Category Archives: Veterans

ISIS moving into Tunisia and the Indo-Asia-Pacific

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This is precisely how the civil war in Syria began, with a protest. And so much for that Obama Asia pivot.

Escalating Protests Threaten Instability in Tunisia

AEI: Key Takeaway: Economic protests resembling those that sparked the 2010 Jasmine Revolution are spreading throughout Tunisia and may grow into nationwide civil unrest. The protests may escalate if security forces respond with violence or officials prove unwilling or unable to meet protestors’ demands. Widespread civil unrest provides an opportunity for Salafi-jihadi groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda, to attack government or economic targets and further destabilize the Tunisian state.

The Situation as of September 15, 2016

Major economic protests began in two Tunisian cities on September 5 and September 7.

  • Protestors blocked roads and burned a business in the town of Ben Guerdane on September 5 after Tunisian security forces shot dead a suspected smuggler. Ben Guerdane is located on the Mediterranean coastline near the Libyan border. Its economy depends on smuggling. Trade unions plan to strike in Ben Guerdane on September 21 to protest administrative gridlock.
  • A café owner set himself on fire in Fernana, a town in northwestern Tunisia, on September 7 after being denied a request to negotiate a fine. Protestors responded by burning tires, closing a major road, striking, calling for the resignation of local officials, and attempting to disrupt the water supply to Tunisia’s capital. Demonstrations intensified on September 11 after the café owner succumbed to his injuries. Additional security forces deployed to Fernana on September 12. Protestors released a series of demands, including calls for anti-corruption measures, an industrial zone, and improved public health and energy infrastructure on September 13. Demonstrations quieted on September 15, but government buildings and schools remain closed.

Protests are spreading to other cities in Tunisia in a manner that resembles the beginning of the 2010 Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia that overthrew the Zine el Abidine Ben Ali regime.

  • Labor union members marched in Makthar, western Tunisia on September 13 to protest overdue development projects. Demonstrators demanded the removal of a corrupt official in El Mida, a town on Tunisia’s northeastern coast, on September 14. National Guard officers intervened to protect the official. Teachers and professors marched in Beja, north central Tunisia and Tozeur, southwestern Tunisia on September 14 to demand the implementation of a labor agreement and development plans. A farm worker in Reguib, central Tunisia attempted to self-immolate after a dispute with a local official on September 15.
  • These protests resemble the wave of civil unrest triggered by the self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi in late 2010 that ousted longtime Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali. The Jasmine Revolution sparked the Arab Spring.

The Tunisian government is attempting to respond to protestors’ demands, but its response may be insufficient.

  • Tunisian authorities had promised on September 12 to send a ministerial delegation to Fernana to hear protestors’ grievances. Local activists reported on September 14 that the promised delegation never arrived. A regional council is now set to convene to discuss Fernana’s development on September 18. The Tunisian Ministry of Industry and Trade announced plans to develop a free-trade zone in Ben Guerdane on September 13, possibly in an effort to placate protestors.
  • The Tunisian public’s expectations that life would improve after the 2010 Jasmine Revolution have not been met. Continued economic failure and successive corruption scandals underpin widespread discontent with the government, especially in marginalized regions, where the unemployment rate hovers around 30 percent. Clashes between security forces and local residents, as well as corruption, drive popular resentment against the police.

 

Context

Tunisia’s new unity government is vulnerable to economic and political backlash.

  • Newly appointed Prime Minister Youssef Chahed is preparing to announce austerity measures that will include new taxes and limits on public sector jobs. Parliament ousted former Prime Minister Habib Essid for his failure to resolve the country’s economic and security challenges. Chahed’s government faces the same challenges, as well as allegations of nepotism.

Tunisian security forces have violently repressed popular protests in the post-revolution period.

  • Protestors demonstrated nationwide in January 2016 after an unemployed young man electrocuted himself. Tunisian police responded with violent crackdowns.
  • Tunisian security forces may crack down on protestors. Tunisia’s security sector, including key leadership, has not changed since it responded violently to demonstrations in January 2016. Security forces have used states of emergency and unlawful force to break up peaceful demonstrations and detain suspects multiple times in recent years.

Tunisia is surrounded by unstable neighbors.

Tunisia is a target for global Salafi-jihadi groups.

  • Thousands of Tunisian militants are fighting for ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Waves of returning foreign fighters will attempt to re-enter their country, bringing with them plans to break the Tunisian state.
  • The al Qaeda network, composed of a core group and an array of associates and affiliates that pursue al Qaeda’s objectives, has grown stronger since 2011. This network includes Ansar al Sharia Tunisia and the Tunisian Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade.

 

Complications

Salafi-jihadi groups may be positioned to infiltrate or attack Tunisia in the event of unrest.

  • Tunisian has limited security resources. The government would probably re-allocate these resources from counter-terrorism operations to quell unrest should there be widespread protests.
  • Tunisian ISIS militants operating in Libya may be preparing to return to Tunisia. ISIS could exploit unrest to penetrate Tunisia’s border at Ben Guerdane, where it attacked in March 2016. ISIS militants moving westward from the group’s former stronghold in Sirte, Libya are a growing threat on Tunisia’s eastern border.
  • Al Qaeda’s strategy includes embedding itself within and co-opting movements. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade, an AQIM affiliate, may be positioned to infiltrate a movement against the Tunisian state.

A crackdown by security forces would strengthen the Salafi-jihadi base in Tunisia.

  • A violent crackdown would exacerbate existing popular grievances and reinforce a Salafi-jihadi popular support base in Tunisia. This base will remain a source of strength for local and global Salafi-jihadi groups.

 

Implications

Instability in Tunisia could greatly exacerbate regional instability and threaten U.S. interests in the region.

  • The destabilization of Tunisia would remove one of the few remaining semi-stable states in North Africa.
  • The U.S. relies on Tunisia as the host of diplomatic efforts for neighboring Libya. U.S. Africa Command works closely with Tunisian security forces in counterterrorism operations and may seek to base from Tunisia for future operations.

A stronger Salafi-jihadi base in Tunisia would threaten the security of the U.S. and its allies in the long term.

  • Salafi-jihadi groups with global objectives, including ISIS and al Qaeda, will continue to draw on a Tunisian support base for resiliency and strength.
  • This base will continue to threaten Tunisia and provide foreign fighters to regional conflicts. It will support Salafi-jihadi groups with the intent and capability to attack the American and European homelands.

Popular protests in Tunisia may spread throughout the country. In the most dangerous scenario, the Tunisian state will weaken or collapse and the country’s Salafi-jihadi base will grow stronger.  

*****

SanDiegoUnionTribune: The commander of American military forces across Asia, Adm. Harry Harris, said the jihadist group — commonly called ISIS — is seeking new territory as it gets squeezed out of Iraq and Syria.

“It’s clear to me that [ISIS] is also “rebalancing” to the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” said Harris, speaking during a meeting of the San Diego Military Advisory Council on Wednesday in Point Loma.

Using a cancer analogy, the four-star leader of U.S. Pacific Command added: “Through multinational cooperation, we can eradicate this [ISIS] disease before it metastasizes.”

But the U.S. alliance with the Philippines hit choppy waters recently after comments by President Rodrigo Duterte — something that Harris also addressed Wednesday with lightly veiled criticism of Duterte’s statements.

“We have been allied with the Philippines for a long time. We have shed our blood with them. … We fought side by side during World War II. I consider our alliance with the Philippines to be iron-clad,” Harris said. He also mentioned U.S. aid to the Philippines, budgeted at $120 million this year, and the dispatch of American troops to help after Typhoon Haiyan in 2013.

“So when the leader said, ‘Only China supports us,’ I don’t know what he means,” Harris said, answering a reporter’s question toward the end of his presentation.

Duterte started making headlines last week when, speaking in Tagalog, he called President Barack Obama a son of a bitch.

Since then the Philippines president has said his government would shop for weapons in China and Russia and would halt joint U.S.-Philippines patrols in the South China Sea to avoid appearing hostile to China.

He also called for the departure of U.S. special-operations troops from the southern Philippines, saying their presence could complicate the fight against the ISIS-linked terrorist group Abu Sayyaf.

One analyst said it appears that nationalism and a desire for “outsider” status are driving the Filipino president’s current tone.

“I don’t really think this is as much about the U.S. as it is about domestic politics — and just his personality. We are a very useful whipping boy,” said Thomas Sanderson, director of the transnational threats project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. “I think this is largely about someone who is a rebel … he’s an outsider and he’s broken through into an area that outsiders typically didn’t get to.”

Sanderson said the Philippines would do an about-face if Islamic terrorism becomes a more widespread problem for Filipinos.

“[Duterte] comes right back to us, there’s no doubt about it,” he said. “Because the center of gravity for counter-terrorism knowledge and skill is the United States.”

Harris outlined the signposts of the ISIS advance on new turf in the Pacific Command theater, an area that’s home to 700 million Muslims. That means more Muslims live in the Asia-Pacific region than in the Middle East.

“Population numbers alone have forced [Pacific Command] to think ahead about what’s next in the fight against [ISIS],” Harris said. “The vast majority of these people are peaceful citizens who seek to live lives free from the scourge of terrorism, but we know that a small band of fanatics can produce deadly results.”

He pointed to ISIS-inspired terrorism in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines so far in 2016. Those events include the July 2 attack on a Bangladeshi restaurant by ISIS-aligned militants. In May and June, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines released video showing the beheadings of two Canadians after their families didn’t pay ransoms.

Hundreds of jihadists have traveled from Asia to the main ISIS battlegrounds of Iraq and Syria to join in the group’s violent vision of creating an Islamic caliphate, according to published accounts.

The tally is about 700 from Indonesia, 100 from Malaysia, 100 from the Philippines, 200 from the Maldives, 300 from China and 120 from Australia, according to a December report by The Soufan Group. These recruits make up a small portion of the estimated 30,000 to 40,000 fighters ISIS can claim or has been credited with over time.

But as they tire of warfare, the danger is that they may return home and try to continue the fight — and recruit others.

Sanderson said Indonesia has the highest vulnerability to ISIS despite its strong security forces, because of the number of ISIS fighters already hailing from there and because of Indonesia being a string of islands with lots of places to hide.

All of this comes as the United States is finishing its own “rebalance,” with the Navy shifting 60 percent of its fleet to the Pacific by 2020. That move, announced late in Barack Obama’s first term, was seen as a hedge against North Korean saber-rattling and the growing economic and military might of China.

Academics differ on how big the ISIS threat is becoming in the Pacific and Asia.

Eli Berman, a UC San Diego economics professor, said he thinks “rebalancing” is too strong a term for the jihadist group’s foothold in Asia. ISIS isn’t on the verge of controlling territory anywhere in the Pacific Rim, said Berman, who is a research director at the university’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.

Asia expert Denny Roy at the East-West Center in Honolulu agrees with Harris that the basic ideas represented by ISIS won’t die if the Islamic State is geographically erased.

“The purveyors of those ideas are already trying to transplant them into other regions and are finding some interest,” Roy said.

But several observers pointed out that Asia has major differences that may hinder ISIS if it tries to expand there.

Governments there are generally more intact than in the Middle East.

“What’s missing is the ultra-weak states in which locals are ready and chomping at the bit to sign up for something to do,” said Sanderson at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “There are far fewer people who would want to sign up for a battle inside of Indonesia, as opposed to those who would want to sign up to battle inside Libya, Tunisia, Yemen or Syria — where the majority of young men would say, ‘Give me a gun and let’s go.’ They have nothing to lose.”

Roy sees South Asia, which includes Bangladesh, as fertile ground for extremism.

“Southeast Asia is less so, because the sense of grievance and the (routine practice) of mass political violence are less strong than in the Middle East or South Asia,” he said.

 

For my Military Friends: General Mattis -‘Everyone Fills Sand Bags’

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Art of War Papers

Hat-tip to Michael L. ValentiMajor, USMC

Mattis believed in delegating responsibility to the lowest capable level. He stated, “Most Marine units and most Marines can do more than they are asked to do. It’s how you unleash that, delegate the decision making to the lowest capable level so that units can maneuver swiftly and aggressively based on exercising initiative. A sense of co-equal ownership of the mission between generals and 18 year olds.”

Mattis asserted that “by reading, you learn through others’ experiences—generally a better way to do business—especially in our line of work where the consequences of incompetence are so final for young men.”36 This alluded to a responsibility that is inherent to commanders and leaders: honest and detailed preparation for the task. It went far beyond just concentrating study on tactics, techniques, and procedures, for that will never be enough for “those who must adapt to overcoming an independent enemy’s will are not allowed the luxury of ignorance of their profession.”37

Mattis gave guidance on the construction of his staff. He wanted “a small staff comprised of aggressive officers who were able to act with initiative, make rapid decisions and recommendations, and exercise good judgment.”14 Due to the small size of the staff and few enlisted Marines to support it, General Mattis made it clear that everyone had to “fill sandbags.”15 The initial tempo of planning was intense and as new members arrived to fill positions, they had to be caught up to speed quickly and start working quickly. In order to expedite this process the creation of a “Brain Book” was implemented. The book consisted of various references and orders that were needed to get new members ready to operate quickly. The Brain Book by itself would not be enough. Instead, professionalism, willingness, and doctrinal foundation of the new members of the staff would carry them the rest of the way.16

General Mattis’s personal feelings:

War is a human endeavor and as such, warriors must be comfortable operating on and within the scopes of human terrain.38 An object in war is to impose our will upon the enemy.39 It is critical in professional study to include the study of the human dimension that is the study of decision-making, group interaction, leadership, etc. When the enemy votes, a study of these topics will enable the warrior to beat him to the polls.

warrior

A Marine from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit moves to a security position at Forward Operating Base Rhino, Afghanistan, 25 November 2001. Photo by Sgt. Joseph R. Chenelly. (DVIC DM-SD-06-03033).

Mattis asserts that a commander must “be ready to embrace allied elements without necessarily having TACON/OPCON over them—use HANDCON.”54 Bringing allied elements into the planning process early with an emphasis on information sharing a commander can gain battlefield harmony through trust building.55 His bottom line is that “you will have little formal authority yet expectations for tactical achievements will not be diminished just because you lack formal command authority.”56

The greatest attribute a field grade officer can have according to Mattis is anticipation.57 General Mattis anticipated his lack of resources, capabilities, and authorities and actively sought measures to correct them by forming relationships and exchanging liaison officers.

For a full read and inspiring summary, go here.

Image result for task force 58 afghanistan 2001

Related reading: Task Force 58: A Higher Level of Naval Operation

ODNI Report on Released Gitmo Detainees

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In an attempt to prevent the closure, Congress is now voting on a bill preventing further transfers of inmates until a new defense policy bill is passed.

Currently, 61 detainees still remain at the detention camp, following the release of 15 in August, the largest single transfer under the Obama administration. Additionally, 16 others have been cleared for transfer.

Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

Wednesday, September 14, 2016
From the Office of the Director of National Intelligence:

Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states:

(a) “The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of,

(1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and

(2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.

(b) Updates – Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection (a) and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station.”

Section 307 (a) (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense.

**

Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detainees as of 15 July 2016
Total Pre-22 January 2009a Post-22 January 2009
Detainees Transferred 693* 532 161
Confirmed of Reengaging 122 of 693 (17.6%) 113 of 532 (21.2%) 9 of 161 (5.6%)**
Dead – 30 of 122 29 1
In custody – 25 of 122 25 0
Not in custody – 67 of 122 59 8
Suspected of Reengagingb 86 of 693 (12.4%) 75 of 532 (14.1%)** 11 of 161 (6.8%)**
Dead – 3 of 86c 2 1
In custody – 18 of 86 18 0
Not in custody – 65 of 86 55 10

a Executive Order 13492 was signed on January 22, 2009 to determine the disposition of the 240 detainees then remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

b The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses five additional detainees are suspected of reengagement.

c Due to a coding error this number was previously reported as 4.

*An additional nine detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was convicted, and is now imprisoned in Colorado.

**Each of these categories includes detainees who were transferred pursuant to a court order.

Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism.

Based on trends identified during the past eleven years, we assess that some detainees currently at GTMO will seek to reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities after they are transferred. Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations could pose problems. While enforcement of transfer conditions may deter reengagement by many former detainees and delay reengagement by others, some detainees who are determined to reengage will do so regardless of any transfer conditions, albeit probably at a lower rate than if they were transferred without conditions.

Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.

Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees transferred in the future also will communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations—including other former GTMO detainees—an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged.

Definition of “Terrorist” or “Insurgent” Activities. Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations—including other former GTMO detainees—on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-US books or articles, or making anti-US propaganda statements.

Definition of “Confirmed” Activities. A preponderance of information which identifies a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity.

Definition of “Suspected” Activities. Plausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity.

Corruption Undermined US Mission in Afghanistan

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Report: Corruption Substantially Undermined US Mission in Afghanistan

VOA/WASHINGTON — Widespread corruption in Afghanistan has substantially undermined U.S. efforts to rebuild the county, according to a report released Wednesday

The U.S. government’s Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) John Sopko said corruption has fueled grievances against the Afghan government and channeled material support to the insurgency from the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Sopko’s report says corruption remains an enormous challenge to security, political stability, and development, and urges the U.S. mission to make anticorruption efforts a top priority.

The report offers a number of recommendations for implementing a U.S. interagency anticorruption strategy in Afghanistan.

Although the United States injected tens of billions of dollars into the Afghan economy, it contributed to the growth of corruption by being slow to recognize the magnitude of the problem, the role of corrupt patronage networks, and the ways in which corruption threatened core U.S. goals. It said certain U.S. policies and practices exacerbated the problem.

‘Endemic’ problem

The report titled, “Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan,” quoted Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who re-opened the U.S. Embassy in Kabul soon after the September 11, 2001, attacks and served again as ambassador in 2011-2012 (and who is a member of Broadcasting Board of Governors which oversees U.S. international broadcasting, including the Voice of America) as saying that “the ultimate point of failure for our efforts … wasn’t an insurgency. It was the weight of endemic corruption.”

“The corruption lens has got to be in place at the outset, and even before the outset, in the formulation of reconstruction and development strategy, because once it gets to the level I saw, it’s somewhere between unbelievably hard and outright impossible to fix,” Crocker said.

****

The report is 164 pages, but here is some help with the conclusions:

Our study of the U.S. experience with corruption in Afghanistan finds:

1. Corruption undermined the U.S. mission in Afghanistan by fueling

grievances against the Afghan government and channeling material

support to the insurgency.

2. The United States contributed to the growth of corruption by injecting

tens of billions of dollars into the Afghan economy, using flawed oversight

and contracting practices, and partnering with malign powerbrokers.

3. The U.S. government was slow to recognize the magnitude of the problem,

the role of corrupt patronage networks, the ways in which corruption

threatened core U.S. goals, and that certain U.S. policies and practices

exacerbated the problem.

4. Even when the United States acknowledged corruption as a strategic

threat, security and political goals consistently trumped strong

anticorruption actions.

5. Where the United States sought to combat corruption, its efforts

saw only limited success in the absence of sustained Afghan and

U.S. political commitment.

Thumb through the report here.

Summary:

Billions in US taxpayer money filled the pockets of Afghan warlords, bolstered the drug trade and fed corruption during effort to rebuild the country after the war

  • Federal watchdog released damning report into post-war efforts by US
  • Was based on the ‘lessons’ needed to be learned from military operations
  • They injected billions into economy without knowing extent of corruption 
  • The money ended up in hands of criminals, some with ties to the Taliban 
  • Multi-million dollar villas were built for the corrupt individuals 
  • While programs meant to actually rebuild the country were undermined  
  • A top diplomat Ryan Crocker said: ‘The ultimate point of failure for our efforts wasn’t an insurgency. It was the weight of endemic corruption’
  • He added that the failures in the system are ‘almost impossible to fix’ 

Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3789240/Corruption-undermines-US-efforts-Afghanistan.html#ixzz4KGPWwkxm
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ISIS Chemical Weapons Destroyed and Hostilities with Hezbollah

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US says it destroyed Islamic State chemical threat in Iraq

WASHINGTON (AP)– American warplanes eliminated a “significant chemical threat” to Iraqi civilians by bombing a complex of buildings near the northern city of Mosul that Islamic State militants had converted from pharmaceutical manufacturing to chemical weapons production, the three-star general in charge of U.S. air operations in the Middle East said Tuesday.

 Photo: DailyMail

Air Force Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Harrigian told reporters at the Pentagon that the target was an Islamic State headquarters also used to produce lethal chemicals, possibly including chlorine and mustard gas. He provided no details on the chemical production.

Harrigian described the airstrike as a large, well-planned operation, which destroyed more than 50 targets at the site with a variety of U.S. warplanes, including Air Force B-52 bombers and Marine Corps F-18D attack planes. Other U.S. officials said later that a total of 12 U.S. planes were used.

Harrigian said the mission was part of a broader effort to cut off the Islamic State’s main sources of revenue, kill their leaders and create “organizational dysfunction” in ways that will eliminate the group as a military threat in Iraq and Syria.

Meanwhile:

Hezbollah “secretly” deploying in Quneitra: report

A pro-rebel outlet claims that Hezbollah fighters have taken up positions in the province along the Israeli border under the guise of being local militiamen.

BEIRUT – Hezbollah has allegedly started to “secretly” deploy its members to Quneitra to replace regime troops stationed in the province near the Golan demarcation line with Israel, according to a pro-opposition outlet.

Al-Etihad press reported Thursday that pro-regime troops in Madinat al-Baath and Khan Arnabeh—both government strongholds northeast of the rebel-held Quneitra border crossing—were being “withdrawn in batches” for redeployment near the western Ghouta suburbs of Damascus.

The outlet’s report mirrored that of local correspondent Omar al-Joulani, who reported on Tuesday that pro-regime forces as well as Hezbollah withdrew a number of their combatants and tanks from the two Quneitra province towns.

However, Al-Etihad press cited local sources as saying that Hezbollah members “came out with the regime forces in public,” but returned in secret to positions under the guise of being local militiamen.

“Hezbollah fighters… returned under the name of the Golan Regiment,” the sources claimed, in reference to the predominantly Druze force that fights under the banner of the regime’s auxiliary National Defense Force.

On Monday, Iran’s Fars News reported that Hezbollah and Syrian regime forces are readying a major offensive against rebels along the Golan demarcation line with Israel.

Syrian military sources said that Hezbollah deployed fighters “in the vicinity of the Quneitra border crossing.”

“[Hezbollah] aims to put an end to the presence of armed men in the area close to the border,” the sources told the Iranian outlet.

The Fars News report comes after the leader of Iran’s paramilitary Basij force, General Mohammad Reza Naqdi, toured Syria’s border with Israel near Quneitra in July, the first such visit of a top-ranking official from Tehran to be publicized in Iranian media.

Cross-border incidents

 

In past weeks, pro-regime forces have bombarded rebel positions in Al-Hamidiyah and other rebel-held villages along the Golan border near the Quneitra crossing, with a number of mortar rounds hitting Israel, prompting Tel Aviv to launch retaliatory strikes on at least five occasions.

On July 4, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) hit two Syrian army targets in the Golan after stray fire damaged the technical fence stretching across the demarcation line between the two countries in the mountainous region.

Two weeks later, an unmanned aerial vehicle crossed over the border into Israeli territory in the central Golan, prompting Israel to fire two Patriot missiles in an unsuccessful attempt to shoot down the drone.

An air-to-air missile fired by an Israeli jet also failed to bring down the drone, which Tel Aviv suspects is Russian-manufactured.

In the latest incident, Israel once again responded to a stray cross-border mortar strike on September 8, hitting a Syrian army target east of the Druze-populated town of Hader in Quneitra, as per Tel Aviv’s standard practice of retaliation to errant fire.

A local pro-Assad fighting force also claimed that Israel conducted a missile strike on one of its convoys in the Quneitra province, although Tel Aviv has made no official comment on the accusation while Syrian state media has also stayed mum.

The Golan Regiment announced on July 28 that two Israeli Nimrod missiles hit one of its positions, but did not name the specific location of the strike.

“The commander of the Golan Regiment’s Fist Battalion, Majid Himoud, escaped the Zionist [strike],” the group, which is part of the Syrian regime’s auxiliary National Defense Force, announced on its official Facebook page.

The militia, which is predominantly Druze, added that Israel fired the missiles from its side of the divided Golan Heights, but did not specify whether the Nimrods were launched from an aircraft or the ground.