CIA Did not Get it Wrong on DPRK Nukes, Policymakers Did

Posted on August 13, 2017August 13, 2017 by Denise Simon

CIA Director Mike Pompeo said on Fox News Sunday with Chris Wallace that the CIA provided accurate intelligence on the DPRK nuclear program and policymakers too, were well aware even before Pompeo took over the agency.

When you look closely enough you will find serial numbers belonging to Pakistan, China and Russia…

Related reading and the graphs: Where did Iran get its military arms over the last 70 years?

Looking back and open source information is that statement accurate? When investigative media does the job of investigating and informs, Pompeo is correct. Furthermore, Iran was and is part of all the variables such that Barack, Hillary and John overlooked it all. How so? That pesky JPOA. Then cultivating the original Wikileaks cables, there was more….

NKNews

In the shank of the Obama administration, 2011 please note the following:

http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/analysis-west-fears-possible-iran-north-korea-nuclear-links/

17 Sep 2011 22:26

Source: reuters // Reuters

By Fredrik Dahl

VIENNA, Sept 18 (Reuters) – It is one of the West’s biggest nuclear
proliferation nightmares — that increasingly isolated Iran and North
Korea might covertly trade know-how, material or technology that could be
put to developing atomic bombs.

“Such a relationship would be logical and beneficial to both North Korea
and Iran,” said Mark Hibbs, an expert of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.

Last year, a U.N. report suggested that impoverished, reclusive North
Korea might have supplied Iran as well as Syria and Myanmar with banned
atomic technology.

In what could be a sign of this, a German newspaper last month reported
that North Korea had provided Iran with a computer programme as part of
intensified cooperation that could help the Islamic state build nuclear
weapons.

“There are reports and rumours, which governments and the IAEA (the U.N.
International Atomic Energy Agency) have not denied, indicating that there
may be a track record of bilateral nuclear cooperation between North Korea
and Iran,” Hibbs said.

But while this could make sense for two states facing tightening sanctions
— and potentially earn Pyongyang some badly needed funds — the extent
and nature of any such dealings, if they take place at all, remain
shrouded in mystery.
“It seems to be very difficult to sort out what the relationship in the
nuclear world between DPRK (North Korea) and Iran is. We just simply do
not know,” prominent U.S. nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker said.

This was in contrast to missile cooperation between the two countries,
where North Korea has helped Iran both with the weapons and in building
related factories, he said.

Hecker, who has often visited the east Asian state, said possible
Tehran-Pyongyang atomic technology transfers would be a major concern for
everyone dedicated to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Iran’s nuclear programme is based on uranium enrichment, activity which
can have both civilian and military purposes.

North Korea has twice tested plutonium-based nuclear devices, drawing
international condemnation, although it last year revealed the existence
also of a uranium enrichment site, potentially giving it a second pathway
to bombs.
“They complement each other so well (in terms of their expertise). There
is just a lot of synergy in how they would be able to exchange
capabilities,” Hecker said at a seminar for diplomats in Vienna, the
IAEA’s headquarters, this month.
Citing Western intelligence sources, the Munich newspaper Sueddeutsche
Zeitung said in August that North Korea had this year delivered software,
originally developed in the United States, that could simulate neutron
flows.

Such calculations, which can help scientists identify self-sustaining
chain reactions, are vital in the construction of reactors and also in the
development of nuclear explosives.

With the help of the programme, Iran could gain important knowledge of how
to assemble nuclear weapons, the paper said.

WESTERN INTELLIGENCE HUNT

There has been no public confirmation or denial of the report in the West.
But Hecker did not rule it out, saying Pyongyang had demonstrated
experience in this field.

He said North Korea must have some “nuclear code capabilities” which they
would have been able to assess in comparison with the result of an atomic
test.
“So to some extent they have had an opportunity to verify or check their
codes,” Hecker said. “Iran has not had a chance to do that. So exchanging
that type of information … you could see as being very useful.”

North Korea tested nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009, but still has not
shown it has a working nuclear bomb.

Proliferation experts have said the country has enough fissile material
for up to 10 nuclear weapons. But they don’t believe Pyongyang is yet
capable of miniaturising the material to fit into the cone of a missile.

While North Korea has made no secret of its nuclear weapons ambitions,
Iran denies Western allegations that it is covertly seeking to develop an
atomic arms capability.

The Islamic Republic says its nuclear programme is for purposes of
electricity generation, but its refusal to halt uranium enrichment and its
stonewalling of a U.N. nuclear watchdog probe have stoked suspicions
abroad.

The Vienna-based U.N. nuclear watchdog said this month in a report that it
was “increasingly concerned” about possible work in Iran to develop a
nuclear missile.

For several years, the IAEA has been investigating Western intelligence
reports indicating Iran has coordinated efforts to process uranium, test
high explosives and revamp a ballistic missile cone to accommodate a
nuclear warhead.

Iran says the allegations are baseless and forged.

In a separate report on North Korea, from which its inspectors were
expelled in 2009, the IAEA suggested past nuclear-related ties with Syria
and Libya, but it made no mention of Iran.
Proliferation expert Mark Fitzpatrick said it would not be hard for Tehran
and Pyongyang to put “well-practised trade deals and transfer routes” from
their ballistic missile cooperation to use also in the nuclear field.
Still, there were few signs of any nuclear cooperation between the two
countries.

“It is not for lack of looking. Western intelligence agencies are
intensively targeting nuclear acquisition efforts by Iran and North
Korea,” Fitzpatrick, a former senior U.S. State Department official, said.

“Yet finding nuclear weapons-related trade is akin to the proverbial
needle in a haystack. In the vastness of ocean and sky routes, most forms
of nuclear-related cargo are so minute as to be almost undetectable.”

Hibbs said any nuclear dealings with North Korea would pose risks for
Iran: “Were this traffic to be confirmed, that would deepen the suspicion
that Iran is involved in nuclear activities which are clandestine and
military in nature.”

***

What about China selling weapons to Iran and operating groups being still worried about non-proliferation by North North Korea? Lots of chatter of that and left unresolved:

5. (S) Noting a decrease in the sales of Chinese conventional weapons to Iran, DASD Sedney expressed appreciation for China’s efforts to limit conventional arms sales to Iran. Sedney emphasized that Iran’s spreading of conventional BEIJING 00000058 002 OF 003 weapons to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon poses the serious problem of Chinese weapons killing U.S. soldiers. Sedney expressed concern about Iran’s nuclear program. More on that cable here, of note is the distribution list.

***

So under Obama it seems we left the A.Q. Khan sanctions to the Export Import Bank and the IAEA: From Secretary of State to the United Nations/Vienna by method deliver of a telegram and SIPDIS

DE RUEHC #2552 0092353 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 092336Z JAN 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0000

4. (SECRET/rel IAEA) — I wanted to inform you of a legal process that has concluded in the U.S. — U.S. nonproliferation law requires that sanctions be imposed in certain circumstances; the activities of Dr. Khan and some of his associates fall under the requirements of this law. — The U.S. has decided to impose sanctions on individuals and companies listed in a media note that was released on January 12. — This is a very complex case that involved a large volume of information and many people and companies across the globe. — The U.S. sanctions laws and executive orders involved include the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA), the Export Import Bank Act (EXIM), and Executive Orders (E.O.) 12938 and 13382. — This legal non-paper describes in more detail the specific sanctions and penalties involved. — The U.S. decision was announced on January 12 and will soon be printed in the Federal Register. — This U.S. decision is not directed at any country. In fact, as we highlight in our public statement, many countries contributed to international efforts to shut down and investigate the network. — The sanctions decision reflects the diverse and global nature of the network. — No sanctions were imposed on governments. — As IAEA knows, the actions of the A.Q. Khan network have irrevocably changed the proliferation landscape and will have lasting implications for international security. — These sanctions will help prevent and deter future proliferation-related activities and provide a warning to other would-be proliferators. — It is imperative that all countries remain vigilant in order to ensure that Khan network associates or others seeking to pursue similar proliferation activities will not become a future source for sensitive nuclear information or equipment. — If Asked: Will there be any additional sanctions on these individuals? We don,t foresee, at this time, the imposition of additional sanctions related to these activities. — If Asked: Will you share your findings with us? We can not share details of the sanction decision but don,t believe the information we have would contribute to a different understanding of the activities than you already have. End suggested talking points. ————– LEGAL NONPAPER ————– 5. (U) Begin non-paper: Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA) The NPPA provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on U.S. procurement from any person who, on or after June 30, 1994, knowingly and materially contributes, through the export of nuclear-related goods or technology, to the efforts of any individual, group, or non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded special nuclear material. Once imposed, the sanction shall apply for a period of at least 12 months, but can thereafter be terminated if reliable information indicates that (1) the sanctioned person has ceased to aid or abet any individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material or any nuclear explosive device, and (2) the United States has received reliable assurances from the sanctioned person that such person will not, in the future, aid or abet any individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material or any nuclear explosive device. Export Import Bank Act (EXIM) The EXIM provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on the Export-Import Bank,s guaranteeing, insuring, or extending credit, or participating in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to any person who, after September 23, 1996, knowingly aids or abets a non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded material. This sanction can be terminated if the U.S. determines and certifies in writing to the Congress that reliable information indicates that the sanctioned person has ceased to aid or abet any non-nuclear weapon state to acquire any nuclear explosive device or acquire un-safeguarded special nuclear material; and steps have been taken to ensure that the sanctionable activities will not resume. The sanction may also be terminated if the appropriate government has taken certain corrective actions. Executive Orders 12938 and 13382 These Executive Orders (E.O.) provide the authority to impose measures against a foreign person that has engaged or attempted to engage in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their means of delivery. The sanctions under E.O. 12938 include: a ban on USG departments, and agencies, procurement from, or entering into contracts for procurement with, the sanctioned person or entity; a ban on providing any USG assistance to, and any participation in USG assistance programs by, the sanctioned person or entity; and a ban on the importation into the U.S. of goods, technology or services procured or provided by the sanctioned person or entity. The E.O. 12938 sanctions may be terminated if there is reliable evidence that the foreign person has ceased the activities that led to the imposition of sanctions. The sanction under E.O. 13382 is that all property and interests in property of the designated entity, that are in the U.S. or subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. (i.e., U.S. persons anywhere) are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in. Sanctions under E.O. 13382 may be lifted when circumstances no longer warrant their imposition. End non-paper. ———- MEDIA NOTE ———— 6. (U) Post can draw from the following Media Note after 0900 EST January 12. Begin Media Note: For Immediate Release January 12, 2009 Designation of A.Q. Khan and Associates for Nuclear Proliferation Activities Today, the Department of State announced that sanctions will be imposed on 13 individuals and three private companies for their involvement in the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network. This announcement comes after a multi-year U.S. government review of the available information pertaining to the activities of this network. We believe these sanctions will help prevent future proliferation-related activities by these private entities, provide a warning to other would-be proliferators, and demonstrate our ongoing commitment to using all available tools to address proliferation-related activities. Dr. A.Q. Khan led an extensive international network for the proliferation of nuclear equipment and know-how that provided &one stop shopping8 for countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons. He and his associates provided Iran and Libya with centrifuge components, designs, and, in some cases, complete centrifuges. The United States also believes that Khan and his associates provided centrifuge designs, equipment, and technology to North Korea. Dr. Khan also provided Libya with nuclear weapon designs. With the assistance of Khan,s network, countries could leapfrog the slow, incremental stages of other nuclear weapons development programs. In 2004, following Libya,s welcome decision to renounce its nuclear program, the United States removed from Libya items it had received from the network. The network,s actions have irrevocably changed the proliferation landscape and have had lasting implications for international security. Governments around the world, including Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, and Malaysia, worked closely with the United States to investigate and shut down the network. Governments have also joined together to put in place United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 to criminalize proliferation and have worked cooperatively to establish the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to enhance international tools to interdict and prevent trade in sensitive technologies. Many of Dr. Khan,s associates are either in custody, being prosecuted, or have been convicted of crimes. Dr. Khan publicly acknowledged his involvement in the network in 2004, although he later retracted those statements. While we believe the A.Q. Khan network is no longer operating, countries should remain vigilant to ensure that Khan network associates, or others seeking to pursue similar proliferation activities, will not become a future source for sensitive nuclear information or equipment. Sanctions have been imposed under the following statutes as follows: Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA): Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., Muhammad Farooq, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, and Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain Export-Import Bank Act (EXIM): Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, Gerhard Wisser, and Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain Executive Order 12938: Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, Tradefin Engineering, Gerhard Wisser, and Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain Executive Order 13382: Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, and Gerhard Wisser End media note. ————– Press Guidance —————– 7. (U) Post can draw from the ISN Press Guidance after 0900 EST January 12. Begin Press Guidance: ISN Contingency Press Guidance January 12, 2009 A.Q. Khan Network: Sanctions General Questions Q: What specifically did A.Q. Khan and his network transfer? What did these people do to trigger sanctions? These entities were sanctioned for engaging in nuclear-related proliferation activities as part of the international A.Q. Khan network. In particular, Dr. Khan and his associates in a number of countries provided Iran and Libya with centrifuge components, designs, and, in some cases, complete centrifuges. The United States also believes that Khan and his associates provided centrifuge designs, equipment, and technology to North Korea. Dr. Khan also provided Libya with nuclear weapon designs. These illicit transfers by the Khan network have been reported in the press for a number of years. I cannot comment on additional specific intelligence-related information. Today,s imposition of sanctions on private companies and individuals does not reflect recent proliferation activity by the network. Q: Why haven,t you sanctioned any countries? The authorities under which sanctions are being imposed do not target countries. Governments around the world, including Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, Germany, Switzerland, the UAE, and Malaysia worked closely with the U.S. to investigate and shut down this international network. Q: Why has it taken four years to impose sanctions? This is a very complex case that involved a large volume of information and many people and companies across the globe. We have been working diligently for the past four years to assemble and properly evaluate the available information. Given the consequences of a sanctions decision, it is important that the information be thoroughly vetted and evaluated before a sanctions determination is made. Q: Why couldn,t you have sanctioned some entities earlier instead of waiting four years? Information continued to become available as other countries concluded their investigations or prosecutions and we believed in this case that it was important to sanction the group at one time. Q: Did you tell the affected governments prior to public announcement? Yes, governments were notified in advance that the United States intends to impose proliferation sanctions on these private companies and individuals. We applaud the actions that each of these countries took to shut down and investigate the network, and work cooperatively to implement new measures to prevent proliferation. Q: What sanctions authorities were used to impose penalties? There are two sanctions laws and two Executive Orders that provide the basis for the imposition of sanctions in this case. The sanctions laws are the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (the &NPPA8) and the Export Import Bank Act (&EXIM8). The two Executive Orders are 12938 and 13382. Q: What do these authorities require? The NPPA provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on U.S. procurement from any person who, on or after June 30, 1994, knowingly and materially contributes, through the export of nuclear-related goods or technology, to the efforts of any individual, group, or non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded special nuclear material. The EXIM provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on the Export-Import Bank,s guaranteeing, insuring, or extending credit, or participating in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to any person who, after September 23, 1996, knowingly aids or abets a non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded material. The Executive Orders provide the authority to impose measures against a foreign person that has engaged or attempted to engage in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their means of delivery, including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items, by any person or foreign country of proliferation concern. Q: What penalties can be imposed pursuant to these sanctions authorities? These sanctions are not being applied to any governments, but to private companies and individuals. In brief, the NPPA provides for a ban on USG procurement from the sanctioned person. EXIM provides for a ban on Export Import Bank credit, guarantees, or insurance in support of U.S. exports to the sanctioned person. Executive Order 12938 provides for a ban on USG procurement or imports from the sanctioned entity as well as a ban on U.S. assistance to the sanctioned entity. Executive Order 13382 freezes the assets of a sanctioned entity that are under U.S. jurisdiction. Q: What impact, if any, will these sanctions have? These sanctions will help prevent and deter future proliferation-related activities and provide a warning to other would-be proliferators. Q: What can companies and individuals do to have sanctions rescinded? Each law treats this issue differently. I refer you to the statutes. Q: Is the A.Q. Khan network still active? If so, what are we doing about it? We do not believe that the network run by A.Q. Khan is still functioning. Most of the key people involved with the network have been put out of business, are in jail and/or facing prosecution. We remain concerned that individuals associated with the network, once they are released from jail or are no longer being closely monitored, could re-engage in proliferation on their own in the future. It is important that countries continue to monitor their behavior closely and put in place laws and enforcement mechanisms to prevent proliferation activities. Q: Do remnants of the network still exist? What are we doing about them? Saying the Khan network is no longer functioning does not mean that other proliferation-related networks and activity around the world has stopped. We know, for example, that Iran has utilized several different front and Iranian companies to purchase particular items of proliferation concern. Several of these entities and companies were identified in UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803 in connection with their involvement in the Iranian nuclear or missile programs. The U.S. has taken action against many of these entities, including designations under E.O. 13382. More information on E.O. 13382 designations can be found on the State Department,s website under nonproliferation sanctions as well as the Treasury,s Office of Foreign Asset Control,s website. Country Specific Questions Pakistan Q: Wasn,t the Government of Pakistan involved or at least knew what was going on? The government of Pakistan assured us it had nothing to do with the network and we have no information to refute this. We applaud the actions Pakistan took to shut down and investigate the network. In the years since the public revelation of the Khan network, the government of Pakistan also has taken a number of positive steps to improve its export controls and promote international nonproliferation. Q: Why haven,t we had direct access to Khan? We appreciate the cooperation the government of Pakistan has provided the IAEA and the United States. We believe that Pakistan took seriously its commitment to dismantle the network. Pakistan has assured us that it will not be a source of proliferation in the future. The United States does not need direct access to A.Q. Khan in order to obtain information about his dealings. Q: Reports indicate that Pakistan is easing restrictions on Khan ) What is your reaction to this? We appreciate Pakistan,s efforts in shutting down the proliferation network led by A.Q. Khan as well as the cooperation Pakistan has provided the United States and the IAEA to investigate the Khan network. We believe Dr. Khan is still a proliferation threat to the world and the proliferation support that he and his associates provided to several states of proliferation concern has had a harmful impact on international security and will for years to come. Q: Khan recently said he was forced to confess. If we haven,t had access to Khan then how do we know he was complicit? We have information from other sources indicating that Khan was complicit in nuclear-related transfers to several countries. Q: Any response to statements by Pakistan that it wants to put the A.Q. Khan issue to rest or that the U.S. has not passed questions on Khan,s activities for some time. The U.S. appreciates the cooperation Pakistan has provided the U.S. and IAEA. Such cooperation will continue to be important as we work toward a greater understanding of what the network provided to various countries. Q: Will there be any additional sanctions on these individuals? We don,t foresee, at this time, the imposition of additional sanctions related to these activities. Q: Why didn,t you sanction Khan Research Labs? I can,t comment on individual decisions. Q: What effect will these sanctions have on our relationship with Pakistan ) specifically, our counter-terrorism relationship? These sanctions are based on activities by individuals that occurred well in the past and have been public for many years. We appreciate Pakistan,s efforts in shutting down the Khan proliferation network as well as the cooperation Pakistan has provided the United States and the IAEA to investigate the activities of the Khan network. The United States has a close partnership with Pakistan on counter-terrorism, nonproliferation, and other issues. Q: Do you think these sanctions will have an effect on the India-Pakistan relationship? These sanctions are based on activities by individuals that occurred well in the past and have been public for many years. Questions about India and Pakistan,s relationship are best answered by those countries. Switzerland Q: Is it true that the U.S. asked Switzerland to destroy nuclear documents? We have no comment. Q: Why aren,t you sanctioning any of the Tinners? Is it because they were spies for the U.S.? We have no comment. Sanctions Decisions: Q: Didn,t the Khan network include many more people and companies than you sanctioned, including the Tinner family, Henk Slebos, and companies in the UAE. Why aren,t you sanctioning them? The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough review of all available information. While I cannot comment on individual decisions, I can note that we did not impose sanctions on companies that are no longer operating. Q: Why did you designate some people under E.O. 13382 but not others? The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough review of all available information. I can,t comment on individual sanction decisions. Q: Why did you sanction Lerch, Geiges, and Wisser under EXIM, but not under the NPPA? The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough review of all available information. I can,t comment on individual sanction decisions. Q: What about Libya, Iran and North Korea? They bought these items ) why haven,t we sanctioned them? These sanctions focus on individuals and companies associated with the Khan network. As such, the governments that acquired these items are not subject to sanction under the NPPA or the EXIM Bank Act. Iran and the DPRK are subject to a wide array of sanctions, including UNSCRs 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1718 respectively. In addition, sanctions were imposed on the DPRK under the Glenn Amendment of the Atomic Energy Act following its October 2006 nuclear test. In the case of Libya, once it made the strategic 2003 decision to dismantle its WMD program, it then cooperated with the USG to facilitate that process. Libya also provided information about the A.Q. Khan network’s activities in Libya. Q: Aren,t these kinds of sanctions really toothless with little impact? Sanctions help signal strong U.S. opposition to the activities of the A.Q. Khan network, expose publicly those involved, and serve as a deterrent to others that might consider pursuing similar activities. Sanctions imposed under Executive Order 13382 will allow the U.S. to seize assets held under U.S. jurisdiction and thereby help prevent future proliferation. Q: What about North Korea ) are sanctions in the works for their nuclear transfers to Syria? The DPRK is subject to a wide array of sanctions, including UNSCR 1718 and a number of other U.S. sanctions related to its transfers of items proliferation concern. Furthermore, in the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK has reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology or know-how. Q: What have we learned about Khan,s efforts to assist Iran,s nuclear program? The IAEA has detailed in various reports that Iran has admitted to a relationship with the Khan network ) the same network that provided nuclear weapons designs to Libya ) from 1987 to 1999. This network provided Iran with P1 centrifuge designs, centrifuges, and components; P2 centrifuge designs; other very sensitive information; and technical advice including a &hemispheres document8. The &hemispheres document8 contains instructions for casting enriched uranium metal into hemispheres, which the IAEA,s January 2006 report noted are &related to the fabrication of nuclear weapons.8 Beginning with the November 2003 report, the IAEA Director General confirmed that for almost 20 years, Iran had been pursuing undeclared work in some of the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, and had systematically hidden that work from the IAEA. Iran,s failure to cooperate sharply limits the IAEA,s ability to know more about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program, and increases the international community,s concerns about Iran,s true intentions. Q: What have we learned about Khan,s efforts to assist North Korea,s nuclear program? Former Pakistani President Musharraf has previously acknowledged that Dr. A.Q. Khan and his international network provided sensitive centrifuge technology, including about two dozen centrifuges, to North Korea. Q: Were there other customer of Khan,s network? Questions remain as to whether there were other customers. End Press Guidance. —————— REPORTING DEADLINE —————— 8. (U) Please report within ten working days of receipt of this cable. Please use SIPDIS caption on all responses. —————- POINT OF CONTACT —————- 9. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up information is Caroline Russell and Chris Herrington, ISN/CPI, 647-5035. RICE

NoKo Crossed the Nuclear Power Threshold, 60?

Posted on August 8, 2017August 8, 2017 by Denise Simon

The best defense is to take them out before they are fired…..we can and we know where they are.

We Know the Locations of N Korea Nuclear Sites

Primer: North Korean delegation wraps up Iran visit

Trip included opening of new embassy and meetings with foreign representatives

North Korea’s newly built embassy in Tehran opened Wednesday, according to the North’s state-run KCNA news agency. It said the new embassy was “built to boost exchanges, contacts and cooperation between the two countries for world peace and security and international justice.”

After the second ICBM test last month, defense experts said it appeared North Korea’s long-range ballistic missile had the range to reach half, if not most, of the continental United States. Iran could have an ICBM capability similar to North Korea within a few years, as just last week it successfully launched a satellite-carrying rocket that some see as a precursor to long-range ballistic missile weapon capability.

‘Extensive’ missile cooperation

“There’s been fairly extensive cooperation on missiles,” said Bunn. “And in fact, early generations of Iranian missiles were thought to be basically modestly adapted North Korean missiles.” More here.

North Korea now making missile-ready nuclear weapons, U.S. analysts say

North Korea has successfully produced a miniaturized nuclear warhead that can fit inside its missiles, crossing a key threshold on the path to becoming a full-fledged nuclear power, U.S. intelligence officials have concluded in a confidential assessment.

The new analysis completed last month by the Defense Intelligence Agency comes on the heels of another intelligence assessment that sharply raises the official estimate for the total number of bombs in the communist country’s atomic arsenal. The U.S. calculated last month that up to 60 nuclear weapons are now controlled by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Some independent experts believe the number of bombs is much smaller.

The findings are likely to deepen concerns about an evolving North Korean military threat that appears to be advancing far more rapidly than many experts had predicted. U.S. officials last month concluded that Pyongyang is also outpacing expectations in its effort to build an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking cities on the American mainland.

While more than a decade has passed since North Korea’s first nuclear detonation, many analysts believed it would be years before the country’s weapons scientists could design a compact warhead that could be delivered by missile to distant targets. But the new assessment, a summary document dated July 28, concludes that this critical milestone has already been reached.

“The IC [intelligence community] assesses North Korea has produced nuclear weapons for ballistic missile delivery, to include delivery by ICBM-class missiles,” the assessment states, in an excerpt read to The Washington Post. The assessment’s broad conclusions were verified by two U.S. officials familiar with the document. It is not yet known whether the reclusive regime has successfully tested the smaller design, although North Korean officially last year claimed to have done so.

The DIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment.

An assessment this week by the Japanese Ministry of Defense also concludes there is evidence to suggest that North Korea has achieved miniaturization.

Kim Jong Un is becoming increasingly confident in the reliability of his nuclear arsenal, analysts have concluded, explaining perhaps the dictator’s willingness to engage in defiant behavior, including missile tests that have drawn criticism even from North Korea’s closest ally, China. On Saturday, both China and Russia joined other members of the U.N. Security Council in approving punishing new economic sanctions, including a ban on exports that supply up to a third of North Korea’s annual $3 billion earnings.

The nuclear progress further raises the stakes for President Trump, who has vowed that North Korea will never be allowed to threaten the United States with nuclear weapons. In an interview broadcast Saturday on MSNBC’s Hugh Hewitt Show, national security adviser H.R. McMaster said the prospect of a North Korea armed with nuclear-tipped ICBMs would be “intolerable, from the president’s perspective.”

“We have to provide all options . . . and that includes a military option,” he said. But McMaster said the administration would do everything short of war to “pressure Kim Jong Un and those around him, such that they conclude it is in their interest to denuclearize.” The options said to be under discussion ranged from new multilateral negotiations to reintroducing U.S. battlefield nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula, officials familiar with internal discussions said.

Determining the precise makeup of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal has long been a difficult challenge for intelligence professionals because of the regime’s culture of extreme secrecy and insularity. The country’s weapons scientists have conducted five nuclear tests since 2006, the latest being a 20- to 30-kiloton detonation on Sept. 9, 2016, that produced a blast estimated to be up to twice that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945.

But producing a compact nuclear warhead that can fit inside a missile is a technically demanding feat, one that many analysts believed was still beyond North Korea’s grasp. Last year, state-run media in Pyongyang displayed a spherical device that government spokesmen described as a miniaturized nuclear warhead, but whether it was a real bomb remained unclear. North Korean officials described the September detonation as a successful test of a small warhead designed to fit on a missile, though many experts were skeptical of the claim.

Kim has repeatedly proclaimed his intention to field a fleet of nuclear-tipped ICBMs as a guarantor of his regime’s survival. His regime took a major step toward that goal last month with the first successful tests of a missile with intercontinental range. Video analysis of the latest test revealed that the missile caught fire and apparently disintegrated as it plunged back toward Earth’s surface, suggesting North Korea’s engineers are not yet capable of building a reentry vehicle that can carry the warhead safely through the upper atmosphere. But U.S. analysts and many independent experts believe that this hurdle will be overcome by late next year.

“What initially looked like a slow-motion Cuban missile crisis is now looking more like the Manhattan Project, just barreling along,” said Robert Litwak, a nonproliferation expert at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and author of “Preventing North Korea’s Nuclear Breakout,” published by the center this year. “There’s a sense of urgency behind the program that is new to the Kim Jong Un era.”

While few discount North Korea’s progress, some prominent U.S. experts warned against the danger of overestimating the threat. Siegfried Hecker, director emeritus of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the last known U.S. official to personally inspect North Korea’s nuclear facilities, has calculated the size of North Korea’s arsenal at no more than 20 to 25 bombs. Hecker warned of potential risks that can come from making Kim into a bigger menace than he actually is.

“Overselling is particularly dangerous,” said Hecker, who visited North Korea seven times between 2004 and 2010 and met with key leaders of the country’s weapons programs. “Some like to depict Kim as being crazy – a madman – and that makes the public believe that the guy is undeterrable. He’s not crazy and he’s not suicidal. And he’s not even unpredictable.”

“The real threat,” Hecker said, “is we’re going to stumble into a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula.”

In the past, U.S. intelligence agencies have occasionally overestimated the North Korean threat. In the early 2000s, the George W. Bush administration assessed that Pyongyang was close to developing an ICBM that could strike the U.S. mainland – a prediction that missed the mark by more than a decade. More recently, however, analysts and policymakers have been taken repeatedly by surprise as North Korea achieved key milestones months or years ahead of schedule, noted Jeffrey Lewis, director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ East Asia Nonproliferation Program. There was similar skepticism about China’s capabilities in the early 1960s, said Lewis, who has studied that country’s pathway to a successful nuclear test in 1964.

“There is no reason to think that the North Koreans aren’t making the same progress after so many successful nuclear explosions,” Lewis said. “The big question is why do we hold the North Koreans to a different standard than we held [Joseph] Stalin’s Soviet Union or Mao Zedong’s China? North Korea is testing underground, so we’re always going to lack a lot of details. But it seems to me a lot of people are insisting on impossible levels of proof because they simply don’t want to accept what should be pretty obvious.”

Maduro is Taking Venezuela Where Castro Tells Him

Posted on August 7, 2017August 7, 2017 by Denise Simon

The rogue countries across the globe are Russia, Iran, North Korea, China and Cuba. What is in common here is they have each other and they work their foreign policy agendas in locations that threaten the West at every turn including militarily.

Iran, China and Russia are running the influence operations in North Korea. Russia is running the influence operation in Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Syria. China and Pakistan is the enabler to North Korea. China is in Africa, Russia is in Africa, Iran is in Iraq and Afghanistan….they are all policy, money and oil opportunists….crazy right?

The Star

A video showing more than a dozen men dressed in military fatigues, some carrying rifles, began circulating widely on social media around that time. In the recording, a man who identified himself as Capt. Juan Caguaripano said the men were members of the military who oppose Maduro’s socialist government and called on military units to declare themselves in open rebellion.

“This is not a coup d’etat,” the man said. “This is a civic and military action to re-establish the constitutional order.” More from the Associated Press.

So, while Venezuela is in a full blown tailspin….who owns the chaos there via Maduro? Cuba…

2004, the agreement was signed.

To further help, the University of Miami has an archived summary here.

So, it goes like this and the burden belongs to Obama and John Kerry for the plight of Venezuelans.

Photo

The Guns of Venezuela

Castro is calling the shots in Caracas. Sanctions have to be aimed at him.

WSJ: In a video posted on the internet Sunday morning, former Venezuelan National Guard captain Juan Caguaripano, along with some 20 others, announced an uprising against the government of Nicolás Maduro to restore constitutional order. The rebels reportedly appropriated some 120 rifles, ammunition and grenades from the armory at Fort Paramacay in Valencia, the capital of Carabobo state. There were unconfirmed claims of similar raids at several other military installations including in Táchira.

The Cuba-controlled military regime put tanks in the streets and unleashed a hunt for the fleeing soldiers. It claims it put down the rebellion and it instructed all television to broadcast only news of calm. But Venezuelans were stirred by the rebels’ message. There were reports of civilians gathering in the streets to sing the national anthem in support of the uprising.

Note to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson: Venezuelans want to throw off the yoke of Cuban repression. They need your help.

Unfortunately Mr. Tillerson so far seems to be taking the bad advice of his State Department “experts.”

The same bureaucrats, it should be noted, ran Barack Obama’s Latin America policy. Those years gave us a rapprochement with Havana that culminated with the 44th president doing “the wave” with Raúl Castro at a baseball game in 2016. Team Obama also pushed for Colombia’s surrender to the drug-trafficking terrorist group FARC in a so-called peace deal last year. And it supported “dialogue” last year to restore free, fair and transparent elections in Venezuela. The result, in every case, was disaster.

Any U.S.-led international strategy to liberate Venezuela must begin with the explicit recognition that Cuba is calling the shots in Caracas, and that Havana’s control of the oil nation is part of its wider regional strategy.

Slapping Mr. Maduro’s wrist with sanctions, as the Trump administration did last week, won’t change Castro’s behavior. He cares only about his cut-rate Venezuelan oil and his take of profits from drug trafficking. To affect things in Venezuela, the U.S. has to press Cuba.

Burning Cuban flags, when they can be had, is now practically a national pastime in Venezuela because Venezuelans understand the link between their suffering and Havana. The Castro infiltration began over a decade ago when Fidel sent thousands of Cuban agents, designated as teachers and medical personnel, to spread propaganda and establish communist cells in the barrios.

As I noted in this column last week, since 2005 Cuba has controlled Venezuela’s citizen-identification and passport offices, keeping files on every “enemy” of the state—a k a political opponents. The Venezuelan military and National Guard answer to Cuban generals. The Venezuelan armed forces are part of a giant drug-trafficking operation working with the FARC, which is the hemisphere’s largest cartel and also has longstanding ties to Cuba.

These are the tactical realities of the Cuba-Venezuela-Colombia nexus. The broader strategic threat to U.S. interests, including Cuba’s cozy relationship with Middle East terrorists, cannot be ignored.

Elisabeth Burgos is the Venezuelan ex-wife of the French Marxist Regis Debray. She was born in Valencia, joined the Castro cause as a young woman, and worked for its ideals on the South American continent.

Ms. Burgos eventually broke free of the intellectual bonds of communism and has lived in Paris for many years. In a recent telephone interview—posted on the Venezuelan website Prodavinci—she warned of the risks of the “Cuban project” for the region. “Wherever the Cubans have been, everything ends in tragedy,” she told Venezuelan journalist Hugo Prieto. “Surely we have no idea what forces we face,” Mr. Prieto observed—reflecting as a Venezuelan on the words of Ms. Burgos—because, as she said, there is “a lot of naiveté, a lot of ignorance, about the apparatus that has fallen on [Venezuelans]: Castroism.”

Cuban control of citizens is as important as control of the military. In Cuba this is the job of the Interior Ministry. For that level of control in Venezuela, Ms. Burgos said, Mr. Maduro must rely on an “elite of exceptional experts” Castro grooms at home.

Cuba, Ms. Burgos said, is not “simply a dictatorship.” For the regime it is a “historical political project” aiming for “the establishment of a Cuban-type regime throughout Latin America.” She noted that along with Venezuela the Cubans have taken Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, and are now going after Colombia. “The FARC, turned into a political party and with all the money of [the narcotics business], in an election can buy all the votes that it wants.”

Mr. Tillerson is forewarned. Castro won’t stop until someone stops him. To get results, any U.S.-led sanctions have to hit the resources that Havana relies on to maintain the repression.

North Korea Kim Jung un, Cyber Theft of Currency

Posted on July 31, 2017July 31, 2017 by Denise Simon

Going back to the 1970’s, North Korea was counterfeiting U.S. currency. In 2006, it was the super note, a perfect $100 dollar bill.

Training for such skills as counterfeiting, illicit drugs, weapons, cyber warfare and bootleg merchandise comes out of Office 39. Clandestine and fraudulent transactions including management operations flowing through Office 39 is estimate in the $6-8 billion range.

In 2014, one defector fleeing to Russia had $5 million of the Office 39 funds money with him.

Those highly selected North Koreans assigned to Office 39 arrive from having received an education in these specialties from elite universities or academies in China and Russia. Other highly selected North Koreans are also required to attend an in country school known as Mirim College. This school was founded by Kim Jong Il in 1986.

According to a defector:

this college has a highly confidential mission—education of world-class IT warriors—its security is so exhaustively kept that individual guard units are dispatched to the college solely for security. The security manual distributed to guards indicates that, “Without the permission of the college commander, no car should be allowed entrance to college grounds except for that of Kim Jong Il.”

Students of the college wear the same uniform as military officials, but on their shoulders they brandish special stars, on which hak (meaning is learning) is printed. A “Kim Il Political Military University” badge is worn on the left side of the chest.

Kim Jung Il lived the high life while his own people suffered to not only beatings but to death by starvation. His son, Kim Jung Un, taking over the country lives much the same yet due to sanctions and isolation by the international community, illicit activities continue.

Counterfeiting of currency is not so much a common practice in North Korea and the country has been dabbling in bitcoin fraud and now through cyber activity, they steal currency.

Just recently, Reuters published an item referring to a report analyzed suspected cyber attacks between 2015 and 2017 on South Korean government and commercial institutions, identified another Lazarus spinoff named Andariel.

“Bluenoroff and Andariel share their common root, but they have different targets and motives,” the report said. “Andariel focuses on attacking South Korean businesses and government agencies using methods tailored for the country.”

Pyongyang has been stepping up its online hacking capabilities as one way of earning hard currency under the chokehold of international sanctions imposed to stop the development of its nuclear weapons program.

North Korea has cooperated with China, Russia and Iran to improve their cyber capabilities. China is especially complicit in that cooperation by providing the communications network inside the DPRK and inside China. Additionally, China has provided hardware, servers, routers. Russia is not without major blame and shares the guilt by dispatching Russian professors from Frunze Military Academy to train North Koreans to be professional hackers.

Additionally, Russia has sold to North Korea GPS jamming equipment in the area of sea navigation and also provides financial aid to North Korea supporting it’s abilities to interfere and disrupt command and control systems.

North Korea operates yet another location known as Office 91. It has four units:

110= Technology Reconnaissance Team for DDoS attacks

35= External Offensive Cyber Operations

121= Strictly assigned for cyber attacks on South Korea

204= Enemy Secret Cyber Psychological Warfare Unit

In total, it is estimated that North Korea has close to 10,000 people assigned the the cyber and hacking operations in country. Additionally, North Korea maintains a force of up to 1000 in China performing cyber warfare.

While it is common for headlines to refer to Kim Jung Un as a nutcase, that is hardly a fitting description for him. While he may be militant and spontaneous, he is well educated. He attended Liebefeld-Steinhölzli Schule, a Swiss state school gaining access to Western culture, but had lousy grades. He has two degrees, one in physics from Kim il Sung University and another as an Army officer obtained from the Kim Il Sung Military University.

He does maintain an asymmetrical military strategy that has astounded the West and countries in the region with his advanced missile systems and launch abilities. All this is funded by cyber theft of currency and information and cooperation with Iran, China and Russia. North Korea does have IP proxy locations for operations that include New Zealand, Malaysia, Indonesia an several others. The ‘darknet’ is full of countries co-opting servers and jump points all doing the same thing.

The Frunze Military Academy Panorama

Blame Obama and Brennan for Venezuela, Maduro

Posted on July 29, 2017July 29, 2017 by Denise Simon

Some facts on Venezuela under Chavez and now Maduro. When it comes to blame on why the country is in a tailspin and on the way to be a failed state where people are suffering beyond measure, rogue foreign leaders flock together and Obama/Brennan knew this was coming.

VIR

Venezuela is part of SWIFT, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications. SWIFT knows precisely all the global transactions into and out of Venezuela including the country’s dealings with Syria, Iran, and Russia.

Venezuela has received at least $36 billion in loans from China that have helped finance two economic development funds focused largely on infrastructure projects. Five people in raids that we carried out in Caracas linked to the embezzlement of $84 million from the Chinese Fund and Bandes. Maduro pledged to stop the corruption. Right huh? What about $300 billion?

Oops, there is more: How about the loan for oil program?

Under Chavez, several global oil deals were signed that included India, China and Russia. Under Maduro, the production has failed to meet contractual agreements. Caracas needs the oil to pay debts to China and Russia, key political allies that have together lent Venezuela at least $50 billion in exchange for promised crude and fuel deliveries.

According to Reuters, former ministers Héctor Navarro and Jorge Giordani are accusing government workers of pocketing more than $300 billion in crude oil revenue over the past decade. They are demanding the government account for these funds and investigate into whose hands they went. Navarro has personally requested that “a state ethics council review the operations of the 13-year-old exchange control mechanism that opposition leaders have described as a ‘corruption machine.’”

Another former Chávez minister, Ana Elisa Osorio, petitioned the Republican National Council, a government watchdog group, to investigate the case. “In the last two years, we have found missing $20 billion from the Republic’s funds. This is why we resort here to calling for a meeting of regulators, the treasury, and the national attorney’s office,” Osorio said. More here.

Oh yeah, we cant leave out Goldman Sachs. In 2016, Goldman Sachs confirmed its asset management arm had bought $2.8 billion of another bond issued by Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA at a steep discount.

SantiagoTimes

So on to some other facts that rogue leaders overlook, including the United States when it comes to heading off the tailspin and eventual failure of a state resulting in disgusting human rights violations.

2011: Iran began building intermediate-range missile launch pads on the Paraguaná Peninsula, and engineers from a construction firm – Khatam al-Anbia – owned by the Revolutionary Guards visited Paraguaná in February. Amir al-Hadschisadeh, the head of the Guard’s Air Force, approved the visit, according to the report. Die Welt cited information from “Western security insiders.”

In 2015: Drug smuggling is thought to be on the rise in Venezuela, with many public officials complicit. According to the BBC, the US has already sanctioned at least 50 whom it accuses of human rights abuses and drug trafficking.

Pressure on the drug trade in neighbouring Colombia appears to have forced many narco-traffickers over the border. While Venezuela does not grow the coca plant or manufacture cocaine, estimates in the US State Department’s annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports suggest that between 161 and 212 metric tons of cocaine are shipped from the country each year, although data is scarce.

In its most recent such report, published in March 2015, the US State Department reported that “public corruption is a major problem in Venezuela that makes it easier for drug-trafficking organizations to move and smuggle illegal drugs”. More here.

IBTimes

2017: Maduro named Tareck El Aissami as the Vice President.

That means that, in a country of complete and utter chaos — where people are starving, healthcare is nonexistent, electricity is scarce, and vigilante justice is becoming a norm — a suspected terrorist is one heartbeat away from the highest office in the land.

El Aissami is a known entity in the world of US intelligence. He is allegedly a part of Venezuela’s state drug-trafficking network and has ties to Iran, Syria, and Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah.

Joseph Humire, coauthor of “Iran’s Strategic Penetration in Latin America” and founder of the Center for a Secure Free Society (SFS) think tank, testified to the same effect before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs last year.

“Over the years, El Aissami developed a sophisticated, multi-layered financial network that functions as a criminal-terrorist pipeline bringing militant Islamists into Venezuela and surrounding countries, and sending illicit funds and drugs from Latin America to the Middle East.

“His financial network consists of close to 40 front companies that own over 20 properties with cash, vehicles, real estate and other assets sitting in 36 bank accounts spread throughout Venezuela, Panama, Curacao, St. Lucia, Southern Florida and Lebanon. This network became integrated with the larger Ayman Joumaa moneylaundering network that used the Lebanese Canadian Bank to launder hundreds of million of dollars and move multi-ton shipments of cocaine on behalf of Colombian and Mexican drug cartels as well as Hezbollah.

“This immigration scheme is suspected to also be in place in Ecuador, Nicaragua and Bolivia, as well as some Caribbean countries.”

In 2016: A jury in New York found two relatives of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro guilty on Friday of attempting to import 800 kilograms of cocaine into the United States. Franqui Francisco Flores de Freitas and Efrain Antonio Campo Flores, both nephews of Maduro’s wife Cilia Flores, were arrested in November 2015 in Haiti in an investigation that saw Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) informants pose as Mexican traffickers and meet with the nephews. More here.

Further on that case during trial it was revealed that Flores and Campo are the nephews of Cilia Flores, the wife of President Maduro and a politician in her own right. According to trial testimony, they were planning to move cocaine for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) through Venezuela via the president’s private hangar at the Simon Bolivar International Airport in Caracas.

They expected the deal to bring them as much as $11 million, some of which was to be used to help fund Cilia Flores’ re-election campaign.