Space Warfare, the New Battlefield

Posted on March 8, 2018March 8, 2018 by Denise Simon

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Primer: The Pentagon is considering creating a combatant command for space warfare, the latest step by the Defense Department to respond to Chinese and Russian militarization high above Earth.

The move — one of several under consideration — is mentioned in a new Pentagon report sent to Congress last week. Right now, space forces are dispersed throughout the military and intelligence community.

There are two kinds of combatant commands. Geographic cocoms oversee military operations in six regions of the world. Functional ones — like U.S. Strategic Command and U.S.Transportation Command — oversee operations that span multiple geographical commands. U.S. Cyber Command is considered a subunified command under STRATCOM, but is being elevated to a functional command.

The Pentagon is looking into whether space should have its own combatant command or subunified command (like Cyber Command), the report says. Space forces were grouped under U.S. Space Command, a unified combatant command, until 2002.

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The Pentagon is preparing for war should China, Russia, or other adversaries attack vital American satellites and other space systems, a senior Pentagon official told Congress on Wednesday.

The Pentagon has requested $12.5 billion in funding for the fiscal year 2019 that begins Oct. 1 for building up what he termed a “more resilient defendable space architecture.”

The request is $1.1 billion more than funding for last year on military space.

Rood, and Air Force Gen. John Hyten, commander of the Omaha-based Strategic Command, testified on the command’s budget request of $24 billion.

Neither elaborated on what space warfare capabilities are being developed. The Pentagon also has not said how it would deter and defend satellites from attack.

Space defense so far has involved development of intelligence capabilities to identify and assess if an incident in space is an attack, or the result of a malfunction or disruption due to collision with space debris.

Military space “resilience” also calls for the Pentagon to rapidly replace or restore satellites after attacks or other disruptions.

The Pentagon’s Defense Science Board, in a report last year, warned that the vulnerability of U.S. satellites to electronic attack was “a crisis to be dealt with immediately.”

The Joint Staff intelligence directorate warned earlier this year that China and Russia will have fully developed space attack weapons in place by 2020 that will threaten all U.S. satellites in low earth orbit—100 miles to 1,200 miles in space.

“Space is a warfighting domain just like the air, ground, maritime, and cyberspace domains,” Hyten said.

Currently, a defense and intelligence center called the National Space Defense Center, located at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, runs 24-hour operations for rapid detection, warning, and defense from space attacks.

War games involving space war also are held regularly with U.S. military forces and allies, including Asian and European allies.

China has conducted at least seven tests of hypersonic vehicles and Russia as well has conducted several hypersonic missile tests.

The hypersonic vehicles are designed to defeat missile defenses. More here.

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February 2018: The Pentagon put Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites in orbit to ensure communication in the event of a nuclear attack. But those spacecraft could also play a role in the rapid militarization of space.

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites will be able to keep the U.S. military in communication even after a nuclear attack.
They’re also more resistant to electronic jamming, which is a growing concern as tensions with China and Russia heat up.
In the war of the future, nations may try to physically destroy other nations’ satellites to disrupt communications and navigation.

Your phone is not going to work on the day nuclear war starts. But the U.S. President, National Security Council, and combat commanders count on being able to communicate. This doomsday connection relies on what we call Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites that sit in geostationary orbit.

“We need systems that work on the worst day in the history of the world,” says Todd Harrison, director of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

There are four AEHF sats in orbit today. The proposed 2019 U.S. Air Force budget shows about $29.8 million in funding to complete two more, which would launch in 2019 and 2020. Air Force staffers say more money has been set aside in 2019 to ready the software and databases for the pair of new sats.

The Air Force talks about the AEHF satellites as part of its new focus on modernizing America’s nuclear abilities. “We must concurrently modernize the entire nuclear triad and the command and control systems that enable its effectiveness,” says Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson. The Trump administration has its eye on nuclear weapons, but these satellites also sit at the nexus of another big defense trend: Space warfare.

The Department of Defense is also investing in new jam-resistant GPS satellites. It is pouring money into future satellite programs, including AEHF, to the tune of $677 million for research and development in 2019. As orbital threats grow, new potential users—especially the U.S. Army—are taking interest in what the doomsday spacecraft can do. Preparing for post-apocalyptic communication may be just the beginning. More here.

Do the Russians have the Voting Machines Source Codes?

Posted on March 8, 2018March 8, 2018 by Denise Simon

On February 28th, the Senate asks what NSA and Cyber Command are doing about Russian election interference. Admiral Rogers’s answer, in brief, is that his organizations lack the authorities to do much (that he can openly discuss, that is).

US senator grills CEO over the myth of the hacker-proof voting machine

Nation’s biggest voting machine maker reportedly relies on remote-access software.

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – Two Democratic senators on Wednesday asked major vendors of U.S. voting equipment whether they have allowed Russian entities to scrutinize their software, saying the practice could allow Moscow to hack into American elections infrastructure.

The letter from Senators Amy Klobuchar and Jeanne Shaheen followed a series of Reuters reports saying that several major global technology providers have allowed Russian authorities to hunt for vulnerabilities in software deeply embedded across the U.S. government.

The senators requested that the three largest election equipment vendors – Election Systems & Software, Dominion Voting Systems and Hart Intercivic – answer whether they have shared source code, or inner workings, or other sensitive data about their technology with any Russian entity.

They also asked whether any software on those companies’ products had been shared with Russia and for the vendors to explain what steps they have taken to improve the security of those products against cyber threats to the election.

The vendors could not immediately be reached for comment. It was not immediately clear whether any of the vendors had made sales in Russia, where votes are submitted via written ballots and usually counted by hand.

“According to voting machine testing and certification from the Election Assistance Commission, most voting machines contain software from firms which were alleged to have shared their source code with Russian entities,” the senators wrote. “We are deeply concerned that such reviews may have presented an opportunity for Russian intelligence agents looking to attack or hack the United States’ elections infrastructure.”

U.S. voters in November will go to the polls in midterm elections, which American intelligence officials have warned could be targeted by Russia or others seeking to disrupt the process.

There is intense scrutiny of the security of U.S. election systems after a 2016 presidential race in which Russia interfered, according to American intelligence agencies, to try to help Donald Trump win with presidency. Trump in the past has been publicly skeptical about Russian election meddling, and Russia has denied the allegations.

Twenty-one states experienced probing of their systems by Russian hackers during the 2016 election, according to U.S. officials.

Though a small number of networks were compromised, voting machines were not directly affected and there remains no evidence any vote was altered, according to U.S. officials and security experts.

Related reading:

Top intel official says US hasn’t deterred Russian meddling (Fifth Domain) “I believe that President (Vladimir) Putin has clearly come to the conclusion that there’s little price to pay and that therefore, ‘I can continue this activity,‘” Adm. Mike Rogers, director of both the U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, told Congress.

Senators: Cyber Command should disrupt Russian influence campaigns (Fifth Domain) Senators pressed Cyber Command on how they can use their national mission force to combat Russian cyber intrusions.

Rogers: CyberCom lacks authority, resources to defend all of cyberspace (FCW) The outgoing NSA and U.S. Cyber Command chief told lawmakers CyberCom is not sitting on its hands when it comes to potential Russian cyber interference, but it lacks the authority to do more absent additional presidential direction.

NSA: Trump’s Lukewarm Response on Russia Will Embolden Putin (Infosecurity Magazine) NSA: Trump’s Lukewarm Response on Russia Will Embolden Putin. Expect more election interference, Cyber Command boss warns

Decoding NSA director Mike Rogers’ comments on countering Russian cyberattacks (Washington Examiner) It’s not as simple as ‘I’m not authorized to do anything.’

*** Footnotes:

Electronic Systems and Software:

1. In 2014, ES&S claimed that “in the past decade alone,” it had installed more than 260,000 voting systems, more than 15,000 electronic poll books, provided services to more than 75,000 elections. The company has installed statewide voting systems in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia. ES&S claims a U.S. market share of more than 60 percent in customer voting system installations.

The company maintains 10 facilities in the United States, two field offices in Canada (Pickering, Ontario; and Vancouver, British Columbia) and a warehouse in Jackson, Mississippi.

2. Dominion Voting Systems is a global provider of end-to-end election tabulation solutions and services. The company’s international headquarters are in Toronto, Canada, and its U.S. headquarters are in Denver, Colorado. Dominion Voting also maintains a number of additional offices and facilities in the U.S. and Europe.

Dominion’s technology is currently used in 33 U.S. states, including more than 2,000 customer jurisdictions. The company also has 100+ municipal customers in Canada.

3. Hart InterCivic Inc. is a privately held United States company that provides elections, and print solutions to jurisdictions nationwide. While headquartered in Austin, Texas, Hart products are used by hundreds of jurisdictions nationwide, including counties in Texas, the entire states of Hawaii and Oklahoma, half of Washington and Colorado, and certain counties in Ohio, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.

Hart entered the elections industry in 1912, printing ballots for Texas counties. (Side note: As Republican and Democratic state legislators hustle to pass a law moving Georgia toward paper ballot voting technology, election integrity advocates said they’re concerned a bill that already cleared the state Senate could lead to a new vulnerability in Georgia’s next voting system, if it becomes law.

One way a new system might work is through a touchscreen computer similar to those currently used in Georgia. It would print a paper ballot with a visual representation of a voter’s choices so they themselves can check for accuracy.

In some systems, counting the votes means scanning an entire image of the ballot that may include a timestamp and precinct information.

In other systems, barcodes or QR codes on a ballot would correspond with the voter’s choices, which can make counting easier and faster for election officials, said Peter Lichtenheld, vice president of operations with Hart Intercivic, one of several election technology companies that hired lobbyists at the statehouse this year.)

*** The text of the letter to the three vendors is below:

The full text of the senators’ letter is below:

Dear Mr. Braithwaite, Mr. Burt, and Mr. Poulos:

Recent reports of U.S. IT and software companies submitting to source code reviews in order to access foreign markets have raised concern in Congress given the sensitivity of the information requested by countries like China and the Russian Federation. As such, we write to inquire about the security of the voting machines you manufacture and whether your company has been asked to share the source code or other sensitive or proprietary details associated with your voting machines with the Russian Federation.

The U.S. intelligence community has confirmed that Russia interfered with the 2016 presidential elections. As a part of a multi-pronged effort, Russian actors attempted to hack a U.S. voting software company and at least 21 states’ election systems. According to the Chicago Board of Elections, information on thousands of American voters was exposed after an attack on their voter registration system.

Foreign access to critical source code information and sensitive data continues to be an often overlooked vulnerability. The U.S. government and Congress have recently taken steps to address some cyber vulnerabilities, including by banning the use Kaspersky Lab, a Moscow-based cybersecurity firm that has maintained a relationship with Russia’s military and intelligence sectors, from all U.S. government computers. Now, we must also ensure the security of our voting machines and associated software.

Recent reports indicate that U.S. based firms operating on U.S. government platforms gave Russian authorities access to their software. In order to sell their software within Russia, these companies allowed Russian authorities to review their source code for flaws that could be exploited. While some companies maintain this practice is necessary to find defects in software code, experts have warned that it could jeopardize the security of U.S. government computers if these reviews are conducted by hostile actors or nations. U.S. tech companies, the Pentagon, former U.S. security officials, and a former U.S. Department of Commerce official with knowledge of the source code review process have expressed concerns with this practice.

In addition, Russia’s requests for source code reviews have increased. According to eight current and former U.S. officials, four company executives, three U.S. trade attorneys, and Russian regulatory documents, between 1996 and 2013 Russia conducted reviews for 13 technology products from Western companies, but has conducted 28 such reviews in the past three years alone.

As the three largest election equipment vendors, your companies provide voting machines and software used by ninety-two percent of the eligible voting population in the U.S. According to voting machine testing and certification from the Election Assistance Commission, most voting machines contain software from firms which were alleged to have shared their source code with Russian entities. We are deeply concerned that such reviews may have presented an opportunity for Russian intelligence agents looking to attack or hack the United States’ elections infrastructure. Further, if such vulnerabilities are not quickly examined and mitigated, future elections will also remain vulnerable to attack.

In order to help the security and integrity of our systems and to understand the scope of any potential access points into our elections infrastructure, we respectfully request answers to the following questions:

Have you shared your source code or any other sensitive data related to your voting machines or other products with any Russian entity?
To your knowledge, has any of the software that runs on your products been shared with any Russian entity?
What steps have you taken or will you take in order to upgrade existing technologies in light of the increased threat against our elections?

The 2018 election season is upon us. Primaries have already begun and time is of the essence to ensure any security vulnerabilities are addressed before 2018 and 2020.

Thank you for your attention to this matter, and we look forward to working with you to secure our elections.

Sincerely,

CFIUS, what is Worse than Uranium One?

Posted on March 6, 2018March 6, 2018 by Denise Simon

When Douglas Campbell, the FBI informant and Uranium One whistle-blower says that Obama himself approved the deal, he was right. Campbell has delivered in February, written testimony annexed with full evidence to three congressional committees. Further, he was provided an monetary award/reward for his remarkable work as an informant. For the full summary and details, go here.

Campbell’s lawyer of record, Victoria Toensing has sent a letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions to further investigate the matter and the media smearing of Campbell himself including committee leaks. That letter is found here.

AG Sessions has not responded at the time of this post.

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Meanwhile, looking deeper into Obama and CFIUS….

By law, CFIUS, Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, does not publicly disclose information provided to CFIUS by parties to a transaction, nor does it reveal the fact that the parties have submitted the transaction for review. If CFIUS determines that the transaction poses national security concerns that cannot be resolved, it will refer the transaction to the President which the President has 15 days after completion of CFIUS’s investigation to decide. The President must publicly announce his decision.

CFIUS provides an annual report to Congress, but the last report was dated 2015. This report is in accordance with section 721(m) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 and the amended section of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007.

The Process

During the review period, CFIUS members examine the transaction in order to identify and address, as appropriate, any national security concerns that arise as a result of the transaction. CFIUS concludes action on the preponderant majority of transactions during or at the end of the initial 30-day review period. In certain circumstances defined in section 721 and at § 800.503 of the regulations, CFIUS may initiate a subsequent investigation, which must be completed within 45 days. In certain circumstances described at section 6(c) of Executive Order 11858, as amended, and § 800.506 of the regulations, CFIUS may also refer a transaction to the President for decision. In such case, section 721 requires the President to announce a decision with respect to a transaction within 15 days of CFIUS’s completion of the investigation. If CFIUS finds that a covered transaction presents national security risks and that other provisions of law do not provide adequate authority to address the risks, then CFIUS may enter into an agreement with, or impose conditions on, parties to mitigate such risks or may refer the case to the President for action.

Where CFIUS has completed all action with respect to a covered transaction or the President has announced a decision not to exercise his authority under section 721 with respect to the covered transaction, then the parties receive a “safe harbor” with respect to that transaction, as described in § 800.601 of the regulations and section 7(f) of Executive Order 11858, as amended.

Rejection

During the entire term of President, he only got one referral that he rejected. President Obama blocked a privately owned Chinese company from building wind turbines close to a Navy military site in Oregon due to national security concerns, and the company said it would challenge the action in court.

Ralls Corp, which had been installing wind turbine generators made in China by Sany Group, has four wind farm projects that are within or in the vicinity of restricted air space at a naval weapons systems training facility, according to the Obama administration.

“There is credible evidence that leads me to believe” that Ralls Corp, Sany Group and the two Sany Group executives who own Ralls “might take action that threatens to impair the national security of the United States,” Obama said in issuing his decision.

Industry Sectors

From 2009-2015, 75% of the foreign transactions included finance, information, mining, utilities and transportation. From 2013-2015, China was the largest country with transactions by far with manufacturing being the majority of the transactions. If there are concerns with any part of the transaction, CFIUS will work on mitigation measures as they relate to national security such that CFIUS earnestly wants the transaction(s) to occur. CFIUS offers onsite compliance, assigns additional staff and offers tracking systems as well as instructions and procedures from in-house expertise to meet stipulations and standards where on other issues, waivers can be designated if compliance is too difficult or adverse to national security standards and law.

Review Concerns

Expanded conditions for national security considerations include vulnerabilities, cyber, sabotage and exploitation. Further, if any transaction leads to complications to critical infrastructure or energy production or would affect the U.S. financial system and would in some conditions have access to sensitive government information, classified material or in any manner threaten a government employee, involve activities related to weapons, munitions, aerospace, satellite or radar system(s), these items would impair the approval process or under the CFIUS review, mitigation procedures would be applied.

Little is of consequence when a foreign company that under cover is actually controlled by a foreign government which is a terrifying condition. A 2011 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive report to Congress stated that the pace of foreign economic collection and industrial espionage activities against major U.S corporations and U.S. government agencies is accelerating.

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Are we sure we want China, Russia or any Middle Eastern country investing in any form or part in the United States when we have the likes of Warren Buffet or Bill Gates and those billions?

Sens. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) and Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) introduced legislation on Wednesday to prevent the U.S. government from using products from certain Chinese telecommunications firms.

The impetus for Cotton and Rubio’s legislation is concern over the Chinese government using hypothetical backdoors in ZTE and Huawei phones to spy on U.S. government officials.

“Huawei is effectively an arm of the Chinese government, and it’s more than capable of stealing information from U.S. officials by hacking its devices,” Cotton said in a statement. “There are plenty of other companies that can meet our technology needs, and we shouldn’t make it any easier for China to spy on us.”

Uranium One violated all conditions set forth in the CFIUS law. China is yet a larger security issue and all agency members of CFIUS are aware of this and the history of both Russia and China.

The risks and violations of law are well known in Congress and legislation has been introduced to address major concerns, yet still the United States is and has sold out to at least 2 rogue countries and no security assessments have been published.

The 25 Most Powerful Militaries in the World

Posted on February 28, 2018February 28, 2018 by Denise Simon

Primer:

One of the most senior generals in the U.S. suggested America faces losing influence in the world because its partners are looking to buy military equipment and training from its rivals, particularly Russia and China, who offer cheaper weapons and can supply them faster.

In a statement to the House Armed Services Committee, General Joseph L. Votel, commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), warned that “some of our partners are seeking alternate sources of military equipment from near-peer competitors like Russia and China”.

Votel said the U.S. increasingly relies on “interoperability” in its military operations—using its allies to “accomplish common objectives”—and so its programs to supply partners with the equipment and training they need are vital in maintaining this cooperation.

He made reference to U.S. government-funded Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs, which “encompass security cooperation and security assistance activities,” and Foreign Military Sales (FMS).

“However, due to political considerations, cost, or delivery speed, some of our partners are seeking alternate sources of military equipment from near-peer competitors like Russia and China,” Votel said. “When our partners go elsewhere, it reduces our interoperability and challenges our ability to incorporate their contributions into theater efforts.”

In 2017, the U.S. State Department spent $5.7bn on Foreign Military Financing, according to a data guide published by the Security Assistance Monitor group, around the average spend in recent years. That military aid went to 53 countries, including $150m for Iraq, $350m for Jordan, and $3.1bn for Israel. More here.

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Ranking from Business Insider

25. Algeria

Power Index rating: 0.4366

Total population: 40,263,711

Total military personnel: 792,350

Total aircraft strength: 502

Fighter aircraft: 89

Combat tanks: 2,405

Total naval assets: 85

Defense budget: $10.6 billion

24. Saudi Arabia

Power Index rating: 0.4302

Total population: 28,160,273

Total military personnel: 256,000

Total aircraft strength: 790

Fighter aircraft: 177

Combat tanks: 1,142

Total naval assets: 55

Defense budget: $56.7 billion

23. North Korea

Power Index rating: 0.4218

Total population: 25,115,311

Total military personnel: 6,445,000

Total aircraft strength: 944

Fighter aircraft: 458

Combat tanks: 5,025

Total naval assets: 967

Defense budget: $7.5 billion

22. Australia

Power Index rating: 0.4072

Total population: 22,992,654

Total military personnel: 81,000

Total aircraft strength: 465

Fighter aircraft: 78

Combat tanks: 59

Total naval assets: 47 (two aircraft carriers)

Defense budget: $24.1 billion

21. Iran

Power Index rating: 0.3933

Total population: 82,801,633

Total military personnel: 934,000

Total aircraft strength: 477

Fighter aircraft: 137

Combat tanks: 1,616

Total naval assets: 398

Defense budget: $6.3 billion

20. Thailand

Power Index rating: 0.3892

Total population: 68,200,824

Total military personnel: 627,425

Total aircraft strength: 555

Fighter aircraft: 76

Combat tanks: 737

Total naval assets: 81 (one aircraft carrier)

Defense budget: $5.4 billion

19. Poland

Power Index rating: 0.3831

Total population: 38,523,261

Total military personnel: 184,650

Total aircraft strength: 465

Fighter aircraft: 99

Combat tanks: 1,065

Total naval assets: 83

Defense budget: $9.4 billion

18. Taiwan

Power Index rating: 0.3765

Total population: 23,464,787

Total military personnel: 1,932,500

Total aircraft strength: 850

Fighter aircraft: 286

Combat tanks: 2,005

Total naval assets: 87

Defense budget: $10.7 billion

17. Brazil

Power Index rating: 0.3654

Total population: 205,823,665

Total military personnel: 1,987,000

Total aircraft strength: 697

Fighter aircraft: 43

Combat tanks: 469

Total naval assets: 110

Defense budget: $24.5 billion

16. Vietnam

Power Index rating: 0.3587

Total population: 95,261,021

Total military personnel: 5,488,500

Total aircraft strength: 278

Fighter aircraft: 76

Combat 1,545

Total naval assets: 65

Defense budget: $3.4 billion

15. Israel

Power Index rating: 0.3476

Total population: 8,174,527

Total military personnel: 718,250

Total aircraft strength: 652

Fighter aircraft: 243

Combat tanks: 2,620

Total naval assets: 65

Defense budget: $15.5 billion

14. Indonesia

Power Index rating: 0.3347

Total population: 258,316,051

Total military personnel: 975,750

Total aircraft strength: 441

Fighter aircraft: 39

Combat tanks: 418

Total naval assets: 221

Defense budget: $6.9 billion

13. Pakistan

Power Index rating: 0.3287

Total population: 201,995,540

Total military personnel: 919,000

Total aircraft strength: 951

Fighter aircraft: 301

Combat tanks: 2,924

Total naval assets: 197

Defense budget: $7 billion

12. South Korea

Power Index rating: 0.2741

Total population: 50,924,172

Total military personnel: 5,829,750

Total aircraft strength: 1,477

Fighter aircraft: 406

Combat tanks: 2,654

Total naval assets: 166 (one aircraft carrier)

Defense budget: $43.8 billion

11. Italy

Power Index rating: 0.2694

Total population: 62,007,540

Total military personnel: 267,500

Total aircraft strength: 822

Fighter aircraft: 79

Combat tanks: 200

Total naval assets: 143 (two aircraft carriers)

Defense budget: $34 billion

10. Egypt

Power Index rating: 0.2676

Total population: 94,666,993

Total military personnel: 1,329,250

Total aircraft strength: 1,132

Fighter aircraft: 337

Combat tanks: 4,110

Total naval assets: 319 (two aircraft carriers)

Defense budget: $4.4 billion

9. Germany

Power Index rating: 0.2609

Total population: 80,722,792

Total military personnel: 210,000

Total aircraft strength: 698

Fighter aircraft: 92

Combat tanks: 543

Total naval assets: 81

Defense budget: $39.2 billion

8. Turkey

Power Index rating: 0.2491

Total population: 80,274,604

Total military personnel: 743,415

Total aircraft strength: 1,018

Fighter aircraft: 207

Combat tanks: 2,445

Total naval assets: 194

Defense budget: $8.2 billion

7. Japan

Power Index rating: 0.2137

Total population: 126,702,133

Total military personnel: 311,875

Total aircraft strength: 1,594

Fighter aircraft: 288

Combat tanks: 700

Total naval assets: 131 (four aircraft carriers)

Defense budget: $43.8 billion

6. United Kingdom

Power Index rating: 0.2131

Total population: 64,430,428

Total military personnel: 232,675

Total aircraft strength: 856

Fighter aircraft: 88

Combat tanks 249

Total naval assets: 76 (two aircraft carriers)

Defense budget: $45.7 billion

5. France

Power Index rating: 0.1914

Total population: 66,836,154

Total military personnel: 387,635

Total aicraft strength: 1,305

Fighter aircraft 296

Combat tanks: 406

Total naval assets: 118 (four aircraft carriers)

Defense budget: $35 billion

4. India

Power Index rating: 0.1593

Total population: 1,266,883,598

Total military personnel: 4,207,250

Total aircraft strength: 2,102

Fighter aircraft: 676

Combat tanks: 4,426

Total naval assets: 295 (three aircraft carriers)

Defense budget: $51 billion

3. China

Power Index rating: 0.0945

Total population: 1,373,541,278

Total military personnel: 3,712,500

Total aircraft strength: 2,955

Fighter aircraft: 1,271

Combat tanks: 6,457

Total naval assets: 714 (one aircraft carrier)

Defense budget: $161.7 billion

2. Russia

Power Index rating: 0.0929

Total population: 142,355,415

Total military personnel: 3,371,027

Total aircraft strength: 3,794

Fighter aircraft: 806

Combat tanks: 20,216

Total naval assets: 352 (one aircraft carrier)

Defense budget: $44.6 billion

1. United States

Power Index rating: 0.0857

Total population: 323,995,528

Total military personnel: 2,363,675

Total aircraft: 13,762

Fighter aircraft: 2,296

Combat tanks: 5,884

Total naval assets: 415 (19 aircraft carriers)

Defense budget: $587.8 billion

Cyber: ‘Our adversaries have grown more emboldened’

Posted on February 27, 2018February 27, 2018 by Denise Simon

Primer:

Russia hasn’t been sufficiently penalized for its meddling in the 2016 U.S. elections and that has emboldened Moscow to continue interfering in American elections, Adm. Michael Rogers, Commander of the U.S. Cyber Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday.

“They haven’t paid a price sufficient to change their behavior,” Rogers said under questioning by Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn. Although the United States has taken some actions, including imposing additional sanctions and Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III has indicted more than a dozen Russians for their role in the interference, “it hasn’t changed the calculus,” Rogers said, adding that “it hasn’t generated the change in behavior that we all know we need.”

In another exchange with Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., Rogers said that Russian President Vladimir Putin has probably come to the conclusion that “that there’s little price to pay here so I can continue the activity” of interfering in the U.S. election system. More here.

*** In context however, where is Senator(s) Warren and Blumenthal’s proposed legislation on sanctions or punishment toward Russia for cyber and active measures interference? It was political posturing by Warren and Blumenthal when they can introduce multi-faceted legislation as Russia, China and North Korea continue to attack the United States via layered cyber operations including espionage.

Meanwhile…. Image result for admiral rogers nsa photo

WASHINGTON, Feb. 27, 2018 —

Although competitors such as China and Russia remain the greatest threat to U.S. security, rogue regimes such as Iran and North Korea have increased in capabilities and have begun using aggressive methods to conduct malicious cyberspace activities, the military’s top cyber officer told Congress today.

Navy Adm. Michael S. Rogers, director of the National Security Agency, commander of U.S. Cyber Command and chief of the Central Security Service, testified at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.

“Our adversaries have grown more emboldened, conducting increasingly aggressive activities to extend their influence without fear of significant consequence,” Rogers said. “We must change our approaches and responses here if we are to change this dynamic.”

But as the cyber domain has evolved, Rogers told the senators, Cybercom’s three major mission areas endure: protecting the Department of Defense Information Network; enabling other joint force commanders by delivering effects in and through cyberspace; and defending the nation against cyber threats through support to the Department of Homeland Security and others when directed to do so by the president or secretary of defense.

Cybercom Milestones

Rogers highlighted milestones in Cybercom’s growth.

Joint Force Headquarters DODIN, the subordinate headquarters responsible for securing, operating and defending the Defense Department’s complex information technology infrastructure, has achieved full operational capability, he said.

Joint Task Force Ares, created to lead the fight in cyber against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, has successfully integrated cyberspace operations into broader military campaigns, has achieved some “excellent results,” and will continue to pursue ISIS in support of the nation’s objectives, the admiral told the Senate panel.

Cybercom also has significantly enhanced training in cyber operation platforms to prepare the battlespace against key adversaries, he said.

Milestones expected to be achieved this year include Cyber Command’s elevation to a combatant command responsible for providing mission-ready cyberspace operations forces to other combatant commanders, Rogers said.

New Facility

In addition, the admiral said, Cybercom will be moving into a state-of-the-art integrated cyber center and joint operations facility at Fort Meade, Maryland, enhancing the coordination and planning of operations against cyber threats.

“Without cyberspace superiority in today’s battlefield, risk to mission increases across all domains and endangers our security,” Rogers said.

Cybercom’s focus on innovation and rapid tech development has extended all the way to small businesses and working with the private sector while maintaining cybersecurity, Rogers told the committee.

“We intend in the coming year to create an unclassified collaboration venue where businesses and academia can help us tackle tough problems without needing to jump over clearance hurdles, for example, which for many are very difficult barriers,” Rogers explained.

After serving more than four years as a commander of Cybercom and after nearly 37 years of service as a naval officer, Rogers is set to retire this spring.

“I will do all I can during the intervening period to ensure the mission continues, that our men and women remain ever motivated, and that we have a smooth transition,” he said.