Category Archives: NSA Spying

Forget the EMP, It’s the Hack, You’re at Risk

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Iranian hackers infiltrated computers of small dam in NY

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – Iranian hackers breached the control system of a dam near New York City in 2013, an infiltration that raised concerns about the security of the country’s infrastructure, the Wall Street Journal reported on Monday, citing former and current U.S. officials.

Two people familiar with the breach told the newspaper it occurred at the Bowman Avenue Dam in Rye, New York. The small structure about 20 miles from New York City is used for flood control.

The hackers gained access to the dam through a cellular modem, the Journal said, citing an unclassified Department of Homeland Security summary of the incident that did not specify the type of infrastructure.

The dam is a 20-foot-tall concrete slab across Blind Brook, about five miles from Long Island Sound.

“It’s very, very small,” Rye City Manager Marcus Serrano told the newspaper. He said FBI agents visited in 2013 to ask the city’s information-technology manager about a hacking incident.

The dam breach was difficult to pin down, and federal investigators at first thought the target was a much larger dam in Oregon, the Journal said.

The breach came as hackers linked to the Iranian government were attacking U.S. bank websites after American spies damaged an Iranian nuclear facility with the Stuxnet computer worm.

It illustrated concerns about many of the old computers controlling industrial systems, and the White House was notified of the infiltration, the Journal said.

The newspaper said the United States had more than 57,000 industrial control systems connected to the Internet, citing Shodan, a search engine that catalogs each machine.

Homeland Security spokesman S.Y. Lee would not confirm the breach to Reuters. He said the department’s 24-hour cybersecurity information-sharing hub and an emergency response team coordinate responses to threats to and vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure.

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Cant Sleep, You are at Risk

In part from Wired: If you want to keep yourself up at night, spend some time reading about the latest developments in cybersecurity. Airplanes hacked, cars hacked, vulnerabilities in a breathtaking range of sensitive equipment from TSA locks to voting booths to medical devices.

The big picture is even scarier. Former NSA Director Mike McConnell suspects China has hacked “every major corporation” in the US. Edward Snowden’s NSA leaks revealed the US government has its own national and international hacking to account for. And the Ponemon Institute says 110 million Americans saw their identities compromised in 2014. That’s one in two American adults.

The system is broken. It isn’t keeping us, our companies, or our government safe. Worse yet, no one seems to know how to fix it.

How Did We Get Here?

One deceptive truth seems to drive much of the cybersecurity industry down a rabbit hole: If you keep bad actors and bad software out of your system, you have nothing to worry about.

Malicious actors target “endpoints”—any device or sensor connected to a network—to break into that network. Network security seeks to protect those endpoints with firewalls, certificates, passwords, and the like, creating a secure perimeter to keep the whole system safe.

This wasn’t difficult in the early days of the Internet and online threats. But today, most private networks have far too many endpoints to properly secure. In an age of “Bring Your Own Device,” the cloud, remote access, and the Internet of Things, there are too many vulnerabilities hackers can exploit. As Ajay Arora, CEO of file security company Vera, notes, there is no perimeter anymore. It’s a dream of the past.

But the security paradigm remains focused on perimeter defense because, frankly, no one knows what else to do. To address threats, security experts should assume compromise – that hackers and malware already have breached their defenses, or soon will – and instead classify and mitigate threats.

The CIA Triad

The information security community has a model to assess and respond to threats, at least as a starting point. It breaks information security into three essential components: confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Confidentiality means protecting and keeping your secrets. Espionage and data theft are threats to confidentiality.

Availability means keeping your services running, and giving administrators access to key networks and controls. Denial of service and data deletion attacks threaten availability.

Integrity means assessing whether the software and critical data within your networks and systems are compromised with malicious or unauthorized code or bugs. Viruses and malware compromise the integrity of the systems they infect.

The Biggest Threat

Of these, integrity is the least understood and most nebulous. And what many people don’t realize is it’s the greatest threat to businesses and governments today.

Meanwhile, the cybersecurity industry remains overwhelmingly focused on confidentiality. Its mantra is “encrypt everything.” This is noble, and essential to good security. But without integrity protection, the keys that protect encrypted data are themselves vulnerable to malicious alteration. This is true even of authenticated encryption algorithms like AES-GCM.

In the bigger picture, as cybercrime evolves, it will become clear that loss of integrity is a bigger danger than loss of confidentiality. One merely has to compare different kinds of breaches to see the truth of this:

A confidentiality breach in your car means someone learns your driving habits. An integrity breach means they could take over your brakes. In a power grid, a confidentiality breach exposes system operating information. An integrity breach would compromise critical systems, risking failure or shutdown. And a confidentiality breach in the military would mean hackers could obtain data about sensitive systems. If they made an integrity beach, they could gain control over these weapons systems. Full details and actions you can take to protect yourself, go here.

A Money Trail: Iran to Hamas to Islamic State

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For Hamas and Islamic State, the common enemy is Egypt. Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel spoke truth to power on this relationship months ago.

Analysis: Money Trail Leads From Iran to ISIS, by Way of Hamas

TheTower: A report published Monday in Ynet that documents ties between Hamas and the Sinai-based branch of ISIS also shows Iran’s role in supporting ISIS.

Israel’s security establishment has pointed out a clear paradox in this dangerous collaboration: the bulk of Hamas’ financial support comes from Iran, which is persistently fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Many Iranians have already been killed on the frontline of this battle. Furthermore, the Iranians are specifically funding the Gaza front against ISIS’s Sinai branch – via Hamas.

The Times of Israel reported in September that Iran, in expectation of the sanctions relief it would receive under terms of the nuclear deal, was smuggling “suitcases of cash” to Hamas so that the terror group could upgrade its arsenal.

Since the deal was signed, Iran has significantly increased its financial support for two of the largest terror groups in the region that have become political players, Hamas and Hezbollah. In the years before the deal was signed, the crippling sanctions limited this support, which had significantly diminished along with Iran’s economy. But Tehran’s belief that tens, or hundreds, of billions of dollars will flow into the country in the coming years as a result of sanctions relief has led to a decision to boost the cash flow to these terror organizations.

At around the same time, Major General Ataollah Salehi, the commander-in-chief of Iran’s armed forces, boasted of the support Iran was giving to terror groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to help them fight terror wars against Israel.

The Ynet article, coming a week after the leader of ISIS’s Sinai branch was reported in Gaza, highlighted the operational cooperation between Hamas and ISIS. Hamas has been giving funds, received from Iran, to ISIS to finance its operations. Hamas has also provided training to ISIS and treated ISIS terrorists in Gaza hospitals. In return, ISIS has helped Hamas smuggle weapons into Gaza.

Because Hamas has a clear hierarchy and command structure, it is highly unlikely that funds would go to ISIS without approval from both the highest echelons of Hamas and their funders in Iran.

  • Hamas’ military wing in the Gaza Strip has been transferring tens of thousands of dollars a month to the Islamic State group’s Sinai branch over the past year, via one of its emissaries.
  • The transfer of cash is just one part of the military and strategic cooperation between the two groups. The finances of Hamas’ military arm, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, are independent of those of the organization’s political bureau. Hamas is paying the Islamic State militants in Egypt to secure weapons shipments being smuggled through the Sinai to Gaza. More details here.

Juniper Hacked, Several Govt Agencies at Risk

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Backdoor Code Found in Firewall

Engadget: One of the reasons corporate users and the privacy-minded rely on VPNs is to control access to their networks and (hopefully) not expose secrets over insecure connections. Today Juniper Networks revealed that some of its products may not have been living up to that standard, after discovering “unauthorized code” in the software that runs on its NetScreen firewalls during a code review. Pointed out by security researcher “The Grugq,” the backdoor has been present since late 2012 and can only be fixed by upgrading to a new version of software just released today.

Telnet / ssh exposes a backdoor added by attackers to ScreenOS source code. This has been there since August 2012. Noted code here.

The pair of issues that created the backdoor would allow anyone who knows about it to remotely log in to the firewall as an administrator, decrypt and spy on supposedly secure traffic, and then remove any trace of their activity. Obviously this is a Very Bad Thing, although Juniper claims it has not heard of any exploitation in the wild (which would be difficult, since no one knew it existed and attackers could hide their traces) so far.

Beyond sending IT people sprinting to patch and test their setups, now we can all speculate about which friendly group of state-sponsored attackers is responsible. US government officials have recently been pushing for mandated backdoor access to secure networks and services, but the Edward Snowden saga made clear that even our own country’s personnel aren’t always going to ask permission before snooping on any information they want to check out. I contacted Juniper Networks regarding the issue, but have not received a response at this time.

Update: A Juniper Networks spokesperson told us:

During a recent internal code review, Juniper discovered unauthorized code in ScreenOS® that could allow a knowledgeable attacker to gain administrative access and if they could monitor VPN traffic to decrypt that traffic. Once we identified these vulnerabilities, we launched an investigation and worked to develop and issue patched releases for the impacted devices. We also reached out to affected customers, strongly recommending that they update their systems and apply the patched releases with the highest priority.

The patched releases also address an SSH bug in ScreenOS that could allow an attacker to conduct DoS attacks against ScreenOS devices. These two issues are independent of each other.

Newly discovered hack has U.S. fearing foreign infiltration

Washington (CNN) A major breach at computer network company Juniper Networks has U.S. officials worried that hackers working for a foreign government were able to spy on the encrypted communications of the U.S. government and private companies for the past three years.

The FBI is investigating the breach, which involved hackers installing a back door on computer equipment, U.S. officials told CNN. Juniper disclosed the issue Thursday along with an emergency security patch that it urged customers to use to update their systems “with the highest priority.”

The concern, U.S. officials said, is that sophisticated hackers who compromised the equipment could use their access to get into any company or government agency that used it.

One U.S. official described it as akin to “stealing a master key to get into any government building.”

The breach is believed to be the work of a foreign government, U.S. officials said, because of the sophistication involved. The U.S. officials said they are certain U.S. spy agencies themselves aren’t behind the back door. China and Russia are among the top suspected governments, though officials cautioned the investigation hasn’t reached conclusions.

It’s not yet clear what if any classified information could be affected, but U.S. officials said the Juniper Networks equipment is so widely used that it may take some time to determine what damage was done.

A senior administration official told CNN, “We are aware of the vulnerabilities recently announced by Juniper. The Department of Homeland Security has been and remains in close touch with the company. The administration remains committed to enhancing our national cybersecurity by raising our cyber defenses, disrupting adversary activity, and effectively responding to incidents when they occur.”

Juniper Networks’ security fix is intended to seal a back door that hackers created in order to remotely log into commonly used VPN networks to spy on communications that were supposed to be among the most secure. A free trial vpn has been helpful for those new to the VPN world to decide if it is right for them.

Juniper said that someone managed to get into its systems and write “unauthorized code” that “could allow a knowledgeable attacker to gain administrative access.”

Such access would allow the hacker to monitor encrypted traffic on the computer network and decrypt communications.

Juniper sells computer network equipment and routers to big companies and to U.S. government clients such as the Defense Department, Justice Department, FBI and Treasury Department. On its website, the company boasts of providing networks that “US intelligence agencies require.”

Its routers and network equipment are widely used by corporations, including for secure communications. Homeland Security officials are now trying to determine how many such systems are in use for U.S. government networks.

Juniper said in its security alert that it wasn’t aware of any “malicious exploitation of these vulnerabilities.” However, the alert also said that attackers would leave behind no trace of their activity by removing security logs that would show a breach.

“Note that a skilled attacker would likely remove these entries from the log file, thus effectively eliminating any reliable signature that the device had been compromised,” the Juniper security alert said. If encrypted communications were being monitored, “There is no way to detect that this vulnerability was exploited,” according to the Juniper security alert.

According to a Juniper Networks spokeswoman’s statement, “Once we identified these vulnerabilities, we launched an investigation and worked to develop and issue patched releases for the impacted devices. We also reached out to affected customers, strongly recommending that they update their systems.”

U.S. officials said it’s not clear how the Juniper source code was altered, whether from an outside attack or someone inside.

The work to alter millions of lines of source code is sophisticated. The system was compromised for three years before Juniper uncovered it in a routine review in recent weeks.

Juniper said it was also issuing a security fix for a separate bug that could allow a hacker to launch denial-of-service attacks on networks.

FBI Prevented from Using Open Source?

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‘ISIS Supporters’ Twitter Accounts Traced To UK Government Department’: Report

NDTV: London:  Hackers in Britain have claimed that a number of ISIS supporters’ social media accounts are being run from internet addresses linked to the UK government’s Department for Work and Pensions (DWP).

A group of four young computer experts, who call themselves VandaSec, have unearthed evidence indicating that at least three ISIS-supporting accounts can be traced back to the DWP’s London offices, the ‘Daily Mirror’ reported.

Every computer and mobile phone logs onto the internet using an IP address, which is a type of identification number. The hacking collective showed the newspaper details of the IP addresses used by three separate so-called “digital jihadis” to access Twitter accounts, which were then used to carry out online recruitment and propaganda campaigns.

At first glance, the IP addresses seem to be based in Saudi Arabia, but upon further inspection using specialist tools they appeared to link back to the DWP.

The newspaper learned that the British government had sold on a large number of IP addresses to two Saudi Arabian firms.

After the sale completed in October of this year, they were used by extremists to spread their message of hate.

A Cabinet Office spokesperson said: “The government owns millions of unused IP addresses which we are selling to get a good return for hardworking taxpayers.

“We have sold a number of these addresses to telecoms companies both in the UK and internationally to allow their customers to connect to the internet. We think carefully about which companies we sell addresses to, but how their customers use this internet connection is beyond our control.”

The UK government has not revealed how much money it has made from the sale of IP addresses.

Now we have learned that DHS has an edit to not use social media or open source for reasons of profiling, which likely has handicapped the FBI from sourcing and connecting intelligence when it comes to cultivating data on would-be jihadists.

Jihadists are making their plans public. Why hasn’t the FBI caught on?

Each week, In Theory takes on a big idea in the news and explores it from a range of perspectives. This week we’re talking about Internet encryption. Need a primer? Catch up here.

WaPo: Rita Katz is the director of the SITE Intelligence Group and has spent nearly two decades tracking, studying and reporting on jihadists. She has testified before Congress and in terrorism trials, briefed the White House, and is the author of the book “Terrorist Hunter: The Extraordinary Story of a Woman who Went Undercover to Infiltrate the Radical Islamic Groups Operating in America.”

Following the terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, Calif., FBI Director James Comey revealed to the Senate Judiciary Committee that one of the two Islamic State-inspired shooters in the May 3 attack in Garland, Tex., “exchanged 109 messages with an overseas terrorist” the morning of the attack. He followed up by saying that the FBI was unable to read those messages. His implication? Better regulation of message-disguising encryption technology could have revealed the shooters’ plans earlier and could help prevent attacks.

However, regulation of encryption is unlikely to provide the government with the counterterrorism benefit it says it will.  Jihadists’ main tool for planning and executing attacks in recent years has been social media — to which the government has full access — not encrypted messaging. In addition, regulation of one messaging technology will lead to immediate adaptation and the creation of ways to circumvent it.

In recent years, smartphones and social media have enabled users from around the world to communicate easily, safely and free of charge. Programs facilitating such communications sprouted, and jihadists — the Islamic State in particular — quickly adopted them as their main means of communication. For over three years, Twitter has been the Islamic State’s most important platform. High-level operatives within the group have used Twitter’s unencrypted direct messaging to recruit, give instructions for donating and plan attacks. Jihadists even rely on Twitter to promote their channels on other platforms, such as Telegram, which supporters would otherwise have difficulty finding.

Jihadists’ presence on social media has also spread the Islamic State around the world, with people of all ages, sexes and ethnicities leaving their families and friends to join the group. Social media use has been linked to executed and attempted lone-wolf attacks in the United States, Canada, Australia, France, Denmark and other Western nations.

The Garland, Tex., shooting — the only example Comey used  as an impetus to regulate encrypted technology — in fact makes the opposite point. Attacker Elton Simpson, who was under previous FBI terror-related investigations, used Twitter to openly follow and communicate with high-profile terrorists. His account was followed by prominent English-speaking Islamic State fighters and recruiters Abu Rahin Aziz and Junaid Hussain — both of whom for a long time were known to provide manuals on how to carry out lone-wolf attacks from Raqqa, Syria, before they were killed. Simpson also followed and communicated with Mohamed Abdullahi Hassan, a known American jihadist in Somalia who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State.

Relatedly, the incitement for the Texas shooting came from Hassan’s 31st Twitter account. Simpson, a friend and follower of Hassan, retweeted the call and later requested that Hassan send him a direct message. We at SITE, using only open-source information, reported on the call before the attack took place, and the FBI had a week to investigate the matter before the shooting. Though only nine Twitter users retweeted the call for attack, the FBI failed to prevent it.

The encrypted messages Comey mentioned before the Judiciary Committee were discovered by the FBI only after the attack took place, but Simpson’s open-source communication was available far in advance. There is in fact no evidence that this or any of these other lone-wolf attacks could have been prevented by regulation of encryption technology.

In stark contrast, a proper, targeted open-source investigation could have. Yet the FBI is reluctant to recognize open-source as an important — arguably the most important — tool to track jihadists online.

It’s also important to note that jihadists are very quick to adapt online. In the past year alone, the Islamic State and al-Qaeda fighters have moved quickly from WhatsApp to Kik, Wickr, Surespot, then to Telegram – all different encryption programs created to give smartphone users safe and free text messaging available across multiple devices.  Jihadists are constantly ranking, debating and explaining which of the services is the safest and most effective. Regulation of these programs will take jihadists next to no time to circumvent; the U.S. government would be the one taking years to catch up. And even if successful, they may be able to regulate companies based in the United States, but such programs would appear everywhere else, from Russia to India to China

SITE’s leadership and continued success do not stem from access to secret databases. Our research, investigations and reporting are based on open-source information — social media, forums, websites, blogs, IP addresses — which can be immensely powerful if used wisely. Government agencies, however, seem blind to this bountiful intelligence resource, and too often rely solely on classified documents and back-end access to websites.

Rather than try to create backdoors to encrypted communication services, or use the lack thereof as an excuse to intelligence failures, the U.S. government must first know how to utilize the mass amount of data it has been collecting and to improve its monitoring of jihadist activity online. A focused approach of this sort is much more likely to lead to success in the war on terrorism.

 

Russian Cyber Attacks on America

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Russian cybersecurity intelligence targets critical U.S. infrastructure

By Bill Gertz

U.S. intelligence agencies recently identified a Russian cybersecurity firm, which has expertise in testing the network vulnerabilities of the electrical grid, financial markets and other critical infrastructure, as having close ties to Moscow’s Federal Security Service, the civilian intelligence service.

The relationship between the company and the FSB, as the spy agency is known, has heightened fears among U.S. cyberintelligence officials that Moscow is stepping up covert efforts to infiltrate computer networks that control critical U.S. infrastructure such as oil and gas pipelines and transportation.

The effort appears to be part of FSB and Russian military cyberwarfare reconnaissance targeting, something the Pentagon calls preparation of the battlefield for future cyberattacks. The Russian company is taking steps to open a U.S. branch office as part of the intelligence-gathering, said officials familiar with reports of the effort who spoke on background.

Officials familiar with reports about the company did not identify it by name. However, security officials are quietly alerting government security officials and industry cybersecurity chiefs about the Russian firm and its covert plans for operations in the United States.

The Russian firm is said to have extensive technical experience in security vulnerabilities of supervisory control and data acquisition systems that are used to remotely control critical infrastructure.

These systems are employed by both government and private-sector system controllers for equipment running water treatment and distribution, wastewater collection and treatment, oil and gas pipelines, electrical power grids, wind farms and large communication systems.
In September, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper told Congress that Russian hackers have penetrated U.S. industrial control networks operating critical infrastructure. The objective of the hackers is to develop the capability to remotely access the control systems that “might be quickly exploited for disruption if an adversary’s intent became hostile,” Mr. Clapper said.

“Unknown Russian actors successfully compromised the product-supply chains of at least three [industrial control system] vendors so that customers downloaded malicious software designed to facilitate exploitation directly from the vendors’ websites along with legitimate software updates,” Mr. Clapper stated in Sept. 10 testimony to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Russian hackers also were linked to cyberpenetrations of U.S. industrial control networks used for water and energy systems in 2014.

The Russian connection was identified through the use of malware called BlackEnergy that has been linked to Russian government cyberoperations dubbed Sandworm by security researchers.

Mr. Clapper also testified that the Russian Defense Ministry has created a military cybercommand for offensive attacks. Additionally, the Russian military is setting up a specialized branch for computer network attacks.
RUSSIAN GENERAL ISSUES THREAT

Gen. Valery Gerasimov, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, told foreign military attaches in Moscow on Monday that increased military activities by NATO and the development of global missile defenses were “creating a threat of new conflicts and escalation of existent conflicts,” the official Interfax news agency reported.

“The NATO military policy unfriendly towards Russia is a source of concern,” Gen. Gerasimov said. “The alliance continues to expand its military presence and is stepping up the activity of the bloc’s armed forces along the perimeter of borders of the Russian Federation.”

Because of the deployment of a global missile defense network and the development of new means of armed struggle, including hypersonic weapons, “the problem of upsetting the existent strategic balance of force has been growing,” said the general, referring to high-speed strike weapons.
The Pentagon is developing a conventional rapid-attack capability called “prompt global strike,” which can target any spot on Earth in 30 minutes.

Russia has stepped up nuclear threats against the United States and NATO in response to deployment of missile defenses in Europe.

In recent months, Russian President Vladimir Putin has issued an unprecedented number of threats to use nuclear weapons, most notably after the Russian military annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea last year. On Dec. 11, Mr. Putin said he hoped nuclear weapons would not be needed during operations in Syria.

“Particular attention must be paid to the consolidation of the combat potential of the strategic nuclear forces and the execution of space-based defense programs,” Mr. Putin was quoted as saying at the meeting with his defense chiefs. “We need, as our plans specify, to equip all components of the nuclear triad with new arms.”

Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe, told reporters last week that Russian nuclear threats are troubling in the current security environment.

“The way that senior Russian officials have talked about Denmark as a nuclear target, Sweden as a nuclear target, Romania as a nuclear target, sort of an irresponsible use of the nuclear word, if you will, you can understand why our allies on the eastern flank of NATO — particularly in the Baltic region — are nervous, are uneasy,” Gen. Hodges said.

Additionally, the Russian military has conducted “large snap exercises without announcement,” which also has increased fears of a Moscow threat, he said.

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Since the FSB (KGB) company is un-named could it be: (RecordedFuture)

What is SORM?

Russia’s SORM (Система Оперативно-Розыскных Мероприятий, literally “System for Operative Investigative Activities”) is a lawful intercept system operated by the Federal Security Service (or FSB – the Russian successor to the KGB).

Russia SORM Timeline

SORM came to light recently during the Sochi Olympic Games where reports claimed that “all communications” were monitored. SORM differs from the US lawful intercept system, as once the FSB receives approval for access to a target’s communications they are able to unilaterally tap into the system without provider awareness.

Further, SORM is also lawfully used to target opposition parties within Russia. According to the World Policy Institute, on November 12, 2012, Russia’s Supreme Court upheld the right of authorities to eavesdrop on the opposition.

  • SORM-1 intercepts telephone traffic (including both landline (analog) and mobile networks).
  • SORM-2 targets internet traffic (including VoIP calls).
  • SORM-3 has the ability to target all forms of communication providing long-term storage of all information and data on subscribers, including actual recordings and locations.

Former Soviet States (Kazakhstan, Belarus, Uzbekistan and Ukraine) have installed SORM-standard equipment. According to research by Wired Magazine, Ukraine’s SORM is more advanced as the SBU (Ukraine’s Security Service) has the ability to interrupt a target’s communications.

In April 2011, Iskratel – which provides Ukraine’s sole telephone company Ukrtelekom with broadband equipment – announced its SORM device was tested successfully under the new requirements and had been approved by the SBU.

Analyzing SORM manufacturers within Recorded Future identified equipment suppliers including Juniper Networks (US), Cisco Systems (US), Huawei (China) and Alcatel-Lucent (France).