House Office Report on Edward Snowden

Posted on September 16, 2016September 16, 2016 by Denise Simon

Edward Snowden, Defending His Patriotism, Says Disclosures Helped Privacy

© REUTERS/Andrew Kelly

In this file photo, American whistleblower Edward Snowden delivers remarks via video link from Moscow to attendees at a discussion regarding an International Treaty on the Right to Privacy, Protection Against Improper Surveillance and Protection of Whistleblowers in New York City on Sept. 24, 2015. More here.

Executive Summary of Review of the Unauthorized Disclosures of Former National Security Agency Contractor Edward Snowden

UNCLASSIFIED

In June 2013, former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden

perpetrated the largest and most damaging Public release of classified information in U.S.

intelligence history. In August 2014, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) directed Committee staff to carry out a

comprehensive review of the unauthorized disclosures. The aim of the review was to allow the

Committee to explain to other Members of Congress-and, where possible, the American

people-how this breach occurred, what the U.S. Government knows about the man who

committed it, and whether the security shortfalls it highlighted had been remedied.

Over the next two years, Committee staffrequested hundreds ofdocuments from the

Intelligence Community (IC), participated in dozens ofbriefings and meetings with IC

personnel, conducted several interviews with key individuals with knowledge of Snowden’s

background and actions, and traveled to NSA Hawaii to visit Snowden’s last two work locations.

The review focused on Snowden’s background, how he was able to remove more than 1.5

million classifled documents from secure NSA networks, what the 1.5 million documents

contained, and the damage their removal caused to national security.

The Committee’s review was careful not to disturb any criminal investigation or future

prosecution of Snowden, who has remained in Russia since he fled there on June 23, 2013.

Accordingly, the Committee did not interview individuals whom the Depatment of Justice

identified as possible witnesses at Snowden’s trial, including Snowden himself, nor did the

Committee request any matters that may have occurred before a grand jury. Instead, the IC

provided the Committee with access to other individuals who possessed substantively similar

knowledge as the possible witnesses. Similarly, rather than interview Snowden’s NSA

coworkers and supervisors directly, Committee staffinterviewed IC personnel who had reviewed

reports o finterviews with Snowden’s co-workers and supervisors. The Committee remains

hopeful that Snowden will retum to the United States to face justice.

The bulk of the Committee’s 36-page review, which includes 230 footnotes, must remain

classified to avoid causing further harm to national security; however, the Committee has made

a number of unclassified findings. These findings demonstrate that the public narrative

popularized by Snowden and his allies is rife with falsehoods, exaggerations, and crucial

omissions, a pattem that began befiore he stole 1.5 million sensitive documents.

First, Snowden caused tremendous damage to national security, and the vast

majority of the documents he stole have nothing to do with programs impacting individual

privacy interests-they instead pertain to military, defense? and intelligence programs of

great interest to America,s adversaries. A review ofthe materials Snowden compromised

makes clear that he handed over secrets that protect American troops overseas and secrets that

provide vital defienses against terrorists and nation-states. Some of Snowden’s disclosures

exacerbated and accelerated existing trends that diminished the IC’s capabilities to collect

against legitimate foreign intelligence targets, while others resulted in the loss of intelligence

streams that had saved American lives. Snowden insists he has not shared the full cache of 1.5

million classified documents with anyone; however, in June 2016, the deputy chairman of the

Russian parliaments defense and security committee publicly conceded that “Snowden did

share intelligence” with his govemment. Additionally, although Snowden’s professed objective

may have been to inform the general public, the infiormation he released is also available to

Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean govemment intelligence services; any terrorist

with Internet access; and many others who wish to do harm to the United States.

The full scope ofthe damage inflicted by Snowden remains unknown. Over the past

three years, the IC and the Department ofDefiense (DOD) have carried out separate

reviews with differing methodologies-fthe damage Snowden caused. Out of an abundance of

caution, DOD reviewed all 1.5 million documents Snowden removed. The IC, by contrast, has

carried out a damage assessment fior only a small subset ofthe documents. The Committee is

concerned that the IC does not plan to assess the damage ofthe vast majority of documents

Snowden removed. Nevertheless, even by a conservative estimate, the U.S. Govemment has

spent hundreds of millions of dollars, and will eventually spend billions, to attempt to mitigate

the damage Snowden caused. These dollars would have been better spent on combating

America’s adversaries in an increasingly dangerous world.

Second, Snowden was not a whistleblower. Under the law, publicly revealing

classifled information does not qualify someone as a whistleblower. However, disclosing

classified information that Shows fraud, Waste, Abuse, Or Other illegal activity to the

appropriate law enforcement or oversight personnel-including to Congressuloes make someone

a whistleblower and affords them with critical protections. Contrary to his public claims that he

notified numerous NSA officials about what he believed to be illegal intelligence collection, the

Committee found no evidence that Snowden took any official effort to express concems about

U.S. intelligence activities-legal, moral, or otherwise-to any oversight officials Within the

U.S. Govemment, despite numerous avenues for him to do so. Snowden was aware of these

avenues. His only attempt to contact an NSA attomey revolved around a question about the

legal precedence ofexecutive orders, and his only contact to the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) Inspector General (IG) revolved around his disagreements with his managers about

training and retention ofinfiormation technology specialists.

Despite Snowden’s later public claim that he would have faced retribution for voicing

concems about intelligence activities, the Committee found that laws and regulations in effect at

the time of Snowden’s actions afforded him protection. The Committee routinely receives

disclosures from IC contractors pursuant to the Intelligence Community Whistleblower

Protection Act of 1998 (IC WPA). If Snowden had been worried about possible retaliation for

voicing concerns about NSA activities, he could have made a disclosure to the Committee. He

did not. Nor did Snowden remain in the United States to flee the legal consequences of his

actions, contrary to the tradition of civil disobedience he professes to embrace. Instead, he fled

to China and Russia, two countries whose governments place scant value on their citizens’

privacy or civil liberties-and whose intelligence services aggressively collect information on

both the United States and their own citizens.

To gather the files he took with him when he left the country for Hong Kong, Snowden

infringed on the privacy of thousands of govemment employees and contractors. He obtained

his colleagues, security credentials through misleading means, abused his access as a systems

administrator to search his co-workers, personal drives, and removed the personally

identifiable information of thousands of IC employees and contractors. From Hong Kong he

went to Russia, where he remains a guest of the Kremlin to this day.

It is also not clear Snowden understood the numerous privacy protections that govern the

activities of the IC. He failed basic annual training for NSA employees on Section 702 of the

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and complained the training was rigged to be

overly difficult. This training included explanations of the privacy protections related to the

PRISM program that Snowden would later disclose.

Third, two weeks before Snowden began mass downloads of classified documents,

he was reprimanded after engaging in a workplace spat with NSA managers. Snowden was

repeatedly counseled by his managers regarding his behavior at work. For example, in June

2012, Snowden became involved in a fiery e-mail argument With a Supervisor about how

computer updates should be managed. Snowden added an NSA senior executive several levels

above the supervisor to the e-mail thread, an action that earned him a swift reprimand from his

contracting officer for failing to follow the proper protocol for raising grievances through the

chain of command. Two weeks later, Snowden began his mass downloads of classified

information from NSA networks. Despite Snowden’s later claim that the March 2013

congressional testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper was a “breaking

point” for him, these mass downloads predated Director Clapper’s testimony by eight months.

Fourth, Snowden was, and remains) a serial exaggerator and fabricator. A close

review of Snowden’s official employment records and submissions reveals a pattern of

intentional lying. He claimed to have left Army basic training because of broken legs when in

fact he washed out because of shin splints. He claimed to have obtained a high school degree

equivalent when in fact he never did. He claimed to have worked for the CIA as a “senior

advisor,” which was a gross exaggeration of his entry-level duties as a computer technician. He

also doctored his performance evaluations and obtained new positions at NSA by exaggerating

his resume and stealing the answers to an employment test. In May 2013, Snowden informed

his supervisor that he would be out of the office receive treatment for worsening epilepsy. In

reality, he was on his way to Hong Kong with stolen secrets.

Finally, the Committee remains concerned that more than three years after the start

of the unauthorized disclosures, NSA, and the IC as a whole, have not done enough to

minimize the risk of another massive unauthorized disclosure. Although it is impossible to

reduce the chance of another Snowden to zero, more work can and should be done to improve

the security of the people and computer networks that keep America’s most closely held secrets.

For instance, a recent DOD Inspector General report directed by the Committee found that NSA

has yet to effectively implement its post-Snowden security improvements. The Committee has

taken actions to improve IC information security in the Intelligence Authorization Acts for

Fiscal Years 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, and looks forward to working with the IC to continue

to improve security.

Worth $2 Billion Secreted in the Mexican Desert

Posted on September 12, 2016September 12, 2016 by Denise Simon

An aluminum stockpile (pictured), worth $2 billion and representing six per cent of the world’s aluminum, was discovered two years ago in San José Iturbide, a city in central Mexico

Liu (center) controls China Zhongwang Holdings Ltd, the world’s second largest aluminum producer in its category. His current fortune is estimated at $3.2 billion

Liu, who is currently the deputy secretary of China’s Communist Party, told the Wall Street Journal he didn’t have any connection with the aluminum in San José Iturbide. He denied trying to route his aluminum through Mexico to avoid the payments. More from the DailyMail.

A Chinese billionaire may have hidden 6 percent of the world’s aluminum in the Mexican desert

It’s not every day that Mr. Bean makes an appearance on the Wall Street Journal’s commodities coverage.

And that might not even be the strangest finding in the Journal’s investigation into a massive pile of aluminum that allegedly just sat there, unused, in the Mexican desert for years.

To start, some background: China’s growing industrial sector has been hard on the aluminum producers in the United States. In 2000 there were 23 smelters operating nationwide, now there are only five.

So when an aluminum executive named Jeff Henderson got wind of a giant stockpile of Chinese aluminum just below the U.S border with Mexico, he decided to commission a plane to check it out.

What did they find?

Six percent of the world’s aluminum, worth some $2 billion and enough to make 77 billion beer cans, according to the Journal‘s fascinating report.

The revelation led to tensions between U.S. trade authorities and China, as U.S. industry executives insist that the metal is linked to Liu Zhongtian, who runs China Zhongwang Holdings, an enormous industrial aluminum company.

U.S. industry officials allege the metal got there as part of a scheme to evade trade restrictions. The idea was to move aluminum through Mexico into the U.S. where it could benefit from provisions in the North American Free Trade Agreement.

“These things have nothing to do with me,” Liu told the Journal, although the results of the investigation cast doubt on that claim.

Aluminum manufacturing is subsidized in China, and so Chinese firms were able to undercut U.S. producers; the United States responded by setting up tariffs to make domestic aluminum more attractive.

Routing Chinese aluminum through Mexico was a way to get around those tariffs.

Things went awry when a one of Liu’s alleged business partners Po-Chi “Eric” Shen, started to gain attention over some of his erratic practices, which the Journal report highlighted and included spending fortunes on dubious expenses like $70 million worth of red diamonds and rare Ferraris.

The relationship allegedly deteriorated quickly — Shen made headlines in 2014 when he wrecked Liu’s sports car while vacationing in Italy, and was rescued by Rowan Atkinson, of Mr. Bean fame.

The metal may never make it to the United States, in fact there are currently plans to ship it back to Asia, this time Vietnam.

15 Kiloton Nuclear Detonation, North Korea

Posted on September 9, 2016September 9, 2016 by Denise Simon

North Korea Claims Nuke Test Proves It Can Miniaturize Warheads

VOA: North Korea has claimed the past two tests involved hydrogen bombs, which are much more powerful than atomic bombs. Analysts, however, said the January blast was not big enough to be a full thermonuclear explosion or “H-bomb.”

South Korea’s meteorological agency said Friday’s test produced a 10-kiloton blast, nearly twice the power of the country’s nuclear test in January but slightly less than the Hiroshima bombing, which was measured about 15 kilotons.

N.Korea conducts fifth and largest nuclear test, drawing broad condemnation

AP/MSN: North Korea conducted its fifth and biggest nuclear test on Friday and said it had mastered the ability to mount a warhead on a ballistic missile, ratcheting up a threat that its rivals and the United Nations have been powerless to contain.

The blast, on the 68th anniversary of North Korea’s founding, was more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, according to some estimates, and drew condemnation from the United States as well as China, Pyongyang’s main ally.

Diplomats said the United Nations Security Council would discuss the test at a closed-door meeting on Friday, at the request of the United States, Japan and South Korea.

Under 32-year-old dictator Kim Jong Un, North Korea has accelerated the development of its nuclear and missile programmes, despite U.N. sanctions that were tightened in March and have further isolated the impoverished country.

South Korean President Park Geun-hye, in Laos after a summit of Asian leaders, said Kim was showing “maniacal recklessness” in completely ignoring the world’s call to abandon his pursuit of nuclear weapons.

U.S. President Barack Obama, aboard Air Force One on his way home from Laos, said the test would be met with “serious consequences”, and held talks with Park and with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the White House said.

China said it was resolutely opposed to the test and urged Pyongyang to stop taking any actions that would worsen the situation. It said it would lodge a protest with the North Korean embassy in Beijing.

There were further robust condemnations from Russia, the European Union, NATO, Germany and Britain.

North Korea, which labels the South and the United States as its main enemies, said its “scientists and technicians carried out a nuclear explosion test for the judgment of the power of a nuclear warhead,” according to its official KCNA news agency.

It said the test proved North Korea was capable of mounting a nuclear warhead on a medium-range ballistic missile, which it last tested on Monday when Obama and other world leaders were gathered in China for a G20 summit.

Pyongyang’s claims of being able to miniaturise a nuclear warhead have never been independently verified.

Its continued testing in defiance of sanctions presents a challenge to Obama in the final months of his presidency and could become a factor in the U.S. presidential election in November, and a headache to be inherited by whoever wins.

“Sanctions have already been imposed on almost everything possible, so the policy is at an impasse,” said Tadashi Kimiya, a University of Tokyo professor specialising in Korean issues.

“In reality, the means by which the United States, South Korea and Japan can put pressure on North Korea have reached their limits,” he said.

UNPRECEDENTED RATE

North Korea has been testing different types of missiles at an unprecedented rate this year, and the capability to mount a nuclear warhead on a missile is especially worrisome for its neighbours South Korea and Japan.

“The standardisation of the nuclear warhead will enable the DPRK to produce at will and as many as it wants a variety of smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power,” KCNA said, referring to the country’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

It was not clear whether Pyongyang had notified Beijing or Moscow of its planned nuclear test. Senior officials from Pyongyang were in both capitals this week.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said she had no information to provide when asked if China had advance warning of the test, and would not be drawn on whether China would support tougher sanctions against its neighbour.

Although Beijing has criticised North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests, it has repeatedly expressed anger since the United States and South Korea decided in July to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system in the South.

China calls THAAD a threat to its own security and will do nothing to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table on its nuclear programme.

Preliminary data collected by the Vienna-based Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), which monitors nuclear tests around the world, indicates the magnitude – around 5 – of the seismic event detected in North Korea on Friday was greater than a previous one in January.

Jeffrey Lewis of the California-based Middlebury Institute of International Studies said the highest estimates of seismic magnitude suggested this was North Korea’s most powerful nuclear test so far.

He said the seismic magnitude and surface level indicated a blast with a 20- to 30-kilotonne yield. Such a yield would make this test larger than the nuclear bomb dropped by the United States on the Japanese city of Hiroshima in World War Two.

“That’s the largest DPRK test to date, 20-30kt, at least. Not a happy day,” Lewis told Reuters.

South Korea’s military put the force of the blast at 10 kilotonnes, which would still be the North’s most powerful nuclear blast to date.

“The important thing is, that five tests in, they now have a lot of nuclear test experience. They aren’t a backwards state any more,” Lewis said.

Executive Orders, Statutes, Rules and Regulations Relating to North Korea

The North Korea sanctions program represents the implementation of multiple legal authorities. Some of these authorities are in the form of executive orders issued by the President. Other authorities are public laws (statutes) passed by The Congress. These authorities are further codified by OFAC in its regulations which are published the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Modifications to these regulations are posted in the Federal Register. In addition to all of these authorites, OFAC may also implement United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) with regard to the North Korea.
Proclamations

Proclamation 8271 – Termination of the Exercise of Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act With Respect to North Korea (Effective Date – June 27, 2008)

Executive Orders

13722 – Blocking Property of the Government of North Korea and the Workers’ Party of Korea, and Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to North Korea (Effective date – March 16, 2016)
13687 – Imposing Additional Sanctions with Respect to North Korea (Effective date – January 2, 2015)
13570 – Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect To North Korea (Effective date – April 18, 2011)
13551 – Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to North Korea (Effective date – August 30, 2010)
13466 – Continuing Certain Restrictions With Respect to North Korea and North Korean Nationals (June 26, 2008)

Determinations

Determination Pursuant to the Executive Order of March 16, 2016 (Effective date – March 16, 2016)

Statutes

State Dept: Country Reports on Terrorism 2015

Posted on August 31, 2016August 31, 2016 by Denise Simon

Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, all in our hemisphere get major passes from the State Department.

Related reading: The 50 most violent cities in the world

Related reading: The world’s most dangerous and safest countries revealed Interactive map for rankings is found here.

Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act.

Beginning with the report for 2004, it replaced the previously published Patterns of Global Terrorism.

Chapters

–Chapter 1. Strategic Assessment
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: Europe Overview
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: South and Central Asia Overview
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: Western Hemisphere Overview
–Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview
–Chapter 4: The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism
–Chapter 5: Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report)
–Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations
–Chapter 7. Legislative Requirements and Key Terms

Annexes

–National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information [ PDF version ]
–Terrorism Deaths, Injuries and Kidnappings of Private U.S. Citizens Overseas in 2015

Full Report

–Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 (PDF)

Wenxia Man, Chinese Spy Found Guilty Stealing Aircraft Secrets

Posted on August 24, 2016August 24, 2016 by Denise Simon

Illegally Export Fighter Jet Engines and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle to China

Wenxia Man, aka Wency Man, 45, of San Diego, was sentenced today to 50 months in prison for conspiring to export and cause the export of fighter jet engines, an unmanned aerial vehicle – commonly known as a drone – and related technical data to the People’s Republic of China in violation of the Arms Export Control Act.

The sentence was announced by Assistant Attorney General for National Security John P. Carlin, U.S. Attorney Wifredo A. Ferrer of the Southern District of Florida, Special Agent in Charge Mark Selby of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations (ICE-HSI) in Miami and Special Agent in Charge John F. Khin of the Department of Defense’s Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS).

On June 9, 2016, Man was convicted by a federal jury in the Southern District of Florida of one count of conspiring to export and cause the export of defense articles without the required license.

According to evidence presented at trial, between approximately March 2011 and June 2013, Man conspired with Xinsheng Zhang, who was located in China, to illegally acquire and export to China defense articles including: Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-100 engines used in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter; Pratt & Whitney F119-PW-100 turbofan engines used in the F-22 Raptor fighter jet; General Electric F110-GE-132 engines designed for the F-16 fighter jet; the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper/Predator B Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, capable of firing Hellfire Missiles; and technical data for each of these defense articles. During the course of the investigation, when talking to an undercover HSI agent, Man referred to Zhang as a “technology spy” who worked on behalf of the Chinese military to copy items obtained from other countries and stated that he was particularly interested in stealth technology.

HSI and DCIS investigated the case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Walleisa of the Southern District of Florida and Trial Attorney Thea D. R. Kendler of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section prosecuted the case.

Photo: balicad24.com

Announcement by the Justice Department

Related reading: 5 Weapons China Stole & Copied from the US

In part from FreeBeacon:

Michael Walleisa, assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, asked the judge to impose the maximum sentence of 78 months for the weapons conspiracy conviction.

“There is hardly a more serious case than a case such as this that involves some of our most sophisticated fighter jet engines and unmanned weaponized aerial drones,” Walleisa said in a sentencing memorandum.

“The potential for harm to the safety of our fighter pilots, military personnel, and national security which would occur had the defendant been successful is immeasurable, particularly where, as here the clear intent of the co-conspirators was to enable the People’s Republic of China to reverse engineer the defense articles and manufacture fighter jets and UAV’s.”

The conspiracy revealed that China was seeking to “increase its military capabilities and might to the potential detriment of the United States,” Walleisa said.

The U.S. government imposed an arms embargo on China in 1990 following the Chinese military’s massacre of unarmed pro-democracy protesters in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square a year earlier.

Between 2011 and 2013, Man and Zhang worked together to solicit three sets of General Electric and Pratt and Whitney turbofan engines for the F-35, F-22, and F-16 jets, as well as a General Atomics Reaper drone and technical details of the equipment. The Chinese were prepared to pay $50 million for the embargoed items.

Authorities launched an investigation of the case after Man contacted a defense industry source who alerted U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations unit in Miami. The Pentagon’s Defense Criminal Investigative Service also investigated the case.

Man used a company called AFM Microelectronics, Inc. in trying to buy the military equipment. She disclosed to an undercover federal agent in 2012 that the jet engines were meant for the Chinese government and that she knew it was illegal to export them, according to court papers.

China is engaged in a major military buildup that includes two new advanced stealth jet fighters that U.S. intelligence agencies say benefitted from stolen American aircraft technology.

The attempt to buy embargoed jet fighter engines highlights what military analysts say is China’s major technology shortfall—its inability to manufacture high-quality jet engines. Turbofan engines require extremely precise machine work and parts because of the high speeds of their spinning engine fans.

Zhang was described by the government in court papers as a “technology spy” working for China’s military-industrial complex. The Chinese government buys arms and military technology from Russia and other states “so that China can obtain sophisticated technology without having to conduct its own research,” the indictment in the case states.

The name of the Chinese entity was not disclosed. China’s government defense industry group is SASTIND, an acronym for State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense.

Zhang sought to buy the operating system and aircraft control system for the MQ-9 Reaper as well as the unmanned aerial vehicle itself and the technical design data for the aircraft. The drone sought was an armed version capable of firing Hellfire missiles.

Man, 45, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to export defense goods with a license.

At sentencing on Friday, U.S. District Judge Beth Bloom told the court that Man hoped to get a $1 million commission on the illegal export and that she wanted to help China compete with the United States militarily.

“I’m innocent,” Man told the judge, the South Florida Sun-Sentinel newspaper reported. “This is my country, too.” She plans to appeal the conviction that was reached after a jury trial in June.

Michael Pillsbury, a China specialist at the Hudson Institute, said the Man case highlights China’s large-scale technology theft program.

“The scope and the ambition of their technology intelligence collection is breathtaking,” said Pillsbury. “They’re not after petty secrets.”

The Man case is similar to an earlier Chinese technology acquisition operation headed by Chi Mak, another naturalized Chinese citizen. In 2007, Mak, an electrical engineer at the U.S. firm Power Paragon, was convicted of conspiracy to export sensitive electronics defense technology to China.

Mak was a long-term technology spy who operated for 20 years. U.S. officials believe Mak provided China with secrets to the Aegis battle management system, the heart of current Navy warships.

China has deployed a similar version of the Aegis ship, known as the Type 052D warship.