ISIS

Posted on October 23, 2017October 23, 2017 by Denise Simon

Primer:

A North Korean mining firm, reputed to be a front for Pyongyang’s weapons development programs, attempted to ship materiel to Syrian officials tied to the country’s chemical weapons program, according to a confidential United Nations assessment of international sanctions against the North.

Details of the U.N. findings, first reported by Reuters, found officials from Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation {KOMID) had sent a pair of shipments of unknown contents to members of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Centre or SSRC. The Syrian government organization has been responsible for developing chemical and biological weapons for regime in Damascus since the 1970’s.

The shipments never arrived in Syria after being intercepted by international authorities from U.N. partner nations, Reuters reports. “Two member states interdicted shipments destined for Syria. Another member state informed the panel that it had reasons to believe that the goods were part of a KOMID contract with Syria,” the U.N. review states.

KOMID has repeatedly trafficked in materials associated with ballistic missile development and other conventional arms programs, and was blacklisted by the U.N. security council as a result of those activities, Reuters reports.

As a result, the U.N. “is investigating reported prohibited chemical, ballistic missile and conventional arms cooperation between Syria and [North Korea],” the report states. More here.

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Quoting the South Korean Defense Ministry, it said: ‘North Korea has 13 types of biological weapons agents which it can weaponize within ten days, and anthrax and smallpox are the likely agents it would deploy.’

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Harvard produced a report with the summary in part that reads:

Amidst the growing threat of North Korea’s nuclear program, the assas-

sination of Kim Jong-Un’s half-brother via VX nerve agent in February

2017 brought renewed interest in North Korea’s other weapons of

mass destruction (WMD) programs—chemical and biological weap-

ons. If used on a large scale, these weapons can cause not only tens of

thousands of deaths, but also create panic and paralyze societies. Nev-

ertheless, the vividness of the nuclear threat has overshadowed other

weapons programs, limiting the attention and policy input that they

deserve. This paper focuses on North Korea’s biological weapons (BW).

Accurately assessing the threat from North Korea’s biological weapons

is challenging. Whereas North Korea has publicly declared its will to

become a nuclear power many times, it has been less overt about its

intention or capability for biological weapons. BW capabilities are

inherently hard to detect and measure. While nuclear programs can

be monitored by the number of nuclear tests and the success of missile

tests, weaponizing and cultivating pathogens can stay invisible behind

closed doors. Moreover, equipment used for BW production are often

dual-use for agriculture, making external monitoring and verification

virtually impossible. Limited information on North Korea’s BW pro-

gram leads to a low threat perception that may undermine preparation

and response efforts. The full 46 page report is here.

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A German newspaper reported last week that at least one European intelligence agency has already warned that the Islamic State is exploring the use of chemicals for attacks in Europe. Such an eventuality would be a radical departure from prior attacks by the Islamic State in the West. In the past, the militant group has shown a strong preference for low-tech means of dispensing violence, such as firearms, vehicles and knives. But it has utilized chemical substances in Iraq and Syria, and its technical experts have amassed significant knowledge about weaponized chemicals.

Last week, several European and American counter-terrorism experts participated in a bioterrorism preparedness exercise in Berlin. Codenamed WUNDERBAUM, the exercise was one of several anti-terrorism drills that have taken place in the German capital this year alone. But last week’s drill was the first with an exclusive focus on preparing for a bioterrorist attack. German authorities insisted that the drill was not sparked by concrete intelligence of a pending biological or chemical attack. But the Berlin-based national newspaper Die Welt claimed on Friday that it had information about at least one such warning by a European intelligence agency. The paper did not name the agency, but said that “a foreign intelligence agency” had warned European security authorities of a possible terrorist attack by the Islamic State using chemical weapons. According to Die Welt, the warning was “explicit” and cautioned that the Sunni militant group may be preparing to use improvised bombs utilizing chemicals, including toxic gasses. The warning was communicated to European intelligence agencies, including Germany’s said Die Welt.

How likely is such a scenario? Terrorist groups tend to be conservative in their use of lethal technologies. They typically opt for time-tested methods using explosives or firearms, because these have a higher of success in comparison to more sophisticated, hi-tech weapons. The latter are also more expensive to build and require scientific and technical capabilities that are not typically available to terrorist organizations. Militants are usually strapped for cash, and are not science-savvy, so exceptions to this general trend are rare. But the Islamic State is different. Ever since it made its eventful appearance in 2013, the group has experimented with a variety of chemicals, including nerve agents. It is known that it initiated a modest chemical weapons program, headed by Iraqi engineers who were trained under Iraq’s late ruler, Saddam Hussein. One of them, Abu Malik, was killed in an American airstrike in early 2015. Another, Sleiman Daoud al-Afari, who headed the Islamic State’s chemical weapons program, was captured by US Special Forces in northern Iraq in March of last year.

The Islamic State’s rapid loss of territory in the past year has delivered serious blows to the group’s military infrastructure. Its chemical weapons program, which was targeted early on by the US, Iran and other belligerents, is now almost certainly defunct. But many of its engineers and technical experts are still at large, as are those who were trained by them during the group’s heyday in Iraq and Syria. Despite its continuing retreat, the Islamic State is still capable of employing chemicals that are relatively easy to procure, such as chlorine, hydrogen sulfide, or even various fertilizers, to construct explosives or nerve agents. Last summer, members of a terrorist cell with connections to the Islamic State were arrested in Sydney, Australia. By the time they were arrested, they had already procured significant quantities of hydrogen sulfide and had even tested the chemical, in an apparent preparation for a large-scale attack.

The Australian case shows that the Islamic State is not averse to the tactical use of chemical weapons in terrorist attacks. As the militant group’s self-proclaimed caliphate is disintegrating, and its leaders feel like they have nothing left to lose, the deployment of unconventional terrorist technologies should not be excluded as a tactical option for the organization. Western counter-terrorism officials should actively and immediately prepare for such an eventuality.

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Anyone From the U.S. Mentioning this to China’s President Xi?

Posted on October 19, 2017October 19, 2017 by Denise Simon

Remarkable site and well on top of this issue, for the summary go here.

Primer:

Out of a list of 57 companies accused by U.N. investigators of aiding North Korea, 43 of them haven’t been sanctioned by Treasury.

One of them is Glocom, a firm also known as Pan Systems Pyongyang Branch, a North Korean company based in Malaysia that investigators say uses a series of front companies and agents to procure components and sell communications systems in violation of U.N. sanctions. Pan Systems and another associated firm, Wonbang Trading Co., are operated by North Korea’s intelligence service, the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the U.N. says. Wonbang has also been one of the largest shippers of North Korea coal and Glocom has been investigated for arms shipments. Glocom, which maintains a website, didn’t respond to repeated requests for comment on the allegations.

Another network cited by the U.N. is a transport firm named Vast Win Trading, whose ship, the Jie Shun, was seized in Egypt last year with 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades. The owner of that ship, Chinese national Sun Sidong, has business ties to a network owned by Chinese national Chi Yupeng through a shared email address in China’s business registry, according to the nonprofit group, C4ADS, that monitors global threats. U.S. Attorneys and Treasury have already targeted the Chi Yupeng network with sanctions and seized funds. Mr. Sun’s network of companies has remained so far untouched. In August, Mr. Sun sold his $1.3 million home in Great Neck, N.Y., for cash, according to his real-estate agent. Mr. Sun couldn’t be reached through his U.S.- and U.K.-based companies or through an individual identified as his lawyer in New York property records.

One of his companies, Dandong Dongyuan Industrial Co. Ltd., is the largest exporter of what’s called “dual use” equipment that can include navigation systems and guidance devices that can be used for ballistic missiles, according to C4ADS. Mr. Sun is also the CEO of Dongyuan Enterprise, a Flushing, N.Y., firm.

U.N. investigators named several banks in North Korea that were established, managed or owned by Chinese firms. First Eastern Bank in Rason, North Korea, owned by Unaforte Hong Kong, was set up to provide loans to Chinese individuals and companies, for example. More here.

DoJ: On Aug. 3, 2016, a U.S. Magistrate Judge Joseph A. Dickson of the District of New Jersey signed a criminal complaint charging Ma Xiaohong (Ma) and her company, Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co. Ltd. (DHID), and three of DHID’s top executives, general manager Zhou Jianshu (Zhou), deputy general manager Hong Jinhua (Hong) and financial manager Luo Chuanxu (Luo), with conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and to defraud the United States; violating IEEPA; and conspiracy to launder monetary instruments.

Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) also imposed sanctions on DHID, Ma, Zhou, Hong and Luo for their ties to the government of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction proliferation efforts.

In addition, the department filed a civil forfeiture action for all funds contained in 25 Chinese bank accounts that allegedly belong to DHID and its front companies. The department has also requested tha the federal court in the District of New Jersey issue a restraining order for all of the funds named in the civil forfeiture action, based upon the allegation that the funds represent property involved in money laundering, which makes them forfeitable to the United States. There are no allegations of wrongdoing by the U.S. correspondent banks or foreign banks that maintain these accounts.

“The charges and forfeiture action announced today allege that defendants in China established and used shell companies around the world, surreptitiously moved money through the United States and violated the sanctions imposed on North Korea in response to, among other things, its nuclear weapons program,” said Assistant Attorney General Caldwell. “The actions reflect our efforts to protect the integrity of the U.S. banking system and hold accountable those who seek to evade U.S. sanctions laws.”

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For context:

Hong Kong (CNN)Easey Commercial Building is an unassuming mid-rise office tower on Hennessy Road, an artery that runs through Hong Kong’s busy Wan Chai district. The structure sits among scenery that’s classic Hong Kong: bright lights, tall buildings, people rushing about.

But camouflaged in the normalcy is a business that seemingly exists in name only.

Take the elevator to the Easey building’s 21st floor, and in room 2103 is the registered office of Unaforte Limited Hong Kong. It’s a company accused by the United Nations of violating sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea’s official name) for helping the country make money internationally, funding everything from its nuclear weapons program to the lavish lifestyles of North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un and Pyongyang’s most important players.

At least, Unaforte is supposed to be there. That is the address listed on its publicly available corporate filings provided to the Hong Kong government. When CNN visited the office, it found neither Unaforte nor its listed company secretary, Prolive Consultants Limited.

Instead, room 2103 was home to a seemingly unrelated company: Cheerful Best Company Services. Only one man was there when CNN stopped by, and he said a representative for Prolive Consultants only comes by every so often to pick up mail. He had not heard of Unaforte.

The United Nations Panel of Experts on North Korea — the body charged with monitoring sanctions enforcement on the hermit nation — said in two recent reports that Unaforte opened and owned a bank in the North Korean city of Rason. That is likely a violation of the latest UN Security Council resolution banning joint international ventures with North Korea, according to Christopher Wall, a lawyer who specializes in international trade law and a partner at Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman in Washington, DC.

North Korea is believed to use these types of practices to cover up much of its trade, from selling coal and fuel to exporting weapons.

“The (North Korean) regime accesses the international financial system through front companies and other deceptive financial practices in order to buy goods and services abroad,” Sigal Mandelker, the undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence at the US Department of the Treasury, said in Senate testimony on September 28.

Hong Kong is one of two business jurisdictions (along with the British Virgin Islands) where the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea has seen the largest share of North Korean-controlled front companies operating, said Hugh Griffiths, the panel’s coordinator.

When Unaforte’s company particulars show up in Hong Kong’s publicly available corporate records, the name of just one individual appears. He holds a passport from the small Caribbean island of Dominica. A passport number is there, but not a phone number.

Those details shed light on Hong Kong’s incorporation requirements. To start a company in Hong Kong, one needs at least one director (has to be an actual person) and a company secretary (which can either be a person or another company, but must be based in Hong Kong), according to the Companies Registry website.

Companies that are sanctioned in most cases cannot easily conduct transactions in the dollar, as US banks have to back those deals and would filter and flag sanctioned entities, Anthony Ruggiero, an expert in the use of targeted financial measures at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, told CNN.

The DHID charges revealed that to get around US prying eyes, North Korea uses a complex ledger and credit scheme to hide North Korea’s involvement in dollar transactions, Ruggiero explained to Congress in September.

Thirteen of DHID’s front companies were located in Hong Kong. Eleven shared the same registered address in Wan Chai, less than a kilometer away from the Easey Commercial Building, the indictment said. Read more here from CNN.

S Korea Pursuit of the Blackout Weapon

Posted on October 11, 2017October 11, 2017 by Denise Simon

As the United States flew B1 Lancers based out of Guam in exercises with South Korea and Japan over the Korean Peninsula, the Trump White House was meeting with Pentagon officials on expanded details and strategies with regard to North Korea.

Meanwhile, China continues to demand that all sides tone down the threatening talk and military activities. Has anyone asked China if they are accepting North Korea’s nuclear weapons as a standard condition?

Additionally, more sanctions are taking place including naming four cargo ships under North Korea’s authority from being received in several ports due to hidden illicit cargo transports as recently exposed in Egypt.

Moving to preemptive strategies, South Korea is developing a new weapon called a ‘blackout weapon’ which is not to be confused with an EMP. This blackout weapon, known as a graphite ordnance was developed and used by the United States during the first Gulf War and later in the Balkans.

The purpose of this weapon is to destroy the power grid in hostile nations as a part of the tactics applied where military actions are likely to escalate.

Known as “blackout bombs,” the warheads can be dropped by a plane over power stations. A form of cluster bombs, they split into several canister-like “sub-munitions,” which in turn release carbon graphite filaments that short-circuit the electricity supplies.

South Korea is adding the weapons to its arsenal as part of one of its recently-developed military programs, the so-called “Kill Chain,” which aims to detect an imminent missile attack from the North and react with a pre-emptive strike.

No shots are actually fired and there is no injury or death component to using the blackout bombs. The objective is the merely destroy power stations by short circuiting the systems.

The BLU-114 was developed as a highly classified weapon intended to effectively neutralize electrical power infrastructure without destroying it. This weapon also has been referred to as the ‘soft-bomb’ or the ‘graphite bomb’. Like many other cluster bombs it can be released from virtually any tactical aircraft operated by the United States or allied countries.

The BLU-114 disperses large numbers of chemically treated carbon graphite filaments which short-circuit electrical power distribution equipment such as transformers and switching stations. Used in large numbers it can even shut down the entire power grid of a given country. This weapon represents an excellent sample of non-lethal weaponry with near zero collateral damage.

The CBU-94 Blackout Bomb is the main application for the BLU-114 warhead. It was reported to be employed during the conflict of the former Yugoslavia in 1999 short-cincturing the electrical power infrastructure of Serbia during operation Allied Force. It has been suggested that the BLU-114 or a very similar warhead was integrated into the Tomahawk missile and the AGM-154 JSOW standoff weapon.

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A tactic known as a ‘kill chain’ does not represent death but rather it is a pillar as part of a first strike mission to begin the process of neutralizing battle-space.

Applying all intelligence including satellite reconnaissance as well as cyber and signals intelligence is part of the operations in the stepped process to execute war strategies.

The second and third prongs of South Korea’s defense strategy include missile defense and retaliatory strikes from aircraft in the event North Korea launches a missile. They include the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, and the Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMRR) plan. KAMD is a controversial plan to develop a system to intercept short-range missiles. KMRR is a concept for destroying Pyongyang in the event of a North Korean nuclear first strike.

But it is the first and most dangerous part of the new military strategy – the “Kill Chain” – that has diplomatic observers worried. Such a pre-emptive strike would almost certainly lead to war – and not just any war, but regional nuclear war.

Chinese Infusion of Spies in the U.S.

Posted on October 9, 2017October 9, 2017 by Denise Simon

Related reading: 2014/ How the F.B.I. Cracked a Chinese Spy Ring

Dissident Reveals Secret Chinese Intelligence Plans Targeting U.S.

Guo Wengui calls China communist system a ‘kleptocracy,’ vows reform

China earlier this year ordered the dispatch of 27 intelligence officers to the United States as part of a larger campaign of subversion, according to a leading Chinese dissident.

Guo Wengui, a billionaire real estate mogul, disclosed what he said was an internal Communist Party document authorizing the Ministry of State Security to send the spies, described as “people’s police officers.”

Guo, who is being sought by the Chinese government in a bid to silence his disclosures of high-level corruption and intelligence activity, denounced the Beijing regime as corrupt and called for a “revolution” to reform the system.

“My only single goal that I set myself to try to achieve is to change China,” Guo said through an interpreter during a National Press Club meeting attended by news reporters and supporters of the exiled dissident.

“What they’re doing is against humanity,” he said. “What the U.S. ought to do is take action, instead of just talking to the Chinese kleptocracy.”

Guo last month requested political asylum in the United States in the face of a high-level Chinese government effort to force the United States to return him to China. China has charged him with several crimes. Guo has denied the charges.

Guo earlier charged that senior Chinese leader Wang Qishan, who controls most of China’s finances, is corrupt and has engaged in moving money and documents outside of China. Wang is leading China’s nationwide anti-corruption drive that critics say is cover for efforts by Xi to consolidate power.

The Chinese campaign against Guo has included high-level diplomatic and economic pressure on American government and business leaders to lobby for Guo’s repatriation.

China’s Minister of Public Security, Guo Shengkun, met with Attorney General Jeff Sessions on Wednesday where China’s demands for the return of fugitives was discussed.

A Justice Department spokesman said Sessions raised the issue of a Chinese-origin cyber attack against the Hudson Institute, a think tank that had canceled its plan to hold the press conference for Guo under pressure from China. The Justice spokesman, Wynn Hornbuckle, said China pledged their cooperation in investigating the incident.

Hornbuckle would not say if Guo Wengui was discussed during the law enforcement and cyber security talks.

David Tell, a Hudson spokesman, told the Washington Free Beacon, the denial of service cyber attack was traced by investigators to Shanghai.

According to an email obtained by the Free Beacon, a Hudson employee stated that he was asked to forward a message to institute leaders sent from a Chinese Embassy official on Sept. 29.

Chinese officials, according to the email, “want Hudson to cancel the Guo Wengui event because he is a criminal and tells lies, that China is about to enter a sensitive time with its Party Congress, that hosting him would hurt China-U.S. relations, and that this event would embarrass Hudson Institute and hurt our ties with the Chinese government.”

The intelligence document released Thursday is one of a number sensitive internal reports obtained by Guo who was once close to MSS Vice Minister Ma Jian, who was imprisoned last year on corruption charges, but who Guo has said was repressed politically because of his knowledge of corruption among Chinese leaders.

Guo said he had planned to disclose three internal Chinese government documents during the Hudson event. But instead he burned the documents after the event was canceled.

Guo said he maintains close ties to supporters within the Chinese government and security system and is able to obtain many internal documents.

According to Guo, for simply holding the top-secret document he distributed at the press conference, a person could be jailed in China for three to five years.

The document was issued by the National Security Council, a new Chinese government and Party entity headed by Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

The MSS operatives will work under cover at the Bank of China branch offices and at Chinese diplomatic facilities in the United States.

The document is labeled “top secret” and dated April 27. It was released by Guo at a press conference in Washington during which he appealed for the U.S. government to wake up to the threat posed by China and counter it.

Guo said the authenticity of the document was confirmed by the U.S. government.

The directive to the MSS was formally called “The Request for Instructions on the Working Plan of Secretly Dispatching and 27 People’s Police Officers, He Jianfeng and Others from the Ministry of State Security to the United States on Field Duty in 2017.”

“We approve in principle,” the report says, adding “please carefully organize and implement.”

According to the document the MSS should follow Chinese ideology set out by the late leader Deng Xiaoping, as well as the concepts outlined in speeches by Xi, the current leader.

The document is one of the first internal documents to reveal how China is expanding intelligence activities targeting what it calls “hostile forces” in the United States.

The MSS, according to the report, was told to “go according to the need of the strategic arrangements” of the Communist Party “against overseas hostile forces, strictly abide by our national principles of state security work on the United States, and use the opportunity of the rise of our comprehensive national strength and Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations tending to ease to further expand the scope and depth of the infiltration into the anti-China hostile forces in the United States.”

The MSS agents are to enter the United States secretly in phases and “use the cover of the executives of the state-owned enterprises in the United States, such as the Bank of China (New York) to carry out solid intelligence collection, to incite defection of relevant individuals, and to conduct counter-espionage, etc.”

The spies also were directed to focus on “extraordinarily significant criminal suspects, including Ling Wancheng, Guo Wengui, and Cheng Muyang, etc.”

Ling is the brother of Ling Jihua, a former high-ranking Chinese official who China has accused of illegal activities and who defected to the United States in 2016. Cheng is a real estate mogul in Canada who China also accused of illegal activities.

“If necessary, they should also actively support, cooperate with, and assist the personnel in the United States who conduct the United Front operations, diplomatic operations, and military intelligence operations to carry out related business,” the document states.

United Front work is what the Chinese government calls influence operations aimed at coopting Americans into supporting Beijing’s policies.

The directive urges the spies to “make contributions for further crushing overseas anti-China hostile forces.”

Lastly, MSS officials should seek to strengthen the organization and provide after actions reports to the senior Party organ.

“We have friends all over the world … those who provide the documents are among the most senior people, including the current Politburo standing committee,” Guo said. “My material is real. Otherwise, they wouldn’t be afraid of it.”

Guo said during his press conference that since the April directive, around 50 additional intelligence operatives were sent to the United States.

An FBI spokeswoman had no comment on the document. A Chinese Embassy spokesman did not respond to an email seeking comment.

On Saturday, China’s Public Security Ministry issued a statement denying China was behind the hack of a law firm representing Guo and the Hudson Institute. The ministry also disputed the authenticity of the document.

“An official of the Ministry of Public Security states that, China paid close attention to such allegations and launched immediate investigation,” the statement said. “But no evidence has been found that China and its government have been involved with these incidents.”

The ministry also called the documents revealed by Guo “utterly clumsily forged and full of obvious mistakes.” It did not elaborate but offered to cooperate in a U.S. investigation into the authenticity of the materials and cooperate in the probe of the cyber attacks.

According to Guo, China is engaged in a three-pronged campaign of subversion in the United States he labeled “Blue-Gold-Yellow,” with each color standing for a different line of attack.

Blue represents large-scale Chinese cyber and internet operations while gold represents China’s use of money and financial power. The yellow is part of a plan to use sex to undermine American society.

Another Chinese government subversion program was described by Guo using the code name the “Three Fs.” It involves China’s systematic programs targeting the United States with the goal to weaken the country, throw the country into turmoil and ultimately defeat America.

Asked about the major Communist Party meeting scheduled for later this month, Guo said: “I would like all members of the Chinese Communist Party to wake up and say no to this ruling clique.”

Guo disclosed that he was imprisoned in China after the 1989 pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square and spent 22 months in prison. Chinese police also shot his brother, who later died.

Since then, he has spent the intervening years as an entrepreneur preparing to expose corrupt Chinese leaders, a process he began in January.

China has retaliated by freezing some $17 billion in assets in China and by imprisoning business associates and relatives of Guo.

Radio France’s Chinese-language radio service reported recently that several Chinese have been harassed by authorities for discussing Guo’s disclosures about Wang’s corruption. The report called the activity “Guo Wengui-phobia.”

Chinese censors have cracked down on people online who used the phrases used by Guo, like “Wang-Seven-Three” and “73” for Wang Qishen. Also a person wearing the t-shirt with the word “all of this is only the beginning”—one of Guo’s catch phrases on social media was detained.

“Those who support Guo Wengui call out ‘put a pot on your head,’ a homophone for ‘support Guo,'” the French report said. “Those who desperately want to catch him want to ‘smash that pot,’ literally meaning ‘smash the pot,’ but the term means ‘to fail.'”

China also recently blocked the messaging app WhatsApp, after China tightened controls on WeChat, Weibo, and Baidu message boards that were sharing posts on Guo.

“Looking at social media, every time Guo Wengui has revealed the secrets of a corrupt official, there’s been a reaction on the streets of Beijing,” the report said. “In restaurants, bars, in the streets and alleyways, people see each other and, smiling, ask, ‘What did he say now?’ It’s become a tacit greeting.”

DPRK: What Barack/Hillary Knew and When

Posted on September 4, 2017September 4, 2017 by Denise Simon

Hey China…what gives? France, you have a call holding on line 4.

None of this would have been in Obama’s, Hillary’s or John Kerry’s emails? Hillary did not use ANY official government email platform…just say’n.

John Kerry under the instruction of the Obama White House negotiated the Joint Plan of Action with Iran on the nuclear development program. Purposely many things were overlooked including the nefarious activities between Iran and North Korea.

Imagine the developments are cables since 2009.

Countries that were part of the long negotiations were the P5+1, which included:

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the EU3) also offered Iran several proposals to resolve the nuclear issue during negotiations with Iran in 2004 and 2005. China, Russia, and the United States joined the three European countries in 2006 to offer “P5+1” proposals to Iran.

North Korean front companies operate inside China with impunity.

The extent of Chinese companies’ role in enabling North Korea’s evasion of sanctions is detailed deep in the fine print of the still unpublished 105-page report. For instance, North Korea’s Daedong Credit Bank (DCB) and Korea Daesong Bank, both subject to U.S. and U.N. sanctions, continue to operate in the Chinese cities of Dalian, Dandong, and Shenyang in violation of U.N. resolutions. The panel suspects that one of the banks, Daedong, may in fact be majority-owned by Chinese shareholders, citing July 2011 documents indicating the sale of a controlling stake, 60 percent, to a Chinese firm. More here.

So, when it comes to France, what did they know via the MTCR?

Background

Formal discussions on controlling missile proliferation began in 1983 among France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They were later joined by Canada and Japan, and in 1985, an interim agreement to control the proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, including dual-use missile items, was reached. A nuclear-capable missile was defined as one capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms (kg) to a range of 300 kilometers (km) or more. The G-7 States formally announced the Missile Technology and Control Regime (MTCR) on 16 April 1987.

Since then, membership has expanded to the present 34 States, the additional members being Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. Some other States, including China, India, Israel, Romania, and Slovakia, have pledged to abide by the MTCR Guidelines.

Regime Goal

The regime goal is to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons) by controlling the transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons.

Regime Guidelines

The regime guidelines consist of national control laws and procedures; a two-category common control list; information-sharing on any denied cases to ensure no commercial advantage; no impediment to national space programs; presumption of denial of any transfers in terms of nuclear weapon delivery systems development; and no retransfers without authorization.

Equipment and Technology Annex

Category I items of the Equipment and Technology Annex include complete rocket and unmanned-air-vehicle delivery systems and subsystems. The transfer of Category I items is subject to a strong presumption of denial. The transfer of production technology for Category I items is prohibited.

Category II items include propulsion and propellant components, launch and ground support equipment, as well as the materials for the construction of missiles. The transfer of Category II items is less restricted, but still requires end-use certification or verification where appropriate. More here.

So, to answer the question in the title of this article, here is a WikiLeaks cable providing background:

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MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): NORTH KOREA,S MISSILE PROGRAM
Date: 2009 October 6, 13:14 (Tuesday)	Canonical ID: 09STATE103755_a
Original Classification: SECRET	Current Classification: SECRET
In the metadata of the Kissinger Cables this field is called ‘Previous Handling Restrictions’. Cablegate does not originally have this field. We have given it the entry ‘Not Assigned’. Citations for acronyms used are available here.” data-hasqtip=”true” oldtitle=”Handling Restrictions” title=””>Handling Restrictions — Not Assigned —	Character Count: 14817
Executive Order: — Not Assigned —	Locator: TEXT ONLINE
TAGS: BR – Brazil \| ETTC – Trade and Technology Controls \| FR – France \| KSCA – Science Counselors and Attachés \| MNUC – Military and Defense Affairs–Military Nuclear Applications \| MTCRE – Missile Technology Control Regime \| PARM – Political Affairs–Arms Controls and Disarmament \| TSPA – Technology and Science–Space Activities	Concepts: — Not Assigned —
Enclosure: — Not Assigned —	Type: TE – Telegram (cable)
Office Origin: — N/A or Blank — Office Action: — N/A or Blank —	Archive Status: — Not Assigned —
From: Secretary of State	Markings: — Not Assigned —
To: France Paris \| Missile Technology Control Regime

Original cable: Reasons: 1.4 (B), (D), (H). 1. (U)

This is an action request.

Please see paragraph 2. 2. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests Embassy Paris provide the interagency cleared paper “North Korea,s Missile Program” in paragraph 3 below to the French Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Point of Contact (POC) for distribution to all Partners.

Info addressees also may provide to host government officials as appropriate. In delivering paper, posts should indicate that the U.S. is sharing this paper as part of our preparation for the Information Exchange that will be held in conjunction with the MTCR Plenary in Rio, November 9-13, 2009. NOTE: Additional IE papers will be provided via septels. END NOTE.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER: (SECRET REL MTCR) North Korea’s Missile Program Introduction North Korea continues to make progress in its ballistic missile development efforts. We expect both the new Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and the solid-propellant Toksa short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) to be fielded in the coming years, and as demonstrated by North Korea,s April 5th launch of the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) space launch vehicle (SLV)/intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in a failed attempt to place a satellite into orbit, the pursuit of longer-range systems remains a DRPK priority. North Korea’s deployed forces include hundreds of Scud and No Dong short and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBM/MRBM), seven of which it launched in 2009.

North Korea remains one of the world’s leading suppliers of ballistic missiles and technology, and continues to provide assistance to both Iran’s and Syria’s ballistic missile programs. North Korea, since the 1980s, has supplied a variety of customers with ballistic missiles, missile components, and missile-related technology. These sales have included complete Category I missile systems, as well as production technology and expertise.

North Korea has maintained its right to sell ballistic missiles and continues to market its systems to countries in the Middle East while seeking to expand its missile marketing activities worldwide. North Korea this year probably resumed ballistic missile-related cooperation with Yemen, and may have recently reached an agreement with Burma to provide Rangoon with ballistic missile technology.

North Korea has developed most of the necessary capability and infrastructure to produce and assemble its ballistic missiles. However, while North Korea continues to make progress in its missile development efforts, it remains reliant on outside suppliers for a range of missile-related raw materials and components. While most of these materials are for direct application to its missile program, North Korea may procure some items in support of its missile customers.

Program History North Korea’s ballistic missile program started in the early-1980s, when it reverse-engineered Soviet-made 300km-range Scud B SRBMs acquired from Egypt. This Scud B technology went on to form the basis for the DPRK,s Scud B, Scud C, No Dong, Taepo Dong-l (TD-1), and TD-2 systems. In return for the Scud Bs, North Korea assisted Egypt’s efforts to domestically produce Scuds. Building on this success, the DPRK began designing the 500 km- range Scud C in the mid-1980s.

These Scuds have been exported to customers in the Middle East and are deployed in North Korea. Given its 20 years experience working with Scud technology, North Korea is able to design and produce extended-range variants of the Scud, capable of delivering payloads of over 500 kg to ranges up to 1,000 km.

North Korea also used Scud technology to develop the No Dong medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) that is deployed as part of North Korea’s missile forces. The No Dong has a range of 1,300 km with a 500 kg payload, which could strike all of South Korea and Japan. Scud and No Dong technology also form the basis of North Korea’s TD-1 and TD-2 systems. In 1998, North Korea tested the Taepo Dong-1, which probably utilized a No Dong first stage and Scud second stage. Although launched as an SLV, the TD-1 launch showed that North Korea had successfully developed many of the essential technologies for staged missile systems vital for ICBM development.

The DPRK has also developed the follow-on system for the TD-1, the TD-2. Although a more advanced design than the TD-l, the TD-2 still relies on Scud and No Dong technology, with probably clustered No Dong engines powering the first stage, and either a Scud or No Dong-based second stage. In a two stage configuration, the TD-2 would have a range of over 9,000 km with a substantial weapons payload of approximately 500 kg.

In a three stage configuration, such as that launched in April 2009, the TD-2 could deliver the same sized payload up to 15,000 km, which could reach all of the United States and Europe, although likely with very poor accuracy.

The first stage of the April 2009 launch fell into the Sea of Japan, and the upper stages landed in the Pacific. This demonstrates progress since the 2006 test, which flew only about 40 seconds. Recently, North Korea has developed a new land-mobile IRBM –called the Musudan by the United States.

The Musudan is a single-stage missile and may have a range of up to 4,000 km with a 500 kg payload. The Musudan is derived from the SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and represents a substantial advance in North Korea’s liquid propellant technology, as the SS-N-6 had a much more advanced engine and used more energetic propellants — unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (N204) — than those used in Scud-type missiles. Development of the Musudan with this more advanced propulsion technology allows North Korea to build even longer-range missiles — or shorter range missiles with greater payload capacity — than would be possible using Scud-type technology. As the Scud market nears saturation, North Korea also has started to develop its own solid-propellant missile systems, as evidenced by its development of a new solid propellant SRBM based on the SS-21 SRBM.

This new missile — called the Toksa by the United States — has a range of 120 km with a payload as large as 500 kg. This is a disturbing development since North Korea can apply its experience in producing this missile to other, longer- range, solid propellant missile designs. Solid propellant ballistic missiles are preferred by many countries due to their lesser logistics requirements and shorter launch times, making them more survivable than liquid propellant missiles. North Korea,s advances — in both its liquid and solid propellant programs — have come despite a self-imposed missile launch moratorium, that limited North Korea’s ability to verify new designs or modifications to its missile systems during the 1999-2006 timeframe.

North Korea ended the moratorium with its July 5, 2006 Scud, No Dong, and Taepo Dong-2 launches. Program Activities On April 5, 2009, North Korea — despite UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which requires the suspension of all activities related to its ballistic missile program — conducted the second launch of the TD-2. Although the April 5th TD-2 launch failed to place a satellite in orbit, the launch was much more successful than the first TD-2 launch in 2006, demonstrating that North Korea is making progress in developing technology that can directly contribute to the production of ICBMs. Subsequently, and despite the adoption on June 12, 2009 of UNSCR 1874, which reaffirmed the provisions of UNSCR 1718 related to North Korea,s ballistic missile activities, North Korea tested seven Scud SRBMs and No Dong MRBMs on July 4th.

The April 5th TD-2 launch also demonstrated that North Korea continues to pursue the development of longer-range missile systems and that long range missile development probably remains a priority. North Korea’s next goal may be to develop a mobile ICBM that would be capable of threatening targets around the world, without requiring the lengthy — and potentially vulnerable — launch preparation time required by the TD-2. Technology Supplier The DPRK continues to sell ballistic missile-related technology to countries in the Middle East, while seeking to re-engage with former customers in the region. North Korea is probably also pursuing new markets for its missiles, including in regions such as Southeast Asia and Africa.

North Korea offers a wide-range of ballistic missile services, almost certainly is willing to offer any missile design in its inventory for sale to customers interested in complete systems, and can design missiles to meet specific customer needs. For customers with established missile programs or otherwise lacking interest in complete systems, North Korea provides missile refurbishment and technical expertise, ground support equipment and launchers, and production technology. North Korea can also broker precision machine tools and other missile-related raw materials from third-parties for customers through its extensive procurement network. Iran Iran is one of North Korea’s key missile customers.

Since the late 1980s, the DPRK has exported complete Scud B and Scud C missiles to Iran, as well as their production technology. The Scud and other missile technology acquired from North Korea form the basis for the Iranian Shahab-3, which is based on North Korea’s No Dong. North Korea has probably provided Iran an MRBM variant, called the BM-25, of its Musudan IRBM.

This technology would provide Iran with more advanced missile technology than currently used in its Shahab-series of ballistic missiles and could form the basis for future Iranian missile and SLV designs. North Korea also provided assistance to Iran’s SLV program. On February 2nd, Iran successfully orbited the Omid satellite, using its Safir SLV, the first stage of which was based on the Shahab-3 (No Dong). Pyongyang’s assistance to Iran’s SLV program suggests that North Korea and Iran may also be cooperating on the development of long-range ballistic missiles. Syria Syria is another of North Korea’s key missile customers. North Korea has provided Syria with 500 km-range Scud C missiles and technology as well as technology for a 700 km-range Scud variant, referred to in Syria as the “Scud D.”

The missiles came initially in either partially or completely knocked-down kit form, but were produced in North Korea. Syria has since achieved a domestic production capability, probably with extensive assistance from Pyongyang. North Korea has also provided a range of other missile-related services to Syria, including production technology, ground support equipment, raw material, components, technical assistance, and know-how.

North Korea probably provided assistance to Syria’s development of a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) for its Scud ballistic missiles. Yemen In December 2002, Yemen received a shipment of Scud missiles, which Sanaa claimed to have bought from North Korea for defensive purposes and pledged would not be retransferred to any third party. North Korea probably resumed ballistic missile cooperation with Yemen in 2009.

Burma The mid-2009 voyage of the North Korean ship, Kang Nam 1, probably was associated with North Korea’s primary arms export entity — suggesting that the cargo was most likely weapons-related. The ship returned to North Korea prior to reaching its destination, which was most likely Burma.

The Kang Nam 1 probably was carrying ballistic missiles or conventional weapons. A November 2008 visit by a senior Burmese official to a North Korean ballistic missile production facility suggests that the two sides probably have been discussing a ballistic missile deal, and that the cargo may have been related to these discussions.

Foreign Assistance North Korea operates a vast network of embassy personnel, front companies, and commercial entities run by ethnic Koreans in other countries to obtain key technologies and materials needed to support both its own and its customers’ missile programs. Members of this network often do not reveal their affiliation with North Korea, or North Korea as the end-user of critical goods; they utilize entities in Europe, China, East Asia, and South Asia to establish reliable routes for the transfer of controlled items. Most foreign procurement by the North Korean missile program includes material North Korea finds too costly or too advanced to manufacture domestically, such as missile component testing equipment, heat-resistant materials for re-entry vehicles, heavy-duty vehicle chassis, missile tracking technologies, precision machine tools, specialty steels and aluminums, ball bearings, precision gyroscopes, solid-propellant precursor chemicals, and liquid-propellant precursors. Although important for its own program, North Korea also uses this network to broker missile-related raw materials for its missile export customers.

Conclusion North Korea will continue to develop missiles with increasing range, payload capacity, and sophistication. In support of these efforts, North Korea will continue to seek critically-needed components from foreign suppliers — most commonly China-based, given their proximity and access to technology that would be beneficial to North Korea,s missile program. In light of its past missile technology acquisition practices, we remain vigilant for any attempts by North Korea to acquire material or technology associated with missile systems other countries — including MTCR Partners — have retired. International pressure against North Korea and its customers have had a significant impact on North Korea,s missile sales.

However, despite such pressure, North Korea continues missile cooperation with its core clients and continues to offer MTCR Category I missile systems, their production technology, and missile maintenance and support services to all interested customers. END TEXT OF PAPER.

4. (U) Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR issues for ISN/MTR.

A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON