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As the United States flew B1 Lancers based out of Guam in exercises with South Korea and Japan over the Korean Peninsula, the Trump White House was meeting with Pentagon officials on expanded details and strategies with regard to North Korea.
Meanwhile, China continues to demand that all sides tone down the threatening talk and military activities. Has anyone asked China if they are accepting North Korea’s nuclear weapons as a standard condition?
Additionally, more sanctions are taking place including naming four cargo ships under North Korea’s authority from being received in several ports due to hidden illicit cargo transports as recently exposed in Egypt.
Moving to preemptive strategies, South Korea is developing a new weapon called a ‘blackout weapon’ which is not to be confused with an EMP. This blackout weapon, known as a graphite ordnance was developed and used by the United States during the first Gulf War and later in the Balkans.
The purpose of this weapon is to destroy the power grid in hostile nations as a part of the tactics applied where military actions are likely to escalate.
Known as “blackout bombs,” the warheads can be dropped by a plane over power stations. A form of cluster bombs, they split into several canister-like “sub-munitions,” which in turn release carbon graphite filaments that short-circuit the electricity supplies.
South Korea is adding the weapons to its arsenal as part of one of its recently-developed military programs, the so-called “Kill Chain,” which aims to detect an imminent missile attack from the North and react with a pre-emptive strike.
No shots are actually fired and there is no injury or death component to using the blackout bombs. The objective is the merely destroy power stations by short circuiting the systems.
The BLU-114 was developed as a highly classified weapon intended to effectively neutralize electrical power infrastructure without destroying it. This weapon also has been referred to as the ‘soft-bomb’ or the ‘graphite bomb’. Like many other cluster bombs it can be released from virtually any tactical aircraft operated by the United States or allied countries.
The BLU-114 disperses large numbers of chemically treated carbon graphite filaments which short-circuit electrical power distribution equipment such as transformers and switching stations. Used in large numbers it can even shut down the entire power grid of a given country. This weapon represents an excellent sample of non-lethal weaponry with near zero collateral damage.
The CBU-94 Blackout Bomb is the main application for the BLU-114 warhead. It was reported to be employed during the conflict of the former Yugoslavia in 1999 short-cincturing the electrical power infrastructure of Serbia during operation Allied Force. It has been suggested that the BLU-114 or a very similar warhead was integrated into the Tomahawk missile and the AGM-154 JSOW standoff weapon.
A tactic known as a ‘kill chain’ does not represent death but rather it is a pillar as part of a first strike mission to begin the process of neutralizing battle-space.
Applying all intelligence including satellite reconnaissance as well as cyber and signals intelligence is part of the operations in the stepped process to execute war strategies.
The second and third prongs of South Korea’s defense strategy include missile defense and retaliatory strikes from aircraft in the event North Korea launches a missile. They include the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, and the Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMRR) plan. KAMD is a controversial plan to develop a system to intercept short-range missiles. KMRR is a concept for destroying Pyongyang in the event of a North Korean nuclear first strike.
But it is the first and most dangerous part of the new military strategy – the “Kill Chain” – that has diplomatic observers worried. Such a pre-emptive strike would almost certainly lead to war – and not just any war, but regional nuclear war.
Dissident Reveals Secret Chinese Intelligence Plans Targeting U.S.
Guo Wengui calls China communist system a ‘kleptocracy,’ vows reform
China earlier this year ordered the dispatch of 27 intelligence officers to the United States as part of a larger campaign of subversion, according to a leading Chinese dissident.
Guo Wengui, a billionaire real estate mogul, disclosed what he said was an internal Communist Party document authorizing the Ministry of State Security to send the spies, described as “people’s police officers.”
Guo, who is being sought by the Chinese government in a bid to silence his disclosures of high-level corruption and intelligence activity, denounced the Beijing regime as corrupt and called for a “revolution” to reform the system.
“My only single goal that I set myself to try to achieve is to change China,” Guo said through an interpreter during a National Press Club meeting attended by news reporters and supporters of the exiled dissident.
“What they’re doing is against humanity,” he said. “What the U.S. ought to do is take action, instead of just talking to the Chinese kleptocracy.”
Guo last month requested political asylum in the United States in the face of a high-level Chinese government effort to force the United States to return him to China. China has charged him with several crimes. Guo has denied the charges.
Guo earlier charged that senior Chinese leader Wang Qishan, who controls most of China’s finances, is corrupt and has engaged in moving money and documents outside of China. Wang is leading China’s nationwide anti-corruption drive that critics say is cover for efforts by Xi to consolidate power.
The Chinese campaign against Guo has included high-level diplomatic and economic pressure on American government and business leaders to lobby for Guo’s repatriation.
China’s Minister of Public Security, Guo Shengkun, met with Attorney General Jeff Sessions on Wednesday where China’s demands for the return of fugitives was discussed.
A Justice Department spokesman said Sessions raised the issue of a Chinese-origin cyber attack against the Hudson Institute, a think tank that had canceled its plan to hold the press conference for Guo under pressure from China. The Justice spokesman, Wynn Hornbuckle, said China pledged their cooperation in investigating the incident.
Hornbuckle would not say if Guo Wengui was discussed during the law enforcement and cyber security talks.
David Tell, a Hudson spokesman, told the Washington Free Beacon, the denial of service cyber attack was traced by investigators to Shanghai.
According to an email obtained by the Free Beacon, a Hudson employee stated that he was asked to forward a message to institute leaders sent from a Chinese Embassy official on Sept. 29.
Chinese officials, according to the email, “want Hudson to cancel the Guo Wengui event because he is a criminal and tells lies, that China is about to enter a sensitive time with its Party Congress, that hosting him would hurt China-U.S. relations, and that this event would embarrass Hudson Institute and hurt our ties with the Chinese government.”
The intelligence document released Thursday is one of a number sensitive internal reports obtained by Guo who was once close to MSS Vice Minister Ma Jian, who was imprisoned last year on corruption charges, but who Guo has said was repressed politically because of his knowledge of corruption among Chinese leaders.
Guo said he had planned to disclose three internal Chinese government documents during the Hudson event. But instead he burned the documents after the event was canceled.
Guo said he maintains close ties to supporters within the Chinese government and security system and is able to obtain many internal documents.
According to Guo, for simply holding the top-secret document he distributed at the press conference, a person could be jailed in China for three to five years.
The document was issued by the National Security Council, a new Chinese government and Party entity headed by Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
The MSS operatives will work under cover at the Bank of China branch offices and at Chinese diplomatic facilities in the United States.
The document is labeled “top secret” and dated April 27. It was released by Guo at a press conference in Washington during which he appealed for the U.S. government to wake up to the threat posed by China and counter it.
Guo said the authenticity of the document was confirmed by the U.S. government.
The directive to the MSS was formally called “The Request for Instructions on the Working Plan of Secretly Dispatching and 27 People’s Police Officers, He Jianfeng and Others from the Ministry of State Security to the United States on Field Duty in 2017.”
“We approve in principle,” the report says, adding “please carefully organize and implement.”
According to the document the MSS should follow Chinese ideology set out by the late leader Deng Xiaoping, as well as the concepts outlined in speeches by Xi, the current leader.
The document is one of the first internal documents to reveal how China is expanding intelligence activities targeting what it calls “hostile forces” in the United States.
The MSS, according to the report, was told to “go according to the need of the strategic arrangements” of the Communist Party “against overseas hostile forces, strictly abide by our national principles of state security work on the United States, and use the opportunity of the rise of our comprehensive national strength and Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations tending to ease to further expand the scope and depth of the infiltration into the anti-China hostile forces in the United States.”
The MSS agents are to enter the United States secretly in phases and “use the cover of the executives of the state-owned enterprises in the United States, such as the Bank of China (New York) to carry out solid intelligence collection, to incite defection of relevant individuals, and to conduct counter-espionage, etc.”
The spies also were directed to focus on “extraordinarily significant criminal suspects, including Ling Wancheng, Guo Wengui, and Cheng Muyang, etc.”
Ling is the brother of Ling Jihua, a former high-ranking Chinese official who China has accused of illegal activities and who defected to the United States in 2016. Cheng is a real estate mogul in Canada who China also accused of illegal activities.
“If necessary, they should also actively support, cooperate with, and assist the personnel in the United States who conduct the United Front operations, diplomatic operations, and military intelligence operations to carry out related business,” the document states.
United Front work is what the Chinese government calls influence operations aimed at coopting Americans into supporting Beijing’s policies.
The directive urges the spies to “make contributions for further crushing overseas anti-China hostile forces.”
Lastly, MSS officials should seek to strengthen the organization and provide after actions reports to the senior Party organ.
“We have friends all over the world … those who provide the documents are among the most senior people, including the current Politburo standing committee,” Guo said. “My material is real. Otherwise, they wouldn’t be afraid of it.”
Guo said during his press conference that since the April directive, around 50 additional intelligence operatives were sent to the United States.
An FBI spokeswoman had no comment on the document. A Chinese Embassy spokesman did not respond to an email seeking comment.
On Saturday, China’s Public Security Ministry issued a statement denying China was behind the hack of a law firm representing Guo and the Hudson Institute. The ministry also disputed the authenticity of the document.
“An official of the Ministry of Public Security states that, China paid close attention to such allegations and launched immediate investigation,” the statement said. “But no evidence has been found that China and its government have been involved with these incidents.”
The ministry also called the documents revealed by Guo “utterly clumsily forged and full of obvious mistakes.” It did not elaborate but offered to cooperate in a U.S. investigation into the authenticity of the materials and cooperate in the probe of the cyber attacks.
According to Guo, China is engaged in a three-pronged campaign of subversion in the United States he labeled “Blue-Gold-Yellow,” with each color standing for a different line of attack.
Blue represents large-scale Chinese cyber and internet operations while gold represents China’s use of money and financial power. The yellow is part of a plan to use sex to undermine American society.
Another Chinese government subversion program was described by Guo using the code name the “Three Fs.” It involves China’s systematic programs targeting the United States with the goal to weaken the country, throw the country into turmoil and ultimately defeat America.
Asked about the major Communist Party meeting scheduled for later this month, Guo said: “I would like all members of the Chinese Communist Party to wake up and say no to this ruling clique.”
Guo disclosed that he was imprisoned in China after the 1989 pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square and spent 22 months in prison. Chinese police also shot his brother, who later died.
Since then, he has spent the intervening years as an entrepreneur preparing to expose corrupt Chinese leaders, a process he began in January.
China has retaliated by freezing some $17 billion in assets in China and by imprisoning business associates and relatives of Guo.
Radio France’s Chinese-language radio service reported recently that several Chinese have been harassed by authorities for discussing Guo’s disclosures about Wang’s corruption. The report called the activity “Guo Wengui-phobia.”
Chinese censors have cracked down on people online who used the phrases used by Guo, like “Wang-Seven-Three” and “73” for Wang Qishen. Also a person wearing the t-shirt with the word “all of this is only the beginning”—one of Guo’s catch phrases on social media was detained.
“Those who support Guo Wengui call out ‘put a pot on your head,’ a homophone for ‘support Guo,'” the French report said. “Those who desperately want to catch him want to ‘smash that pot,’ literally meaning ‘smash the pot,’ but the term means ‘to fail.'”
China also recently blocked the messaging app WhatsApp, after China tightened controls on WeChat, Weibo, and Baidu message boards that were sharing posts on Guo.
“Looking at social media, every time Guo Wengui has revealed the secrets of a corrupt official, there’s been a reaction on the streets of Beijing,” the report said. “In restaurants, bars, in the streets and alleyways, people see each other and, smiling, ask, ‘What did he say now?’ It’s become a tacit greeting.”
Hey China…what gives? France, you have a call holding on line 4.
None of this would have been in Obama’s, Hillary’s or John Kerry’s emails? Hillary did not use ANY official government email platform…just say’n.
John Kerry under the instruction of the Obama White House negotiated the Joint Plan of Action with Iran on the nuclear development program. Purposely many things were overlooked including the nefarious activities between Iran and North Korea.
Imagine the developments are cables since 2009.
Countries that were part of the long negotiations were the P5+1, which included:
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the EU3) also offered Iran several proposals to resolve the nuclear issue during negotiations with Iran in 2004 and 2005. China, Russia, and the United States joined the three European countries in 2006 to offer “P5+1” proposals to Iran.
North Korean front companies operate inside China with impunity.
The extent of Chinese companies’ role in enabling North Korea’s evasion of sanctions is detailed deep in the fine print of the still unpublished 105-page report. For instance, North Korea’s Daedong Credit Bank (DCB) and Korea Daesong Bank, both subject to U.S. and U.N. sanctions, continue to operate in the Chinese cities of Dalian, Dandong, and Shenyang in violation of U.N. resolutions. The panel suspects that one of the banks, Daedong, may in fact be majority-owned by Chinese shareholders, citing July 2011 documents indicating the sale of a controlling stake, 60 percent, to a Chinese firm. More here.
So, when it comes to France, what did they know via the MTCR?
Background
Formal discussions on controlling missile proliferation began in 1983 among France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They were later joined by Canada and Japan, and in 1985, an interim agreement to control the proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, including dual-use missile items, was reached. A nuclear-capable missile was defined as one capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms (kg) to a range of 300 kilometers (km) or more. The G-7 States formally announced the Missile Technology and Control Regime (MTCR) on 16 April 1987.
Since then, membership has expanded to the present 34 States, the additional members being Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. Some other States, including China, India, Israel, Romania, and Slovakia, have pledged to abide by the MTCR Guidelines.
Regime Goal
The regime goal is to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons) by controlling the transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons.
Regime Guidelines
The regime guidelines consist of national control laws and procedures; a two-category common control list; information-sharing on any denied cases to ensure no commercial advantage; no impediment to national space programs; presumption of denial of any transfers in terms of nuclear weapon delivery systems development; and no retransfers without authorization.
Equipment and Technology Annex
Category I items of the Equipment and Technology Annex include complete rocket and unmanned-air-vehicle delivery systems and subsystems. The transfer of Category I items is subject to a strong presumption of denial. The transfer of production technology for Category I items is prohibited.
Category II items include propulsion and propellant components, launch and ground support equipment, as well as the materials for the construction of missiles. The transfer of Category II items is less restricted, but still requires end-use certification or verification where appropriate. More here.
So, to answer the question in the title of this article, here is a WikiLeaks cable providing background:
***
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): NORTH KOREA,S MISSILE PROGRAM
Please see paragraph 2. 2. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests Embassy Paris provide the interagency cleared paper “North Korea,s Missile Program” in paragraph 3 below to the French Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Point of Contact (POC) for distribution to all Partners.
Info addressees also may provide to host government officials as appropriate. In delivering paper, posts should indicate that the U.S. is sharing this paper as part of our preparation for the Information Exchange that will be held in conjunction with the MTCR Plenary in Rio, November 9-13, 2009. NOTE: Additional IE papers will be provided via septels. END NOTE.
3. BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER: (SECRET REL MTCR) North Korea’s Missile Program Introduction North Korea continues to make progress in its ballistic missile development efforts. We expect both the new Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and the solid-propellant Toksa short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) to be fielded in the coming years, and as demonstrated by North Korea,s April 5th launch of the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) space launch vehicle (SLV)/intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in a failed attempt to place a satellite into orbit, the pursuit of longer-range systems remains a DRPK priority. North Korea’s deployed forces include hundreds of Scud and No Dong short and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBM/MRBM), seven of which it launched in 2009.
North Korea remains one of the world’s leading suppliers of ballistic missiles and technology, and continues to provide assistance to both Iran’s and Syria’s ballistic missile programs. North Korea, since the 1980s, has supplied a variety of customers with ballistic missiles, missile components, and missile-related technology. These sales have included complete Category I missile systems, as well as production technology and expertise.
North Korea has maintained its right to sell ballistic missiles and continues to market its systems to countries in the Middle East while seeking to expand its missile marketing activities worldwide. North Korea this year probably resumed ballistic missile-related cooperation with Yemen, and may have recently reached an agreement with Burma to provide Rangoon with ballistic missile technology.
North Korea has developed most of the necessary capability and infrastructure to produce and assemble its ballistic missiles. However, while North Korea continues to make progress in its missile development efforts, it remains reliant on outside suppliers for a range of missile-related raw materials and components. While most of these materials are for direct application to its missile program, North Korea may procure some items in support of its missile customers.
Program History North Korea’s ballistic missile program started in the early-1980s, when it reverse-engineered Soviet-made 300km-range Scud B SRBMs acquired from Egypt. This Scud B technology went on to form the basis for the DPRK,s Scud B, Scud C, No Dong, Taepo Dong-l (TD-1), and TD-2 systems. In return for the Scud Bs, North Korea assisted Egypt’s efforts to domestically produce Scuds. Building on this success, the DPRK began designing the 500 km- range Scud C in the mid-1980s.
These Scuds have been exported to customers in the Middle East and are deployed in North Korea. Given its 20 years experience working with Scud technology, North Korea is able to design and produce extended-range variants of the Scud, capable of delivering payloads of over 500 kg to ranges up to 1,000 km.
North Korea also used Scud technology to develop the No Dong medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) that is deployed as part of North Korea’s missile forces. The No Dong has a range of 1,300 km with a 500 kg payload, which could strike all of South Korea and Japan. Scud and No Dong technology also form the basis of North Korea’s TD-1 and TD-2 systems. In 1998, North Korea tested the Taepo Dong-1, which probably utilized a No Dong first stage and Scud second stage. Although launched as an SLV, the TD-1 launch showed that North Korea had successfully developed many of the essential technologies for staged missile systems vital for ICBM development.
The DPRK has also developed the follow-on system for the TD-1, the TD-2. Although a more advanced design than the TD-l, the TD-2 still relies on Scud and No Dong technology, with probably clustered No Dong engines powering the first stage, and either a Scud or No Dong-based second stage. In a two stage configuration, the TD-2 would have a range of over 9,000 km with a substantial weapons payload of approximately 500 kg.
In a three stage configuration, such as that launched in April 2009, the TD-2 could deliver the same sized payload up to 15,000 km, which could reach all of the United States and Europe, although likely with very poor accuracy.
The first stage of the April 2009 launch fell into the Sea of Japan, and the upper stages landed in the Pacific. This demonstrates progress since the 2006 test, which flew only about 40 seconds. Recently, North Korea has developed a new land-mobile IRBM –called the Musudan by the United States.
The Musudan is a single-stage missile and may have a range of up to 4,000 km with a 500 kg payload. The Musudan is derived from the SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and represents a substantial advance in North Korea’s liquid propellant technology, as the SS-N-6 had a much more advanced engine and used more energetic propellants — unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (N204) — than those used in Scud-type missiles. Development of the Musudan with this more advanced propulsion technology allows North Korea to build even longer-range missiles — or shorter range missiles with greater payload capacity — than would be possible using Scud-type technology. As the Scud market nears saturation, North Korea also has started to develop its own solid-propellant missile systems, as evidenced by its development of a new solid propellant SRBM based on the SS-21 SRBM.
This new missile — called the Toksa by the United States — has a range of 120 km with a payload as large as 500 kg. This is a disturbing development since North Korea can apply its experience in producing this missile to other, longer- range, solid propellant missile designs. Solid propellant ballistic missiles are preferred by many countries due to their lesser logistics requirements and shorter launch times, making them more survivable than liquid propellant missiles. North Korea,s advances — in both its liquid and solid propellant programs — have come despite a self-imposed missile launch moratorium, that limited North Korea’s ability to verify new designs or modifications to its missile systems during the 1999-2006 timeframe.
North Korea ended the moratorium with its July 5, 2006 Scud, No Dong, and Taepo Dong-2 launches. Program Activities On April 5, 2009, North Korea — despite UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which requires the suspension of all activities related to its ballistic missile program — conducted the second launch of the TD-2. Although the April 5th TD-2 launch failed to place a satellite in orbit, the launch was much more successful than the first TD-2 launch in 2006, demonstrating that North Korea is making progress in developing technology that can directly contribute to the production of ICBMs. Subsequently, and despite the adoption on June 12, 2009 of UNSCR 1874, which reaffirmed the provisions of UNSCR 1718 related to North Korea,s ballistic missile activities, North Korea tested seven Scud SRBMs and No Dong MRBMs on July 4th.
The April 5th TD-2 launch also demonstrated that North Korea continues to pursue the development of longer-range missile systems and that long range missile development probably remains a priority. North Korea’s next goal may be to develop a mobile ICBM that would be capable of threatening targets around the world, without requiring the lengthy — and potentially vulnerable — launch preparation time required by the TD-2. Technology Supplier The DPRK continues to sell ballistic missile-related technology to countries in the Middle East, while seeking to re-engage with former customers in the region. North Korea is probably also pursuing new markets for its missiles, including in regions such as Southeast Asia and Africa.
North Korea offers a wide-range of ballistic missile services, almost certainly is willing to offer any missile design in its inventory for sale to customers interested in complete systems, and can design missiles to meet specific customer needs. For customers with established missile programs or otherwise lacking interest in complete systems, North Korea provides missile refurbishment and technical expertise, ground support equipment and launchers, and production technology. North Korea can also broker precision machine tools and other missile-related raw materials from third-parties for customers through its extensive procurement network. Iran Iran is one of North Korea’s key missile customers.
Since the late 1980s, the DPRK has exported complete Scud B and Scud C missiles to Iran, as well as their production technology. The Scud and other missile technology acquired from North Korea form the basis for the Iranian Shahab-3, which is based on North Korea’s No Dong. North Korea has probably provided Iran an MRBM variant, called the BM-25, of its Musudan IRBM.
This technology would provide Iran with more advanced missile technology than currently used in its Shahab-series of ballistic missiles and could form the basis for future Iranian missile and SLV designs. North Korea also provided assistance to Iran’s SLV program. On February 2nd, Iran successfully orbited the Omid satellite, using its Safir SLV, the first stage of which was based on the Shahab-3 (No Dong). Pyongyang’s assistance to Iran’s SLV program suggests that North Korea and Iran may also be cooperating on the development of long-range ballistic missiles. Syria Syria is another of North Korea’s key missile customers. North Korea has provided Syria with 500 km-range Scud C missiles and technology as well as technology for a 700 km-range Scud variant, referred to in Syria as the “Scud D.”
The missiles came initially in either partially or completely knocked-down kit form, but were produced in North Korea. Syria has since achieved a domestic production capability, probably with extensive assistance from Pyongyang. North Korea has also provided a range of other missile-related services to Syria, including production technology, ground support equipment, raw material, components, technical assistance, and know-how.
North Korea probably provided assistance to Syria’s development of a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) for its Scud ballistic missiles. Yemen In December 2002, Yemen received a shipment of Scud missiles, which Sanaa claimed to have bought from North Korea for defensive purposes and pledged would not be retransferred to any third party. North Korea probably resumed ballistic missile cooperation with Yemen in 2009.
Burma The mid-2009 voyage of the North Korean ship, Kang Nam 1, probably was associated with North Korea’s primary arms export entity — suggesting that the cargo was most likely weapons-related. The ship returned to North Korea prior to reaching its destination, which was most likely Burma.
The Kang Nam 1 probably was carrying ballistic missiles or conventional weapons. A November 2008 visit by a senior Burmese official to a North Korean ballistic missile production facility suggests that the two sides probably have been discussing a ballistic missile deal, and that the cargo may have been related to these discussions.
Foreign Assistance North Korea operates a vast network of embassy personnel, front companies, and commercial entities run by ethnic Koreans in other countries to obtain key technologies and materials needed to support both its own and its customers’ missile programs. Members of this network often do not reveal their affiliation with North Korea, or North Korea as the end-user of critical goods; they utilize entities in Europe, China, East Asia, and South Asia to establish reliable routes for the transfer of controlled items. Most foreign procurement by the North Korean missile program includes material North Korea finds too costly or too advanced to manufacture domestically, such as missile component testing equipment, heat-resistant materials for re-entry vehicles, heavy-duty vehicle chassis, missile tracking technologies, precision machine tools, specialty steels and aluminums, ball bearings, precision gyroscopes, solid-propellant precursor chemicals, and liquid-propellant precursors. Although important for its own program, North Korea also uses this network to broker missile-related raw materials for its missile export customers.
Conclusion North Korea will continue to develop missiles with increasing range, payload capacity, and sophistication. In support of these efforts, North Korea will continue to seek critically-needed components from foreign suppliers — most commonly China-based, given their proximity and access to technology that would be beneficial to North Korea,s missile program. In light of its past missile technology acquisition practices, we remain vigilant for any attempts by North Korea to acquire material or technology associated with missile systems other countries — including MTCR Partners — have retired. International pressure against North Korea and its customers have had a significant impact on North Korea,s missile sales.
However, despite such pressure, North Korea continues missile cooperation with its core clients and continues to offer MTCR Category I missile systems, their production technology, and missile maintenance and support services to all interested customers. END TEXT OF PAPER.
4. (U) Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR issues for ISN/MTR.
A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON
The United States knows all too well about an EMP. With regard to North Korea, the Kim regime has acknowledged it was active in EMP pursuits. The U.S. has EMP weapons developed by Boeing.
So what is Starfish Prime?
On July 9, 1962 — 50 years ago today — the United States detonated a nuclear weapon high above the Pacific Ocean. Designated Starfish Prime, it was part of a dangerous series of high-altitude nuclear bomb tests at the height of the Cold War. Its immediate effects were felt for thousands of kilometers, but it would also have a far-reaching aftermath that still touches us today.
In 1958, the Soviet Union called for a ban on atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons, and went so far as to unilaterally stop such testing. Under external political pressure, the US acquiesced. However, in late 1961 political pressures internal to the USSR forced Khrushchev to break the moratorium, and the Soviets began testing once again. So, again under pressure, the US responded with tests of their own.
It was a scary time to live in.
The US, worried that a Soviet nuclear bomb detonated in space could damage or destroy US intercontinental missiles, set up a series of high-altitude weapons tests called Project Fishbowl (itself part of the larger Operation Dominic) to find out for themselves what happens when nuclear weapons are detonated in space. High-altitude tests had been done before, but they were hastily set up and the results inconclusive. Fishbowl was created to take a more rigorous scientific approach. Read more here.
The Wall Street Journal published an item offering insight regarding North Korea and the threat of an EMP and the United States is not prepared for such a weapon in either a defensive or offensive posture without some exceptional consequence to life.
As South Korea performed some live fire drills in response to the last nuclear test by North Korea that measured a 6.3 on the Richter Scale, at issue is the immediate line of an estimated thousands of rockets pointed at South Korea. It would take a robust offensive first strike to remove this border threat in cadence with other strike operations into the North Korea tunnel network where most of the weaponry is located.
Finally, South Korea’s leader has taken a more aggressive posture, leaning towards a military operation and this could bring the closer to Japan which is a positive indication where activities to neutralize North Korea is tantamount.
Tensions sharply escalated Sunday as the communist regime conducted what it claims to have been a test of a hydrogen bomb mountable on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The test was only the latest in a recent series of saber-rattling, including two ICBM tests in July.
In its report to the legislature’s defense committee, the defense ministry said that it, in consultation with Washington, will seek to deploy a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, strategic bombers and other powerful assets to the peninsula as a response to the North’s nuclear experiment.
It also unveiled its plan to stage unilateral live-fire drills involving Taurus air-to-surface guided missiles mounted on its F-15K fighter jets. The missile, with a range of 500 kilometers, is capable of launching precision strikes on the North’s key nuclear and missile facilities.
In his assessment of the sixth nuke test, Song said that the North is presumed to have reduced the weight of a nuclear warhead to below 500 kilograms. More here.
Adding more sanctions on China or those doing business with North Korea does not stop or deter North Korea at all. China knows precisely what North Korea is doing and has not moved to stop any of these missile or nuclear activity.
North Korea’s nuclear test occurred in Punggye-ri, the same site where a nuclear test occurred in January 2016, about 50 miles away from the border with China. Tremors were felt in the Chinese border city of Yanji, home to about 400,000 people, Chinese media reported. The latest test occurred as China hosted the leaders of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries for their annual summit. China “strongly condemned” North Korea’s provocation and a draft communique from the BRICS summit quoted in Chinese state media “strongly deplored” North Korea’s nuclear test but called for a peaceful solution to the crisis. More here.
All the alleged professional continue to say the United States, Japan and South Korea have no good options with regard to North Korea, and there may be some truth to that given the descriptions as defined here.
What is left out of all conversations is the cyber abilities of the United States, knocking out North Korea’s space segments on existing satellites owned by China, Iran or Russia and lastly once again dusting off the files of Starfish Prime as described below:
Launched via a Thor rocket and carrying a W49thermonuclear warhead (manufactured by Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory) and a Mk. 2 reentry vehicle, the explosion took place 250 miles (400 km) above a point 19 miles (31 km) southwest of Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean. It was one of five tests conducted by the USA in outer space as defined by the FAI. It produced a yield equivalent to 1.4 megatons of TNT.
The Starfish test was one of five high altitude tests grouped together as Operation Fishbowl within the larger Operation Dominic, a series of tests in 1962 begun in response to the Soviet announcement on August 30, 1961 that they would end a three-year moratorium on testing.[2]
In 1958 the United States had completed six high-altitude nuclear tests, but the high-altitude tests of that year produced many unexpected results and raised many new questions. According to the U.S. Government Project Officer’s Interim Report on the Starfish Prime project:
“Previous high-altitude nuclear tests: YUCCA, TEAK, and ORANGE, plus the three ARGUS shots were poorly instrumented and hastily executed. Despite thorough studies of the meager data, present models of these bursts are sketchy and tentative. These models are too uncertain to permit extrapolation to other altitudes and yields with any confidence. Thus there is a strong need, not only for better instrumentation, but for further tests covering a range of altitudes and yields.”[3]
Still, our State Department and White House appears to think that we can have honest dialogues with China regarding North Korea? Additionally, it was just reported a month ago that Beijing has a major spy network in the United States with up to 25,000 Chinese intelligence officers and 15,000 recruited agents.
Not feeling confident on this, are you? Perhaps some expulsions are in order…
Did Owner of Million-Dollar U.S. Home Help North Korea Evade Sanctions?
GREAT NECK, N.Y. — The five-bedroom house in New York’s Long Island suburbs — listed for nearly $1.3 million — boasts a southern exposure and proximity to a country club.
But here’s what’s more interesting: The seller, a Chinese national named Sun Sidong, has been linked by American security experts to a network of Chinese companies under Treasury sanctions for helping companies and individuals who support North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
According to Chinese corporate filings, Sun is the listed owner of Dandong Dongyuan Industrial Co., which has shared an email address with another Chinese company, Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co., a coal exporter suspected of helping North Korea evade sanctions.
The coal company and “four related front companies” were targeted by a federal search warrant allowing prosecutors to secretly monitor their financial transactions at eight U.S. banks, seizing any funds stemming from illegal sanctions-busting, according to a May federal court ruling.
The ruling, by U.S. District Judge Beryl Howell of Washington, D.C., said the eight American financial institutions — Bank of America, Wells Fargo, BNY Mellon, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, and Standard Chartered Bank — had already processed upwards of $700 million in prohibited transactions involving North Korea since 2009. The ruling does not allege any wrongdoing by any of the banks.
The Great Neck, N.Y., home purchased by Sun Sidong in December 2016. Google Maps
On Tuesday, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co. and its primary shareholder in response to “attempted evasion of U.S. sanctions.”
That shareholder, a Chinese businessman named Chi Yupeng, was also named in a civil complaint filed Tuesday by the Justice Department seeking a money laundering penalty against the firm, as well as the seizure of $4 million in funds allegedly laundered for North Korea’s ruling party. The complaint alleges that front companies controlled by Chi Yupeng comprise one of the largest financial facilitators for North Korea.
Chi Yupeng hung up on NBC News several times when asked for comment.
The Justice Department also moved to seize nearly $7 million from a Singapore firm over similar allegations, and Treasury levied sanctions against a number of other Chinese and Russian entities — 16 in total — it accused of helping North Korea evade sanctions.
The government’s investigation was supported by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), a non-profit U.S. think tank, as part of a new get-tough approach to North Korean sanctions that began in the Obama administration and is accelerating under President Trump, current and former U.S. officials say.
Chi Yupeng is the majority owner of Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co. A civil complaint filed by the Justice Department Tuesday alleges that companies he controls helped North Korea evade sanctions. Bohai University
While it’s widely assumed that North Korea has for years been subjected to punishing international pressure as it defied the world and advanced toward a nuclear missile capability, the sanctions against North Korea have been full of holes, experts say — far less restrictive, for example, than the measures that brought Iran to the nuclear bargaining table.
Sun’s Great Neck house is an example of how the alleged sanction-busting networks can stretch around the globe, even to the luxe suburbs of Long Island. “The fact that you have somebody who’s engaged in trade that is potentially not just sanctioned, but dangerous, and that individual then invests in real estate in the United States reflects that there are holes in the system,” NBC News National Security Analyst Juan Zarate said.
The North Korea sanctions targeted specific military technology, “but what you didn’t see until quite recently are these kind of broader sanctions to go after the North Korean economy as a whole,” said Peter Harrell, who was the deputy assistant secretary for counter threat finance and sanctions in the State Department from 2012 to 2014.
The Friendship Bridge crosses the Yalu River and connects Dandong, China with Sinuiju, North Korea. David Lom / NBC News
Nor was there an aggressive enforcement effort against banks and individuals doing business with Pyongyang. As a result, the North Korean economy has grown steadily over the last decade, analysts say. And while the country as a whole remains extremely poor, the elite live relatively well amid a building boom of gleaming skyscrapers in the capital.
“Until February of 2016, U.N. sanctions against North Korea were strong on paper but poorly enforced, and U.S. sanctions against North Korea were comparatively weak — weaker than our sanctions against Belarus and Zimbabwe,” said Joshua Stanton, a North Korea expert and former Army officer.
Now, that is changing — though it may be too late. North Korea tested a missile that many experts say could strike the U.S. mainland, and American intelligence officials say the country may be months away from being able to mount a nuclear warhead on such a missile.
Still, aided by new sanctions imposed in the past year, the Trump administration is moving to increase economic pressure on North Korea, by targeting the Chinese companies that have for years helped the North fund its military activities.
“Justice is stepping it up by going after the Chinese banks,” said Anthony Ruggiero, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, who served as the nonproliferation advisor to the U.S. delegation to the 2005 Six-Party Talks on North Korea.
In June, the U.S. Treasury Department designated China’s Bank of Dandong — based in a city on the North Korean border that serves as a center of trade between the two countries — to be a “primary money laundering concern.” It said the small bank “acts as a conduit for illicit North Korean financial activity.” Two Chinese individuals were also targeted in the government’s action.
Last September, the Justice Department charged Dandong-based businesswoman Ma Xiaohong with evading sanctions and laundering millions of dollars for North Korea. Ma has not made a court appearance and her whereabouts are unclear.
Sen. Cory Gardner, R-Colo., recently introduced a bill that would cut off entities that do business in North Korea, including the top ten Chinese importers of North Korean goods, from using the American financial system.
This photo taken July 5, 2017 shows the Bank of Dandong, a Chinese bank accused of laundering money for North Korea. Kyodo
In August, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed new sanctions meant to pressure Pyongyang’s export revenue. They crack down on North Korea’s primary exports — including iron, iron ore, coal, lead, lead ore and seafood — and target banks and joint ventures with foreign companies.
C4ADS, which focuses on international security, uses sophisticated software and business records to map links between companies involved with North Korea.
In June, the group published a report — titled “Risky Business” — naming Sun, who owns the Great Neck house, as part of a network that may be exporting technology that could be used in North Korea’s missile program.
Chinese business records cited by C4ADS show Sun owns 97 percent of Dandong Dongyuan Industrial Co. Ltd., a general-purpose trading firm whose businesses include the sale of automobiles, machinery, natural resources, and general household products, the report says. NBC News confirmed that the records show Sun as primary shareholder.
Customs records indicate the firm has exported to three countries: North Korea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the United States. From 2013 to 2016, the company sent $28 million worth of material to North Korea, the records show.
For example, Dandong Dongyuan Industrial Co. sent North Korea a shipment of radio navigational aid apparatus valued at nearly $800,000 in June 2016, the C4ADS report said. Experts at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies concluded that “this category might contain guidance devices for ballistic missiles.”
NBC News reviewed shipment data from Panjiva, which tracks global trade. It shows more than 60 shipments of items by Sun’s company to North Korea that fall into the category of “nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof.” This broad category is set by the country of origin, in this case the Chinese government. Experts say dual-use items like these help the Kim regime evade sanctions that are explicitly designed to prevent its nuclear capability.
“The danger with the export of dual-use items is that they appear to be legitimate. These are things that could be used for normal purposes,” Zarate said. “You have parties that are willing to export what are really dangerous items to a regime that has been sanctioned, and trying to use the cloak of legitimate commerce in order to do that.”
Parts for approximately 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades, manufactured in North Korea and seized in Egyptian waters, hidden under 2,300 tons of iron ore. UN Security Council Panel of Experts
C4ADS also links Sun to a ship carrying arms from North Korea to an unknown destination. In August 2016, a cargo vessel flying a Cambodian flag was intercepted by Egyptian authorities entering the Suez Canal with parts for 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades aboard. The grenade parts were hidden under 2,300 tons of iron ore, which is one of the newly banned mineral exports targeted by the U.N.’s recent sanctions program.
According to shipping records reviewed by NBC News, one of Sun Sidong’s companies owned the vessel from April 2012 until August 2014, when ownership was transferred to a company controlled by Sun Sihong, who according to C4ADS is Sun’s sister.
In 2015, Sun registered a New York-based company called Dongyuan Enterprise USA. On March 2, it received a shipment of “used furniture” from Dandong Dongyuan Industrial Co., Sun’s Chinese company. Originally shipped from Dandong, the cargo traveled to the U.S. from Busan, South Korea, according to its bill of lading.
The real estate agent who brokered the sale of the Great Neck home to Sun recalled that the family was expecting furniture to arrive from China.
An assembled rocket-propelled grenade intercepted in the Jie Shun shipment. The ship’s bill of lading misidentified the parts as pieces of an underwater pump. UN Security Council Panel of Exp
Sun, whose U.S. company operates out of a New York City address he does not own, bought the Great Neck property near the country club for $1.1 million in December 2016.
The house is already on the market again. Sun’s U.S. real estate broker told NBC News that’s because Sun “doesn’t want to do business here.”
One lesson of Sun’s activities is that targeting a small number of key actors could put a severe dent in North Korean’s effort to evade sanctions, according to David Johnson, the executive director of C4ADS.
“The networks that perpetrate sanctions evasion for North Korea are limited, centralized, and vulnerable,” Johnson said. “That is, we can touch them, there are very few pressure points, and we can make a major impact.”
