The Mercenaries Secretly Hired by the Kremlin

Posted on August 10, 2016August 10, 2016 by Denise Simon

First Putin launched this operation years ago with the Chechens and now with any others they can recruit. The most recent secret group was recruited and deployed to Syria and the survival rate of the ‘Wagner’ cell is less than 50%.

Since 2013, A commander from the Russian Caucasus known as Omar al Chechen is a key leader in the Muhajireen Brigade, a jihadist group that fights alongside the Al Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant against the regime of President Bashir al Assad. More here.

There is yet more as noted below, from the Ukraine to Syria?

Revealed: Russia’s ‘Secret Syria Mercenaries’

Sky News speaks to men who claim they were trained and flown on Russian military planes to assist troops loyal to Bashar al Assad.

By John Sparks, Moscow Correspondent

If Russia is a nation at war, the Kremlin has always been careful to frame its campaign in Syria as an aerial operation.

Other than a limited number of ‘instructors and military advisers’, Russian officials have repeatedly stated that they do not need to put ‘boots on the ground’.

The Russian narrative of low-cost conflict has been seriously challenged however by a group of young Russian men who claim that their country’s involvement in Syria is far more extensive – and more costly – than anyone in President Putin’s administration is prepared to admit.

These individuals told Sky News that they were recruited by a highly secretive private military company called ‘Wagner’ and flown to Syria aboard Russian military transport planes.

For the equivalent of £3,000 a month, they say they were thrown into pitch battles and firefights with rebel factions – including Islamic State.

Two of the group, Alexander and Dmitry, told Sky News they felt lucky to be alive.

“It’s 50-50,” said Alexander (not his real name). “Most people who go there for the money end up dead. Those who fight for ideals, to fight against the Americans, American special-forces, some ideology – they have a better chance of survival.”

“Approximately 500 to 600 people have died there,” claimed Dmitry. “No one will ever find out about them…. that’s the scariest thing. No one will ever know.”

Russian mercenaries are alleged to have fought in eastern Ukraine

The country’s Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, warned in February that the deployment of ground troops by foreign powers could result in a “world war”.

He seems to have excluded the use of Russian mercenaries from that calculation, however – although analysts are not surprised.

The deployment of military contractors is consistent with the Russian take on ‘hybrid-war’, according to military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer.

He said: “Obviously (Wagner) does exist. These kind of ‘volunteers’ do appear in different war zones, where the Russian government wants them to appear. So first in Crimea, then in Donbass, now in Syria. But they have not been legalised up till now.”

Private military companies are banned under the Russian constitution – but that is not something that seems to trouble the man who runs the operation.

The only known image of the shadowy head of Wagner Nikolai Utkin. Pic: Fontanka

A former special forces soldier, he is known to his men as Nikolai Utkin.

The only known picture of Mr Utkin was published earlier this year by St Petersburg-based newspaper ‘Fontanka’.

The paper described him as an aficionado of the aesthetics and ideology of the Nazi German Third Reich.

His nom-de-guerre – Wagner – is thought to be a tribute to Hitler’s favourite composer.

The company has recruited hundreds of men online, by posting temporary advertisements in military-themed chat rooms on one popular Russian website.

The men say they were taken from Russia to Syria on Russian military aircraft

Sky News obtained a record of a conversation between one recruit and a Wagner agent. It read:

Recruit: I heard that Wagner is looking for guys. I was in the army in ….. division.
Wagner: What sort of physical shape are you in?
Recruit: I can run 10km. I can do 20 chin ups.
Wagner: Can you do 3km in 13 minutes?
Recruit: For sure! In the army I was doing 11km in 40 minutes.
Wagner: Do you have any problems with the law, debts?
Recruit: I have a problem with money. I want to buy an apartment.
Wagner: Do you have a valid passport for travelling?
Recruit: Yes, sure.
Wagner: Ok, come to Molkino. You have a high chance of being selected.

Molkino is a small village in southern Russia that is home to a Ministry of Defence special forces base. Part of the base has been handed over to Wagner for the selection and training of recruits.

Alexander, who has conducted a number of missions to Syria, said he was aware of men of all abilities being accepted for training – even those who had never fired a gun.

He said the training – which generally lasts from one to two months – was intense.

He added: “If the person hasn’t been the army, he is trained from level zero. They’re taught to be infantrymen – the usual cannon fodder. If the person has served in the artillery, reconnaissance, assault brigades – his skills are polished…. they teach you how to drive and use absolutely all the equipment they have.”

Dmitry said recruits were given ‘NATO-standard’ kit to practise with.

Some of the men Sky News spoke to say they took part in the battle for Palmyra

Both men soon found themselves deployed to the main Russian base on the Syrian coast.

Alexander said he was joined by more than 500 men.

“There were 564 soldiers with me and we were put up at the base,” he added. “We had two reconnaissance companies, one air defence company, two assault groups and foot troops, plus heavy artillery, tanks and so on.”

Dmitry said he was joined by 900 others – but had second thoughts on arrival.

He previously worked as an office secretary and had little military experience.

“We arrived at night at the airport,” he said. “What is it called? Hmay? Hymeem? Hhmemeen? (Khmeimim). Then we were put in trucks. To be honest I was scared. I don’t have a strong build and I wasn’t very good at the drills.”

The Wagner fighters accused their commanders of sending them on ‘suicide missions’ designed to ‘soften-up’ the opposition before Syrian Army troops were sent in.

Alexander recounted the battle for the city of Palmyra, conducted earlier this year.

He said: “During the storming of Palmyra, we were used as cannon fodder. You could say that. Reconnaissance went forward first so they could observe and report. I knew three in that group – two died before they got to the city. From my assault company, 18 died. After us, those chickens from Assad’s army followed and finished the job but we did most of the work.”

The official number of Russians killed in Syria stands at 19. However, the Wagner fighters told Sky News they believed hundreds of their fellow employees have been killed.

They accuse the authorities of covering it up.

“Who will ever tell you about this? Sometimes the bodies are cremated but the papers say ‘they’re missing’. Sometimes the documents say the soldier was killed in Donbass (eastern Ukraine). Sometimes they say ‘car accident’ and so on,” claimed Alexander.

Photos apparently captured by IS fighters appear to show Russian mercenaries

Dmitry claimed hundreds of men have been left in Syria.

“Sometimes they are buried, sometimes they are not,” he said. “Sometimes they just dig a hole. It depends on how the commanders feel towards the person.”

He is back in Moscow now but says the experience still stalks him. When he signed on with Wagner, Dmitry handed over his personal identification papers – an essential part of life in Russia. Upon his return, he went back to the training base to retrieve his documents but found himself arrested by police. An officer told him, unequivocally, that Wagner “does not exist”.

Dmitry told Sky News that there are 50 other men – Wagner survivors – now walking the streets of Moscow, traumatised and without papers.

“No one knows me,” he said. “They just threw me away.”

:: For more of the accounts of the battlefield experiences of the two Russian Wagner soldiers, watch Sky News’ exclusive report.

Is your Church Targeted for Terror?

Posted on August 8, 2016August 8, 2016 by Denise Simon

Yazidis, Jews, Apostate Muslims and Christians have all been part of the genocide in the Middle East and terror has arrived in Europe.

The Director of the FBI, James Comey has already sounded the alarm speaking to a terror diaspora…anyone listening?

Churches take new security measures in face of terror threats

FNC: As Father Josiah Trenham prepared to read the Gospel, several parishioners discreetly scooped up their babies, retreated up the aisles of St. Andrew Orthodox Church and out into the spring air, so as not to allow the crying of little ones to disturb the divine liturgy.

The time-honored tradition was shattered when a car passed by the Riverside, Calif., church, slowing down as the front passenger leaned out of his window and bellowed menacingly through a bullhorn, according to witnesses.

“Allahu Akbar!” the unidentified man repeated several times as the unnerved parents drew their infants close and exchanged worried glances.

Members of the church were gathered under the main archway when the car passed slowly by, its occupant allegedly yelling “Allahu Akbar!” over a bullhorn. (FoxNews.com)

Witnesses were able to give Riverside police a description of the green Honda Civic, but not of the three occupants. Some told police they believed one or more of the men may have been taking photographs, according to Officer Ryan Railsback. Although Trenham insisted multiple congregants heard the Arabic phrase, Railsback noted no mention of it was in the police report.

Whatever the case, no law was broken – even if an unmistakable message was sent and received.

“Be calm and to keep a special vigilance over the property and our children while we are at church,” Trenham wrote in an email to parishioners in which he recounted the disturbing event. “Pray that these provocative young men might repent of their intimidation and be saved.”

Trenham told FoxNews.com last week the situation remains “tense and tenuous,” and said the church now has security officers on hand for all regular services.

“It is a deep sorrow to live this way in the ‘new America,’” he said.

The incident took place on April 12, some four months after a terror attack left 14 dead in nearby San Bernardino, and just over three months before a French priest was killed by ISIS-linked jihadists in his church. The events, whether far or near, underscore a grim new reality for pastors such as Trenham: Instead of offering sanctuary from evil, churches could in fact be attractive targets for terror.

“Many churches are now hiring self-defense instructors for classes or security guards that include off-duty police,” said Ryan Mauro, a professor of Homeland Security at Liberty University and national security analyst for the Clarion Project. “If you are an Islamist terrorist seeking self-glory, executing a priest will bring you more attention than executing an average civilian.”

While no lethal terror attacks have occurred inside a U.S. church to date, experts like Jeff King, president of International Christian Concern, notes the threat tally is growing.

The murder of French Priest Jacques Hamel on July 26 showed terrorists could target Christian churches.

“I’m pretty sure there will be attacks in the future,” King said. “Until [radical Islam is defeated], we can expect Christians, including in the West, to rationally tighten security measures and try to protect themselves from attack.”

In February, Khial Abu-Rayyan, 21, of Dearborn Heights, Mich., was arrested after he told an undercover FBI agent he was preparing to “shoot up” a major church near his home on behalf of ISIS. A month earlier, the Rev. Roger Spradlin of Valley Baptist Church – one of the biggest congregations in Bakersfield, Calif. – told attendees that they had received a threat written in Arabic.

Spradlin told his congregants the church had received a threat, and officials have since taken new precautions. (Valley Baptist Church)

“Undercover officers were then placed during worship services,” Valley Baptist spokesman Dave Kalahar said. “The FBI continues to investigate along with the local task force.”

Last September, an Islamic man clad in combat gear was charged with making a terrorist threat after entering Corinth Missionary Baptist Church, in Bullard, Tex., and claiming that God had instructed him to kill Christians and “other infidels.” A year earlier, police were called to Saint Bartholomew’s Catholic Church in Columbus, Ind., after the house of worship was vandalized with the word “Infidels!” along with a Koranic verse sanctioning death for nonbelievers. Similar graffiti was found that same night at nearby Lakeview Church of Christ and East Columbus Christian Church.

St. Bartholomew Pastor Clem Davis said he doesn’t know if the threat was legitimate, but said little can be done to harden a target whose mission is to welcome all.

“I don’t know that there is any real protection against the ‘lone wolf’ mentality, not without infringing on everybody’s freedoms,” Davis said. “We don’t have metal detectors, people go in and out. Churches are family-orientated, public, tax-supported spaces; so they may appeal to some as a target.”

Synagogues have faced increasing threats in recent years, too. Earlier this year, the FBI disrupted a plot by a Muslim convert to blow up the Aventura Turnberry Jewish Center, in Aventura, Fla. A 2014 audit by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) found that anti-Semitic incidents rose 21 percent across the country that year.

Eastern Orthodox Christians, who in many cases suffered persecution at the hands of radical Muslims in their Middle Eastern homelands, believe they may be singled out because of their heritage. Mass at St. Andrew typically attracts up to 400 worshippers with roots in Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Russia and Greece.

“We have guards now; we never used to have guards,” said St. Andrew attendee Solomon Saddi, a Syrian-American Christian. “They keep an eye on everyone and talk to the faces that aren’t familiar,” he continued, referring to the aftermath of the April incident. “It is a very dangerous time for us even in America.”

In San Diego’s Iraqi-Christian community, known as Chaldeans, many local churches have had to dip into their collection baskets to hire security.

“There is a concern over attacks,” said a parishioner at St. Peter Chaldean Catholic Church. “Everyone knows that a church, especially like St. Peter, is a risk. But everyone tries not to let their fear get in the way of their faith.”

The July 26 murder of the Rev. Jacques Hamel, in the Normandy town of St.-Étienne-du-Rouvray sent shock waves around the world, and signaled to U.S. law enforcement that it could happen here, said Horace Frank, assistant commanding officer of the Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau of the Los Angeles Police Department.

“We see things happen in other countries and worry about them happening here,” Frank said. “You always have to be worried about copycats. That’s why we focus on prevention, trying to look ahead.”

Frank’s division works with Christian, Jewish, Muslim and Sikh groups to discuss such topics as terrorist reporting, suspicious activity and active shooter training.

“We reach out to churches and they reach out to us. You have to be aware, you have to be vigilant,” Frank said. “It’s a concern not just in Christian communities, but all faith communities.”

Why Did Secretaries Gates, Hagel and Panetta Really Resign?

Posted on August 7, 2016August 7, 2016 by Denise Simon

What they were really saying is fighting a war under Baraq Obama became a behemoth bureaucracy and just as an added concept, so has local law enforcement. But to stay on topic and to understand why the enemies have the advantage whether on a battlefield or in any diplomatic efforts with other world leaders, the below text will blow your head off.

Bring in the lawyers, submit names for nomination as a militant or enemy, form a committee, have meetings, clear with more lawyers, challenge the evidence, seek advise from other agencies, get Obama off the golf course, meet again, see what the State Department has to say, collaborate with other world leaders, go back to the White House and hope the pen and phone are available and agree. Meanwhile, the high value target is where again?

(Please excuse the text formatting below, it is a conversion from a .pdf file)

The original document from the Justice Department is here.

May 22, 2013

PROCEDURES FOR APPROVING DIRECT ACTION AGAINST TERRORIST TARGETS

LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND AREAS OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES

From the Justice Department: This Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) establishes the standard operating procedures for when the United States takes direct action, which refers to lethal and non-lethal uses of force, including capture operations, against terrorist targets outside the United States and areas of active hosti lities.

Any direct action must be conducted lawfully and taken against lawful targets; wherever possible such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted]such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted]such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted]such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted]such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] plan. In particular, whether any proposed target would be a lawful target for direct action is a determination that will be made in the first instance by the nominating department’s or agency’s counsel (with appropriate legal review as provided below) based on the legal authorities of the nominating department or agency and other applicable law. Even if the proposed target is lawful, there remains a separate question whether the proposed target should be targeted for direct action as a matter of pol icy. That determination will be made pursuant to the interagency review process and policy standards set forth in this PPG. The most important policy objective. particularly informing consideration of lethal action, is to protect American lives.

Capture operations offer the best opportunity for meaningful intelligence gain from counterterrorism (CT) operations and the mitigation and disruption of terrorist threats. Consequently, the United States prioritizes. as a matter of policy. the capture of terrorist suspects as a preferred option over lethal action and will therefore require a feasibility assessment of capture options as a component of any proposal for lethal action. Lethal action should be taken in an effort to prevent terrorist attacks against U.S. persons only when capture of an individual is not feasible and no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat. Lethal action should not be proposed or pursued as a punitive step or as a substitute for prosecuting a terrorist suspect in a civilian court or a military commission. Capture is preferred even in circumstances where neither prosecution nor third-country custody are availab le disposition options at the time.

CT actions, including lethal action against designated terrorist targets. shall be as discriminating and precise as reasonably possible. Absent extraordinary circumstances, direct action against an identified high-value terrorist (HVT) will be taken only when there is near certainty that the individual being targeted is in fact the lawful target and located at the place where the action will occur. Also absent extraordinary circumstances, direct action will be taken only if there is near certainty that the action can be taken without injuring or killing non-combatants. For purposes of this PPG. non-combatants are understood to be individuals who may not be made the object of attack under the law of armed conflict. The term ·’non-combatant” does not include an individual who is targetable as part of a belligerent party to an armed conflict, an individual who is taking a direct part in hostilities, or an individual who is targetable in the exercise of national self-defense. Moreover, international legal principles. including respect for a state’s sovereignty and the laws of war, impose important constraints on the ability of the United States to act

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unilaterally-and on the way in which the United States can use force -in foreign territories.

Direct action should only be undertaken

As renected in the procedures contained in this PPG, whenever possible and appropriate, decisions regarding direct action will be informed by departments and agencies with relevant

expertise. knowledge, and equities . •••••••••••••••••••••••

•••••••••••

. as well as by coordinated interagc ncy intelligence analysis.

Such intcragency coordination and consultation will ensure that decisions on operational matters or such importance are well-informed and will racilitate de-confliction among departments and agencies addressing overlapping threat streams. uch coordination is not intended to interfere with the traditional command and control authority of departments and agencies conducting CT operations.

Lastly. when considering potential direct action against a U.S. person under this PPG, there are

additional questions that must be answered. The Depat1ment of Justice (DOJ ). for example.

must conduct a legal analysis to ensure that such action may be conducted against the individual

consistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States.

Based on the principles and priorities described above. Section I sets forth the procedure for

establishing

plan for taking direct action against terrorist targets.

Section 2 sets forth the approval process for the capture and long-term disposition of suspected terrorists. Section 3 sets forth the policy standard and procedure for designating identified I IYTs for lethal action. Section 4 sets forth the policy standard and procedure for approving kthal

force aga in st terrorist targets other than identified HVTs.

1 Section 5 sets forth the procedures for approving proposals that vary from the policy guidance otherwise set forth in this PPG. Section 6 sets forth the procedure for arter-action reports. Section 7 addresses congressional notification.

ection 8 sets forth general provisions.

SECTION 1. Procedure for Establishing a

Plan for taking

Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets

1.A Operational Plans for Taking Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets

Each of the operating agencies may propose a deta iled operational plan to govern their respective

direct action operations

against: (I) suspected terrorists who may

be lawfully detained: (2) identified HVTs who may be lawfully targeted for lethal action; or (3) lawful terrorist targets other than identilied I IYTs.

J.B lnteragency Review of Operational Plans

All operational plans to undertake direct action operations against terrorist targets···

•••••••••

must undergo a legal review b) the general counsel(s) or the operating

1 This PPG docs noL address ocherwise lawful and properly authorized activities !hat may have lethal effects. which are incidental to the primary purpose of the operation.

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agency executing the plan, and be submitted to the National Security Staff (NSS) for interagency review. All proposed operational plans must conform to the policy standards set forth in this

Section. All proposed operational plans to undertake direct action against terrorist targets •••••••••••

along with the conc lus ions of the General Counsel, sha ll be referred

to the NSS Legal Adviser. The NSS Legal Adviser and the General Counsel of the proposing operating agency shall consult with other department and agency counsels, as necessary and appropriate. The NSS Legal Adviser shall submit the relevant legal conclusions to the Deputies Committee to inform its consideration of the proposed operational plan. AII proposed

operational plans to undertake direct action against terrorist targets···········

•l

will be reviewed by appropriate members of the Deputies and Principals Committees of

the National Security Council (NSC) (defined in Presidential Policy Directive-I or any successor directive) before presentation to the President for decision.

l.C Guidelines for Operational Plans

Any operational plan for taking direct action against terrorist targets·········

–

shall. among other things. indicate with precision:

I) The S. CT objectives to be achieved; 2) The duration of time for which the authority is to remain in force:

3) The international legal basis for taking action •••••

4) The strike and surveillance assets that may be employed when taking action against an authorized objective;

5)

6) Any proposed stipulation related to the operational plan, including the duration ofauthority for such stipulation;

7) Any proposed variations from the policies and procedures set forth in this PPG; and

8) The conditions precedent for any operation, which shall include at a minimum the following: (a) near certainty that an identified HVT or other lawful terrorist target other than an identified HVT is present; (b) near certainty that non-combatants wi ll not be inJured or

killed: (c)

and (d) ir

lethal force is being employed: (i) an assessment that capture is not feasible at the time of the operation: (ii) an assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons; and (iii) an assessment that no other reasonable alternatives to lethal action exist to effectively address the threat to U.S. persons.

: Operational disagreements

shall be elevated to

Principals. The President will adjudicate any disagreement among or between Principals .

..,

.)

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l.D Additional Requirements When Requesting Authority for Directing Lethal Force Against Targets Other Than Identified HVTs

When requesting authority to direct lelhal force against lerrorist targets other than identi ficd

HVTs, the

plan shall also inc lude the following:

I) The types of targets that would qualify as appropriate targets pursuant lo Section 4 (Terrorist Targets Other Than Identified HVTs) for purposes of the proposed operational plan: and

2) A description of the operating agency” s internal process for nominating and approving the use of lethal force aga inst terrorist targets other than identified HYTs.

t.E Policies and Procedures

The operating agencies shall estab lish harmonized policies and procedures for assessing:

I) ear certainty that a lawful target is present:

2) Near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed; and

3) With respect to a proposal to lake direct action against terrorist targets other than identified HVTs, whether the target qualifies pursuant to the policy standard set forth in Section 4.A of this PPG and in the specific operational plan.

1.F When Using Lethal Action, E mploy All Reasonably Available Resources to Ascerta in the Identity of the Target

When the use of lethal action is deemed necessary. departments and agencies of the United Slates Government must employ all reasonably available resources to ascertain the identity of the target so that action can be taken, for example. aga inst identified HVTs in accordance with

ection 3 of this PPG. Verifying a target·s identity before taking lethal action ensures greater certainty of outcome that lethal action has been taken against identified I IVTs who satisfy Lhe policy standard for lethal action in ection 3.A.

l.G Principals and Deputies Review of Operational Plans for Taking Direct Action

Against Terrorists Targets···············

When considering a proposed operational plan, Principals and Deputies shall evaluate the following issues, along with any others they deem appropriate:

I) The implications for the broader regional and international political interests of the United States; and

2) For an operational plan that includes the option of lethal force against targets other than identified HVTs. an explanation of why authorizing direct action against targets other than identi fied HYTs is necessary to achieve U . . policy objectives.

4

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t.H Presentation to the President

I.H. I If Lhe Principal of the nominaling operating agency, after review by Principals and Deputies. continues to support Lhe operational plan, the plan shall be presented to the President for decision, along with the views expressed by departments and agencies during the NSC process.

I.H.2 An appropriate NSS official will communicate, in writing, the Presidenl’s decision, including any Lerms or conditions placed on any approval, to appropriale deparLmcnts and agencies.

1.1 Amendments or Modifications to Operational Plans

Excepl as described in Section 5, any amendments or modifications to an approved operalional

plan ror direct action

shall undergo the same review and approval

process oullined in this Section.

SECTION 2. Approval Process for Certain Captures and the Long-Term Disposition of Certain Suspects

This Section sets forth the approval process for nominating for capture suspected terrorists or individuals providing operational support to suspected terrorists (in this section, togeLhcr referred to as ·’suspects”): proposals to take custody of suspects, including pre-and post-capture

screening:

and

determining a long-term disposition for suspects.

Unless otherwise approved in an operational plan under Section I. the SS shal I coordinate for

interagency review under this PPG, as described below, the following: (I) operations intended to

result····································

(2) operations that result in United States Government personnel taking custody (through a capture or lransrer)3 of a suspect located overseas and outside areas oractive host ii ities; and (3) long-term disposition decisions wilh respect to such suspecls. The involvement of United Slates Government personnel in extraditions or transfers initiated for the purpose of prosecution in civi I ian court or those scenarios to which PPD-14 applies (i.e., circumslances in which an individual is arrested or otherwise taken into custody by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or another Federal law enforeemenl agency)4 are nol covered by this PPG.

Captures and Transfers by Foreign Governments: These procedures do not apply to U.S. law enrorcement requests for foreign governments to arrest or otherwise take into custody a suspecL

‘ ··custody:· as referred to here.

it is anticipated that the

United States Government will have temporar; or transitory custody ofthe individual(s) without the presence of officials ofthe foreign government maintaining custody of the detainee(s).

4 Consistent with existing policy and practice. DOJ will. as appropriate. continue to notify the SS. through the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG). ofplans to arrest. or seek the extradition or transfer of. a suspected terrorist. and where appropriate (e.g .. to consider other potential disposition options) the SS. in consultation with DOJ, may arrange for interagency consideration ofa request for extradition or transfer.

5

I

1i8P 8E@RE1i:’tJ8F8RlJ 6

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or lo United States Government provision of training. funds, or equipment to enable a foreign government to capture a suspect. These procedures also do not apply to non-law enforcement United States Government requests to capture a suspect who will remain in the custody of the foreign government or to the provision of actionable intelligence to enable such captures. Every 6 months, departments and agencies shall notify the NSS of any requests made of a foreign government to capture a suspect in the preceding 6 months. Unless covered by the exceptions above or otherwise included in an operational plan under Section I, if United States Government

personnel

capture a suspect.

or an operation is intended to result in United States Government personnel taking custody of a suspect. the department or agency must submit a proposal through the NS for interagency

review. Operational plans

may include additional conditions

requiring interagency review of capture operalions involving United Slates Government personnel, depending on the policy consideration of the panicular country or region in which the

operations would occur. If United tales Government personnel are expected·····

•••••••••••••••••

to capture or transfer suspects in a particular

country or region on an ongoing basis. the department or agency involved should seek to include

a proposed plan for such activities in the operational plan approved under Section I.

2.A Nomination Process

2.A. I Any department or agency participating in the Deputies Committee review in Section 2.D may identify an individual for consideration, but only an operating agency or DOJ (“nominating agencies·· for purposes of Section 2 of this PPG) may forma lly request that a suspect be considered for capture or custody by U.S. personnel. Additionally, a department or agency that has captured a suspect, or that plans to capture or otherwise take custody of a suspect. shall, whenever practicable, propose a long-term disposition for such individual. Prior to requesling that an individual be considered for capture or custody by the United States, the nominating agency must confirm with its General Counsel that the operation can be conducted lawfully, but it i not neces ary to have resolved the long-term dispos ition plan prior to proposing a capture operation.

2.A.2 Whenever possible, the nominating agency shall notify the lnteragency Disposition Planning Group prior to such a request.

2.A.3 A nomination for custody, including capture, or a proposed long-term disposition under Section 2.A. I shall be referred to the NSS, which shall initiate the screening process described in Section 2.8.

2.A.4 In the event initial screening under Section 2.B has not taken place prior to U.S. personnel taking custody of a suspect. the process for screening after capture described in ection 2.C shall be initiated.

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2.B Screening Prior to a Capture Operation

2.8.1 The nominating agency shall prepare a profile for each suspect referred to the S for review of a proposal to capture or otherwise lake custody of the individual. The profile shall be developed based upon all relevant disseminated information available to the Intelligence Community (IC), as well as any other information needed Lo present as comprehensive and thorough a profile of the individual as possible. The profile should explain any difference of views among the IC and note. where appropriate. gaps in existing intelligence. as well as inconclusive and contradictory intelligence reports. At a minimum, each individual profile shall include the following in formation to the extent that such information exists:

2.B.2 Once the profile has been completed. the nominating agency shall provide the profile to the NSS Senior Director for Countcrterrorism.

2.B.3 Whenever time permits, the lnteragency Disposition Planning Group shall assess the availability. including the strengths and weaknesses. of potential disposition options.

2.B.4 All nominations under this Section for capturing or otherwise taking a suspect into custody must undergo a legal review by the General Counsel of the nominating agency to determine that the suspect may lawfully be captured or taken into custody by the United States and that the operation can be conducted in accordance with applicable law. The General Counsel’s conclusions shall be referred to the NSS Legal Adviser. The NSS Legal Adviser and the General Counsel of the nominating agency sh al I consult with other department and agency counsels, as necessary and appropriate. In addition, in the event that the suspect who has been

TOP ~1!:’2Rl5T~IOFO~~I 7

2.C.3

TOP gcc ~GT:’!’IOFOR~I

nominated is a U.S. person. DOJ shall conduct a legal analysis to ensure that the operation may be conducted consistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States. The NSS Legal Adviser shall submit the relevant legal conclusions to the Deputies Committee to inform its consideration of the nomination.

2.B.5 The NSS shall convene a Restricted Countcrterrorism Security Group (RCSG/’ for the purpose of reviewing and organizing material and addressing any issues related to the nomination of an individual for capture. custody, or long-term disposition. Before forward ing to the Deputies the nomination of a suspect for capture or to otherwise be taken into custody, the RCSG shall identify whether any other material is needed for Deputies’ consideration of the nomination and issue taskings to departments and agencies. as appropriate. For each nomination. the Swill request. and the ational Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) shall conduct. an assessment of the suspect and provide that assessment to the SS prior to consideration of the nomination or proposed long-term disposition by the Depmies Committee. and where feasible. prior to RCSG review. The SS will be responsible for ensuring that all necessary materials. including the profile developed by the nominating agency and th e CTC assessment, are included in the nomination package submitted to Deputies.

2.C Screening After Capture

2.C. I Whenever feasible. initial screening by the United States of suspects taken into U.S. custody should be conducted before the United States captures or otherwise takes custody of the suspect, as set out in Section 2.B.

2.C.2 In the event initial screening cannot be conducted before the United States takes custody of the individual. immediately after capturing or otherwise taking custody of the suspect, appropriate U.S. personnel shall screen the individual to ensure that the correct individual has been taken into custody and that the individual may be lawfully detained. Such screening shall be conducted consistent with the laws and policies applicable to the authorities pursuant to which

the individual is being detained. and

2.C.4 In the event that the suspect is detained pursuant to law of war authorities by the U. military and additional time is needed for purposes of intelligence collection or the development of a long-term disposition option. the Secretary of Defense or his designce, following appropriate intcragcncy consultations coordinated through the NSC process, may approve an extension of the

screening period

subject to the fo llowing:

~ The RCSG shall be chaired by the NSS Senior Director for Counterterrorism and shall include the following departments and agencies: the Department ofState, the Department of the Treasury. DOD. DOJ, the Department of

I lomeland Security (DHS) – .

Cir\. Joint Chiefs ofStaff(JCS).

and NCTC.

Additional departments and agencies may participate in the RCSG meetings. as appropriate.

8

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I) The suspect’s detention must be consistent with S. law and policy, as we ll as all applicable international law;

2)

3) The International Commillee of the Red Cross must be notified of. and prov ided timely access Lo. any suspect held by the U.S. military pursuant to law of war authorities; and

4) When po sible and consistent with the primary objective of collecting intelligence, intelligence will be collected in a manner that preserves the ava ilability of long-term disposition options. including prosecution.

2.D Deputies Review

2.D. I A nomination or disposition package for capture. custody, or long-term dispos ition forwarded to Lhe Deputies shall include the following:

I) The profile, produced by the nominating agency pursuant Lo Section B. l. for the suspect or suspects proposed for capture or long-term disposi tion;

2) Any assessment produced by NCTC pursuant to Section 2.B.5:

3) If appropriate. a description of the planned capture and screening operation and ••••

••••••

operational plan under which the capture would be conducted:

4) The deparLmenL(s) or agency or agencies that wou ld be responsible for carrying out the proposed operation. if nol already conducted:

5) A summary of the legal assessment prepared under ection 2.B.4: and

6) An assessment. including the strengths and weaknesses. of potential long-term disposition options.

2.D.2 The Deputies of the Department of State. the Treasury. DOD, DOJ, OHS. the Office of

the Director ofNational Intelligence (DNI) ••

, CIA, JCS, –

. NCTC. and any other

Deputies or officials a Deputy National Security Advisor (D SA) may invite to pa11icipate. shall promptly consider whether to reco mmend to the Principal of the nominating agency that a capture operation be conducted in the context of the proposed plan at issue, that the United States Government otherwise take custody of the indi vidual, or that a particular long-term dispos ition option be pursued.

2.D.3 When considering a proposed nomination. the Deputies shall evaluate the following issues, and any others deemed appropriate by the Deputies:

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l”OP ~ECRE1″11JOFORN

I) Whether the suspect’s capture would further the U.S. CT strategy; 2) The implications for the broader regional and international political interests of the United States; 3) Whether the proposed action would interfere with any intelligence collection or compromise

any intelligence sources or methods: 4) The proposed plan for the detention and interrogation of the suspect; 5) The proposed plan to capture the suspect. including the feasibility of capture and the risk to

U.S. personnel; 6) In the event that transfer to a third party or country is anticipated, the proposed plan for

obtaining humane treatment assurances from any country; 7) The long-term disposition options for the individual: and

8)

2.D.4 When considering the long-term disposition of a suspect who is already in U.S. custody. or whom a department or agency has already been aUlhorized to capture or take into custody, the Deputies ‘ discussion shall be guided by the following principles:

I) Whenever possible, third-country custody options that are consistent with . national security should be explored:

2) Where transfer to a third country is not feas ible or consistent with U.S. national security interests. the preferred long-term disposition option for suspects captured or otherwise taken into custody by the United States will be prosecution in a civilian court or, where ava ilable, a military commission. Consistent with that preference. wherever poss ible and consistent with the primary objective of collecting intelligence. intelligence will be collected in a manner that allows it to be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution: and

3) In no event wi ll additional detainees be brought to the detention facilities at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.

Following consideration and discussion by the Deputies. departments and agencies shall submit the final positions of their Principals within a time frame consistent with operational needs.

2.E Presentation to the President and the Principal of the Nominating Agency

2.E. I If the nominating agency, on behalf of its Principal. continues to support taking action, a D A shall inform the President of the views expressed by departments and agencies. As appropriate, the nomination shall be presented to the Pres ident for a decision or the nomination will be provided to the Principal of the appropriate operating agency for a decision. along with any views expressed by the President.

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II

2.E.2 An appropriate SS official will communicate in writing the decision taken. including any terms or conditions placed on such decisions. to the Deputies who participated in the Deputies Comminee review of the nomination.

SECTION 3. Policy Standard and Procedure for Designating Identified HVTs for Lethal Action

3.A Policy Standard for the Use of Lethal Action Against HVTs

Where the use of lethal action against I IVTs has been authorized ••••••••••••

an individual whose identity is known will only be eligible to be targeted. as a policy matter.

COnSiStent \Vi th the requirements Of the approved Operational plan

. if

the individual’s activities pose a con ti nu ing. imm i ncnt threat to U.S. persons.

3.B Necessary Preconditions for Taking Lethal Action

Lethal action requires that the individual may lawfully be targeted under existing authorities and that any conditions established in the appropriate operational plan. including those set forth in eclion I .C.8, are met. The preconditions ct forth in Section I .C.8 for the use of lethal force are as fo llows: (a) near certainly that an identified HVT is present; (b) near certainty that nonc1o1m1b1a1ta1n1ts1w1

1i111 n?(tdb)e injured or kil k d: (c) . r “bl h . f I . J( )

l ; an assessment L1iat capture 1s not 1eas1 eat t e time o tic operation: e

an assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is

contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons: and (f) an

assessment that no other reasonable alternatives to lethal action exist to effectively add ress the

threat to U.S. persons.

3.C lnteragency Review Process

3.C. I Any department or agency participating in the Deputies Committee review in Section 3.D may identify an individual for consideration. but only the operating agencies (also known as the ··nominating agencies .. for purposes of ection 3 of this PPG) may formally propose that an individual be nominated for lethal action following confirmation from the General Counsel of the nominating agency that the individual would be a lawful target.

3.C.2 The nominating agency shall prepare a profile for each individual nominated for lethal action. The profile shall be developed based upon all relevant disseminated information available to the IC. as well as any other information needed co prese nt as comprehensive and thorough a profile of the individual as possible. The profile shall note. where appropriate, gaps

7 Operational disagreements

are to be elevated to

Principals. The President will adjudicate any disagreement among or between Principals. ~ rhis process is designed to review nominations or individuals only where the capture or any individual at issue is not feasible. If. at any point during or after the approval process capture appears feasible. a capture option in

accordance with Section 2 of this PPG (or the relevant operational plan

) should be pursued.

If the individual has already been approved for lethal action when a capture option becomes feasible, the individual should be referred to the 155 Senior Director for Countcrterrorism and undergo an expedited Deputies review focused on idcmifying disposition options.

TOP SECRETi~qQfORlq

in existing intelligence. as well as inconclusive and contradictory intelligence reports. At a minimum, each indi vidual profile shall include a summary of all relevant disseminated intelligence required to determine whether the policy standard set forth in Section 3.A for lethal action aga inst HYTs has been met, and include the following information lo the extent that such information is available:

3.C.3 The shall convene a meeting of the RCSG for the purpose of reviewing and organizing material. and addressing any issues. related to the nomination of an individual for lethal action.

3.C.4 Before forward ing the nom ination of an identified HVT for lethal action to Deputies. the RCSG shall identify other materials needed for Deputies· consideration of the nomination and shall issue such taskings to departments and agencies. as appropriate. For each nomination. the

SS will request. and NCTC shall conduct. an assessment of the nomination and provide that assessment to the NSS prior to consideration of the nomination by the Deputies Committee, and where feasible prior to RCSG review. The NSS will be responsible for ensuring that all necessary materials. including the profile developed by the nom inating agency and the NCTC assessment. arc included in the nomination package submitted to Deputies.

T@P ~ECRCT;~J@P@RH 12

3.C.5 All nominations for lethal action must undergo a legal review by the General Counsel of the nominating agency to ensure that the action contemplated is lawful and may be conducted in accordance with applicable law. The General Counsel’s conclusions shall be referred to the NSS Legal Adviser. In all events. the NSS Legal Adviser and the General Counsel of the nominating agency shall consult with DOJ. The S Legal Adviser and the General Counsel of the nominating agency shall also consult with other interagency lawyers depending on the particular nomination. In addition, in the event that the individual proposed for nomination is a U.S. person, DOJ shall conduct a legal analysis to ensure that lethal action may be conducted against that individual consistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States. The NSS Legal Adviser shall submit the relevant legal conclusions to the SS Senior Director for Counterterrorism for inclusion in the nom ination package to be submiued to Deputies.

3.C.6 If the proposal may be conducted lawfully, the nomination shall be referred to a DNSA. or another appropriate NSS official. to facilitate consideration by the Deputies Committee.

3.D Deputies Review

3.0.1 Upon completion of a nomination package, the NSS shall forward the nomination package to the Deputies Committee for consideration. A standard nomination package to be forwarded to the Deputies shall include, at a minimum, the following:

I) The profile, produced by the nominating agency pursuant to Section C.2, for the individual proposed for lethal action;

2) The assessment produced by CTC pursuant to Section 3.C.4;

3) A description

operational pl an to which the nomination would be

added. including the time frame. if any, in which the operation may be executed:

4) The operating agency or agencies that would be responsible for conducting the proposed lethal action;

5) A summary of the legal assessment: and

6) The determinations made by the nominating agency that capture is not currently feasible and that the relevant governmental authorilics in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons, as well as the underlying analysis for those determinations.

3.0.2 The Deputies of the Department of State. DOD, JCS, DOJ. DI IS. DNI, CIA, and CTC

shall promptly consider whether to recommend to the Principal of the nominating agency that

lethal action be taken against the proposed individual in the context··········

operational plan at issue. –

shall participate in the review process as

observers. A D SA may invite Deputies or other officials to participate as appropriate. Following consideration and discussion by the Deputies. departments and agencies shall submit to the NSS the final positions of their Principals within a timeframe consistent with operational needs.

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3.D.3 When considering each proposed nomination, the Deputies shall evaluate the following issues. and any oLhers deemed appropriate by the DepuLies:

1) WheLher the Deputies can conclude with confidence that che nominated individual qualifies under the policy standard in Section 3.A for lethal action, taking into account credib le information that may cast doubt on such a conclusion;

2) Whether the threat posed by the individual to U.S. persons can be minimized through a response short of lethal action;

3) The implications for the broader regional and international political interests of the United States:

4) Whether the proposed action would interfere with any intelligence collection or compromise any intelligence sources or methods;

5) Whether the individual, if captured, would likely result in the collection of va luable intelligence, notwithstanding an assessment that capture is not currently feasible; and

6)

E Presentation to the President and the Principal of the Nominating Agency

3.E.1 The Principal of the nominating agency may approve lethal action aga inst the proposed ind ividual if: ( 1) the relevant Principals unanimously agree that lethal action should be taken against the proposed individual. and (2) the Principal of the nominating agency has notified the Pres ident through a DNSA of his intention to approve lethal action and has received notice from a DNSA that the President has been apprised of that intention. The Principal of the nominating agency may not delegate his authority Lo approve a nomination.

3.E.2 ominations shall be presented to the President for decision. along with the views expressed by departments and agencies during the process, when: ( 1) the proposed individual is a

U.S. person, or (2) there is a lack of consensus among Principals regarding the nomination, but the Prine ipal of the nominating agency continues to support approving the nomination.

3.E.3 In either case, an appropriate NSS official will communicate in writing che decision, including any terms or conditions placed on any approva l. to the Deputies who participated in the Deputies Committee review of the nomination.

3.F Annual Review;·········

3.F. I The NSS, in conjunction with the nominating agency. shall coordinate an annual review of •••I

individuals authorized for possible lethal action to evaluate whether the intelligence

continues to upport a determination that the individuals

qualify for lethal action under

the standard set forth in Section 3.A. The SS shall refer the necessary information for the

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annual review to the Deputies for cous1deration. Following Deputies re\·iew. the iufo1matio11. along with any recollllllendatious from Deputies. shall be forwarded 10 the Principal of the nominating agency for re\·iew. A separnre legal re\·iew will be conducted. as approp1iate. Au appropriate official from each nominating agency sl.iall inform a DNSA of what action. if any. the Principal of the norniuatiug agency takes in response to tlie re\·iew.

3.F.2

The Deputy of any clepcu1meut or agency pa11icipating in the Deputies Committee review

in Scctil)IJ ~.D may propo-,e at any time that an incli\”idunl be

for

lerhal action. 111 the en:>nt that such a propo:,al IS made. ~CTC :,hall updare the re -coordinated profile for the incli\·idual at issue and. as appropriate. the Deputies sball consider whether to propose that the indi\·idual be remo\”ed by lbe Principal of tbe nominating agency.

3.F.3 Following consideration and discussion by the Deputies in accordance with 3.F. l or 3.F.2. depa11ments and agencies sball submit tbe final pos1tio11s of tbeir Principals wirhin an appropriate timeframe detenniued by the NS .

. EC’TIO~ -t Policy Standard and Procedure for Approving Lethal Force Again’it Terrori<;t Targets Other Than Identified HYTs

-L\ Policy Standard for Directing Lethal Force Against Terrorist Targets Other Than Identified HVTs

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threat to U.. pen.ans.

4.B ::\ece<.<.ary Precondition for Directing Lethal Force rnder Thi<> ection

Directing lethal force under this Section 1equires that: (I) tbe target may lawfully be taTgeted and that any conditions established in the appropriate operational plan, including those set fo11b in Section l.C.8. are met. The preconditions set fo11b in Sectiou l.C.8 for the use of letbal force are as follows: (a) uear ce11ai11ty tbat a lawful te1rnrist target other than an identified If\.T i:,

p1 esent: (b) ner11 certainty that non-comlrntanh will not be injmed or killed: ( c)

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TOP ISEGR:fT ‘NOFORN 15

“FOP SEC RE”f1~40PORl4

threat lo U.S. persons: and (I) an assessment that no other reasonable alternatives to lethal action exist lo effectively address the threat to U.S. persons.

4.C Nomination and Review of Terrorist Targets Other Than Identified High-Value Individuals

Where an operating agency has been authorized to direct force against terrorist targets (including

•••••

property) other than identified HVTs

may

nominate specific terrorist targets to largel with lethal force consistent with the requirements of

the approved operational plan

. including the process required by the

plan for nom inating and approving such targets.

SECTION 5. Procedures for Approving Proposals that Vary from the Policy Guidance Otherwise Set Forth in th is PPG

5.A Already Authorized Targets: Variations from Operational Plan Requi rements When Fleeting Opportunities Arise

5.A. I

When direct action has been authorized under this PPG against identified HYTs or against

terrorist targets other than identified HYTs

, the operating agency

responsible for conducting approved operations. as a result of unforeseen circumstances and in the event of a nceting opportunity, may submit an individualized operational plan lo the NSS

that varies from the requirements of the operational plan

. In that event.

an appropriate official shall consult with other departments and agencies. as appropriate and a time permits. before submilling the proposal to the President for his decision.

5.A.2 All such variations from an operational plan must be reviewed by the General Counsel of the operating agency conducting the operation and the conclusions referred to the NSS Legal Adviser. In all cases. any operational plan must contemplate an operation that is in full compliance with applicable law. Absent extraordinary circumstances, these proposals shall:

I) Identify an international and domestic legal basis for taking action in the relevant country

2) Mandate that lethal action may only be taken if: (a) there is near certainty that the target is present: (b) there is near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed; (c) it has been determined that capture is not feas ible; (d) the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U .. persons; and (e) no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat to U.S. persons.

5.A.3 Any variation from an operational plan shall be presented to the President for decision. and an appropriate NSS official shall communicate the President’s decision, including any terms or conditions placed on any approval, to appropriate agencies.

TOP SECR:ETi’l’40FOR:N 16

T’OP ~EC~E’f;140FOl04

5.B Extraordinary Cases: Variations from the Policy Guidance Otherwise Set Forth in this PPG

Nothing in this PPG shall be construed to prevent the Pres ident from exercising his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, as we ll as his statutory authority, to consider a lawful proposal from operating agencies that he authorize direct action that would fall outside of the policy guidance conta ined herein. including a proposal that he authorize lethal force against an individual who poses a continuing, imminent threat to another country’s persons. In extraordinary cases. such a proposal may be brought forward to the President for consideration as fo llows:

I) A proposal that varies from the policy guidance contained in this PPG may be brought forward by the Principal of one of the operating agencies through the interagency process described in Section 1 of this PPG, after a separate legal review has been undertaken to determine whether action may be taken in acco rdance with applicable law.

2) Where there is a fleeting opportunity, the Principal of one of the operating agencies may propose to the President that action be taken that would otherw ise vary from the guidance contained in this PPG, after a separate legal review has been undertaken to determine whether action may be taken in accordance with applicable law.

3) In all cases, any proposal brought forward pursuant to this subsection must contemp late an operation that is in full compliance with applicable law.

SECTION 6. Procedures for After Action Reports

6.A The department or agency that conducted the operation shall provide the following prel iminary information in writing to the NSS within 48 hours of taking direct action against any authorized target:

1) A description of the operation;

2) A summary of the basis for determining that the operation satisfied the applicable criteria conta ined in the approved operational plan;

3) An assessment of whether the operation achieved its objective;

4) An assessment of the number of combatants killed or wounded;

5) A description of any collateral damage that resulted from the operation;

6) A description of all munitions and assets used as part of the operation; and

7)

li8P SECREli/H8F8R?J 17

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6.B The department or agency that conducted the operation shall provide subsequent updates LO the SS on the outcome of the operation, as appropriate, including any intelligence collected as a result of the operation. The information prov ided to the NSS under this Section shall be made available lo appropriate officials al the departments and agencies taking part in the review under Sections 1 and 3 of this PPG.

SECTION 7. Congressional Notification

A congressional notification shall be prepared and promptly provided to the appropriate Members of the Congress by the department or agency approved to carry out such actions when:

I) A new operational plan for taking direct action•••••••••••

is approved:

2) Authority is expanded under an operational plan for directing lethal force aga inst lawfully targeted individuals and against lawful terrorist targets other than individuals; or

3) An operation has been conducted pursuant to such approval(s).

In addition, appropriate Members of the Congress will be provided, no less than every 3 months. updates on identified HVTs who have been approved for lethal action under Section 3. Each department or agency required to submit congressional notifications under this Section shall inform the NSS of how it intends to comply with this Section prior to providing any such notifications to Congress.

SECTION 8. General Provisions

8.A This PPG is not intended to. and does not. create any right or benefit. substantive or procedural. enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States. its departments, agencies. or entities, its officers. employees. or agents. or any other person.

8.B

8.C Twelve months after entry into force of this PPG, Principals shall review the implementation and operation of the PPG. including any lessons learned from evaluating the information provided under Section 6. and consider whether any adjustments are warranted.

18

What is Life in Aleppo After Siege is Broken?

Posted on August 7, 2016August 7, 2016 by Denise Simon

Aleppo is an ancient metropolis, and one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world; it has been inhabited since perhaps as early as the 6th millennium BC. The city’s significance in history has been its location at one end of the Silk Road, which passed through central Asia and Mesopotamia. When the Suez Canal was inaugurated in 1869, trade was diverted to sea and Aleppo began its slow decline. At the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, Aleppo ceded its northern hinterland to modern Turkey, as well as the important railway connecting it to Mosul.

Rebel fighters break siege in southern Aleppo, sources say

But little has changed for the besieged residents of rebel-held eastern Aleppo neighborhoods, who have been enduring acute shortages of food and medicine, as the fighting remains too fierce for aid to be delivered, the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and humanitarian workers operating in the area say.

Syrian state news agency SANA says that the rebels have not broken the siege of the city’s eastern neighborhoods. The agency reports that government troops had inflicted “heavy losses” on rebel groups in the fighting raging in the south and southwest of the city. More here from CNN.

Video here.

Aleppo Siege Broken

A coalition of Rebel Forces Has broken the siege of Aleppo according to reports Rebels say they have breached the siege imposed by the Syrian government on opposition neighbourhoods in the northern city of Aleppo, in a major military breakthrough after intense fighting.

The Syrian Regime seized the only route into rebel-held areas in northern Aleppo last month, prompting a rebel counteroffensive from the city’s south.

Clashes Reported In Aleppo

A monitoring group reported sporadic clashes in Aleppo on August 7, a day after Syrian opposition fighters said they broke a three-week government siege of the city. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights was quoted by the AFP news agency as saying that a road opened to the south of Aleppo was too dangerous for civilians to use, and that intermittent clashes and air strikes were taking place.

First food delivery into east Aleppo after rebels break siege

Doctors at the Omar bin Abdulaziz hospital told the Telegraph patients and staff took cover in the basement for most of night. “Everyone is staying in the safest room,” said Dr Fatima AlMousalem, whose hospital has been targeted several times in recent weeks. “We expected this bloody attack from the Assad regime.

Syrian rebels vow to take Aleppo after breaking siege – FT.com

Syrian opposition fighters vowed to capture all of Aleppo after breaking a weeks-long siege of the northern city that has become a critical battleground of the country’s five-year civil war. Fierce battles raged in several parts of Aleppo, Syria’s

Military success in Syria gives Putin upper hand

Washington: The Syrian military was foundering last year, with thousands of rebel fighters pushing into areas of the country long considered to be government strongholds. The rebel offensive was aided by powerful tank-destroying missiles supplied by the CIA and Saudi Arabia. Intelligence assessments circulated in Washington that the Syrian president, Bashar Al Assad, was losing his grip on power.

Daesh destroys ancient treasures in Syria’s Tal Ajaja

Tal Ajaja: When Daesh captured Tal Ajaja, one of Syria’s most important Assyrian-era sites, they discovered previously unknown millennia-old statues and cuneiform tablets, and then they destroyed them. The terrorist group, which has ravaged archeological sites under its control in Syria and Iraq, was chased from Tal Ajaja in northeastern Hasakeh province in February by Kurdish fighters.

Syria’s war: Deaths as air strikes hit Idlib hospital

At least 10 people, including three children and four women, have been killed in air strikes on a hospital in northwestern Syria’s rebel-held Idlib province. Al Jazeera’s Adham Abu Hossam, reporting from the site of the attack in Meles, a town about 15km from Idlib city, said Saturday’s raids had also left many in critical condition.

Syrian refugees settling in US at a faster clip

When Ajwad Al Zoubi, a tall, stocky man who for years drove trucks across the Middle East, saw the emailed photo of his beloved home with the bountiful orange trees burned to the ground, he turned into a pool of tears. They come suddenly, even now, when he talks about it.

Syrian refugees design app for navigating German bureaucracy

Munzer Khattab likens German bureaucracy to a game of snakes and ladders. When the 23-year-old from Latakia on the Syrian coast arrived and registered in Berlin last year, he was given the address of a job centre in another part of the city. But when he turned up at the address, the building was shut for renovation.

UK unlikely to reach target of resettling 20,000 Syrian refugees

There is scant evidence that Britain would reach the target set by David Cameron last year of resettling 20,000 Syrian refugees in the country by 2020, MPs have said in a damaging report which calls the response to the refugee crisis of 2015-16 a “Europe-wide failure”.

Adele snubs Glasto LP to fundraise for refugees and murdered MP

Adele was the star performer at the Glastonbury Festival this year But she has declined to offer a song from her set to a new charity album All profits generated will be split between Oxfam and the Jo Cox Fund Adele was the undisputed queen of this year’s Glastonbury festival and her show-stopping performance propelled her latest album back to the top of the charts.

Syrian refugee swimmer wins heat, won’t advance in butterfly | Fox News

Swimmer Yusra Mardini, who survived a harrowing sea crossing a year ago and is now among 10 refugees competing under the Olympic flag in Rio, won her preliminary heat in the 100-meter butterfly Saturday. But the result wasn’t enough to advance her to the semifinals.

Democrats Social Reconstruction in America via Putin

Posted on August 7, 2016August 7, 2016 by Denise Simon

Primer for this interview: Why did Baraq Obama put Chuck Hagel in as Secretary of Defense? Global Zero. Further, while everyone is caught up in the election cycle, it is important to know that Obama has removed our first strike option to deploy a nuclear weapon. Kinda don’t need that pesky nuclear football that is with Obama at all times.

This week, Trevor interviews Jeffrey R. Nyquist, geopolitical expert and author of “Origins of the Fourth World War: And the Coming Wars of Mass Destruction.” This particularly frightening episode of LoudonClear delves into what happened to the communists after the cold war, the Russian propaganda machine and Donald Trump’s Russian ties. Hat tip to NoisyRoom. Related reading:

Russia Weaponizing the Arctic

Hillary’s Relationship with Russia is Approved Espionage

Russian spies claim they can now collect crypto keys

The U.S. has had a Russian Problem of Espionage for Decades

The Games of Russia and the IRGC, that Kidnapped our Sailors

What you Need to Know About the Gerasimov Doctrine’

That should keep you busy for a while and provide an in sight into how the willing accomplices within our government are either carrying the baton for the Kremlin or are too stupid to know otherwise.