Category Archives: Whistleblower

FBI Arrests Hacker Linked to Katie Hill Campaign

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Federal agents have arrested Arthur Dam in connection with a hacking spree that disrupted the 2018 Democratic California primary that ultimately nominated Katie Hill, according to a new criminal complaint. Criminal complaint found here.

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‘Throuple’ congresswoman Katie Hill says she made the right choice to resign

Dam, in the criminal complaint, is linked directly to the Hill campaign. Hill won the general election in California’s 25th district, and then later resigned from Congress amid controversy.
“Dam was found to be connected to the cyber attacks through subscriber information, IP addresses, geolocation history, and open sources, including through his employer and his wife, K.O., who worked for one of the Victim’s opponents,” the complaint reads.

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Dam’s wife is Kelsey O’Hara, Hill’s fundraiser during the campaign and her district director after she won office. O’Hara was also the subject of a sexual joke made by Hill and caught on tape by Vice News in 2018. In Hill’s FEC records, she lists a $500 in-kind contribution from Dam on March 25, 2018, for “Graphic design and website security consultation.”
During the campaign, the websites of Hill’s opponents, Democrats Bryan Caforio and Jess Phoenix, were both attacked, though Hill’s never was, raising suspicions at the time that Hill’s campaign was behind them. One major attack on Caforio’s campaign website came at a crucial moment, just an hour before the biggest debate of the primary, the complaint notes. Hill eventually won the California primary by fewer than 3,000 votes.

The FBI traced the hacking to an Amazon Web Services account tied to the email address [email protected], though the credit card used to pay for the service was listed under Dam. The Hotmail account had been created in 2002 using the subscriber name “Arthur Slam.” Dam also used the Hotmail account as the recovery email for his own Gmail account.
The FBI launched a probe that zeroed in on the Hill campaign in 2019, according to FBI correspondence reviewed by The Intercept. Hill did not immediately respond for comment.

Hill’s campaign was the subject of unusual national attention during her campaign, including a Vice News documentary and a Rolling Stone article. On March 3, the 25th Congressional district will hold a special election to replace Hill, who resigned in October 2019.

Justice Dept Brands Huawei as a Criminal Enterprise

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Gotta hope that Europe takes note, especially Britain. Europe so far has approved Huawei as the vendor platform for 5G. Check your use of apps at the Google store and take a second look at your smart devices.

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FDD: The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei Technologies and its subsidiaries last week for alleged racketeering, theft of intellectual property, and conspiracy to commit bank fraud, among other charges. The indictment portrays Huawei not merely as a company that has broken the law, but as a fundamentally criminal enterprise.

The new charges target Huawei, four of Huawei’s subsidiaries (Huawei Device Co. Ltd., Huawei Device USA Inc., Futurewei Technologies Inc., and Skycom Tech Co. Ltd.), and Huawei’s chief financial officer, Meng Wanzhou, for violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, which Congress passed in 1970 to combat organized crime.

According to the DOJ, the Huawei business model entailed “the deliberate and repeated misappropriation of intellectual property of companies headquartered or with offices in the United States.” DOJ also highlighted other violations, including Huawei’s role in sanctions evasion and fraudulent activities.

Last week’s indictment marks the first time DOJ charged a company with suspect connections to a foreign government as a criminal enterprise. Although Huawei asserts it is not state-owned, the company has indirect ties to the Chinese government and has yet to publically disclose who exactly owns and controls the company. Huawei’s majority shareholder is the company’s labor union, which keeps the details of its membership and governance structure out of the public eye. Last year, Jiang Xisheng, a top executive, explained during a press conference that the labor union’s ownership is simply a matter of legal convenience; this only further obfuscated who is really in charge. Additionally, Huawei’s founder, Ren Zhangfei, served in the Chinese military and is a member of the Chinese Communist Party.

While the indictment does not say that Beijing directed Huawei to operate as a criminal enterprise, China’s National Intelligence Law of 2017 requires Huawei and other private companies to provide the government with their data to “support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence according to the law.” In short, the law empowers Beijing to exploit Huawei as an intelligence asset whenever it sees fit.

In other high-profile cases, the Chinese government has stolen sensitive U.S. data to achieve a strategic advantage. U.S. officials have even deemed China’s espionage and intelligence activities as a “long-term existential threat to the security of our nation.” In 2012, the head of the U.S. National Security Agency estimated that China’s economic espionage cost U.S. companies $250 billion in annual losses. Additionally, the targeting of strategic industries has allowed Beijing to enhance its own military capabilities at America’s expense.

The exploitation of Huawei could clearly enhance Beijing’s intelligence collecting capabilities. Just last week, the U.S. government reported that for over ten years Huawei secretly maintained “back doors” on its mobile networks that allowed the company – and potentially the Chinese government – to have direct access to their users’ most sensitive data.

The indictment of Huawei as a criminal enterprise shows that the Trump administration was mistaken when it placated Beijing by softening previous penalties for Huawei’s misconduct. If the court finds Huawei guilty under RICO, the administration should ensure the full application of all penalties necessary to end its criminal pursuits.

 

US Unable to Trace $716 Million of Military Gear

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It was and still is a nasty conflict in Syria, Iraq and even in Turkey. Islamic State lost their control of land mass but the terror group(s) still operate in various locations.
The Pentagon’s Office of the Inspector General, which was released to the public on Tuesday, shows that most of the CTEF weaponry’s whereabouts cannot be verified. The reason, according to the audit, is that officials with the Special Operations Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, failed to maintain detailed lists of all military equipment given to Washington’s allies in Syria between 2017 and 2018. Officials did not have a centralized depository facility for dispensing the equipment, and no documentation was kept during the operation, according to the audit. Consequently, thousands of weapons, weapons parts and other military hardware were exposed to “loss and theft”, says the Pentagon report.

US pulled multiple ways in Syria as Islamic State recedes ... source

In December 2018, the DoD began planning for the safe, professional withdrawal of U.S. personnel from Syria while maintaining its efforts to defeat ISIS. For FY 2020, the DoD budget requested $300 million, including $173.2 million for weapons, ammunitions, vehicles, and other CTEF-S equipment, to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS. The FY 2020 DoD budget request states that equipping, sustaining, and enabling the VSO is critical to the DoD’s approach. The relationship between U.S. forces and the VSO relies heavily on the DoD’s ability to provide weapons, ammunitions, and equipment. Furthermore, the FY 2020 DoD budget request states that the VSO’s combat effectiveness, movement, and operational tempo are directly linked to U.S. support, including the provision of weapons, ammunition, and equipment.

The CTEF-S program provides equipment designated for Syria to support the VSO. From FY 2017 through FY 2018, Congress authorized a total of $930 million for the CTEF-S program to support the VSO. Of the $930 million, the DoD budget requested $715.8 million for weapons, ammunition, vehicles, or equipment for FYs 2017 and 2018.

Special Operations Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR), under Combined Joint Task Force–OIR (CJTF-OIR), is the primary accompany force in Syria that advises and assists the VSO. According to SOJTF-OIR personnel, SOJTF-OIR also manages the day-to-day operations of the CTEF-S program. Specifically, SOJTF-OIR personnel identify program requirements—including the VSO’s needs for CTEF-S equipment and weapons— coordinate with acquisition agencies, manage equipment distribution, and monitor divestment tracking and reporting for CTEF-S equipment, such as weapons, ammunition, or vehicles.

Personnel from 1st Theater Sustainment Command (1st TSC), under U.S. Army Central, told us that 1st TSC personnel account for and store CTEF-S equipment in Kuwait, accept the equipment once it arrives in Kuwait, then transport the equipment to the Building Partners Capacity (BPC) Kuwait warehouse. According to 1st TSC personnel, 1st TSC maintain a detailed inventory of all CTEF-S equipment at the BPC Kuwait warehouse and coordinate the movement of all CTEF-S equipment from the BPC Kuwait warehouse to storage sites closer to Syria. Personnel from 1st TSC indicated that CTEF-S equipment remains in U.S. Government possession while stored at the BPC Kuwait warehouse and storage sites closer to Syria. According to SOJTF-OIR personnel, Coalition units located throughout Syria work closely with the VSO to identify their current and future operational needs, such as weapons and vehicles. The VSO consists of DoD-approved Syrian opposition personnel who are dedicated to fighting ISIS throughout Syria. SOJTF-OIR personnel stated that Coalition units select, investigate, train, and equip these local Syrian forces to defeat ISIS. In addition, SOJTF-OIR personnel stated that Coalition units receive the CTEF-S equipment from the BPC Kuwait warehouse and divest CTEF-S equipment to the VSO. Once divested, ownership and accountability of CTEF-S equipment is transferred from the DoD to the VSO.

Finding

SOJTF-OIR personnel did not account for the budgeted $715.8 million of CTEF-S equipment for FYs 2017 and 2018 from procurement through divestment in accordance with DoD Instruction 5000.64 and Army Regulation 735-5. For example, SOJTF-OIR personnel did not maintain comprehensive lists of all equipment purchased and received. This occurred because SOJTF-OIR personnel allowed multiple entities involved with CTEF-S equipment to store records in numerous locations instead of designating a central repository for all supporting accountability documentation.

1st TSC personnel did not properly store or secure CTEF-S equipment at the BPC Kuwait warehouse in accordance with DoD guidance, Army regulations, or SOJTF-OIR standard operating procedures. For example, 1st TSC personnel stored weapons outside in metal shipping containers, exposing the equipment to harsh environmental elements, such as heat and humidity. This occurred because SOJTF-OIR personnel did not divest or dispose of CTEF-S equipment, which led to overcrowding at the BPC Kuwait warehouse. In addition, according to 1st TSC’s inventory records, 1st TSC personnel stored 4,144 Category II weapons (sensitive weapons), such as machine guns and grenade launchers, outside in metal shipping containers and not in a facility that met the requirement for storing Category II weapons.

For FY 2020, the DoD budget requested $173.2 million for weapons, ammunitions, vehicles, and other CTEF-S equipment. Without accurate accountability records, such as inventory records and hand receipts, SOJTF-OIR personnel could order equipment that SOJTF-OIR already has in stock, risking unnecessary spending of CTEF-S funds and further overcrowding the BPC Kuwait warehouse resulting in equipment being stored outside.

Furthermore, SOJTF-OIR and 1st TSC personnel left thousands of CTEF-S weapons and sensitive equipment items vulnerable to loss or theft. Without conducting consistent inventories and ensuring proper security for CTEF-S equipment, 1st TSC could not determine whether items were lost or stolen which could delay the initiation of an investigation.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Commander of SOJTF-OIR develop a central repository system for all documentation required to support CTEF-S equipment requested on the memorandum of requirement through the entire divestment process.

We recommend that the Commander of SOJTF-OIR develop guidance for the proper disposal of CTEF-S equipment stored at the BPC Kuwait warehouse that has been declared unserviceable.

Additionally, we recommend that the Commander of 1st TSC complete a physical security inspection periodically, but no less than every 18 months, and ensure corrective action is taken to fix new and existing security issues identified.

Management Comments and Our Response

During the audit, we advised SOJTF-OIR and 1st TSC of the deficiencies within the CTEF-S program for the accountability and security of CTEF-S equipment. SOJTF-OIR and 1st TSC personnel agreed with our findings and immediately initiated corrective actions. SOJTF-OIR personnel stated that SOJTF-OIR created a shared drive portal for all documentation for CTEF-S equipment from procurement through divestment, including memorandums of requirement, purchase orders, equipment received, inventories completed, hand receipts, transfers, and divestment packages. 1st TSC has already started providing its hand receipts and completed inventory documents to SOJTF-OIR for inclusion in the shared drive. As of January 2020, SOJTF-OIR is using this shared drive portal to store documentation for CTEF-S equipment, such as inventories, lateral transfers, and hand receipts. The actions taken addressed the specifics of Recommendation 1 to establish a central repository for all documentation required to support CTEF-S equipment requested on the memorandum of requirement through the entire divestment process; therefore, Recommendation 1 is closed.

On May 31, 2019, U.S. Central Command developed and began implementing a disposal plan for unserviceable equipment purchased for the VSO, including items stored at the BPC Kuwait warehouse. CJTF-OIR personnel stated that this plan will reduce the amount of CTEF-S equipment currently stored at the BPC Kuwait warehouse, and equipment will no longer need to be stored outside the warehouse exposed to the harsh elements. Furthermore, in November 2019, CJTF-OIR personnel confirmed that disposition guidance for unserviceable CTEF-S equipment was received from U.S. Central Command and that unserviceable CTEF-S equipment will be provided to the Defense Logistics Agency or disposed. The actions taken addressed the specifics of Recommendation 2 to develop guidance for the disposal of unserviceable equipment; therefore, Recommendation 2 is closed.

During our February 2019 followup site visit, the audit team verified that 1st TSC personnel had started taking corrective actions to address the security deficiencies on the issues the audit team identified during the initial site visit. The actions taken addressed the specifics of Recommendation 3 to complete a security inspection and address security issues; therefore, Recommendation 3 is closed.

This report is a result of Project No. D2019-D000RJ-0031.000

Iran to be Blacklisted as a Country

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Financial Action Task Force, a Paris based organization will take blacklisting action on Iran this week. Finally, it appears Europe is joining the United States in this effort even while former Secretary of State John Kerry and a democrat U.S. Senate delegation met with Iranian leaders in a secret setting.
The task force designation will encompass 39 member countries and organizations where this calls for sanctions on Iran due to money-laundering, financing of terror organizations, corruption politicians, international crime, illegal arms trade and drug trafficking. It is unclear if the United Nations has offered any resistance or comment. The only other country under this full designation is North Korea, yet another 12 countries are subject to the same scrutiny and punitive actions by the task force. Banking and access to international trade will be limited or terminated in many cases completely.

Meanwhile, Russia and China have stepped in to provide more support and aid to Iran.
In an effort to preserve trade and revenue, Iran was construction a rail system into Central Asia connecting the Caspian countries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Due to US sanctions, Iran has been in a financial tailspin and construction has essentially stopped and the costs were escalating due to the difficult mountainous regions and regional politics. Enter China and Russia.

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The project is expected to cost 1.2 billion euros ($1.5 billion) and is being financed by an export credit that Moscow has extended to Tehran. It will involve the electrification of 495 kilometers of existing line, including 203 kilometers in mountainous areas, and the updating of 31 stations and 95 tunnels. This railway segment is projected to carry up to ten million tons of cargo annually upon completion, in 2024. Russian and Iranian officials are jubilant: “All this creates conditions for the growth of goods traffic along the International North–South Transport Corridor and the intensification of economic ties in the Caspian region,” they say (Casp-geo.ru, February 18). The reasons are obvious: if this rail project is completed, Russia and Iran will be able to control much of the trade coming through or out of Central Asia, thus limiting the freedom of action of the states of that region and giving Moscow and Tehran a greater voice in Chinese decisions there (Casp-geo.ru, November 28, 2019; Ru.irna.ir, November 13, 2019).

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Development of Xinjiang

For China, the project is extremely important due to several factors. First, it will stimulate the economic development of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. This autonomous region of China plays a significant role in rail freight transportation on the New Silk Road. The majority of container trains from central, eastern and southern China to Europe run via Xinjiang. Its capital, Urumqi, is also an important railway hub on the corridor towards Europe.

Kashgar, one of the westernmost cities in China, could be another junction in Xinjiang. The Chinese government is discussing the construction of two railway lines from Kashgar: one westward to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and another southward. The latter heads to Pakistan, where China Overseas Port Holding Company operates Gwadar Deep Sea Port, and where China intends to build its second, after Djibouti, overseas naval base.

New Silk Road

The second factor of success is the potential of the railway line for the New Silk Road. According to estimations, the Xinjiang – Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan route will shorten the route from China to Uzbekistan. Currently, containers going to this Central Asian country must cover long distances and cross the territory of neighbouring Kazakhstan.

Moreover, the railway link between China and Uzbekistan links to Iran (via Turkmenistan) and Turkey, as well as eventually to Europe, especially to Southeast Europe. With this, the route from China to Southeast Europe could be reduced up to 900 kilometres, equal to up to seven or eight days. At the same time, the new railway will allow China to better involve Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan into the New Silk Road.

Dem Senators Meet in Secret with Zarif/Iran Last Week

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Did you hear about Senator(s) Whitehouse and Murphy and their secret meeting and delegation?

*** “Murphy is a frequent speaker at the National Iranian American Council, a lobbying group with alleged links to the Islamic Republic of Iran.” He also criticized the killing of Soleimani, the world’s most notorious terrorist, who also killed more than 600 US soldiers in Iraq.

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Sen. Chris Murphy of Connecticut and other Democratic senators had a secret meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif during the Munich Security Conference last week, according to a source briefed by the French delegation to the conference. Murphy’s office did not respond to repeated requests for comment by press time.

Such a meeting would mean Murphy had done the type of secret coordination with foreign leaders to potentially undermine the U.S. government that he accused Trump officials of doing as they prepared for Trump’s administration. In February 2017, Murphy demanded investigations of National Security Advisor Mike Flynn because he had a phone call with his counterpart-to-be in Russia.

“Any effort to undermine our nation’s foreign policy – even during a transition period – may be illegal and must be taken seriously,” Murphy said in 2017 after anonymous leaks of Flynn’s phone call with Russian ambassador Sergey Kisylak were published. He also strongly criticized the open letter some Republican senators sent Iranian leaders during the Obama administration’s campaign for a nuclear agreement.

However, Murphy has previously defended rogue meetings if they’re done by Democrats such as former Secretary of State John Kerry.

“Unless it was authorized by the president or secretary of state, conducting independent foreign policy sends mixed signals to our adversaries,” said Christian Whiton, former State Department senior advisor in the Trump and George W. Bush administrations. “It seems very unpalatable. If we want to talk to Iranians, they know how to reach us and they don’t need to go through an intermediary.”

A State Department official who spoke on background said that the State Department was not aware of any side meetings with Iranian officials that Murphy was engaged in.

The Munich Security Conference, an annual forum on international security policy, welcomes hundreds of world leaders each February. This year’s conference featured robust debate on the United States’ maximum pressure policy against Iran, China’s handling of the coronavirus and technology concerns, and the European alliance with the United States. Other Democrat senators at the conference included Sens. Robert Menendez of New Jersey and Chris Van Hollen of Maryland. Former Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts also attended.

Both Murphy and Zarif spoke publicly during a two-hour session on Middle East policy, with Murphy and Zarif both fiercely criticizing U.S. policy.

President Donald Trump has reoriented American policy in the Middle East away from President Barack Obama’s friendly posture toward Iran. He departed from Obama’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a nuclear arrangement with the Republic of Iran that was not ratified by the United States Senate.

Trump has exerted instead a “maximum pressure” campaign against the regime, with 12 demands on Iran before a new deal is reached. Those demands include a full account of its nuclear program, ending its proliferation of ballistic missiles, releasing all U.S. citizens held on spurious charges, ending support to terrorist groups, withdrawal of forces in Syria, and cessation of its threatening behavior against its neighbors.

The “maximum pressure” campaign of sanctions has devastated the Iranian economy, which is in recession and faces rising inflation. It has made it difficult for Iran to pay foreign fighters engaged in supported terror operations. Iranians have taken to the streets in protest.

Iran recently killed an American contractor in Iraq and the United States killed Iranian general Qassim Suleimani, a top Iranian leader who was responsible for the killing and maiming of thousands of U.S. soldiers. Iran’s retaliatory strike for that killing resulted in no U.S. deaths, but the country did shoot down a Ukrainian passenger plane then lied about it for days.

At the conference, Zarif said official retaliation for the killing of Suleimani had ended, although he suggested independent attacks from others in the country might follow.

Murphy is a frequent speaker at the National Iranian American Council, a lobbying group with alleged links to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Republican Sens. Mike Braun of Indiana, Tom Cotton of Arkansas, and Ted Cruz of Texas recently asked the Department of Justice for potential violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

They wrote that the influential lobbying group “purports to improve understanding between American and Iranian people but in reality seems to spread propaganda and lobby on behalf of the Iranian government.” Evidence indicates that evidence Zarif himself was involved in founding the group. Hat tip/Federalist