ICANN Soon to be ICANT? Obama Gives Away Internet Control

   

ICANN, the International Community, and Internet Governance

Because cyberspace and the Internet transcend national boundaries, and because the successful

functioning of the DNS relies on participating entities worldwide, ICANN is by definition an

international organization. Both the ICANN Board of Directors and the various constituency

groups who influence and shape ICANN policy decisions are composed of members from all over

the world. Additionally, ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), which is

composed of government representatives of nations worldwide, provides advice to the ICANN

Board on public policy matters and issues of government concern. Although the ICANN Board is

required to consider GAC advice and recommendations, it is not obligated to follow those

recommendations.

Many in the international community, including foreign governments, have argued that it is

inappropriate for the U.S. government to maintain its legacy authority over ICANN and the DNS,

and have suggested that management of the DNS should be accountable to a higher

intergovernmental body. The United Nations, at the December 2003 World Summit on the

Information Society (WSIS), debated and agreed to study the issue of how to achieve greater

international involvement in the governance of the Internet and the domain name system in

particular. The study was conducted by the U.N.’s Working Group on Internet Governance

(WGIG). On July 14, 2005, the WGIG released its report, stating that no single government

should have a preeminent role in relation to international Internet governance. The report called

for further internationalization of Internet governance, and proposed the creation of a new global

forum for Internet stakeholders. Four possible models were put forth, including two involving the

creation of new Internet governance bodies linked to the U.N. Under three of the four models,

ICANN would either be supplanted or made accountable to a higher intergovernmental body. The

report’s conclusions were scheduled to be considered during the second phase of the WSIS held

in Tunis in November 2005. U.S. officials stated their opposition to transferring control and

administration of the domain name system from ICANN to any international body. Similarly, the

109th Congress expressed its support for maintaining U.S. control over ICANN (H.Con.Res. 268

and S.Res. 323).39

The European Union (EU) initially supported the U.S. position. However, during September 2005

preparatory meetings, the EU seemingly shifted its support towards an approach which favored an

enhanced international role in governing the Internet. Read more here from FAS.

President Barack Obama’s drive to hand off control of Internet domains to a foreign multi-national operation will give some very unpleasant regimes equal say over the future of online speech and commerce.

Breitbart: In fact, they are likely to have much more influence than America, because they will collectively push hard for a more tightly controlled Internet, and they are known for aggressively using political and economic pressure to get what they want.

Here’s a look at some of the regimes that will begin shaping the future of the Internet in just a few days, if President Obama gets his way.

China

China wrote the book on authoritarian control of online speech. The legendary “Great Firewall of China” prevents citizens of the communist state from accessing global content the Politburo disapproves of. Chinese technology companies are required by law to provide the regime with backdoor access to just about everything.

The Chinese government outright banned online news reporting in July, granting the government even tighter control over the spread of information. Websites are only permitted to post news from official government sources. Chinese online news wasn’t exactly a bastion of freedom before that, of course, but at least the government censors had to track down news stories they disliked and demand the site administrators take them down.

Related reading: Dangerous Transfer: The President’s ICANN Internet Problem

Unsurprisingly, the Chinese Communists aren’t big fans of independent news analysis or blogging, either. Bloggers who criticize the government are liable to be charged with “inciting subversion,”even when the writer in question is a Nobel Peace Prize winner.

Chinese citizens know better than to get cheeky on social media accounts, as well. Before online news websites were totally banned, they were forbidden from reporting news gathered from social media, without government approval. Spreading anything the government decides is “fake news” is a crime.

In a report labeling China one of the worst countries for Internet freedom in the world, Freedom House noted they’ve already been playing games with Internet registration and security verification:

The China Internet Network Information Center was found to be issuing false digital security certificates for a number of websites, including Google, exposing the sites’ users to “man in the middle” attacks.

The government strengthened its real-name registration laws for blogs, instant-messaging services, discussion forums, and comment sections of websites.

A key feature of China’s online censorship is that frightened citizens are not entirely certain what the rules are. Huge ministries work tirelessly to pump out content regulations and punish infractions. Not all of the rules are actually written down. As Foreign Policy explained:

Before posting, a Chinese web user is likely to consider basic questions about how likely a post is to travel, whether it runs counter to government priorities, and whether it calls for action or is likely to engender it. Those answers help determine whether a post can be published without incident — as it is somewhere around 84 percent or 87 percent of the time — or is instead likely to lead to a spectrum of negative consequences varying from censorship, to the deletion of a user’s account, to his or her detention, even arrest and conviction.

This was accompanied by a flowchart demonstrating “what gets you censored on the Chinese Internet.” It is not a simple flowchart.

Beijing is not even slightly self-conscious about its authoritarian control of the Internet. On the contrary, their censorship policies are trumpeted as “Internet sovereignty,” and they aggressively believe the entire world should follow their model, as the Washington Post reported in a May 2016 article entitled “China’s Scary Lesson to the World: Censoring the Internet Works.”

China already has a quarter of the planet’s Internet users locked up behind the Great Firewall. How can anyone doubt they won’t use the opportunity Obama is giving them, to pursue their openly stated desire to lock down the rest of the world?

Russia

Russia and China are already working together for a more heavily-censored Internet. Foreign Policy reported one of Russia’s main goals at an April forum was to “harness Chinese expertise in Internet management to gain further control over Russia’s internet, including foreign sites accessible there.”

Russia’s “top cop,” Alexander Bastrykin, explicitly stated Russia needs to stop “playing false democracy” and abandon “pseudo-liberal values” by following China’s lead on Internet censorship, instead of emulating the U.S. example. Like China’s censors, Russian authoritarians think “Internet freedom” is just coded language for the West imposing “cultural hegemony” on the rest of the world.

Just think what Russia and China will be able to do about troublesome foreign websites, once Obama surrenders American control of Internet domains!

Russian President Vladimir Putin has “chipped away at Internet freedom in Russia since he returned to the Kremlin in 2012,” as International Business Times put it in a 2014 article.

One of Putin’s new laws requires bloggers with over 3,000 readers to register with the government, providing their names and home addresses. As with China, Russia punishes online writers for “spreading false information,” and once the charge is leveled, it’s basically guilty-until-proven-innocent. For example, one of the “crimes” that can get a blogger prosecuted in Russia is alleging the corruption of a public official, without ironclad proof.

Human-rights group Agora estimates that Russian Internet censorship grew by 900% in 2015 alone, including both court orders and edicts from government agencies that don’t require court approval. Censorship was expected to intensify even further throughout 2016. Penalties include prison time, even for the crime of liking or sharing banned content on social media.

Putin, incidentally, has described the entire Internet as a CIA plot designed to subvert regimes like his. There will be quite a few people involved in the new multi-national Internet control agency who think purging the Web of American influence is a top priority.

The Russian government has prevailed upon Internet Service Providers to block opposition websites during times of political unrest, in addition to thousands of bans ostensibly issued for security, crime-fighting, and anti-pornography purposes.

Many governments follow the lead of Russia and China in asserting the right to shut down “extremist” or “subversive” websites. In the United States, we worry about law enforcement abusing its authority while battling outright terrorism online, arguing that privacy and freedom of speech must always be measured against security, no matter how dire the threat. In Russia, a rough majority of the population has no problem with the notion of censoring the Internet in the name of political stability, and will countenance absolutely draconian controls against perceived national security threats. This is a distressingly common view in other nations as well: stability justifies censorship and monitoring, not just physical security.

Turkey

Turkey’s crackdown on the Internet was alarming even before the aborted July coup attempt against authoritarian President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Turkey has banned social media sites, including temporary bans against even giants like Facebook and YouTube, for political reasons. Turkish dissidents are accustomed to such bans coming down on the eve of elections. The Turkish telecom authority can impose such bans without a court order, or a warning to offending websites.

Turkey is often seen as the world leader in blocking Twitter accounts, in addition to occasionally shutting the social media service down completely, and has over a 100,000 websites blacklisted. Criticizing the government online can result in anything from lost employment to criminal charges. And if you think social-media harassment from loyal supporters of the government in power can get pretty bad in the U.S., Turks sometimes discover that hassles from pro-regime trolls online are followed by visits from the police.

Turkish law infamously makes it a crime to insult the president, a law Erdogan has already attempted to impose beyond Turkey’s borders. One offender found himself hauled into court for creating a viral meme – the sort of thing manufactured by the thousands every hour in America – that noted Erdogan bore a certain resemblance to Gollum from Lord of the Rings. The judge in his case ordered expert testimony on whether Gollum was evil to conclusively determine whether the meme was an illegal insult to the president.

The Turkish example introduces another idea common to far too many of the countries Obama wants to give equal say over the future of the Internet: intimidation is a valid purpose for law enforcement. Many of Turkey’s censorship laws are understood to be mechanisms for intimidating dissidents, raising the cost of free speech enough to make people watch their words very carefully. “Think twice before you Tweet” might be good advice for some users, but regimes like Erdogan’s seek to impose that philosophy on everyone. This runs strongly contrary to the American understanding of the Internet as a powerful instrument that lowers the cost of speech to near-zero, the biggest quantum leap for free expression in human history. Zero-cost speech is seen as a big problem by many of the governments that will now place strong hands upon the global Internet rudder.

Turkey is very worried about “back doors” that allow citizens to circumvent official censorship, a concern they will likely bring to Internet control, along with like-minded authoritarian regimes. These governments will make the case that a free and open Internet is a direct threat to their “sovereign right” to control what their citizens read. As long as any part of the Internet remains completely free, no sector can be completely controlled.

Saudi Arabia

The Saudis aren’t too far behind China in the Internet rankings by Freedom House. Dissident online activity can bring jail sentences, plus the occasional public flogging.

This is particularly lamentable because Saudi Arabia is keenly interested in modernization, and sees the Internet as a valuable economic resource, along with a thriving social media presence. Freedom House notes the Internet “remains the least repressive space for expression in the country,” but “it is by no means free.”

“While the state focuses on combatting violent extremism and disrupting terrorist networks, it has clamped down on nonviolent liberal activists and human rights defenders with the same zeal, branding them a threat to the national order and prosecuting them in special terrorism tribunals,” Freedom House notes.

USA Today noted that as of 2014, Saudi Arabia had about 400,000 websites blocked, “including any that discuss political, social or religious topics incompatible with the Islamic beliefs of the monarchy.”

At one point the blacklist included the Huffington Post, which was banned for having the temerity to run an article suggesting the Saudi system might “implode” because of oil dependency and political repression. The best response to criticism that your government is too repressive is a blacklist!

The Saudis have a penchant for blocking messaging apps and voice-over-IP services, like Skype and Facetime. App blocking got so bad that Saudi users have been known to ask, “What’s the point of having the Internet?”

While some Saudis grumble about censorship, many others are active, enthusiastic participants in enforcement, filing hundreds of requests each day to have websites blocked. Religious figures supply many of these requests, and the government defends much of its censorship as the defense of Islamic values.

As with other censorious regimes, the Saudi monarchy worries about citizens using web services beyond its control to evade censorship, a concern that will surely be expressed loudly once America surrenders its command of Internet domains.

For the record, the Saudis’ rivals in Iran are heavy Internet censors too, with Stratfor listing them as one of the countries seeking Chinese assistance for “solutions on how best to monitor the Iranian population.”

North Korea

You can’t make a list of authoritarian nightmares without including the psychotic regime in Pyongyang, the most secretive government in the world.

North Korea is so repressive the BBC justly puts the word “Internet” in scare quotes, to describe the online environment. It doesn’t really interconnect with anything, except government propaganda and surveillance. Computers in the lone Internet cafe in Pyongyang actually boot up to a customized Linux operating system called “Red Star,” instead of Windows or Mac OS. The calendar software in Red Star measures the date from the birth of Communist founder Kim Il-sung, rather than the birth of Christ.

The “Internet” itself is a closed system called Kwangmyong, and citizens can only access it through a single state-run provider, with the exception of a few dozen privileged families that can punch into the real Internet.

Kwangmyong is often compared to the closed “intranet” system in a corporate office, with perhaps 5,000 websites available at most. Unsurprisingly, the content is mostly State-monitored messaging and State-supplied media. Contributors to these online services have reportedly been sent to re-education camps for typos. The North Koreans are so worried about outside contamination of their closed network that they banned wi-fi hotspots at foreign embassies, having noticed information-starved North Korean citizens clustering within range of those beautiful, uncensored wireless networks.

This doesn’t stop South Koreans from attempting cultural penetration of their squalid neighbor’s dismal little online network. Lately they’ve been doing it by loading banned information onto cheap memory sticks, tying them to balloons, and floating them across the border.

Sure, North Korea is the ultimate totalitarian nightmare, and since they have less than two thousand IP addresses registered in the entire country, the outlaw regime won’t be a big influence on Obama’s multi-national Internet authority, right?

Not so fast. As North Korea expert Scott Thomas Bruce told the BBC, authoritarian governments who are “looking at what is happening in the Middle East” see North Korea as a model to be emulated.

“They’re saying rather than let in Facebook, and rather than let in Twitter, what if the government created a Facebook that we could monitor and control?” Bruce explained.

Also, North Korea has expressed some interest in using the Internet as a tool for economic development, which means there would be more penetration of the actual global network into their society. They’ll be very interested in censoring and controlling that access, and they’ll need a lot more registered domains and IP addresses… the very resource Obama wants America to surrender control over.

Bottom line: contrary to left-wing cant, there is such a thing as American exceptionalism – areas in which the United States is demonstrably superior to every other nation, a leader to which the entire world should look for examples. Sadly, our society is losing its fervor for free expression, and growing more comfortable with suppressing “unacceptable” speech, but we’re still far better than anyone else in this regard.

The rest of the world, taken in total, is very interested in suppressing various forms of expression, for reasons ranging from security to political stability and religion. Those governments will never be comfortable, so long as parts of the Internet remain outside of their control. They have censorship demands they consider very reasonable, and absolutely vital. The website you are reading right now violates every single one of them, on a regular basis.

There may come a day we can safely remand control of Internet domains to an international body, but that day is most certainly not October 1, 2016.

APT 28: Russian Cyber Attacks Britain and Germany as Well as U.S.

APT 28:

TechTimes: FireEye said in a white paper they released in 2014 that APT 28 had launched attacks against military and political organizations beginning in 2007. Other targets that the Kremlin have special interest in include the NATO alliance offices and government officials in Georgia. In these attacks, the group had reportedly gathered “malware samples with Russian language settings during working hours consistent with the time zone of Russia’s major cities, including Moscow and St. Petersburg.”

The APT 28 used the same tools and hit the same targets performed by the Pawn Storm hackers that were described by security firm Trend Micro in a separate report. According to the company, the Pawn Storm hacking group recently increased their activity and targeted bloggers who conducted interviews with President Barack Obama. There is also speculation that the group had stolen online credentials of a military correspondent of an unnamed major publication in the U.S. More here.

 

RUSSIA’S HACKERS HIT BRITAIN

Putin’s cyber warriors the Fancy Bears targeted government websites and the BBC in the run-in to last year’s election

Defensive measures deployed to thwart the attack by Fancy Bears after it was discovered by spy agency GCHQ

TheSun: A RUSSIAN cyber attack on British government departments and TV broadcasters in the run-up to last year’s general election was thwarted by intelligence agencies, it emerged today.

GCHQ boffins halted the “imminent threat” by Kremlin-backed hackers Fancy Bears – the group behind the leak of Olympic athletes’ doping files.

Dimbleby on the BBC election show

Russian hackers targeted government departments and broadcasters including the BBC in the run-up to the 2015 general election.
***
The revelation of the attack on the British election comes amid concerns Russian hackers are attempting to disrupt the US presidential race.Last week another Russian group, DC Leaks, hacked White House servers to obtain what appeared to be Michelle Obama’s passport.

Fancy Bears planned to attack every Whitehall server including the Home Office, Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence, security officials told the Sunday Times.

They were also targeting all the main UK broadcasters including the BBC, ITV, Channel 4 and Sky.

cyber-caliphate

Getty Image: An attack on France’s TV5Monde network claimed on behalf od ISIS by the ‘Cyber-Caliphate’ was traced to the Fancy Bears in Moscow
***

The GCHQ eavesdropping agency uncovered the threat after probing the group’s successful attack against TV5Monde, one of France’s biggest TV networks, in April last year.

It was feared ISIS had reached new levels in its ability to wage cyber war after all 11 of the French broadcasters channels were take off air and its website was flooded with jihadist propaganda.

Related reading: Russia ‘was behind German parliament hack’

But GCHQ traced the hack – claimed by a group calling themselves the “Cyber-Caliphate” – back to Moscow and then uncovered they were planning to hit Britain next.

Analysts feared that the Putin-sponsored group could “embarrass” pillars of the British state and took defensive measures to protect government departments.

Senior security officials are also understood to have warned the TV networks so they could defend themselves.

One security official said: “We had information, and it could have been activated, which is why it was an imminent threat.

“They certainly could have defaced a website for propaganda reasons and they could have possibly taken it down.”

It is the first known threat by the Kremlin-backed hackers to interfere in the British political process.

News of the attack comes after Fancy Bears published details of athletes including Mo Farah and Sir Bradley Wiggins hacked from the global anti-doping watchdog Wada.

Papers revealed they were given medical exemption certificates to use banned drugs.

Fancy Bears website

AP:Associated Press: The Fancy Bears leaked confidential medical filed on dozens of Olympic athletes after hacking the anti-doping body Wada
***

In July the hackers were blamed for the leak of 20,000 damaging emails from the US Democratic National Committee – just as it was about to confirm Hillary Clinton as presidential candidate.

The intervention was seen a Moscow’s attempt to boost Donald Trump’s chances in the election.

The group is thought to be behind a shutdown of the national grid in Ukraine and attacks on the governments of Syria, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates.

Fancy Bears also targeted the BBC, The Guardian, Al Jazeera, Reuters, CNN, Farnborough arms fair, defence contractor Northrop Grumman, one cyber security report says.

Separately a list published by security experts at the PwC consultancy shows 245 apparent Fancy Bears attacks on targets including Nato, the Chilean military, Apple, Google, the German ministry of defence and the Polish and Hungarian governments.

There is no suggestion any of these has been successful although one firm on the list, Yahoo, last week admitted the personal information of 500million users had been stolen by what it called “state-sponsored” hackers in late 2014.

****

BroadbandTVNews: The BBC, ITV, Channel 4 and Sky were involved in what David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, described the incident as a “possible imminent threat” to the UK. The Sunday Times reports that Anderson said the government’s monitoring agency GCHQ “deployed a capability to protect government networks from this cyber-attacker”.

The information was revealed in a previously unnoticed report released in July. Broadcasters were warned of the potential threat and advised to take action.

British security officials have told the paper the group plotting the attack was Fancy Bears, also known as APT28 and Sofacy, the same group that last April brought down the French international broadcaster TV5 Monde.

Within a few seconds of the April 8th attack, all of TV5’s channels stopped broadcasting, and it also lost control of its sites and social profiles. On screen messages declared allegiance to ISIS.

7700 Terrorists at the Southern Border

Oh….another leak and no word from the Department of Homeland Security….

Leaked FBI Data Reveal 7,700 Terrorist Encounters in USA in One Year; Border States Most Targeted

Breitbart: Leaked documents with sensitive FBI data exclusively obtained by Breitbart Texas reveal that 7,712 terrorist encounters occurred within the United States in one year and that many of those encounters occurred near the U.S.-Mexico border. The incidents are characterized as “Known or Suspected Terrorist Encounters.” Some of the encounters occurred near the U.S.-Mexico border at ports-of-entry and some occurred in between, indicating that persons known or reasonably suspected of being terrorists attempted to sneak into the U.S. across the border. In all, the encounters occurred in higher numbers in border states.

Some of the documents pertain to the entire U.S., while others focus specifically on the state of Arizona. The documents are labeled, “UNCLASSIFIED/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE” and contain data from the FBI-administered Terrorist Screening Center, the organization maintaining the Terrorist Screening Database, also known as the “Terror Watch List.”

 CNN

The leaked FBI data are contained in a fusion center’s educational materials, specifically the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center’s (ACTIC) “Known or Suspected Terrorist (KST) Encounters Briefing” covering from July 20 2015 through July 20 2016. The leaked documents are composed of 10 individual pages, but Breitbart Texas chose to release only nine of them due to page 10 containing contact information for ACTIC.

Page Two of the documents contains a map of the entire U.S. with the numbers of encounters per state. The states with the highest encounters are all border states. Texas, California, and Arizona–all states with a shared border with Mexico–rank high in encounters.

Page Three shows a map of where the encounters occurred in the state of Arizona. The majority from this map occurred in Phoenix, a major destination point for people who illegally cross the U.S.-Mexico border. The map also shows that encounters occurred at ports-of-entry, likely from persons either walking up and asking for asylum or from Sinaloa cartel attempts to smuggle them into the U.S. in vehicles. Most significantly, the map shows that many of the encounters occurred near the border outside of ports-of-entry, indicating that persons were attempting to sneak into the U.S.

Page Six shows a pie chart indicating that the majority of encounters in Arizona were with Islamic known or suspected terrorists, both Sunni and Shi’a. Eighty-nine encounters were Sunni, 56 were Shi’a, 70 were “Other International Terrorist Groups or Affiliates,” and only 52 were with “Domestic Terrorism.”

Page 7 contains definitions to help understand the maps.

Breitbart Texas provides the leaked documents and data below: (Go here to see all pages)

Page 1 of 9 by Brandon Darby on Scribd

Related reading:

2012: Inside a secret U.S. Terrorist Screening Center

(CBS News) The Terrorist Screening Center is one of the U.S. government’s most secure buildings. It is home to the nation’s top secret terrorist databases.

For CBS to gain access, no sound could be recorded and only one agent could be identified, Tim Healy.

He is the FBI veteran who currently runs the center.

“We are the only country in the world that has a terrorist watch list.”

The center was founded in 2003 in response to the 9/11 attacks. Their job is to gather intelligence about possible terrorists both in the United States and abroad.

The watch list contains about 520,000 people world wide suspected of having ties to terrorism. Names on the list are added and subtracted daily, but who in on the list remains a secret.

“We don’t confirm anyone’s existence on the watch list,” said Healy.

In addition to the watch list, Healy oversees a second more critical list, the “No Fly List”.

“If you have information that the guy wants to blow up a plane, I can keep him off a plane,” said Healy. “If I’ve [got] information he wants to conduct a terrorist attack, I can keep him off a plane.”

There are about 20,000 people on the “No Fly List”. Seven-hundred of them are Americans and they are considered too much of a risk to allow onto an airplane.

Names on the various watch lists surface each day in calls to the center. For example, each time a police officer run someone’s ID through a computer, that person is checked against the lists.

“So if you are speeding, you get pulled over, they’ll query that name. And if they are encountering a known or suspected terrorist, it will pop up and say call the Terror Screening Center,” said Healy. “So now the officer on the street knows he may be dealing with a known or suspected terrorist.”

The center averages about 55 encounters a day from people who are known or suspected terrorists.

In most cases, according to Healy, the encounters do not produce arrests, but they do provide additional intelligence.

“[The] location of where the guy’s going. What he’s doing [and] additional associates that the subject is hanging around.”

Throughout the Terrorist Screening Center are placed artifacts from various terrorist attacks including Oklahoma City federal building, the USS Cole bombing, and the World Trade Centers. All sober reminders of how important their work is.

For Tim Healy and the workers of the Terrorist Screening Center, failure is not an option. They measure their success by what doesn’t happen.

*****

On September 16, 2003, the President signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 (HSPD-6), requiring the establishment of an organization to “consolidate the Government’s approach to terrorism screening and provide for the appropriate and lawful use of Terrorist Information in screening processes.” Specifically, the Attorney General was directed to create a new organization to consolidate terrorist watch lists and provide 24-hour, 7-day a week operational support for federal, state, local, territorial, tribal, and foreign government as well as private sector screening across the country and around the world. As a result of this presidential directive, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) was created. As of the end of fiscal year (FY) 2004, the TSC was a $27 million organization with approximately 175 staff.

House Office Report on Edward Snowden

Edward Snowden, Defending His Patriotism, Says Disclosures Helped Privacy

In this file photo, American whistleblower Edward Snowden delivers remarks via video link from Moscow to attendees at a discussion regarding an International Treaty on the Right to Privacy, Protection Against Improper Surveillance and Protection of Whistleblowers in New York City on Sept. 24, 2015. © REUTERS/Andrew Kelly

In this file photo, American whistleblower Edward Snowden delivers remarks via video link from Moscow to attendees at a discussion regarding an International Treaty on the Right to Privacy, Protection Against Improper Surveillance and Protection of Whistleblowers in New York City on Sept. 24, 2015.  More here.

Executive Summary of Review of the Unauthorized Disclosures of Former National Security Agency Contractor Edward Snowden

UNCLASSIFIED

In June 2013, former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden

perpetrated the largest and most damaging Public release of classified information in U.S.

intelligence history. In August 2014, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) directed Committee staff to carry out a

comprehensive review of the unauthorized disclosures. The aim of the review was to allow the

Committee to explain to other Members of Congress-and, where possible, the American

people-how this breach occurred, what the U.S. Government knows about the man who

committed it, and whether the security shortfalls it highlighted had been remedied.

Over the next two years, Committee staffrequested hundreds ofdocuments from the

Intelligence Community (IC), participated in dozens ofbriefings and meetings with IC

personnel, conducted several interviews with key individuals with knowledge of Snowden’s

background and actions, and traveled to NSA Hawaii to visit Snowden’s last two work locations.

The review focused on Snowden’s background, how he was able to remove more than 1.5

million classifled documents from secure NSA networks, what the 1.5 million documents

contained, and the damage their removal caused to national security.

The Committee’s review was careful not to disturb any criminal investigation or future

prosecution of Snowden, who has remained in Russia since he fled there on June 23, 2013.

Accordingly, the Committee did not interview individuals whom the Depatment of Justice

identified as possible witnesses at Snowden’s trial, including Snowden himself, nor did the

Committee request any matters that may have occurred before a grand jury. Instead, the IC

provided the Committee with access to other individuals who possessed substantively similar

knowledge as the possible witnesses. Similarly, rather than interview Snowden’s NSA

coworkers and supervisors directly, Committee staffinterviewed IC personnel who had reviewed

reports o finterviews with Snowden’s co-workers and supervisors. The Committee remains

hopeful that Snowden will retum to the United States to face justice.

The bulk of the Committee’s 36-page review, which includes 230 footnotes, must remain

classified to avoid causing further harm to national security; however, the Committee has made

a number of unclassified findings. These findings demonstrate that the public narrative

popularized by Snowden and his allies is rife with falsehoods, exaggerations, and crucial

omissions, a pattem that began befiore he stole 1.5 million sensitive documents.

First, Snowden caused tremendous damage to national security, and the vast

majority of the documents he stole have nothing to do with programs impacting individual

privacy interests-they instead pertain to military, defense? and intelligence programs of

great interest to America,s adversaries. A review ofthe materials Snowden compromised

makes clear that he handed over secrets that protect American troops overseas and secrets that

provide vital defienses against terrorists and nation-states. Some of Snowden’s disclosures

exacerbated and accelerated existing trends that diminished the IC’s capabilities to collect

against legitimate foreign intelligence targets, while others resulted in the loss of intelligence

streams that had saved American lives. Snowden insists he has not shared the full cache of 1.5

million classified documents with anyone; however, in June 2016, the deputy chairman of the

Russian parliaments defense and security committee publicly conceded that “Snowden did

share intelligence” with his govemment. Additionally, although Snowden’s professed objective

may have been to inform the general public, the infiormation he released is also available to

Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean govemment intelligence services; any terrorist

with Internet access; and many others who wish to do harm to the United States.

The full scope ofthe damage inflicted by Snowden remains unknown. Over the past

three years, the IC and the Department ofDefiense (DOD) have carried out separate

reviews with differing methodologies-fthe damage Snowden caused. Out of an abundance of

caution, DOD reviewed all 1.5 million documents Snowden removed. The IC, by contrast, has

carried out a damage assessment fior only a small subset ofthe documents. The Committee is

concerned that the IC does not plan to assess the damage ofthe vast majority of documents

Snowden removed. Nevertheless, even by a conservative estimate, the U.S. Govemment has

spent hundreds of millions of dollars, and will eventually spend billions, to attempt to mitigate

the damage Snowden caused. These dollars would have been better spent on combating

America’s adversaries in an increasingly dangerous world.

Second, Snowden was not a whistleblower. Under the law, publicly revealing

classifled information does not qualify someone as a whistleblower. However, disclosing

classified information that Shows fraud, Waste, Abuse, Or Other illegal activity to the

appropriate law enforcement or oversight personnel-including to Congressuloes make someone

a whistleblower and affords them with critical protections. Contrary to his public claims that he

notified numerous NSA officials about what he believed to be illegal intelligence collection, the

Committee found no evidence that Snowden took any official effort to express concems about

U.S. intelligence activities-legal, moral, or otherwise-to any oversight officials Within the

U.S. Govemment, despite numerous avenues for him to do so. Snowden was aware of these

avenues. His only attempt to contact an NSA attomey revolved around a question about the

legal precedence ofexecutive orders, and his only contact to the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) Inspector General (IG) revolved around his disagreements with his managers about

training and retention ofinfiormation technology specialists.

Despite Snowden’s later public claim that he would have faced retribution for voicing

concems about intelligence activities, the Committee found that laws and regulations in effect at

the time of Snowden’s actions afforded him protection. The Committee routinely receives

disclosures from IC contractors pursuant to the Intelligence Community Whistleblower

Protection Act of 1998 (IC WPA). If Snowden had been worried about possible retaliation for

voicing concerns about NSA activities, he could have made a disclosure to the Committee. He

did not. Nor did Snowden remain in the United States to flee the legal consequences of his

actions, contrary to the tradition of civil disobedience he professes to embrace. Instead, he fled

to China and Russia, two countries whose governments place scant value on their citizens’

privacy or civil liberties-and whose intelligence services aggressively collect information on

both the United States and their own citizens.

To gather the files he took with him when he left the country for Hong Kong, Snowden

infringed on the privacy of thousands of govemment employees and contractors. He obtained

his colleagues, security credentials through misleading means, abused his access as a systems

administrator to search his co-workers, personal drives, and removed the personally

identifiable information of thousands of IC employees and contractors. From Hong Kong he

went to Russia, where he remains a guest of the Kremlin to this day.

It is also not clear Snowden understood the numerous privacy protections that govern the

activities of the IC. He failed basic annual training for NSA employees on Section 702 of the

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and complained the training was rigged to be

overly difficult. This training included explanations of the privacy protections related to the

PRISM program that Snowden would later disclose.

Third, two weeks before Snowden began mass downloads of classified documents,

he was reprimanded after engaging in a workplace spat with NSA managers. Snowden was

repeatedly counseled by his managers regarding his behavior at work. For example, in June

2012, Snowden became involved in a fiery e-mail argument With a Supervisor about how

computer updates should be managed. Snowden added an NSA senior executive several levels

above the supervisor to the e-mail thread, an action that earned him a swift reprimand from his

contracting officer for failing to follow the proper protocol for raising grievances through the

chain of command. Two weeks later, Snowden began his mass downloads of classified

information from NSA networks. Despite Snowden’s later claim that the March 2013

congressional testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper was a “breaking

point” for him, these mass downloads predated Director Clapper’s testimony by eight months.

Fourth, Snowden was, and remains) a serial exaggerator and fabricator. A close

review of Snowden’s official employment records and submissions reveals a pattern of

intentional lying. He claimed to have left Army basic training because of broken legs when in

fact he washed out because of shin splints. He claimed to have obtained a high school degree

equivalent when in fact he never did. He claimed to have worked for the CIA as a “senior

advisor,” which was a gross exaggeration of his entry-level duties as a computer technician. He

also doctored his performance evaluations and obtained new positions at NSA by exaggerating

his resume and stealing the answers to an employment test. In May 2013, Snowden informed

his supervisor that he would be out of the office receive treatment for worsening epilepsy. In

reality, he was on his way to Hong Kong with stolen secrets.

Finally, the Committee remains concerned that more than three years after the start

of the unauthorized disclosures, NSA, and the IC as a whole, have not done enough to

minimize the risk of another massive unauthorized disclosure. Although it is impossible to

reduce the chance of another Snowden to zero, more work can and should be done to improve

the security of the people and computer networks that keep America’s most closely held secrets.

For instance, a recent DOD Inspector General report directed by the Committee found that NSA

has yet to effectively implement its post-Snowden security improvements. The Committee has

taken actions to improve IC information security in the Intelligence Authorization Acts for

Fiscal Years 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, and looks forward to working with the IC to continue

to improve security.

Worth $2 Billion Secreted in the Mexican Desert

An aluminum stockpile (pictured), worth $2 billion and representing six per cent of the world's aluminum, was discovered two years ago in San José Iturbide, a city in central Mexico
An aluminum stockpile (pictured), worth $2 billion and representing six per cent of the world’s aluminum, was discovered two years ago in San José Iturbide, a city in central Mexico
Liu (center) controls China Zhongwang Holdings Ltd, the world's second largest aluminum producer in its category. His current fortune is estimated at $3.2 billion
Liu (center) controls China Zhongwang Holdings Ltd, the world’s second largest aluminum producer in its category. His current fortune is estimated at $3.2 billion

Liu, who is currently the deputy secretary of China’s Communist Party, told the Wall Street Journal he didn’t have any connection with the aluminum in San José Iturbide. He denied trying to route his aluminum through Mexico to avoid the payments. More from the DailyMail. 

A Chinese billionaire may have hidden 6 percent of the world’s aluminum in the Mexican desert

It’s not every day that Mr. Bean makes an appearance on the Wall Street Journal’s commodities coverage.

And that might not even be the strangest finding in the Journal’s investigation into a massive pile of aluminum that allegedly just sat there, unused, in the Mexican desert for years.

To start, some background: China’s growing industrial sector has been hard on the aluminum producers in the United States. In 2000 there were 23 smelters operating nationwide, now there are only five.

So when an aluminum executive named Jeff Henderson got wind of a giant stockpile of Chinese aluminum just below the U.S border with Mexico, he decided to commission a plane to check it out.

What did they find?

Six percent of the world’s aluminum, worth some $2 billion and enough to make 77 billion beer cans, according to the Journal‘s fascinating report.

The revelation led to tensions between U.S. trade authorities and China, as U.S. industry executives insist that the metal is linked to Liu Zhongtian, who runs China Zhongwang Holdings, an enormous industrial aluminum company.

U.S. industry officials allege the metal got there as part of a scheme to evade trade restrictions. The idea was to move aluminum through Mexico into the U.S. where it could benefit from provisions in the North American Free Trade Agreement.

“These things have nothing to do with me,” Liu told the Journal, although the results of the investigation cast doubt on that claim.

Aluminum manufacturing is subsidized in China, and so Chinese firms were able to undercut U.S. producers; the United States responded by setting up tariffs to make domestic aluminum more attractive.

Routing Chinese aluminum through Mexico was a way to get around those tariffs.

Things went awry when a one of Liu’s alleged business partners Po-Chi “Eric” Shen, started to gain attention over some of his erratic practices, which the Journal report highlighted and included spending fortunes on dubious expenses like $70 million worth of red diamonds and rare Ferraris.

The relationship allegedly deteriorated quickly — Shen made headlines in 2014 when he wrecked Liu’s sports car while vacationing in Italy, and was rescued by Rowan Atkinson, of Mr. Bean fame.

The metal may never make it to the United States, in fact there are currently plans to ship it back to Asia, this time Vietnam.