Russian Military Stuff in Venezuela, Concerns for U.S.

Posted on April 4, 2019April 4, 2019 by Denise Simon

For context:

In 2007, Chavez and President Hu Jintao of China signed a deal for operating credit. The deal was loans for oil .
In 2014, the China Development Bank provided Venezuela another $30 billion in more oil back loans including mining, refining, pipelines and power stations. Maduro failed on parts of the deal and China is working diligently to protect the loans, investments and the deals.
Russia in 2015, stepped in a provided $6.5 billion in new funds through Rosneft while in previous years, Venezuela bought $4 billion in Russian arms and military equipment. Now both China and Russia are facing defaults by Venezuela.
Russia flew in 2 bombers containing more military equipment last month and an estimate 100-200 Russian troops. Russia has explained the troops were there for maintenance. However, as a cover, Russia immediately opened a helicopter training center via Rostec. The helicopters included are Mi-35M gunships and troop transports. At least 2 factories are under construction in Venezuela building Kalashnikov rifles and ammunition. Furthermore, Russia provides military tactic advice and training to Venezuela.
Russia has supplied Venezuela with fighter jets, tanks and an air defense system(s).
The worst part of the relationship between Russia and Venezuela consists of at least 5000 MANPADS. The stockpile in Venezuela is the largest in Latin America are of a shoulder fired variation. Known to be SA-24 or Igla-S, having a range of 500-6,000m and an altitude up to 3,500m. More details here.

Venezuela is home to a vibrant illegal weapons trade and smuggling operation(s). Weapons include long guns, machine guns, grenades and other military grade items.

Image result for igla 2 manpads venezuela

While U.S. operatives are working to locate and understand all military equipment in Venezuela, theft of the MANPADS is most concerning including investigations into trade on the Black market.

Image result for igla 2 manpads

Venezuela maintains an inventory of MSTA self-propelled howitzers, TOR0M1 mobile SAMS and T-72 tanks.

It is thought that stockpile is located near the coast in fears of a U.S. attack which Russia is accusing the U.S. of planning. With those stockpiles are 1,500 launchers and grip stocks fundamental to MANPAD operations. These MANPADS were purchased by Chavez in 2010 as part of a $4 billion weapons purchase with Russia. In 2009, Sweden had confirmed that at least 3 MANPADS were found in a FARC guerrilla camp in Columbia. Sweden had actually sold them to Venezuela in the late 1980’s.

Both Obama and John Kerry negotiated a deal with Columbia to disband FARC. The deal happened in early 2016 in Cuba. FARC is a Marxist guerrilla group and was on the U.S. State Department terror list for years. The talks took place in Cuba, yet FARC remains a major concern as to where members are today, likely joined up with other militant organizations in the region.

All of the items above play into the equation of decisions made by the United States, The LIMA Group and the Organization of American States. Not to be left out is the China trade negotiations and matters with Russia.

Trump’s EO on Electromagnetic Pulses

Posted on March 27, 2019March 27, 2019 by Denise Simon

If government agencies are working this mission, shouldn’t Congress take up some measures too? Given this Executive Order, consider what motivated this action and consider all the measures you yourself should take.

Executive Order on Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Purpose. An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) has the potential to disrupt, degrade, and damage technology and critical infrastructure systems. Human-made or naturally occurring EMPs can affect large geographic areas, disrupting elements critical to the Nation’s security and economic prosperity, and could adversely affect global commerce and stability. The Federal Government must foster sustainable, efficient, and cost-effective approaches to improving the Nation’s resilience to the effects of EMPs.

Sec. 2. Definitions. As used in this order:

(a) “Critical infrastructure” means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.

(b) “Electromagnetic pulse” is a burst of electromagnetic energy. EMPs have the potential to negatively affect technology systems on Earth and in space. A high-altitude EMP (HEMP) is a type of human-made EMP that occurs when a nuclear device is detonated at approximately 40 kilometers or more above the surface of Earth. A geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) is a type of natural EMP driven by a temporary disturbance of Earth’s magnetic field resulting from interactions with solar eruptions. Both HEMPs and GMDs can affect large geographic areas.

(c) “National Critical Functions” means the functions of government and the private sector so vital to the United States that their disruption, corruption, or dysfunction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.

(d) “National Essential Functions” means the overarching responsibilities of the Federal Government to lead and sustain the Nation before, during, and in the aftermath of a catastrophic emergency, such as an EMP that adversely affects the performance of Government.

(e) “Prepare” and “preparedness” mean the actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation. These terms include the prediction and notification of impending EMPs.

(f) A “Sector-Specific Agency” (SSA) is the Federal department or agency that is responsible for providing institutional knowledge and specialized expertise as well as leading, facilitating, or supporting the security and resilience programs and associated activities of its designated critical infrastructure sector in the all-hazards environment. The SSAs are those identified in Presidential Policy Directive 21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience).

Sec. 3. Policy. (a) It is the policy of the United States to prepare for the effects of EMPs through targeted approaches that coordinate whole-of-government activities and encourage private-sector engagement. The Federal Government must provide warning of an impending EMP; protect against, respond to, and recover from the effects of an EMP through public and private engagement, planning, and investment; and prevent adversarial events through deterrence, defense, and nuclear nonproliferation efforts. To achieve these goals, the Federal Government shall engage in risk-informed planning, prioritize research and development (R&D) to address the needs of critical infrastructure stakeholders, and, for adversarial threats, consult Intelligence Community assessments.

(b) To implement the actions directed in this order, the Federal Government shall promote collaboration and facilitate information sharing, including the sharing of threat and vulnerability assessments, among executive departments and agencies (agencies), the owners and operators of critical infrastructure, and other relevant stakeholders, as appropriate. The Federal Government shall also provide incentives, as appropriate, to private-sector partners to encourage innovation that strengthens critical infrastructure against the effects of EMPs through the development and implementation of best practices, regulations, and appropriate guidance.

Sec. 4. Coordination. (a) The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), through National Security Council staff and in consultation with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), shall coordinate the development and implementation of executive branch actions to assess, prioritize, and manage the risks of EMPs. The APNSA shall, on an annual basis, submit a report to the President summarizing progress on the implementation of this order, identifying gaps in capability, and recommending how to address those gaps.

(b) To further the Federal R&D necessary to prepare the Nation for the effects of EMPs, the Director of OSTP shall coordinate efforts of agencies through the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). The Director of OSTP, through the NSTC, shall annually review and assess the R&D needs of agencies conducting preparedness activities for EMPs, consistent with this order.

Sec. 5. Roles and Responsibilities. (a) The Secretary of State shall:

(i) lead the coordination of diplomatic efforts with United States allies and international partners regarding enhancing resilience to the effects of EMPs; and

(ii) in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of other relevant agencies, strengthen nuclear nonproliferation and deterrence efforts, which would reduce the likelihood of an EMP attack on the United States or its allies and partners by limiting the availability of nuclear devices.

(b) The Secretary of Defense shall:

(i) in cooperation with the heads of relevant agencies and with United States allies, international partners, and private-sector entities as appropriate, improve and develop the ability to rapidly characterize, attribute, and provide warning of EMPs, including effects on space systems of interest to the United States;

(ii) provide timely operational observations, analyses, forecasts, and other products for naturally occurring EMPs to support the mission of the Department of Defense along with United States allies and international partners, including the provision of alerts and warnings for natural EMPs that may affect weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States;

(iii) conduct R&D and testing to understand the effects of EMPs on Department of Defense systems and infrastructure, improve capabilities to model and simulate the environments and effects of EMPs, and develop technologies to protect Department of Defense systems and infrastructure from the effects of EMPs to ensure the successful execution of Department of Defense missions;

(iv) review and update existing EMP-related standards for Department of Defense systems and infrastructure, as appropriate;

(v) share technical expertise and data regarding EMPs and their potential effects with other agencies and with the private sector, as appropriate;

(vi) incorporate attacks that include EMPs as a factor in defense planning scenarios; and

(vii) defend the Nation from adversarial EMPs originating outside of the United States through defense and deterrence, consistent with the mission and national security policy of the Department of Defense.

(c) The Secretary of the Interior shall support the research, development, deployment, and operation of capabilities that enhance understanding of variations of Earth’s magnetic field associated with EMPs.

(d) The Secretary of Commerce shall:

(i) provide timely and accurate operational observations, analyses, forecasts, and other products for natural EMPs, exclusive of the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense set forth in subsection (b)(ii) of this section; and

(ii) use the capabilities of the Department of Commerce, the private sector, academia, and nongovernmental organizations to continuously improve operational forecasting services and the development of standards for commercial EMP technology.

(e) The Secretary of Energy shall conduct early-stage R&D, develop pilot programs, and partner with other agencies and the private sector, as appropriate, to characterize sources of EMPs and their couplings to the electric power grid and its subcomponents, understand associated potential failure modes for the energy sector, and coordinate preparedness and mitigation measures with energy sector partners.

(f) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall:

(i) provide timely distribution of information on EMPs and credible associated threats to Federal, State, and local governments, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and other stakeholders;

(ii) in coordination with the heads of any relevant SSAs, use the results of risk assessments to better understand and enhance resilience to the effects of EMPs across all critical infrastructure sectors, including coordinating the identification of national critical functions and the prioritization of associated critical infrastructure at greatest risk to the effects of EMPs;

(iii) coordinate response to and recovery from the effects of EMPs on critical infrastructure, in coordination with the heads of appropriate SSAs;

(iv) incorporate events that include EMPs as a factor in preparedness scenarios and exercises;

(v) in coordination with the heads of relevant SSAs, conduct R&D to better understand and more effectively model the effects of EMPs on national critical functions and associated critical infrastructure — excluding Department of Defense systems and infrastructure — and develop technologies and guidelines to enhance these functions and better protect this infrastructure;

(vi) maintain survivable means to provide necessary emergency information to the public during and after EMPs; and

(vii) in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, and informed by intelligence-based threat assessments, develop quadrennial risk assessments on EMPs, with the first risk assessment delivered within 1 year of the date of this order.

(g) The Director of National Intelligence shall:

(i) coordinate the collection, analysis, and promulgation, as appropriate, of intelligence-based assessments on adversaries’ capabilities to conduct an attack utilizing an EMP and the likelihood of such an attack; and

(ii) provide intelligence-based threat assessments to support the heads of relevant SSAs in the development of quadrennial risk assessments on EMPs.

(h) The heads of all SSAs, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall enhance and facilitate information sharing with private-sector counterparts, as appropriate, to enhance preparedness for the effects of EMPs, to identify and share vulnerabilities, and to work collaboratively to reduce vulnerabilities.

(i) The heads of all agencies that support National Essential Functions shall ensure that their allhazards preparedness planning sufficiently addresses EMPs, including through mitigation, response, and recovery, as directed by national preparedness policy.

Sec. 6. Implementation. (a) Identifying national critical functions and associated priority critical infrastructure at greatest risk.

(i) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and other agencies as appropriate, shall identify and list the national critical functions and associated priority critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets, including space-based assets that, if disrupted, could reasonably result in catastrophic national or regional effects on public health or safety, economic security, or national security. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall update this list as necessary.

(ii) Within 1 year of the identification described in subsection (a)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of other agencies as appropriate, shall, using appropriate government and private-sector standards for EMPs, assess which identified critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets are most vulnerable to the effects of EMPs. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide this list to the President, through the APNSA. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall update this list using the results produced pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, and as necessary thereafter.

(b) Improving understanding of the effects of EMPs.

(i) Within 180 days of the identification described in subsection (a)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and in consultation with the Director of OSTP and the heads of other appropriate agencies, shall review test data — identifying any gaps in such data — regarding the effects of EMPs on critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets representative of those throughout the Nation.

(ii) Within 180 days of identifying the gaps in existing test data, as directed by subsection (b)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and in consultation with the Director of OSTP and the heads of other appropriate agencies, shall use the sector partnership structure identified in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan to develop an integrated cross-sector plan to address the identified gaps. The heads of agencies identified in the plan shall implement the plan in collaboration with the private sector, as appropriate.

(iii) Within 1 year of the date of this order, and as appropriate thereafter, the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the heads of other agencies and the private sector, as appropriate, shall review existing standards for EMPs and develop or update, as necessary, quantitative benchmarks that sufficiently describe the physical characteristics of EMPs, including waveform and intensity, in a form that is useful to and can be shared with owners and operators of critical infrastructure.

(iv) Within 4 years of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Interior shall complete a magnetotelluric survey of the contiguous United States to help critical infrastructure owners and operators conduct EMP vulnerability assessments.

(i) Within 1 year of the date of this order, and every 2 years thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, and in consultation with the Director of OSTP, the heads of other appropriate agencies, and private-sector partners as appropriate, shall submit to the President, through the APNSA, a report that analyzes the technology options available to improve the resilience of critical infrastructure to the effects of EMPs. The Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security shall also identify gaps in available technologies and opportunities for future technological developments to inform R&D activities.

(ii) Within 180 days of the completion of the activities directed by subsections (b)(iii) and (c)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of other agencies and in consultation with the private sector as appropriate, shall develop and implement a pilot test to evaluate available engineering approaches for mitigating the effects of EMPs on the most vulnerable critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets, as identified in subsection (a)(ii) of this section.

(iii) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of relevant SSAs, and in consultation with appropriate regulatory and utility commissions and other stakeholders, shall identify regulatory and non regulatory mechanisms, including cost recovery measures, that can enhance private-sector engagement to address the effects of EMPs.

(d) Strengthening critical infrastructure to withstand the effects of EMPs.

(i) Within 90 days of completing the actions directed in subsection (c)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and in consultation with the heads of other appropriate agencies and with the private sector as appropriate, shall develop a plan to mitigate the effects of EMPs on the vulnerable priority critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets identified under subsection (a)(ii) of this section. The plan shall align with and build on actions identified in reports required by Executive Order 13800 of May 11, 2017 (Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure). The Secretary of Homeland Security shall implement those elements of the plan that are consistent with Department of Homeland Security authorities and resources, and report to the APNSA regarding any additional authorities and resources needed to complete its implementation. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, shall update the plan as necessary based on results from the actions directed in subsections (b) and (c) of this section.

(ii) Within 180 days of the completion of the actions identified in subsection (c)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Energy, shall conduct a pilot test to evaluate engineering approaches used to harden a strategic military installation, including infrastructure that is critical to supporting that installation, against the effects of EMPs.

(iii) Within 180 days of completing the pilot test described in subsection (d)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Defense shall report to the President, through the APNSA, regarding the cost and effectiveness of the evaluated approaches.

(e) Improving response to EMPs.

(i) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the heads of appropriate SSAs, shall review and update Federal response plans, programs, and procedures to account for the effects of EMPs.

(ii) Within 180 days of the completion of actions directed by subsection (e)(i) of this section, agencies that support National Essential Functions shall update operational plans documenting their procedures and responsibilities to prepare for, protect against, and mitigate the effects of EMPs.

(iii) Within 180 days of identifying vulnerable priority critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets as directed by subsection (a)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, shall provide the Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and the Director of OSTP with an assessment of the effects of EMPs on critical communications infrastructure, and recommend changes to operational plans to enhance national response and recovery efforts after an EMP.

Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 26, 2019.

Iran continues to Take Over Syria

Posted on March 27, 2019March 27, 2019 by Denise Simon

Based on how al Qaeda operated and then how Islamic State operated, it appears the winning the hearts of minds of the locals essentially through humanitarian extortion was originally created by Iran.

For at least 3-4 years, Iran has been buying up land in worn torn areas of Syria and real bargain prices. Iran is transferring construction workers into Syria to rebuild designated areas. At a minimum, 5 million homes in Syria have been destroyed due to the civil war. While Iranians are struggling to make a living in their home country, they have at least a chance of working for an income in and around Damascus. Not to be left out, Afghan nationals are also traveling to Syria to take up construction jobs. Most of the community rebuilds, media and businesses are being watched and managed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, a known terror group that the United States is still considering listing as such formally. By the way, it was the IRGC that kidnapped our sailors and held them hostage during the Obama regime.

Meanwhile, as we have known, Bashir al Assad has been a puppet of Tehran. Assad himself is part of the Alawite Sect, which is part of Shia Islam. Iran is moving relentlessly to install hegemony of the Shiite sect in Syria expanding their territory by using the land bridge from Iran to Iraq to Syria and Lebanon.

By using humanitarian bait, military tactics and economic tools, Syrians are being forced to move from being Sunni to Shiite just to live and survive. This is all under the guise of goodwill….yeah sure. So, police stations scattered across the Deir Ezzour province are staffed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. It is at these locations that food, medicine , education and basic life necessities are distributed but not before the conversion takes place from Sunni to Shiite and then people receive a ID card and stipend of $200 per month. This is essentially forcing Syrians to work for Iran.

IRGC-controlled Iraqi militia deploys to eastern Damascus ...

Iran is taking full control of key mosques and what is taught in schools is designed and implemented by the Iranian regime. Bashir al Assad appears to be an advocate of this hearts and minds operation as he owes Tehran for his own survival of power.

There is some resistance from the local Syrians, yet if this continues, the civil war will continue.

Enter the Hussein Organization, an alleged charity that provides water and pockets of electricity. Key areas where all this is occurring in regions along that pesky land bridge where military supply lines continue to flow.

As Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan have hundreds of refugee camps for displaced Syrians, it appears there is no hope or will to return home for them under the growing threat of Iran formally taking power in pockets of Syria.

Late last year, Iran signed a deal to build a major power plant in Latakia. Latakia is a port city that is home to the largest Russian foreign eavesdropping facility. There is also a large airbase in Latakia that is operated by Russia known as the Khmeimim Air Base. Reconnaissance flights take place on a frequent basis under a Russian-Syria treaty.

Syria conflict: First pictures of Russian warplanes ...

This airbase was built in 2015 and is adjacent to the Bassel al Assad International Airport while Russia maintains a permanent navy base not far away in Tartus.

President Trump has a mission to remove all U.S. forces from Syria, however that has been somewhat altered in recent months where an estimate 1000 U.S. forces will remain for a term. Complicating matters in recent days is the Golan Heights.

Syria is demanding a UN Security Council meeting regarding the full declaration of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights region. This region has been under Israeli control going back to 1967 in what was known then as the 6-day war. An armistice line was created and a few times since, Syria has attempted to retake the Golan Heights. Another armistice was signed in 1974 and since that time, the UN has only an observer force as Golan was formally annexed by Israel.

Currently, there are thousands of Jews living in the Golan along with Syrians of the Druze sect. The Golan is a mountainous region that provides the Israeli military and intelligence a good view and buffer of militant activities in Syria.

Maduro Gets Russian Military Backup

Posted on March 27, 2019March 27, 2019 by Denise Simon

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – A Russian military contingent that arrived in Venezuela over the weekend, drawing U.S. condemnation, is believed by the U.S. government to be made up of special forces including “cybersecurity personnel,” a U.S. official told Reuters on Tuesday.

The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the United States was still assessing the Russian deployment, which Washington has called a “reckless escalation” of the situation in Venezuela.

Two Russian air force planes landed outside Caracas on Saturday carrying nearly 100 Russian troops, according to local media reports, two months after the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump disavowed Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

Russia’s main objective in providing the military assistance, including cyber experts, would likely be to help shield Maduro from “regime change” and ensure a foothold for Moscow in Latin America, according to a source familiar with U.S. government assessments of Venezuela. Russia also has major energy investments in OPEC member Venezuela.

Russia’s foreign ministry said on Tuesday that the presence of “Russian specialists” in Venezuela was governed by a military-technical cooperation agreement between the two countries. It did not provide further details.

The United States condemned this action and Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State called Moscow to discuss describing this as a reckless escalation of conditions on the ground in Venezuela.

There is more.

China is defending Russia in this action.

White House national security adviser John Bolton tweeted Monday that the U.S. “will not tolerate hostile foreign military powers meddling” within the Western Hemisphere. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that Washington “will not stand idly by as Russia exacerbates tensions in Venezuela,” according to State Department.

Asked about these developments, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang told a press briefing Tuesday that “countries in the Western Hemisphere, including Latin American countries, are all sovereign states,” so “they have the right to determine their own foreign policy and their way to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation with countries of their own choosing.”

Geng went on to cite the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, a 1954 document asserting Beijing’s commitment to avoid aggression and interference abroad. The strategy was developed to promote relations with India, though the two would go on to fight three border disputes and threatened to clash a fourth time over contested territory in summer 2017.

“Regarding the Venezuela issue, we want to stress that it can only be resolved by the Venezuelan people, and stability is in the interests of Venezuela and the region,” Geng told reporters. “China would like to work with the international community to help Venezuela restore stability at an early date. Meanwhile, we will continue to advance friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation with Latin American countries.

“Latin American affairs are not a certain country’s exclusive business, nor is Latin America a certain country’s backyard,” he added.

The U.S. has a long history of intervening against left-wing forces across Latin America and Washington officials—including current Venezuela envoy Elliot Abrams—have been linked to an attempted coup against Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chávez, in 2002. Russia’s outreach to Venezuela, which previously conducted joint air drills with Moscow over the Caribbean in December, has evoked comparisons to the Cuban Missile Crisis, especially amid the collapse of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty banning land-based missiles systems ranging from 310 to 3,420 miles.

Russia and China have defied these measures, however, continuing to engage with the Venezuelan government. As Moscow continued to deal in oil with Maduro’s administration, Beijing has offered to help fix the South American state’s failing electricity grid. Maduro and his officials have accused Washington and Guaidó of conspiring to cause recent blackouts made worse by fuel shortages caused by sanctions.

It is already affecting the trade talks between the United States and China.

Beijing’s support for Maduro has also led to the cancellation of a high-profile meeting organized by the Washington-based Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) meeting in the Chinese city of Chengdu. China refused to grant Guaidó a diplomatic visa as he was not considered a head of state, and the bank ultimately called off the event.

Geng said Tuesday that “China deeply regrets that the IDB decided to call off its annual meeting in Chengdu.” He said, “The vast majority of the IDB membership agree with China’s view that the annual meeting should focus on financial cooperation and not be disrupted by contentious political issues.”

In addition to China and Russia, fellow socialist-led Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua were among those in Latin America backing Maduro, as were Belarus, Cambodia, Iran, North Korea, Serbia, South Africa, Syria and Turkey. On Guaidó’s side were most other Latin American states, as well as Albania, Australia, Canada, the E.U,, Georgia, Israel, Japan and South Korea.

U.S. to Base Rockets/Satellite Launches in Brazil

Posted on March 19, 2019March 19, 2019 by Denise Simon

A few months ago, Vice President Pence traveled to Latin America with a specific visit to Brazil to discuss the location of a U.S. military base in Brazil. President Bolsonaro has waffled somewhat on this possibility, however, it is advancing. The mission for both the United States and Brazil is to counter China and Russia’s military influence in Latin America. Truth be told, the Brazilian military high command is against this ambition unless Russia displays further aggression….

(ummm, they have)

Anyway….under the guise of a space program, the U.S. and Brazil have finalized the agreement for a U.S. space technology/military program in Alcantara, Brazil.

Located out of the Forca Aerea Brasileira, the Brazilian Air Force base in Alcantra Launch Center, Equatorial launches are beneficial so close to the equator due to the speed of the earth’s rotation, saving at least 30% on fuel.

Scott Pace, executive director of the US National Space Council, said on 18 March at a Computing Technology Industry Association (CompTIA) industry group event that the TSA could be signed later that day. The remaining hurdle is approval by Brazil’s congress, David Logsdon, head of CompTIA’s Space Enterprise Council, told Jane’s after the event. Coincidently, Brazil President Jair Bolsonaro is in Washington to meet with US President Donald Trump.

A TSA prevents unauthorised access to and transfer of protected technologies. US companies are interested in flying out of ALC due to its location for equatorial launches. Equatorial launches are advantageous as the Earth spins the fastest at the equator, giving launches an extra boost to reach orbit.

However, ALC’s remote location poses a challenge. Flying out of ALC would require US companies to first fly into Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo before connecting to a flight to ALC, adding an extra day of travel. An industry source told Jane’s that it is still challenging for US companies to close their business case with flying out of ALC due to the distance between the two countries, corruption, Bolsonaro’s mercurial personality, and the tendency of Brazilians to run hot-and-cold when dealing with the US.

However, the source said if a company can work out the logistics and partner with an honest local broker, the 30% efficiency savings for launching that close to the equator can be a major incentive.

Brazil can currently launch small rockets for this same base for what is known as microsatellites. Brazil is investing with partners an estimated $300 billion for the joint or multi-lateral launch business. When General Mattis was still the Secretary of Defense, he signed a Space Situational Awareness agreement during his own visit to Brazil. This is an effort to do real-time tracking of other rogue satellites, data of objects in space and debris.

Not to be overlooked, both Boeing and Lockheed Martin went to the Alcantara Space Center last December along with Vector Launch, Inc. to determine costs of payloads. Brazil appears to have a new corporation called Alada and yet another named Embraer SA to advance the aerospace programs along with seeking investors.