The Field for the Oval Office is Expanding

Evan McMullin for President

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My Letter To America

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Jobs and the Economy

Why Did Secretaries Gates, Hagel and Panetta Really Resign?

What they were really saying is fighting a war under Baraq Obama became a behemoth bureaucracy and just as an added concept, so has local law enforcement. But to stay on topic and to understand why the enemies have the advantage whether on a battlefield or in any diplomatic efforts with other world leaders, the below text will blow your head off.

Bring in the lawyers, submit names for nomination as a militant or enemy, form a committee, have meetings, clear with more lawyers, challenge the evidence, seek advise from other agencies, get Obama off the golf course, meet again, see what the State Department has to say, collaborate with other world leaders, go back to the White House and hope the pen and phone are available and agree. Meanwhile, the high value target is where again?

(Please excuse the text formatting below, it is a conversion from a .pdf file)

The original document from the Justice Department is here.

May 22, 2013

PROCEDURES FOR APPROVING DIRECT ACTION AGAINST TERRORIST TARGETS

LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND AREAS OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES

From the Justice Department: This Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) establishes the standard operating procedures for when the United States takes direct action, which refers to lethal and non-lethal uses of force, including capture operations, against terrorist targets outside the United States and areas of active hosti lities.

Any direct action must be conducted lawfully and taken against lawful targets; wherever possible such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted]such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted]such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted]such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted]such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] plan. In particular, whether any proposed target would be a lawful target for direct action is a determination that will be made in the first instance by the nominating department’s or agency’s counsel (with appropriate legal review as provided below) based on the legal authorities of the nominating department or agency and other applicable law. Even if the proposed target is lawful, there remains a separate question whether the proposed target should be targeted for direct action as a matter of pol icy. That determination will be made pursuant to the interagency review process and policy standards set forth in this PPG. The most important policy objective. particularly informing consideration of lethal action, is to protect American lives.

Capture operations offer the best opportunity for meaningful intelligence gain from counterterrorism (CT) operations and the mitigation and disruption of terrorist threats. Consequently, the United States prioritizes. as a matter of policy. the capture of terrorist suspects as a preferred option over lethal action and will therefore require a feasibility assessment of capture options as a component of any proposal for lethal action. Lethal action should be taken in an effort to prevent terrorist attacks against U.S. persons only when capture of an individual is not feasible and no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat. Lethal action should not be proposed or pursued as a punitive step or as a substitute for prosecuting a terrorist suspect in a civilian court or a military commission. Capture is preferred even in circumstances where neither prosecution nor third-country custody are availab le disposition options at the time.

CT actions, including lethal action against designated terrorist targets. shall be as discriminating and precise as reasonably possible. Absent extraordinary circumstances, direct action against an identified high-value terrorist (HVT) will be taken only when there is near certainty that the individual being targeted is in fact the lawful target and located at the place where the action will occur. Also absent extraordinary circumstances, direct action will be taken only if there is near certainty that the action can be taken without injuring or killing non-combatants. For purposes of this PPG. non-combatants are understood to be individuals who may not be made the object of attack under the law of armed conflict. The term ·’non-combatant” does not include an individual who is targetable as part of a belligerent party to an armed conflict, an individual who is taking a direct part in hostilities, or an individual who is targetable in the exercise of national self-defense. Moreover, international legal principles. including respect for a state’s sovereignty and the laws of war, impose important constraints on the ability of the United States to act

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unilaterally-and on the way in which the United States can use force -in foreign territories.

Direct action should only be undertaken

As renected in the procedures contained in this PPG, whenever possible and appropriate, decisions regarding direct action will be informed by departments and agencies with relevant

expertise. knowledge, and equities . •••••••••••••••••••••••

  • •••••••••••

. as well as by coordinated interagc ncy intelligence analysis.

Such intcragency coordination and consultation will ensure that decisions on operational matters or such importance are well-informed and will racilitate de-confliction among departments and agencies addressing overlapping threat streams. uch coordination is not intended to interfere with the traditional command and control authority of departments and agencies conducting CT operations.

Lastly. when considering potential direct action against a U.S. person under this PPG, there are

additional questions that must be answered. The Depat1ment of Justice (DOJ ). for example.

must conduct a legal analysis to ensure that such action may be conducted against the individual

consistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States.

Based on the principles and priorities described above. Section I sets forth the procedure for

establishing

plan for taking direct action against terrorist targets.

Section 2 sets forth the approval process for the capture and long-term disposition of suspected terrorists. Section 3 sets forth the policy standard and procedure for designating identified I IYTs for lethal action. Section 4 sets forth the policy standard and procedure for approving kthal

force aga in st terrorist targets other than identified HVTs.

1 Section 5 sets forth the procedures for approving proposals that vary from the policy guidance otherwise set forth in this PPG. Section 6 sets forth the procedure for arter-action reports. Section 7 addresses congressional notification.

ection 8 sets forth general provisions.

SECTION 1. Procedure for Establishing a

Plan for taking

Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets

1.A Operational Plans for Taking Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets

Each of the operating agencies may propose a deta iled operational plan to govern their respective

direct action operations

against: (I) suspected terrorists who may

be lawfully detained: (2) identified HVTs who may be lawfully targeted for lethal action; or (3) lawful terrorist targets other than identilied I IYTs.

J.B lnteragency Review of Operational Plans

All operational plans to undertake direct action operations against terrorist targets···

  • •••••••••

must undergo a legal review b) the general counsel(s) or the operating

1 This PPG docs noL address ocherwise lawful and properly authorized activities !hat may have lethal effects. which are incidental to the primary purpose of the operation.

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agency executing the plan, and be submitted to the National Security Staff (NSS) for interagency review. All proposed operational plans must conform to the policy standards set forth in this

Section. All proposed operational plans to undertake direct action against terrorist targets •••••••••••

along with the conc lus ions of the General Counsel, sha ll be referred

to the NSS Legal Adviser. The NSS Legal Adviser and the General Counsel of the proposing operating agency shall consult with other department and agency counsels, as necessary and appropriate. The NSS Legal Adviser shall submit the relevant legal conclusions to the Deputies Committee to inform its consideration of the proposed operational plan. AII proposed

operational plans to undertake direct action against terrorist targets···········

  • •l

will be reviewed by appropriate members of the Deputies and Principals Committees of

the National Security Council (NSC) (defined in Presidential Policy Directive-I or any successor directive) before presentation to the President for decision.

l.C Guidelines for Operational Plans

Any operational plan for taking direct action against terrorist targets·········

shall. among other things. indicate with precision:

  1. I) The S. CT objectives to be achieved; 2) The duration of time for which the authority is to remain in force:

3) The international legal basis for taking action •••••

4) The strike and surveillance assets that may be employed when taking action against an authorized objective;

5)

6) Any proposed stipulation related to the operational plan, including the duration ofauthority for such stipulation;

7) Any proposed variations from the policies and procedures set forth in this PPG; and

8) The conditions precedent for any operation, which shall include at a minimum the following: (a) near certainty that an identified HVT or other lawful terrorist target other than an identified HVT is present; (b) near certainty that non-combatants wi ll not be inJured or

killed: (c)

and (d) ir

lethal force is being employed: (i) an assessment that capture is not feasible at the time of the operation: (ii) an assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons; and (iii) an assessment that no other reasonable alternatives to lethal action exist to effectively address the threat to U.S. persons.

: Operational disagreements

shall be elevated to

Principals. The President will adjudicate any disagreement among or between Principals .

..,

.)

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l.D Additional Requirements When Requesting Authority for Directing Lethal Force Against Targets Other Than Identified HVTs

When requesting authority to direct lelhal force against lerrorist targets other than identi ficd

HVTs, the

plan shall also inc lude the following:

  1. I) The types of targets that would qualify as appropriate targets pursuant lo Section 4 (Terrorist Targets Other Than Identified HVTs) for purposes of the proposed operational plan: and

2) A description of the operating agency” s internal process for nominating and approving the use of lethal force aga inst terrorist targets other than identified HYTs.

t.E Policies and Procedures

The operating agencies shall estab lish harmonized policies and procedures for assessing:

  1. I) ear certainty that a lawful target is present:

2) Near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed; and

3) With respect to a proposal to lake direct action against terrorist targets other than identified HVTs, whether the target qualifies pursuant to the policy standard set forth in Section 4.A of this PPG and in the specific operational plan.

1.F When Using Lethal Action, E mploy All Reasonably Available Resources to Ascerta in the Identity of the Target

When the use of lethal action is deemed necessary. departments and agencies of the United Slates Government must employ all reasonably available resources to ascertain the identity of the target so that action can be taken, for example. aga inst identified HVTs in accordance with

ection 3 of this PPG. Verifying a target·s identity before taking lethal action ensures greater certainty of outcome that lethal action has been taken against identified I IVTs who satisfy Lhe policy standard for lethal action in ection 3.A.

l.G Principals and Deputies Review of Operational Plans for Taking Direct Action

Against Terrorists Targets···············

When considering a proposed operational plan, Principals and Deputies shall evaluate the following issues, along with any others they deem appropriate:

  1. I) The implications for the broader regional and international political interests of the United States; and

2) For an operational plan that includes the option of lethal force against targets other than identified HVTs. an explanation of why authorizing direct action against targets other than identi fied HYTs is necessary to achieve U . . policy objectives.

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t.H Presentation to the President

I.H. I If Lhe Principal of the nominaling operating agency, after review by Principals and Deputies. continues to support Lhe operational plan, the plan shall be presented to the President for decision, along with the views expressed by departments and agencies during the NSC process.

I.H.2 An appropriate NSS official will communicate, in writing, the Presidenl’s decision, including any Lerms or conditions placed on any approval, to appropriale deparLmcnts and agencies.

1.1 Amendments or Modifications to Operational Plans

Excepl as described in Section 5, any amendments or modifications to an approved operalional

plan ror direct action

shall undergo the same review and approval

process oullined in this Section.

SECTION 2. Approval Process for Certain Captures and the Long-Term Disposition of Certain Suspects

This Section sets forth the approval process for nominating for capture suspected terrorists or individuals providing operational support to suspected terrorists (in this section, togeLhcr referred to as ·’suspects”): proposals to take custody of suspects, including pre-and post-capture

screening:

and

determining a long-term disposition for suspects.

Unless otherwise approved in an operational plan under Section I. the SS shal I coordinate for

interagency review under this PPG, as described below, the following: (I) operations intended to

result····································

(2) operations that result in United States Government personnel taking custody (through a capture or lransrer)3 of a suspect located overseas and outside areas oractive host ii ities; and (3) long-term disposition decisions wilh respect to such suspecls. The involvement of United Slates Government personnel in extraditions or transfers initiated for the purpose of prosecution in civi I ian court or those scenarios to which PPD-14 applies (i.e., circumslances in which an individual is arrested or otherwise taken into custody by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or another Federal law enforeemenl agency)4 are nol covered by this PPG.

Captures and Transfers by Foreign Governments: These procedures do not apply to U.S. law enrorcement requests for foreign governments to arrest or otherwise take into custody a suspecL

‘ ··custody:· as referred to here.

it is anticipated that the

United States Government will have temporar; or transitory custody ofthe individual(s) without the presence of officials ofthe foreign government maintaining custody of the detainee(s).

4 Consistent with existing policy and practice. DOJ will. as appropriate. continue to notify the SS. through the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG). ofplans to arrest. or seek the extradition or transfer of. a suspected terrorist. and where appropriate (e.g .. to consider other potential disposition options) the SS. in consultation with DOJ, may arrange for interagency consideration ofa request for extradition or transfer.

5

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or lo United States Government provision of training. funds, or equipment to enable a foreign government to capture a suspect. These procedures also do not apply to non-law enforcement United States Government requests to capture a suspect who will remain in the custody of the foreign government or to the provision of actionable intelligence to enable such captures. Every 6 months, departments and agencies shall notify the NSS of any requests made of a foreign government to capture a suspect in the preceding 6 months. Unless covered by the exceptions above or otherwise included in an operational plan under Section I, if United States Government

personnel

capture a suspect.

or an operation is intended to result in United States Government personnel taking custody of a suspect. the department or agency must submit a proposal through the NS for interagency

review. Operational plans

may include additional conditions

requiring interagency review of capture operalions involving United Slates Government personnel, depending on the policy consideration of the panicular country or region in which the

operations would occur. If United tales Government personnel are expected·····

  • •••••••••••••••••

to capture or transfer suspects in a particular

country or region on an ongoing basis. the department or agency involved should seek to include

a proposed plan for such activities in the operational plan approved under Section I.

2.A Nomination Process

2.A. I Any department or agency participating in the Deputies Committee review in Section 2.D may identify an individual for consideration, but only an operating agency or DOJ (“nominating agencies·· for purposes of Section 2 of this PPG) may forma lly request that a suspect be considered for capture or custody by U.S. personnel. Additionally, a department or agency that has captured a suspect, or that plans to capture or otherwise take custody of a suspect. shall, whenever practicable, propose a long-term disposition for such individual. Prior to requesling that an individual be considered for capture or custody by the United States, the nominating agency must confirm with its General Counsel that the operation can be conducted lawfully, but it i not neces ary to have resolved the long-term dispos ition plan prior to proposing a capture operation.

2.A.2 Whenever possible, the nominating agency shall notify the lnteragency Disposition Planning Group prior to such a request.

2.A.3 A nomination for custody, including capture, or a proposed long-term disposition under Section 2.A. I shall be referred to the NSS, which shall initiate the screening process described in Section 2.8.

2.A.4 In the event initial screening under Section 2.B has not taken place prior to U.S. personnel taking custody of a suspect. the process for screening after capture described in ection 2.C shall be initiated.

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2.B Screening Prior to a Capture Operation

2.8.1 The nominating agency shall prepare a profile for each suspect referred to the S for review of a proposal to capture or otherwise lake custody of the individual. The profile shall be developed based upon all relevant disseminated information available to the Intelligence Community (IC), as well as any other information needed Lo present as comprehensive and thorough a profile of the individual as possible. The profile should explain any difference of views among the IC and note. where appropriate. gaps in existing intelligence. as well as inconclusive and contradictory intelligence reports. At a minimum, each individual profile shall include the following in formation to the extent that such information exists:

2.B.2 Once the profile has been completed. the nominating agency shall provide the profile to the NSS Senior Director for Countcrterrorism.

2.B.3 Whenever time permits, the lnteragency Disposition Planning Group shall assess the availability. including the strengths and weaknesses. of potential disposition options.

2.B.4 All nominations under this Section for capturing or otherwise taking a suspect into custody must undergo a legal review by the General Counsel of the nominating agency to determine that the suspect may lawfully be captured or taken into custody by the United States and that the operation can be conducted in accordance with applicable law. The General Counsel’s conclusions shall be referred to the NSS Legal Adviser. The NSS Legal Adviser and the General Counsel of the nominating agency sh al I consult with other department and agency counsels, as necessary and appropriate. In addition, in the event that the suspect who has been

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2.C.3

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nominated is a U.S. person. DOJ shall conduct a legal analysis to ensure that the operation may be conducted consistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States. The NSS Legal Adviser shall submit the relevant legal conclusions to the Deputies Committee to inform its consideration of the nomination.

2.B.5 The NSS shall convene a Restricted Countcrterrorism Security Group (RCSG/’ for the purpose of reviewing and organizing material and addressing any issues related to the nomination of an individual for capture. custody, or long-term disposition. Before forward ing to the Deputies the nomination of a suspect for capture or to otherwise be taken into custody, the RCSG shall identify whether any other material is needed for Deputies’ consideration of the nomination and issue taskings to departments and agencies. as appropriate. For each nomination. the Swill request. and the ational Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) shall conduct. an assessment of the suspect and provide that assessment to the SS prior to consideration of the nomination or proposed long-term disposition by the Depmies Committee. and where feasible. prior to RCSG review. The SS will be responsible for ensuring that all necessary materials. including the profile developed by the nominating agency and th e CTC assessment, are included in the nomination package submitted to Deputies.

2.C Screening After Capture

2.C. I Whenever feasible. initial screening by the United States of suspects taken into U.S. custody should be conducted before the United States captures or otherwise takes custody of the suspect, as set out in Section 2.B.

2.C.2 In the event initial screening cannot be conducted before the United States takes custody of the individual. immediately after capturing or otherwise taking custody of the suspect, appropriate U.S. personnel shall screen the individual to ensure that the correct individual has been taken into custody and that the individual may be lawfully detained. Such screening shall be conducted consistent with the laws and policies applicable to the authorities pursuant to which

the individual is being detained. and

2.C.4 In the event that the suspect is detained pursuant to law of war authorities by the U. military and additional time is needed for purposes of intelligence collection or the development of a long-term disposition option. the Secretary of Defense or his designce, following appropriate intcragcncy consultations coordinated through the NSC process, may approve an extension of the

screening period

subject to the fo llowing:

~ The RCSG shall be chaired by the NSS Senior Director for Counterterrorism and shall include the following departments and agencies: the Department ofState, the Department of the Treasury. DOD. DOJ, the Department of

I lomeland Security (DHS) – .

Cir\. Joint Chiefs ofStaff(JCS).

and NCTC.

Additional departments and agencies may participate in the RCSG meetings. as appropriate.

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  1. I) The suspect’s detention must be consistent with S. law and policy, as we ll as all applicable international law;

2)

3) The International Commillee of the Red Cross must be notified of. and prov ided timely access Lo. any suspect held by the U.S. military pursuant to law of war authorities; and

4) When po sible and consistent with the primary objective of collecting intelligence, intelligence will be collected in a manner that preserves the ava ilability of long-term disposition options. including prosecution.

2.D Deputies Review

2.D. I A nomination or disposition package for capture. custody, or long-term dispos ition forwarded to Lhe Deputies shall include the following:

  1. I) The profile, produced by the nominating agency pursuant Lo Section B. l. for the suspect or suspects proposed for capture or long-term disposi tion;

2) Any assessment produced by NCTC pursuant to Section 2.B.5:

3) If appropriate. a description of the planned capture and screening operation and ••••

  • ••••••

operational plan under which the capture would be conducted:

4) The deparLmenL(s) or agency or agencies that wou ld be responsible for carrying out the proposed operation. if nol already conducted:

5) A summary of the legal assessment prepared under ection 2.B.4: and

6) An assessment. including the strengths and weaknesses. of potential long-term disposition options.

2.D.2 The Deputies of the Department of State. the Treasury. DOD, DOJ, OHS. the Office of

the Director ofNational Intelligence (DNI) ••

, CIA, JCS, –

. NCTC. and any other

Deputies or officials a Deputy National Security Advisor (D SA) may invite to pa11icipate. shall promptly consider whether to reco mmend to the Principal of the nominating agency that a capture operation be conducted in the context of the proposed plan at issue, that the United States Government otherwise take custody of the indi vidual, or that a particular long-term dispos ition option be pursued.

2.D.3 When considering a proposed nomination. the Deputies shall evaluate the following issues, and any others deemed appropriate by the Deputies:

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  1. I) Whether the suspect’s capture would further the U.S. CT strategy; 2) The implications for the broader regional and international political interests of the United States; 3) Whether the proposed action would interfere with any intelligence collection or compromise

any intelligence sources or methods: 4) The proposed plan for the detention and interrogation of the suspect; 5) The proposed plan to capture the suspect. including the feasibility of capture and the risk to

U.S. personnel; 6) In the event that transfer to a third party or country is anticipated, the proposed plan for

obtaining humane treatment assurances from any country; 7) The long-term disposition options for the individual: and

8)

2.D.4 When considering the long-term disposition of a suspect who is already in U.S. custody. or whom a department or agency has already been aUlhorized to capture or take into custody, the Deputies ‘ discussion shall be guided by the following principles:

  1. I) Whenever possible, third-country custody options that are consistent with . national security should be explored:

2) Where transfer to a third country is not feas ible or consistent with U.S. national security interests. the preferred long-term disposition option for suspects captured or otherwise taken into custody by the United States will be prosecution in a civilian court or, where ava ilable, a military commission. Consistent with that preference. wherever poss ible and consistent with the primary objective of collecting intelligence. intelligence will be collected in a manner that allows it to be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution: and

3) In no event wi ll additional detainees be brought to the detention facilities at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.

Following consideration and discussion by the Deputies. departments and agencies shall submit the final positions of their Principals within a time frame consistent with operational needs.

2.E Presentation to the President and the Principal of the Nominating Agency

2.E. I If the nominating agency, on behalf of its Principal. continues to support taking action, a D A shall inform the President of the views expressed by departments and agencies. As appropriate, the nomination shall be presented to the Pres ident for a decision or the nomination will be provided to the Principal of the appropriate operating agency for a decision. along with any views expressed by the President.

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II

2.E.2 An appropriate SS official will communicate in writing the decision taken. including any terms or conditions placed on such decisions. to the Deputies who participated in the Deputies Comminee review of the nomination.

SECTION 3. Policy Standard and Procedure for Designating Identified HVTs for Lethal Action

3.A Policy Standard for the Use of Lethal Action Against HVTs

Where the use of lethal action against I IVTs has been authorized ••••••••••••

an individual whose identity is known will only be eligible to be targeted. as a policy matter.

COnSiStent \Vi th the requirements Of the approved Operational plan

. if

the individual’s activities pose a con ti nu ing. imm i ncnt threat to U.S. persons.

3.B Necessary Preconditions for Taking Lethal Action

Lethal action requires that the individual may lawfully be targeted under existing authorities and that any conditions established in the appropriate operational plan. including those set forth in eclion I .C.8, are met. The preconditions ct forth in Section I .C.8 for the use of lethal force are as fo llows: (a) near certainly that an identified HVT is present; (b) near certainty that nonc1o1m1b1a1ta1n1ts1w1

  • 1i111 n?(tdb)e injured or kil k d: (c) . r “bl h . f I . J( )

l ; an assessment L1iat capture 1s not 1eas1 eat t e time o tic operation: e

an assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is

contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons: and (f) an

assessment that no other reasonable alternatives to lethal action exist to effectively add ress the

threat to U.S. persons.

3.C lnteragency Review Process

3.C. I Any department or agency participating in the Deputies Committee review in Section 3.D may identify an individual for consideration. but only the operating agencies (also known as the ··nominating agencies .. for purposes of ection 3 of this PPG) may formally propose that an individual be nominated for lethal action following confirmation from the General Counsel of the nominating agency that the individual would be a lawful target.

3.C.2 The nominating agency shall prepare a profile for each individual nominated for lethal action. The profile shall be developed based upon all relevant disseminated information available to the IC. as well as any other information needed co prese nt as comprehensive and thorough a profile of the individual as possible. The profile shall note. where appropriate, gaps

7 Operational disagreements

are to be elevated to

Principals. The President will adjudicate any disagreement among or between Principals. ~ rhis process is designed to review nominations or individuals only where the capture or any individual at issue is not feasible. If. at any point during or after the approval process capture appears feasible. a capture option in

accordance with Section 2 of this PPG (or the relevant operational plan

) should be pursued.

If the individual has already been approved for lethal action when a capture option becomes feasible, the individual should be referred to the 155 Senior Director for Countcrterrorism and undergo an expedited Deputies review focused on idcmifying disposition options.

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in existing intelligence. as well as inconclusive and contradictory intelligence reports. At a minimum, each indi vidual profile shall include a summary of all relevant disseminated intelligence required to determine whether the policy standard set forth in Section 3.A for lethal action aga inst HYTs has been met, and include the following information lo the extent that such information is available:

3.C.3 The shall convene a meeting of the RCSG for the purpose of reviewing and organizing material. and addressing any issues. related to the nomination of an individual for lethal action.

3.C.4 Before forward ing the nom ination of an identified HVT for lethal action to Deputies. the RCSG shall identify other materials needed for Deputies· consideration of the nomination and shall issue such taskings to departments and agencies. as appropriate. For each nomination. the

SS will request. and NCTC shall conduct. an assessment of the nomination and provide that assessment to the NSS prior to consideration of the nomination by the Deputies Committee, and where feasible prior to RCSG review. The NSS will be responsible for ensuring that all necessary materials. including the profile developed by the nom inating agency and the NCTC assessment. arc included in the nomination package submitted to Deputies.

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3.C.5 All nominations for lethal action must undergo a legal review by the General Counsel of the nominating agency to ensure that the action contemplated is lawful and may be conducted in accordance with applicable law. The General Counsel’s conclusions shall be referred to the NSS Legal Adviser. In all events. the NSS Legal Adviser and the General Counsel of the nominating agency shall consult with DOJ. The S Legal Adviser and the General Counsel of the nominating agency shall also consult with other interagency lawyers depending on the particular nomination. In addition, in the event that the individual proposed for nomination is a U.S. person, DOJ shall conduct a legal analysis to ensure that lethal action may be conducted against that individual consistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States. The NSS Legal Adviser shall submit the relevant legal conclusions to the SS Senior Director for Counterterrorism for inclusion in the nom ination package to be submiued to Deputies.

3.C.6 If the proposal may be conducted lawfully, the nomination shall be referred to a DNSA. or another appropriate NSS official. to facilitate consideration by the Deputies Committee.

3.D Deputies Review

3.0.1 Upon completion of a nomination package, the NSS shall forward the nomination package to the Deputies Committee for consideration. A standard nomination package to be forwarded to the Deputies shall include, at a minimum, the following:

  1. I) The profile, produced by the nominating agency pursuant to Section C.2, for the individual proposed for lethal action;

2) The assessment produced by CTC pursuant to Section 3.C.4;

3) A description

operational pl an to which the nomination would be

added. including the time frame. if any, in which the operation may be executed:

4) The operating agency or agencies that would be responsible for conducting the proposed lethal action;

5) A summary of the legal assessment: and

6) The determinations made by the nominating agency that capture is not currently feasible and that the relevant governmental authorilics in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons, as well as the underlying analysis for those determinations.

3.0.2 The Deputies of the Department of State. DOD, JCS, DOJ. DI IS. DNI, CIA, and CTC

shall promptly consider whether to recommend to the Principal of the nominating agency that

lethal action be taken against the proposed individual in the context··········

operational plan at issue. –

shall participate in the review process as

observers. A D SA may invite Deputies or other officials to participate as appropriate. Following consideration and discussion by the Deputies. departments and agencies shall submit to the NSS the final positions of their Principals within a timeframe consistent with operational needs.

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3.D.3 When considering each proposed nomination, the Deputies shall evaluate the following issues. and any oLhers deemed appropriate by the DepuLies:

1) WheLher the Deputies can conclude with confidence that che nominated individual qualifies under the policy standard in Section 3.A for lethal action, taking into account credib le information that may cast doubt on such a conclusion;

2) Whether the threat posed by the individual to U.S. persons can be minimized through a response short of lethal action;

3) The implications for the broader regional and international political interests of the United States:

4) Whether the proposed action would interfere with any intelligence collection or compromise any intelligence sources or methods;

5) Whether the individual, if captured, would likely result in the collection of va luable intelligence, notwithstanding an assessment that capture is not currently feasible; and

6)

  1. E Presentation to the President and the Principal of the Nominating Agency

3.E.1 The Principal of the nominating agency may approve lethal action aga inst the proposed ind ividual if: ( 1) the relevant Principals unanimously agree that lethal action should be taken against the proposed individual. and (2) the Principal of the nominating agency has notified the Pres ident through a DNSA of his intention to approve lethal action and has received notice from a DNSA that the President has been apprised of that intention. The Principal of the nominating agency may not delegate his authority Lo approve a nomination.

3.E.2 ominations shall be presented to the President for decision. along with the views expressed by departments and agencies during the process, when: ( 1) the proposed individual is a

U.S. person, or (2) there is a lack of consensus among Principals regarding the nomination, but the Prine ipal of the nominating agency continues to support approving the nomination.

3.E.3 In either case, an appropriate NSS official will communicate in writing che decision, including any terms or conditions placed on any approva l. to the Deputies who participated in the Deputies Committee review of the nomination.

3.F Annual Review;·········

3.F. I The NSS, in conjunction with the nominating agency. shall coordinate an annual review of •••I

individuals authorized for possible lethal action to evaluate whether the intelligence

continues to upport a determination that the individuals

qualify for lethal action under

the standard set forth in Section 3.A. The SS shall refer the necessary information for the

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annual review to the Deputies for cous1deration. Following Deputies re\·iew. the iufo1matio11. along with any recollllllendatious from Deputies. shall be forwarded 10 the Principal of the nominating agency for re\·iew. A separnre legal re\·iew will be conducted. as approp1iate. Au appropriate official from each nominating agency sl.iall inform a DNSA of what action. if any. the Principal of the norniuatiug agency takes in response to tlie re\·iew.

3.F.2

The Deputy of any clepcu1meut or agency pa11icipating in the Deputies Committee review

in Scctil)IJ ~.D may propo-,e at any time that an incli\”idunl be

for

lerhal action. 111 the en:>nt that such a propo:,al IS made. ~CTC :,hall updare the re -coordinated profile for the incli\·idual at issue and. as appropriate. the Deputies sball consider whether to propose that the indi\·idual be remo\”ed by lbe Principal of tbe nominating agency.

3.F.3 Following consideration and discussion by the Deputies in accordance with 3.F. l or 3.F.2. depa11ments and agencies sball submit tbe final pos1tio11s of tbeir Principals wirhin an appropriate timeframe detenniued by the NS .

. EC’TIO~ -t Policy Standard and Procedure for Approving Lethal Force Again’it Terrori<;t Targets Other Than Identified HYTs

-L\ Policy Standard for Directing Lethal Force Against Terrorist Targets Other Than Identified HVTs

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4.B ::\ece<.<.ary Precondition for Directing Lethal Force rnder Thi<> ection

Directing lethal force under this Section 1equires that: (I) tbe target may lawfully be taTgeted and that any conditions established in the appropriate operational plan, including those set fo11b in Section l.C.8. are met. The preconditions set fo11b in Sectiou l.C.8 for the use of letbal force are as follows: (a) uear ce11ai11ty tbat a lawful te1rnrist target other than an identified If\.T i:,

p1 esent: (b) ner11 certainty that non-comlrntanh will not be injmed or killed: ( c)

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threat lo U.S. persons: and (I) an assessment that no other reasonable alternatives to lethal action exist lo effectively address the threat to U.S. persons.

4.C Nomination and Review of Terrorist Targets Other Than Identified High-Value Individuals

Where an operating agency has been authorized to direct force against terrorist targets (including

  • •••••

property) other than identified HVTs

may

nominate specific terrorist targets to largel with lethal force consistent with the requirements of

the approved operational plan

. including the process required by the

plan for nom inating and approving such targets.

SECTION 5. Procedures for Approving Proposals that Vary from the Policy Guidance Otherwise Set Forth in th is PPG

5.A Already Authorized Targets: Variations from Operational Plan Requi rements When Fleeting Opportunities Arise

5.A. I

When direct action has been authorized under this PPG against identified HYTs or against

terrorist targets other than identified HYTs

, the operating agency

responsible for conducting approved operations. as a result of unforeseen circumstances and in the event of a nceting opportunity, may submit an individualized operational plan lo the NSS

that varies from the requirements of the operational plan

. In that event.

an appropriate official shall consult with other departments and agencies. as appropriate and a time permits. before submilling the proposal to the President for his decision.

5.A.2 All such variations from an operational plan must be reviewed by the General Counsel of the operating agency conducting the operation and the conclusions referred to the NSS Legal Adviser. In all cases. any operational plan must contemplate an operation that is in full compliance with applicable law. Absent extraordinary circumstances, these proposals shall:

  1. I) Identify an international and domestic legal basis for taking action in the relevant country

2) Mandate that lethal action may only be taken if: (a) there is near certainty that the target is present: (b) there is near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed; (c) it has been determined that capture is not feas ible; (d) the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U .. persons; and (e) no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat to U.S. persons.

5.A.3 Any variation from an operational plan shall be presented to the President for decision. and an appropriate NSS official shall communicate the President’s decision, including any terms or conditions placed on any approval, to appropriate agencies.

TOP SECR:ETi’l’40FOR:N 16

T’OP ~EC~E’f;140FOl04

5.B Extraordinary Cases: Variations from the Policy Guidance Otherwise Set Forth in this PPG

Nothing in this PPG shall be construed to prevent the Pres ident from exercising his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, as we ll as his statutory authority, to consider a lawful proposal from operating agencies that he authorize direct action that would fall outside of the policy guidance conta ined herein. including a proposal that he authorize lethal force against an individual who poses a continuing, imminent threat to another country’s persons. In extraordinary cases. such a proposal may be brought forward to the President for consideration as fo llows:

  1. I) A proposal that varies from the policy guidance contained in this PPG may be brought forward by the Principal of one of the operating agencies through the interagency process described in Section 1 of this PPG, after a separate legal review has been undertaken to determine whether action may be taken in acco rdance with applicable law.

2) Where there is a fleeting opportunity, the Principal of one of the operating agencies may propose to the President that action be taken that would otherw ise vary from the guidance contained in this PPG, after a separate legal review has been undertaken to determine whether action may be taken in accordance with applicable law.

3) In all cases, any proposal brought forward pursuant to this subsection must contemp late an operation that is in full compliance with applicable law.

SECTION 6. Procedures for After Action Reports

6.A The department or agency that conducted the operation shall provide the following prel iminary information in writing to the NSS within 48 hours of taking direct action against any authorized target:

1) A description of the operation;

2) A summary of the basis for determining that the operation satisfied the applicable criteria conta ined in the approved operational plan;

3) An assessment of whether the operation achieved its objective;

4) An assessment of the number of combatants killed or wounded;

5) A description of any collateral damage that resulted from the operation;

6) A description of all munitions and assets used as part of the operation; and

7)

li8P SECREli/H8F8R?J 17

TOP SECRETffqQfORN

6.B The department or agency that conducted the operation shall provide subsequent updates LO the SS on the outcome of the operation, as appropriate, including any intelligence collected as a result of the operation. The information prov ided to the NSS under this Section shall be made available lo appropriate officials al the departments and agencies taking part in the review under Sections 1 and 3 of this PPG.

SECTION 7. Congressional Notification

A congressional notification shall be prepared and promptly provided to the appropriate Members of the Congress by the department or agency approved to carry out such actions when:

  1. I) A new operational plan for taking direct action•••••••••••

is approved:

2) Authority is expanded under an operational plan for directing lethal force aga inst lawfully targeted individuals and against lawful terrorist targets other than individuals; or

3) An operation has been conducted pursuant to such approval(s).

In addition, appropriate Members of the Congress will be provided, no less than every 3 months. updates on identified HVTs who have been approved for lethal action under Section 3. Each department or agency required to submit congressional notifications under this Section shall inform the NSS of how it intends to comply with this Section prior to providing any such notifications to Congress.

SECTION 8. General Provisions

8.A This PPG is not intended to. and does not. create any right or benefit. substantive or procedural. enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States. its departments, agencies. or entities, its officers. employees. or agents. or any other person.

8.B

8.C Twelve months after entry into force of this PPG, Principals shall review the implementation and operation of the PPG. including any lessons learned from evaluating the information provided under Section 6. and consider whether any adjustments are warranted.

18

Half of Those Remaining at Gitmo are Cleared for Release

There remains a key question to be asked: If those remaining are not a risk or a threat then why has it taken a more than a decade to form this conclusion? Additional questions include how much are we paying other countries to take a detainee as no agreements or conditions have ever been published.

Is this the right time to be doing this? Not so much as noted here:

Key takeaways in this month’s Terror Threat Snapshot include:

– There have been 24 ISIS-linked plots or attacks against Western targets in the first half of 2015, up from 19 in all of last year.

– The number of homegrown terror plots since 9/11 has reached 116, tripling in just the past five years.

– Foreign fighters continue to flow into Syria and Iraq.  There has been an 80 percent increase in fighters traveling to the conflict zone since ISIS declared its “caliphate” one year ago.

– More than 200 Americans are believed to have traveled—or attempted to travel—to fight in Syria, a 33 percent increase overall since the beginning of this year.

  The full report is here.

Half of Guantánamo’s uncharged captives are OK’d to go

Musab Omar Ali al Madhwani in a photo from his 2008 prison profile provided to McClatchy by WikiLeaks.

Musab Omar Ali al Madhwani in a photo from his 2008 prison profile provided to McClatchy by WikiLeaks.

McClatchy: The Guantánamo parole board on Monday said it had cleared a Yemeni captive for release to resettlement outside his homeland, reaching a milestone:

Now, 33 of the last 76 captives at the U.S. Navy base in Cuba can go to nations providing security assurances that satisfy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. Ten captives are charged with war crimes. So half of those long-held, uncharged detainees are now approved to go.

The figure could rise. Seventeen captives not currently facing charges await their parole board hearings, or decisions from them.

Musab Omar Ali al Madhwani, 36, “never held extremist views or any desire to harm Americans,” his U.S. military advocate told the Periodic Review Board on June 28. “I am confident Musab is honest in his intentions after Guantánamo” to pursue a career as an accountant, marry and have children.

Pakistani security forces captured him on Sept. 11, 2002, in a day of raids in Karachi, according to his 2008 prison profile, parts of which an updated assessment discredited. He arrived at Guantánamo on Oct. 28, 2002, after 30 or more days in CIA custody, according to a portion of the so-called Senate Torture Report on the spy agency’s secret prison network.

At Guantánamo, U.S. military intelligence dubbed him a member of the “Karachi Six,” calling him part of a six-member “al-Qaida operational cell intended to support a future attack” in the Pakistani port city, the country’s largest and most populous.

The decision released Monday by the board, however, noted that by March he had been “reassessed to be that of a low-level fighter” who was probably trying to get home to Yemen when he was arrested. The board said he should be resettled in a third country with “reintegration support” and security assurances.

His lawyer, Patricia Bronte, told the board that her client had grown at Guantánamo into someone she would welcome into her family home. She and two other no-charge defense lawyers who had represented him vowed to attend his wedding “regardless of where it takes place,” she said.

“Musab is no longer the shy, gullible youth whom two men convinced to run away from home and go to Afghanistan,” she said. Once, she added, he was “afraid of being alone in the dark.” Now, “he reaches out to calm his brothers’ fears and resolve their disputes.”

Madhwani was one of two Yemeni clients for whom Bronte bought socks and shoes last year after she noticed the men’s footwear looked scruffy. She said she didn’t mind the expense, but was disturbed by what appeared to be prison camp cost-cutting. The spokesman at the time called reports of shortages at the Most Expensive Prison on Earth “baseless”

*****

MIAMI (AP) — A review board has decided that a Saudi prisoner at Guantanamo Bay who attended flight school in the U.S. and was trained to make explosives by al-Qaida should continue to be held without charge.

The Periodic Review Board said in a decision released Friday that Ghassan Abdallah al-Sharbi should remain in custody at the U.S. base in Cuba because he remains a security threat.

Factors cited by the board include what it said was his past involvement in terrorism as well as “hostile behavior” while detained, including organizing confrontations between detainees and the guard force at the detention center.

A short statement added that “the board considered the detainee’s prior statements expressing support for attacking the United States, and the detainee’s refusal to discuss his plans for the future.”

The 41-year-old al-Sharbi attended Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Prescott, Arizona, and later went to a U.S. flight school, where he “associated with” two of the hijackers in the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attack, according to a profile released by the Pentagon before his review board hearing in June.

Authorities said he later received training by al-Qaida in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices and was captured in a raid on a terrorist safe house in Pakistan in 2002.

He faced charges that included providing material support for terrorism before the military commission at the base. But U.S. courts have ruled that material support at the time of the alleged offenses did not constitute a war crime that could be prosecuted at Guantanamo and the case was withdrawn. He cannot be tried in civilian court because Congress has prohibited the transfer of Guantanamo detainees to the U.S. for any reason, including prosecution.

Al-Sharbi is one of 76 prisoners held at Guantanamo, including 32 who have been approved for release and are awaiting transfer.

 

Hillary’s Relationship with Russia is Approved Espionage

Dealing with evil, the evil empire as President Reagan declared. Quite actually under the Barack Obama administration it is nothing more than groveling with the Kremlin.

The United States has an Open Skies Treaty. and one must question why. Further, the Russians have taken full advantage of it.

Then there was the red line threat by Obama where it was later dismissed and handed over to Putin to handle those chemical weapons in Syria for removal.

Then we heard about the Bill and Hillary deal with the Canadian operative on Uranium One giving over rights of U.S. uranium supply to Russia.

But now we have yet another operation concocted by the White House and the Hillary State Department and this one is a blockbuster as noted by going back in history through the original WikiLeaks cables.

It is highly suggested to read the full document below, as it summarizes how Hillary allowed trade secrets and professional Russian espionage within the United States.

****

The full document is here.

FROM RUSSIA WITH Money

Hillary Clinton, the Russian Reset, and Cronyism

NYPost: Key players in a main component of the reset — a Moscow-based, Silicon Valley-styled campus for developing biomed, space, nuclear and IT technologies called “Skolkovo” — poured tens of millions of dollars into the Clinton Foundation, the report by journalist Peter Schweizer alleges.

As the Obama administration’s top diplomat, Hillary Clinton was at the center of US efforts on the reset in general and Skolkovo in particular, Schweizer argues.

Yet, “Of the 28 US, European and Russian companies that participated in Skolkovo, 17 of them were Clinton Foundation donors” or sponsored speeches by former President Bill Clinton, Schweizer told The Post.

“It raises the question — do you need to pay money to sit at the table?”

In one example cited by Schweizer, Skolkovo Foundation member and then-Cisco CEO John Chambers donated between $1 million and $5 million in personal and corporate cash to the Clinton Foundation, the report says.

But Skolkovo wound up making America less safe, Schweizer argues, because it shared advanced US technology that Russia can develop for both civilian and military applications, a concern raised already by Army and FBI officials.

Many of Skolkovo’s research projects involved “dual-use” technologies, meaning they would have both civilian and military uses, the report said, citing one in particular — a hybrid airship called an “Atlant” developed at the Skolkovo Aeronautical Center.

“Particularly noteworthy is Atlant’s ability to deliver military cargoes,” including “radar surveillance, air and missile defense and delivery of airborne troops,” the Skolkovo Foundation bragged in a document Schweizer cites.

Hillary Clinton personally launched the State Department’s efforts toward a Russian reset, presenting her Russian then-counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, with a prop reset button in Geneva in 2009.

The reset petered out by the end of 2011, when Russian President Vladimir Putin accused Hillary of fomenting Russian protests over suspicions of fraud in that year’s parliamentary elections.

But by then, the damage had already been done, Schweizer feels.

“I think the idea that you’re going to help develop a Russian version of Silicon Valley, which, by the way, will be controlled by the Russian government, and then not to expect that the technology will be siphoned off for military uses, is incredibly naive,” Schweizer said.

As early as 2010, cybersecurity experts also expressed deep concerns about Russia using Skolkovo to develop hacking capabilities.

Russia’s FSB spy agency — the successor to the KGB — reportedly keeps two of its information warfare “security centers” at Skolkovo, the report says.

“There certainly is an irony that as we are now concerned about Russian cyber-attacks on the US, that the reset played a role in enhancing their cyber-capabilities,” Schweizer said.

In this latest report, as in his book, “Clinton Cash: The Untold Story of How and Why Foreign Governments and Businesses Helped Make Bill and Hillary Rich,” Schweizer concedes he found no “smoking gun” evidence that any of the donors who poured cash into the Clinton coffers actually were promised, or received, any State Department favors in return.

“We don’t have an email or a pirated voice mail message saying, ‘We’ll give you money if you help us with Skokovo,’” Schweizer told The Post. “But what we do have is a pattern that shows a high percentage of participants in Skolkovo who happen to be Clinton Foundation donors.

“I think that everybody at the Russian reset table seems to walk away with something,” he added.

“The Clintons, they get their donations and speaking fees in the millions of dollars. The Russians get access to advanced US technology. The tech companies [that participated in the reset, including Cisco, Intel, Microsoft] get special access to the Russian market and workforce.

“But the American people get nothing. In fact, we get a rival — Russia — with enhanced technological capabilities. At best, that makes them a tougher competitor [in legitimate commerce],” Schweizer said.

“At worst, they get a more robust military, with technologies that we helped develop, and that can be sold to our enemies.”

The Clinton Foundation is sure to be a sore spot in Hillary’s campaign for the presidency, Schweizer predicted — tainted as it is, despite its laudable philanthropy.

“At the entire Democratic convention, they did not mention the Clinton Foundation once,” he said. “And it’s been the Clintons’ life work for 16-plus years.”

The Clinton campaign did not respond to requests from The Post for comment on the report.

“All I ask is that people look at the money. Who made the deals, who benefited from the deals,” Schweizer said. “We can’t get inside people’s heads as to why they did something, but we should follow the money.”

 

Top Secret Reason for the Cold War Revealed

The Top-Secret Cold War Plan to Keep Soviet Hands Off Middle Eastern Oil

Fearing a Russian invasion, the U.S. and Britain were prepared to ravage the region’s oil industry—and even considered going nuclear.

 Politico: On a cool summer day in London in 1951, an American CIA officer told three British oil executives about a top-secret U.S. government plan. The goal was to ravage the Middle East oil industry if the region were ever invaded by the Soviet Union. Oil wells would be plugged, equipment and fuel stockpiles destroyed, refineries and pipelines disabled—anything to keep the USSR from getting its hands on valuable oil resources. The CIA called it the “denial policy.”

Such a plan couldn’t work without the cooperation of the British and American companies who controlled the oil industry in the Middle East, which is why the CIA operative, George Prussing, ended up at the Ministry of Fuel and Power in London that day. To the British representatives of Iraq Petroleum, Kuwait Oil and Bahrain Oil, Prussing detailed how their production operations in those countries would in effect be transformed into a paramilitary force, trained and ready to execute the CIA’s plan in the event of a Soviet invasion. He asked for their help, and they agreed to cooperate. He also emphasized the need for security, which included keeping the policy secret from the targeted Middle East countries. “Security now is more important than the success of any operations,” Prussing told them.

The CIA’s oil denial policy is a snippet of a Cold War history that is finally giving up more of its secrets. In 1996, a brief description of the plan emerged after the Truman Presidential Library mistakenly declassified it—a security breach the National Archives deemed the worst in its history—and some additional details have trickled out over the years. But a recently discovered trove of documents stashed in Britain’s National Archives, along with some key American documents, now declassified, provide a more complete and more revelatory account—published here for the first time.

It turns out that the denial policy, long believed to have ended during Eisenhower’s presidency, was in place much longer than that, lingering into the Kennedy administration. And the newly discovered British documents reveal Britain was prepared to use nuclear weapons to keep the Soviet Union from Middle Eastern oil. The documents also show that the CIA played a far larger role than previously thought. The State Department and the National Security Council were always known to have been significantly involved, but in fact, it was the intelligence agency that was the driving force of the operation, organizing American and British companies to execute the denial policy, coming up with plans, providing explosives and spying on some of those companies as part of its oversight.

The history of this top secret U.S. government plot is a tumultuous mix of Arab nationalism, Big Oil and the CIA on the most oil-rich chunk of real estate on earth. Fundamentally, it is a tale of the growing importance of Middle Eastern oil and the West’s early thirst to control it. And decades later, with that thirst still driving U.S. involvement in the volatile region, it’s worth remembering the risky scheme that foreshadowed it all.

The oil denial policy was hatched in 1948 during the Berlin Blockade, when the Soviet Union tried to block the West’s access to the German city. The blockade stoked fears that further communist aggression would include a sweep through Iran and Iraq to the Persian Gulf—an invasion, the Truman administration worried, that U.S. troops and their allies wouldn’t be able to stop. But American and British companies controlled Middle Eastern oil, and the U.S. government decided a stop-gap measure could stymie the Soviet military by ensuring its taste for fuel wasn’t slaked with petroleum.

The National Security Council’s plan, officially known as NSC 26/2 (and which was approved by President Harry Truman in 1949), was for those American and British companies to destroy or sideline Middle East oil resources and facilities at the start of a Soviet offensive. According to the NSC 26/2 planning documents, the State Department would provide oversight; the CIA would handle operational details for each country.

160622_everly_aramco_pipeline_1160_ap.jpg

Based on National Security Council documents, the intelligence agency immediately approached Terry Duce, Aramco’s vice president of government relations, for advice about implementing a covert denial plan in Saudi Arabia. Aramco owned the rights to produce Saudi Arabian oil and had a working relationship with the country’s government. Duce, who liked to wear a black beret and loved the spy game, had served a stint at the federal government’s Petroleum Administration during World War II and was well known in Washington. Allen Dulles, who later became the CIA’s director, was a frequent guest at Duce’s home.

Aramco, jointly owned at the time by predecessor companies of Exxon Corp., Mobil Inc., Chevron Corp. and Texaco Inc., threw itself into the effort by providing the CIA with crucial advice, including how to plug oil wells and disable refineries. Through Duce, Aramco also volunteered its employees to execute the plan and was even willing to consider their induction into the military if the plan were triggered. (Aramco and U.S. officials hoped military status would protect employees from execution for sabotage if they were captured.)

In the meantime, according to British Foreign Office documents, the British government was notified about NSC 26/2 and threw its support behind the measure, agreeing to prepare denial plans for its oil companies in Iran and Iraq. Britain’s approach differed from the outset: While the CIA’s strategy for Saudi Arabia relied entirely on Aramco employees and not at all on the U.S. military, the British plan used airborne troops to protect and assist the hundreds of oil company employees who would participate in destroying the facilities.

All appeared to be going well for the CIA’s ambitious plot. But it wasn’t long until this promising start began to degenerate. British oil companies turned out to be way more reluctant to cooperate than their government had been. In late 1950, Sir Thomas Fraser, chairman of Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., a jewel in the fading British Empire, learned for the first time his company was expected to provide hundreds of employees for the denial scheme. He feared economic blackmail, even expulsion, if the Iranian government learned about his company’s involvement—and, according to British documents, Fraser pulled Anglo-Iranian Oil out of the plan in late 1950.

George McGhee, an undersecretary at the State Department, was furious. In February 1951, he summoned a British official to Foggy Bottom and told him it was time for his government to make up its mind regardless of what Anglo-Iranian Oil—later to be renamed British Petroleum—thought. “It was quite unjustifiable that the oil denial arrangements should not be completed to the last detail,” McGhee said, according to a British memo about the meeting. In response a few weeks later, the British offered a denial blueprint for Iran that depended entirely on military troops and suggested a similar approach for Iraq. According to British documents that reveal communication with the State Department, this proposal stunned U.S. officials, who believed the plan would fail without the expertise and manpower provided by the oil companies.

What the United States didn’t know, however, was that the British were in fact willing to tap their oil companies for assistance, and that the oil companies were willing to provide it. London just didn’t want the United States to be aware of this, for fear that U.S. knowledge would jeopardize the secret. “We are bound not to let them know how much British oil companies are cooperating,” said D.P. Reilly of Britain’s Foreign Office to a senior British military official, a few weeks after the McGhee meeting.

***

When George Prussing, the CIA operative assigned to work with Middle Eastern oil companies on denial plans, stepped into the State Department on May 1, 1951, he hoped to convince the two British diplomatic and military officials there to meet him that they needed the CIA’s help to salvage their strategies. He gave them for the first time a detailed briefing of the Aramco plan he had helped develop, hoping that it would serve as a model for the rest of the region.

The Aramco denial plan, according to British notes of Prussing’s briefing, was organized around the company’s three administrative districts in Saudi Arabia. Forty-five senior Aramco employees were “fully in the picture.” Altogether 645 employees were earmarked to participate, but most knew only of their individual roles to prevent disclosure of the overall plan.

In addition, five CIA undercover agents were embedded in Aramco in jobs such as storekeeper and general manager’s assistant. They were charged with keeping the intelligence agency informed of the company’s work on the denial plan and any developments that might affect it. Outside the CIA, only one Aramco executive and one State Department official were aware of the agents’ real jobs, according to the British notes.

The CIA had already imported military-grade explosives into Saudi Arabia, specially shaped to fit specific parts, to store in bunkers on Aramco property.

The goal was to keep the Soviets from tapping Saudi Arabia’s oil and refined fuels for up to a year in the event of an invasion. The plan would unfold in phases, starting with destruction of fuel stockpiles and disabling Aramco’s refinery. Selective demolitions would destroy key refinery components difficult for the Russians to replace. This would leave much of the refinery intact, making it easier for Aramco to resume production after the Soviets were ousted.

According to British notes of this meeting, the CIA had already imported military-grade explosives into Saudi Arabia, specially shaped to fit specific parts, to store in bunkers on Aramco property. Flamethrowers were to be widely used to melt small equipment parts. Other weapons included special grenades tested for destroying fuel stockpiles. Cement trucks were ordered for plugging oil wells.

Trucks, railway cars, generators and drilling rigs were also slated for destruction. Aramco employees, besides receiving military commissions, would be evacuated to safety once the denial operation was completed, Prussing said.

The briefing impressed J.A. Beckett, petroleum attaché at the British Embassy in Washington, who fired off a telegram to London advising that Aramco and the CIA had “developed a satisfactory modus operandi for this type of covert planning and are most anxious to extend their activities to cover the remaining [oil] fields.”

Prussing sought approval to install Aramco-style plans in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, where a mix of American and British oil companies were then operating, according to British documents. Britain, the governing authority in those countries, accepted Prussing’s proposal as long as Britain could remain responsible for triggering the execution of the denial plans in Kuwait and Qatar. (A decision about which country would order the plan to begin in Bahrain was deferred although Britain was inclined to give it to the United States.)

Britain remained responsible for developing the denial plans for Iran and Iraq, but Prussing offered the CIA’s assistance. To this end, British officials arranged a meeting in London for the next month, which is how Prussing ended up briefing executives from oil companies in Kuwait, Bahrain and Iraq in June 1951. There, according to British notes of of the meeting, Prussing reviewed the Aramco plan with the businessnmen and said he was ready to advise and assist their own denial plans. They agreed to the assistance.

Yet, there was one key oil empire conspicuously missing from the meeting: Iran. Arranging plans for that country was proving to be far more difficult than for the others.

***

In early 1951, Iran was a steaming stew of resentment toward Anglo-Iranian Oil. The British company’s shabby treatment of its Iranian employees and its mercenary grip on the country’s oil riches had long soured relations between the company and the country.

Whispers about the denial plan were making things even worse. In December 1950, a Tehran newspaper published a story that reported rumors of high-level British government discussions to destroy Iran’s oil industry in the event of war—arousing astonishment and anxiety in Iranian political circles. The story also set off alarms bells in London and at Anglo-Iranian Oil, where efforts were redoubled to keep its cooperation a secret. Based on British Foreign Office documents detailing a conversation with an Anglo-Iranian executive, the company’s general manager was told—whether by his company or the government, it’s not clear—to disavow any knowledge of the denial plan. “The article was far too near the truth,” A.T. Chisholm, a company executive, said while dropping off a translated copy of the story at the British Foreign Office in London.

At the time, the British government owned 51 percent of Anglo-Iranian Oil, but an unusual clause in the ownership agreement prevented the government from being involved in the company’s commercial matters. According to Foreign Office documents discussing Anglo-Iranian’s participation in the plan, Fraser, the company’s chairman, shrewdly used this provision to push his view that the denial plan would be a financial disaster for the company. He warned that an American competitor might intentionally leak his company’s participation to Iran’s government to gain an advantage in the country—and he said he would not participate.

“He was convinced that no security measure would be effective once the American oil companies were brought into the picture,” said R. Kelf-Cohen, an official with Britain’s Ministry of Fuel and Power, during a meeting in London to discuss the denial policy.

But Fraser, under pressure after the McGhee meeting with British government officials in February 1951, eventually grudgingly agreed to allow a denial plan to use his company’s employees. He had conditions, though. His approval would be required, for instance, to execute the denial plan until he was sure the company could recover any financial losses incurred. The British government decided that his cooperation would be kept secret from the Americans so that U.S. oil companies didn’t try to undercut Ango-Iranian oil.

But then, Iranian politics put a wrench in the plan. On March 7, 1951, Iranian Prime Minister Ali Razmara was assassinated by a nationalist and was replaced in April by Mohammad Mosaddeq, who promptly nationalized the company.

Seizure of Anglo-Iranian Oil’s assets by the Iranian government nixed the denial plan with consequences that threatened the entire NSC 26/2 policy. The company produced half the oil in the Middle East and more than half the gasoline, diesel and jet fuel. Its Abadan refinery was the largest in the world and by itself could probably satisfy a Soviet invasion’s thirst for fuel.

The nationalization triggered a scramble for options. According to British documents, the United States asked Britain if the plan’s mission to counter a Soviet invasion could be salvaged with airborne strikes aiding British troops on the ground. Britain rejected this idea, claiming spare troops were not available and the ground demolitions called for by the plan would be too dangerous without the expert assistance of refinery workers.

According British military documents, Britain’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, responsible for the country’s denial planning, decided instead that “oil denial [in Iran] can only be carried out by air attack.” Still, they were skeptical about having enough aircraft to successfully attack the massive Abadan refinery. Because of this fear, the plan that emerged was highly targeted: If the Soviets invaded Iran, the British Royal Air Force based in Iraq would attack fuel stockpiles at the Abadan facility, which was then idled by a British embargo of Iranian oil, leaving the refinery intact. British aircraft would snip production at the Abadan refinery, if reactivated, by bombing a railway that delivered crude oil to the facility. Airstrikes would also hit two small refineries in Iran, at Kermanshah and Naft-I-Shah, along with their fuel stockpiles.

***

By late 1951, as the denial plan for Iran reorganized, the plan for Saudi Arabia was settling in. Prussing was even treating a handful of Aramco employees to a picnic in the desert where they discussed the gritty details of oil denial over sandwiches.

“Refinery explosions would work like Chinese firecrackers; when one exploded it would set off another,” Bill Otto, an Aramco employee and a manager of the company’s denial plan who was at the picnic, told me in an interview.

The CIA wanted a speedy timetable to ensure the plan could be completed before the Soviets arrived. The agency had already arranged a communications channel that would allow the U.S. secretary of state to send the order triggering the denial plan to a boat sitting off the shore of Saudi Arabia. Aramco did its part by filling binders with photos, diagrams and instructions needed to execute the plan. A handful of the company’s American employees stored the 20,000 pounds of dynamite and plastic explosives needed for the demolitions—a job done without arising suspicion since Aramco used explosives in its normal operations.

“The program didn’t have any meat to it until we started putting [demolition details] down,” said Otto, a former Army bomb disposal expert. “[The CIA was] happy to have someone else doing it.”

Refinery explosions would work like Chinese firecrackers; when one exploded it would set off another.”

There were other signs of progress in the region, with Bahrain Petroleum Co. and Kuwait Oil wrapping up their Aramco-style denial plans while the British oil company in Qatar agreed to cooperate with the CIA, according to a National Security Council document tracking the denial plan’s progress. A U.S. delegation visiting the Middle East in late 1951 gushed that “pre-war plans for denial of oil facilities have never before been so perfected.”

But this confidence was premature as Aramco, Kuwait Oil and Bahrain Petroleum executives signaled second thoughts, according to a later NSC progress report. They told U.S. officials in 1952 that they had made no final decisions about their companies’ role in executing the denial plan. “I think they saw the difficulties,” said Parker Hart, the State Department consul general in Saudi Arabia at the time.

These difficulties included using employees to execute the policy. Though the companies had initially embraced the idea, they later had doubts about their authority to force workers to participate in the dangerous operation. That problem could be fixed by using volunteers, but the companies wanted military protection for them, something not part of the CIA’s plans. But the biggest issue for these companies, just like for Anglo-Iranian Oil, centered on the economic consequences if the denial plans leaked to the host governments: Aramco, for example, was producing more than twice the amount of oil it had been when it agreed to help the CIA in 1948—and bigger revenues meant the company was less prepared to risk Saudi Arabia’s wrath.

Looking for some insurance, Kuwait Oil and Bahrain Petroleum requested letters from the British and American governments stating their companies had been commandeered for the denial plan. They could show the letters to local government officials if the plan leaked, which they hoped would save their companies. But the State Department refused to provide the letters, saying they were unnecessary: There was ample evidence in its files to show it pressured the companies to cooperate. British officials summarily rejected the request fearing the “demand for such a letter appeared to be a lever which might be used in any subsequent discussions on compensation.”

Aramco and Kuwait Oil, by then the largest oil producers in the Middle East after production plummeted in Iran following the nationalization of Anglo-Iranian, tried another route and pushed for disclosure of the denial plans to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The United States again refused, since it was about to ask some Middle Eastern countries to join a military alliance (which became the Baghdad Pact of 1955). U.S. officials believed disclosure of the denial policy could derail the fledgling alliance.

With that, Aramco decided the economic risk for the company was too great and demanded removal of denial plans and explosives from its property. The company believed the surge in denial training and the growing number of Saudi employees at Aramco made a security leak inevitable, and American diplomats in the country agreed. “You’d never get away with it,” said U.S. Consul General Hart to the State Department.

***

The setback in Saudi Arabia threatened to kill the denial policy as it limped into the Eisenhower administration in 1953. But just a few weeks after the new president’s inauguration, a report on NSC 26/2 landed at the National Security Council, and ignited efforts to save it. The author of the report was Walter Bedell Smith, a former chief of staff and trusted aide for Ike during World War II who was settling into a State Department job. He told colleagues he was “vexed” by the denial policy, and his report, seasoned by his recent three-year stint as CIA director, reflected it. He sketched out the plan’s problems, which went beyond Aramco’s reluctance to participate. The use of volunteers was under review, but they might not be as effective as hand-picked employees. The program to plug oil wells was also in trouble because of the time it took to complete the job. The report noted high-level discussions taking place about giving the U.S. military more responsibility for the denial policy, which would diminish the CIA’s control.

The report led with a bullet-point list of the changes in oil demand and supply since the approval of NSC 26/2 four years before. The United States had become a net importer of 600,000 barrels of oil per day, double what it was in 1949, and the United Kingdom’s demand for imported oil climbed had to 161 million barrels in 1952, up from 126 million barrels just three years earlier. During the same period, Middle East oil production had soared to meet the needs of the West.

A follow-up review found that while denial plans were still needed to counter the Soviets, it was increasingly important that Middle East oil be preserved for later use by the West. The denial policy’s use of selective demolitions promised a quick production rebound once the Soviets were ousted. The problem was with plugging the oil wells, which could take a week or more to do—not fast enough in the face of a rapid Soviet assault. Unplugged wells could allow the Soviets to cause permanent damage to the oil fields, by setting the wells on fire or letting them flow freely.

In 1954, Eisenhower approved NSC 5401, which straddled these disparate goals. The new policy called for “conservation” of Middle East oil, with more emphasis on plugging oil wells in a timely way, while also maintaining ground demolitions. At the same time, a last resort plan was added: If the companies were unable to execute ground demolitions, the U.S. military would destroy the oil facilities with airstrikes.

The State Department also eyed the military to fill the vacuum left by Aramco’s refusal to execute the ground demolitions—that meant sending in troops to do the job. But the Defense Department pushed back. Smith told the National Security Council, as it mulled approval of NSC 5401, that he understood the military’s reluctance but it was inevitable that oil denial in Saudi Arabia was primarily a military job. Allen Dulles, by then director of CIA, agreed that for Saudi Arabia if “anything at all were to be done on D-Day, it would be done by the military.”

But the Defense Department, anticipating a shortage of troops in the region, refused to commit to ground demolitions. Airstrikes were still available as a last resort, but they were not ideal since disabling rather than destroying the fields was the preferred outcome. “The most therefore that could be hoped for was the [ground demolition] job could be done by experts from Aramco and the CIA with some degree of protection by the military,” said Robert Cutler, Eisenhower’s special assistant for national security, according to a National Security Council document in December 1953.

Had Aramco changed its mind? Cutler left it an open question, but William Chandler, vice president at the time of Aramco-owned Tapline, said in an interview before his death in 2009 that the company did resume cooperation, at least to some extent. He received a call in early 1954 from an Aramco executive to expect a briefing about a “special program” involving Tapline, which operated an oil pipeline across Saudi Arabia. The plan was to disable the pipeline if the Soviets invaded by destroying key valves in its pumps. Company supervisors were trained to use plastic explosives, which they stored in footlockers under their beds. “It was something we were ordered to do,” said Chandler.

***

Meanwhile, Britain was also rethinking its denial plans for Iran and Iraq. In 1953, a coup in Iran, backed by the United States and Britain, installed a friendlier government. An oil consortium, majority owned by British Petroleum and the four American oil companies that owned Aramco, was created to manage the bulk of the country’s oil industry. But Iranian government owned facilities were emerging despite the consortium, according to British documents.

The same thing was happening in Iraq, where hundreds of Iraq Petroleum employees were prepared to disable the company’s massive Kirkuk petroleum complex. The British company’s grip on the Iraqi oil industry had loosened, and the country’s government controlled refineries in Baghdad, Basra and Alwand.

For the denial plans to succeed in these countries, these government-controlled facilities had to be sidelined as well as all the others. But asking Iran and Iraq’s governments to develop denial plans would confirm existence of the policy and likely cause the two countries to lose confidence in their Western allies. That left Britain with the option to use airstrikes, but the military was wary of that option: German refineries during World War II had proven difficult to knock out using conventional bombs.

The “most complete method of destroying oil installations would be by nuclear bombardment,” read a 1955 report endorsed by Britain’s Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In 1955, when Britain was just starting to stockpile nuclear weapons, Britain’s Joint Chiefs of Staff showed interest in using nuclear weapons to destroy oil facilities in Iran and Iraq. The “most complete method of destroying oil installations would be by nuclear bombardment,” read a 1955 report endorsed by Britain’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. It’s not clear if U.S. officials were involved in these discussions at this stage. But according to British military documents reviewing denial plan options, the Joint Chiefs, had minister-level approval to ask the United States to help by using some of its nuclear arsenal on Iran if the denial plan were triggered, according to British Ministry of Defence documents. The request was discussed in a meeting with U.S. officials in London in early 1956. Meeting records don’t mention any American reaction to the proposal. But a decision was deferred until Prussing could review the denial plan for Iran and inspect its oil fields and facilities. A British memorandum to Britain’s Joint Chiefs of Staff after the meeting said in the “near future, the only feasible means [in Iran] of oil denial would be American nuclear action.”

After returning from Iran, Prussing concluded that oil denial using ground demolitions was still workable for the country. In British military documents dated after Prussing’s review, British officials noted the growing number of U.S. nationals working in Iran made it increasingly likely that ground demolitions would be successful, and that nuclear destruction wouldn’t be necessary. Otto, Aramco’s expert on ground demolitions, was dispatched to help the British restructure its denial plan for Iran.

Elsewhere, Britain and the United States agreed to extend the reach of the denial policy. A refinery in Lebanon owned by predecessor companies of Chevron and Texaco, and a British refinery in Egypt for the first time were covered by denial plans. A proposed refinery in Syria was slated for one as soon as it was completed. The United States agreed to be responsible for denial planning in the Kuwait Neutral Zone, a patch of land between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The British identified refineries and pipelines in Israel and Turkey to eventually target.

The progress was encouraging enough for the State and Defense Departments and the CIA in 1956 to propose continuing the denial policy essentially unchanged. But a junior staffer at the National Security Council had a different idea. He believed changing politics in the Middle East meant that “the whole operation” should be killed.

***

George Weber, 31, was no stranger to the denial policy, having assisted the government committee whose recommendations led to NSC 5401. But by 1956 the University of Cincinnati graduate and NSC staffer believed it should be shelved, in part because it only dealt with a war involving the Soviet Union. By that year, the Soviets weren’t the only problem for Western nations in the Middle East; burgeoning Arab nationalism movements were also a threat to the West’s hold on regional oil. President Gamal Abdul Nasser’s 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal was a prime example.

Weber also questioned the usefulness of selective demolitions to disable facilities since the Soviets would probably completely destroy them when forced to retreat. Meanwhile, increased selective-demolitions training by the oil companies was raising chances of a security leak, “I think the Council should review very carefully the wisdom of such a program,” he said in a memorandum to Cutler, Eisenhower’s national security adviser.

The denial policy was not killed, but Weber triggered a transformation, and in a few months Eisenhower approved its replacement: NSC 5714. The destruction of oil facilities in the event of a Soviet invasion remained part of the plan as a last resort, but only with “direct military action” as opposed to employee involvement directed by the CIA. The CIA partnership with the oil companies was abandoned. “Covert denial by civilian agencies had become impracticable,” said William Rountree, a State Department official, in a memo.

In 1963, the Kennedy White House asked the State Department whether NSC 5714 should be rescinded, replaced by something else, or if it still represented U.S. policy. A response is not in the file.

The new policy also became more preemptive, swinging toward protection of oil facilities in the face of new threats in addition to Soviet invasion, like sabotage and regional war. In this, Middle Eastern countries were to be asked to play an unprecedented role. Oil companies and local governments were to work together to boost security, including hardening oil facilities for protection against attack. Local governments would also be asked to cooperate in plugging oil wells if they were threatened to save the oil for later use by the West.

“Thus the evolution of this policy has taken another step,” Weber said.

The shift did not put an end to other American and British plans involving Middle East oil. A broader U.S initiative in 1958—unrelated to NSC 5714—called for the possible use of military force as a last resort against Arab nationalists, to keep the oil flowing at reasonable prices. The British in 1957, deeming a Soviet invasion unlikely, refined plans to use its military to protect oil installations in Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar if threatened by “Egyptian subversion.”

How NSC 5714 fit in to this new Middle Eastern security landscape is unclear. It was put in place, but the handful of declassified documents reveals little about its fate, including whether or not any local governments agreed to cooperate. In 1963, the Kennedy White House asked the State Department whether NSC 5714 should be rescinded, replaced by something else, or if it still represented U.S. policy. That is the last document I was able to find about the denial plan in America or Britain. A response is not in the file, and it’s unclear when the policy ended.

Those in the field did notice the shift brought on by NSC 5714. Otto was instructed to destroy the 10 tons of explosives stashed at Aramco, which rattled windows miles away. He was also was dispatched in the late 1950s to Tapline to remove the explosives still tucked under the beds of supervisors. Chandler, who became president of Tapline, was relieved to see them gone. The Saudis believed they owned the pipeline and would have been furious about the denial plan.

So why take the risk from the start? Patriotism was high in the years after World War II, Chandler later recalled, and so was the willingness to help the United States in its fight against communism.

“We had a good crowd and we didn’t have complaints and that was the amazing thing,” he said. “It was just we had to do this and everyone went along with it.”