Category Archives: Failed foreign policy

U.S. Applies New Iran Sanctions, Hardly Enough

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We are still at war in the Middle East where Iran with proxies is the real and virtual enemy. The United States uses proxies as well, yet the United States near term and long range strategy remains fleeting.

The talks that continue between Iran and Europe on the JCPOA should include Iran’s war operation in the Middle East.

For related reading: How Iran Spreads Its Empire through Terrorist Militias, In Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere, Tehran has perfected the art of gradually conquering a country without replacing its flag.

https://lh5.googleusercontent.com/_fdkmbEaLNsthfxOkoTpRxuhC2mSgPJfm2_f4IcdO9OLC8jMqBk5ambXr3ZwDw1cbXzPO0HkTEU_l5j-ZIOvKmJfUplgWyyl6COiJ7zOyS8IC7PFxOXsApqtEhf085IRRVbVd8e_ photo

Going forward for the United States:

Implications and Future Research
The unwillingness of the United States and its GCC partners to use their vast conventional military superiority has shifted the balance of power in the region from the conventional to the unconventional realm. Iran then relies on its willingness to assume more risk and its ability to better influence proxies than its adversaries, to achieve favorable foreign policy outcomes despite the opposition of the United States and its Arab allies. The use of proxy groups fundamentally decreases the physical cost a state incurs due to conflict. However, when the soldiers of a state die advising and assisting these proxies, it is more difficult to justify domestically, because using proxies signals that the objectives are not important enough to warrant decisive intervention. Therefore, states are most successful when they use proxies not as a cost-reduction mechanism alone but because proxies
are better able to achieve the desired end than conventional military forces. If the United States is unwilling to risk additional battle deaths or domestic political repercussions to prevent Iran from projecting power across the Middle East, then it must instead apply cost-imposing strategies.
Increasing the effectiveness of special operations forces from allied Arab states through intelligence sharing, kinetic strikes, training, and attached American advisors, while encouraging deployments of these elements to areas where Iranian advisors and IRGC units operate, would increase the human cost of Iranian activities. In addition to targeting Iran’s primary efforts in Iraq and Syria, these partnered operations should also confront peripheral Iranian efforts throughout the Gulf, including Yemen, in order to exploit the weakness of Iranian popular support for its presence therein. By working through Arab partners, the United States can apply the indigenous force necessary to confront Iranian proxies, while increasing the likelihood that Arab states achieve a confluence of shared ideology and objectives with their proxies, which eludes the United States
as a separate actor. Saudi and Emirati support to Yemeni military units recapturing the port of Aden and the Bab al-Mandab Strait serve as good examples of the type of effort the United States should expand.
In addition to combating Iranian proxy groups directly, targeting the ground, air, and sea logistical routes that the IRGC Quds Force uses to supply its proxies would affect Iran’s ability to support its efforts in the region. As long as Iran continues to rely on a domestically based force projection model, its network is vulnerable to air strikes, raids, and sabotage. An expanded network of friendly proxies partnered with US and allied
-Arab advisors would be ideally suited to facilitating this type of targeting.
The author is: Maj. Alex Deep is an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He is a Special Forces officer with ten years of service and multiple deployments to Afghanistan in conventional and special operations task forces. He served as a rifle platoon leader and company executive officer in the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team prior to completing Special Forces Assessment and Selection and subsequently the Special Forces Qualification Course. He then served as a Special Forces detachment commander and battalion assistant operations officer in 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne). He currently teaches SS307: Introduction to International Relations. Deep holds a Bachelor of Science in American Politics and Arabic from the United States Military Academy at West Point and a Master of Arts in Strategic Studies and International Economics from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

Qasem Soleimani, Marshal of Global Terror and Money Laundering

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Primer: Qasem Soleimani, the military maestro of the IRGC, commanded the base that attacked Israel earlier this week. Further, the Israelis asked permission to assassinate Soleimani during the Obama administration. They were denied and Obama officials leaked the plot to Iran. Now, that same request has apparently been asked of the Trump administration and the request was approved.

General Qassem Suleimani: The Thinker Of Our Time ...

Soleimani has a long terror history, globally.

Tower: The United States Treasury Department, working with authorities in the United Arab Emirates, broke up a money laundering scheme that provided millions of dollars to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), Reuters reported Thursday.

Treasury designated six individuals and three business entities for their role in the scheme. The UAE, where companies facilitating the money laundering were located, but the same people and entities on its list of terrorists and terror organizations that do business with the IRGC-QF.

In a statement announcing the new sanctions, Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin said, “The Iranian regime and its Central Bank have abused access to entities in the UAE to acquire U.S. dollars to fund the IRGC-QF’s malign activities, including to fund and arm its regional proxy groups, by concealing the purpose for which the U.S. dollars were acquired. As I said following the President’s announcement on Tuesday, we are intent on cutting off IRGC revenue streams wherever their source and whatever their destination. Today we are targeting Iranian individuals and front companies engaged in a large-scale currency exchange network that has procured and transferred millions to the IRGC-QF.”

Mnuchin thanked the UAE for its “close collaboration” in disrupting the money laundering and called on all nations to “be vigilant” in fighting Iranian attempts at money-laundering to “fund the nefarious actors of the IRGC-QF and the world’s largest state sponsor of terror.”

United States and United Arab Emirates disrupt large scale currency exchange network transferring millions of dollars to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force: Exchange Network CHART:

Reuters described the IRGC as Iran’s “most powerful security entity,” with control over a large share of Iran’s economy. IRGC-QF is described as “an elite unit in charge of the IRGC’s overseas operations.”

In 2015, Reuters reported that more than $1 billion in cash had been smuggled into Iran despite sanctions, utilizing “money changers and front companies in Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates and Iraq.” Iran preferred using a network of front companies to handle the money laundering in order to conceal “the overall size of the dollar-purchasing operation.”

When he announced the United States’ withdrawal from the nuclear deal earlier this week, President Donald Trump gave companies either three month or six months to wind down their dealings with Iran.

Did the Trump Operation Hire Black Cube for Dirty Ops?

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The allegations are that certain former Obama officials were part of discredit operation by Donald Trump. Humm, perhaps but who has been fully discredited that anyone seems to know or care about?

‘Dirty Ops’?

The Observer did not name any Trump officials or the private Israeli intelligence firm said to be involved in the plot, which was allegedly hatched when “Trump’s team contacted investigators days after Trump visited Tel Aviv a year ago,” according to the report. The plan was to “get dirt” on Rhodes and Kahl “as part of an elaborate attempt to discredit the deal,” The Observer said. Trump has suggested he will not recertify that Iran is complying with the pact when it comes up for renewal May 12. (The U.K., Russia, France and Germany also signed the deal.)

Veteran Washington foreign affairs journalist Laura Rozen told Newsweek that Kahl showed her the first email his wife got from the person, who identified herself as “Adriana Gavrilov from Reuben Capital Partners.” Rozen said she recognized Reuben Capital from a New Yorker story by Ronan Farrow that described it as a cover for Black Cube, a private Israeli spy firm reportedly hired by Hollywood mogul Harvey Weinstein to dig up dirt on the women who accused him of sexual misconduct, harassment, assault or rape.

Farrow reported Sunday on another attempt linked to Black Cube: In 2017, Rhodes’s wife, a former State Department official, received a proposal from a London-based film company called Shell Productions for a movie that would follow the personal lives of “government officials in the positions that determine war and peace” during times of geopolitical crisis, including “nuclear negotiations with a hostile nation.” She said she found the pitch “bizarre” and never responded. Farrow said two sources told him the proposal originated with Black Cube.

*** War News Updates: An Insider's View On White House Policy ...  White House aide Ben Rhodes responds to controversial New ...

A former deputy assistant to president Barack Obama and national security adviser to vice president Joe Biden responded on Twitter Sunday night to reports he was targeted by the private Israeli security firm Black Cube in an attempt to discredit the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.

 

Putin Denies Military Operations Against Ukraine, Proof Emerges

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Map of Mariupol in Ukraine - ABC News (Australian ...

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The Ambassador predicted liberation of Mariupol in 2014, the plan was in place, was anyone listening? Liberation? That is how Moscow packaged it? And the Active Measures/propaganda continues.

Related reading: Ukraine Fortifies Its Airwaves Against Russian TV Broadcasts

Russian troops attacking Mariupol, Ukrainian militia ... photo

Breaking: Russian Officers and Militants Identified as Perpetrators of the January 2015 Mariupol Artillery Strike

The investigation can be viewed here. 

На русском языке

The Bellingcat Investigation Team has determined conclusively that the artillery attack on targets in the Ukrainian town of Mariupol on 24 January 2015, which resulted at least 30 civilian deaths and over 100 injuries, came from Russia-controlled territory. Bellingcat has also determined that the shelling operation was instructed, directed and supervised by Russian military commanders in active service with the Russian Ministry of Defense. Bellingcat has identified nine Russian officers, including one general, two colonels, and three lieutenant colonels, involved directly with the military operation.

Furthermore, Bellingcat has determined that two artillery batteries of Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) were transported from Russia into Ukraine the day before the Mariupol operation. In the early morning of 24 January 2015, these batteries were deployed near the village of Bezimenne exclusively for the shelling of targets in and around Mariupol, after which they were repatriated back into Russia.

In the course of analyzing the events in the eve of and on 24 January 2015, Bellingcat has also identified two Russian generals involved with the selection and assignment of Russian artillery specialists to commanding roles in eastern Ukraine.

This investigation was made possible due to access to raw video and audio data that is being submitted by the Ukrainian government to the International Court of Justice as part of an ongoing legal case. This data was made available to a small group of international investigative media for the purposes of independent assessment. Bellingcat and its media partners analyzed a large volume of intercepted calls from and to participants in the armed conflict located in the area of Bezimenne at the time of shelling. Bellingcat conducted detailed cross-referencing of events, names and locations, as well as metadata from the calls, to open source data, including satellite photography data, social media posts, and voice samples from public statements of some of the identified persons. A detailed analysis permitted the identification of persons and military units, and the reconstruction of events leading up to the shelling of residential areas in Mariupol.

While previous reports, including the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine report from 24 January 2015, have identified that shelling of Mariupol’s residential areas came from separatist-controlled territory, Bellingcat’s investigation is the first to fully detail and identify the role of active Russian military units, as well as the direct commanding role of active Russian army officers in this military operation.

Our full report identifying the nine Russian officers involved with the military operation that led to the deaths of 30 Ukrainian civilians in Mariupol will be published later this week. Today, we are revealing the names of these individuals, along with a sampling of the telephone conversations that led to their identification.

The Russian officers who were in charge on high and lower levels of the MLRS batteries on the day of the shelling at Mariupol, or provided target instructions from another location in Eastern Ukraine, have been identified by Bellingcat as:

  • Major General Stepan Stepanovich Yaroshchuk
  • Alexander Iozhefovich Tsapliuk, call sign ‘Gorets’
  • Alexander Anatolevich Muratov
  • Maksim Vladimirovich Vlasov, call sign ‘Yugra’
  • Sergey Sergeyevich Yurchenko, call sign ‘Voronezh’
  • Alexander Valeryevich Grunchev, call sign ‘Terek’

The Russian officers who were in charge of selecting and sending artillery commanders and artillery equipment to Eastern Ukraine have been identified by Bellingcat as:

  • Colonel Oleg Leargievich Kuvshinov
  • Major General Dmitry Nikolaevich Klimenko
  • Colonel Sergey Ivanovich Lisai

The two Russian and Ukrainian militants in direct charge of the artillery units that shelled Mariupol have been identified by Bellingcat as:

  • Alexander Mikhailovich Evtody, call sign ‘Pepel’
  • Grayr Manukovich Egiazaryan, call sign ‘Shram’

Our full investigation, with biographical details on each of these men, our research process, and our analysis of the shelling attack itself, will be published later this week.

The investigation can be viewed here. 

Facebook Suggested Friends Feature Recruited for ISIS

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Ooops, call it Artificial Intelligence or an automated outcome friend feature because Mark Zuckerberg thinks connecting people to be friends globally is a good thing. In this case, not so much and who was paying attention? Further, has it been fixed? Nah.

Remember the time when Islamic State has mastered social media to exploit their jihad successes including their videos and publications? The world was in shock and yet, it continues today.

What about al Qaeda, or other domestic militant groups? Facebook says there is no easy fix, what? Anyone considering other social media platforms or the tech companies such as Google?

Facebook (FB) is being accused of inadvertently helping Islamist extremists connect and recruit new members. A new report in The Telegraph cites research suggesting that the social media giant connected and introduced thousands of extremists through its “suggested friends” feature. One writer who spoke to CBSN says “it’s cause for concern.”

The research was conducted by the Counter Extremism Project, a non-profit organization that pressures companies to remove extremist content online. It plans to release its findings in an extensive report later this month.

“The failure to effectively police its platform has allowed Facebook to become a place where extensive (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS) supporting networks exist, propaganda is disseminated people are radicalized and new supporters are recruited,” researcher Gregory Waters told The Telegraph.

Facebook is already facing criticism for failing to remove terrorist material from its platform. The platform has also been blamed for spreading disinformation that stokes violence in Myanmar.

“There is no place for terrorists on Facebook,” a Facebook spokesperson said in a statement. “We work aggressively to ensure that we do not have terrorists or terror groups using the site, and we also remove any content that praises or supports terrorism. 99 percent of ISIS and Al Qaeda-related content we remove is found by our automated systems.”

J.M. Berger, author of “Extremism” and a fellow with the Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications program, told CBSN’s Elaine Quijano that this issue is something that’s been known for some time and says “it’s cause for concern,” but further analysis of the research is needed. Berger said that “the online environment for ISIS and other jihadist extremists is much more difficult than it was just a couple of years ago.”

“It’s a problem we’ve known about for a long time … I first wrote about it in 2013,” Berger said. “All of the social media platforms use algorithms that allow them to suggest content that you might be interested in. It’s a key, integral part of their functioning and what we’ve seen is that these algorithms will recommend whatever kind of content … whether it’s extremist content or normal content. Managing that is a slightly different problem than managing extremist content where you go in and look for keywords.”

“You can be on Facebook and be an ISIS supporter and not post content that would get you suspended — if you don’t put anything publicly than you’re not going to get caught,” Berger explained. “But if you’re part of a social network that supports ISIS, then once a person becomes friends with you — Facebook is going to suggest that they all become friends.”

Berger elaborated: “It used to be that it was extraordinarily easy to find this content — to find other people doing active recruiting who are being open supporters — now that is no longer the case. We can’t realistically hope for 100 percent elimination of this content on these platforms, but now the question is how much is left?”