Stop With the al Qaeda Core Crap

Posted on May 29, 2014May 29, 2014 by Denise Simon

Just because Usama bin Ladin is dead does not translate to al Qaeda being decimated, in fact nothing is farther from the truth.

It should make one wonder why the CTC (Counter Terrorism Center) has only released 17 of the documents from the trove of evidence taken from the bin Ladin Pakistan compound. It also should be the question on why drone strikes have suddenly stopped in Pakistan and moved to other locations such as Yemen.

On the heels of the Barack Obama West Point speech yesterday on the foreign policy doctrine, both the White House and the State Department announced a $5 billion global counter-terrorism fund. Ah, why now? Why was there at least a two year delay in placing Boko Harem on the FTO by Hillary Clinton? Why was there a major delay in placing Ansar al Sharia on the FTO, which was not done until January of this year given the proof of their attack on our two locations in Benghazi?

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A Map of All the Countries That Now Have Al-Qaeda Affiliated Terrorist Groups

The United Nations decided late last week to add Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram to its list of terrorist organizations formally recognized as being associated with al Qaeda.

The UN said in its statement that Boko Haram—whose name loosely translates to “Western education is a sin”—has “maintained a relationship with the Organization of Al-Qaida [sic] in the Islamic Maghreb for training and material support purposes.”

Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan has been referring to the group as a terrorist organization since last year and arresting members accordingly. But his country’s battles with Islamism have been launched onto the international stage since Boko Haram abducted hundreds of schoolgirls last month. This has put Nigeria on the map in a way Jonathan would have done best to avoid.

It has also put Nigeria on this particular map of countries with recognized al-Qaeda affiliates.

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Obama’s $5 Billion Counterterrorism Fund Already in Trouble in Congress

by Josh Rogin

President Obama’s Wednesday announcement that he wants $5 billion more next year to fight terrorism came as a complete surprise to the congressmen who will have to give him the money, and they reacted Wednesday with confusion and skepticism.

The new fund, if Congress goes along, would be added to the administration’s Pentagon budget request for the upcoming fiscal year, inside what’s known as the Overseas Contingency Operations fund. (That’s the cash that’s supposed to be used to help fight America’s wars, and is not considered part of the Defense Department’s core budget.) Experts and former officials warned that unless the administration comes to Congress with detailed plans of how the money will be spent and why those tasks can’t be completed inside the Pentagon’s already-huge budget, lawmakers are not likely to sign off on the idea. The total lack of administration outreach to Congress so far is not a good start.

At West Point, Obama said he was “calling on Congress to support a new Counter-Terrorism Partnerships Fund of up to $5 billion, which will allow us to train, build capacity, and facilitate partner countries on the front lines”—from Yemen to Libya to Syria to Mali.

Normalcy, America Cannot Retire

Posted on May 29, 2014May 29, 2014 by Denise Simon

Superpowers Don’t Get to Retire

What our tired country still owes the world

By Robert Kagan

Almost 70 years ago, a new world order was born from the rubble of World War II, built by and around the power of the United States. Today that world order shows signs of cracking, and perhaps even collapsing. The Russia-Ukraine and Syria crises, and the world’s tepid response, the general upheaval in the greater Middle East and North Africa, the growing nationalist and great-power tensions in East Asia, the worldwide advance of autocracy and retreat of democracy—taken individually, these problems are neither unprecedented nor unmanageable. But collectively they are a sign that something is changing, and perhaps more quickly than we may imagine. They may signal a transition into a different world order or into a world disorder of a kind not seen since the 1930s.

If a breakdown in the world order that America made is occurring, it is not because America’s power is declining—America’s wealth, power, and potential influence remain adequate to meet the present challenges. It is not because the world has become more complex and intractable—the world has always been complex and intractable. And it is not simply war-weariness. Strangely enough, it is an intellectual problem, a question of identity and purpose.

Many Americans and their political leaders in both parties, including President Obama, have either forgotten or rejected the assumptions that undergirded American foreign policy for the past seven decades. In particular, American foreign policy may be moving away from the sense of global responsibility that equated American interests with the interests of many others around the world and back toward the defense of narrower, more parochial national interests. This is sometimes called “isolationism,” but that is not the right word. It may be more correctly described as a search for normalcy. At the core of American unease is a desire to shed the unusual burdens of responsibility that previous generations of Americans took on in World War II and throughout the cold war and to return to being a more normal kind of nation, more attuned to its own needs and less to those of the wider world.

If this is indeed what a majority of Americans seek today, then the current period of retrenchment will not be a temporary pause before an inevitable return to global activism. It will mark a new phase in the evolution of America’s foreign policy. And because America’s role in shaping the world order has been so unusually powerful and pervasive, it will also begin a new phase in the international system, one that promises not to be marginally different but radically different from what we have known these past 70 years. Unless Americans can be led back to an understanding of their enlightened self-interest, to see again how their fate is entangled with that of the world, then the prospects for a peaceful twenty-first century in which Americans and American principles can thrive will be bleak.

To understand where America, and the world, may be heading, it is useful to remind ourselves where we have been—of the choices that Americans made decades ago and of the profound, world-changing consequences of those choices. For Americans, the choice was never been between isolationism and internationalism. With their acquisitive drive for wealth and happiness, their love of commerce, their economic and (in earlier times) territorial expansiveness, and their universalistic ideology, they never had it in them to wall themselves off from the rest of the world. Tokugawa Japan and Ming China were isolationist. Americans have always been more like republican Rome or ancient Athens, a people and a nation on the move.

When, roughly 70 years ago, American foreign policy underwent a revolutionary transformation, it was not a transformation from isolationism to internationalism. What Americans had rejected before World War II was a steady global involvement, with commitments to other nations and responsibilities for the general well-being of the world. That was what the so-called “internationalists” of the time wanted for the United States. Theodore Roosevelt, John Hay, Henry Cabot Lodge, Elihu Root, Henry Stimson, Woodrow Wilson, and many others believed that Americans ought to take on a much bigger role in world affairs, as befitted their growing power. The United States had become “more and more the balance of power of the whole globe,” Roosevelt observed, and it ought to behave accordingly. And indeed, following the Spanish-American War and for the first two decades of the twentieth century, the United States did pursue a wider and deeper global involvement than it had ever done before, culminating in the dispatch of two million troops to France. When World War I ended, Wilson, like Roosevelt before him, ambitiously set out to make the United States a central player in world affairs. Beseeched by all the European powers after the war—for American financing aid to steady their economies and for American security guarantees against each other—Wilson wanted the United States to commit itself to an enduring global role. The world, he warned Americans, would be “absolutely in despair if America deserts it.” Wilson’s League of Nations (actually it had been Roosevelt’s idea first), although couched in the idealistic language of universal principles and collective security, was meant above all to serve as the vehicle for American power and influence in support of a new liberal world order.

But Americans rejected this role. Disillusioned by the compromises and imperfections of the Versailles Treaty, mourning the loss of more than 100,000 dead soldiers, skeptical about American participation in the league, and spurred on by Republicans eager to defeat Wilson and recapture the White House, a majority of Americans came to oppose not only the league but also the internationalists’ broad vision of America’s global role. This was no absentminded lapse back into nonexistent isolationist traditions. It was a deliberate decision to turn away from the increasingly active global involvement of the previous two decades, to adopt a foreign policy of far greater restraint, and above all to avoid future military interventions beyond the Western Hemisphere. Wilson’s Republican successors promised, and the American public welcomed, what Warren Harding called a “return to normalcy.”

Normalcy in the 1920s did not mean isolation. Americans continued to trade, to invest, and to travel overseas; their navy was equaled in size only by Britain’s, and had fleets in the Atlantic and the Pacific; and their diplomats pursued treaties to control the arms race and to “outlaw” war. Normalcy simply meant defining America’s national interests the way most other nations defined theirs. It meant defending the homeland, avoiding overseas commitments, preserving the country’s independence and freedom of action, and creating prosperity at home. The problems of Europe and Asia were not America’s problems, and they could be solved, or not solved, without American help. This applied to global economic issues as well. Harding wanted to “prosper America first,” and he did. The 1920s were boom years for the American economy, while Europe’s postwar economies stagnated.

To the vast majority of Americans, normalcy seemed a reasonable response to the world of the 1920s, after the enormous exertions of the Wilson years. There were no obvious threats on the horizon. Postwar Weimar Germany was a faltering republic more likely to collapse than to take another stab at continental dominance. Bolshevik Russia was wracked by civil war and economic crisis. Japan, though growing in power and ambition, was a fragile democracy with a seat on the League of Nations permanent council. To most Americans in the 1920s, the greatest risk to America came not from foreign powers but from those misguided “internationalists” and the greedy bankers and war profiteers who would involve the nation in foreign conflicts that were none of America’s business.

This consensus was broad, deep, and bipartisan, and Americans stayed on the course of normalcy for two full decades. They did so even as the world order—no longer upheld by the old combination of British naval might and a relatively stable balance of power in Europe and Asia—began to fray and then collapse. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931; Hitler’s rise to power in 1933; Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935; Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland, and the German and Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War, in 1936; Japan’s invasion of central China in 1937; Hitler’s absorption of Austria, followed by his annexation and eventual conquest of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939—all these events troubled and at times appalled Americans. They were not ignorant of what was going on. Even back then information traveled widely and rapidly, and the newspapers and newsreels were filled with stories about each unfolding crisis. Reports of Mussolini’s dive-bombers dropping their ordnance on spear-carrying Ethiopians; Germany’s aerial bombing of the civilian population of Guernica; Japan’s rampage of rape, pillage, and murder in Nanking—they were horrific and regrettable. But they were not reasons for the United States to get involved. On the contrary, they were reasons for not getting involved. The worse things looked around the world, the more hopeless it all seemed, the less Americans wanted to have anything to do with it. The United States, it was widely believed, had no vital interests at stake in Manchuria, Ethiopia, Spain, or Czechoslovakia.

In fact, it was not clear that the United States had vital interests anywhere outside the Western Hemisphere. Even after the German invasion of Poland in 1939, and the outbreak of a general European war that followed, respected American strategic thinkers, priding themselves on “realistic thinking,” the “banishment of altruism and sentiment” from their analysis, and “single-minded attention to the national interests,” advised that, with two oceans and a strong navy standing between America and every great power in the world, the United States was invulnerable.A Japanese attack on, say, Hawaii, they ruled out as literally impossible. Republican Senator Robert A. Taft felt confident in saying that no power “would be stupid enough” to attack the United States “from across thousands of miles of ocean.” Nor would the United States suffer appreciably if Nazi Germany did manage to conquer all of Europe, including Great Britain, which by 1940 the realists regarded as a foregone conclusion. Taft saw no reason why the United States could not trade and conduct normal diplomacy with a Europe dominated by Nazi Germany just as it had with Great Britain and France. As the historian Howard K. Beale put it, nations “do not trade with one another because they like each other’s governments but because both sides find the exchange of goods desirable.”

Holders of such views were tagged with the disparaging label of “isolationist,” but as Hans Morgenthau later pointed out, they believed at the time that they were upholding the “realist tradition of American foreign policy.” The United States should not range “over the world like a knight-errant,” Taft admonished, “[protecting] democracy and ideals of good faith and [tilting] like Don Quixote against the windmills of fascism.” Taft insisted on seeing the world as it was, not as idealists wished it to be. The European war was the product of “national and racial animosities” that had existed “for centuries” and would continue to exist “for centuries to come,” he argued. To make a difference in the war, the United States would have to send millions of troops across the ocean, make an impossible amphibious landing on shores heavily defended by German forces, and then march across Europe against the world’s strongest army. The very thought was inconceivable. Much as they might wish to help Europe, therefore, Americans had “no power, even if we have the will, to be its savior.”

This view was so dominant and so politically popular that Franklin Roosevelt spent his first years in office muzzling his internationalist instincts and vowing to keep America out of another war—“I hate war!” he roared in a famous address in 1936. After Munich, however, he grew panicked, sensing that the Western powers, Britain and France, had lost the will to stand up to Hitler. And so he began trying to warn Americans of what he regarded as the coming threat. Yet it was difficult to counter the realists’ hardheaded analysis. Roosevelt could not prove that American security was directly endangered by what was happening in Europe. He was left making a case that really did appeal more to sentiment and idealism than to demonstrable threats to the American homeland.

Even if the United States faced no immediate danger of military attack, Roosevelt argued, if Hitler, Mussolini, and Imperial Japan were allowed to have their way, the world would be a “shabby and dangerous place to live in—yes, even for Americans to live in.” America would become a “lone island” in a world dominated by the “philosophy of force.” The “institutions of democracy” would be placed at risk even if America’s security was not, because America would have to become an armed camp to defend itself. Roosevelt urged Americans to look beyond their immediate physical security. “There comes a time in the affairs of men,” he said, “when they must prepare to defend, not their homes alone, but the tenets of faith and humanity on which their churches, their governments, and their very civilization are founded. The defense of religion, of democracy, and of good faith among nations is all the same fight. To save one we must now make up our minds to save all.”

Such arguments, along with the fall of France and the Battle of Britain, did help convince Americans that they had a stake in the outcome of the European struggle, but it did not convince them to go to war. That decision followed only after Pearl Harbor. The Japanese attack, Hitler’s subsequent declaration of war, and America’s full-scale entry into the conflicts in both Europe and Asia were a traumatic shock to Americans, especially for those in positions of power. That which had been deemed impossible had proved possible, and long-held assumptions about American security in a troubled world collapsed in a single day.

Then there was the global economy. In the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, the United States had sought mostly domestic remedies for the Great Depression, raising its own tariffs, choking off lending abroad, refusing to join other nations in a common monetary policy, and generally protecting the American economy while ignoring the world economy. By 1941, however, Roosevelt and his advisers had concluded that both America’s prosperity and its security depended on a healthy world economy. Poverty and economic dislocation had played a major role in the rise of both Hitler and Bolshevism. The United States bore much of the blame, for although it had been the world’s leading economic power in the 1920s and 1930s, it had failed to play a constructive and responsible role in stabilizing the global economy.

Finally, there was the issue of American public support for global involvement. In the 1920s and 1930s, Americans had been allowed and even encouraged by their political leaders to believe that the United States was immune to the world’s troubles. They could not be allowed to fall back into such complacency. They could no longer regard events thousands of miles away as of no concern to them. To Roosevelt, assuring public support for a larger and more consistent American role in the world was going to be among the greatest challenges after the war. Americans had to understand, as Reinhold Niebuhr wrote in April 1943, that “the world problem cannot be solved if America does not accept its full share of responsibility in solving it.”

That share was to be sizeable. convinced that World War II had been the result not of any single incident but rather of the overall breakdown of world order, politically, economically, and strategically, American leaders set out to erect and sustain a new order that could endure. This time it was to be a world order built around American economic, political, and military power. Europeans had proved incapable of keeping the peace. Asia was entirely unstable on its own. Any new order would depend on the United States. It would become the center of a new economic system that would encourage open trade and provide financial assistance and loans to nations struggling to stay afloat. It would take a substantial and active part in the occupation and transformation of the defeated powers, ensuring that some form of democracy took root in place of the dictatorships that had led those nations to war. America would also have to possess preponderant military strength and when necessary deploy sufficient power to preserve stability and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

Military force played a central part in the calculations of Roosevelt and his advisers as they set out to establish and defend the new liberal world order. “Peace must be kept by force,” Roosevelt insisted. There was “no other way.” He anticipated that an American occupation force of one million troops would be necessary to keep the peace in Europe, for at least a year and perhaps longer. During the war, the Joint Chiefs envisioned establishing military bases around the world in “areas well removed from the United States” so that any fighting would take place “nearer the enemy” rather than near American territory.

A must to continue to read here.

Obama’s Doctrine is Vertigo

Posted on May 29, 2014May 29, 2014 by Denise Simon

The quite rage began across country by experts when it comes to foreign policy as a result of Barack Obama’s speech at West Point. Omitting the fact that he included climate change as a major global threat, Barack Obama worked to defend his posture and to explain his own view on why America is in fact exceptional and not weak when it comes to enemies of the United States. He even took a shot at World War ll veterans and military leadership by saying they did not estimate the later conditions or damage of their strategic decisions during World War ll.

The United States has a historical and successful duty to provide equilibrium to the world. There have been some failures yet they were corrected, yet no other nation has stepped up across the globe where the duty has fallen to America. The globe calls us to duty now yet Barack Obama has vertigo when it comes to leading, being decisive and demonstrating power.

The reaction to the speech was broadly in agreement, such that Obama is not a war-time president much less does he see the world for what it is but rather for what he wants it to be. Just a small comparison of the West Point speech, see the two videos here.

Reaction to the President’s West Point Speech

At West Point, President Obama Binds America’s Hands on Foreign Affairs – Washington Post Editorial

President Obama has retrenched U.S. global engagement in a way that has shaken the confidence of many U.S. allies and encouraged some adversaries. That conclusion can be heard not just from Republican hawks but also from senior officials from Singapore to France and, more quietly, from some leading congressional Democrats. As he has so often in his political career, Mr. Obama has elected to respond to the critical consensus not by adjusting policy but rather by delivering a big speech.

Obama’s Vision of U.S. as ‘Empowering Partners’ – Christian Science Monitor Editorial

Obama quoted President Kennedy about peace needing to be based upon “a gradual evolution in human institutions.” As more people and nations evolve toward shared ideals, the task of maintaining international order also becomes more of a shared one. The U.S., which was so instrumental as a military leader in the 20th century, can take on a new role in bringing nations and people closer.

America Can’t Ignore Military Muscle of Russia and China – Washington Examiner Editorial

President Obama told West Point’s graduating cadets Wednesday that “some of our most costly mistakes came not from our restraint, but from our willingness to rush into military adventures without thinking through the consequences.” Apparently the nation’s commander-in-chief is unaware of — or perhaps unconcerned by — the more pressing reality that bad things happen when America’s real and potential adversaries don’t fear U.S. strength.

Obama’s Unclear Foreign Policy Path – Richard N. Haass, Council on Foreign Relations

President Barack Obama has laid out a vision for U.S. foreign policy calling for the need to avoid both unnecessary military entanglements and isolationism. CFR President Richard N. Haass said the speech at West Point on May 28 appeared too focused on what the president opposed and less on what he favored. “It was an attempt to essentially carve out a form of involvement in the world that avoided any and every excess,” Haass said. “But with one or two exceptions, it didn’t provide any specifics.” Obama’s call for ramping up support for non-jihadist rebels in Syria is welcomed, Haass said.

Doubling Down on a Muddled Foreign Policy – John Bolton, Wall Street Journal

At West Point on Wednesday, President Obama told the graduating seniors that he had discovered a middle way in foreign policy between isolationism and military interventionism. To the White House, this was like “the dawn come up like thunder outer China,” in Kipling’s phrase. Others were less impressed, especially since it took five-plus years of on-the-job training to grasp this platitude. Of course the United States has options between war and complete inaction. Not since Nixon has a president so relished uncovering middling alternatives between competing straw men.

The Obama Defense – Michael O’Hanlon, Foreign Affairs

U.S. President Obama — increasingly accused of having a listless foreign policy that, in the eyes of some, made Russian President Vladimir Putin believe he could get away with stealing Crimea — is doing much better on the world stage than his critics allow. But he does still have to address one significant problem. If he does not, he will likely find himself increasingly harangued over a supposed decline in American influence and power on his watch. His West Point speech on May 28 will probably fix some of the problem, but not all of it.

Obama’s Foreign Policy Repeats Some Avoidable Mistakes – David Ignatius, Washington Post

President Obama’s measured defense of his foreign policy at West Point on Wednesday made many cogent points to rebut critics. Unfortunately, the speech also showed that he hasn’t digested some of the crucial lessons of his presidency.

Obama Just Accidentally Explained Why His Foreign Policy Hasn’t Worked – Elliott Abrams, Washington Post

At West Point today, President Obama marched out his army of straw men and continued his ungracious habit of taking credit for successful actions attributable to his predecessor. But at bottom, the policy he outlined will be of little comfort to our allies and to the cause of freedom in the world.

Obama at West Point: A Foreign Policy of False Choices – David Frum, The Atlantic

On the evidence of President Obama’s commencement address at West Point on Wednesday, he’d have made an outstanding State Department memo-writer. The president outlined a Washington policy debate occurring in three corners. Over in Corner 1 are those who believe in “a strategy that involves invading every country that harbors terrorist networks.” Huddled in Corner 2 are those who insist that “conflicts in Syria or Ukraine or the Central African Republic are not ours to solve.” Between these obviously stupid extremes is a sensible third way, which happens to coincide perfectly with the policy of the Obama administration.

What Obama Didn’t Explain in His Foreign Policy Speech at West Point – Doyle McManus, Los Angeles Times

President Obama’s foreign policy speech at West Point on Wednesday didn’t break any new ground, not even rhetorically. But it wasn’t intended to. It was meant as a rebuttal, an answer to critics who have harried Obama for months complaining that America’s adversaries (Russia, China and Syria, for example) are pursuing their goals with more success than the United States has found in stopping them. The criticisms have gotten under Obama’s skin. He gripes about them frequently, in public and in private. So, with a speech already promised for West Point’s graduation ceremony, he seized the opportunity for a longer, more considered version of his side of the argument.

Obama Says Goodbye to American Hubris – Peter Bergen, CNN News

What Obama did in his West Point speech was to chart a course that balances two natural, and contradictory, American national security impulses — isolationism and interventionism — and points to a hybrid approach that avoids some of the pitfalls of either of these strategic approaches.

Obama vs. His Imagined Critics – Max Boot, Commentary

In his much ballyhooed West Point address, President Obama employed what in the 1990s was known as “triangulation”–but not an effective or convincing form of triangulation, rather one that appears to be mainly rhetorical instead of policy oriented.

The New World Disorder – Richard Parker, McClatchy-Tribune

The president’s speech Wednesday at West Point was, as all of his speeches are, a fine speech. But it did not advance the ball. He did not move the locus of American attention and energy out of the Middle East and northern Africa, where he continued to focus on the fragments of the remnants of al-Qaida. For a president who correctly noted that “not every problem is a nail,” he focused chiefly on the nails of terrorism and the hammer of the judicious use of force.

Obama’s Small Ball Foreign Agenda – Steve Huntley, Chicago Sun-Times

A strategy of singles and doubles is how President Barack Obama recently characterized his foreign policy. Anyone looking for more than small ball in what the White House billed as a major speech at West Point on Wednesday was bound to be disappointed. No big agenda or ambitious goals were pronounced. It was more a steady as we go on the more modest role Obama has chartered for America in world affairs.

Obama’s Foreign Policy Speech Sounds Familiar – Michael Crowley, Time

Obama’s foreign policy address at West Point won’t satisfy his critics, but it might reassure anxious supporters. For all the hype, President Barack Obama’s foreign policy speech at West Point on Wednesday didn’t break much new ground.

The Goldilocks Speech – Eric Cantor, ABC News

Today’s address at West Point was a goldilocks speech. Trying to find the lukewarm bowl of porridge will not likely reassure those who worry about our lack of leadership, and will not concern those who fear its return.

Commentators Break Down Obama Foreign Policy Speech at West Point – U.S. News & World Report Roundup

Views You Can Use: Staying the Course on Foreign Policy – Obama’s West Point speech didn’t break much ground.

Did Obama Make His Case? – New York Times Debate

In his address to graduating West Point cadets on Wednesday, President Obama laid out his administration’s foreign policy goals. His speech was directed at his critics who have suggested “that America is in decline” and “has seen its global leadership slip away.” Did it work?

US Lawmakers React to Obama Speech at West Point – Michael Bowman, Voice of America

One of Barack Obama’s top congressional critics in foreign policy matters has responded forcefully to a speech in which the president mapped out his vision for U.S. engagement around the globe.

MTV Indoctrinates Viewers at Behest of CAIR

Posted on May 27, 2014May 27, 2014 by Denise Simon

In 1979, the United State severed ties with Iran. An interesting twist however, Iran did not sever ties with factions inside the United States and pro-Khomeini Shiite activities. Even back in 1979 and moving forward, Iranian influence and Islamic influence were making end roads into the culture and driving down Main Street USA. No one noticed except the FBI. But the investigations of the FBI remained classified until 2008 and then the reports were meant to remain obscure and out of sight from America.

Moving into the United States went unnoticed such that Islam is now a common and accepted condition in America but this is the time to fight back as Islam is political and packaged as a religion. Sharia law cannot compete with the U.S. Constitution however, so far it has.

So, here we are witnessing Islamic indoctrination on our televisions right in our homes but who notices that? CAIR is a co-conspirator of the Holyland Foundation trial and was deemed such by the Department of Justice. Why then would MTV partner with CAIR?

No one at MTV is talking which likely is to understand that no one at MTV did their homework or bothered with vetting. So, the homework has been done for them and perhaps you will collectively contact MTV and hold class with their leadership. Then have a talk with your family and then have a talk with your cable provider until MTV admits the error and fixes the matter.

MTV Partners With CAIR Despite Islamist Agenda

MTV has seriously erred by choosing CAIR, an organization with an extremist history that tars every opponent as an anti-Muslim bigot.

By Ryan Mauro

MTV is including the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), a U.S. Muslim Brotherhood entity with a history of radicalism, in its “world-class coalition of expert partners” for a campaign to combat discrimination and inequality. CAIR has a history of tarring its opponents by calling them “anti-Muslim” or “Islamophobes.”

The multi-year “Look Different” campaign will use celebrity activism, television shows and social media to influence the over 500 million households that MTV is available in. While well-intentioned, MTV unfortunately chose to include CAIR, an organization with an extremist history that tars every opponent as an anti-Muslim bigot.

The Justice Department designated CAIR an unindicted co-conspirator in the largest terrorism-financing trial in U.S. history. The government listed CAIR as an entity of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood, specifically its secret Palestine Committee; a body set up to covertly support the Hamas terrorist group.

The designation was upheld by a federal judge in 2009 because of “ample” evidence to show that CAIR is part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s pro-Hamas network in America. After the designation, the FBI formally ended its use of CAIR as an outreach partner “until we can resolve whether there continues to be a relationship between CAIR or its executives with Hamas.”

In 2004, CAIR Executive Director Nihad Awad said in an interview with Al-Jazeera that CAIR does not consider Hamas and Hezbollah to be terrorist organizations. He said, “We do not and will not condemn any liberation movement inside Palestine or Lebanon.”

In 2007, federal prosecutors said in a court filing: “From its founding by Muslim Brotherhood leaders, CAIR conspired with other affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood to support terrorists … the conspirators agreed to use deception to conceal from the American public their connections to terrorists.”

You can read the Clarion Project’s fully-documented profile of CAIR here.

The Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas have a history of extremism and anti-Semitism; the exact type of sentiment that MTV’s project seeks to counter. Yet, MTV is embracing an organization with confirmed links to these groups. CAIR’s fundraising banquets regularly feature radical speakers that promote violence and anti-American and anti-Semitic propaganda and conspiracy theories.

“In our work, we see biases carried out in hurtful actions almost every day. The fact that so many of the young people MTV polled want to work to change or eliminate harmful biases fills us with hope that campaigns like Look Different can effect long-lasting, positive changes in our society,” CAIR spokesman Amina Rubin said.

CAIR and associated Islamists play the “Islamophobia

IslamophobiaGlossary Item

Unwarranted fear of Muslims; term frequently used by Islamist groups and their allies to label critics of Islamic extremism as bigots in order to stifle criticism.

According to Abdur-Rahman Muhammad, a former member of a U.S. Muslim Brotherhood front group (IIIT), “This loathsome term is nothing more than a thought-terminating cliche conceived in the bowels of Muslim think tanks for the purpose of beating down critics.”

” card on anyone who stands in their way, drawing the ire of anti-Islamist Muslim activists. It is part of a calculated political strategy and CAIR will utilize MTV towards this end if given the opportunity.

“Name-calling with the term Islamophobia is an aggressive tactic popularized by apologists for Radical Islam to silence individuals who attempt to tell the truth about Jihadist Islam,” writes Muslim activist Tawfik Hamid, a former member of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s group in Egypt.

Raheel Raza, President of the Council for Muslims Facing Tomorrow, describes the “Islamophobia” tactic as “a form of emotional extortion intended to extract special concessions from well-meaning but gullible people the West.”

A former member of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood network, Abdur-Rahman Muhammad, has talked about a private meeting he held in the 1990s with the International Institute of Islamic Thought, CAIR’s fellow U.S. Muslim Brotherhood entity. The discussion focused on delegitimizing any opposition by accusing it of “Islamophobia.”

“This loathsome term is nothing more than a thought-terminating cliché conceived in the bowels of Muslim think tanks for the purpose of beating down critics,” he explains.

This tactic is even used on devout Muslims. Dr. Zuhdi Jasser, a practicing Muslim, has been accused of belonging to an “Islamophobia Network” countless times by CAIR. The group also went after the American Islamic Congress without provocation, accusing it of promoting “Islamophobia” just because it hasn’t adopted CAIR’s political causes.

This stands in sharp contrast to CAIR’s treatment of Islamist radicals, most recently defending Jamaat ul-Fuqra, a virulently anti-Semitic group with a terrorist history.

The American Islamists have been using this strategy since long before 9/11. For example, Imam

ImamGlossary Item

Religious authority figure; usually the leader of a mosque.

Siraj Wahhaj, a radical cleric that helps CAIR fundraise, can be seen preaching this theme in this video from around the time of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

Wahhaj tells the audience that there’s an anti-Muslim conspiracy involving the U.S. government and Israel and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, he claims, is part of it. The overall message is the same one that we hear today: The Islamists’ opponents are part of an anti-Muslim network that is hijacking the institutions of power.

CAIR’s efforts to use MTV’s campaign for political advantage will be endorsed by the Southern Poverty Law Center, another organization included in MTV’s coalition. The think-tank equates any recognition of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood with anti-Muslim bigotry.

“The sole evidence for this conspiracy theory is a 20-year old document outlining a plan for such a [Muslim Brotherhood] takeover, which has since been debunked as the fantasy of a single Muslim Brotherhood member,” the Center incorrectly claims.

The Muslim Brotherhood document the Center refers to introduced as evidence in the Holy Land Foundation trial. Contrary to what the Center says, the file’s authenticity has not been debunked or even seriously challenged.

And even if it was, it wouldn’t make any difference. Supporting proof comes in the form of declassified FBI documents, court filings, U.S. government determinations, other internal Brotherhood documents and the Islamists’ own actions and statements.

On May 19, the Clarion Project contacted MTV to inform the network of CAIR’s history and its false labeling of any and all critics as anti-Muslim “Islamophobes” with bigoted agendas. We requested a statement in response. MTV did not respond.

MTV has seriously erred by choosing CAIR as an “expert partner” in combating intolerance and discrimination. The well-meaning campaign runs the risk of becoming a platform for CAIR to assault the integrity of its opponents.

War Time President or Ally? Not so Much

Posted on May 27, 2014May 27, 2014 by Denise Simon

Much has been written that Barack Obama is feeble when it comes to foreign policy. There is the matter of Syria where deference was given to Putin by the White House to handle matters regarding the civil war there as well as the chemical weapons. Well, now additional chemical weapons are being used today that are chlorine based barrel bombs. Then there is Iraq where war again is as bad today as it was in 2004.

One cannot overlook the matter of the Budapest Memorandum where the United States as well as the United Kingdom must protect Ukraine with something more than a VP Joe Biden visit and MRE’s.

Completely ignored until 300 girls were kidnapped in Nigeria by Boko Harem, it was not until the media reported the vast kidnappings that we found that neither Hillary Clinton or John Kerry listed Boko Harem on the FTO (Foreign Terror Organization) list. Heck it was not until this past January of 2014 that the attackers in Benghazi, Ansar al Sharia was listed on the FTO.

There is a war brewing in the South China sea where China continues to be aggressive over disputed islands involving Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines.

So, sanctions rule and go where no offensive measures shall. Diplomatic victories should prevail for sure but to date, all diplomatic efforts and talks have failed with Iran nuclear negotiations are now permanently broken as is the matter between Israel and the Palestinians.

The truth be known, America is at war and Barack Obama has not figured out how to be a war time president except to retreat without tangible victories anywhere.

Allies are asking hard questions of the White House and not getting any responses, so their conclusions are such that they doubt seriously that America even with NATO’s Article 5 will not be at their side at all.

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May 27, 2014

U.S. Foreign Policy Barack Obama Is Accused Of Timidity Overseas, Raising Fear and Anger Among The Country’s Allies.

By Geoff Dyer

When President Barack Obama ran for re-election in 2012, he pulled off what for Democrats was a remarkable feat – he took foreign policy off the table as a campaign issue. Ever since Harry Truman was accused of “losing China”, Republicans have sought to cast their Democratic opponents as weak in the face of foreign challenges. Yet fresh from his risky but successful military operation to kill Osama bin Laden, Mr. Obama side-stepped the usual assault during his re-election campaign. His challenger Mitt Romney hardly brought up foreign policy. Eighteen months later, the political ground is shifting rapidly beneath Mr. Obama’s feet. As he prepares to give an important address on foreign policy at West Point tomorrow, the president finds himself under attack over what critics charge is a record of indecisive leadership. The loudest voices have been Mr. Obama’s political opponents at home, but the critique of a rudderless, risk-adverse president has also found strong echoes among some of America’s most important allies. From Saudi Arabia to Japan, officials have been wondering whether the US would still come to their defense. Mr. Obama’s election in 2008 reflected a widespread belief at home and abroad that there was “too much America” in the world. Although he still seems to be in tune with the US public, Mr. Obama faces the accusation that there is now too little. Even John Kerry, his secretary of state, appeared to acknowledge this international perception in a speech last week. “We cannot allow a hangover from the excessive interventionism of the last decade to lead now to an excess of isolationism,” he told students at Yale. “Most of the rest of the world doesn’t lie awake at night worrying about America’s presence – they worry about what would happen in our absence.”

In his West Point speech, Mr. Obama will lay out how the US intends to “lead the international community but without getting overextended”, as a White House official puts it. But the persistent attacks have left Mr. Obama in a defensive crouch, tetchily defending his cautious approach. “That may not always be sexy. That may not always attract a lot of attention, and it doesn’t make for good argument on Sunday morning shows,” he said during a recent Asia trip. “But it avoids errors.” The rap sheet on Mr. Obama has two basic charges: that he is too timid in his approach to foreign affairs; and that the US has begun a process of retreating from its place in the world during his presidency. “On all these issues, our response has been to do the minimum and no more,” says Bob Corker, the leading Republican on the Senate foreign relations committee. “Every allied government I talk to, I get the same questions about whether we will be there.” On one level, the claim that Mr. Obama is too passive is part of a longstanding intellectual debate in Washington about foreign policy.

When he was first elected, many analysts pegged Mr. Obama as an idealist – a reflection of his stirring rhetoric, his reaching out to the Muslim world and his longstanding association with Samantha Power, now his UN ambassador and the leading intellectual voice of liberal interventionism. Instead, in recent years Mr. Obama has revealed himself as a president more rooted in a realist tradition that is more focused on the defense of national interests and is wary of moral causes. This should not have come as a complete surprise: even during his first election campaign, he told interviewers of his respect for the foreign policy of George HW Bush. Mr. Obama’s reticence over Syria reflects a belief that it is better to avoid mistakes than to appear decisive. “The United States has a hard-earned humility when it comes to our ability to determine events inside other countries,” Mr. Obama said in a speech to the UN last September. “Obama’s mistake on Syria was not that he did not follow through on the red line he set [about the use of chemical weapons],” says John Mearsheimer, the University of Chicago scholar who is one of the leading realist thinkers. “It was setting a red line in the first place.” (He adds that he believes Mr. Obama “95 per cent supports” his point of view.) Such a world view, however, puts the president at odds with a large part of the US foreign policy establishment on both the left and the right, which, despite the traumas of Iraq, is still instinctively interventionist.

Some supporters worry that the president’s caution can become an excuse for inaction. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national security adviser, says that he believes Mr. Obama often has the right instincts but that “he does not always translate that into diplomatic strategies to achieve his goals”. Mr. Obama has added to the impression of dithering and inaction through his highly deliberative style of decision-making, which is in stark contrast to George W Bush’s reliance on gut instinct. The months of painstaking discussion in the first term over whether to put more troops into Afghanistan have been matched in the second term by a series of reviews of Syria policy, which have each ended with Mr. Obama deciding to do little. The root cause of much of the angst about Mr. Obama has been his public wobble last September over whether to launch Tomahawk missiles against Syria, culminating in the walk on the White House lawn when he decided to punt the issue to Congress. Outside of the Middle East, few US allies were worried about the details of the proposed Syria strike: what rattled them was the sight of a US president making a threat and then deciding he did not have the political authority to carry through with it. “We have lost some of the aura we used to enjoy in the region,” says Vali Nasr, a former state department official in Mr. Obama’s first term who has been a strong critic of the administration’s approach to the Middle East. Since then the humanitarian catastrophe of the Syrian war has only deepened, yet Mr. Obama has consistently resisted pressure from within his administration to do more. Even those aides who agree with his caution admit it has been an inglorious episode.

The unfolding events in Europe and Asia have also fed the perception of a US president losing his capacity to shape events abroad. At a time that the Pentagon budget is being cut, China is increasingly bent on pursuing its territorial claims and on challenging American naval dominance in the western Pacific. In Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has been able to annex Crimea and to destabilize parts of the east of the country while the west has scrambled to come up with a response that will be effective in the short term. “While the wolf is eating the sheep, there is no shepherd to come to the rescue of the pack,” former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal told the FT. The second, broader argument about the Obama presidency – that the US is disengaging from the world – is much harder to support. After all, the Afghanistan mission, which formally ends this year, is the longest-running conflict in US history.

The strongest complaints about American retrenchment have come from the Middle East. Yet even after the withdrawal from Iraq, the US military presence in the region remains formidable, following a dramatic expansion in recent decades. During the second term of Ronald Reagan, at the height of the cold war, the US had an average of 8,800 troops in the Middle East: it now has 35,000. “Over the years we have steadily militarized our approach to the Middle East, which has not always been in our interests,” says Dennis Blair, the retired admiral and former Director of National Intelligence. In some parts of the region and south Asia, Mr. Obama has provoked anger not for reticence over Syria, but for his aggressive use of drone strikes or cyber attacks against Iran. Indeed, a significant part of the criticism from allies in the Middle East has been much less about the credibility of the American president and more about basic differences in interests. Washington’s biggest focus is preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon without starting a new war. The Saudis and Israelis, however, are incensed that the US would negotiate with a country they believe to be a rival for regional influence or an existential threat. Many of the Sunni-dominated Gulf nations see the Syrian war in sectarian terms and want to defeat Shia Iran. Yet the sectarian nature of the conflict is one of the main reasons the US is reluctant to get involved.

In Asia, the Obama administration is expanding America’s military presence, signing agreements with Australia and the Philippines for much greater access to bases and deepening co-operation with Japan. One explanation for recent Chinese assertiveness is that Mr. Obama has been pushing too hard rather than that he is considered a pushover.

Europe is the one place where the US military footprint has significantly shrunk. However, the case for a bigger American presence in Europe would be easier to make if European governments were not slashing their own defense budgets. Moreover, it is a stretch to suggest that Russia felt emboldened to annex Crimea because there were fewer US soldiers stationed in western Germany. “We should worry less about putting more NATO troops in the Baltics, and more about whether there are disaffected Russian populations that Putin can take advantage of,” says Thomas Graham, a former White House official under George W Bush.

Sometimes lost in Washington’s rancorous debates are the changes taking place in the world, the underlying shift in relative power that is being caused by the “rise of the rest”, the new generation of great powers that are staking their own claims. The crises facing the administration are in many ways an early example of the harsh realities that a more multipolar world can bring. Countries such as China and Russia appear to have found new ways to gradually chip away at US influence, pursuing territorial claims in Crimea or the South China Sea in a manner that fall well short of casus belli. The fresh strategies that the US will require to meet this sort of challenge are rarely captured in the discussions about decisive presidential leadership.

Jeremy Shapiro, a former Obama administration official now at the Brookings Institution, highlights this changed foreign policy landscape. “With such a structural shift in international politics, the US will need to operate in different ways, but we are still struggling to come to terms with the new reality,” he says.