcoming IAEA report on this issue. Araghchi noted that he had also spoken with the Americans and Europeans in Vienna, and had understood from them that “they too were heading towards closing the PMD dossier.”

It should be recalled that Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization and a member of the nuclear negotiation team, said in a June 21, 2015 interview on Iranian television that Iran had “reached understandings with the IAEA” on the PMD issue, and added: “Now there is political backing [of the P5+1], and the [PMD] issue should be resolved.” He stated further: “By December 15, [2015], at the end of the year, the issue [of the PMD] should be determined. The IAEA will submit its report to [its] board of governors. It will only submit it. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action will continue independently of the results of this report. We have reached understandings with the IAEA… The technical issues are now being resolved in a political framework. They have set a time frame and, God willing, the issue must be resolved by December 15.” In response to the interviewers’ remark that the IAEA has “a bad record” (in terms of cooperating with Iran), Salehi stated: “In short, they [the IAEA] will be the losers. As I have said, the issue has received political backing. The work of [the IAEA] must be reasonable. They cannot do anything unreasonable. When there is no political backing, they do whatever they want, but now there is political backing, and the issue should be resolved.” According to Araghchi, “if the Security Council does not close the PMD dossier, the process of implementing the JCPOA will stop. Hence, the P5+1 must decide between the PMD and the JCPOA… In the past, the P5+1 chose the JCPOA. The [Supreme] Leader [Khamenei]’s letter on Iran’s implementation of the nuclear steps [a document published by Khamenei in October 21 detailing 9 additional conditions for Iranian compliance with the JCPOA][3] likewise emphasizes that they must choose between the JCPOA and the PMD.” The full report is here courtesy of MEMRI.