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This is hardly a complete snapshot, however with President Trump considering the decertification of the JCPOA with Iran, adding the IRGC to the terror list and now seeking the arrest of two Hezbollah leaders from the 1983 Marine barracks bombing…the case against Iran is building. Iran is watching closely as it too has threatened a response which includes U.S. military bases as targets.
Iran, as rightly noted by Trump has exported terror for decades and the previous administration dismissed all that terror history for the sake of a deal with Iran. It also cannot be overlooked that Hezbollah took attacks into our hemisphere with two in Argentina. Noted here and here.
Talal Hamiyah is a top military leader of Hezbollah in charge of orchestrating its operations abroad. Hamiyah heads Hezbollah’s External Security Organization (ESO).* The ESO is responsible for planning and executing Hezbollah’s terrorist activities outside of Lebanon.*
Hamiyah is suspected of involvement in the 1994 Hezbollah attacks in Argentina.* Security officials recorded Hamiyah praising “our project in Argentina” in a conversation with his predecessor, Imad Mugniyah.* Hamiyah replaced Mughniyeh after the latter was killed in 2008.*
There have not been any attacks specifically attributed to the ESO since 1994.* Israeli intelligence officials believe Hamiyah is recruiting Hezbollah cells around the world, primarily in South America, Western Europe, and Africa.* Sympathetic Shiite communities offer Hamiyah opportunities for recruitment and fundraising.* Israeli intelligence has accused Hamiyah of coordinating with Moqtada Sadir’s Mahdi Army and other Shiite militias in Iraq following the U.S. invasion.* Hamiyah’s cells reportedly rely on Iranian embassies to help transfer weapons.
The State Department announced today that it is offering millions of dollars as rewards for information concerning the whereabouts of two senior Hezbollah leaders. The two Lebanese men are Hezbollah veterans with well-established terrorist credentials. One of the two allegedly “played a central role” in the 1983 Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon. That suicide bombing helped inspire a generation of Shiite and Sunni jihadists.
State is offering a $7 million bounty for Talal Hamiyah, the head of Hezbollah’s External Security Organization (ESO). The ESO “maintains organized cells worldwide” and is “responsible for the planning, coordination, and execution of terrorist attacks outside of Lebanon.” The ESO “primarily” targets “Israelis and Americans.”
The US designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in 1997, but State modified the designation in June, adding some of the group’s aliases. Foggy Bottom noted that both the Foreign Relations Department (FRD) and the ESO are “key components” of Hezbollah.
The ESO is “also known as the Islamic Jihad Organization” (IJO) and “was established by” Imad Mughniyah, a notorious Hezbollah leader who was killed in 2008. Mughniyah is widely credited with orchestrating some of Hezbollah’s most notorious acts of terror against the US.
After Mughniyah’s death, Hamiyah assumed leadership of the ESO/IJO. Hamiyah was added to the US government’s list of specially designated global terrorists in Sept. 2012.
Hamiyah’s wing of Hezbollah has been operational since the early 1980s, when it carried out a series of attacks against American and Western interests inside Lebanon and elsewhere. The ESO/IJO has continued to plot around the globe in the decades since.
In June, the Department of Justice announced the arrests of two alleged Hezbollah operatives who worked for the ESO/IJO. The men are accused of performing surveillance on prospective American and Israeli targets in Panama and New York City, as well as other acts. [For more on the arrests and the history of the ESO/IJO, see FDD’s Long War Journal report, Analysis: 2 US cases provide unique window into Iran’s global terror network.]
State also announced a reward of $5 million for information on Fuad Shukr, “a longtime senior advisor on military affairs.” Both Hamiyah and Shukr answer to Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Hasan Nasrallah.
Shukr is “a senior Hezbollah operative” and a “military commander” in charge of the group’s forces in southern Lebanon. He “serves on Hezbollah’s highest military body, the Jihad Council,” according to Foggy Bottom.
Shukr’s dossier of “activities” stretches back “over 30 years,” according to State. He “was a close associate of” Mugniyah.
The US government says Shukr “played a central role in the planning and execution of the Oct. 23, 1983 US Marine Corps Barracks Bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed 241 US service personnel.”
The 1983 attack was a seminal event in the history of modern jihadism. Hezbollah conducted near simultaneous suicide bombings on the barracks for Marines and French service members. Both America and France had contributed military personnel to a multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon. While France retaliated by bombing Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is intertwined with Hezbollah, America failed to respond with force. The bombing at the Marine Barracks contributed to the Reagan administration’s decision to withdraw from Lebanon.
Iranian-backed terrorists weren’t the only jihadists emboldened by the American withdrawal from Lebanon. So were Sunni jihadists, including a young Osama bin Laden.
Al Qaeda modeled 1998 US Embassy bombings on Hezbollah’s 1983 attacks
The 1983 bombings on the Marine and French barracks served as a model for al Qaeda’s most devastating attack prior to the 9/11 hijackings: the Aug. 7, 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The twin attacks left 224 people dead.
The 9/11 Commission documented this key link in its final report. Discussions between al Qaeda and Iran in the early 1990s were brokered by Hassan al-Turabi, who was then a prominent Islamist in Sudan’s government. Al Qaeda was based in Sudan at the time and Turabi’s country housed various bad actors looking to cut deals with one another. Turabi advocated big tent jihadism when it came to confronting the US and the West. Turabi was even nicknamed the “Pope of Terrorism” for his ecumenical approach. Consistent with his vision of a grand anti-Western alliance, Turabi “sought to persuade Shiites and Sunnis to put aside their divisions and join against the common enemy,” according to the 9/11 Commission.
The discussions between “al Qaeda and Iranian operatives led to an informal agreement to cooperate in providing support – even if only training – for actions carried out primarily against Israel and the United States,” the 9/11 Commission found. “Not long afterward, senior al Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives.” During the “fall of 1993, another such delegation went to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon for further training in explosives as well as in intelligence and security.” The Bekaa Valley has long been a Hezbollah stronghold.
The training taught al Qaeda operatives how to carry out suicide bombings such as those orchestrated by Shukr and Mughniyah in Lebanon. The 9/11 Commission wrote that Bin Laden “reportedly showed particular interest in learning how to use truck bombs such as the one that had killed 241 US Marines in Lebanon in 1983.”
Federal prosecutors in the Clinton administration discovered Iran’s and Hezbollah’s training of al Qaeda operatives. They included the relationship in their indictment of al Qaeda in 1998, noting that bin Laden and his men had “forged alliances” with the Sudanese regime, as well as “the government of Iran and its associated terrorist group Hezbollah for the purpose of working together against their perceived common enemies in the West, particularly the United States.”
More details concerning Iran’s and Hezbollah’s assistance came to light during the trial of some of the al Qaeda operatives responsible for the 1998 US Embassy bombings.
In his plea hearing before a New York court in 2000, Ali Mohamed – an al Qaeda operative who was responsible for performing surveillance used in the bombings – testified that he had set up the security for a meeting between bin Laden and Mugniyah. “I arranged security for a meeting in the Sudan between Mugniyah, Hezbollah’s chief, and bin Laden,” Mohamed told the court.
Mohamed also confirmed that Hezbollah and Iran had provided explosives training to al Qaeda. “Hezbollah provided explosives training for al Qaeda and [Egyptian Islamic] Jihad,” Mohamed explained. “Iran supplied Egyptian Jihad with weapons.” Mohamed was originally a member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, an organization that merged with bin Laden’s enterprise and closely cooperated with the al Qaeda founder’s men well before the formal merger.
Mohamed explained al Qaeda’s rationale for seeking assistance from Iran and Hezbollah:
And the objective of all this, just to attack any Western target in the Middle East, to force the government of the Western countries just to pull out from the Middle East…Based on the Marine explosion in Beirut in 1984 [sic: 1983] and the American pull-out from Beirut, they will be the same method, to force the United States to pull out from Saudi Arabia.
Jamal al Fadl, an operative who was privy to some of al Qaeda’s most sensitive secrets, conversed with his fellow al Qaeda members about Iran’s and Hezbollah’s explosives training, which included take-home videotapes so that al Qaeda’s terrorists would not forget what they learned. “I saw one of the tapes, and he [another al Qaeda operative] tell me they train about how to explosives big buildings,” Al Fadl told federal prosecutors.
One of the al Qaeda leaders who attended the training was Saif al Adel, who has long been wanted for his role in the embassy bombings. Al Adel fled to Iran after the 9/11 hijackings and was tied to operations elsewhere, including inside Saudi Arabia. His status was murky for years, but the Iranians reportedly freed him from some form of detention in 2015. Some reports have placed him in Syria, but al Adel’s current location has not been confirmed.
Although many assume that Iran and al Qaeda couldn’t cooperate because of their ideological differences, the 9/11 Commission concluded “that Sunni-Shia divisions did not necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in terrorist operations.” The 9/11 Commission (pp. 240-241) also found intelligence connecting Mugniyah’s men to some of the flights taken by al Qaeda’s hijackers and called for the US government to investigate further.
In more recent years, the Iranian government has allowed al Qaeda to operate a “core facilitation pipeline” on Iranian soil. According to the US government, this facilitation network exists despite the fact that the two sides are on opposite sides of the wars in Syria and Yemen.
Primer: The Iranian Resistance has been monitoring the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-controlled entity tasked with building the nuclear bomb, the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (Sazman-e Pazhouheshhaye Novin-e Defa’i), known by its Persian acronym SPND, for nearly two decades. SPND is comprised of 7 subdivisions, each of which carries out a certain portion of nuclear weapons research.
The unit responsible for conducting research and building a trigger for a nuclear weapon is called the Center for Research and Expansion of Technologies for Explosion and Impact (Markaz-e Tahghighat va Tose’e Fanavari-e Enfejar va Zarbeh), known by its acronym METFAZ.
Since April 2017, when the NCRI found out about a new military location being used by SPND, the coalition has focused its attention on all the potential SPND sites that we suspected were tasked with building the bomb. The NCRI’s investigation inside Iran was conducted by the network associated with the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), which was responsible for blowing the cover off the program, particularly since 2002. More here.
In December 2015, the IAEA decided to “close” the file on outstanding concerns about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program.
Without ever admitting to weaponization activities, Iran convinced the international community to wipe the slate clean. The IAEA’s report on the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program left many questions unanswered. In addition to prohibiting on site inspections of suspected military sites, Iran can delay IAEA
inspections of suspected sites without facing consequences. The JCPOA creates a minimum of a 24 day delay possibly longer between a formal IAEA request to access
a suspicious site and the date Iran must allow access. As Mr. Tobey explains, “24 days … [is] ample time for Iran to hide or destroy evidence.” More here.
***
“Iran’s military sites are off limits,” he said. “All information about these sites are classified. Iran will never allow such visits. Don’t pay attention to such remarks that are only a dream.”
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani followed up later by saying the U.S. call was unlikely to be accepted by the U.N. nuclear watchdog.
So much for what John Kerry and Barack Obama pledged to America right?
***
Decertifying the nuclear deal without walking away gives the Trump administration an opening to confront the Islamic Republic’s foreign meddling.
President Donald Trump is taking considerable heat for his expected announcement this week that he will “decertify” the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Critics say he is heedlessly discarding a deal that has been working, and needlessly putting America on a collision course with Iran.
As it turns out, Trump is actually not poised to “rip up the deal.” By decertifying it, the president and his advisors are, in fact, signaling their intent to strengthen it, with the help of Congress, so that the deal advances U.S. national security interests. Those interests are key criteria for the certification process, which takes place every 90 days, as laid out in the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) of 2015. Right now, with the Iranians hindering inspection of military sites, working feverishly on their ballistic missile program, and banking on the nuclear deal’s sunset clauses, which all but guarantee Tehran an advanced nuclear program in roughly a decade, it’s hard to argue the deal is working for the United States.
Decertification has the potential to change all of that. The move will plunge Iran and the other parties involved in the nuclear deal into a state of limbo. It will prompt all sides to consider what the deal is worth to them, and what further compromises they may be willing to make to satisfy the national interests of the United States, as laid out by the Trump administration.
Under President Barack Obama, whose foreign-policy legacy was anchored to the nuclear deal, the promise of deferring (not preventing) Iran’s nuclear ambitions superseded all else. As a result, the fear of Iran walking away paralyzed Washington and prevented the Obama White House from making even reasonable demands of Tehran. The credible threat of a U.S. response to Iranian aggression was effectively off the table. So was the imposition of meaningful new sanctions, for that matter.
The coming decertification announcement provides an opportunity to break this paralysis. Trump is effectively telling Tehran that he sets the terms for the nuclear deal because he is not tethered to its success the way Obama was. The administration will then have a chance to chart its own Iran policy. As the 60-day INARA review period plays out, Trump can regain U.S. leverage, establish new red lines on Iranian behavior, and (unlike his predecessor) actually enforce them. If he does it right, he can do all of this without exiting the deal.
In response to decertification, Iran’s leadership will undoubtedly threaten to walk away from the table. But it’s not that simple. There are benefits the Iranians have yet to reap from the deal—beyond the more than $100 billion in released oil funds—ranging from increased foreign investment to greater integration with the global economy after years of economic isolation. In other words, Iran can still cash in considerably, but not if it balks at Trump’s calls to fix the deal.
The Europeans, Russians, and Chinese, are also reluctant to go along with Trump’s certification gambit. Some are already howling with disapproval. But some are already voicing their willingness to work with the White House. As the primary investors in Iran’s recent economic rebound, they have little choice but to try to resolve American concerns.
Of course, even the Chinese, Russians, and Europeans understand that they have a daunting task ahead of them. Iran is on a collision course with the West, one that has little to do with the nuclear file. Rather, it is about what the nuclear deal negotiators chose to ignore: Iran’s aggression across the Middle East.
Iran has harassed American ships in the Persian Gulf, held American sailors at gunpoint, bankrolled the murderous Assad regime in Syria, supported the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and furnished the majority of Hezbollah’s operating budget. And those are just a few of the highlights.
Tehran’s broader efforts to dominate the Middle East are also intensifying. From the deployment of its Revolutionary Guard Corps to far-flung corners of the region to the conscripting of Shiite irregular proxies to fight or hold territory in Syria and Iraq, Iran’s footprint continues to grow.
For American policymakers, Iran’s bid for regional hegemony is just as troubling as its nuclear ambitions. Together, they represent a dual Iranian strategy that cannot be separated, despite the P5+1’s efforts to do so back in 2015. This is why Trump should build on his decertification announcement with the rollout of a new Iran policy that actively counters these activities.
As it happens, the timing is fortuitous. The administration is slated to complete and roll out its Iran Policy Review by October 31st. If the policy lives up to the hints dropped by senior officials, the United States will once again push back on Iran’s malign behavior. If done right, it will do so wherever possible, and by using every pressure point available.
Such a policy would include designating the Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist group (a move mandated by statute by October 31st), but also new tranches of Treasury sanctions on Iranian bad actors, and other economic pressure. The financial targets figure to be non-nuclear in nature, to ensure that the United States remains compliant with the nuclear deal. But the pressure should be palpable.
From there, Washington is also expected to actively target Hezbollah, Iran’s most powerful and active proxy. The Trump administration and Congress have already signaled they will take aim at Hezbollah’s economic interests, while also weakening their positions across the Middle East.
Beyond that, Washington can take further steps to strengthen America’s allies, such as the Sunni Arab states and Israel, who are also willing to challenge Iranian aggression. This could mean greater intelligence-sharing and bilateral cooperation, but could also include new hardware and military capabilities. More broadly, the United States must signal that Iranian threats to its allies will be seen as threats to the United States itself.
Admittedly, none of this will be easy. The Middle East is a dangerous region that doesn’t respond well to change. The same can be said for Washington in the Trump era. But whatever challenges loom will be the cost of shattering the paralysis in Washington that has reduced America’s Iran policy to a false binary of either hewing to the nuclear deal or war.
The choices to counter Iranian aggression before the nuclear deal were many. President George W. Bush understood this at the tail end of his presidency. President Obama even understood this at the beginning of his. But Obama then chose to limit his options through the nuclear deal. This has not served America well. It’s time to restore those options. Decertification and a new Iran policy, if done right, can potentially put America back in the driver’s seat after two years of going along for the ride.
We know that the Trump administration has already certified Iranian compliance once, yet now there is a question as to whether it will be certified again or the White House will move to terminate the whole JCPOA.
Is Iran complying with the ‘spirit’ of the agreement? Hardly, yet should it be ended completely? There are implications and Iran for sure is not a partner that can be trusted as it continues to export terror throughout the Middle East and has it hands in other regions of the globe including Latin America.
Through its military forces, the Islamic Republic is actively engaged in intervening in the domestic affairs of other nations in the Middle East. For example, in Syria, Iranian leaders have admitted that their Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its elite branch, the Quds Force, are fighting on the ground alongside Bashar Assad’s forces. In addition, Iran is providing financial, weapons, advisory and intelligence assistance to the Syrian regime apparatus.
Putting their direct military intervention aside, Iranian leaders have successfully formed powerful proxies and Shiite militias in Syria in order to serve the revolutionary and geopolitical interests of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his gilded circle.
The Iranian leaders’ plan is a long-term one — to make political realities out of these militias, ensuring Iran’s infiltration and domination of the nation in case Assad falls. In other words, Iran’s plan is to make itself a winner whether the Syrian president is toppled or remains in power, as Tehran would continue to have influence and control in the security, political and intelligence infrastructure of Syria. Furthermore, under the aegis of the IRGC, Iran’s leaders believe they have ensured their presence in Iraq for decades to come, as well as being capable of dictating Iraq’s future policies by setting up the People’s Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF is a conglomerate of more than 40 Iraqi militia groups, which act in favor of the Iranian regime’s interests and enjoy close ties with the head of the Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani. More here.
As for compliance to the JCPOA, how about violations? Seems there are indeed violations as reported by a segment of German Intelligence.
Iran tried to obtain illicit technology that could be used for military nuclear and ballistic missile programs, raising questions about a possible violation of the 2015 agreement intended to stop Tehran’s drive to become an atomic armed power, according to three German intelligence reports obtained by Fox News.
The new intelligence, detailing reports from September and October and disclosed just ahead of President Trump’s planned announcement Thursday on whether the U.S. will recertify the Iran deal, reveals that Iran’s regime made “32 procurement attempts … that definitely or with high likelihood were undertaken for the benefit of proliferation programs.”
According to the document, the 32 attempts took place in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia. The report lists Iran as a nation that engages in proliferation, which is defined as “spreading atomic, biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction.”
Missile delivery systems are also included in the definition of illicit proliferation activity in the report.
The North Rhine-Westphalia agency accused Iran of using front companies in the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and China to circumvent international restrictions on its nuclear and missile programs.
The intelligence report, which covered the year 2016 — the Iran deal was implemented on Jan. 16, 2016 — calls further into question Iran’s compliance with the agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA.
In a second intelligence report obtained by Fox News, the German state of Hessen said Iran, Pakistan, North Korea and Sudan use “guest academics” for illegal activities related to nuclear and other weapons programs. “An example for this type of activity occurred in the sector of electronic technology in connection with the implementation of the enrichment of uranium,” the document reads.
The intelligence officials also cited an example of foreign intelligence services using “research exchanges at universities in the sector of biological and chemical procedures.”More here.
Most will say the JCPOA should be decertified or terminated. Yet, as a matter for consideration, if that action is taken rather than to work to amend the deal, such that if that fails then terminate, the United States’s reputation will be such that it cannot be trusted failing other attempts….just consider….frankly, this site is fine with termination given aggressive repercussions.
Somali Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Mohamed Muktar Ibrahim has talked about the Somalia’s Mineral Resources saying that they have made contacts with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the controlling of minerals that can be use chemical weapons.
He noted they are taking measures to prevent raw materials like Uranium to fall into the hands wrong people.
In an exclusive interview he gave to Universal TV, the minister highlighted that they also held talks with UNDP which had information on mining depots in the country as it has surveyed on the country’s mineral deposits in the years between 1965 and 1975.
In a UN report released in 1968 shows that Somalia is a hotspot for uranium.
Somali government is busy amending some provision in the Mineral Law 1984 and compliance with the current conditions in the country now.
An Al Qaeda affiliate has seized control of uranium mines in Africa with the intent of supplying the material to Iran, according to a diplomatic letter from a top Somali official appealing to the U.S. for “immediate military assistance.”
The letter, reviewed by Fox News, was addressed to U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Stephen Schwartz. Somalia’s Ambassador to the U.S. Ahmed Awad confirmed to Fox News on Thursday that the letter “has indeed been issued” by Minister of Foreign Affairs Yusuf Garaad Omar, whose signature is on the document.
The Aug. 11-dated letter delivered an urgent warning to the U.S. that the al-Shabaab terror network has linked up with the regional ISIS faction and is “capturing territory” in the central part of the country.
“Only the United States has the capacity to identify and smash Al-Shabaab elements operating within our country. The time for surgical strikes and limited engagement has passed, as Somalia’s problems have metastasized into the World’s problems,” the letter said. “Every day that passes without intervention provides America’s enemies with additional material for nuclear weapons. There can be no doubt that global stability is at stake.”
The State Department would not comment on the diplomatic letter, but did not dispute its authenticity and referred Fox News to the government of Somalia. Iran was supposed to pull back on its nuclear program under the terms of the agreement struck with the Obama administration. More here from FNC.
***
Background:
Is Somalia a safe haven for terrorists?
On one hand, Somalia is a chaotic, poor, battle-weary Muslim country with no central government and a long, unguarded coastline. Its porous borders mean that individuals can enter without visas, and once inside the country, enjoy an almost complete lack of law enforcement. Somalia has long served as a passageway from Africa to the Middle East based on its coastal location on the Horn of Africa, just a boat ride away from Yemen. These aspects make Somalia a desirable haven for transnational terrorists, something al-Qaeda has tried to capitalize on before, and is trying again now.
On the other hand, Somalia is different from other failed states in several ways. While it is roughly the size of Afghanistan, its landscape lacks Afghanistan’s many natural hiding places and does not offer the topographical haven of other states like Yemen. It is also a fiercely clan-oriented culture with an aversion to foreign presence of any kind, including Arab jihadi organizations. “When you get these extremist ideologies, the Somalis look at them and they are immediately perceived as foreign,” says Bruton, “They’re perceived as Arab. It’s an Arab ideology. And just as the Somalis are hostile to American ideology, they’re hostile to Arab ideology as well.” Finally, the Somalis–Sufi Muslims since the birth of Islam in the seventh century–have moderate religious views; until recently, Taliban-style fundamentalism was unfamiliar in the country.
These factors were responsible for al-Qaeda’s failure in the 1990s, when it tried working closely with al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI). Al-Qaeda was unable to root itself in Somalia’s clan system, and, according to former ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn, “overestimated the degree to which Somalis would become jihadists.” The experience of the al-Qaeda operatives was so treacherous that Bruton says: “U.S. intelligence officials came up with a verdict that Somalia was actually inoculated from foreign terrorist groups, that it’s just fundamentally inhospitable, that the clan system is so closed to foreigners that there’s just no way that these groups can operate.”
Since the Ethiopian invasion, al-Qaeda has seen a resurgent connection to the country, and HI and al-Shabaab control most of the territory. However, experts disagree over whether Somalia could be the base for an international attack or whether the group will continue its domestic focus. “Personally, my view is that they don’t have much to gain by [partnering with al-Qaeda to conduct an international attack],” Bruton says. “And they probably don’t have the capacity to do it. But it’s worrisome that they’re making the threats, so I think it’s something to be watched and assessed very carefully. But right now, I would say the odds of a transnational attack are very, very low.” More here.
CIA Director Mike Pompeo said on Fox News Sunday with Chris Wallace that the CIA provided accurate intelligence on the DPRK nuclear program and policymakers too, were well aware even before Pompeo took over the agency.
When you look closely enough you will find serial numbers belonging to Pakistan, China and Russia…
Looking back and open source information is that statement accurate? When investigative media does the job of investigating and informs, Pompeo is correct. Furthermore, Iran was and is part of all the variables such that Barack, Hillary and John overlooked it all. How so? That pesky JPOA. Then cultivating the original Wikileaks cables, there was more….
VIENNA, Sept 18 (Reuters) – It is one of the West’s biggest nuclear
proliferation nightmares — that increasingly isolated Iran and North
Korea might covertly trade know-how, material or technology that could be
put to developing atomic bombs.
“Such a relationship would be logical and beneficial to both North Korea
and Iran,” said Mark Hibbs, an expert of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.
Last year, a U.N. report suggested that impoverished, reclusive North
Korea might have supplied Iran as well as Syria and Myanmar with banned
atomic technology.
In what could be a sign of this, a German newspaper last month reported
that North Korea had provided Iran with a computer programme as part of
intensified cooperation that could help the Islamic state build nuclear
weapons.
“There are reports and rumours, which governments and the IAEA (the U.N.
International Atomic Energy Agency) have not denied, indicating that there
may be a track record of bilateral nuclear cooperation between North Korea
and Iran,” Hibbs said.
But while this could make sense for two states facing tightening sanctions
— and potentially earn Pyongyang some badly needed funds — the extent
and nature of any such dealings, if they take place at all, remain
shrouded in mystery.
“It seems to be very difficult to sort out what the relationship in the
nuclear world between DPRK (North Korea) and Iran is. We just simply do
not know,” prominent U.S. nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker said.
This was in contrast to missile cooperation between the two countries,
where North Korea has helped Iran both with the weapons and in building
related factories, he said.
Hecker, who has often visited the east Asian state, said possible
Tehran-Pyongyang atomic technology transfers would be a major concern for
everyone dedicated to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Iran’s nuclear programme is based on uranium enrichment, activity which
can have both civilian and military purposes.
North Korea has twice tested plutonium-based nuclear devices, drawing
international condemnation, although it last year revealed the existence
also of a uranium enrichment site, potentially giving it a second pathway
to bombs.
“They complement each other so well (in terms of their expertise). There
is just a lot of synergy in how they would be able to exchange
capabilities,” Hecker said at a seminar for diplomats in Vienna, the
IAEA’s headquarters, this month.
Citing Western intelligence sources, the Munich newspaper Sueddeutsche
Zeitung said in August that North Korea had this year delivered software,
originally developed in the United States, that could simulate neutron
flows.
Such calculations, which can help scientists identify self-sustaining
chain reactions, are vital in the construction of reactors and also in the
development of nuclear explosives.
With the help of the programme, Iran could gain important knowledge of how
to assemble nuclear weapons, the paper said.
WESTERN INTELLIGENCE HUNT
There has been no public confirmation or denial of the report in the West.
But Hecker did not rule it out, saying Pyongyang had demonstrated
experience in this field.
He said North Korea must have some “nuclear code capabilities” which they
would have been able to assess in comparison with the result of an atomic
test.
“So to some extent they have had an opportunity to verify or check their
codes,” Hecker said. “Iran has not had a chance to do that. So exchanging
that type of information … you could see as being very useful.”
North Korea tested nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009, but still has not
shown it has a working nuclear bomb.
Proliferation experts have said the country has enough fissile material
for up to 10 nuclear weapons. But they don’t believe Pyongyang is yet
capable of miniaturising the material to fit into the cone of a missile.
While North Korea has made no secret of its nuclear weapons ambitions,
Iran denies Western allegations that it is covertly seeking to develop an
atomic arms capability.
The Islamic Republic says its nuclear programme is for purposes of
electricity generation, but its refusal to halt uranium enrichment and its
stonewalling of a U.N. nuclear watchdog probe have stoked suspicions
abroad.
The Vienna-based U.N. nuclear watchdog said this month in a report that it
was “increasingly concerned” about possible work in Iran to develop a
nuclear missile.
For several years, the IAEA has been investigating Western intelligence
reports indicating Iran has coordinated efforts to process uranium, test
high explosives and revamp a ballistic missile cone to accommodate a
nuclear warhead.
Iran says the allegations are baseless and forged.
In a separate report on North Korea, from which its inspectors were
expelled in 2009, the IAEA suggested past nuclear-related ties with Syria
and Libya, but it made no mention of Iran.
Proliferation expert Mark Fitzpatrick said it would not be hard for Tehran
and Pyongyang to put “well-practised trade deals and transfer routes” from
their ballistic missile cooperation to use also in the nuclear field.
Still, there were few signs of any nuclear cooperation between the two
countries.
“It is not for lack of looking. Western intelligence agencies are
intensively targeting nuclear acquisition efforts by Iran and North
Korea,” Fitzpatrick, a former senior U.S. State Department official, said.
“Yet finding nuclear weapons-related trade is akin to the proverbial
needle in a haystack. In the vastness of ocean and sky routes, most forms
of nuclear-related cargo are so minute as to be almost undetectable.”
Hibbs said any nuclear dealings with North Korea would pose risks for
Iran: “Were this traffic to be confirmed, that would deepen the suspicion
that Iran is involved in nuclear activities which are clandestine and
military in nature.”
***
What about China selling weapons to Iran and operating groups being still worried about non-proliferation by North North Korea? Lots of chatter of that and left unresolved:
5. (S) Noting a decrease in the sales of Chinese conventional weapons to Iran, DASD Sedney expressed appreciation for China’s efforts to limit conventional arms sales to Iran. Sedney emphasized that Iran’s spreading of conventional BEIJING 00000058 002 OF 003 weapons to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon poses the serious problem of Chinese weapons killing U.S. soldiers. Sedney expressed concern about Iran’s nuclear program. More on that cable here, of note is the distribution list.
***
So under Obama it seems we left the A.Q. Khan sanctions to the Export Import Bank and the IAEA: From Secretary of State to the United Nations/Vienna by method deliver of a telegram and SIPDIS
DE RUEHC #2552 0092353 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 092336Z JAN 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0000
4. (SECRET/rel IAEA) — I wanted to inform you of a legal process that has concluded in the U.S. — U.S. nonproliferation law requires that sanctions be imposed in certain circumstances; the activities of Dr. Khan and some of his associates fall under the requirements of this law. — The U.S. has decided to impose sanctions on individuals and companies listed in a media note that was released on January 12. — This is a very complex case that involved a large volume of information and many people and companies across the globe. — The U.S. sanctions laws and executive orders involved include the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA), the Export Import Bank Act (EXIM), and Executive Orders (E.O.) 12938 and 13382. — This legal non-paper describes in more detail the specific sanctions and penalties involved. — The U.S. decision was announced on January 12 and will soon be printed in the Federal Register. — This U.S. decision is not directed at any country. In fact, as we highlight in our public statement, many countries contributed to international efforts to shut down and investigate the network. — The sanctions decision reflects the diverse and global nature of the network. — No sanctions were imposed on governments. — As IAEA knows, the actions of the A.Q. Khan network have irrevocably changed the proliferation landscape and will have lasting implications for international security. — These sanctions will help prevent and deter future proliferation-related activities and provide a warning to other would-be proliferators. — It is imperative that all countries remain vigilant in order to ensure that Khan network associates or others seeking to pursue similar proliferation activities will not become a future source for sensitive nuclear information or equipment. — If Asked: Will there be any additional sanctions on these individuals? We don,t foresee, at this time, the imposition of additional sanctions related to these activities. — If Asked: Will you share your findings with us? We can not share details of the sanction decision but don,t believe the information we have would contribute to a different understanding of the activities than you already have. End suggested talking points. ————– LEGAL NONPAPER ————– 5. (U) Begin non-paper: Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA) The NPPA provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on U.S. procurement from any person who, on or after June 30, 1994, knowingly and materially contributes, through the export of nuclear-related goods or technology, to the efforts of any individual, group, or non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded special nuclear material. Once imposed, the sanction shall apply for a period of at least 12 months, but can thereafter be terminated if reliable information indicates that (1) the sanctioned person has ceased to aid or abet any individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material or any nuclear explosive device, and (2) the United States has received reliable assurances from the sanctioned person that such person will not, in the future, aid or abet any individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material or any nuclear explosive device. Export Import Bank Act (EXIM) The EXIM provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on the Export-Import Bank,s guaranteeing, insuring, or extending credit, or participating in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to any person who, after September 23, 1996, knowingly aids or abets a non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded material. This sanction can be terminated if the U.S. determines and certifies in writing to the Congress that reliable information indicates that the sanctioned person has ceased to aid or abet any non-nuclear weapon state to acquire any nuclear explosive device or acquire un-safeguarded special nuclear material; and steps have been taken to ensure that the sanctionable activities will not resume. The sanction may also be terminated if the appropriate government has taken certain corrective actions. Executive Orders 12938 and 13382 These Executive Orders (E.O.) provide the authority to impose measures against a foreign person that has engaged or attempted to engage in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their means of delivery. The sanctions under E.O. 12938 include: a ban on USG departments, and agencies, procurement from, or entering into contracts for procurement with, the sanctioned person or entity; a ban on providing any USG assistance to, and any participation in USG assistance programs by, the sanctioned person or entity; and a ban on the importation into the U.S. of goods, technology or services procured or provided by the sanctioned person or entity. The E.O. 12938 sanctions may be terminated if there is reliable evidence that the foreign person has ceased the activities that led to the imposition of sanctions. The sanction under E.O. 13382 is that all property and interests in property of the designated entity, that are in the U.S. or subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. (i.e., U.S. persons anywhere) are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in. Sanctions under E.O. 13382 may be lifted when circumstances no longer warrant their imposition. End non-paper. ———- MEDIA NOTE ———— 6. (U) Post can draw from the following Media Note after 0900 EST January 12. Begin Media Note: For Immediate Release January 12, 2009 Designation of A.Q. Khan and Associates for Nuclear Proliferation Activities Today, the Department of State announced that sanctions will be imposed on 13 individuals and three private companies for their involvement in the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network. This announcement comes after a multi-year U.S. government review of the available information pertaining to the activities of this network. We believe these sanctions will help prevent future proliferation-related activities by these private entities, provide a warning to other would-be proliferators, and demonstrate our ongoing commitment to using all available tools to address proliferation-related activities. Dr. A.Q. Khan led an extensive international network for the proliferation of nuclear equipment and know-how that provided &one stop shopping8 for countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons. He and his associates provided Iran and Libya with centrifuge components, designs, and, in some cases, complete centrifuges. The United States also believes that Khan and his associates provided centrifuge designs, equipment, and technology to North Korea. Dr. Khan also provided Libya with nuclear weapon designs. With the assistance of Khan,s network, countries could leapfrog the slow, incremental stages of other nuclear weapons development programs. In 2004, following Libya,s welcome decision to renounce its nuclear program, the United States removed from Libya items it had received from the network. The network,s actions have irrevocably changed the proliferation landscape and have had lasting implications for international security. Governments around the world, including Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, and Malaysia, worked closely with the United States to investigate and shut down the network. Governments have also joined together to put in place United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 to criminalize proliferation and have worked cooperatively to establish the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to enhance international tools to interdict and prevent trade in sensitive technologies. Many of Dr. Khan,s associates are either in custody, being prosecuted, or have been convicted of crimes. Dr. Khan publicly acknowledged his involvement in the network in 2004, although he later retracted those statements. While we believe the A.Q. Khan network is no longer operating, countries should remain vigilant to ensure that Khan network associates, or others seeking to pursue similar proliferation activities, will not become a future source for sensitive nuclear information or equipment. Sanctions have been imposed under the following statutes as follows: Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA): Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., Muhammad Farooq, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, and Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain Export-Import Bank Act (EXIM): Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, Gerhard Wisser, and Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain Executive Order 12938: Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, Tradefin Engineering, Gerhard Wisser, and Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain Executive Order 13382: Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, and Gerhard Wisser End media note. ————– Press Guidance —————– 7. (U) Post can draw from the ISN Press Guidance after 0900 EST January 12. Begin Press Guidance: ISN Contingency Press Guidance January 12, 2009 A.Q. Khan Network: Sanctions General Questions Q: What specifically did A.Q. Khan and his network transfer? What did these people do to trigger sanctions? These entities were sanctioned for engaging in nuclear-related proliferation activities as part of the international A.Q. Khan network. In particular, Dr. Khan and his associates in a number of countries provided Iran and Libya with centrifuge components, designs, and, in some cases, complete centrifuges. The United States also believes that Khan and his associates provided centrifuge designs, equipment, and technology to North Korea. Dr. Khan also provided Libya with nuclear weapon designs. These illicit transfers by the Khan network have been reported in the press for a number of years. I cannot comment on additional specific intelligence-related information. Today,s imposition of sanctions on private companies and individuals does not reflect recent proliferation activity by the network. Q: Why haven,t you sanctioned any countries? The authorities under which sanctions are being imposed do not target countries. Governments around the world, including Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, Germany, Switzerland, the UAE, and Malaysia worked closely with the U.S. to investigate and shut down this international network. Q: Why has it taken four years to impose sanctions? This is a very complex case that involved a large volume of information and many people and companies across the globe. We have been working diligently for the past four years to assemble and properly evaluate the available information. Given the consequences of a sanctions decision, it is important that the information be thoroughly vetted and evaluated before a sanctions determination is made. Q: Why couldn,t you have sanctioned some entities earlier instead of waiting four years? Information continued to become available as other countries concluded their investigations or prosecutions and we believed in this case that it was important to sanction the group at one time. Q: Did you tell the affected governments prior to public announcement? Yes, governments were notified in advance that the United States intends to impose proliferation sanctions on these private companies and individuals. We applaud the actions that each of these countries took to shut down and investigate the network, and work cooperatively to implement new measures to prevent proliferation. Q: What sanctions authorities were used to impose penalties? There are two sanctions laws and two Executive Orders that provide the basis for the imposition of sanctions in this case. The sanctions laws are the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (the &NPPA8) and the Export Import Bank Act (&EXIM8). The two Executive Orders are 12938 and 13382. Q: What do these authorities require? The NPPA provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on U.S. procurement from any person who, on or after June 30, 1994, knowingly and materially contributes, through the export of nuclear-related goods or technology, to the efforts of any individual, group, or non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded special nuclear material. The EXIM provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on the Export-Import Bank,s guaranteeing, insuring, or extending credit, or participating in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to any person who, after September 23, 1996, knowingly aids or abets a non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded material. The Executive Orders provide the authority to impose measures against a foreign person that has engaged or attempted to engage in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their means of delivery, including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items, by any person or foreign country of proliferation concern. Q: What penalties can be imposed pursuant to these sanctions authorities? These sanctions are not being applied to any governments, but to private companies and individuals. In brief, the NPPA provides for a ban on USG procurement from the sanctioned person. EXIM provides for a ban on Export Import Bank credit, guarantees, or insurance in support of U.S. exports to the sanctioned person. Executive Order 12938 provides for a ban on USG procurement or imports from the sanctioned entity as well as a ban on U.S. assistance to the sanctioned entity. Executive Order 13382 freezes the assets of a sanctioned entity that are under U.S. jurisdiction. Q: What impact, if any, will these sanctions have? These sanctions will help prevent and deter future proliferation-related activities and provide a warning to other would-be proliferators. Q: What can companies and individuals do to have sanctions rescinded? Each law treats this issue differently. I refer you to the statutes. Q: Is the A.Q. Khan network still active? If so, what are we doing about it? We do not believe that the network run by A.Q. Khan is still functioning. Most of the key people involved with the network have been put out of business, are in jail and/or facing prosecution. We remain concerned that individuals associated with the network, once they are released from jail or are no longer being closely monitored, could re-engage in proliferation on their own in the future. It is important that countries continue to monitor their behavior closely and put in place laws and enforcement mechanisms to prevent proliferation activities. Q: Do remnants of the network still exist? What are we doing about them? Saying the Khan network is no longer functioning does not mean that other proliferation-related networks and activity around the world has stopped. We know, for example, that Iran has utilized several different front and Iranian companies to purchase particular items of proliferation concern. Several of these entities and companies were identified in UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803 in connection with their involvement in the Iranian nuclear or missile programs. The U.S. has taken action against many of these entities, including designations under E.O. 13382. More information on E.O. 13382 designations can be found on the State Department,s website under nonproliferation sanctions as well as the Treasury,s Office of Foreign Asset Control,s website. Country Specific Questions Pakistan Q: Wasn,t the Government of Pakistan involved or at least knew what was going on? The government of Pakistan assured us it had nothing to do with the network and we have no information to refute this. We applaud the actions Pakistan took to shut down and investigate the network. In the years since the public revelation of the Khan network, the government of Pakistan also has taken a number of positive steps to improve its export controls and promote international nonproliferation. Q: Why haven,t we had direct access to Khan? We appreciate the cooperation the government of Pakistan has provided the IAEA and the United States. We believe that Pakistan took seriously its commitment to dismantle the network. Pakistan has assured us that it will not be a source of proliferation in the future. The United States does not need direct access to A.Q. Khan in order to obtain information about his dealings. Q: Reports indicate that Pakistan is easing restrictions on Khan ) What is your reaction to this? We appreciate Pakistan,s efforts in shutting down the proliferation network led by A.Q. Khan as well as the cooperation Pakistan has provided the United States and the IAEA to investigate the Khan network. We believe Dr. Khan is still a proliferation threat to the world and the proliferation support that he and his associates provided to several states of proliferation concern has had a harmful impact on international security and will for years to come. Q: Khan recently said he was forced to confess. If we haven,t had access to Khan then how do we know he was complicit? We have information from other sources indicating that Khan was complicit in nuclear-related transfers to several countries. Q: Any response to statements by Pakistan that it wants to put the A.Q. Khan issue to rest or that the U.S. has not passed questions on Khan,s activities for some time. The U.S. appreciates the cooperation Pakistan has provided the U.S. and IAEA. Such cooperation will continue to be important as we work toward a greater understanding of what the network provided to various countries. Q: Will there be any additional sanctions on these individuals? We don,t foresee, at this time, the imposition of additional sanctions related to these activities. Q: Why didn,t you sanction Khan Research Labs? I can,t comment on individual decisions. Q: What effect will these sanctions have on our relationship with Pakistan ) specifically, our counter-terrorism relationship? These sanctions are based on activities by individuals that occurred well in the past and have been public for many years. We appreciate Pakistan,s efforts in shutting down the Khan proliferation network as well as the cooperation Pakistan has provided the United States and the IAEA to investigate the activities of the Khan network. The United States has a close partnership with Pakistan on counter-terrorism, nonproliferation, and other issues. Q: Do you think these sanctions will have an effect on the India-Pakistan relationship? These sanctions are based on activities by individuals that occurred well in the past and have been public for many years. Questions about India and Pakistan,s relationship are best answered by those countries. Switzerland Q: Is it true that the U.S. asked Switzerland to destroy nuclear documents? We have no comment. Q: Why aren,t you sanctioning any of the Tinners? Is it because they were spies for the U.S.? We have no comment. Sanctions Decisions: Q: Didn,t the Khan network include many more people and companies than you sanctioned, including the Tinner family, Henk Slebos, and companies in the UAE. Why aren,t you sanctioning them? The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough review of all available information. While I cannot comment on individual decisions, I can note that we did not impose sanctions on companies that are no longer operating. Q: Why did you designate some people under E.O. 13382 but not others? The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough review of all available information. I can,t comment on individual sanction decisions. Q: Why did you sanction Lerch, Geiges, and Wisser under EXIM, but not under the NPPA? The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough review of all available information. I can,t comment on individual sanction decisions. Q: What about Libya, Iran and North Korea? They bought these items ) why haven,t we sanctioned them? These sanctions focus on individuals and companies associated with the Khan network. As such, the governments that acquired these items are not subject to sanction under the NPPA or the EXIM Bank Act. Iran and the DPRK are subject to a wide array of sanctions, including UNSCRs 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1718 respectively. In addition, sanctions were imposed on the DPRK under the Glenn Amendment of the Atomic Energy Act following its October 2006 nuclear test. In the case of Libya, once it made the strategic 2003 decision to dismantle its WMD program, it then cooperated with the USG to facilitate that process. Libya also provided information about the A.Q. Khan network’s activities in Libya. Q: Aren,t these kinds of sanctions really toothless with little impact? Sanctions help signal strong U.S. opposition to the activities of the A.Q. Khan network, expose publicly those involved, and serve as a deterrent to others that might consider pursuing similar activities. Sanctions imposed under Executive Order 13382 will allow the U.S. to seize assets held under U.S. jurisdiction and thereby help prevent future proliferation. Q: What about North Korea ) are sanctions in the works for their nuclear transfers to Syria? The DPRK is subject to a wide array of sanctions, including UNSCR 1718 and a number of other U.S. sanctions related to its transfers of items proliferation concern. Furthermore, in the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK has reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology or know-how. Q: What have we learned about Khan,s efforts to assist Iran,s nuclear program? The IAEA has detailed in various reports that Iran has admitted to a relationship with the Khan network ) the same network that provided nuclear weapons designs to Libya ) from 1987 to 1999. This network provided Iran with P1 centrifuge designs, centrifuges, and components; P2 centrifuge designs; other very sensitive information; and technical advice including a &hemispheres document8. The &hemispheres document8 contains instructions for casting enriched uranium metal into hemispheres, which the IAEA,s January 2006 report noted are &related to the fabrication of nuclear weapons.8 Beginning with the November 2003 report, the IAEA Director General confirmed that for almost 20 years, Iran had been pursuing undeclared work in some of the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, and had systematically hidden that work from the IAEA. Iran,s failure to cooperate sharply limits the IAEA,s ability to know more about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program, and increases the international community,s concerns about Iran,s true intentions. Q: What have we learned about Khan,s efforts to assist North Korea,s nuclear program? Former Pakistani President Musharraf has previously acknowledged that Dr. A.Q. Khan and his international network provided sensitive centrifuge technology, including about two dozen centrifuges, to North Korea. Q: Were there other customer of Khan,s network? Questions remain as to whether there were other customers. End Press Guidance. —————— REPORTING DEADLINE —————— 8. (U) Please report within ten working days of receipt of this cable. Please use SIPDIS caption on all responses. —————- POINT OF CONTACT —————- 9. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up information is Caroline Russell and Chris Herrington, ISN/CPI, 647-5035. RICE
