Battle-hardened fighters are on the move from Chechnya to the Middle East. This is not a recent development however a new dynamic is underway. First there was Syria, now there is Islamic State and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi is happy to have new fighters.
*** There may, in fact, be as many as four separate categories of Chechens in Syria — or even five, if an unconfirmed recent report that a detachment of the Chechen security forces is fighting in Aleppo on the side of Assad is indeed true.
The first category are the battle-hardened veterans of the North Caucasus insurgency. It has been suggested, but not proven, that Qatar and Saudi Arabia financed the recruitment of those experienced former insurgents because “the Chechens are regarded as the best of the jihadist fighters.”
“The Guardian” profiled in September 2012 a brigade of fighters that included Chechens, together with fighters from Libya, Tajikistan, Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The author of that article described the Chechen fighters as “older, taller, and stronger” than their comrades in arms, many of whom clearly lacked any previous combat experience. He further noted that the Chechens “carried their weapons with confidence and distanced themselves from the rest, moving around in a tight-knit unit-within-a-unit,” suggesting that many have been members of the North Caucasus insurgency.
The second category is Kists — members of Georgia’s Chechen minority from the Pankisi Gorge close to the Georgian-Chechen border. Two of the Chechen commanders in Syria, Abu Omar al-Chechen (the commander of the brigade profiled by “The Guardian”) and Saifullah, are reportedly from Pankisi.
One of those fighters from Pankisi, who gave his name as Abu Hamza, told a Western journalist two months ago that he was motivated to travel to Syria and join the opposition by video footage on the Internet of Syrian government forces killing innocent women and children. The Georgian-Russian border is so tightly controlled that it is far easier for the Kists to travel to Syria than to enter Chechnya to join the North Caucasus insurgency.
The third category is young Chechens from among the estimated 250,000 who left Chechnya since the beginning of the first war in 1994 and settled in Europe and elsewhere. Abu Hamza said most of the Chechens he encountered during the several months he spent in Syria were from this category.
Pro-Moscow Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov has confirmed that young Chechens from Europe are fighting in Syria. He claims some of them, from low-income families, were attracted by the prospect of “violence and looting,” while others were victims of a concerted effort by Western intelligence services to recruit fighters by means of jihadist websites. Last summer, Kadyrov had affirmed that if young Chechen refugees in Europe wanted to take up arms they would travel to the North Caucasus to join the insurgency.
The fourth category is young Chechens from the Chechen Republic who either abandoned their studies at Middle Eastern universities to fight in Syria or managed to leave Chechnya with the explicit aim of joining the Syrian opposition forces. Kadyrov categorically denied last summer that any “Russian citizens from the Chechen Republic” were fighting in Syria. But over the past two months he has admitted on several occasions that Chechens from both Chechnya and the émigré community in Europe and Turkey had traveled to Syria to fight.
On May 6, Kadyrov implied that the latter category far outnumber the former: he said “a few” Chechens from Chechnya were fighting in Syria, and that “hundreds” from Europe and Turkey had been killed. Two weeks later, however, Kadyrov said “just a few” Chechens from Europe had been killed in the fighting.
The exodus of young men from Chechnya intent on fighting in Syria was discussed at a session of Chechnya’s Economic and Social Security Council on June 6. The website Kavkaz-Uzel quoted an unnamed member of that body as saying 29 Chechens have left Chechnya for Syria, seven of whom have been killed. That source did not specify a time frame. He did say, however, that those who left were mostly aged between 25 and 30, which contradicts Kadyrov’s repeated claims that the men in question are immature adolescents seduced by recruitment videos posted on the Internet.
The true number of Chechens who have headed to Syria to fight may be even larger. Kavkaz-Uzel quoted a representative of a local NGO as saying he knows of some 30 who have left, while an unnamed cleric suggested the true figure could run into dozens, or even hundreds. Predictably, the Chechen authorities are reportedly exerting pressure on the parents of those young men to persuade them to return to Chechnya.
Federal Security Service head Aleksandr Bortnikov told journalists earlier this month that some 200 militants from the Russian Federation are fighting on the side of the “terrorists” in Syria. He did not, unfortunately, give any indication how many are from which republic.
Last fall, the insurgency website Kavkaz Center reported that there were 150 fighters from the “Caucasus Emirate” in Syria, divided into four brigades. One of those brigades is from Kabardino-Balkaria. *** Shock Waves From Insurgency Commanders’ Defection To IS Felt Beyond North Caucasus The decision late last year by several prominent North Caucasus insurgency commanders to retract their oath of allegiance to Caucasus Emirate leader Aliaskhab Kebekov (Sheikh Ali Abu-Mukhammad) and pledge loyalty to Islamic State (IS) leader Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi has apparently engendered confusion and discord not only across the North Caucasus but within the Chechen diaspora community.
That at least is the message conveyed by Akhmad Umarov (nom de guerre Abu Khamza), the brother of Caucasus Emirate (IK) founder and leader Doku Umarov and the IK’s official representative abroad, in a 15-minute video address posted last week on Checheninfo.com, the website of the Chechen wing of the North Caucasus insurgency.
In that video footage, Umarov requests a statement of moral support from Kebekov and Emir Khamzat (Aslan Byutukayev), the commander of the Chechen insurgency wing, in response to what he terms the “groundless accusations” dreamed up against him by the pro-IS faction and the latter’s “childish” attempts to justify their actions.
He says it is “unacceptable” that those who do not obey Shari’a law “are trying to obstruct us in our work and spread discord,” and insists that those persons who do so, whether unwittingly, or at the behest of “enemies of Islam,” or in the hope of securing a comfortable post within the IS leadership, should be held responsible under Shari’a law, and will answer for their actions on Judgment Day.
Umarov appeals to Kebekov and Khamzat to explain why Chechen commanders are violating their oath of loyalty to Kebekov and their theological arguments for doing so. He says failure to clarify their arguments will only deepen the split between the two factions.
Umarov then presents his superiors with a choice: either to issue a statement of support for the stance adopted by the IK representation abroad with regard to the defections to IS that would make clear to all fighters from Chechnya and Daghestan that they should “abide by all demands that do not contradict the Koran and Sunna,” meaning remain loyal to Kebekov. Or, “if you have doubts about what we are saying and our sincerity, then we ask you to appoint new people to replace us and dismiss us from our posts. If you have faith and confidence in us, then we ask you to grant us additional powers to restore order and establish a strict and functional system in accordance with Shari’a law to address urgent questions which it is imperative to resolve — questions concerning religion, politics, and social, financial, and informational issues.”
Umarov then addresses Chechen fighters both in the Caucasus and beyond “who are trying to help the cause and to defend our religion and honor,” urging them to take a clear stance against the renegade faction. He says he can provide an explanation for what that faction “is saying behind our backs,” but does not say what those criticisms are.
With regard to Syria (he does not use the toponym “Sham” favored by the Chechens fighting there), Umarov affirms unequivocally that “any fighter who travels to Syria to take part in jihad there should understand that he will have to answer for that on Judgment Day. We appeal to you, especially to the young people of the Vilayat Nokhchiicho [Chechnya], to stay where you are. Your holy duty today is jihad in the Caucasus…to defend our land, the territory of the Caucasus Emirate,” from the “primary foe” in the person of the Kremlin regime and its apostate collaborators, meaning the pro-Moscow Chechen leadership.
Given that Umarov speaks in very general terms, it is impossible to assess the extent of support among IK fighters for IS and the magnitude of the threat that faction poses to the cohesion of the insurgency ranks. But his request for “additional powers” suggests he faces a serious challenge.
Since the statements of support for Baghdadi by six Chechen and Daghestani commanders last month, several insurgency commanders from Chechnya and Ingushetia who for reasons they do not specify are no longer in the Caucasus have reaffirmed their loyalty to Kebekov. So too has Emir Salim (Zalim Shebzukhov), commander of the Kabardino-Balkar-Karachai insurgency wing.
