Over 10,000 non-detained Illegal Aliens in America

Posted on April 19, 2019April 19, 2019 by Denise Simon

ERO-LESA Statistical Tracking UnitFor Official Use Only (FOUO)

Pre-decisional 2018-ICFO-32380 Non-Detained Illegal Aliens on the National Docket, as of 06/02/2018

Country of Citizenship Final Order Pending Final Order Total

IRAN 6,331 NORTH KOREA 21 SUDAN 1,860 SYRIA 2,128

The Immigration Reform Law Institute (IRLI) revealed Friday that it has received documents under the Freedom of Information Act that show that the illegals have either been ordered deported or have pending final orders of removal, but are still in the U.S.”

IRLI reported, “In response to an IRLI Freedom of Information Act request, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) provided records that showed that as of June 2018, there were over 10,000 non-detained illegal aliens on ICE’s National Docket from Iran, Syria, Sudan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). Iran led the pack with over 6,000 or 61 percent of their citizens with removal orders followed by Syria with 20 percent, Sudan with 18 percent, and North Korea with less than a percent.”

The report quoted ICE Director Thomas Homan expressing his concern, asserting, “My biggest concern isn’t how many terrorists have been arrested entering the country illegally, but how many got through? How many did Border Patrol not catch? That’s what Americans should be thinking about.”

IRLI’s director, Dale L. Wilcox, added:

It’s simply unacceptable that we also have more than 10,000 aliens here from terrorist states that are sworn enemies of America. We saw on 9/11 the damage that only 19 sleeper cell terrorists could cause. This is just the latest example of the disaster of sanctuary laws, which force ICE agents to operate with one hand tied behind their backs while making our communities inherently more dangerous.

PJ Media noted, “State and local law enforcement agencies once coordinated with ICE to remove people on the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) list who were wanted on an administrative warrant for removal from the U.S., but sanctuary laws prevent such coordination. ICE has still removed an average of about 44 known or suspected terrorists per year in fiscal years 2017 and 2018, IRLI reported.”

The Washington Free Beacon reported in April 2018, “Iranian agents tied to the terror group Hezbollah have already been discovered in the United States plotting attacks.” The Beacon quoted various intelligence officials and former White House insiders saying Iran could use Hezbollah agents in America to mount a strike. Michael Pregent, a former intelligence officer, said, “They are as good or better at explosive devices than ISIS, they are better at assassinations and developing assassination cells. They’re better at targeting, better at looking at things … Hezbollah is smart. They’re very good at keeping their communications secure, keeping their operational security secure, and, again, from a high profile attack perspective, they’d be good at improvised explosive devices.”

Emanuele Ottolenghi, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, added, “The answer is absolutely. We do face a threat. Their networks are present in the Untied States … It doesn’t take many of them to penetrate this country and be a major threat. They can pose a major threat to our homeland.” He concluded, “Iran’s proxy terror networks in Latin America are run by Tehran’s wholly owned Lebanese franchise Hezbollah. These networks are equal part crime and terror and have the ability to provide funding and logistics to militant fighters. Their presence in Latin America must be viewed as a forward operating base against America’s interest in the region and the homeland itself.”

N Korea Test Fires Tactical Weapon

Posted on April 17, 2019April 17, 2019 by Denise Simon

(Reuters) – Satellite images from last week show movement at North Korea’s main nuclear site that could be associated with the reprocessing of radioactive material into bomb fuel, a U.S. think tank said on Tuesday. The U.S. State Department declined to comment on intelligence matters, but a source familiar with U.S. government assessments said that while U.S. experts thought the movements could possibly be related to reprocessing, they were doubtful it was significant nuclear activity.

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SEOUL, April 18 (Yonhap) — North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has supervised a test-firing of a new tactical guided weapon, calling its development an “event of very weighty significance” in beefing up its military power, state media reported Thursday.

The Korean Central News Agency said the test happened Wednesday but did not specify what the newly developed weapon was. It was the first time since November the North’s leader has overseen a weapons testing.

“Saying that the completion of the development of the weapon system serves as an event of very weighty significance in increasing the combat power of the People’s Army, he noted that it is a very good thing that the field of national defense science has waged a dynamic struggle for attaining core research goals,” Kim was quoted as saying by the KCNA.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspects a flight drill of the North’s Air and Anti-aircraft Force on April 17, 2019, in this photo released by the Korean Central News Agency on April 18. As is customary, the agency didn’t provide the location. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

“After watching the power of the new-type tactical guided weapon, he pointed out that our national defense scientists and workers in the field of the munitions industry performed another great work in increasing the country’s defense capabilities,” the KCNA said.

Kim also set the “phased and strategic goals” for maintaining his country’s munitions production, putting national defense science and technology on a “cutting edge level,” and ordering “detailed tasks and ways to attain them.”

The test-firing came after Kim suggested a year-end deadline for denuclearization negotiations with the United States following the breakdown of his February summit with U.S. President Donald Trump.

On Wednesday, Pyongyang’s media said that the North Korean leader visited an air force unit and reviewed a flight exercise in his first public inspection of military activities in five months.

Title lll vs. Cuba for Cuban Exiles, About Time

Posted on April 17, 2019April 17, 2019 by Denise Simon

There is a provision of the Cuban trade embargo that no U.S. president has ever used. President Trump has decided to be the first, according to White House officials. But it’s far from clear if it will do much to dislodge the island’s communist government.

It’s called Title III. It allows Americans – in this case mostly Cuban-Americans – to use U.S. federal courts to sue foreign companies that do business in Cuba on property taken from them by the Castro revolution.

Conservative Cuban exiles insist President Trump’s activation of Title III (part of the 1996 Helms-Burton Act that tightened the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba) will have a chilling effect on foreign investment in Cuba – particularly for European and Canadian companies. That, they insist, will undermine the island’s economically failing regime.

“I do think it will be a turning point,” says Cuban-American attorney Marcell Felipe, who heads the Inspire America Foundation, a pro-democracy NGO in Miami. “For too long the Spanish and Canadian governments and their business interests have promoted respect for human rights everywhere in the world while they support a regime that imprisons anyone who dissents.”

But critics of Trump’s Title III move says it’s primarily another political bone tossed to his Cuban exile supporters – who he believes won Florida for him in the 2016 election.

Cuban-American attorney Pedro Freyre, who heads international practice at the Akerman law firm in Miami and represents firms that may face Title III lawsuits, warns it will be hard to collect money from those suits. Countries like Spain and Canada already have laws in place to block Cuban embargo-related litigation, and he points out that no U.S. president ever triggered the provision before for fear it could lead to retaliation against U.S. business interests around the world.

Freyre also believes it will probably take much more to topple Cuba’s repressive government.

“After watching the Cuban regime navigate 60 years of sanctions and having a rotten economy and a bad political system,” says Freyre, “it’s clear it’s particularly adept at survival. So I am skeptical that this will accomplish that.”

National Security Advisor John Bolton is expected to formally announce the Title III decision when he visits Miami on Wednesday. Sources close to the Trump administration tell WLRN the Title III decree may also include tightening U.S. government officials’ interaction with Cuban officials on the island – and possibly a dramatic scaling back of the amount of remittances Cuban-Americans can send to Cuba and the trips they can take there each year.

*** Image result for bolton in miami cuba

US National Security Adviser John Bolton is set to outline President Donald Trump’s plan to fully implement Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, a previously suspended section of the US trade embargo on the Communist-run country during a speech in Miami, the official said.

It is a move that is widely considered to be part of the administration’s efforts to ramp up pressure on Havana over its support for Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro — who Trump criticized as a “Cuban puppet” in February. Cuban officials have decried the increased sanctions on the communist-run island and offered to enter into negotiations to repay US companies for seized property.

During a speech in Miami last year, Bolton promised the crowd a tough US approach to the “troika of tyranny,” his term for Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, saying they represented “the perils of poisonous ideologies left unchecked.”

Trump’s EO on Electromagnetic Pulses

Posted on March 27, 2019March 27, 2019 by Denise Simon

If government agencies are working this mission, shouldn’t Congress take up some measures too? Given this Executive Order, consider what motivated this action and consider all the measures you yourself should take.

Executive Order on Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Purpose. An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) has the potential to disrupt, degrade, and damage technology and critical infrastructure systems. Human-made or naturally occurring EMPs can affect large geographic areas, disrupting elements critical to the Nation’s security and economic prosperity, and could adversely affect global commerce and stability. The Federal Government must foster sustainable, efficient, and cost-effective approaches to improving the Nation’s resilience to the effects of EMPs.

Sec. 2. Definitions. As used in this order:

(a) “Critical infrastructure” means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.

(b) “Electromagnetic pulse” is a burst of electromagnetic energy. EMPs have the potential to negatively affect technology systems on Earth and in space. A high-altitude EMP (HEMP) is a type of human-made EMP that occurs when a nuclear device is detonated at approximately 40 kilometers or more above the surface of Earth. A geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) is a type of natural EMP driven by a temporary disturbance of Earth’s magnetic field resulting from interactions with solar eruptions. Both HEMPs and GMDs can affect large geographic areas.

(c) “National Critical Functions” means the functions of government and the private sector so vital to the United States that their disruption, corruption, or dysfunction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.

(d) “National Essential Functions” means the overarching responsibilities of the Federal Government to lead and sustain the Nation before, during, and in the aftermath of a catastrophic emergency, such as an EMP that adversely affects the performance of Government.

(e) “Prepare” and “preparedness” mean the actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation. These terms include the prediction and notification of impending EMPs.

(f) A “Sector-Specific Agency” (SSA) is the Federal department or agency that is responsible for providing institutional knowledge and specialized expertise as well as leading, facilitating, or supporting the security and resilience programs and associated activities of its designated critical infrastructure sector in the all-hazards environment. The SSAs are those identified in Presidential Policy Directive 21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience).

Sec. 3. Policy. (a) It is the policy of the United States to prepare for the effects of EMPs through targeted approaches that coordinate whole-of-government activities and encourage private-sector engagement. The Federal Government must provide warning of an impending EMP; protect against, respond to, and recover from the effects of an EMP through public and private engagement, planning, and investment; and prevent adversarial events through deterrence, defense, and nuclear nonproliferation efforts. To achieve these goals, the Federal Government shall engage in risk-informed planning, prioritize research and development (R&D) to address the needs of critical infrastructure stakeholders, and, for adversarial threats, consult Intelligence Community assessments.

(b) To implement the actions directed in this order, the Federal Government shall promote collaboration and facilitate information sharing, including the sharing of threat and vulnerability assessments, among executive departments and agencies (agencies), the owners and operators of critical infrastructure, and other relevant stakeholders, as appropriate. The Federal Government shall also provide incentives, as appropriate, to private-sector partners to encourage innovation that strengthens critical infrastructure against the effects of EMPs through the development and implementation of best practices, regulations, and appropriate guidance.

Sec. 4. Coordination. (a) The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), through National Security Council staff and in consultation with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), shall coordinate the development and implementation of executive branch actions to assess, prioritize, and manage the risks of EMPs. The APNSA shall, on an annual basis, submit a report to the President summarizing progress on the implementation of this order, identifying gaps in capability, and recommending how to address those gaps.

(b) To further the Federal R&D necessary to prepare the Nation for the effects of EMPs, the Director of OSTP shall coordinate efforts of agencies through the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). The Director of OSTP, through the NSTC, shall annually review and assess the R&D needs of agencies conducting preparedness activities for EMPs, consistent with this order.

Sec. 5. Roles and Responsibilities. (a) The Secretary of State shall:

(i) lead the coordination of diplomatic efforts with United States allies and international partners regarding enhancing resilience to the effects of EMPs; and

(ii) in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of other relevant agencies, strengthen nuclear nonproliferation and deterrence efforts, which would reduce the likelihood of an EMP attack on the United States or its allies and partners by limiting the availability of nuclear devices.

(b) The Secretary of Defense shall:

(i) in cooperation with the heads of relevant agencies and with United States allies, international partners, and private-sector entities as appropriate, improve and develop the ability to rapidly characterize, attribute, and provide warning of EMPs, including effects on space systems of interest to the United States;

(ii) provide timely operational observations, analyses, forecasts, and other products for naturally occurring EMPs to support the mission of the Department of Defense along with United States allies and international partners, including the provision of alerts and warnings for natural EMPs that may affect weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States;

(iii) conduct R&D and testing to understand the effects of EMPs on Department of Defense systems and infrastructure, improve capabilities to model and simulate the environments and effects of EMPs, and develop technologies to protect Department of Defense systems and infrastructure from the effects of EMPs to ensure the successful execution of Department of Defense missions;

(iv) review and update existing EMP-related standards for Department of Defense systems and infrastructure, as appropriate;

(v) share technical expertise and data regarding EMPs and their potential effects with other agencies and with the private sector, as appropriate;

(vi) incorporate attacks that include EMPs as a factor in defense planning scenarios; and

(vii) defend the Nation from adversarial EMPs originating outside of the United States through defense and deterrence, consistent with the mission and national security policy of the Department of Defense.

(c) The Secretary of the Interior shall support the research, development, deployment, and operation of capabilities that enhance understanding of variations of Earth’s magnetic field associated with EMPs.

(d) The Secretary of Commerce shall:

(i) provide timely and accurate operational observations, analyses, forecasts, and other products for natural EMPs, exclusive of the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense set forth in subsection (b)(ii) of this section; and

(ii) use the capabilities of the Department of Commerce, the private sector, academia, and nongovernmental organizations to continuously improve operational forecasting services and the development of standards for commercial EMP technology.

(e) The Secretary of Energy shall conduct early-stage R&D, develop pilot programs, and partner with other agencies and the private sector, as appropriate, to characterize sources of EMPs and their couplings to the electric power grid and its subcomponents, understand associated potential failure modes for the energy sector, and coordinate preparedness and mitigation measures with energy sector partners.

(f) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall:

(i) provide timely distribution of information on EMPs and credible associated threats to Federal, State, and local governments, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and other stakeholders;

(ii) in coordination with the heads of any relevant SSAs, use the results of risk assessments to better understand and enhance resilience to the effects of EMPs across all critical infrastructure sectors, including coordinating the identification of national critical functions and the prioritization of associated critical infrastructure at greatest risk to the effects of EMPs;

(iii) coordinate response to and recovery from the effects of EMPs on critical infrastructure, in coordination with the heads of appropriate SSAs;

(iv) incorporate events that include EMPs as a factor in preparedness scenarios and exercises;

(v) in coordination with the heads of relevant SSAs, conduct R&D to better understand and more effectively model the effects of EMPs on national critical functions and associated critical infrastructure — excluding Department of Defense systems and infrastructure — and develop technologies and guidelines to enhance these functions and better protect this infrastructure;

(vi) maintain survivable means to provide necessary emergency information to the public during and after EMPs; and

(vii) in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, and informed by intelligence-based threat assessments, develop quadrennial risk assessments on EMPs, with the first risk assessment delivered within 1 year of the date of this order.

(g) The Director of National Intelligence shall:

(i) coordinate the collection, analysis, and promulgation, as appropriate, of intelligence-based assessments on adversaries’ capabilities to conduct an attack utilizing an EMP and the likelihood of such an attack; and

(ii) provide intelligence-based threat assessments to support the heads of relevant SSAs in the development of quadrennial risk assessments on EMPs.

(h) The heads of all SSAs, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall enhance and facilitate information sharing with private-sector counterparts, as appropriate, to enhance preparedness for the effects of EMPs, to identify and share vulnerabilities, and to work collaboratively to reduce vulnerabilities.

(i) The heads of all agencies that support National Essential Functions shall ensure that their allhazards preparedness planning sufficiently addresses EMPs, including through mitigation, response, and recovery, as directed by national preparedness policy.

Sec. 6. Implementation. (a) Identifying national critical functions and associated priority critical infrastructure at greatest risk.

(i) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and other agencies as appropriate, shall identify and list the national critical functions and associated priority critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets, including space-based assets that, if disrupted, could reasonably result in catastrophic national or regional effects on public health or safety, economic security, or national security. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall update this list as necessary.

(ii) Within 1 year of the identification described in subsection (a)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of other agencies as appropriate, shall, using appropriate government and private-sector standards for EMPs, assess which identified critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets are most vulnerable to the effects of EMPs. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide this list to the President, through the APNSA. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall update this list using the results produced pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, and as necessary thereafter.

(b) Improving understanding of the effects of EMPs.

(i) Within 180 days of the identification described in subsection (a)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and in consultation with the Director of OSTP and the heads of other appropriate agencies, shall review test data — identifying any gaps in such data — regarding the effects of EMPs on critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets representative of those throughout the Nation.

(ii) Within 180 days of identifying the gaps in existing test data, as directed by subsection (b)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and in consultation with the Director of OSTP and the heads of other appropriate agencies, shall use the sector partnership structure identified in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan to develop an integrated cross-sector plan to address the identified gaps. The heads of agencies identified in the plan shall implement the plan in collaboration with the private sector, as appropriate.

(iii) Within 1 year of the date of this order, and as appropriate thereafter, the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the heads of other agencies and the private sector, as appropriate, shall review existing standards for EMPs and develop or update, as necessary, quantitative benchmarks that sufficiently describe the physical characteristics of EMPs, including waveform and intensity, in a form that is useful to and can be shared with owners and operators of critical infrastructure.

(iv) Within 4 years of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Interior shall complete a magnetotelluric survey of the contiguous United States to help critical infrastructure owners and operators conduct EMP vulnerability assessments.

(i) Within 1 year of the date of this order, and every 2 years thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, and in consultation with the Director of OSTP, the heads of other appropriate agencies, and private-sector partners as appropriate, shall submit to the President, through the APNSA, a report that analyzes the technology options available to improve the resilience of critical infrastructure to the effects of EMPs. The Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security shall also identify gaps in available technologies and opportunities for future technological developments to inform R&D activities.

(ii) Within 180 days of the completion of the activities directed by subsections (b)(iii) and (c)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of other agencies and in consultation with the private sector as appropriate, shall develop and implement a pilot test to evaluate available engineering approaches for mitigating the effects of EMPs on the most vulnerable critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets, as identified in subsection (a)(ii) of this section.

(iii) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of relevant SSAs, and in consultation with appropriate regulatory and utility commissions and other stakeholders, shall identify regulatory and non regulatory mechanisms, including cost recovery measures, that can enhance private-sector engagement to address the effects of EMPs.

(d) Strengthening critical infrastructure to withstand the effects of EMPs.

(i) Within 90 days of completing the actions directed in subsection (c)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and in consultation with the heads of other appropriate agencies and with the private sector as appropriate, shall develop a plan to mitigate the effects of EMPs on the vulnerable priority critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets identified under subsection (a)(ii) of this section. The plan shall align with and build on actions identified in reports required by Executive Order 13800 of May 11, 2017 (Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure). The Secretary of Homeland Security shall implement those elements of the plan that are consistent with Department of Homeland Security authorities and resources, and report to the APNSA regarding any additional authorities and resources needed to complete its implementation. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, shall update the plan as necessary based on results from the actions directed in subsections (b) and (c) of this section.

(ii) Within 180 days of the completion of the actions identified in subsection (c)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Energy, shall conduct a pilot test to evaluate engineering approaches used to harden a strategic military installation, including infrastructure that is critical to supporting that installation, against the effects of EMPs.

(iii) Within 180 days of completing the pilot test described in subsection (d)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Defense shall report to the President, through the APNSA, regarding the cost and effectiveness of the evaluated approaches.

(e) Improving response to EMPs.

(i) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the heads of appropriate SSAs, shall review and update Federal response plans, programs, and procedures to account for the effects of EMPs.

(ii) Within 180 days of the completion of actions directed by subsection (e)(i) of this section, agencies that support National Essential Functions shall update operational plans documenting their procedures and responsibilities to prepare for, protect against, and mitigate the effects of EMPs.

(iii) Within 180 days of identifying vulnerable priority critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets as directed by subsection (a)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, shall provide the Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and the Director of OSTP with an assessment of the effects of EMPs on critical communications infrastructure, and recommend changes to operational plans to enhance national response and recovery efforts after an EMP.

Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 26, 2019.

Iran continues to Take Over Syria

Posted on March 27, 2019March 27, 2019 by Denise Simon

Based on how al Qaeda operated and then how Islamic State operated, it appears the winning the hearts of minds of the locals essentially through humanitarian extortion was originally created by Iran.

For at least 3-4 years, Iran has been buying up land in worn torn areas of Syria and real bargain prices. Iran is transferring construction workers into Syria to rebuild designated areas. At a minimum, 5 million homes in Syria have been destroyed due to the civil war. While Iranians are struggling to make a living in their home country, they have at least a chance of working for an income in and around Damascus. Not to be left out, Afghan nationals are also traveling to Syria to take up construction jobs. Most of the community rebuilds, media and businesses are being watched and managed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, a known terror group that the United States is still considering listing as such formally. By the way, it was the IRGC that kidnapped our sailors and held them hostage during the Obama regime.

Meanwhile, as we have known, Bashir al Assad has been a puppet of Tehran. Assad himself is part of the Alawite Sect, which is part of Shia Islam. Iran is moving relentlessly to install hegemony of the Shiite sect in Syria expanding their territory by using the land bridge from Iran to Iraq to Syria and Lebanon.

By using humanitarian bait, military tactics and economic tools, Syrians are being forced to move from being Sunni to Shiite just to live and survive. This is all under the guise of goodwill….yeah sure. So, police stations scattered across the Deir Ezzour province are staffed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. It is at these locations that food, medicine , education and basic life necessities are distributed but not before the conversion takes place from Sunni to Shiite and then people receive a ID card and stipend of $200 per month. This is essentially forcing Syrians to work for Iran.

IRGC-controlled Iraqi militia deploys to eastern Damascus ...

Iran is taking full control of key mosques and what is taught in schools is designed and implemented by the Iranian regime. Bashir al Assad appears to be an advocate of this hearts and minds operation as he owes Tehran for his own survival of power.

There is some resistance from the local Syrians, yet if this continues, the civil war will continue.

Enter the Hussein Organization, an alleged charity that provides water and pockets of electricity. Key areas where all this is occurring in regions along that pesky land bridge where military supply lines continue to flow.

As Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan have hundreds of refugee camps for displaced Syrians, it appears there is no hope or will to return home for them under the growing threat of Iran formally taking power in pockets of Syria.

Late last year, Iran signed a deal to build a major power plant in Latakia. Latakia is a port city that is home to the largest Russian foreign eavesdropping facility. There is also a large airbase in Latakia that is operated by Russia known as the Khmeimim Air Base. Reconnaissance flights take place on a frequent basis under a Russian-Syria treaty.

Syria conflict: First pictures of Russian warplanes ...

This airbase was built in 2015 and is adjacent to the Bassel al Assad International Airport while Russia maintains a permanent navy base not far away in Tartus.

President Trump has a mission to remove all U.S. forces from Syria, however that has been somewhat altered in recent months where an estimate 1000 U.S. forces will remain for a term. Complicating matters in recent days is the Golan Heights.

Syria is demanding a UN Security Council meeting regarding the full declaration of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights region. This region has been under Israeli control going back to 1967 in what was known then as the 6-day war. An armistice line was created and a few times since, Syria has attempted to retake the Golan Heights. Another armistice was signed in 1974 and since that time, the UN has only an observer force as Golan was formally annexed by Israel.

Currently, there are thousands of Jews living in the Golan along with Syrians of the Druze sect. The Golan is a mountainous region that provides the Israeli military and intelligence a good view and buffer of militant activities in Syria.