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Sergey has many successes on his resume, all of which make him a possible candidate for President. Here are some:
– Russia’s military success in Crimea, East Ukraine, Syria, South Ossetia, Chechnya, and down the border of NATO countries, Sergey and Russia were viewed as force well protected that can show effectiveness and efficiency in military actions
– Shoigu was minister in the Ministry of emergency situations for almost 22 years. During that time, he efficiently used the advantages of Russian bureaucracy and legalism to gather power and popularity, all while not making a single enemy
– Sergey showed pragmatic approach in addressing former American defense secretary Chuck Hagel with his personal name, not with his surname, which was practice before
Militarization of Russia
Since 2013, Russia and Moscow were heavily criticized for spending large amounts of money on armed forces. Many Western leaders thought that Putin is the man pulling the strings, and that it was his idea to spend so much money, despite his weak economy that is too much oil-dependent. However, what few people outside of Russia knew until lately is that Sergey Shoigu, the Russian defense minister is the one responsible for the huge expansion. More here.
In April of this year, Maduro’s Defense Minister paid an interesting visit to Moscow. Vladimir Padrino Lopez the Defense Minister would meet his Russian counterpart, Sergey Kuzhugetovich Shoygu, at a conference of international defense.
“I have come (to Moscow) upon the orders of President Nicolás Maduro,” Padrino said in the video. He added: “I bring a very interesting, a very important point (to the conference), which is NATO’s projection in Latin America, its consequences and risks.”
Beyond the excuse of the conference, why is Maduro’s Defense Minister, the man who “pulls the strings of power behind the scenes” in Venezuela according to García Otero, visiting Moscow precisely when massive citizen protests are posing an existential threat to the Chavista regime? The answer may have to do with what is perhaps the least analyzed aspect of the Venezuelan crisis: the geostrategic implications of a failed state in Venezuela from the point of view of the world’s great powers.
There certainly has been a shift in Washington’s attitude toward the Venezuelan regime since Donald Trump arrived at the White House. As the PanAm Post explained in 2016, the Obama administration carried out a three-pronged strategy in Latin America, its aims being:
Achieving the dangerous pact between Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and the communist FARC guerrillas.
Renewing diplomatic and commercial relations with the Castros’ Cuba after more than five decades since the Cuban embargo was put in place.
Appeasing the Maduro regime in Venezuela in order to guarantee the success of the Santos-FARC pact while preventing the implosion of the Cuban economy, which depends on Venezuelan oil for its survival (Obama wanted to avoid a Mariel Boatlift-type humanitarian crisis on the coasts of Florida).
Yes, there is some indication that NATO may begin cultivating members nations in Latin America, Putin is on the move using Iran, Cuba and Venezuela. Now you know why Vice President Pence is on a tour in Latin America.
When President Trump mentioned just a few days ago about a military option in Venezuela, he had something in mind due to the above meetings and building Russian influence in the region. Beginning in Columbia Pence discussions began this way:
Colombia is one of the United States’ closest allies in the Western Hemisphere, yet, as he stood next to Pence, Santos denounced Trump’s threat of military action, and told the visiting vice president that such a possibility “shouldn’t even be considered” and would be “unacceptable.”
“Every country in Latin America would not favor any form of military intervention, and that is why we are saying we are intent on looking into other measures, some of which are already underway and others to be implemented in the future,” Santos said.
The concerns build as Maduro’s Vice President, El Aissami has deep ties to Hezbollah of Iran and he was responsible for those tens of thousands of passports illegally issued for Syrians. Of course Putin is running Assad of Syria with the aid of Iran. Weapons abound globally. Vladimir Padrino Lopez is the mastermind and driver of the region.
The ideology of Venezuela’s minister of defense, Vladimir Padrino López, is captured in a 2015 photo of him kneeling before Fidel Castro. But he is reputed to be even closer to the Kremlin. This January, Venezuela launched a series of civil-military exercises around the country, dubbed Plan Zamora, under the guidance of advisers from Iran, Russia and Cuba.
Russia supplies arms to Venezuela. In November the Kremlin sent new aviation and air-defense technology to Caracas. Reuters reported in May that Venezuela now has “5,000 Russian-made MANPADS surface-to-air weapons,” representing “the largest known stockpile in Latin America.” More here from the WSJ.
For a comprehensive timeline and names, go here, excellent work going back to 2015 investigating the Russian, Cuban, Iranian and Venezuelan operation.
Ships set out from Northern Fleet headquarters in Severomorsk. Photo: mil.ru
It will include about 50 vessels and is held as a preparatory phase to the upcoming «Zapad-2017» drills.
The Northern Fleet, the most powerful of Russia’s five fleets, is unfolding a special exercise which includes key parts of fleet capacities.
The drills will be headed directly by Russian Navy Head Commander Vladimir Korolyev and will last «for several days», the Northern Fleet informs.
Included are about 50 ships, submarines and support vessels. Also aircrafts, helicopters from the Air Force and Air Defense will be deployed, a Navy representative says to Interfax.
The drills are held as several of the most powerful Northern Fleet vessels are on their way home after participation in a Navy parade outside St.Petersburg. Among them are battle cruiser «Pyotr Veliky» and typhoon-class submarine «Dmitry Donskoy».
It is likely that the returning vessels will take part in the exercise.
In the course of the training, antisubmarine and anti-sabotage activities will be conducted along with navigational, hydrographical, anti-mine and search and rescue operations.
According to the Navy representatives, the exercise is held as a preparatory phase to the large-scale joint Russian-Belarus drills «Zapad-2017» scheduled for the period 14-20 September.
Russia’s leadership is angling to annex its closest western neighbor during upcoming military drills, according to the former leader of Georgia. Mikheil Saakashvili made the comments on the anniversary of his own country’s brief conflict with Moscow that resulted in Russian troops cordoning off Georgia’s two northern regions.
Referring to the much anticipated joint Russian-Belarusian drill in the Baltic region, the former president said: “What we are seeing in Belarus, I think that Russia is planning to take and annex Belarus.” Saakashvili, who is a longtime critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin, spoke to told Baltic news agency BNS ahead of the drill, called Zapad and scheduled for September.
Lithuania, a NATO ally that borders with Russia, has expressed concern that the drill indicates a wider threat to the alliance, constituting a “simulated” attack. NATO has demanded that Russia allows for more transparency in the drill, nominally set to involve around 12,000 troops. However, Russia has previously sparked much bigger exercises to go in tandem with drills such as Zapad, upping the number of troops from the promised levels.
“During the drill, infrastructure will be brought in,” Saakashvili said. “In that sense the threat [from Russia] has not disappeared rather it only grows. It is just that until now Ukrainians have held it at its own borders [with Russia].”
Saakashvili was president of Georgia until 2013, when he lost the election and left the country for Ukraine. He was made a Ukrainian citizen and appointed as governor of Ukraine’s Odessa region in 2015 by Petro Poroshenko after the revolution that brought the pro-Europe, pro-West government to power.
His reputation as a hardline opponent of the Kremlin’s foreign policy and his imposing oratorical style made him popular quickly, and he was tipped to be the country’s next prime minister. But his often combative manner and vows to “clean up” corrupt Ukrainian institutions, put him at odds with established political figures. Ukraine stripped him of his citizenship in 2017 and he became a stateless person. He has dismissed it, and Georgia’s previous decision to strip him of citizenship, as political decisions by governments that have fallen out with him.
Despite enjoying Western support for his hawkish positions on Russia and for his campaigns against corruption, Saakashvili’s leadership of Georgia was not without its critics. The European Union criticized his decision-making during a 2008 political crisis that sparked a five day war with Russia. Under Saakashvili’s command, Georgian forces tried to restore control over two of its regions that have declared independence under Russian military sponsorship.
Belarus’s President Alexander Lukashenko has dismissed concerns that Zapad is anything but a routine defense drill. “We traditionally carry out these drills with Russia,” he said in July. Although strongly reliant on Russia in most regards, the Belarusian government has shown some signs of disagreement with its bigger partner in what the two countries symbolically call “the Union State.”
Despite a Kremlin push to deploy an airbase in Belarus, Minsk has resisted that initiative. The Union State relationship— a post-Soviet branding of Minsk and Moscow’s close relationship—looked in minor jeopardy earlier this year when Russia responded to Belarus’s looser visa-regime for Westerners by starting border checks between the two countries.
In the exercise scenario used for the Zapad series of exercises, there is undoubtedly a NATO dimension. This stems from Moscow’s response, opposition and complete rejection on political and legal grounds of the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia. The events of 1999 loom large today in Russian strategic thinking and are also reflected in how the General Staff approaches the planning for a Zapad exercise. Consequently, while there is currently a Western preoccupation with the possibility of a Russian offensive operation against the Baltic States, in Moscow’s view the more likely scenario of conflict erupting on Russia’s periphery with NATO stems from an Allied intervention in Belarus. As a result, the Zapad 2017 exercise will place all operational and scenario activities under a defensive guise in response to foreign intervention, demanding a response to protect the Russia-Belarus Union State (Regnum, July 11).
Some Russian commentaries show awareness of the concern expressed by Alliance members about Zapad 2017 and its potentially aggressive rehearsal of operations against its members from Belarusian territory: these suggestions are, of course, the subject of much derision. However, there are indications of some features of the joint exercise that will come into play in September to which NATO must pay additional attention. The first is the extent to which Zapad 2017 will fine-tune joint operations carried out by the elite airborne and special forces units of Belarus and Russia. Such preparation occurred in early April, with these forces rehearsing joint operations in the Vitebsk Region in Belarus over an area of 12,000 square kilometers. The focus was on parachute landings, reconnaissance, and action to fix and locate enemy forces. During these tactical-level exercises, elite troops were also tasked with establishing the best areas to land the “main force” and coordinating air cover for these forces. On April 11–13, a parachute company from the 106th Airborne Division (Tula) relocated to Brest and, in close coordination with Belarusian counterparts as well as interior troops, worked on training tasks to block and defeat four groups of “illegal armed formations,” which had broken into strategically important facilities in the region (Nezavisimaya Voyennoye Obozreniye, June 16).
In a related preparation for Zapad 2017, in May, a one-week tactical exercise involved the electronic warfare (EW) forces of Belarus and Russia, using three training grounds in Brest and Vitebsk Regions. Whereas the elite and special forces tactical exercises had an alleged terrorist dimension, the joint EW exercises were clearly aimed against a conventionally armed opponent. They focused upon joint EW operations against a high-technology opponent operating in a “complex electronic environment.” The development of the joint force capabilities to protect the Union State is seen in Moscow as reflecting developments within modern local wars and armed conflicts. The EW component of Zapad 2017 will thus prove to be an integral part of the rehearsal of joint operations (Nezavisimaya Voyennoye Obozreniye, June 16).
CIA Director Mike Pompeo said on Fox News Sunday with Chris Wallace that the CIA provided accurate intelligence on the DPRK nuclear program and policymakers too, were well aware even before Pompeo took over the agency.
When you look closely enough you will find serial numbers belonging to Pakistan, China and Russia…
Looking back and open source information is that statement accurate? When investigative media does the job of investigating and informs, Pompeo is correct. Furthermore, Iran was and is part of all the variables such that Barack, Hillary and John overlooked it all. How so? That pesky JPOA. Then cultivating the original Wikileaks cables, there was more….
VIENNA, Sept 18 (Reuters) – It is one of the West’s biggest nuclear
proliferation nightmares — that increasingly isolated Iran and North
Korea might covertly trade know-how, material or technology that could be
put to developing atomic bombs.
“Such a relationship would be logical and beneficial to both North Korea
and Iran,” said Mark Hibbs, an expert of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.
Last year, a U.N. report suggested that impoverished, reclusive North
Korea might have supplied Iran as well as Syria and Myanmar with banned
atomic technology.
In what could be a sign of this, a German newspaper last month reported
that North Korea had provided Iran with a computer programme as part of
intensified cooperation that could help the Islamic state build nuclear
weapons.
“There are reports and rumours, which governments and the IAEA (the U.N.
International Atomic Energy Agency) have not denied, indicating that there
may be a track record of bilateral nuclear cooperation between North Korea
and Iran,” Hibbs said.
But while this could make sense for two states facing tightening sanctions
— and potentially earn Pyongyang some badly needed funds — the extent
and nature of any such dealings, if they take place at all, remain
shrouded in mystery.
“It seems to be very difficult to sort out what the relationship in the
nuclear world between DPRK (North Korea) and Iran is. We just simply do
not know,” prominent U.S. nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker said.
This was in contrast to missile cooperation between the two countries,
where North Korea has helped Iran both with the weapons and in building
related factories, he said.
Hecker, who has often visited the east Asian state, said possible
Tehran-Pyongyang atomic technology transfers would be a major concern for
everyone dedicated to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Iran’s nuclear programme is based on uranium enrichment, activity which
can have both civilian and military purposes.
North Korea has twice tested plutonium-based nuclear devices, drawing
international condemnation, although it last year revealed the existence
also of a uranium enrichment site, potentially giving it a second pathway
to bombs.
“They complement each other so well (in terms of their expertise). There
is just a lot of synergy in how they would be able to exchange
capabilities,” Hecker said at a seminar for diplomats in Vienna, the
IAEA’s headquarters, this month.
Citing Western intelligence sources, the Munich newspaper Sueddeutsche
Zeitung said in August that North Korea had this year delivered software,
originally developed in the United States, that could simulate neutron
flows.
Such calculations, which can help scientists identify self-sustaining
chain reactions, are vital in the construction of reactors and also in the
development of nuclear explosives.
With the help of the programme, Iran could gain important knowledge of how
to assemble nuclear weapons, the paper said.
WESTERN INTELLIGENCE HUNT
There has been no public confirmation or denial of the report in the West.
But Hecker did not rule it out, saying Pyongyang had demonstrated
experience in this field.
He said North Korea must have some “nuclear code capabilities” which they
would have been able to assess in comparison with the result of an atomic
test.
“So to some extent they have had an opportunity to verify or check their
codes,” Hecker said. “Iran has not had a chance to do that. So exchanging
that type of information … you could see as being very useful.”
North Korea tested nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009, but still has not
shown it has a working nuclear bomb.
Proliferation experts have said the country has enough fissile material
for up to 10 nuclear weapons. But they don’t believe Pyongyang is yet
capable of miniaturising the material to fit into the cone of a missile.
While North Korea has made no secret of its nuclear weapons ambitions,
Iran denies Western allegations that it is covertly seeking to develop an
atomic arms capability.
The Islamic Republic says its nuclear programme is for purposes of
electricity generation, but its refusal to halt uranium enrichment and its
stonewalling of a U.N. nuclear watchdog probe have stoked suspicions
abroad.
The Vienna-based U.N. nuclear watchdog said this month in a report that it
was “increasingly concerned” about possible work in Iran to develop a
nuclear missile.
For several years, the IAEA has been investigating Western intelligence
reports indicating Iran has coordinated efforts to process uranium, test
high explosives and revamp a ballistic missile cone to accommodate a
nuclear warhead.
Iran says the allegations are baseless and forged.
In a separate report on North Korea, from which its inspectors were
expelled in 2009, the IAEA suggested past nuclear-related ties with Syria
and Libya, but it made no mention of Iran.
Proliferation expert Mark Fitzpatrick said it would not be hard for Tehran
and Pyongyang to put “well-practised trade deals and transfer routes” from
their ballistic missile cooperation to use also in the nuclear field.
Still, there were few signs of any nuclear cooperation between the two
countries.
“It is not for lack of looking. Western intelligence agencies are
intensively targeting nuclear acquisition efforts by Iran and North
Korea,” Fitzpatrick, a former senior U.S. State Department official, said.
“Yet finding nuclear weapons-related trade is akin to the proverbial
needle in a haystack. In the vastness of ocean and sky routes, most forms
of nuclear-related cargo are so minute as to be almost undetectable.”
Hibbs said any nuclear dealings with North Korea would pose risks for
Iran: “Were this traffic to be confirmed, that would deepen the suspicion
that Iran is involved in nuclear activities which are clandestine and
military in nature.”
***
What about China selling weapons to Iran and operating groups being still worried about non-proliferation by North North Korea? Lots of chatter of that and left unresolved:
5. (S) Noting a decrease in the sales of Chinese conventional weapons to Iran, DASD Sedney expressed appreciation for China’s efforts to limit conventional arms sales to Iran. Sedney emphasized that Iran’s spreading of conventional BEIJING 00000058 002 OF 003 weapons to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon poses the serious problem of Chinese weapons killing U.S. soldiers. Sedney expressed concern about Iran’s nuclear program. More on that cable here, of note is the distribution list.
***
So under Obama it seems we left the A.Q. Khan sanctions to the Export Import Bank and the IAEA: From Secretary of State to the United Nations/Vienna by method deliver of a telegram and SIPDIS
DE RUEHC #2552 0092353 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 092336Z JAN 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0000
4. (SECRET/rel IAEA) — I wanted to inform you of a legal process that has concluded in the U.S. — U.S. nonproliferation law requires that sanctions be imposed in certain circumstances; the activities of Dr. Khan and some of his associates fall under the requirements of this law. — The U.S. has decided to impose sanctions on individuals and companies listed in a media note that was released on January 12. — This is a very complex case that involved a large volume of information and many people and companies across the globe. — The U.S. sanctions laws and executive orders involved include the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA), the Export Import Bank Act (EXIM), and Executive Orders (E.O.) 12938 and 13382. — This legal non-paper describes in more detail the specific sanctions and penalties involved. — The U.S. decision was announced on January 12 and will soon be printed in the Federal Register. — This U.S. decision is not directed at any country. In fact, as we highlight in our public statement, many countries contributed to international efforts to shut down and investigate the network. — The sanctions decision reflects the diverse and global nature of the network. — No sanctions were imposed on governments. — As IAEA knows, the actions of the A.Q. Khan network have irrevocably changed the proliferation landscape and will have lasting implications for international security. — These sanctions will help prevent and deter future proliferation-related activities and provide a warning to other would-be proliferators. — It is imperative that all countries remain vigilant in order to ensure that Khan network associates or others seeking to pursue similar proliferation activities will not become a future source for sensitive nuclear information or equipment. — If Asked: Will there be any additional sanctions on these individuals? We don,t foresee, at this time, the imposition of additional sanctions related to these activities. — If Asked: Will you share your findings with us? We can not share details of the sanction decision but don,t believe the information we have would contribute to a different understanding of the activities than you already have. End suggested talking points. ————– LEGAL NONPAPER ————– 5. (U) Begin non-paper: Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA) The NPPA provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on U.S. procurement from any person who, on or after June 30, 1994, knowingly and materially contributes, through the export of nuclear-related goods or technology, to the efforts of any individual, group, or non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded special nuclear material. Once imposed, the sanction shall apply for a period of at least 12 months, but can thereafter be terminated if reliable information indicates that (1) the sanctioned person has ceased to aid or abet any individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material or any nuclear explosive device, and (2) the United States has received reliable assurances from the sanctioned person that such person will not, in the future, aid or abet any individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material or any nuclear explosive device. Export Import Bank Act (EXIM) The EXIM provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on the Export-Import Bank,s guaranteeing, insuring, or extending credit, or participating in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to any person who, after September 23, 1996, knowingly aids or abets a non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded material. This sanction can be terminated if the U.S. determines and certifies in writing to the Congress that reliable information indicates that the sanctioned person has ceased to aid or abet any non-nuclear weapon state to acquire any nuclear explosive device or acquire un-safeguarded special nuclear material; and steps have been taken to ensure that the sanctionable activities will not resume. The sanction may also be terminated if the appropriate government has taken certain corrective actions. Executive Orders 12938 and 13382 These Executive Orders (E.O.) provide the authority to impose measures against a foreign person that has engaged or attempted to engage in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their means of delivery. The sanctions under E.O. 12938 include: a ban on USG departments, and agencies, procurement from, or entering into contracts for procurement with, the sanctioned person or entity; a ban on providing any USG assistance to, and any participation in USG assistance programs by, the sanctioned person or entity; and a ban on the importation into the U.S. of goods, technology or services procured or provided by the sanctioned person or entity. The E.O. 12938 sanctions may be terminated if there is reliable evidence that the foreign person has ceased the activities that led to the imposition of sanctions. The sanction under E.O. 13382 is that all property and interests in property of the designated entity, that are in the U.S. or subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. (i.e., U.S. persons anywhere) are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in. Sanctions under E.O. 13382 may be lifted when circumstances no longer warrant their imposition. End non-paper. ———- MEDIA NOTE ———— 6. (U) Post can draw from the following Media Note after 0900 EST January 12. Begin Media Note: For Immediate Release January 12, 2009 Designation of A.Q. Khan and Associates for Nuclear Proliferation Activities Today, the Department of State announced that sanctions will be imposed on 13 individuals and three private companies for their involvement in the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network. This announcement comes after a multi-year U.S. government review of the available information pertaining to the activities of this network. We believe these sanctions will help prevent future proliferation-related activities by these private entities, provide a warning to other would-be proliferators, and demonstrate our ongoing commitment to using all available tools to address proliferation-related activities. Dr. A.Q. Khan led an extensive international network for the proliferation of nuclear equipment and know-how that provided &one stop shopping8 for countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons. He and his associates provided Iran and Libya with centrifuge components, designs, and, in some cases, complete centrifuges. The United States also believes that Khan and his associates provided centrifuge designs, equipment, and technology to North Korea. Dr. Khan also provided Libya with nuclear weapon designs. With the assistance of Khan,s network, countries could leapfrog the slow, incremental stages of other nuclear weapons development programs. In 2004, following Libya,s welcome decision to renounce its nuclear program, the United States removed from Libya items it had received from the network. The network,s actions have irrevocably changed the proliferation landscape and have had lasting implications for international security. Governments around the world, including Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, and Malaysia, worked closely with the United States to investigate and shut down the network. Governments have also joined together to put in place United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 to criminalize proliferation and have worked cooperatively to establish the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to enhance international tools to interdict and prevent trade in sensitive technologies. Many of Dr. Khan,s associates are either in custody, being prosecuted, or have been convicted of crimes. Dr. Khan publicly acknowledged his involvement in the network in 2004, although he later retracted those statements. While we believe the A.Q. Khan network is no longer operating, countries should remain vigilant to ensure that Khan network associates, or others seeking to pursue similar proliferation activities, will not become a future source for sensitive nuclear information or equipment. Sanctions have been imposed under the following statutes as follows: Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA): Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., Muhammad Farooq, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, and Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain Export-Import Bank Act (EXIM): Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, Gerhard Wisser, and Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain Executive Order 12938: Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, Tradefin Engineering, Gerhard Wisser, and Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain Executive Order 13382: Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, and Gerhard Wisser End media note. ————– Press Guidance —————– 7. (U) Post can draw from the ISN Press Guidance after 0900 EST January 12. Begin Press Guidance: ISN Contingency Press Guidance January 12, 2009 A.Q. Khan Network: Sanctions General Questions Q: What specifically did A.Q. Khan and his network transfer? What did these people do to trigger sanctions? These entities were sanctioned for engaging in nuclear-related proliferation activities as part of the international A.Q. Khan network. In particular, Dr. Khan and his associates in a number of countries provided Iran and Libya with centrifuge components, designs, and, in some cases, complete centrifuges. The United States also believes that Khan and his associates provided centrifuge designs, equipment, and technology to North Korea. Dr. Khan also provided Libya with nuclear weapon designs. These illicit transfers by the Khan network have been reported in the press for a number of years. I cannot comment on additional specific intelligence-related information. Today,s imposition of sanctions on private companies and individuals does not reflect recent proliferation activity by the network. Q: Why haven,t you sanctioned any countries? The authorities under which sanctions are being imposed do not target countries. Governments around the world, including Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, Germany, Switzerland, the UAE, and Malaysia worked closely with the U.S. to investigate and shut down this international network. Q: Why has it taken four years to impose sanctions? This is a very complex case that involved a large volume of information and many people and companies across the globe. We have been working diligently for the past four years to assemble and properly evaluate the available information. Given the consequences of a sanctions decision, it is important that the information be thoroughly vetted and evaluated before a sanctions determination is made. Q: Why couldn,t you have sanctioned some entities earlier instead of waiting four years? Information continued to become available as other countries concluded their investigations or prosecutions and we believed in this case that it was important to sanction the group at one time. Q: Did you tell the affected governments prior to public announcement? Yes, governments were notified in advance that the United States intends to impose proliferation sanctions on these private companies and individuals. We applaud the actions that each of these countries took to shut down and investigate the network, and work cooperatively to implement new measures to prevent proliferation. Q: What sanctions authorities were used to impose penalties? There are two sanctions laws and two Executive Orders that provide the basis for the imposition of sanctions in this case. The sanctions laws are the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (the &NPPA8) and the Export Import Bank Act (&EXIM8). The two Executive Orders are 12938 and 13382. Q: What do these authorities require? The NPPA provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on U.S. procurement from any person who, on or after June 30, 1994, knowingly and materially contributes, through the export of nuclear-related goods or technology, to the efforts of any individual, group, or non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded special nuclear material. The EXIM provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on the Export-Import Bank,s guaranteeing, insuring, or extending credit, or participating in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to any person who, after September 23, 1996, knowingly aids or abets a non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded material. The Executive Orders provide the authority to impose measures against a foreign person that has engaged or attempted to engage in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their means of delivery, including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items, by any person or foreign country of proliferation concern. Q: What penalties can be imposed pursuant to these sanctions authorities? These sanctions are not being applied to any governments, but to private companies and individuals. In brief, the NPPA provides for a ban on USG procurement from the sanctioned person. EXIM provides for a ban on Export Import Bank credit, guarantees, or insurance in support of U.S. exports to the sanctioned person. Executive Order 12938 provides for a ban on USG procurement or imports from the sanctioned entity as well as a ban on U.S. assistance to the sanctioned entity. Executive Order 13382 freezes the assets of a sanctioned entity that are under U.S. jurisdiction. Q: What impact, if any, will these sanctions have? These sanctions will help prevent and deter future proliferation-related activities and provide a warning to other would-be proliferators. Q: What can companies and individuals do to have sanctions rescinded? Each law treats this issue differently. I refer you to the statutes. Q: Is the A.Q. Khan network still active? If so, what are we doing about it? We do not believe that the network run by A.Q. Khan is still functioning. Most of the key people involved with the network have been put out of business, are in jail and/or facing prosecution. We remain concerned that individuals associated with the network, once they are released from jail or are no longer being closely monitored, could re-engage in proliferation on their own in the future. It is important that countries continue to monitor their behavior closely and put in place laws and enforcement mechanisms to prevent proliferation activities. Q: Do remnants of the network still exist? What are we doing about them? Saying the Khan network is no longer functioning does not mean that other proliferation-related networks and activity around the world has stopped. We know, for example, that Iran has utilized several different front and Iranian companies to purchase particular items of proliferation concern. Several of these entities and companies were identified in UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803 in connection with their involvement in the Iranian nuclear or missile programs. The U.S. has taken action against many of these entities, including designations under E.O. 13382. More information on E.O. 13382 designations can be found on the State Department,s website under nonproliferation sanctions as well as the Treasury,s Office of Foreign Asset Control,s website. Country Specific Questions Pakistan Q: Wasn,t the Government of Pakistan involved or at least knew what was going on? The government of Pakistan assured us it had nothing to do with the network and we have no information to refute this. We applaud the actions Pakistan took to shut down and investigate the network. In the years since the public revelation of the Khan network, the government of Pakistan also has taken a number of positive steps to improve its export controls and promote international nonproliferation. Q: Why haven,t we had direct access to Khan? We appreciate the cooperation the government of Pakistan has provided the IAEA and the United States. We believe that Pakistan took seriously its commitment to dismantle the network. Pakistan has assured us that it will not be a source of proliferation in the future. The United States does not need direct access to A.Q. Khan in order to obtain information about his dealings. Q: Reports indicate that Pakistan is easing restrictions on Khan ) What is your reaction to this? We appreciate Pakistan,s efforts in shutting down the proliferation network led by A.Q. Khan as well as the cooperation Pakistan has provided the United States and the IAEA to investigate the Khan network. We believe Dr. Khan is still a proliferation threat to the world and the proliferation support that he and his associates provided to several states of proliferation concern has had a harmful impact on international security and will for years to come. Q: Khan recently said he was forced to confess. If we haven,t had access to Khan then how do we know he was complicit? We have information from other sources indicating that Khan was complicit in nuclear-related transfers to several countries. Q: Any response to statements by Pakistan that it wants to put the A.Q. Khan issue to rest or that the U.S. has not passed questions on Khan,s activities for some time. The U.S. appreciates the cooperation Pakistan has provided the U.S. and IAEA. Such cooperation will continue to be important as we work toward a greater understanding of what the network provided to various countries. Q: Will there be any additional sanctions on these individuals? We don,t foresee, at this time, the imposition of additional sanctions related to these activities. Q: Why didn,t you sanction Khan Research Labs? I can,t comment on individual decisions. Q: What effect will these sanctions have on our relationship with Pakistan ) specifically, our counter-terrorism relationship? These sanctions are based on activities by individuals that occurred well in the past and have been public for many years. We appreciate Pakistan,s efforts in shutting down the Khan proliferation network as well as the cooperation Pakistan has provided the United States and the IAEA to investigate the activities of the Khan network. The United States has a close partnership with Pakistan on counter-terrorism, nonproliferation, and other issues. Q: Do you think these sanctions will have an effect on the India-Pakistan relationship? These sanctions are based on activities by individuals that occurred well in the past and have been public for many years. Questions about India and Pakistan,s relationship are best answered by those countries. Switzerland Q: Is it true that the U.S. asked Switzerland to destroy nuclear documents? We have no comment. Q: Why aren,t you sanctioning any of the Tinners? Is it because they were spies for the U.S.? We have no comment. Sanctions Decisions: Q: Didn,t the Khan network include many more people and companies than you sanctioned, including the Tinner family, Henk Slebos, and companies in the UAE. Why aren,t you sanctioning them? The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough review of all available information. While I cannot comment on individual decisions, I can note that we did not impose sanctions on companies that are no longer operating. Q: Why did you designate some people under E.O. 13382 but not others? The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough review of all available information. I can,t comment on individual sanction decisions. Q: Why did you sanction Lerch, Geiges, and Wisser under EXIM, but not under the NPPA? The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough review of all available information. I can,t comment on individual sanction decisions. Q: What about Libya, Iran and North Korea? They bought these items ) why haven,t we sanctioned them? These sanctions focus on individuals and companies associated with the Khan network. As such, the governments that acquired these items are not subject to sanction under the NPPA or the EXIM Bank Act. Iran and the DPRK are subject to a wide array of sanctions, including UNSCRs 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1718 respectively. In addition, sanctions were imposed on the DPRK under the Glenn Amendment of the Atomic Energy Act following its October 2006 nuclear test. In the case of Libya, once it made the strategic 2003 decision to dismantle its WMD program, it then cooperated with the USG to facilitate that process. Libya also provided information about the A.Q. Khan network’s activities in Libya. Q: Aren,t these kinds of sanctions really toothless with little impact? Sanctions help signal strong U.S. opposition to the activities of the A.Q. Khan network, expose publicly those involved, and serve as a deterrent to others that might consider pursuing similar activities. Sanctions imposed under Executive Order 13382 will allow the U.S. to seize assets held under U.S. jurisdiction and thereby help prevent future proliferation. Q: What about North Korea ) are sanctions in the works for their nuclear transfers to Syria? The DPRK is subject to a wide array of sanctions, including UNSCR 1718 and a number of other U.S. sanctions related to its transfers of items proliferation concern. Furthermore, in the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK has reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology or know-how. Q: What have we learned about Khan,s efforts to assist Iran,s nuclear program? The IAEA has detailed in various reports that Iran has admitted to a relationship with the Khan network ) the same network that provided nuclear weapons designs to Libya ) from 1987 to 1999. This network provided Iran with P1 centrifuge designs, centrifuges, and components; P2 centrifuge designs; other very sensitive information; and technical advice including a &hemispheres document8. The &hemispheres document8 contains instructions for casting enriched uranium metal into hemispheres, which the IAEA,s January 2006 report noted are &related to the fabrication of nuclear weapons.8 Beginning with the November 2003 report, the IAEA Director General confirmed that for almost 20 years, Iran had been pursuing undeclared work in some of the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, and had systematically hidden that work from the IAEA. Iran,s failure to cooperate sharply limits the IAEA,s ability to know more about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program, and increases the international community,s concerns about Iran,s true intentions. Q: What have we learned about Khan,s efforts to assist North Korea,s nuclear program? Former Pakistani President Musharraf has previously acknowledged that Dr. A.Q. Khan and his international network provided sensitive centrifuge technology, including about two dozen centrifuges, to North Korea. Q: Were there other customer of Khan,s network? Questions remain as to whether there were other customers. End Press Guidance. —————— REPORTING DEADLINE —————— 8. (U) Please report within ten working days of receipt of this cable. Please use SIPDIS caption on all responses. —————- POINT OF CONTACT —————- 9. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up information is Caroline Russell and Chris Herrington, ISN/CPI, 647-5035. RICE
His name is Joseph Yun, a U.S. diplomat at the United Nations, one that the North Korean regime has reached out to more than once. Most recently it was over the return of Otto Warmbier and his release.
Under the Obama administration, all talks were terminated where at the time Sweden was the communications envoy of record. With the transfer of power and government to Donald Trump, Pyongyang opened up the back channel via the United Nations to Joseph Yun, who has long diplomatic experience in the region.
While preparations are in place according to President Trump should Kim launch his 4 missiles toward Guam, Pentagon Chief Mattis declares the United States and allies are ready. That still leaves North Korea with nuclear weapons, a condition every expert is omitting in talking points. Secretary of State Tillerson says his work is to get North Korea to stop with the missile program, and that will not likely occur as it is a proxy operation of Iran.
The Kim regime is keeping his estimated 60 nuclear weapons for a bargaining tool and global legitimacy. That is the real problem. Many expert declare that North Korea always backs down in the end when they get food or sanctions relief but we are dealing with a new Kim that is far more unpredictable than his father.
So, what can the U.S. and allies do going forward? Shall we continue to rely on China? They are anything but a friend or a cooperative partner stating in local Chinese news that China will remain neutral should Kim strike first. Further, China declared that if the United States went to a preemptive posture, China would stop us.
China wants total ownership and power in the region and certainly when it comes to navigation, so any U.S. naval activity angers them.
The United States has other options and tools, where not one but a combination of all may also be deployed. That includes forcing a regime change, not always the best solution. Then there is the special forces deployment to covertly enter North Korea and work on a detonation of key command and control sites. Special operations has trained for this kind of operation for more than 20 years.
There is a cyber option, a tool that several experts declare have already been used that Kim’s missile miss targets or fail on re-entry.
Dealing with China to control North Korea is a fool’s errand as Russia and Iran are part of the total equation. There could still be wider consequences when the United States and allies prevail over North Korea on the missile side, again the nuclear inventory remains and is traded to other rogue nations such as Iran or Syria.
There are other allies included in the variables regarding North Korea. They include Australia, Japan and Britain, where Canada, Germany and France remain silent. Japan has just deployed a missile defense system in a defensive mode.
The media continues to declare that any military conflict will lead to millions dying. That is only true if North Korea is successful on a land based conflict hitting Seoul. The U.S. uses only precision guided munitions where collateral damage would not affect other regions of North Korea, hence millions would not escape across the Yalu river into China. China has a standing army at that border preventing such an event.
China and North Korea want the peninsula to be unified and under Chinese control which is much the case to the waterways in dispute along with the contested islands. China fears that the United States is working to unify the peninsula under S. Korean control, which has not been an objective.
In summary, while fear for days has been the media headlines, it cannot be fully dismissed, however, a near term conflict will be likely resolved, leaving North Korea with a viable nuclear weapons and missile program. The coordination between Iran and North Korea will continue in that same realm and Trump is left with the same festering issue of previous president.
Will there be a Chinese naval blockade if the United State and allies go for a preemptive strike? Perhaps that New York Channel to Pyongyang has the burden of finding out. Has someone sent an envoy to Tehran yet with these discussions? Nah….Russia meanwhile is keeping a keen eye on all of it.
Stop just blaming China for being the sole enabler for North Korea’s nuclear and missile program. It is beyond dispute that the moment of reckoning is here for Donald Trump, for he is having a Kennedy/Cuban Missile crisis point in history. But there are other countries that should be blamed and they include Pakistan, Iran and Russia.
Interfax news agency quoted Putin as saying Kim had assured him Pyongyang’s rocket program was entirely peaceful.
Asked if Russia was prepared to offer its rockets for Korean space exploration, Putin said, “Why should only Russia pay? One should expect other countries, if they assert that the DPRK [North Korea] poses a threat for them, would support this project,” Interfax reported.
“One can minimize the threat by supplying the DPRK with its rocket boosters,” it quoted him as saying.
He also said Russia was prepared to do its utmost to improve the situation on the Korean peninsula, and expected other countries to do their part.
“We suggest that the efforts of the Russian Federation alone are not sufficient. We should all — the DPRK, South Korea, as well as the United States, China and Japan — support that process.”
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Historically, Iran has bought a lot with its money. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, thought to be Tehran’s chief nuclear scientist, was almost certainly in North Korea at Punggye-ri in February 2013 to witness Pyongyang’s third atomic test. Reports put Iranian technicians on hand at the site for the first two detonations as well.
Then there was a remarkable confession of Dr A Q Khan, Pakistan’s infamous ‘nuclear’ scientist. It was on 4 February 2004 when Khan appeared on the television and confessed to having supplied nuclear technology and components to North Korea, Iran and Libya. Khan accepted his crimes in English and not in Urdu, which is the language understood by most Pakistanis.
That telecast was actually for the international audience, especially the United States and the European intelligence agencies. Khan explicitly mentioned that this proliferation network was entirely his own and the Pakistani government or authorities were never involved. North Korea’s nuclear ambition started in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Erstwhile Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) agreed to set up their first plutonium-based nuclear reactor at Yongbyon-Kun for peaceful use of nuclear technology. Later, North Korea set up more reactors, signed Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to get access to the latest technology and allowed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to inspect its nuclear facilities, but never gave up its desire to have ‘the bomb’.
Apart from China, Pakistan was the only major country in the world who not only maintained diplomatic relations with North Korea but received weaponry from them.
But the cooperation in nuclear and missile field started in the late 1980s. More here.
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North Korea’s unprecedented level of testing and displays of strategic weapons in 2016 indicate that Kim is intent on proving he has the capability to strike the U.S. mainland with nuclear weapons. In 2016, the regime conducted two nuclear tests—including one that was claimed to be of a standardized warhead design—and an unprecedented number of missile launches, including a space launch that put a satellite into orbit. These ballistic missile tests probably shortened North Korea’s pathway toward a reliable ICBM, which largely uses the same technology. Kim was also photographed beside a nuclear warhead design and missile airframes to show that North Korea has warheads small enough to fit on a missile, examining a reentry-vehicle nose cone after a simulated reentry, and overseeing launches from a submarine and from mobile launchers in the field, purportedly simulating nuclear use in warfighting scenarios. North Korea is poised to conduct its first ICBM flight test in 2017 based on public comments that preparations to do so are almost complete and would serve as a milestone toward a more reliable threat to the U.S. mainland. Pyongyang’s enshrinement of the possession of nuclear weapons in its constitution, while repeatedly stating that nuclear weapons are the basis for its survival, suggests that Kim does not intend to negotiate them away at any price.
David Albright—a widely respected expert on proliferation and president and founder of the Institute for Science and International Security—estimated at the end of 2016 that North Korea’s nuclear programs had reached the following status:
• 33 kilograms of separated plutonium (median value of a distribution).
• 175-645 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium, where 175 kilograms corresponds to a median estimate for the case of one centrifuge plant and 645 kilograms corresponds to the median estimate for the case of two centrifuge plants.
• 13 to 30 nuclear weapons, where these values reflect the utilization of 70 percent of the available, estimated stocks of plutonium and weapon-grade uranium. The limits correspond to the median values for the cases of one or two centrifuge plants and each weapon contains either plutonium or weapon-grade uranium.
• Based on this cumulative estimate, North Korea is currently expanding its nuclear weapons at a rate of about three-five weapons per year.
• 30 percent of North Korea’s total stocks of plutonium and weapon-grade uranium are assessed as in production pipelines, lost during processing, or held in a reserve. More here.
“As the principal economic enablers of North Korea’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development program, China and Russia bear unique and special responsibility for this growing threat to regional and global stability,” he said in a statement.
Tillerson’s comments are sure to anger Russia and China. Earlier this month Beijing rejected claims from US president Donald Trump that it had a responsibility to do more to rein in its ally. “I think this either shows lack of a full, correct knowledge of the issue, or there are ulterior motives for it, trying to shift responsibility,” Geng Shuang, a foreign ministry spokesman, told reporters.
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Certain weapons, however, stand in stark contrast to the rest of North Korea’s aging weapons collection. One is what appears to be a copy of the Russian Kh-35 antiship cruise missile. Known in Russia as the Kh-35 Uran and to NATO as the SS-N-25 “Switchblade,” the Kh-35 has a range of seventy nautical miles and a 320-pound high-explosive warhead, flying above the wavetops to stay undetected as long as possible. Guided by active radar, the subsonic missile is roughly comparable to the American Harpoon antiship missile, earning it the nickname “Harpoonski.”
Although the Uran’s development predated the end of the Cold War, the missile never entered Soviet service, joining the Russian Navy only in 2003. The missile first surfaced in North Korea in June 2014, when it briefly appeared in a North Korean propaganda video. The missile, which appeared to be launched from a ship, was identical to the Uran, although the shipboard mounting hardware appeared different from Russian hardware. North Korea launched a volley of four Kh-35s on June 7 from the vicinity of Wonsan into the Sea of Japan.
A new rocket artillery system recently emerged in North Korea. Known as the KN-09 multiple-rocket launcher, the system consists of eight three-hundred-millimeter rocket-launcher tubes on a 6×6 HOWO 6×6 All-wheel Drive Cargo Truck chassis. The presence of fins on the rocket’s nose suggests each rocket is precision-guided, using either China’s Baidu or Russia’s GLONASS satellite-based global positioning systems. More here.
For a comprehensive timeline and names, go here, excellent work going back to 2015 investigating the Russian, Cuban, Iranian and Venezuelan operation.
Ships set out from Northern Fleet headquarters in Severomorsk. Photo: mil.ru
