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CIA Did not Get it Wrong on DPRK Nukes, Policymakers Did

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CIA Director Mike Pompeo said on Fox News Sunday with Chris Wallace that the CIA provided accurate intelligence on the DPRK nuclear program and policymakers too, were well aware even before Pompeo took over the agency.

When you look closely enough you will find serial numbers belonging to Pakistan, China and Russia…

Related reading and the graphs: Where did Iran get its military arms over the last 70 years?

Related reading: The Audacity Of Silence On Possible Iran-North Korea Nuclear Ties

Looking back and open source information is that statement accurate? When investigative media does the job of investigating and informs, Pompeo is correct. Furthermore, Iran was and is part of all the variables such that Barack, Hillary and John overlooked it all. How so? That pesky JPOA. Then cultivating the original Wikileaks cables, there was more….

  NKNews

In the shank of the Obama administration, 2011 please note the following:

http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/analysis-west-fears-possible-iran-north-korea-nuclear-links/

17 Sep 2011 22:26

Source: reuters // Reuters

By Fredrik Dahl

VIENNA, Sept 18 (Reuters) – It is one of the West’s biggest nuclear
proliferation nightmares — that increasingly isolated Iran and North
Korea might covertly trade know-how, material or technology that could be
put to developing atomic bombs.

“Such a relationship would be logical and beneficial to both North Korea
and Iran,” said Mark Hibbs, an expert of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.

Last year, a U.N. report suggested that impoverished, reclusive North
Korea might have supplied Iran as well as Syria and Myanmar with banned
atomic technology.

In what could be a sign of this, a German newspaper last month reported
that North Korea had provided Iran with a computer programme as part of
intensified cooperation that could help the Islamic state build nuclear
weapons.

“There are reports and rumours, which governments and the IAEA (the U.N.
International Atomic Energy Agency) have not denied, indicating that there
may be a track record of bilateral nuclear cooperation between North Korea
and Iran,” Hibbs said.

But while this could make sense for two states facing tightening sanctions
— and potentially earn Pyongyang some badly needed funds — the extent
and nature of any such dealings, if they take place at all, remain
shrouded in mystery.
“It seems to be very difficult to sort out what the relationship in the
nuclear world between DPRK (North Korea) and Iran is. We just simply do
not know,” prominent U.S. nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker said.

This was in contrast to missile cooperation between the two countries,
where North Korea has helped Iran both with the weapons and in building
related factories, he said.

Hecker, who has often visited the east Asian state, said possible
Tehran-Pyongyang atomic technology transfers would be a major concern for
everyone dedicated to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Iran’s nuclear programme is based on uranium enrichment, activity which
can have both civilian and military purposes.

North Korea has twice tested plutonium-based nuclear devices, drawing
international condemnation, although it last year revealed the existence
also of a uranium enrichment site, potentially giving it a second pathway
to bombs.
“They complement each other so well (in terms of their expertise). There
is just a lot of synergy in how they would be able to exchange
capabilities,” Hecker said at a seminar for diplomats in Vienna, the
IAEA’s headquarters, this month.
Citing Western intelligence sources, the Munich newspaper Sueddeutsche
Zeitung said in August that North Korea had this year delivered software,
originally developed in the United States, that could simulate neutron
flows.

Such calculations, which can help scientists identify self-sustaining
chain reactions, are vital in the construction of reactors and also in the
development of nuclear explosives.

With the help of the programme, Iran could gain important knowledge of how
to assemble nuclear weapons, the paper said.

WESTERN INTELLIGENCE HUNT

There has been no public confirmation or denial of the report in the West.
But Hecker did not rule it out, saying Pyongyang had demonstrated
experience in this field.

He said North Korea must have some “nuclear code capabilities” which they
would have been able to assess in comparison with the result of an atomic
test.
“So to some extent they have had an opportunity to verify or check their
codes,” Hecker said. “Iran has not had a chance to do that. So exchanging
that type of information … you could see as being very useful.”

North Korea tested nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009, but still has not
shown it has a working nuclear bomb.

Proliferation experts have said the country has enough fissile material
for up to 10 nuclear weapons. But they don’t believe Pyongyang is yet
capable of miniaturising the material to fit into the cone of a missile.

While North Korea has made no secret of its nuclear weapons ambitions,
Iran denies Western allegations that it is covertly seeking to develop an
atomic arms capability.

The Islamic Republic says its nuclear programme is for purposes of
electricity generation, but its refusal to halt uranium enrichment and its
stonewalling of a U.N. nuclear watchdog probe have stoked suspicions
abroad.

The Vienna-based U.N. nuclear watchdog said this month in a report that it
was “increasingly concerned” about possible work in Iran to develop a
nuclear missile.

For several years, the IAEA has been investigating Western intelligence
reports indicating Iran has coordinated efforts to process uranium, test
high explosives and revamp a ballistic missile cone to accommodate a
nuclear warhead.

Iran says the allegations are baseless and forged.

In a separate report on North Korea, from which its inspectors were
expelled in 2009, the IAEA suggested past nuclear-related ties with Syria
and Libya, but it made no mention of Iran.
Proliferation expert Mark Fitzpatrick said it would not be hard for Tehran
and Pyongyang to put “well-practised trade deals and transfer routes” from
their ballistic missile cooperation to use also in the nuclear field.
Still, there were few signs of any nuclear cooperation between the two
countries.

“It is not for lack of looking. Western intelligence agencies are
intensively targeting nuclear acquisition efforts by Iran and North
Korea,” Fitzpatrick, a former senior U.S. State Department official, said.

“Yet finding nuclear weapons-related trade is akin to the proverbial
needle in a haystack. In the vastness of ocean and sky routes, most forms
of nuclear-related cargo are so minute as to be almost undetectable.”

Hibbs said any nuclear dealings with North Korea would pose risks for
Iran: “Were this traffic to be confirmed, that would deepen the suspicion
that Iran is involved in nuclear activities which are clandestine and
military in nature.”

***

What about China selling weapons to Iran and operating groups being still worried about non-proliferation by North North Korea? Lots of chatter of that and left unresolved:

5. (S) Noting a decrease in the sales of Chinese conventional weapons to Iran, DASD Sedney expressed appreciation for China’s efforts to limit conventional arms sales to Iran. Sedney emphasized that Iran’s spreading of conventional BEIJING 00000058 002 OF 003 weapons to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon poses the serious problem of Chinese weapons killing U.S. soldiers. Sedney expressed concern about Iran’s nuclear program. More on that cable here, of note is the distribution list.

 

***

So under Obama it seems we left the A.Q. Khan sanctions to the Export Import Bank and the IAEA: From Secretary of State to the United Nations/Vienna by method deliver of a telegram and SIPDIS

DE RUEHC #2552 0092353 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 092336Z JAN 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0000

4. (SECRET/rel IAEA) — I wanted to inform you of a legal process that has concluded in the U.S. — U.S. nonproliferation law requires that sanctions be imposed in certain circumstances; the activities of Dr. Khan and some of his associates fall under the requirements of this law. — The U.S. has decided to impose sanctions on individuals and companies listed in a media note that was released on January 12. — This is a very complex case that involved a large volume of information and many people and companies across the globe. — The U.S. sanctions laws and executive orders involved include the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA), the Export Import Bank Act (EXIM), and Executive Orders (E.O.) 12938 and 13382. — This legal non-paper describes in more detail the specific sanctions and penalties involved. — The U.S. decision was announced on January 12 and will soon be printed in the Federal Register. — This U.S. decision is not directed at any country. In fact, as we highlight in our public statement, many countries contributed to international efforts to shut down and investigate the network. — The sanctions decision reflects the diverse and global nature of the network. — No sanctions were imposed on governments. — As IAEA knows, the actions of the A.Q. Khan network have irrevocably changed the proliferation landscape and will have lasting implications for international security. — These sanctions will help prevent and deter future proliferation-related activities and provide a warning to other would-be proliferators. — It is imperative that all countries remain vigilant in order to ensure that Khan network associates or others seeking to pursue similar proliferation activities will not become a future source for sensitive nuclear information or equipment. — If Asked: Will there be any additional sanctions on these individuals? We don,t foresee, at this time, the imposition of additional sanctions related to these activities. — If Asked: Will you share your findings with us? We can not share details of the sanction decision but don,t believe the information we have would contribute to a different understanding of the activities than you already have. End suggested talking points. ————– LEGAL NONPAPER ————– 5. (U) Begin non-paper: Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA) The NPPA provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on U.S. procurement from any person who, on or after June 30, 1994, knowingly and materially contributes, through the export of nuclear-related goods or technology, to the efforts of any individual, group, or non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded special nuclear material. Once imposed, the sanction shall apply for a period of at least 12 months, but can thereafter be terminated if reliable information indicates that (1) the sanctioned person has ceased to aid or abet any individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material or any nuclear explosive device, and (2) the United States has received reliable assurances from the sanctioned person that such person will not, in the future, aid or abet any individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material or any nuclear explosive device. Export Import Bank Act (EXIM) The EXIM provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on the Export-Import Bank,s guaranteeing, insuring, or extending credit, or participating in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to any person who, after September 23, 1996, knowingly aids or abets a non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded material. This sanction can be terminated if the U.S. determines and certifies in writing to the Congress that reliable information indicates that the sanctioned person has ceased to aid or abet any non-nuclear weapon state to acquire any nuclear explosive device or acquire un-safeguarded special nuclear material; and steps have been taken to ensure that the sanctionable activities will not resume. The sanction may also be terminated if the appropriate government has taken certain corrective actions. Executive Orders 12938 and 13382 These Executive Orders (E.O.) provide the authority to impose measures against a foreign person that has engaged or attempted to engage in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their means of delivery. The sanctions under E.O. 12938 include: a ban on USG departments, and agencies, procurement from, or entering into contracts for procurement with, the sanctioned person or entity; a ban on providing any USG assistance to, and any participation in USG assistance programs by, the sanctioned person or entity; and a ban on the importation into the U.S. of goods, technology or services procured or provided by the sanctioned person or entity. The E.O. 12938 sanctions may be terminated if there is reliable evidence that the foreign person has ceased the activities that led to the imposition of sanctions. The sanction under E.O. 13382 is that all property and interests in property of the designated entity, that are in the U.S. or subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. (i.e., U.S. persons anywhere) are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in. Sanctions under E.O. 13382 may be lifted when circumstances no longer warrant their imposition. End non-paper. ———- MEDIA NOTE ———— 6. (U) Post can draw from the following Media Note after 0900 EST January 12. Begin Media Note: For Immediate Release January 12, 2009 Designation of A.Q. Khan and Associates for Nuclear Proliferation Activities Today, the Department of State announced that sanctions will be imposed on 13 individuals and three private companies for their involvement in the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network. This announcement comes after a multi-year U.S. government review of the available information pertaining to the activities of this network. We believe these sanctions will help prevent future proliferation-related activities by these private entities, provide a warning to other would-be proliferators, and demonstrate our ongoing commitment to using all available tools to address proliferation-related activities. Dr. A.Q. Khan led an extensive international network for the proliferation of nuclear equipment and know-how that provided &one stop shopping8 for countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons. He and his associates provided Iran and Libya with centrifuge components, designs, and, in some cases, complete centrifuges. The United States also believes that Khan and his associates provided centrifuge designs, equipment, and technology to North Korea. Dr. Khan also provided Libya with nuclear weapon designs. With the assistance of Khan,s network, countries could leapfrog the slow, incremental stages of other nuclear weapons development programs. In 2004, following Libya,s welcome decision to renounce its nuclear program, the United States removed from Libya items it had received from the network. The network,s actions have irrevocably changed the proliferation landscape and have had lasting implications for international security. Governments around the world, including Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, and Malaysia, worked closely with the United States to investigate and shut down the network. Governments have also joined together to put in place United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 to criminalize proliferation and have worked cooperatively to establish the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to enhance international tools to interdict and prevent trade in sensitive technologies. Many of Dr. Khan,s associates are either in custody, being prosecuted, or have been convicted of crimes. Dr. Khan publicly acknowledged his involvement in the network in 2004, although he later retracted those statements. While we believe the A.Q. Khan network is no longer operating, countries should remain vigilant to ensure that Khan network associates, or others seeking to pursue similar proliferation activities, will not become a future source for sensitive nuclear information or equipment. Sanctions have been imposed under the following statutes as follows: Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA): Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., Muhammad Farooq, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, and Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain Export-Import Bank Act (EXIM): Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, Gerhard Wisser, and Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain Executive Order 12938: Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, Tradefin Engineering, Gerhard Wisser, and Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain Executive Order 13382: Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, and Gerhard Wisser End media note. ————– Press Guidance —————– 7. (U) Post can draw from the ISN Press Guidance after 0900 EST January 12. Begin Press Guidance: ISN Contingency Press Guidance January 12, 2009 A.Q. Khan Network: Sanctions General Questions Q: What specifically did A.Q. Khan and his network transfer? What did these people do to trigger sanctions? These entities were sanctioned for engaging in nuclear-related proliferation activities as part of the international A.Q. Khan network. In particular, Dr. Khan and his associates in a number of countries provided Iran and Libya with centrifuge components, designs, and, in some cases, complete centrifuges. The United States also believes that Khan and his associates provided centrifuge designs, equipment, and technology to North Korea. Dr. Khan also provided Libya with nuclear weapon designs. These illicit transfers by the Khan network have been reported in the press for a number of years. I cannot comment on additional specific intelligence-related information. Today,s imposition of sanctions on private companies and individuals does not reflect recent proliferation activity by the network. Q: Why haven,t you sanctioned any countries? The authorities under which sanctions are being imposed do not target countries. Governments around the world, including Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, Germany, Switzerland, the UAE, and Malaysia worked closely with the U.S. to investigate and shut down this international network. Q: Why has it taken four years to impose sanctions? This is a very complex case that involved a large volume of information and many people and companies across the globe. We have been working diligently for the past four years to assemble and properly evaluate the available information. Given the consequences of a sanctions decision, it is important that the information be thoroughly vetted and evaluated before a sanctions determination is made. Q: Why couldn,t you have sanctioned some entities earlier instead of waiting four years? Information continued to become available as other countries concluded their investigations or prosecutions and we believed in this case that it was important to sanction the group at one time. Q: Did you tell the affected governments prior to public announcement? Yes, governments were notified in advance that the United States intends to impose proliferation sanctions on these private companies and individuals. We applaud the actions that each of these countries took to shut down and investigate the network, and work cooperatively to implement new measures to prevent proliferation. Q: What sanctions authorities were used to impose penalties? There are two sanctions laws and two Executive Orders that provide the basis for the imposition of sanctions in this case. The sanctions laws are the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (the &NPPA8) and the Export Import Bank Act (&EXIM8). The two Executive Orders are 12938 and 13382. Q: What do these authorities require? The NPPA provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on U.S. procurement from any person who, on or after June 30, 1994, knowingly and materially contributes, through the export of nuclear-related goods or technology, to the efforts of any individual, group, or non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded special nuclear material. The EXIM provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on the Export-Import Bank,s guaranteeing, insuring, or extending credit, or participating in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to any person who, after September 23, 1996, knowingly aids or abets a non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded material. The Executive Orders provide the authority to impose measures against a foreign person that has engaged or attempted to engage in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their means of delivery, including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items, by any person or foreign country of proliferation concern. Q: What penalties can be imposed pursuant to these sanctions authorities? These sanctions are not being applied to any governments, but to private companies and individuals. In brief, the NPPA provides for a ban on USG procurement from the sanctioned person. EXIM provides for a ban on Export Import Bank credit, guarantees, or insurance in support of U.S. exports to the sanctioned person. Executive Order 12938 provides for a ban on USG procurement or imports from the sanctioned entity as well as a ban on U.S. assistance to the sanctioned entity. Executive Order 13382 freezes the assets of a sanctioned entity that are under U.S. jurisdiction. Q: What impact, if any, will these sanctions have? These sanctions will help prevent and deter future proliferation-related activities and provide a warning to other would-be proliferators. Q: What can companies and individuals do to have sanctions rescinded? Each law treats this issue differently. I refer you to the statutes. Q: Is the A.Q. Khan network still active? If so, what are we doing about it? We do not believe that the network run by A.Q. Khan is still functioning. Most of the key people involved with the network have been put out of business, are in jail and/or facing prosecution. We remain concerned that individuals associated with the network, once they are released from jail or are no longer being closely monitored, could re-engage in proliferation on their own in the future. It is important that countries continue to monitor their behavior closely and put in place laws and enforcement mechanisms to prevent proliferation activities. Q: Do remnants of the network still exist? What are we doing about them? Saying the Khan network is no longer functioning does not mean that other proliferation-related networks and activity around the world has stopped. We know, for example, that Iran has utilized several different front and Iranian companies to purchase particular items of proliferation concern. Several of these entities and companies were identified in UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803 in connection with their involvement in the Iranian nuclear or missile programs. The U.S. has taken action against many of these entities, including designations under E.O. 13382. More information on E.O. 13382 designations can be found on the State Department,s website under nonproliferation sanctions as well as the Treasury,s Office of Foreign Asset Control,s website. Country Specific Questions Pakistan Q: Wasn,t the Government of Pakistan involved or at least knew what was going on? The government of Pakistan assured us it had nothing to do with the network and we have no information to refute this. We applaud the actions Pakistan took to shut down and investigate the network. In the years since the public revelation of the Khan network, the government of Pakistan also has taken a number of positive steps to improve its export controls and promote international nonproliferation. Q: Why haven,t we had direct access to Khan? We appreciate the cooperation the government of Pakistan has provided the IAEA and the United States. We believe that Pakistan took seriously its commitment to dismantle the network. Pakistan has assured us that it will not be a source of proliferation in the future. The United States does not need direct access to A.Q. Khan in order to obtain information about his dealings. Q: Reports indicate that Pakistan is easing restrictions on Khan ) What is your reaction to this? We appreciate Pakistan,s efforts in shutting down the proliferation network led by A.Q. Khan as well as the cooperation Pakistan has provided the United States and the IAEA to investigate the Khan network. We believe Dr. Khan is still a proliferation threat to the world and the proliferation support that he and his associates provided to several states of proliferation concern has had a harmful impact on international security and will for years to come. Q: Khan recently said he was forced to confess. If we haven,t had access to Khan then how do we know he was complicit? We have information from other sources indicating that Khan was complicit in nuclear-related transfers to several countries. Q: Any response to statements by Pakistan that it wants to put the A.Q. Khan issue to rest or that the U.S. has not passed questions on Khan,s activities for some time. The U.S. appreciates the cooperation Pakistan has provided the U.S. and IAEA. Such cooperation will continue to be important as we work toward a greater understanding of what the network provided to various countries. Q: Will there be any additional sanctions on these individuals? We don,t foresee, at this time, the imposition of additional sanctions related to these activities. Q: Why didn,t you sanction Khan Research Labs? I can,t comment on individual decisions. Q: What effect will these sanctions have on our relationship with Pakistan ) specifically, our counter-terrorism relationship? These sanctions are based on activities by individuals that occurred well in the past and have been public for many years. We appreciate Pakistan,s efforts in shutting down the Khan proliferation network as well as the cooperation Pakistan has provided the United States and the IAEA to investigate the activities of the Khan network. The United States has a close partnership with Pakistan on counter-terrorism, nonproliferation, and other issues. Q: Do you think these sanctions will have an effect on the India-Pakistan relationship? These sanctions are based on activities by individuals that occurred well in the past and have been public for many years. Questions about India and Pakistan,s relationship are best answered by those countries. Switzerland Q: Is it true that the U.S. asked Switzerland to destroy nuclear documents? We have no comment. Q: Why aren,t you sanctioning any of the Tinners? Is it because they were spies for the U.S.? We have no comment. Sanctions Decisions: Q: Didn,t the Khan network include many more people and companies than you sanctioned, including the Tinner family, Henk Slebos, and companies in the UAE. Why aren,t you sanctioning them? The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough review of all available information. While I cannot comment on individual decisions, I can note that we did not impose sanctions on companies that are no longer operating. Q: Why did you designate some people under E.O. 13382 but not others? The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough review of all available information. I can,t comment on individual sanction decisions. Q: Why did you sanction Lerch, Geiges, and Wisser under EXIM, but not under the NPPA? The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough review of all available information. I can,t comment on individual sanction decisions. Q: What about Libya, Iran and North Korea? They bought these items ) why haven,t we sanctioned them? These sanctions focus on individuals and companies associated with the Khan network. As such, the governments that acquired these items are not subject to sanction under the NPPA or the EXIM Bank Act. Iran and the DPRK are subject to a wide array of sanctions, including UNSCRs 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1718 respectively. In addition, sanctions were imposed on the DPRK under the Glenn Amendment of the Atomic Energy Act following its October 2006 nuclear test. In the case of Libya, once it made the strategic 2003 decision to dismantle its WMD program, it then cooperated with the USG to facilitate that process. Libya also provided information about the A.Q. Khan network’s activities in Libya. Q: Aren,t these kinds of sanctions really toothless with little impact? Sanctions help signal strong U.S. opposition to the activities of the A.Q. Khan network, expose publicly those involved, and serve as a deterrent to others that might consider pursuing similar activities. Sanctions imposed under Executive Order 13382 will allow the U.S. to seize assets held under U.S. jurisdiction and thereby help prevent future proliferation. Q: What about North Korea ) are sanctions in the works for their nuclear transfers to Syria? The DPRK is subject to a wide array of sanctions, including UNSCR 1718 and a number of other U.S. sanctions related to its transfers of items proliferation concern. Furthermore, in the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK has reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology or know-how. Q: What have we learned about Khan,s efforts to assist Iran,s nuclear program? The IAEA has detailed in various reports that Iran has admitted to a relationship with the Khan network ) the same network that provided nuclear weapons designs to Libya ) from 1987 to 1999. This network provided Iran with P1 centrifuge designs, centrifuges, and components; P2 centrifuge designs; other very sensitive information; and technical advice including a &hemispheres document8. The &hemispheres document8 contains instructions for casting enriched uranium metal into hemispheres, which the IAEA,s January 2006 report noted are &related to the fabrication of nuclear weapons.8 Beginning with the November 2003 report, the IAEA Director General confirmed that for almost 20 years, Iran had been pursuing undeclared work in some of the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, and had systematically hidden that work from the IAEA. Iran,s failure to cooperate sharply limits the IAEA,s ability to know more about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program, and increases the international community,s concerns about Iran,s true intentions. Q: What have we learned about Khan,s efforts to assist North Korea,s nuclear program? Former Pakistani President Musharraf has previously acknowledged that Dr. A.Q. Khan and his international network provided sensitive centrifuge technology, including about two dozen centrifuges, to North Korea. Q: Were there other customer of Khan,s network? Questions remain as to whether there were other customers. End Press Guidance. —————— REPORTING DEADLINE —————— 8. (U) Please report within ten working days of receipt of this cable. Please use SIPDIS caption on all responses. —————- POINT OF CONTACT —————- 9. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up information is Caroline Russell and Chris Herrington, ISN/CPI, 647-5035. RICE

 

The New York Channel to North Korea is in Play

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His name is Joseph Yun, a U.S. diplomat at the United Nations, one that the North Korean regime has reached out to more than once. Most recently it was over the return of Otto Warmbier and his release.

Under the Obama administration, all talks were terminated where at the time Sweden was the communications envoy of record. With the transfer of power and government to Donald Trump, Pyongyang opened up the back channel via the United Nations to Joseph Yun, who has long diplomatic experience in the region.

While preparations are in place according to President Trump should Kim launch his 4 missiles toward Guam, Pentagon Chief Mattis declares the United States and allies are ready. That still leaves North Korea with nuclear weapons, a condition every expert is omitting in talking points. Secretary of State Tillerson says his work is to get North Korea to stop with the missile program, and that will not likely occur as it is a proxy operation of Iran.

The Kim regime is keeping his estimated 60 nuclear weapons for a bargaining tool and global legitimacy. That is the real problem. Many expert declare that North Korea always backs down in the end when they get food or sanctions relief but we are dealing with a new Kim that is far more unpredictable than his father.

So, what can the U.S. and allies do going forward? Shall we continue to rely on China? They are anything but a friend or a cooperative partner stating in local Chinese news that China will remain neutral should Kim strike first. Further, China declared that if the United States went to a preemptive posture, China would stop us.

China wants total ownership and power in the region and certainly when it comes to navigation, so any U.S. naval activity angers them.

The United States has other options and tools, where not one but a combination of all may also be deployed. That includes forcing a regime change, not always the best solution. Then there is the special forces deployment to covertly enter North Korea and work on a detonation of key command and control sites. Special operations has trained for this kind of operation for more than 20 years.

There is a cyber option, a tool that several experts declare have already been used that Kim’s missile miss targets or fail on re-entry.

Dealing with China to control North Korea is a fool’s errand as Russia and Iran are part of the total equation. There could still be wider consequences when the United States and allies prevail over North Korea on the missile side, again the nuclear inventory remains and is traded to other rogue nations such as Iran or Syria.

There are other allies included in the variables regarding North Korea. They include Australia, Japan and Britain, where Canada, Germany and France remain silent. Japan has just deployed a missile defense system in a defensive mode.

The media continues to declare that any military conflict will lead to millions dying. That is only true if North Korea is successful on a land based conflict hitting Seoul. The U.S. uses only precision guided munitions where collateral damage would not affect other regions of North Korea, hence millions would not escape across the Yalu river into China. China has a standing army at that border preventing such an event.

China and North Korea want the peninsula to be unified and under Chinese control which is much the case to the waterways in dispute along with the contested islands. China fears that the United States is working to unify the peninsula under S. Korean control, which has not been an objective.

In summary, while fear for days has been the media headlines, it cannot be fully dismissed, however, a near term conflict will be likely resolved, leaving North Korea with a viable nuclear weapons and missile program. The coordination between Iran and North Korea will continue in that same realm and Trump is left with the same festering issue of previous president.

Will there be a Chinese naval blockade if the United State and allies go for a preemptive strike? Perhaps that New York Channel to Pyongyang has the burden of finding out. Has someone sent an envoy to Tehran yet with these discussions? Nah….Russia meanwhile is keeping a keen eye on all of it.

 

Judge Rules to Re-Open Hillary Benghazi Email Case

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Primer:

Photo essay

The following facts are among the many new revelations in Part I:

  • Despite President Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s clear orders to deploy military assets, nothing was sent to Benghazi, and nothing was en route to Libya at the time the last two Americans were killed almost 8 hours after the attacks began. [pg. 141]
  • With Ambassador Stevens missing, the White House convened a roughly two-hour meeting at 7:30 PM, which resulted in action items focused on a YouTube video, and others containing the phrases “[i]f any deployment is made,” and “Libya must agree to any deployment,” and “[w]ill not deploy until order comes to go to either Tripoli or Benghazi.” [pg. 115]
  • The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff typically would have participated in the White House meeting, but did not attend because he went home to host a dinner party for foreign dignitaries. [pg. 107]
  • A Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) sat on a plane in Rota, Spain, for three hours, and changed in and out of their uniforms four times. [pg. 154]
  • None of the relevant military forces met their required deployment timelines. [pg. 150]
  • The Libyan forces that evacuated Americans from the CIA Annex to the Benghazi airport was not affiliated with any of the militias the CIA or State Department had developed a relationship with during the prior 18 months. Instead, it was comprised of former Qadhafi loyalists who the U.S. had helped remove from power during the Libyan revolution. [pg. 144]

The following facts are among the many new revelations in Part II:

  • Five of the 10 action items from the 7:30 PM White House meeting referenced the video, but no direct link or solid evidence existed connecting the attacks in Benghazi and the video at the time the meeting took place. The State Department senior officials at the meeting had access to eyewitness accounts to the attack in real time. The Diplomatic Security Command Center was in direct contact with the Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground in Benghazi and sent out multiple updates about the situation, including a “Terrorism Event Notification.” The State Department Watch Center had also notified Jake Sullivan and Cheryl Mills that it had set up a direct telephone line to Tripoli. There was no mention of the video from the agents on the ground. Greg Hicks—one of the last people to talk to Chris Stevens before he died—said there was virtually no discussion about the video in Libya leading up to the attacks. [pg. 28]
  • The morning after the attacks, the National Security Council’s Deputy Spokesperson sent an email to nearly two dozen people from the White House, Defense Department, State Department, and intelligence community, stating: “Both the President and Secretary Clinton released statements this morning. … Please refer to those for any comments for the time being. To ensure we are all in sync on messaging for the rest of the day, Ben Rhodes will host a conference call for USG communicators on this chain at 9:15 ET today.” [pg. 39]
  • Minutes before the President delivered his speech in the Rose Garden, Jake Sullivan wrote in an email to Ben Rhodes and others: “There was not really much violence in Egypt. And we are not saying that the violence in Libya erupted ‘over inflammatory videos.’” [pg. 44]
  • According to Susan Rice, both Ben Rhodes and David Plouffe prepared her for her appearances on the Sunday morning talk shows following the attacks. Nobody from the FBI, Department of Defense, or CIA participated in her prep call. While Rhodes testified Plouffe would “normally” appear on the Sunday show prep calls, Rice testified she did not recall Plouffe being on prior calls and did not understand why he was on the call in this instance. [pg.98]
  • On the Sunday shows, Susan Rice stated the FBI had “already begun looking at all sorts of evidence” and “FBI has a lead in this investigation.” But on Monday, the Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs sent an email stating: “McDonough apparently told the SVTS [Secure Video Teleconference] group today that everyone was required to ‘shut their pieholes’ about the Benghazi attack in light of the FBI investigation, due to start tomorrow.” [pg. 135]
  • After Susan Rice’s Sunday show appearances, Jake Sullivan assured the Secretary of the State that Rice “wasn’t asked about whether we had any intel. But she did make clear our view that this started spontaneously and then evolved.” [pg. 128]
  • Susan Rice’s comments on the Sunday talk shows were met with shock and disbelief by State Department employees in Washington. The Senior Libya Desk Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, wrote: “I think Rice was off the reservation on this one.” The Deputy Director, Office of Press and Public Diplomacy, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, responded: “Off the reservation on five networks!” The Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, Bureau of Near East Affairs, State Department, wrote: “WH [White House] very worried about the politics. This was all their doing.” [pg. 132]
  • The CIA’s September 13, 2012, intelligence assessment was rife with errors. On the first page, there is a single mention of “the early stages of the protest” buried in one of the bullet points. The article cited to support the mention of a protest in this instance was actually from September 4. In other words, the analysts used an article from a full week before the attacks to support the premise that a protest had occurred just prior to the attack on September 11. [pg. 47]
  • A headline on the following page of the CIA’s September 13 intelligence assessment stated “Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi Protests,” but nothing in the actual text box supports that title. As it turns out, the title of the text box was supposed to be “Extremists Capitalized on Cairo Protests.” That small but vital difference—from Cairo to Benghazi—had major implications in how people in the administration were able to message the attacks. [pg. 52]

Read the full report here as published by the Select Committee on Benghazi

Judge orders new searches for Clinton Benghazi emails

Politico: Nine months after the presidential election was decided, a federal judge is ordering the State Department to try again to find emails Hillary Clinton wrote about the Benghazi attack.

U.S. District Court Judge Amit Mehta ruled that the State Department had not done enough to try to track down messages Clinton may have sent about the assault on the U.S. diplomatic compound on Sept. 11, 2012 — an attack that killed four Americans, including the U.S. ambassador to Libya.

In response to Freedom of Information Act requests, State searched the roughly 30,000 messages Clinton turned over to her former agency at its request in December 2014 after officials searching for Benghazi-related records realized she had used a personal email account during her four-year tenure as secretary.

State later searched tens of thousands of emails handed over to the agency by three former top aides to Clinton: Huma Abedin, Cheryl Mills and Jake Sullivan. Finally, State searched a collection of emails the FBI assembled when it was investigating Clinton’s use of the private account and server.

In all, State found 348 Benghazi-related messages or documents that were sent to or from Clinton in a period of nearly five months after the attack.

However, the conservative watchdog group Judicial Watch argued that the search wasn’t good enough because State never tried to search its own systems for relevant messages in the official email accounts of Clinton’s top aides.

In a 10-page ruling issued Tuesday, Mehta — an Obama appointee — agreed.

“To date, State has searched only data compilations originating from outside sources — Secretary Clinton, her former aides, and the FBI. … It has not, however, searched 8 the one records system over which it has always had control and that is almost certain to contain some responsive records: the state.gov e-mail server,” Mehta wrote.

“If Secretary Clinton sent an e-mail about Benghazi to Abedin, Mills, or Sullivan at his or her state.gov e-mail address, or if one of them sent an e-mail to Secretary Clinton using his or her state.gov account, then State’s server presumably would have captured and stored such an e-mail. Therefore, State has an obligation to search its own server for responsive records.”

Justice Department lawyers representing State argued that making them search other employees’ accounts for Clinton’s emails would set a bad precedent that would belabor other FOIA searches.

But Mehta said the circumstances surrounding Clinton’s email represented “a specific fact pattern unlikely to arise in the future.”

A central premise of Mehta’s ruling is that the State Department’s servers archived emails from Clinton’s top aides. However, it’s not clear that happened regularly or reliably.

State Department officials have said there was no routine, automated archiving of official email during Clinton’s tenure. Some officials did copy their mailboxes from time to time and put archived message folders on desktop computers or servers, so State may still have some messages from the aides, but the FBI may already have acquired some of those messages during its inquiry.

A State Department spokesperson declined to comment on the judge’s decision. A Justice Department spokesman said: “We are reviewing the judge’s opinion and order.”

Obama Blew All Opportunities with China and N. Korea

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Obama along with Hillary and John gave us trade deals and climate change stuff….Obama did not understand Thucydides Trap and chose to ignore it. Steve Bannon and H.R, McMaster along with General Mattis are experts on it and President Trump is confused. Trump tells President Xi, he will honor the one China policy.
Obama launched an Asia Pivot, remember that? Others called it a ‘re-balance’. Well…..
The “rebalance” policy not only aims to protect the region from unwanted security threats, but also to secure commercial sea lanes for American imports and exports flowing in and out of the region.
It is increasingly important for the U.S. to maintain freedom for navigation from the
Arabian Sea to the Pacific Ocean. The economic aspects of the “rebalance” under the Obama Administration have been largely shaped by U.S. participation in the TPP talks aimed at institutionalizing regional free trade practices. The vision of the U.S. Trade Representative for the TPP is an FTA for the twelve negotiating parties –Australia, Brunei, Chile, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the U.S., and Vietnam –
which will form the basis for a broader agreement that eventually could eventually include all the economies of the Asia -Pacific region, including China.
If successful, the TPP could provide the US with a number of benefits. It would include U.S. access to growing markets in Asia, help stimulate the growth in U.S. exports, generate export – related jobs, and foster an economic recovery, while enhancing measures to protect U.S. intellectual property rights, and ensuring that business competition occurs in a fair regional market.
The third major component of the U.S. “rebalance” policy falls in the “dignity basket”
that seeks to uphold democratic and human rights and the rule of law. The Obama
Administration’s emphasis on universal rights targets the credibility of the Chinese
government in the midst of its rapid growth and intends to apply pressure on Beijing to
adhere to right practices as a responsible stakeholder. In this way, China’s rise would be
perceived as less of a threat to regional and global powers and more as a constructive
member of the international community. The Administration’s “rebalance” to the Asia-
Pacific region is in essence a hedging strategy towards China, one that combines engagement
with Beijing with the creation of a network of bilateral military partnerships and alliances in the Asia-Pacific as a potential counterweight against the rise of China.
The U.S. “rebalance” has endowed smaller nations who are claimants of the South China
Sea territories with more political capital without becoming directly involved in such territorial disputes.
As a result, Chinese and western analysts are concerned about the “rebalance” being an actual policy of containment against China. Obama Administration officials, in response, repeatedly
make clear that “rebalance” to Asia is not a containment strategy, but a policy aimed at strategically placing the U.S. in a favorable position as the Asia-Pacific becomes one of

the major centers of global activity. More here.
*** So, with all that early on, the Obama administration got a TPP agreement…okay swell…what came next…
Well after all the Obama administration personnel changes and additional changes in region leaders including Japan, China and S. Korea….and the rise of Islamic State, the best then Obama and John Kerry could do was a Paris Agreement.

The United States and China announced Saturday that they are formally joining the Paris Agreement to combat climate change, significantly increasing the likelihood that the accord will take effect this year.

The announcement, made by U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping before the start of the G20 summit in Hangzhou, China, adds momentum to ongoing international discussions surrounding climate change. The accord requires 55 countries to join, representing 55% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, before it enters into force. Together the U.S. and China represent nearly 39% of the world’s emissions. They join 24 other countries that have already signed on to the agreement, according to a count from the World Resources Institute.

The announcement is the latest in an unlikely partnership on climate change between the two countries. Chinese opposition to strong global warming measures, at least in part, prevented efforts to reach a strong climate deal in Copenhagen in 2009. But climate became an area of cooperation when Xi took office in 2013. The alignment between Obama and Xi has been credited with building support from other countries in advance of the Paris conference in 2015 that yielded the world’s strongest agreement on climate change. More here.

Where the hell were those consequences Obama talked about in September of 2016?

In part from ABC: North Korea confirmed its fifth nuclear test explosion early Friday, its largest yet. The provocation brought instant condemnation from the country’s neighbors and a call from President Obama for “serious consequences.”

Pyongyang also said it has made strides that could bring it closer to mounting a warhead on one of its ballistic missiles and launching a long-distance nuclear strike.

“We successfully conducted a nuclear explosion test to determine the power of [the] nuclear warhead,” a female anchor announced on North Korea’s state television. “We will continue to strengthen our nuclear capabilities to protect our sovereignty. We have now standardized and minimized nuclear warheads … We can now produce small nuclear warheads any time we desire.”

“Today’s nuclear test by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, if confirmed, is its second this year and the fifth since 2006,” said International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Yukiya Amano. “This is in clear violation of numerous UN Security Council resolutions and in complete disregard of the repeated demands of the international community. It is a deeply troubling and regrettable act.”

North Korea previously conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, and most recently in January 2016.

South Korean President Park Geun-hye called the explosion an act of “fanatic recklessness.”

The White House said National Security Adviser Susan Rice briefed Obama on the incident.

“The president also consulted with President Park of the Republic of Korea and Prime Minister Abe of Japan in separate phone calls,” White House press secretary Josh Earnest told ABC News. “The president reiterated the unbreakable U.S. commitment to the security of our allies in Asia and around the world. The president indicated he would continue to consult our allies and partners in the days ahead to ensure provocative actions from North Korea are met with serious consequences.”

The U.S. State Department also told ABC News it was aware of the explosion.

“We are aware of seismic activity on the Korean Peninsula in the vicinity of a known North Korean nuclear test site,” State Department spokesman John Kirby said. “We are monitoring and continuing to assess the situation in close coordination with our regional partners. The Secretary has been briefed on this incident.”

China’s foreign ministry condemned North Korea’s nuclear test and said it will lodge a diplomatic protest with Pyongyang’s ambassador in Beijing. The foreign ministry issued a statement saying it “resolutely opposes” the test and “intensely urges” Pyongyang to abide by its non-proliferation promises.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said the test explosion “could not be tolerated.”

So now Guam is a target of North Korea due to fear of Thucydides Trap, there are 60 nuclear weapons in play, there are 10 hour trilateral air missions daily, and the U.S. nuclear triad is in active deployment.

For a list of what the United States has at the ready, go here. It all sounds good and comforting until someone asks what is on the menu of strategies going forward….the time for talk is over or is it?

 

Blame for NoKo Nuclear Program Goes Beyond China

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Photo.2012

Stop just blaming China for being the sole enabler for North Korea’s nuclear and missile program. It is beyond dispute that the moment of reckoning is here for Donald Trump, for he is having a Kennedy/Cuban Missile crisis point in history. But there are other countries that should be blamed and they include Pakistan, Iran and Russia.

When Putin traveled to North Korea for talks with Kim:

Interfax news agency quoted Putin as saying Kim had assured him Pyongyang’s rocket program was entirely peaceful.

Asked if Russia was prepared to offer its rockets for Korean space exploration, Putin said, “Why should only Russia pay? One should expect other countries, if they assert that the DPRK [North Korea] poses a threat for them, would support this project,” Interfax reported.

“One can minimize the threat by supplying the DPRK with its rocket boosters,” it quoted him as saying.

He also said Russia was prepared to do its utmost to improve the situation on the Korean peninsula, and expected other countries to do their part.

“We suggest that the efforts of the Russian Federation alone are not sufficient. We should all — the DPRK, South Korea, as well as the United States, China and Japan — support that process.”

***

Historically, Iran has bought a lot with its money. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, thought to be Tehran’s chief nuclear scientist, was almost certainly in North Korea at Punggye-ri in February 2013 to witness Pyongyang’s third atomic test. Reports put Iranian technicians on hand at the site for the first two detonations as well.

Then there was a remarkable confession of Dr A Q Khan, Pakistan’s infamous ‘nuclear’ scientist. It was on 4 February 2004 when Khan appeared on the television and confessed to having supplied nuclear technology and components to North Korea, Iran and Libya. Khan accepted his crimes in English and not in Urdu, which is the language understood by most Pakistanis.

That telecast was actually for the international audience, especially the United States and the European intelligence agencies. Khan explicitly mentioned that this proliferation network was entirely his own and the Pakistani government or authorities were never involved. North Korea’s nuclear ambition started in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Erstwhile Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) agreed to set up their first plutonium-based nuclear reactor at Yongbyon-Kun for peaceful use of nuclear technology. Later, North Korea set up more reactors, signed Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to get access to the latest technology and allowed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to inspect its nuclear facilities, but never gave up its desire to have ‘the bomb’.

Apart from China, Pakistan was the only major country in the world who not only maintained diplomatic relations with North Korea but received weaponry from them.

But the cooperation in nuclear and missile field started in the late 1980s. More here.

***

North Korea’s unprecedented level of testing and displays of strategic weapons in 2016 indicate that Kim is intent on proving he has the capability to strike the U.S. mainland with nuclear weapons. In 2016, the regime conducted two nuclear tests—including one that was claimed to be of a standardized warhead design—and an unprecedented number of missile launches, including a space launch that put a satellite into orbit. These ballistic missile tests probably shortened North Korea’s pathway toward a reliable ICBM, which largely uses the same technology. Kim was also photographed beside a nuclear warhead design and missile airframes to show that North Korea has warheads small enough to fit on a missile, examining a reentry-vehicle nose cone after a simulated reentry, and overseeing launches from a submarine and from mobile launchers in the field, purportedly simulating nuclear use in warfighting scenarios. North Korea is poised to conduct its first ICBM flight test in 2017 based on public comments that preparations to do so are almost complete and would serve as a milestone toward a more reliable threat to the U.S. mainland. Pyongyang’s enshrinement of the possession of nuclear weapons in its constitution, while repeatedly stating that nuclear weapons are the basis for its survival, suggests that Kim does not intend to negotiate them away at any price.

David Albright—a widely respected expert on proliferation and president and founder of the Institute for Science and International Security—estimated at the end of 2016 that North Korea’s nuclear programs had reached the following status:

• 33 kilograms of separated plutonium (median value of a distribution).

• 175-645 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium, where 175 kilograms corresponds to a median estimate for the case of one centrifuge plant and 645 kilograms corresponds to the median estimate for the case of two centrifuge plants.

• 13 to 30 nuclear weapons, where these values reflect the utilization of 70 percent of the available, estimated stocks of plutonium and weapon-grade uranium. The limits correspond to the median values for the cases of one or two centrifuge plants and each weapon contains either plutonium or weapon-grade uranium.

• Based on this cumulative estimate, North Korea is currently expanding its nuclear weapons at a rate of about three-five weapons per year.

• 30 percent of North Korea’s total stocks of plutonium and weapon-grade uranium are assessed as in production pipelines, lost during processing, or held in a reserve. More here.

***

Tillerson has pointed the finger of blame at Beijing and Moscow.

“As the principal economic enablers of North Korea’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development program, China and Russia bear unique and special responsibility for this growing threat to regional and global stability,” he said in a statement.

Tillerson’s comments are sure to anger Russia and China. Earlier this month Beijing rejected claims from US president Donald Trump that it had a responsibility to do more to rein in its ally. “I think this either shows lack of a full, correct knowledge of the issue, or there are ulterior motives for it, trying to shift responsibility,” Geng Shuang, a foreign ministry spokesman, told reporters.

***

Certain weapons, however, stand in stark contrast to the rest of North Korea’s aging weapons collection. One is what appears to be a copy of the Russian Kh-35 antiship cruise missile. Known in Russia as the Kh-35 Uran and to NATO as the SS-N-25 “Switchblade,” the Kh-35 has a range of seventy nautical miles and a 320-pound high-explosive warhead, flying above the wavetops to stay undetected as long as possible. Guided by active radar, the subsonic missile is roughly comparable to the American Harpoon antiship missile, earning it the nickname “Harpoonski.”

Although the Uran’s development predated the end of the Cold War, the missile never entered Soviet service, joining the Russian Navy only in 2003. The missile first surfaced in North Korea in June 2014, when it briefly appeared in a North Korean propaganda video. The missile, which appeared to be launched from a ship, was identical to the Uran, although the shipboard mounting hardware appeared different from Russian hardware. North Korea launched a volley of four Kh-35s on June 7 from the vicinity of Wonsan into the Sea of Japan.

A new rocket artillery system recently emerged in North Korea. Known as the KN-09 multiple-rocket launcher, the system consists of eight three-hundred-millimeter rocket-launcher tubes on a 6×6 HOWO 6×6 All-wheel Drive Cargo Truck chassis. The presence of fins on the rocket’s nose suggests each rocket is precision-guided, using either China’s Baidu or Russia’s GLONASS satellite-based global positioning systems. More here.