John Kerry Gave Iran the Pass, is Russia Next?

Seems like any country demonstrating not only bad behavior, but those that are killing regimes are enjoying a new legitimacy by the entire Obama administration and it has Europe in the same camp. Russia is no different from Iran for the most part and yet with 7000 dead in Ukraine and the silent assassinations at the behest of Putin….Russia is getting a pass by the world.

Kerry Says Moves to Lift Russia Sanctions May Begin in `Months’

Bloomberg: The U.S. may be able to consider lifting sanctions it imposed on Russia over its involvement in violence in Ukraine later this year if the Kremlin complies with the Minsk peace deal, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said.

“With effort and with bone fide, legitimate intent to solve the problem on both sides, it’s possible in these next months to find those Minsk agreements implemented,” he told an audience in Davos, Switzerland. If this happens, it would “get to the place where sanctions can be appropriately — because of the implementation — be removed,” he said.

Kerry’s comments are all the more optimistic since as recently as last month the U.S. Treasury Department expanded sanctions related to Russia’s role in Ukraine.

Earlier this week, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko blamed Russia for delays in implementing the Minsk accord and said sanctions enacted by the U.S. and Europe over the conflict are working. The conflict has killed more than 9,000 people and continues to simmer in the country’s easternmost regions.

While the original peace accord, signed last February in Minsk, was due to be completed by 2015, a new deadline hasn’t been set. Russia blames Ukraine for the delays.

Now enter the matter and history of Russian and Europe

Britain’s KGB Sugar Daddy

Weiss/DailyBeast: To understand Britain’s cowardice in standing up to Vladimir Putin, just follow the money.

On Monday, a freelancer photographer called Steve Back snapped a photograph of a document being carried cavalierly in the open by British officials entering Downing Street. The document was a list of suggested countermoves by Westminster to play against the Kremlin for Russia’s recent invasion of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. Some of the items tracked with what other European and American counterparts were thinking. Let’s not fuel up the NATO jets quite just yet; let’s send a monitoring team from the UN and/or OSCE to Crimea (Robert Serry, a UN envoy was nearly kidnapped earlier this week by armed gunmen in Simferopol); let’s draw up financial and energy contingency plans to help the embryonic new government in Kiev. But one item stuck out above the rest: “Not support, for now, trade sanctions… or close London’s financial centre to Russians.”

Two of Britain’s finer Russia-obsessed journalists, Ben Judah and Oliver Bullough, have dealt admirably with why London has all of a sudden gone wobbly on Putinist aggression in Europe. The flow of Moscow gold to the sceptr’d isle, they argue, has now become so steady, so dependable and so relied-upon that no act of geopolitical thuggery can ever again lead to a Churchillian showdown with the Kremlin.

The Cold War may be over in the Western imagination for a number of reasons, but the triumph of cold hard cash is one of them. Russians have bought nearly five percent of the premium London properties in 2013. They’ve kept the tills full at Harrods during an “austerity” economy. They’ve sent their children to elite boarding schools and Oxbridge colleges, paying full tuition fees. And they’ve shoved their questionably-gotten gains into British tax shelters or financial institutions. In return, the political establishment, be it Labour or Tory, has only asked for more.

Old, numerous and bipartisan are the tales that corroborate this dreary hypothesis. At meetings with his Russian counterpart, David Cameron is said to politely cough about the ongoing carnage in Syria before getting down to the real business of greater Anglo-Russian trade and energy cooperation. And wasn’t Cameron’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, once spotted dining aboard the Corfu-anchored “super-yacht” belonging to Oleg Deripaska, the billionaire Russian aluminum magnate who was allegedly considering ways to donate to the Conservative Party even though donations by foreigners are illegal under British electoral law?  The then-Shadow Chancellor of course denied that any chatter about creative campaign financing ever took place. But also aboard Deripaska’s Queen K was Lord Peter Mandelson, a serially-employed Blairite then inhabiting his role as the European Commissioner for Trade. He was reportedly chatting with the oligarch about relaxing E.U. aluminum tariffs. Mandelson refused to flat-out deny that that discussion took place, preferring instead to focus on the “media squalls” and “sensationalist headlines,” but in any event, the tariffs did get lowered, and Deripaska’s metals empire Rusal benefited from looser trade with the E.U. Did I mention that the man to put both Tory and Labour Brits on the mega-yacht was a Rothschild, and that Deripaska’s registered lobbyist in the United States to help with a sticky visa situation has been Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (PDF)?

If you didn’t know any better, you’d start to think that the cousins would gladly pay for the pleasure of selling themselves to Moscow. One celebrated English author has gone that far already:

Plus another thing, Hector!” he barks. “What’s wrong, when you come down to it, with turning black money to white, at the end of the day? All right, there’s an alternative economy out there. A very big one. We all know that. We’re not born yesterday. More black than white, some countries’ economies are, we know that too. Look at Turkey. Look at Colombia, Luke’s parish. All right, look at Russia too. So where would you rather see that money? Black and out there? Or white, and sitting in London in the hands of civilized men, available for legitimate purposes and the public good?”

“Then maybe you should take up laundering yourself, Billy,” says Hector quietly. “For the public good.”

John le Carré is notorious for taking the establishment for which he once toiled as a spy at its lowest estimation.  But in Our Kind of Traitor, his penultimate novel published in 2010, he barely had to stray from the latest headlines in the Daily Mail to depict a credit-crunched nation heavily floated by what every Fleet Street hack has come to semi-affectionately refer to as the “Londongrad” or “Moscow-on-Thames” demimonde.

Dima, an ox-like Russian hood—“World Number One money-launderer”—wants to come in from the cold and set himself and his family up in the high English lifestyle to which so many of his compatriots have grown accustomed. In exchange for a little help from MI6, he promises to show Westminster where all the bodies are buried and where all the illicit assets of the Russian mob and the Russian state are being kept, a task made easier by the fact that the mob has now become the state under the leadership of the ultimate Russian hood, Vladimir Vladimirovich. But therein lies the problem for poor Dima, whose fate actually brings le Carré’s cynicism to new lows, even if the novelist’s grasp of empirical reality has never been less veiled or more vividly represented.  There’s even a scene in Our Kind of Traitor set aboard a yacht anchored off the coast of the Adriatic Sea featuring a Shadow Minister with the “haughty sub-Byronic gaze of sensual entitlement” (here’s a photograph of George Osborne.) And Billy, the apologist for money-laundering referenced above, is meant to be the Service’s “longest-standing and most implacable troubleshooter and left-hand man to the Chief himself.”

***

I lived in London for close to three years, from 2010 to the end of 2012. For the better part of half that period, I spent a great deal of time sussing out the connections between two elites: where the interests of those in positions of financial or political authority in Britain intersected with those of the Russian plutocracy. I left convinced that the reason Putin was able to get away with irradiating Alexander Litvinenko in broad daylight was that he understood that the brutality of Marxism-Leninism was more readily applied in the service of Mammon. Murder could now be weighed as a necessary price to pay for realpolitik. Western democrats became hypocrites in the face of consultancy contracts or low-cost oil and gas. Everyone wants to get rich, no one wants to fight money, however dirty or blood-soaked it may be. As the Economist phrased it during those frenzied months of tracing the source of a radioactive isotope through Piccadilly and beyond, “British diplomats’ biggest worry is not that Scotland Yard will be flummoxed, but that it might succeed” in identifying Litvinenko’s killers. This grim saga continued all through my time in England. The British Home Office last year, under a new administration, cited “international relations” in rejecting Litvinenko’s widow’s call for a public enquiry into her husband’s assassination seven years earlier. A British High Court judge has only just last month ordered the government to reconsider its decision. The siloviki, meanwhile, hug themselves with glee to watch as Scotland Yard reaches for the Geiger counter whenever a seemingly healthy Russian emigré is found dead in Surrey.

Still, there were those trying to end this sordid special relationship. Occasionally I’d get an email from, or have a meeting with, what was then known as the UK’s Financial Services Authority, a quasi-judicial regulatory body that has since cleaved into two separate organizations. The FSA—not to be confused with the anti-Assad rebels in Syria—were always interested in hearing what I’d come up with, but they’d confess immediately that they were hamstrung when it came to doing anything but keeping files on such-and-such finding. “We’re up against all of Downing Street, all of the City,” I remember one enforcement agent telling me, the City being the synecdoche for London’s financial centre, its Wall Street. He might have added a media that was itself hamstrung by Britain’s ludicrous libel laws.

More frustrating was the fact that the funny money was not so terribly obscure or recondite anymore thanks to Britain’s having become a favored jurisdiction for Russians looking to sue each other. As Oliver Bullough points out in the New Republic, “60 percent of the London Commercial Court’s workload now comes from Russia and Eastern Europe, and the pay-offs are huge.”

Alexey Navalny, the leader of the opposition in Russia as well as its foremost anti-corruption campaigner, published an op-ed in the London Times in 2012 in which he called for the Brits to adopt legislation similar to the U.S. Magnitsky Act, which aims to blacklist and sanction Russian officials guilty of gross human-rights violations. In Britain, such a law was needed even more urgently, Navalny wrote. “Local banks apply meagre ‘know your client’ procedures to vet applicants: a passport copy and a utility bill are all that is needed to open an account at any London-based private bank. Then, as if by magic, funds pour into the UK as clean capital, free from any taxation or further scrutiny. Getting the right to stay permanently in the UK with an investor visa is just as easy; all that is needed is a minimum of £2 million in personal assets.”

Moreover, where British banks weren’t doing the work, Russian ones were. I’d later work with Navalny’s Foundation for Fighting Corruption on a report it released on VTB Group, which is 60 percent state-owned by the Russian government. Originally Vneshtorgbank, which was formed in the 1990s following Mikhail Gorbachev’s breakup of the Soviet State Bank of Russia, or Gosbank, it was rebranded VTB in 2006. Today, the bank has a presence in over 20 countries, with assets amounting to $230 billion. In 2011, it took in upwards of $712 million in deposits in France and Germany, including from those countries’ pensioners. In 2007, as a brainchild of Putin, it inaugurated a “People’s IPO” designed to prompt ordinary Russians to become minority shareholders. Small business-owners to babushkas were encouraged to invest in what then-Prime Minister Putin called a “stable” growth vehicle; 130,000 lined up to buy at the offering price of 13.6 kopecks a share, making the IPO the largest in the world that year. Yet days after the IPO was launched, VTB’s stock price dropped; then it tanked, following the global economic crisis, driving the stock down to 1.9 kopecks. Putin tried to correct for this in 2012, by forcing VTB to buy back minority shares from only the IPO investors, at the original share price of 13.6 kopecks. Institutional investors were excluded from this act of czarist munificence and were rightfully furious for being cheated. Rinat Kirdan of Aton Capital told Bloomberg: “Over the years we have seen considerable evidence support in the view that VTB is more a state vehicle than a pro-oriented or shareholder-oriented business.”

The bank’s investment arm, VTB Capital, established a presence in London in 2008, in a building formerly occupied by Lloyds. Not longer thereafter, VTB went to court in London to reclaim losses. Another High Court Justice found in 2012 that “[i]t is not clear from the evidence presently available what, if any, due diligence was carried out by or on behalf of either VTB Moscow or VTB.” This case, involving the purchase of six Russian dairy farms, saw VTB issue a $225 million loan to a company whose collateral was worth less than $45 million. Moreover, the buyer of the farms, the bank later claimed to have discovered (though has not proven), was also the owner. The loan defaulted within a year. In January of this year, one of the defendants in the case, Konstanin Malofeev, filed a $600 million suit against VTB—also in London’s High Court.

Other allegations of rampant mismanagement or crony lending schemes designed to enrich bank executives continue to dog VTB. So have more serious charges that it has been keeping accounts for a mass murderer.

Last September, Senators Kelly Ayotte, Richard Blumenthal, John Cornyn and Jeanne Shaheen asked the U.S. Treasury Department to stop “Russian banks that have repeatedly undermined American, European Union and United Nations sanctions by helping the Assad regime in Syria.” VTB was one of them, although spokesmen for the bank denied that it had taken any deposits from either Assad or any other member of the “Syrian leadership.” A Syrian state-controlled newspaper disagreed; in 2011 it reported that the Syrian Central Bank did indeed have accounts with VTB, as well as Gazprombank—the financial arm of the Russian gas giant—and Vneshekonombank (VEB). Both of these banks are also owned by the Russian government.

Actually, Damascus has been a prominent third party in more recent Londongrad hiccups in the media. Consider the case of Vladimir Lisin, Russia’s second-wealthiest man, with a net worth of $15.9 billion, according to Forbes. Lisin was the vice president of Russia’s Olympic Committee for the 2012 London Games, a role that granted him temporary diplomatic status in Britain. In June 2012, I discovered that a Russian cargo ship called the Professor Katsman, which had already been accused by Western diplomats of running weapons to Assad via Syria’s Russian-maintained port at Tartus, was owned by Lisin through a series of multinational shell companies. As with a lot of Russian businesses, the ownership was concealed in a matryoshka dolls-like series of parents and subsidiaries. The boat was technically registered by a Maltese concern called Rusich 12 Ltd, which was owned by a Cypriot one called Russich-NW Shipholding (PDF), which belonged to North Western Shipping, a Russian entity, which was controlled by Universal Cargo Logistics (UCL) Holding, an international transportation group with corporate addresses in Moscow and Amsterdam. UCL Holding is widely acknowledged as Lisin’s shipping behemoth. Its Amsterdam address, as I noted at the time in the Telegraph, gave sufficient grounds for the Netherlands and other E.U. members-states, which had imposed an arms embargo on Syria, to investigate whether or not the Katsman had violated European law. Moreover, if the British government itself investigated this ship and found evidence that it had been shipping weapons to Syria, then what might be doable to any assets or properties owned by Lisin in the UK, such as his 3,300-acre Aberuchill Castle estate in Perthshire, Scotland?

After my story was published, and a more expansive follow-up appeared in the Sunday Telegraph, UCL Holdings issued a press release stating: “At the moment we don’t have any prove [sic] that Profesor [sic] Katsman had delivered to Syria anything of a military nature that can be used against civilians.” This was itself a curious way of phrasing the matter because the Russian Foreign Ministry back in 2012 liked to say that hardware such as refurbished attack helicopters or spare parts for them wasn’t being used against civilians in Syria (even though it plainly was); it was “defensive” in nature. Also, Lisin threatened to sue the Telegraph if it pursued this line of inquiry further, according to another journalist at the newspaper. As for Malta, the Netherlands, Cyprus and Britain, not a peep was heard about the Katsman’s cargo or its wealthy, Olympic-loving owner. Nor did the Syrian opposition get any joy when it took up the matter itself.

In some cases, the journey of dubious rubles through, past or straight into Blighty involves senior Russian officials who, no matter what accusations may be leveled against them with however much eyebrow-raising evidence, always remain senior Russian officials.

Igor Shuvalov is the first deputy prime minister in Dmitry Medvedev’s cabinet and Putin’s longtime economic consigliere. He’s also the Kremlin’s “sherpa” to three important international bodies: the World Trade Organization, which Russia joined over a year ago after much U.S. string-pulling on its behalf; the Davos World Economic Forum, where the oligarchs turn up each year; and the G8, from which the U.S., along with every other G7 nation, has now pulled its attendance at the forthcoming summit in protest of Moscow’s invasion of Crimea. Shuvalov won acclaim at home and abroad for being the man to lure the 2018 World Cup to Russia. As you might expect, then, he’s done very nicely for himself, but he’s had help.

In 2004, Alisher Usmanov had an idea. The Uzbek-born industrialist who would later become a percipient investor in Facebook, Groupon and Twitter, and as well as a major shareholder in Britain’s Arsenal Football Club, had decided to buy a 13 percent equity interest in an erstwhile Anglo-Dutch steel manufacturer called Corus Group, which was then a whisper away from bankruptcy. (Today, Corus Group has become Tata Steel, having been acquired by the Indian conglomerate; it’s also the second largest steel manufacturer in all of Europe.) To purchase this equity interest, Usmanov needed $319 million. And so the financing for this transaction, which drew the attention of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission at the time, came by way of a Bahamas-registered company called Sevenkey Limited. The owner of that entity was one Olga Shuvalova, Igor Shuvalov’s stay-at-home wife and fellow former law school classmate. Olga’s declared income was $12 million in 2008, $20 million in 2009, and $10 million in 2010.

As Barron’s reported in 2011, the entirety of the $49.5 million was deposited in a Sevenkey bank account just weeks before the money was then transferred to Gallagher Holdings, a company registered in Cyprus, through which Usmanov bought up his Corus stake. The transfer of the money was arranged, Barron’s said, by a man called Eugene Shvidler, another billionaire oligarch who has both Russian and American citizenship.

Shvidler has since admitted in a separate British High Court  case that for the last 10 years he has managed all of the business interests of his dear friend Roman Abramovich, still another lucky enlistee in the nine-figure fortune club. Abramovich is today the ninth richest man in Russia, with a net worth of $12.1 billion, according to Forbes. Having formerly been successful in keeping head below the parapet or out of the spotlight, Abramovich has in the last decade become a conspicuous fixture in the tabloid press because of his ownership of the revered Chelsea Football Club in west London, the purchase of which in 2003 was rumored to have been personally sanctioned by Putin himself, as was Abramovich’s divorce from his second wife, a former Aeroflot stewardess, in 2007. So close are Abramovich and Shvidler that the latter is sometimes referred to as former’s “representative on earth;” so intimate are they that, in 2006, Abramovich “gifted” to Shvidler Le Grand Bleu, a luxury yacht that came with its speedboat, helicopter and indoor aquarium. Together, they also form the majority ownership of Evraz, a Britain-based steel and mining company that is traded on the FTSE 100 Index of the London Stock Exchange and employs 100,000 people worldwide.

But what’s interesting about the “loan” made by Olga Shuvalova’s Sevenkey Limited to Gallagher Holdings—apart from the obvious question of where the unemployed wife of Putin’s trusted economic advisor got $49.5 million to lend to anybody—was that the stated level of interest had been set to five percent per annum. And yet, Gallagher ended up reimbursing Sevenkey to the tune of $119 million from 2005 to 2007: a rate of return of more than 40 percent. In other words, Olga Shuvalova, and by extension her public servant husband, more than doubled their money in the space of three years.

What else was noteworthy about this deal?

Recall that Usmanov said he couldn’t raise money from banks to finance his purchase of 13 percent of Corus’s equity. Well, according to the 2006 audit of Gallagher Holdings, he could and did. In fact, that audit disclosed nothing about a $49.5 million loan coming from Sevenkey, but plenty about other loans Usmanov managed to secure, at the more gentlemanly rate of nine percent annual interest, to help finance his investment.

Sevenkey has altered its ownership structures over the years, but not its ultimate legal beneficiary who was and remained, as of 2011, Olga Shuvalova. Its current sole shareholder is a company called Severin Enterprises, which is registered in the British Virgin Islands, a dependent territory of the UK. Meanwhile,  Sevenkey’s corporate secretary is a man called Alastair Tulloch, a London-based attorney; its director is another Brit called Sean Hogan. When last I looked up Hogan on the UK Companies House website, I discovered that he has been a nominee for 782 companies registered in the Britain.

Prior to 2008, Sevenkey paid no profits to its owners; it was used to manage the assets of the Shuvalov family, which include or once included a Jaguar, a few Mercedes, two limos, apartments in Russia, Austria and London, and “District 4”—a giant villa once frequented by R&R-seeking members of the Soviet Politburo. Abramovich is a neighbor.

After news of the Shuvalov affair broke in the international financial press, the Russian General Prosecutor’s Office opened an investigation, then closed it, claiming it had found no evidence of any illegality or untoward behavior in this cozy arrangement between and amongst two prominent oligarchs and the Kremlin’s influential financial advisor. Moreover, the Office declared, the Shuvalovs were good and regular Russian taxpayers, having replenished the public coffers even on the money made from the Sevenkey-Gallagher transaction. It apparently mattered not at all that Shuvalov later served, from 2008 to 2009, as head of a state commission on stabilizing the distressed Russian economy, a commission which signed off on the issuance of stimulus subsidies to various private enterprises. One such recipient of $30 billion in state guarantees was Metalloinvest, Russia’s largest iron ore company. Metalloinvest is owned by Alisher Usmanov. In 2013, he was named not only the richest man in Russia by Forbes, but also the richest man in Britain by the TheSunday Times, which reckoned that his net worth currently hovers at around $22 billion.

To make matters even more intriguing (and incestuous) Shuvalov has insisted that he and his wife got the money for the Gallagher loan from dividends earned through a 0.5 percent stock option in Sibneft, an oil company created in the mid-1990s for the purpose of rapid privatization. Brits have grown quite familiar with Sibneft over the last few years. It was featured prominently and repeatedly in court room epic drama of “Berezovsky v Abramovich,” the most expensive civil litigation in British history, initiated by Boris Berezovsky, the now-deceased Russian oligarch who did more than any other person to facilitate Putin’s ascent to the presidency in 2000, then squandered his enormous wealth trying to unmake that disastrous decision.  Berezovsky had claimed that, because he’d fallen afoul of Putin in the early aughts and been driven from Russia, he’d been forced to sell his stake in Sibneft for much lower than what it had been worth at the time, and so Abramovich owed him $5 billion in damages. Still another High Court judge found otherwise and ruled in defendant Abramovich’s favor, lambasting Berezovsky as an “unimpressive, and inherently unreliable, witness,” not long after which the plaintiff committed suicide by hanging himself in his own bathroom in Surrey— at least according to the official coroner’s report, which many Russians in both London and Moscow are loath to believe. Meanwhile, Lord Sumption, Abramovich’s defense barrister, is said to have cleared a cool $5 million in legal fees and now has a seat on the British Supreme Court. It was in “Berezovsky v Abramovich” that Shvidler helpfully testified to managing all of Abramovich’s business affairs for the last decade.

But the notion that Shuvalov made a killing via a mystery stock option for a now vanished Russian oil company sounded fishy to many. “What’s the reason for giving an option to Shuvalov in that period of time when he was not an official [of Sibneft]?,” Navalny wrote in 2011, adding that any such stock option would have emerged in later corporate due diligence performed on the company for its merger in 1998 with Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s subsequently confiscated oil giant. (Full disclosure: I work for the Institute of Modern Russia, a New York-based think tank, the president of which is Pavel Khodorkovsky, Mikhail’s son.)

Another Russian opposition figure, Natalia Pelevina, raised the Corus investment with both Britain’s Serious Fraud Office, citing Usmanov and Abramovich’s residency in the UK, and with the F.B.I, citing Shvidler’s American citizenship. Pelevina told me that neither agency has paid much attention to the case, although others clearly have done. She has received death threats in Moscow for kicking up a fuss about this affair. A little over a year ago, she said that she’d been passed messages from anonymous parties through her own lawyer informing her: “When we do you, it won’t be clean like [Anna] Politkovskaya. It’ll be a drunkard smashing your head in with a cinder block.” (I’ve obtained Pelevina’s permission to relay this threat publicly.)

Finally, even those with the ear of the British monarchy have benefited from life in Londongrad. Earlier I mentioned that Abramovich and Shvidler’s largest known investment in Britain is Evraz, the London Stock Exchange-traded steel and mining enterprise.  A “senior, independent non-executive” member of Evraz’s board of directors and a member of its Audit Committee is Sir Michael Peat, who was formerly Keeper of the Privy Purse—i.e. Queen Elizabeth’s treasurer—and the principal private secretary to Prince Charles. Sir Michael’s annual compensation for services rendered to Evraz is £250,000 or $418,000, which isn’t bad for a little independent, non-executive corporate advisement and accountancy. But there appear to be other perks to enjoying a close relationship with two of Russia’s most recognizable oligarchs.

On January 3, 2012, Shvidler was appointed (PDF) to the board of MC Peat & Co LLP, a boutique investment firm established by Sir Michael’s son, Charlie Peat, in order to develop “distribution contracts in Russia, the CIS and the Middle East,” as the company’s website has it. Two days later, on January 5, 2012, MC Peat & Co LLP took out a loan in the amount of £2.73 million, or $4.5 million. The issuer of the loan was an Aruba-based company known as Horizon Investments AVV, which, according to the Department of Civil Aviation in Aruba, formerly owned an EC-135 model Eurocopter. The base of operations for that aircraft, as of 2004, was listed as “United Kingdom—Embarked on the Motor Yacht ‘Le Grand Bleu.’” That yacht, as you may recall, was given as a present by Abramovich to Shvidler in 2006.

Charlie Peat denied to me by email that his investment house was lent any money from Roman Abramovich. However, when I asked if the £2.73 million loan for Charlie’s investment firm might have been provided by Abramovich’s representative on earth, I was referred to Shvidler’s press office. (That office never responded to my inquiries.)

Evraz’s 2011 annual report did disclose that its board of directors considered “an arm’s length business arrangement between one of the non-independent directors and the son of Sir Michael Peat…and satisfied itself that his arrangement has no impact on Sir Michael Peat’s independence.”   “Arm’s length” is a nice way of putting it, although Sir Michael and Shvidler may have recently found they needed still more length. In May 2013, Shvidler quit the board of MC Peat & Co LLP. The lending company of the £2.73 million loan is also no longer listed as a helicopter-owning shell in Aruba.

***

As a result of Russia’s invasion of Crimea, the Russian economy has taken a beating. The Russian Trading System indexed dropped 12 percent on Monday, though seems to have recovered somewhat over the last two days. Gazprom’s stock has sunk more than 18 percent since February 18; VTB’s stock is down 20 percent since the Ukraine crisis hit. With news today that Crimea’s parliament, led by a gangster known as “Goblin,” has just voted to join the Russian Federation, the market in Moscow dipped still further. The ruble, says VTB Capital, is as much as 8.5 percent behind the emerging market average index, with Ukraine accounting for 2.0-3.0 percentage points of that shortfall. Anders Aslund says that “[t]he Russian economy was earlier set to stagnate, but now it is likely to contract.”

Yet Putin is unfazed by all this gloom and doom. In the case of emergency, he cuts a cheque. His initial bribe to Viktor Yanukovych—naturally couched as a loan—was a unilateral $15 billion, to be disbursed in installments, for repudiating a modest Association Agreement with the E.U. in favor of Ukraine’s enlistment in Russia’s neo-Soviet protectionist Customs Union. Now, in order to compete with that sum, the U.S. has had to offer a post-Yanukovych government $1 billion in loan guarantees (more that it offered all the post-Arab Spring countries combined), while the E.U. has just floated $15 billion in aid over the next two years, broken up into loans, credits, and grants. Nevertheless, not a single E.U. country has announced sanctions or trade restrictions against Moscow or any of the Kremlin elite dispatched abroad to do Moscow’s bidding. Even the Czech Republic, which was formerly occupied by the Soviet Union, has ruled out such a contingency.

Will Putin really lose? His long-game (assuming he hasn’t gone mad, as Angela Merkel believes) has been twofold: wait for Ukraine’s economy to implode and then come rushing to the rescue, secure in the knowledge that no European power now crying foul over his actions will have the courage eject Russian lucre from its shores. In order for this gambit to work, he had to count on Britain, Russia’s foremost enemy apart from the United States during the Cold War which had lately transformed into a leading recipient of Russian foreign direct investment, to be first among equals in financial acquiescence. Britain has behaved exactly as Putin expected.

Spoofing the GPS, Navy Sailors Arrested

My first conclusion was Iran hacked the GPS and described this with evidence on January 14th.

Story You Aren’t Being Told About Iran Capturing Two American Vessels

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 01/20/2016

Zerohedge The airwaves in the United States were filled with images of sailors on their knees while a US Navy vessel was searched. Unjustified outrage swept the nation. The US Secretary of Defense blamed the incident on a simple navigation error, however a chain of events leading back to 2009 demonstrates the facts are a little more complicated than first appear. The chain of events leads defense analysts to one unmistakable conclusion: Iran has the ability to disrupt US GPS systems. For western military analysts, the thought is terrifying. The West uses GPS for much more than replacing a compass and a map.

In 2009, Lockheed Martin’s RQ-170 Sentinel showed up on a runway in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The aircraft entered service two years earlier, but the public was unaware. The bat wing styled drone is reminiscent of the Stealth Bomber. The similarities extend beyond the cosmetic, and the RQ-170 is the premier spy drone in the US fleet. This was the drone used to map out Bin Laden’s compound. It was tasked with keeping an eye on Iran’s nuclear program. That’s when things got interesting.

On December 4, 2011 a RQ-170 Sentinel crashed into the Iranian countryside. Iran claimed its electronic warfare unit brought the plane down. The US Department of Defense stated the aircraft was flying over western Afghanistan and crashed near or in Iran. The aircraft was 140 miles inside Iran’s borders. The west laughed at the idea of Iran’s military obtaining the capability to down one the most sophisticated drones in the world. One military official remarked it was like:

“dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture.”

They probably shouldn’t have been so quick to laugh. It appears the Iranians didn’t just down the aircraft, they took control of it mid-flight. Dailytech.com explained:

“Using its knowledge of the frequency, the engineer claims, Iran intiated its ‘electronic ambush’ by jamming the bird’s communications frequencies, forcing it into auto-pilot.  States the source, ‘By putting noise [jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This is where the bird loses its brain.’

 

“The team then use a technique known as ‘spoofing’ — sending a false signal for the purposes of obfuscation or other gain.  In this case the signal in questions was the GPS feed, which the drone commonly acquires from several satellites.  By spoofing the GPS feed, Iranian officials were able to convince it that it was in Afghanistan, close to its home base.  At that point the drone’s autopilot functionality kicked in and triggered the landing.  But rather than landing at a U.S. military base, the drone victim instead found itself captured at an Iranian military landing zone.

 

“Spoofing the GPS is a clever method, as it allows hackers to ‘land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to crack the [encrypted] remote-control signals and communications.’

 

“While the technique did not require sophistication from a cryptography perspective, it was not entirely trivial, either, as it required precise calculations to be made to give the drone the proper forged distance and find and fine an appropriate altitude landing strip to make sure the drone landed as it did in Afghanistan.

 

The Iranian engineers knew the details of the landing site, because the drone had been confirmed in grainy photos to be landing at a base in Khandar, Afghanistan.

 

“Despite the careful calculations, the drone still sustained a dent in its wing and underbody (though it did not have the usual signs of a high-speed collision).  During its press conferences, the Iranian military covered this damage with anti-American banners.

 

“The engineer explained this damage commenting, ‘If you look at the location where we made it land and the bird’s home base, they both have [almost] the same altitude.  There was a problem [of a few meters] with the exact altitude so the bird’s underbelly was damaged in landing; that’s why it was covered in the broadcast footage.’The approach echoes an October security conference presentation [PDF] in Chicago, in which ETH Zurich researchers laid out how to use interference and GPS spoofing to more gently down a drone.”

The Aviationist agreed and suggested the US “reconsider their drones’ equipment, countermeasures and combat operation procedures as well as Iran’s electronic and cyberwarfare capabilities.” It should be noted the “ox-cart technology culture” has since reverse engineered the drone.

The gross underestimation of the Iranian military led to the recent incident in the Persian Gulf. The story being repeated in the western press is one of ten sailors getting lost and ending up in Iranian territorial waters (if the outlet mentions that part). According to Secretary of Defense Carter, “All the contributing factors to that we don’t know yet, and we’re still talking to those folks, and we’ll find out more … but they were clearly out of the position that they intended to be in.”

Two boats lost their GPS abilities at the same time, and the Secretary of Defense isn’t sure what happened? A few US outlets, such as the L.A. Times, reported on the other malfunctions during the incident. Both boats lost radio communication and all other communication during the incident. A single vehicle losing its GPS abilities can happen. It’s rare, but it can happen. Two vehicles losing the systems at the same time borders on implausible, but there is still a possibility of it occurring through Murphy’s Law. The loss of all communication equipment and GPS systems on two boats at the same time means one thing: electronic warfare.

The unwillingness to admit the US military has spent billions on a system that has apparently been defeated by Iran is the most likely culprit behind the western media’s attempt to focus on the “ill treatment” of US sailors. Even the L.A. Times, which was willing to report on the communications failures, placed the following quote in a bold offset in the same article:

“The way those sailors were treated was entirely inappropriate. … The U.S. Navy would never demand Iranian sailors hold their hands on their heads and coerce a confession.– James Stavridis, retired U.S. admiral”

The U.S. Navy’s installation at Guantanamo Bay has been the scene of the worst treatment of detainees by the US government in decades. The sailors captured by Iran were not waterboarded, deprived of sleep or food, sexually abused, or otherwise tortured. The United States does not have the moral authority to object to how another nation treats detainees.

The burning question now relates to whether or not Iran’s actions constitute an attack on the U.S. It’s not a simple question. Electronic warfare and cyber warfare have become common place. It is also worth noting the two US vessels were within just a few miles of Farsi Island. Farsi Island is the home of the Revolutionary Guards’ Navy (RGN). The RGN is Iran’s maritime unconventional warfare force. For comparison, imagine a scenario in which a nation that has attacked a US civilian airliner and whose political leaders have constantly threatened war sent two boats to  pass extraordinarily close to the home base of a U.S. Seal Team. The reader can decide if Iran’s actions were appropriate.

The most important takeaway from this incident is to remember the high-tech military of the United States has an exposed vulnerability. It’s a vulnerability that was exploited by Iran. Iran is not a nation many in military circles would see as technologically advanced. The drone warfare system has a fatal flaw. If Iran can exploit it, China and Russia certainly can. Even North Korea has been able to successfully disrupt the GPS system. Beyond simple navigation, the U.S. employs the GPS system to guide missiles. If the Iranians can jam and spoof their way into controlling a drone, it isn’t a huge leap to believe have the ability, or will soon have the ability, to do the same thing with guided missiles.

It should be noted that GPS jammers are available on the civilian market and have been detected in use inside the United Kingdom. This revelation may also be the reasoning behind the U.S. decision to require drone operators to register their aircraft.

 

Perspective: The Real Violation of Hillary with SAP on Her Server

Humm, was Hillary ever in a SCIF?

(Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility)

The smoking gun?  

TheHill: Special Access Programs (SAP) is a game changer.  It is now undeniably clear that the results of the FBI investigation will be the end of one of two things:  Hillary’s bid for the White House or the legitimacy of the FBI—at least when it comes to prosecuting cases on the mishandling of classified material.

In 2006, a Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) from my company was deployed to Afghanistan.  Theirs was a particular mission that differed from the combat missions the typical ODAs were conducting at that time.  Everyone on that team maintained a Top Secret Sensitive and Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) clearance and was “read-on” to their special program.  A few months into their deployment, their Intelligence Sergeant lost a thumb-drive that possessed classified information.  A week later the thumb drive was found for sale at a local bazaar.

In response to the events, Col. Ken Allard (ret.) stated, “You’ve got a situation in which the U.S. is going to be forced to change an awful lot of its operational techniques.”

Beyond the compromise of classified information, a lot did change.  New protocols for the handling of classified material were established, and the transportation of classified material on thumb drives was strictly forbidden.  The knee jerk reaction even went as far as to disable USB ports on our work computers—in case we forgot.

Since then I’ve deployed to several locations where, at times, we operated in small teams with only non-secure cellphones with which to communicate.  We often found ourselves with a lot of information that needed to be sent up in reports, but due to the nature of our mission we were forced to sit on it for a few days until we were able to type it up and send it through a secure medium.  I’d be lying if I said we didn’t concoct elaborate plans with “foolproof” ways to communicate the information over non-secure channels, but in the end, no one was willing to take the risk of our “fail-safes” failing.

As more information from Hillary Clinton’s server has been made available, it is clear that the contents of the server contained Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT).  Understanding that much of the information has been retroactively classified, there are a few facts that are tough to grasp—at least from the perspective of an intelligence practitioner.

First, when imagery that is classified SECRET//NOFORN (no foreign national) is viewed, regardless of the absence of classification markings, it is distinctly evident. Second, any documents that contain or reference HUMINT is always classified SECRET, and if specific names of sources or handlers are mentioned, they are at a minimum SECRET//NOFORN.  Third, SIGINT is always classified at the TS level.  It’s not uncommon for some SI to be downgraded and shared over SECRET mediums, however, it is highly unlikely that a Secretary of State would receive downgraded intelligence.  Finally, SAP intelligence has been discovered on Clinton’s private server, and many are now calling this the smoking gun.  SAP is a specialized management system of additional security controls designed to protect SAR or Special Access Required.  SAR has to do with extremely perishable operational methods and capabilities, and only selected individuals who are “read on” or “indoctrinated” are permitted access to these programs.  The mishandling of SAP can cause catastrophic damage to current collection methods, techniques and personnel.

In other words, if you have worked with classified material for more than a day, it seems highly implausible that someone could receive any of the aforementioned over an un-secure medium without alarm bells sounding.  However, reading about a Special Access Program on an unclassified device would make anyone even remotely familiar with intelligence mess their pantsuit.

With more damming information being released almost weekly now, it’s interesting that during last Sunday’s Democratic debate, Clinton resoundingly stated: “No one is too big for jail.”Although the context was referencing bank CEOs and Hedge fund managers, the obvious correlation left many scratching their heads and wondering—did Hillary Clinton just say, “I dare you” to the FBI?”

DeChristopher is a 9-year veteran of the United States Army Special Forces.  He holds an M.A. in Strategic Security Studies from National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs with a concentration in Irregular Warfare.  He currently works as an Independent Intelligence Consultant.

***

The State Department Inspector General who investigated the Hillary server, had security clearance but to complete the assignment to investigate deeper the issues and data on the server, he had to go through and additional process to get the highest security clearance. It must also be mentioned that some top intelligence community professionals are now part of the investigation and they are in fact stationed to do nothing but investigate the actual communications and determine what was, should have been classified even though ‘some’ communications had designations removed.

****

FNC: Some of Hillary Clinton’s emails on her private server contained information so secret that senior lawmakers who oversee the State Department cannot read them without fulfilling additional security requirements, Fox News has learned.

The emails in question, as Fox News first reported earlier this week, contained intelligence classified at a level beyond “top secret.” Because of this designation, not all the lawmakers on key committees reviewing the case have high enough clearances.

A source with knowledge of the intelligence review told Fox News that senior members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, despite having high-level clearances, are among those not authorized to read the intelligence from so-called “special access programs” without taking additional security steps — like signing new non-disclosure agreements.

These programs are highly restricted to protect intelligence community sources and methods.

As Fox News previously reported, a Jan. 14 letter from Intelligence Community Inspector General I. Charles McCullough III to senior lawmakers said an intelligence review identified “several dozen” additional classified emails — including specific intelligence from “special access programs” (SAP).

That indicates a level of classification beyond even “top secret,” the label previously given to two emails found on her server, and brings even more scrutiny to the Democratic presidential candidate’s handling of the government’s closely held secrets.

Fox News is told that the reviewers who handled the SAP intelligence identified in Clinton’s emails had to sign additional non-disclosure agreements even though they already have the highest level of clearance — known as TS/SCI or Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented information. This detail was first reported by NBC News.

This alone seems to undercut the former secretary of state’s and other officials’ claims that the material is “innocuous.”

In an interview with NPR, Clinton claimed the latest IG finding doesn’t change anything and suggested it was politically motivated.

“This seems to me to be, you know, another effort to inject this into the campaign, it’s another leak,” she said. “I’m just going to leave it up to the professionals at the Justice Department because nothing that this says changes the fact that I never sent or received material marked classified.”

Despite Clinton’s claims, it is the content that is classified; the markings on the documents do not affect that.

A former Justice Department official said there is another problem — warnings from State Department IT employees and others that she should be using a government account.

“If you have a situation where someone was knowingly violating the law and that they knew that what they were doing was prohibited by federal law because other people were saying, you’re violating the law, knock it off, and they disregarded that advice and they went ahead, that’s a very difficult case to defend,” Thomas Dupree said.

Inspector General’s Report on Hillary’s Email, TROUBLE Ahead

Hillary signed the exact same document General Petraeus did. Since Hillary who does not get along at all with the Obama’s, and since Hillary has been in full lockstep with Obama, this can only mean she went to him to get his signature on ‘executive protection’. But, perhaps Congress can move some legislation to have her security clearance stripped, meaning she then cannot be eligible to be president. Just a thought.

Inspector General: Clinton emails had intel from most secretive, classified programs

Herridge/Brown

EXCLUSIVE: Hillary Clinton’s emails on her unsecured, homebrew server contained intelligence from the U.S. government’s most secretive and highly classified programs, according to an unclassified letter from a top inspector general to senior lawmakers.

Fox News exclusively obtained the text of the unclassified letter, sent Jan. 14 from Intelligence Community Inspector General I. Charles McCullough III. It laid out the findings of a recent comprehensive review by intelligence agencies that identified “several dozen” additional classified emails — including specific intelligence known as “special access programs” (SAP).

That indicates a level of classification beyond even “top secret,” the label previously given to two emails found on her server, and brings even more scrutiny to the presidential candidate’s handling of the government’s closely held secrets.

“To date, I have received two sworn declarations from one [intelligence community] element. These declarations cover several dozen emails containing classified information determined by the IC element to be at the confidential, secret, and top secret/sap levels,” said the IG letter to lawmakers with oversight of the intelligence community and State Department. “According to the declarant, these documents contain information derived from classified IC element sources.”

Intelligence from a “special access program,” or SAP, is even more sensitive than that designated as “top secret” – as were two emails identified last summer in a random sample pulled from Clinton’s private server she used as secretary of state. Access to a SAP is restricted to those with a “need-to-know” because exposure of the intelligence would likely reveal the source, putting a method of intelligence collection — or a human asset — at risk. Currently, some 1,340 emails designated “classified” have been found on Clinton’s server, though the Democratic presidential candidate insists the information was not classified at the time.

“There is absolutely no way that one could not recognize SAP material,” a former senior law enforcement with decades of experience investigating violations of SAP procedures told Fox News. “It is the most sensitive of the sensitive.”

Executive Order 13526 — called “Classified National Security Information” and signed Dec. 29, 2009 — sets out the legal framework for establishing special access programs. The order says the programs can only be authorized by the president, “the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, or the principal deputy of each.”

The programs are created when “the vulnerability of, or threat to, specific information is exceptional,” and “the number of persons who ordinarily will have access will be reasonably small and commensurate with the objective of providing enhanced protection for the information involved,” it states.

According to court documents, former CIA Director David Petraeus was prosecuted for sharing intelligence from special access programs with his biographer and mistress Paula Broadwell. At the heart of his prosecution was a non-disclosure agreement where Petraeus agreed to protect these closely held government programs, with the understanding “unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention or negligent handling … could cause irreparable injury to the United States or be used to advantage by a foreign nation.” Clinton signed an identical non-disclosure agreement Jan. 22, 2009.

Fox News is told that the recent IG letter was sent to the leadership of the House and Senate intelligence committees and leaders of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as well as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and State Department inspector general.

Fox News has asked the committees to make the letter public because its findings are unclassified.

Representatives for the ODNI and intelligence community inspector general had no comment, but did not dispute the findings.

The intelligence community IG was responding in his message to a November letter from the Republican chairmen of the Senate intelligence and foreign relations committees that questioned the State Department email review process after it was wrongly reported the intelligence community was retreating from the “top secret” designation.

As Fox News first reported, those two emails were “top secret” when they hit the server, and it is now considered a settled matter.

The intelligence agencies now have their own reviewers embedded at the State Department as part of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) process. The reviewers are identifying intelligence of a potentially classified nature, and referring it to the relevant intelligence agency for further review.

There is no formal appeals process for classification, and the agency that generates the intelligence has final say. The State Department only has control over the fraction of emails that pertain to their own intelligence.

While the State Department and Clinton campaign have said the emails in questions were “retroactively classified” or “upgraded” – to justify the more than 1,300 classified emails on her server – those terms are meaningless under federal law.

The former federal law enforcement official said the finding in the January IG letter represents a potential violation of USC 18 Section 793, “gross negligence” in the handling of secure information under the Espionage Act.

Demoting Petraeus to a 3 Star, Spells Trouble for Hillary?

General Petraeus is still not out of the realm of more disciplinary action when it comes to his troubles. The ‘all-in’ for Obama, Defense Secretary Ash Carter is considering additional punishment for Petraeus and if this demotion happens, it could set a standard for how Hillary should/could be punished as her crimes were much worse.

Exclusive: Pentagon May Demote David Petraeus

TheDailyBeast: The Pentagon is considering retroactively demoting retired Gen. David Petraeus after he admitted to giving classified information to his biographer and mistress while he was still in uniform, three people with knowledge of the matter told The Daily Beast.

The decision now rests with Secretary of Defense Ash Carter who is said to be willing to consider overruling an earlier recommendation by the Army that Petraeus not have his rank reduced. Such a demotion could cost the storied general hundreds of thousands of dollars—and deal an additional blow to his once-pristine reputation.

“The secretary is considering going in a different direction” from the Army, a defense official told the Daily Beast, because he wants to be consistent in his treatment of senior officers who engage in misconduct and to send a message that even men of Petraeus’ fame and esteemed reputation are not immune to punishment.

Pentagon spokesperson Peter Cook told The Daily Beast that Carter had requested more information on the matter before reaching a final decision.

“The Department of the Army is still in the process of providing the Secretary with information

relevant to former‎ Secretary McHugh’s recommendation,” Cook told The Daily Beast, referring to ex-Army Secretary John McHugh, who had recommended taking no action against Petraeus. “Once the Secretary‎ has an opportunity to consider this information, he will make his decision about next steps, if any, in this matter.”

Carter could also recommend other actions that don’t result in Petraeus losing his fourth star. Or the Defense Secretary could simply allow the Army’s previous recommendations to stand.

Petraeus, arguably the most well-known and revered military officer of his generation, retired from the Army in 2011 with the rank of a four-star general, the highest rank an Army officer can achieve. If Carter decides to strip Petraeus of his fourth star, he could be demoted to the last rank at which he “satisfactorily” served, according to military regulations.

Reducing Petraeus’ rank, most likely to lieutenant general, could mean he’d have to pay back the difference in pension payments and other benefits that he received as a retired four-star general. That would amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars over his retirement. According to Pentagon figures, a four-star general with roughly the same years of experience as Petraeus was entitled to receive a yearly pension of nearly $220,000. A three-star officer would receive about $170,000.

Petraeus didn’t respond to a request for comment.

But the financial pain to Petraeus isn’t likely to be severe. He has confided to friends and acquaintances that he’s making a hefty sum from his job at a private equity firm and through speaking fees.

The demotion in rank would be a bigger, lasting blow, and take from Petraeus the rare achievement he’d set his eyes on many years ago.

At any given time, there are only 12 four-star generals in the Army, the largest of the services. By the time he was a colonel, in the mid-1990s, many thought Petraeus was destined to be one of them.

The U.S military has, on several occasions, demoted generals, increasingly for improper personal contact and not for poor battlefield decisions. But rarely does it demote four-star generals, in part because there are so few of them. It’s also more common to reduce the rank of more junior officers than of top generals.

If Petraeus were demoted, it would mark another spectacular fall. Petraeus stepped down as director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 2012 after his affair with Paula Broadwell, a writer and current Army reservist, was revealed. At the time, Petraeus had been frequently mentioned as a possible Republican presidential candidate in 2016.

Petraeus pleaded guilty last year to giving Broadwell eight notebooks that he compiled while serving as commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and that he knew contained classified information. The notebooks held some of the most sensitive kinds of military and intelligence secrets, including the identities of covert officers, intelligence capabilities, quotes from high-level meetings of the National Security Council, and notes about Petraeus’ discussions with President Obama.

After leaving Afghanistan, Petraeus brought the books back to his home in Virginia and gave them to Broadwell just three days before he retired from the Army. She later returned them. No classified information appeared in her biography, All In: The Education of General David Petraeus, officials have said.

Petraeus could have faced felony charges, including for lying to FBI investigators, but was allowed to plead guilty last year to a misdemeanor count of unauthorized handling classified information. He avoided and avoid a prison sentence and received two years probation and a $100,000 fine.

But that was not the end of the matter. Last year, the FBI gave Army investigators information that the bureau had come across as it was closing up its own investigation of Petraeus, the defense official and one former U.S. official told The Daily Beast.

The information, the FBI believed, might be of interest to the Army, the defense official said. The Army investigated and decided “there was nothing new here that should change his retirement” and “recommended that there be no change” to his four-star rank, the official said. Last month, it went to the Secretary of Defense for final approval.

Army personnel regulations say that an officer doesn’t automatically retire with the highest rank he or she achieved while in uniform. And even though Petraeus had already been officially retired, through a process known as grade determination the Army can retroactively reopen his case and consider whether to demote him “[i]f substantial new evidence discovered contemporaneously with or within a short time following separation could result in a lower grade determination.”

The regulations also state that if “an officer’s misconduct while still on active duty is documented,” including by “conviction after retirement,” a new grade determination may be completed. Petraeus hadn’t yet retired when he gave Broadwell the classified information.

The Army received the information from the FBI that prompted this new review more than four years after Petraeus had retired. The Defense Department was also running its own investigation into Petraeus’ relationship with Broadwell and what classified information he gave her at the same time the FBI and federal prosecutors were pursuing their case. That may explain why the Army decided it had seen nothing new in the information it received last year from the FBI and decided not to recommend a demotion.

But Carter is said to be concerned that because he has recommended other generals be reduced in rank for actions not becoming an officer, he’ll be seen as inconsistent if he doesn’t do the same for Petraeus. The decision is as much about timing and politics as it is Petraeus’ own transgressions.

“This is about Ash Carter, not David Petraeus,” the defense official said.

Last November, Carter removed his senior military aide, Lt. Gen. Ron Lewis, for personal misconduct, and referred the matter to the Pentagon’s inspector general for investigation. Lewis was demoted a rank, to a major general.

Lewis was a long-time and influential aide to the secretary, and his removal and punishment signaled Carter’s commitment to maintaining upstanding behavior among of the military’s generals. The exact nature of Lewis’ misconduct has not been announced, but military officials have suggested he was involved in an improper personal relationship.

While few are familiar with Petraeus’ potential demotion, those who are aware of it said they were surprised that he could be punished years years after the scaNdal was presumably put behind him and after Petraeus pleaded guilty to mishandling classified information. No general in recent history has been demoted years after scandal swirled around him or her.

Those who know and have worked with Petraeus describe him as a man of extraordinary capabilities and ambition. He received his fourth star in 2007 and then served in several prestigious and demanding assignments, including commander of U.S. Central Command, the commanding general of all ground forces in Iraq, and later as commander of ground forces in Afghanistan.

Petraeus’ unorthodox thinking and willingness to buck conventional strategy was seen as key to the U.S. victory over insurgents and jihadists in Iraq during the so-called troop surge of 2007 and 2008. His reputation was so esteemed that there was talk of giving him a fifth star–a largely symbolic gesture that was highly unlikely–or renaming the road to Petraeus’ alma mater, the U.S. Military Academy, after him.

Should Carter choose to knock Petraeus down to the rank of a three-star general, he will have a chance to appeal his case to the secretary, but Congress doesn’t have to be informed of the decision, the official said.

There is no deadline on Carter to make a decision.

The last commander to lose rank for professional misconduct was Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, who was demoted to colonel in 2005 for the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq. The last four-star general to be demoted was Gen. William Ward who retired as a three-star in 2012 amid allegations he misspent government money on himself and his family.