Trump’s EO on Electromagnetic Pulses

The EMP Threat: How It Works and What It Means for the Korean Crisis - Geopolitical Futures

If government agencies are working this mission, shouldn’t Congress take up some measures too? Given this Executive Order, consider what motivated this action and consider all the measures you yourself should take.

Executive Order on Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1.  Purpose.  An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) has the potential to disrupt, degrade, and damage technology and critical infrastructure systems.  Human-made or naturally occurring EMPs can affect large geographic areas, disrupting elements critical to the Nation’s security and economic prosperity, and could adversely affect global commerce and stability.  The Federal Government must foster sustainable, efficient, and cost-effective approaches to improving the Nation’s resilience to the effects of EMPs.

Sec. 2.  Definitions.  As used in this order:

(a)  “Critical infrastructure” means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.

(b)  “Electromagnetic pulse” is a burst of electromagnetic energy.  EMPs have the potential to negatively affect technology systems on Earth and in space.  A high-altitude EMP (HEMP) is a type of human-made EMP that occurs when a nuclear device is detonated at approximately 40 kilometers or more above the surface of Earth.  A geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) is a type of natural EMP driven by a temporary disturbance of Earth’s magnetic field resulting from interactions with solar eruptions.  Both HEMPs and GMDs can affect large geographic areas.

(c)  “National Critical Functions” means the functions of government and the private sector so vital to the United States that their disruption, corruption, or dysfunction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.

(d)  “National Essential Functions” means the overarching responsibilities of the Federal Government to lead and sustain the Nation before, during, and in the aftermath of a catastrophic emergency, such as an EMP that adversely affects the performance of Government.

(e)  “Prepare” and “preparedness” mean the actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation.  These terms include the prediction and notification of impending EMPs.

(f)  A “Sector-Specific Agency” (SSA) is the Federal department or agency that is responsible for providing institutional knowledge and specialized expertise as well as leading, facilitating, or supporting the security and resilience programs and associated activities of its designated critical infrastructure sector in the all-hazards environment.  The SSAs are those identified in Presidential Policy Directive 21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience).

Sec. 3.  Policy.  (a)  It is the policy of the United States to prepare for the effects of EMPs through targeted approaches that coordinate whole-of-government activities and encourage private-sector engagement.  The Federal Government must provide warning of an impending EMP; protect against, respond to, and recover from the effects of an EMP through public and private engagement, planning, and investment; and prevent adversarial events through deterrence, defense, and nuclear nonproliferation efforts.  To achieve these goals, the Federal Government shall engage in risk-informed planning, prioritize research and development (R&D) to address the needs of critical infrastructure stakeholders, and, for adversarial threats, consult Intelligence Community assessments.

(b)  To implement the actions directed in this order, the Federal Government shall promote collaboration and facilitate information sharing, including the sharing of threat and vulnerability assessments, among executive departments and agencies (agencies), the owners and operators of critical infrastructure, and other relevant stakeholders, as appropriate.  The Federal Government shall also provide incentives, as appropriate, to private-sector partners to encourage innovation that strengthens critical infrastructure against the effects of EMPs through the development and implementation of best practices, regulations, and appropriate guidance.

Sec. 4.  Coordination.  (a)  The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), through National Security Council staff and in consultation with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), shall coordinate the development and implementation of executive branch actions to assess, prioritize, and manage the risks of EMPs.  The APNSA shall, on an annual basis, submit a report to the President summarizing progress on the implementation of this order, identifying gaps in capability, and recommending how to address those gaps.

(b)  To further the Federal R&D necessary to prepare the Nation for the effects of EMPs, the Director of OSTP shall coordinate efforts of agencies through the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC).  The Director of OSTP, through the NSTC, shall annually review and assess the R&D needs of agencies conducting preparedness activities for EMPs, consistent with this order.

Sec. 5.  Roles and Responsibilities.  (a)  The Secretary of State shall:

(i)   lead the coordination of diplomatic efforts with United States allies and international partners regarding enhancing resilience to the effects of EMPs; and

(ii)  in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of other relevant agencies, strengthen nuclear nonproliferation and deterrence efforts, which would reduce the likelihood of an EMP attack on the United States or its allies and partners by limiting the availability of nuclear devices.

(b)  The Secretary of Defense shall:

(i)    in cooperation with the heads of relevant agencies and with United States allies, international partners, and private-sector entities as appropriate, improve and develop the ability to rapidly characterize, attribute, and provide warning of EMPs, including effects on space systems of interest to the United States;

(ii)   provide timely operational observations, analyses, forecasts, and other products for naturally occurring EMPs to support the mission of the Department of Defense along with United States allies and international partners, including the provision of alerts and warnings for natural EMPs that may affect weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States;

(iii)  conduct R&D and testing to understand the effects of EMPs on Department of Defense systems and infrastructure, improve capabilities to model and simulate the environments and effects of EMPs, and develop technologies to protect Department of Defense systems and infrastructure from the effects of EMPs to ensure the successful execution of Department of Defense missions;

(iv)   review and update existing EMP-related standards for Department of Defense systems and infrastructure, as appropriate;

(v)    share technical expertise and data regarding EMPs and their potential effects with other agencies and with the private sector, as appropriate;

(vi)   incorporate attacks that include EMPs as a factor in defense planning scenarios; and

(vii)  defend the Nation from adversarial EMPs originating outside of the United States through defense and deterrence, consistent with the mission and national security policy of the Department of Defense.

(c)  The Secretary of the Interior shall support the research, development, deployment, and operation of capabilities that enhance understanding of variations of Earth’s magnetic field associated with EMPs.

(d)  The Secretary of Commerce shall:

(i)   provide timely and accurate operational observations, analyses, forecasts, and other products for natural EMPs, exclusive of the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense set forth in subsection (b)(ii) of this section; and

(ii)  use the capabilities of the Department of Commerce, the private sector, academia, and nongovernmental organizations to continuously improve operational forecasting services and the development of standards for commercial EMP technology.

(e)  The Secretary of Energy shall conduct early-stage R&D, develop pilot programs, and partner with other agencies and the private sector, as appropriate, to characterize sources of EMPs and their couplings to the electric power grid and its subcomponents, understand associated potential failure modes for the energy sector, and coordinate preparedness and mitigation measures with energy sector partners.

(f)  The Secretary of Homeland Security shall:

(i)    provide timely distribution of information on EMPs and credible associated threats to Federal, State, and local governments, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and other stakeholders;

(ii)   in coordination with the heads of any relevant SSAs, use the results of risk assessments to better understand and enhance resilience to the effects of EMPs across all critical infrastructure sectors, including coordinating the identification of national critical functions and the prioritization of associated critical infrastructure at greatest risk to the effects of EMPs;

(iii)  coordinate response to and recovery from the effects of EMPs on critical infrastructure, in coordination with the heads of appropriate SSAs;

(iv)   incorporate events that include EMPs as a factor in preparedness scenarios and exercises;

(v)    in coordination with the heads of relevant SSAs, conduct R&D to better understand and more effectively model the effects of EMPs on national critical functions and associated critical infrastructure — excluding Department of Defense systems and infrastructure — and develop technologies and guidelines to enhance these functions and better protect this infrastructure;

(vi)   maintain survivable means to provide necessary emergency information to the public during and after EMPs; and

(vii)  in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, and informed by intelligence-based threat assessments, develop quadrennial risk assessments on EMPs, with the first risk assessment delivered within 1 year of the date of this order.

(g)  The Director of National Intelligence shall:

(i)   coordinate the collection, analysis, and promulgation, as appropriate, of intelligence-based assessments on adversaries’ capabilities to conduct an attack utilizing an EMP and the likelihood of such an attack; and

(ii)  provide intelligence-based threat assessments to support the heads of relevant SSAs in the development of quadrennial risk assessments on EMPs.

(h)  The heads of all SSAs, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall enhance and facilitate information sharing with private-sector counterparts, as appropriate, to enhance preparedness for the effects of EMPs, to identify and share vulnerabilities, and to work collaboratively to reduce vulnerabilities.

(i)  The heads of all agencies that support National Essential Functions shall ensure that their all­hazards preparedness planning sufficiently addresses EMPs, including through mitigation, response, and recovery, as directed by national preparedness policy.

Sec. 6.  Implementation.  (a)  Identifying national critical functions and associated priority critical infrastructure at greatest risk.

(i)   Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and other agencies as appropriate, shall identify and list the national critical functions and associated priority critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets, including space-based assets that, if disrupted, could reasonably result in catastrophic national or regional effects on public health or safety, economic security, or national security.  The Secretary of Homeland Security shall update this list as necessary.

(ii)  Within 1 year of the identification described in subsection (a)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of other agencies as appropriate, shall, using appropriate government and private-sector standards for EMPs, assess which identified critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets are most vulnerable to the effects of EMPs.  The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide this list to the President, through the APNSA.  The Secretary of Homeland Security shall update this list using the results produced pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, and as necessary thereafter.

(b)  Improving understanding of the effects of EMPs.

(i)    Within 180 days of the identification described in subsection (a)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and in consultation with the Director of OSTP and the heads of other appropriate agencies, shall review test data — identifying any gaps in such data — regarding the effects of EMPs on critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets representative of those throughout the Nation.

(ii)   Within 180 days of identifying the gaps in existing test data, as directed by subsection (b)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and in consultation with the Director of OSTP and the heads of other appropriate agencies, shall use the sector partnership structure identified in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan to develop an integrated cross-sector plan to address the identified gaps.  The heads of agencies identified in the plan shall implement the plan in collaboration with the private sector, as appropriate.

(iii)  Within 1 year of the date of this order, and as appropriate thereafter, the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the heads of other agencies and the private sector, as appropriate, shall review existing standards for EMPs and develop or update, as necessary, quantitative benchmarks that sufficiently describe the physical characteristics of EMPs, including waveform and intensity, in a form that is useful to and can be shared with owners and operators of critical infrastructure.

(iv)   Within 4 years of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Interior shall complete a magnetotelluric survey of the contiguous United States to help critical infrastructure owners and operators conduct EMP vulnerability assessments.

(c)  Evaluating approaches to mitigate the effects of EMPs.

(i)    Within 1 year of the date of this order, and every 2 years thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, and in consultation with the Director of OSTP, the heads of other appropriate agencies, and private-sector partners as appropriate, shall submit to the President, through the APNSA, a report that analyzes the technology options available to improve the resilience of critical infrastructure to the effects of EMPs.  The Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security shall also identify gaps in available technologies and opportunities for future technological developments to inform R&D activities.

(ii)   Within 180 days of the completion of the activities directed by subsections (b)(iii) and (c)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of other agencies and in consultation with the private sector as appropriate, shall develop and implement a pilot test to evaluate available engineering approaches for mitigating the effects of EMPs on the most vulnerable critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets, as identified in subsection (a)(ii) of this section.

(iii)  Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of relevant SSAs, and in consultation with appropriate regulatory and utility commissions and other stakeholders, shall identify regulatory and non regulatory mechanisms, including cost recovery measures, that can enhance private-sector engagement to address the effects of EMPs.

(d)  Strengthening critical infrastructure to withstand the effects of EMPs.

(i)    Within 90 days of completing the actions directed in subsection (c)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and in consultation with the heads of other appropriate agencies and with the private sector as appropriate, shall develop a plan to mitigate the effects of EMPs on the vulnerable priority critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets identified under subsection (a)(ii) of this section.  The plan shall align with and build on actions identified in reports required by Executive Order 13800 of May 11, 2017 (Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure).  The Secretary of Homeland Security shall implement those elements of the plan that are consistent with Department of Homeland Security authorities and resources, and report to the APNSA regarding any additional authorities and resources needed to complete its implementation.  The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, shall update the plan as necessary based on results from the actions directed in subsections (b) and (c) of this section.

(ii)   Within 180 days of the completion of the actions identified in subsection (c)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Energy, shall conduct a pilot test to evaluate engineering approaches used to harden a strategic military installation, including infrastructure that is critical to supporting that installation, against the effects of EMPs.

(iii)  Within 180 days of completing the pilot test described in subsection (d)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Defense shall report to the President, through the APNSA, regarding the cost and effectiveness of the evaluated approaches.

(e)  Improving response to EMPs.

(i)    Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the heads of appropriate SSAs, shall review and update Federal response plans, programs, and procedures to account for the effects of EMPs.

(ii)   Within 180 days of the completion of actions directed by subsection (e)(i) of this section, agencies that support National Essential Functions shall update operational plans documenting their procedures and responsibilities to prepare for, protect against, and mitigate the effects of EMPs.

(iii)  Within 180 days of identifying vulnerable priority critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets as directed by subsection (a)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, shall provide the Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and the Director of OSTP with an assessment of the effects of EMPs on critical communications infrastructure, and recommend changes to operational plans to enhance national response and recovery efforts after an EMP.

Sec. 7.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 26, 2019.

Qatar Operations all Over the United States

File:Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani with Obamas.jpg ...

Back in 2014, I wrote about Qatar, sounding the alarm due to the very close relationship between Hamad bin Thamer al Thani and Barack Obama. In fact when Obama showed up to West Point for a speech and graduation, the son of al Thani was in that graduating class. Wut you say?

Obama: US will work to up support for Syria rebels | The ...

I wrote again about Qatar in 2017  funding Hamas in Gaza. A few months later, I published an item about Qatar hiring lobbying organizations in DC, that other part of the swamp. Then there was the piece about Qatar buying off teachers and American education.

It continues as Qatar has an investment fund worth an estimated $260 billion. The forecast is to spend $35 billion in the United States and they are well underway.

Since, 2015, Qatar spent $8 billion in a Manhattan West real estate project that is mixed use located very near Penn Station. While Qatar is buying off lawyers and lobbyists in DC, even the very buildings are part of the Qatari real estate portfolio including the CityCenterDC. Oh yeah, remember former AG Eric Holder? Well he is of the law firm Covington & Burling. The law firm has a lucrative consulting contract with Qatar. In fact, Covington & Burling has an office in Doha. Perhaps because Qatar owns CityCenter in DC, they needed a tenant, they got one…Covington & Burling.

The spending continues. The Qatar Investment Authority has committed another $45 billion to be spent in Europe and the United States. The operations in the United States include more real estate, technology and U.S. exchanges. They already completed a deal buying Gigamon, Inc., which is a networking software company. That deal was worth a mere $1.6 billion.

Qatar has been funding terrorism for decades hence the reason several countries have terminated relationships with Qatar including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and even the Maldives. But have they really cut ties? No. Is Qatar still funding terrorism? Yes. Hamas enjoys Qatari money as Hamas is currently lobbying rockets into Israel. Oh yeah, remember Jamal Khashoggi? As he was on the payroll of the Washington Post, which was just a cover, Khashoggi was a long-term member of the Muslim Brotherhood which has a headquarters facility in Qatar. If anyone paid attention, the Washington Post admitted the Qatari Foundation shaped news stories the paper published, directed by Khashoggi. Simply put, Qatar enjoys a great reach into U.S. media as Khashoggi was a Qatari intelligence asset.

Khashoggi was handled on behalf of the Qataris by former U.S. foreign service officer Maggie Mitchell Salem, an executive at the Qatar Foundation International. In WhatsApp messages that, as Salem explained in a tweet, she shared with the Post, she urged him “to take a harder line against the Saudi government.” In brief, she used Khashoggi’s byline to run an anti-Saudi campaign through the Washington Post. The Qatar Foundation International did not respond by press time to an email asking whether Qatari officials directed Salem to assist Khashoggi or if any were aware she was assisting him.

Why was the murder of Khashoggi such a big deal in reality? Because of the robust connective tissue in Washington DC of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, competing money and objectives, meaning lobbying. Remember too that Khashoggi was NOT a U.S. citizen or a green cardholder. He was in our country under an 0-1 visa, granted to people with ‘extraordinary ability’ and owned an apartment in Virginia.

Living outside of DC, we dont see how that hidden international machines work in DC….above describes much of it. In case you need more, enjoy this video.

Hat tip to the Securities Studies Group:

BLOOD MONEY: How Qatar Bought Off the Entire DC Establishment

Maduro Gets Russian Military Backup

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – A Russian military contingent that arrived in Venezuela over the weekend, drawing U.S. condemnation, is believed by the U.S. government to be made up of special forces including “cybersecurity personnel,” a U.S. official told Reuters on Tuesday.

The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the United States was still assessing the Russian deployment, which Washington has called a “reckless escalation” of the situation in Venezuela.

Two Russian air force planes landed outside Caracas on Saturday carrying nearly 100 Russian troops, according to local media reports, two months after the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump disavowed Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

Russia’s main objective in providing the military assistance, including cyber experts, would likely be to help shield Maduro from “regime change” and ensure a foothold for Moscow in Latin America, according to a source familiar with U.S. government assessments of Venezuela. Russia also has major energy investments in OPEC member Venezuela.

Russia’s foreign ministry said on Tuesday that the presence of “Russian specialists” in Venezuela was governed by a military-technical cooperation agreement between the two countries. It did not provide further details.

Russian air force planes land in Venezuela carrying troops ...

The United States condemned this action and Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State called Moscow to discuss describing this as a reckless escalation of conditions on the ground in Venezuela.

There is more.

China is defending Russia in this action.

White House national security adviser John Bolton tweeted Monday that the U.S. “will not tolerate hostile foreign military powers meddling” within the Western Hemisphere. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that Washington “will not stand idly by as Russia exacerbates tensions in Venezuela,” according to State Department.

Asked about these developments, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang told a press briefing Tuesday that “countries in the Western Hemisphere, including Latin American countries, are all sovereign states,” so “they have the right to determine their own foreign policy and their way to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation with countries of their own choosing.”

Geng went on to cite the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, a 1954 document asserting Beijing’s commitment to avoid aggression and interference abroad. The strategy was developed to promote relations with India, though the two would go on to fight three border disputes and threatened to clash a fourth time over contested territory in summer 2017.

“Regarding the Venezuela issue, we want to stress that it can only be resolved by the Venezuelan people, and stability is in the interests of Venezuela and the region,” Geng told reporters. “China would like to work with the international community to help Venezuela restore stability at an early date. Meanwhile, we will continue to advance friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation with Latin American countries.

“Latin American affairs are not a certain country’s exclusive business, nor is Latin America a certain country’s backyard,” he added.

Russian air force planes land in Venezuela carrying troops ...

The U.S. has a long history of intervening against left-wing forces across Latin America and Washington officials—including current Venezuela envoy Elliot Abrams—have been linked to an attempted coup against Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chávez, in 2002. Russia’s outreach to Venezuela, which previously conducted joint air drills with Moscow over the Caribbean in December, has evoked comparisons to the Cuban Missile Crisis, especially amid the collapse of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty banning land-based missiles systems ranging from 310 to 3,420 miles.

Russia and China have defied these measures, however, continuing to engage with the Venezuelan government. As Moscow continued to deal in oil with Maduro’s administration, Beijing has offered to help fix the South American state’s failing electricity grid. Maduro and his officials have accused Washington and Guaidó of conspiring to cause recent blackouts made worse by fuel shortages caused by sanctions.

It is already affecting the trade talks between the United States and China.

Beijing’s support for Maduro has also led to the cancellation of a high-profile meeting organized by the Washington-based Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) meeting in the Chinese city of Chengdu. China refused to grant Guaidó a diplomatic visa as he was not considered a head of state, and the bank ultimately called off the event.

Geng said Tuesday that “China deeply regrets that the IDB decided to call off its annual meeting in Chengdu.” He said, “The vast majority of the IDB membership agree with China’s view that the annual meeting should focus on financial cooperation and not be disrupted by contentious political issues.”

In addition to China and Russia, fellow socialist-led Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua were among those in Latin America backing Maduro, as were Belarus, Cambodia, Iran, North Korea, Serbia, South Africa, Syria and Turkey. On Guaidó’s side were most other Latin American states, as well as Albania, Australia, Canada, the E.U,, Georgia, Israel, Japan and South Korea.

Nike Called SDNY About Michael Avenatti

And then for subsequent calls by Avenatti to Nike where yelling and more threats continued, the FBI was listening.

A spokesman for the U.S. attorney in Los Angeles said Avenatti was arrested Monday in New York.

Flipboard: DEVELOPING: Sen. Grassley Refers Michael ...

Now will he be disbarred and will CNN be somewhat embarrassed for hiring CPL….Creey Porn Lawyer…

NEW YORK (Reuters) – Attorney Michael Avenatti, who represented adult film star Stormy Daniels in her legal battles against U.S. President Donald Trump, was arrested on Monday and charged with extorting more than $20 million from Nike, federal prosecutors said.

The U.S. Attorneys offices in New York and Los Angeles separately filed charges against Avenatti, with the California case accusing him of embezzling a client’s money to cover his own debts, as well as using phony tax returns to obtain millions of dollars in loans from a bank.

Avenatti threatened to expose allegations of misconduct from Nike employees unless the apparel company paid him and an unnamed co-conspirator $22.5 million to “buy Avenatti’s silence,” the New York complaint said.

He is also being investigated by the California State Bar Association in addition to the Senator Grassley referral to the DOJ.

According to the criminal complaint, Avenatti met in March 2019 with attorney for Nike and threatened to release damaging information about the company if Nike didn’t make millions in payment to himself and an unnamed co-conspirator. Avenatti also allegedly demanded that Nike pay $1.5 million to an individual he claimed to represent.

“I’ll go take $10 billion dollars off your client’s market cap…I’m not f***ing around,” Avenatti said, according to the complaint.

The criminal complaint is fascinating out of New York. Then there is the California criminal complaint noted below:

 

Avenatti Complaint by on Scribd

 

 

GPS attack on NATO Exercise Came From Russia

Norway has stunned the international community by presenting “proof” Russia was behind a sophisticated GPS attack during war games.

War games are supposed to test a military’s ability to deal with the unexpected. But NATO got more than it anticipated last year when its warships’ navigation systems started acting up.

There was no way they could be where their computers were telling them they were.

This was no small issue: warships from 31 different nations were manoeuvring together in what was one of NATO’s largest exercises in decades.

But the implications went far beyond safety.

It means weapon systems without alternate means of finding out where they were could end up hundreds of kilometres off course.

It wasn’t the first time this GPS ‘glitch’ had been observed in Nordic nations such as Finland, Norway and Sweden. Civilian air traffic has reported several instances of their navigation systems going haywire.

EXPLORE MORE: Huge NATO exercise ‘jammed’ by Russia

DELVE DEEPER: Russia, China test GPS jamming systems’

In all, GPS signals have been reportedly disrupted five times in the northeastern region of Norway, Finland and Sweden since autumn 2017. But Trident Juncture exercise in October and November last year experienced the most intense attack.

A member of staff of the NATO naval and marine works with a navigation display on the bridge of USS Mount Whitney of the US Navy during the NATO-led military exercise Trident Juncture. Picture: AFP A member of staff of the NATO naval and marine works with a navigation display on the bridge of USS Mount Whitney of the US Navy during the NATO-led military exercise Trident Juncture. Picture: AFPSource:AFP

Suspicion immediately fell upon Russia.

Moscow dismissed the claims.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Larov went so far as to call the allegations “fantasy”.

But, now, Norway says it has proof.

“Russia asked to give proof. We gave them the proof,” Norwegian Defence Minister Frank Bakke-Jensen told reporters after a bilateral meeting with Russia in Oslo.

Norwegian civilian science outposts had recorded the type, strength and origins of the signals used to distort signals emitted by GPS satellites, he said.

This data has now been handed over to Moscow.

“Russia said ‘thank you, we will come back when our experts review that’. To have such an answer from Russia is a positive thing,” he said.

Minister Bakke-Jensen said Russia would have had to be well aware of the impact of its jamming systems.

A map provided by Norway's intelligence service showing the source and intensity of GPS jamming signals. Picture: Norway Defence Ministry A map provided by Norway’s intelligence service showing the source and intensity of GPS jamming signals. Picture: Norway Defence MinistrySource:Supplied

“They were exercising very close to the border and they knew this will affect areas on the other side,” he said. “We recognise Russia’s right to exercise and train its capacities [but] it is not acceptable that this kind of activity affects security in Norwegian air space.”

And international conventions dictate notice be given of any kind of major military test.

The dates and locations of NATO’s Trident Juncture exercise was known to Russia for years.

But Moscow called a snap ‘live-fire’ exercise of its own warships on the boundaries of the NATO games. It also appears to have engaged in an undeclared test of its electronic jamming systems, encompassing Trident Juncture’s designated exclusion area.

Russia shows little regard for the ‘fallout’ of its electronic warfare testing.

Norways’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs was forced to contact Moscow in October 2017 to request jamming exercises along its border as part of Russia’s annual Zapad war-games be halted due to public safety concerns.

“It was a large military exercise by a big neighbour and it disrupted civilian activities including air traffic, shipping, and fishing,” defence minister Bakke-Jensen said at the time.