I have been asked several times in the last month if we are prepared for nuclear war with Russia. My responses have consistently been yes but the United States is always prepared and the likelihood of a nuclear conflict is slim. Sure, there is always that threat, yet it is just that, a threat.
Related reading: Russia’s Use of Military Power in Ukraine
This site has published countless items in recent months regarding Russia and the most important of all of them is the Gerasimov Doctrine, a paper that very few have read. Okay, while it is important, below will summarize some items in cliff note fashion.
In July 2015, Putin stated that:
recent events show that we cannot hope that some of our geopolitical opponents will change their hostile course any time in the foreseeable future … we must respond accordingly to this situation … and take additional systemic measures in all key areas … [to] preserve our country’s social, political and economic stability. Much here will depend on consolidating the efforts of our state institutions and civil society and concentrating resources in priority areas.117 (Chatham House)
Steps to a war footing: Recently, Moscow ordered an nationwide military drill for several important reasons. 1. It needed it as a test to determine flaws. 2. The drill was part of the normal propaganda machine where, your government cares deeply about you.
There have been bunkers built and tours provided, there has been training for school children and the applications gas masks, directions throughout the country and who is in charge and has authority, the movement of nuclear weapons to other locations and missile testing.
***** But with all this chatter, are we at a point of a Cuban missile crisis? Well…all the symptoms are there and increasing for sure and American citizens should take notice. However….go slow, be measured and understand more of what needs to be understood and that is Russia itself. She is not a big threat to America as she is to Eastern Europe and Europe proper.
A recent NewsMax article noted that Russia has deployed warships to the English Channel and that Russia was on a economic war-footing. What is an economic war-footing? It has several definitions but most is can this country feed the hungry during a prolonged conflict and Russia will inflict financial damage to her adversaries. Ukraine and regions of Europe could be sacrificial lambs due to stopping energy resources such as gas and oil.
Let’s look closer at Russia:
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Military and security mobilization
In part from Chatham House: The military aspects of Russia’s mobilization include the transition of the military and civil defence forces on to a war footing.37 This is largely a task concerned with complex administration – storing supplies and equipment; organizing and concentrating forces; coordinating men, equipment and transport with their missions; and deploying these assets as needed.
But it is also about the evolving conceptualization of the structure and role of the Russian armed forces. Thus the theme of mobilization sheds light on some enduring questions for the Russian leadership that go beyond the simple idea that mobilization is administration and ‘a staff problem’.
Indeed, mobilization has traditionally been related to how Moscow thinks about contemporary and future war. It has long been associated with the modernization of Russia’s armed forces, as the leadership has sought to work out the kind of force structures necessary to minimize the country’s weaknesses and maximize its advantages over opponents.
Facing a Turbulent Time:
Mobilization, with Difficulty Gerasimov’s brief discussion of mobilization in his February 2013 article has been almost entirely overlooked in the Western debate about Russian actions. Yet it is revealing, and offers a means of understanding the thinking of the Russian leadership and its actions during the past five years, and the direction in which it is taking Russia. Indeed, the ‘Gerasimov doctrine’ is best understood as a portent not of ‘hybrid’ warfare, but of Russian state mobilization. It discussed moving the economy on to a war footing, and pointed to the discussion of mobilization as preparedness, even readiness, proceeding before the outbreak of war.
At heart, Russian state mobilization is, in effect, grand strategy in emergency circumstances. Its implementation reflects a deliberate attempt to generate power and an acknowledgment of the problems that Moscow faces, both in terms of a complex and potentially hostile international environment and the dysfunctionalities of the Russian system. Mobilization is also about conceptualizing contemporary and future war, and preparing for the many and multifaceted challenges it poses. In current circumstances, this means both military combat readiness and the resilience and coordination of the wider system, including the MVD, security and investigation services, and other ministries.
Where are we, then, in terms of Russian mobilization? Given the definitions above, it appears that the Russian leadership is currently operating in the ‘mobilization preparation’ phase. It is taking measures to mobilize the economy, armed forces and state institutions, including explicitly stated actions to prepare Russia for the transition to war. In this it is moving towards a ‘mobilization readiness’ framework. In early 2014 Gerasimov stated that the General Staff had received additional powers for the coordination of federal organs, and that, ‘just in case’, a range of measures had been developed to ‘prepare the country for the transition to conditions of war’.113 Putin had used the same terminology following the Zapad-2013 exercises, and even earlier.114
This process has been under way for some time. If many in the West see relations with Russia in a post-Ukraine, post-2014 context, the Russian leadership is operating in a longer time frame that, though it has roots stretching back over a decade, is perhaps best depicted as a post-Arab Spring context. It is worth restating Gerasimov’s line in his article in February 2013 that ‘mobilization and concentration is not part of the period after the onset of the state of war, as in 1914, but rather unnoticed, proceeds long before that’.115 It is important to read this whole summary for context and perspective.
****** One last item and most significant, don’t underestimate the pro-active measures and defense systems of the United States. It is about the Navy and this summary will offer some comfort. You ask about the weakness of Obama making any decisions and signing his authorization? Sure, he is weak, but there are some thresholds he cannot ignore as Commander in Chief. It is the Pentagon and the Intelligence community that will prove the next measure to the National Security Council along with the House and Senate Arms Services Committee.
