Action Plan for NoKo’s Nuclear Program Same as 1991/2

Posted on February 26, 2019February 26, 2019 by Denise Simon

So, in Hanoi, Vietnam, President Trump is meeting for two days with Kim Jung Un.

Il prossimo meeting tra Kim Jong-Un e Donald J. Trump ...

The White House said Trump would meet Kim at Hanoi’s French-colonial-era Metropole Hotel at 6:30 p.m. (1130 GMT) and have a 20-minute one-on-one conversation before a dinner scheduled to last just over an hour and a half.

Meanwhile, the democrats are telegraphing that Trump is going to give up too much in order to get a deal with North Korea. How do they know? Further, the mainstream media is also broadcasting that Trump will not get anything accomplished during this second summit. Which is it exactly?

Well, it is worth looking at archived documents going back to at least 1991-1992. Remember the U.S. had a different president and military leaders, while North Korea did not have lil Kim. The issue with North Korea and the nuclear program goes back at least 25-30 years. At least under the Trump administration, there are direct talks, summits that did not happen with the top leaders of the two countries…..has the mainstream media explained any of this or for context, the previous action plans and why?

So….skim through documents 6 and 7.

Document 06

Briefing Book, Deputies Committee Meeting, ca. 12/13/1991 (Secret)

1991-12-13

Source: Freedom of Information Act release

This briefing book provides an invaluable and detailed look at how the Bush I administration deliberated over the critical next steps in confronting the North Korea nuclear program, as well as concerns held by the Pentagon about the approach recommended by the State Department. This briefing book was prepared for a NSC/Deputies’ Committee meeting to be held on December 17. The Deputies’ Committee was composed of high-ranking representatives below the Cabinet level from the State Department, the Secretary of Defense and JCS, the CIA and ACDA, as well as other agencies as required, and met to discuss policy issues that cut across the agencies’ briefs. The level of detail found in this briefing book regarding the various negotiating goals and approaches defies easy summarization, and the materials should be read closely to capture all the nuances and factors entering into the U.S. diplomatic efforts aimed at halting Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The contents of the briefing book, with comments on significant points, include: (page numbers refer to the PDF copy):

A) Cover memo, table of contents and agenda (pages 1-3)

B) Meeting objectives memorandum (page 4)

The purpose of the meeting was to consider a “gameplan” to bring North Korea’s nuclear weapons program under control. Specific steps to be considered included preliminary contact with North Korea at the deputy assistant secretary level. This would be accompanied by an approach by Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy in Beijing to invite North Korea to send a high-level official to meet with a U.S. counterpart in New York before President Bush visited Seoul in early January. Also under consideration were talking points for these meetings and demarches to countries with relations or potential influence in Pyongyang informing them of the U.S. concerns about the DPRK nuclear program.

C) Memorandum for ASD/ISA James R. Lilley, Subject DC Meeting on North Korea Nuclear Program, ca. December 12, 1991 (pages 5-6)

This memorandum summarizes the key points in the gameplan and lays out the Pentagon’s concerns that the talking points are too “forward-leaning” with respect to offering the prospect of normalized relations with North Korea at this early point in the process. The Pentagon was already concerned that South Korea had rushed ahead in talks with North Korea about a non-aggression agreement while putting the nuclear issue off to the side. ACDA Director Ronald Lehman in his recent visit to Seoul (see 5 and 6 below) had sought to bolster South Korea’s determination to press Pyongyang on this issue by agreeing to the idea of a North-South inspection regime. The Pentagon agreed with the key point of the gameplan, which was a high-level meeting to make sure Kim Il Sung knew directly about U.S. concerns regarding North Korea’s nuclear program and that, for real progress, signing the IAEA safeguards agreement was not sufficient but the DPRK should reciprocate Roh Tae Woo’s November 8 non-nuclear declaration foreswearing the development, including reprocessing and enrichment, of nuclear weapons. But the Pentagon strongly held that the U.S. side should not offer too much by way of a possible normalization of relations in these early contacts. In its view, the mere fact that these two meetings might take place were carrot enough, and the U.S. should make any second meeting conditional on North Korea signing and implementing safeguards, and agreeing to a reciprocal non-nuclear policy with Seoul and to at least trial inspections.

This memorandum has the following attachments:

1) Suggested Talking Points for Mr. Lilley (page 7) – This paper summarizes the main points Lilley should make in the Deputies’ Committee meeting to drive home the Pentagon’s concerns: keep the pressure on South Korea to push North Korea on the nuclear issue in its bilateral talks and to avoid prematurely raising the prospect of normalized relations in the initial meetings with North Korea, which should focus on making clear the U.S. concerns and benchmarks for progress on the nuclear issue.

2) Strategy for Dealing with North Korean Nuclear Issue (Gameplan paper) (pages 8-15) – This is the State Department paper laying out the diplomatic, political, and economic steps the U.S. should adopt as it works to resolve the North Korea nuclear problem, along with a timeline. The basic components of the plan were: continued international efforts to press North Korea; ensuring that Seoul press Pyongyang at the North-South talks on the nuclear issue; and clearly stating the U.S. position on a peninsula-wide ban on reprocessing and enrichment, both to the world and especially to the DPRK in proposed initial and follow-up, high-level meetings. While there were current signs of movement and success in building international pressures on the DPRK, the paper also sounded a number of warnings, noting that “there is a well-established history of Pyongyang raising expectations . . . only to back off at the last minute with additional demands,”

The paper acknowledges that the odds may be against the U.S. in pursuing the gameplan. It was entirely possible that North Korea had no intention of changing course, and would aim to “delay, diffuse international pressure, and use any opportunity to seem forthcoming, without making meaningful concessions.” Adding to the uncertainties were the gaps in intelligence regarding North Korea’s processing of nuclear material at Yongbyon. There were also signs that North Korea might try to move and hide its processing facilities before agreeing to inspections. The proposed plan for the next few months was to combine increased international pressure with concrete incentives for North Korea to take the steps needed to rein in its nuclear program. The international campaign would be waged on a number of fronts, including with Japan, China, Russia, the IAEA, and the UN. The latter posed particular issues, such as possibly inviting “invidious comparisons” to other unsafeguarded nuclear programs, such as Israel’s. China also posed its own set of possibilities and concerns. The U.S. hoped Beijing would provide more reliable information about the North Korean nuclear program as well as exert its influence. But the U.S. could not be “absolutely certain of PRC motives … and it is unlikely they would be prepared to take any measures they perceived as putting the survival of the Pyonguang regime in question.”

These efforts needed to be coordinated with two other key arenas of discussion: the North-South dialogue and bilateral U.S.-DPRK contacts. The North-South channel was crucial to solution of the nuclear issue and other Korean problems. A meeting to discuss a ROK/DPRK non-nuclear agreement that incorporated a ban on reprocessing and enrichment as well as a bilateral inspection regime was planned for December 20. In support of this initiative, Secretary of Defense Cheney had told Seoul that the U.S. could consider inspections of U.S. bases in South Korea under the right circumstances; i.e., inspections must be reciprocal, simultaneous and involve both civil and military facilities, and should come after the public commitment from both Koreas to a non-nuclear policy. ACDA Director Lehman had elaborated on this position during his visit to Seoul. The North/South talks also carried the risk that South Korea might not be willing to pay the political price of taking tougher steps towards North Korea if needed.

The bilateral U.S.-DPRK dialogue raised the points at issue in the NSC/Deputies’ Committee meeting regarding what should be said at these sessions. They would provide a venue for sending a critical message to the top North Korean leadership: should the U.S., at any point, “learn the DPRK is developing nuclear weapons or producing weapons-usable nuclear material, we would be unable to proceed further in the direction of dialogue and normalization.” This stick would be paired with the carrot of a possible easing of tensions and moves towards normalization of relations in a step-by-step fashion as North Korea met specific benchmarks in bringing its nuclear program under international safeguards and inspections. Another potential stick was explicitly taken off the table, however: Cheney had told South Korean and Japanese leaders that the U.S. should not consider “military measures” as such discussion could jeopardize the current diplomatic strategy.

3) State Department Talking Points – Preliminary Contact with DPRK (pages 16-17) – This and the following document provide talking points that address U.S. concerns about the North Korean nuclear program and the necessary steps to address them, as discussed in the document above. Notable are the marginal notes, assumed to be by a Pentagon official, that would underscore the need to discuss the nuclear issue, and that called for deleting the talking point about possible normalization of relations between the U.S. and North Korea.

4) State Department Talking Points for High-Level Meeting (pages 18-23) – Again, these talking points elaborate on the U.S. concerns and position regarding North Korea’s nuclear program, to be presented at a high-level gathering following the initial meeting. The points are familiar, taken from the gameplan document; of particular interest are the Pentagon marginal notes. The Pentagon remained focused on making it clear to North Korea that its nuclear program was unacceptable and on laying out the steps North Korea must take to bring this program under international review and inspection.

5) Memorandum, Col. Eden Y. Woon (OSD/ISA) for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Subject: ACDEA Director Lehman Visit to Korea on Nuclear Issue, ca. December 30, 1991 (pages 24-26) – This memorandum reports on the interagency team that ACDA Director Lehman took to Seoul on December 6-9. The team consisted of representatives from ACDA, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs, and the office of the Secretary of Defense. After stressing to the South Koreans that the North Korea nuclear issue should be “front and center” in the upcoming North/South ministerial meetings, the U.S. delegation then focused on revising serious problems with a draft joint declaration Seoul planned to propose to Pyongyang at these meetings. Key among these concerns was keeping North Korea’s international obligation regarding IAEA safeguards separate from bilateral nuclear agreements; insuring that a North/South inspection regime included both military and civilian sites, as IAEA inspections alone might not be able to detect a covert weapons program at Yongbyon and other suspected sites; and avoiding any statement that the purpose of a bilateral inspection regime was “to check on the presence of nuclear weapons.” The U.S. feared this would come too close to sounding like checking for U.S. weapons, whereas the purpose of the inspections should be to verify both Koreas are abiding by any joint nuclear declaration.

The U.S. team had to counter serious South Korean resistance to making changes to address these concerns, fearing it would make the joint declaration too tough for North Korea to accept. More worrisome for Seoul was that it would be hard to pressure North Korea on inspecting reprocessing facilities since reprocessing was legal. Fighting back against what the Americans saw as a reversion to old thinking, which the U.S. thought had disappeared with Roh’s November 8 announcement of non-nuclear principles, the U.S. delegation spent the better part of the meeting explaining the inadequacies of IAEA inspections alone, the need to press North Korea to stop reprocessing and the requirement for persuading North Korea to reciprocate Roh Tae Woo’s powerful non-nuclear policy.

In the end, the U.S. delegation persuaded the South Koreans to make the necessary changes in the draft joint declaration. Looking ahead, it was clear Washington needed to do more to reassure South Korea that international pressure on North Korea would not ease once the DPRK signed the IAEA safeguards agreement. To this end, the U.S. would have to send out a “core demarche” cable to its friends and allies stating the American goal of persuading North Korea to reciprocate Roh’s non-nuclear policy and stop reprocessing, and declaring its position that merely signing the IAEA safeguards agreement was insufficient to address international concerns. Sending this cable would also serve to shield the United States from criticism that it was “moving the goalposts” in its demands on North Korea. And again, Washington needed to engage with China, possibly through high-level talks in the near future, to secure its role in putting pressure on North Korea, a role that would increase if the issue had to move to the U.N. Finally, the U.S. and South Korea needed to make a decision on whether to hold the 1992 Team Spirit joint military exercises, a matter on which South Korean views were divided.

6) Cable, Amembassy Seoul 13075 to SecState, Subject: Lehman Visit:

ROKG Proposal for a N/S Non-Nuclear Joint Declaration, December 9, 1991 (pages 27-30) – This cable summarizes the results of the U.S.-ROK meeting on nuclear issues that is the focus of the preceding memorandum. As noted above, these issues were distinguishing between IAEA inspections and any bilateral North/South inspection agreement, the need to include civil sites in any bilateral agreement, the U.S. opposition to having the stated purpose of bilateral inspections include checking for the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons, as well as the need to include trial inspections as a goal of the North/ South talks. The South Koreans accepted the U.S. changes, which would be incorporated into the draft Seoul would present to the DPRK at the ministerial discussions beginning on December 10. The cable reiterates the South Korean agreement that the nuclear issue should be “front and center” at these talks and that the draft joint declaration will be used to “attack” North Korea’s position on nuclear weapons. The South Koreans expected this strategy to lead to a “major confrontation” on the nuclear issue, with Seoul determined to come out of the fight this round as “top dog.” The rest of the cable gives the text of the revised draft joint declaration.

7) Cable, Amembassy Seoul 13322 to SecState, Subject: Prime Ministers Sign Joint Agreement on Reconciliation and Nonaggression: “The Most Comprehensive North-South Document Since the Division of the Peninsula, December 13, 1991 (pages 31-33) – This cable reports that on December 13, North and South Korea’s prime ministers signed the “Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Cooperation and Exchanges,” and provides details on a briefing that Assistant Foreign Minister Lee See Young gave the diplomatic corps on the agreement and the negotiations leading to it. Lee said that Seoul had put strong emphasis on the nuclear issue throughout the negotiations, pressing the DPRK to accept nuclear inspections and halt nuclear weapons development, and calling for agreement to end all reprocessing and enrichment to insure nuclear weapons would not be produced on the peninsula. South Korea had also pushed for North Korea to accept that trial inspections of military and civilian facilities, one of the confidence-building measures, be carried out within the month. Regarding the ROK draft declaration on a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, North Korea had initially responded by repeating its call for a nuclear-free zone, but Seoul had pushed to have further talks on a joint nuclear declaration work from the South Korean draft. Lee also noted the “unexpectedly flexible” North Korean stance at the talks, but felt that Pyongyang may need more concrete proof of progress in the North/South dialogue as a step towards improving its international standing and ending its political and economic isolation. For its part, Seoul held that further moves towards normalizing relations with North Korea should wait to ensure the DPRK followed through on implementing the agreement and its continued stand on the nuclear issue. Summing up, Lee asserted that the joint agreement was the most comprehensive North-South document since the division of the peninsula,” which could bring about “a major change in North-South relations.”

Document 07

Memorandum: North Korea Deputies’ Committee. March 12, 1992 (Secret)

1992-03-12

Source: Freedom of Information Act release

“Our basic policy remains that nuclear weapons in North Korean hands are intolerable.” The state of play in avoiding this outcome is the focus of this memorandum, prepared for a meeting of the North Korea Deputies’ Committee. It was a “testing period” for the DPRK, in which the U.S. and its allies waited for Pyongyang to carry out its promise to ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement reached in January, having already failed to meet a commitment to do this in February. While there were promising signs that North Korea might still ratify the IAEA agreement in April, and talks were underway to establish a Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) to monitor the North-South non-nuclear agreement, the North’s intentions remained unclear. There were signs of an internal debate possibly slowing decisions, as the DPRK might see some political advantage in delay, or it might be playing for time so that it could “destroy, dismantle, or convert sensitive facilities,” even to hide its nuclear weapons program or produce and then hide “significant amounts of plutonium before allowing inspections. Or perhaps it might plan not to accept meaningful inspections at all.

South Korea and Japan agreed with the U.S. that improved political relations with North Korea were off the table until the nuclear issue was resolved. Seoul had made progress on this issue a prerequisite for movement in other North-South talks, going so far as to postpone a summit meeting and would likely postpone the next round of prime ministerial talks in May absent real progress. Even if the DPRK did ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement and negotiated a bilateral inspection regime, the next test would be the completeness of North Korea’s declarations to the IAEA. A further complicating factor was the willingness of some countries, especially China and Russia, to give the DPRK the benefit of the doubt for “plausible delay.” Absent undeniable proof that the DPRK did not intend to carry out its promises, it would be difficult to mobilize international pressure in the near term. A “worst case” scenario in which North Korea delayed action on its IAEA commitments until October was attached to the memorandum.

For the moment, the U.S. had to walk a fine line between accepting that North Korea would meet its obligations and maintaining international concern, while at the same time laying the basis for action that could enable it to narrow North Korea’s freedom of action and tighten international pressure. The key challenge was “to minimize DPRK “wiggle room,” by building international support for a reasonable deadline for initial IAEA inspections at all the DPRK’s nuclear facilities, which would in turn lay the basis for international action if it became necessary to coerce Pyongyang. A best case scenario (also attached) would find the DPRK submitting its nuclear inventory in late May, laying the basis for initial inspections in early June. Future U,S. diplomacy needed to focus on bolstering support for the best-case scenario, while not giving North Korea grounds to charge the U.S. was “pressuring” it. A critical target of this diplomacy would be China, which had the most influence with North Korea. Washington was to stress with Beijing that the U.S. timetable was “critical” and urge the Chinese to “make it happen,” emphasizing China’s national interest and the U.S. determination to pursue tough international steps, which Beijing should support, if Pyongyang “fails to perform.” Other venues at which the U.S. should press its case were the IAEA, the UN and in U.S.-DPRK counselors talks in Beijing. Should coercive steps be needed, these could be pursued through economic sanctions under the UN aegis, in concert with like-minded nations, or unilaterally if need be.

The Creation of a Failed Venezuela due to Maduro

Posted on February 25, 2019February 25, 2019 by Denise Simon

Last year, Lancet Infectious Diseases Journal published a major warning about malaria in Venezuela. In spite of 3 million people fleeing their home country since 2014, the economic condition in Venezuela continues in a financial tail-spin. Treatment of malaria, measles and diphtheria as well as dengue and Zika are just not being treated. Further, the infant mortality rate is skyrocketing. The most recent population with malaria is estimated to be 411, 586.

Maduro has called on Russia, Cuba and Bolivia to help with military action, police action and even his personal security. Cuba denies there are forces in Venezuela. Hold on Cuba….

Informal information published by Foresightcuba, which is dedicated to presenting statistics about the island, counts Cuba’s military presence in Venezuela as follows: 4,500 Cuban infantrymen organized in 8 battalions of 500 troops, plus a battalion stationed in Fuerte Tiuna; 2 Brigade Generals (Herminio Hernández Rodríguez and Alejandro Ronda Marrero, one stationed in Fuerte Tiuna, another in Barquisimeto); 4 colonels (Rodrigo Hernández Maite, Rufino Zabaleta Corvino, Jaime Freitas Sambrano, and Simon Guillermo Senior); 8 lieutenant colonels; 6 frigate captains, and 25 junior officers.

This information details who they are with name and surname, their functions, where they are based, the weapons they use, and notes that they wear Venezuelan military insignia.

A long-standing situation

According to an article published in February 2010 by journalist Leandro Dario, international assistant editor of the newspaper Dario Perfi, by that time the then president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, had incorporated the Cuban military into the Armed Forces of the country with the aim of inserting the high command of Cuba into Venezuelan military forces, to ensure their control in the barracks and project socialism. More here.

This certainly now speaks to the humanitarian aid several countries are working to get to the desperate Venezuelan people that Maduro has cut off completely. Just two days ago:

Grave situation developing right now inside of #Colombia. @freddysuperlano a member of the National Assembly of #Venezuela was poisoned this morning at breakfast inside of Colombia & is in serious condition at the hospital. His assistant Carlos Salinas has died from poisoning.

#ATENCIÓN Ciudadanos intentan salvar parte de la ayuda humanitaria que fue incendiada por funcionarios de la PNB en el puente Santander, Ureña #23Feb pic.twitter.com/tIyJiaJ8Vb

— NTN24 Venezuela (@NTN24ve) February 23, 2019

Enter Senator Marco Rubio, he has been right on top of the conditions for many months sounding all the alarms as VP Mike Pence is presently in Columbia meeting with the interim Venezuelan President Guido and The Lima Group.

There are 5 naturalized American citizens still being jailed in Venezuela. And China deployed a tech envoy to Caracas to in many cases terminate the internet and other telecom services.

Meanwhile, here is more.

In part:

Due to Russia’s support for President Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian civil war, the Kremlin has been given significant more control over Syria’s oil and gas industry. In 2017, Syria signed a deal giving Russia sole rights to its oil and gas production. In return for saving desperate regimes, Russia has gained significant control over global resource markets on top of its own large reserves.

But Assad has also given Russia a permanent air base and an expansion of Russian naval facilities in the country. The Kremlin is banking on mirroring such agreements in Venezuela. Joint Russian-Venezuelan naval exercises were held in 2008, while two nuclear-capable bombers flew to Venezuela’s La Orchila island in December 2018.

Though Venezuelan law prohibits permanent foreign military bases, Russia and Venezuela announced the creation of a ‘temporary’ long-term Russian airbase on La Orchila soon after the flight demonstration. Together with Venezuela’s Russian weapons imports, the two militaries will find it easier to coordinate Russian power projection in the Caribbean.

Expanding a military presence in Venezuela will bring up uncomfortable memories from the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 2017, Igor Sechin held talks with Cuban President Raul Castro and agreed to expand oil and gas ties. The potential for a Russian base in Venezuela came after steady integration through natural resource industries, a formula that Cuba appears intent on replicating.

Stakes have risen in Venezuela since Russia allegedly sent hundreds of personnel from its most notorious private military company, Wagner, in January. Deploying Wagner will allow Russia to mask its presence in Venezuela, similar to recent conflicts.

Many of Wagner’s personnel are ex-Russian soldiers. They have worked with rebel elements in Ukraine and been granted partial control of re-captured oil and gas fields in Syria. Wagner has also been deployed across Africa to safeguard regimes under scrutiny from the West and international institutions, as well as protect their lucrative mining operations.

Wagner represents a privatization of security backed by the power of the Russian military. Rosneft and Gazprom, Russia’s other resource crown jewels, operate their own security forces, and together could be the force that takes over from the Russian military in Syria and potentially in Venezuela.

Russia’s ability to safeguard desperate regimes has made other ‘rogue states’ increasingly look to Russia as a guarantor of their security. Keeping Maduro in power represents part of a wider policy of assisting other states hostile to wider US foreign policy.

The Kremlin often offers diplomatic support to North Korea and relieved most of its debt obligations to Russia in 2014. In the years that followed, Korean rocket tests increased dramatically, drawing the attention of the U.S. More recently, not only has Russia aided the Syrian government in the civil war, it has done so in tandem with Iranian forces after decades of Iranian military isolation.

Backed by the U.S., Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Gaido declared himself acting president on January 23, ushering in the latest escalation of Venezuela’s political crisis. He was soon recognized as interim president by the U.S., Canada, the EU, and most Latin American countries. China, Russia, Turkey, Iran and others continue to recognize Maduro, who still has the broad support of the Venezuelan military.

The U.S. has imposed sanctions on Maduro and individuals associated with him, as well as PVSDA, which is now stacked with Maduro allies. But the ability of Maduro and the Venezuelan economy to withstand the pressure suggests that, though the sanctions may damage his administration, they may not be enough to force him out.

Chavez fought to gain control over Venezuela’s oil supply and push out the U.S. and the West, only to have Maduro establish a new reliance on Russia. With the Kremlin’s help, his administration may survive, in return for Russian control over Venezuela’s oil industry and the establishment of a military footprint in the United States’ backyard. For the full summary, go here.

U.S. is Presently Under 31 National Emergency Orders

Posted on February 14, 2019February 14, 2019 by Denise Simon

Of particular note is during the peaceful transfer of power from Obama to Trump, Obama told Trump the number one threat to the United States and her interests is North Korea. Notice that Obama never made any declaration regarding North Korea. Notice too that under Obama, the Sinaola Cartel, the narco terror organization that killed thousands in Mexico and many in the United States was not part of any declaration. But….Obama did declare a national emergency due to the socialist revolution in Venezuela and hence that has caused 3 million Venezuelans to flee.

Oh yeah….nothing from Obama either regarding Islamic State and Syria or Iraq…..or Russia considering Moscow’s intrusion into our 2016 election systems…..

***

According to the Federal Register, 58 national emergencies have been declared since the National Emergency Act of 1976 was signed into law by President Gerald Ford.

And 31 have been annually renewed and are currently still in effect, as listed in the Federal Register.

Here’s a list of the presidents who declared still ongoing national emergencies.

President Jimmy Carter

Nov 14, 1979: The National Emergency With Respect to Iran, in response to the Iran hostage crisis.

President Bill Clinton

Nov 14, 1994: The National Emergency With Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, that combined two previous national emergencies focused on weapons of mass destruction.

Jan. 2, 1995: The National Emergency With Respect to Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process placed economic sanctions in response to the Jerusalem bombing.

March 15, 1995: The National Emergency With Respect to Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources was an effort to prevent potential deals between oil companies.

October 21, 1995: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions with Significant Narcotics Traffickers Centered in Colombia was declared after increased reports of drug cartels laundering money through American companies.

March 1, 1996: The National Emergency With Respect to Regulations of the Anchorage and Movement of Vessels with Respect to Cuba was after civilian planes were shot down near Cuba

November 3, 1997: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Sudan implemented economic and trade sanctions.

President George W. Bush

June 26, 2001: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans imposed sanctions on those aiding Albanian insurgents in Macedonia

Aug 17, 2001: The National Emergency With Respect to Export Control Regulations renewed presidential power to control exports in a national emergency since the Export Administration Act of 1979 lapsed.

Sept 14, 2001: The National Emergency with Respect to Certain Terrorist Attacks was in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States.

Sept 23, 2001: The National Emergency With Respect to Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism was in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

March 6, 2003: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Zimbabwe was an effort to punish associates of Robert Mugabe.

May 22, 2003: The National Emergency With Respect to Protecting the Development Fund for Iraq and Certain Other Property in Which Iraq has an Interest was issued following the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

May 11, 2004: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to Syria was in response to Syria supporting terrorist activity in Iraq.

June 16, 2006: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus was in response to charges of fraud in the Belarus presidential election.

Oct 27, 2006: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was in response to violence around the Congolese presidential election runoff.

Aug 1, 2007: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Persons Undermining the Sovereignty of Lebanon was in response to a breakdown of the rule of law in Lebanon.

June 26, 2008: The National Emergency With Respect to Continuing Certain Restrictions with Respect to North Korea cited the risk of proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material. President Trump renewed this June 22, 2018 citing the “existence and risk of proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material on the Korean Peninsula and the actions and policies of the Government of North Korea continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat.”

President Barack Obama

April 12, 2010: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Somalia was in respect to threats posed by Somali pirates.

February 25, 2011: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain Transactions Related to Libya froze the assets of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.

July 25, 2011: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Transnational Criminals was in response to the rise in crime by specific organizations: Los Zetas (Mexico), The Brothers’ Circle (former Soviet Union countries), the Yakuza (Japan), and the Camorra (Italy).

May 16, 2012: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Persons Threatening the Peace, Security, or Stability of Yemen addressed political unrest within the Yemen government.

March 16, 2014: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine was in response to the Russian invasion of Crimea.

April 3, 2014: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to South Sudan was in response to the ongoing civil war.

May 12, 2014: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in the Central African Republic was in response to violence towards humanitarian aid workers.

March 8, 2015: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela was in response to human rights violations.

April 1, 2015: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities was in response to Chinese cyber attacks on the U.S.

Nov 23, 2015: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Burundi was declared after a failed coup.

President Donald Trump

Dec 20, 2017: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption imposed sanctions on the Myanmar general for his role persecuting Rohingya Muslims.

Sept 12, 2018: The National Emergency With Respect to Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election attempted to prevent any meddling with the 2018 midterm elections amid the ongoing investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election.

Nov 27, 2018: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Nicaragua was declared by President Trump in response to violence and the Ortega regime’s “systematic dismantling and undermining of democratic institutions and the rule of law” that constitutes an “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”

The Lima Group vs. Maduro

Posted on February 11, 2019February 11, 2019 by Denise Simon

It is a matter of time that Maduro flees somewhere and likely with stolen money of which it appears the U.S. Treasury and the Swift Banking System is watching carefully. The United States is listing those rogue companies and countries and people evade sanctions and are helping Maduro move money for various reasons, money that belongs to Venezuela and to her people. Keep a watchful eye of South Africa, Russia, Cuba, Turkey, Syria and Iran. More punitive sanctions may be bubbling to the surface.

Contrary to many democrats, it was not President Trump that began is Venezuelan revolution or the eventual ouster of Maduro. In fact, it was The Lima Group joined by the Organization of American States.

PressTV-Mexico urges Lima Group not to meddle in Venezuela ...

Back in January of 2019:

Thirteen members of the Lima Group of nations said they will not recognize Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro as the legitimate leader of his nation when he takes office on Thursday for a new six-year term, threatening to ratchet up sanctions and international pressure.

Foreign ministers from the Lima Group said they will not recognize the presidency of Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro when he begins a new six-year term on Jan. 10. Missing from Friday’s group statement was Mexico, a founding member of the bloc of 14 nations.

In a statement issued Friday in Peru, the foreign ministers of the bloc said that Venezuela’s snap presidential elections on May 20, which led to Maduro’s disputed victory, did not “provide the guarantees or meet the international standards necessary for a free, just and transparent process.”

The group also said it would bar Venezuelan officials from traveling to their nations and might impose financial sanctions — including barring those officials from using the local banking system.

The Lima Group said Maduro should hand over the reins of government to the opposition-controlled National Assembly, the only branch of government it recognizes as legitimate.

Maduro, who came to power in 2013 after the death of his mentor Hugo Chávez, is unlikely to be moved by the new round of condemnation. He often accuses Washington and its allies in the region — particularly Colombia — of trying to topple his “socialist revolution” and waging an “economic war” against the once wealthy but now struggling nation. In recent years, more than 3 million people have fled Venezuela due to hunger, violence and political turmoil.

The countries that signed Friday’s statement are: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and St. Lucia.

No one is more current or has a more cogent assessment of Venezuela that Senator Marco Rubio. The Heritage Foundation hosted the Senator for his view, facts and summary of events in Venezuela.

Iranian Revolution at 40 Years Old

Posted on February 11, 2019February 11, 2019 by Denise Simon

Jimmy Carter unavailable for comment…..

DUBAI (Reuters) – Hundreds of thousands of Iranians marched and some burned U.S. flags to mark the revolution’s 40th anniversary on Monday as Tehran showed off ballistic missiles in defiance of U.S. efforts to curb its military power.

Soldiers, students, clerics and black-clad women holding small children thronged streets across Iran, many with portraits of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Shi’ite cleric who toppled the Shah in an Islamic uprising that still haunts the West.

On Feb. 11, 1979 Iran’s army declared its neutrality, paving the way for the fall of U.S.-backed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Iran warns it would ‘raze Tel Aviv to the ground’ if attacked by U.S.: IRNA

State television showed crowds defying cold rainy weather and carrying Iranian flags while shouting “Death to Israel, Death to America” – trademark chants of the revolution.

After decades of hostility with the United States, the Islamic Republic vowed to increase its military strength despite mounting pressure from Western countries.

Ballistic missile capabilities were on display during the main march, including the Qadr F, a ground-to-ground missile with a 1,950-km (1,220-mile) range, Tasnim news agency said.

“We have not asked and will not ask for permission to develop different types of … missiles and will continue our path and our military power,” President Hassan Rouhani said in a speech at Tehran’s Azadi (Freedom) square.

ECONOMIC “HARDSHIPS AND GRIEVANCES”

U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted on Monday that the Iranian government had let down its people.

“40 years of corruption. 40 years of repression. 40 years of terror. The regime in Iran has produced only #40YearsofFailure. The long-suffering Iranian people deserve a much brighter future,” he posted in both English and Farsi.

The large turnout in state-sponsored rallies, in which U.S. and Israeli flags were burned, came as Iranians face mounting economic hardships many blame on the country’s clerical leaders.

Pictures on social media showed some people also demonstrating against corruption, unemployment and high prices.

“Our presence in the 40th anniversary of the revolution is to show our support for the Islamic Republic,” said one sign held by a protester. “But it does not mean we support corruption of some officials and their betrayal of the oppressed people.”

Reuters could not independently verify the pictures. Photo collection found here.

Last year, Iran cracked down on protests over poor living standards that posed the most serious challenge to its clerical elite since a 2009 uprising over disputed elections.

Prices of basic foodstuffs have soared since President Donald Trump withdrew Washington from world powers’ 2015 nuclear deal with Iran last year and reimposed sanctions on Tehran.

“I bow in admiration to Iran’s resilient people who – despite hardships and grievances – today poured into streets by the millions to mark 40th anniv of their Islamic Revolution, which some in the US wished would never come,” Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif tweeted.

“US should take note: REAL Iranians never succumb to diktats.”

In January, Rouhani said Iran was dealing with its worst economic crisis since the Shah was toppled.

But he remained defiant on Monday as Iranians recalled the end of a monarch who catered to the rich. “The Iranian people have and will have some economic difficulties but we will overcome the problems by helping each other,” he said.

U.S. AND ISRAELI THREATS

Yadollah Javani, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ deputy head for political affairs, said Iran would demolish cities in Israel if the United States attacked.

“The United States does not have the courage to fire a single bullet at us despite all its defensive and military assets. But if they attack us, we will raze Tel Aviv and Haifa to the ground,” Javani told the state news agency IRNA.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed the threat. “I am not ignoring the threats of the Iranian regime, but nor I am impressed by them,” he said.

“Were this regime to make the terrible mistake of trying to destroy Tel Aviv and Haifa, it would not succeed, but it would mean that they had celebrated their last Revolution Day. They would do well to take that into account.”

Washington and the Arab world have viewed Iran with great suspicion since the Islamic Revolution, fearing Khomeini’s radical ideology would inspire militants across the Middle East.

Today, the United States, its Arab allies and Israel are trying to counter Tehran’s growing influence in the Middle East, where it has proxies in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.

Iran also has vast clout in Iraq, where Major-General Qassem Soleimani, head of the overseas arm of the Revolutionary Guards, was frequently photographed guiding Shi’ite militias in the war against Sunni Islamic State militants.

ECONOMIC “HARDSHIPS AND GRIEVANCES”

U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted on Monday that the Iranian government had let down its people.

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Back. during post revolution:

Source: Documents of the U.S. Espionage Den (Tehran: Muslim Students Following the Line of the Imam, c. 1981)

This fascinating analysis of the political and social force that would come to dominate the revolution is one indication that line officers in Iran were well aware of the Shiite phenomenon in the country at an earlier time than is sometimes assumed. Ayatollah Khomeini is specifically named as the “symbolic leader” of the revolution. The Embassy’s staff admits they have been “laboring” to get a better understanding of the “renascent Shi’ite religious movement” and they make plain that part of the problem is that Iranians within and outside of the government have consistently “peddled” the view that “Khomeini’s followers are for the most part crypto Communists or leftists of Marxist stripe.” The telegram goes on to give a brief survey of Shiism and Iranian monarchical mistreatment of the “Islamic establishment,” presumably in an attempt to educate non-specialists higher up in the Department. The telegram specifically advises that “it has become obvious that Islam is deeply imbedded in the lives of the vast majority of the Iranian people.”

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Source: “The Carter Administration and the Arc of Crisis: Iran, Afghanistan and the Cold War in Southern Asia, 1977-1981,” briefing book for conference prepared by the National Security Archive

The Defense Intelligence Agency, whose primary audience consisted of the secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military commanders, produced this unclassified primer on Shiism in Iran. The DIA had its own HUMINT sources overseas but this document clearly derives its information from open sources and indeed contains nothing that an interested citizen could not easily have found in a public library. But the topic indicates at least a basic recognition of the importance of one of the key dynamics at work in Iranian society. The extract posted here, all that appears to exist (and one of the few available DIA documents from the period), does not attempt to forecast the course of events in the country.

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Source: Freedom of Information Act request

As late as October 1978, there is still little sense in Washington or other Western capitals that things are heading in a dangerous direction in Iran. In a meeting with British counterparts earlier in the month, State Department Iran specialist Henry Precht gave a lugubrious forecast for the Shah and for Western interests but according to records of the session (click here) the British – and even Precht’s superiors – thought he was well off target. In this telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, an equally dire report directs the State Department’s attention to a visible change in attitudes across many sectors of public opinion. Pro-Shah and anti-Shah elements alike reportedly agree that his apparent lack of firm action is making the situation worse and he is in danger of losing control of events.

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Just a few days after the previous cable expressing a general sense of a worsening atmosphere in the capital, the Embassy in Tehran focuses this report on the specific question of a “military option.” The general sense seems to be that a military takeover is inevitable and many Embassy contacts – especially senior military officers – are actively supporting the idea. Many Iranians evidently believed later that the Carter administration eventually backed a military coup, which never took place. Noting that the Shah told Ambassador Sullivan personally that he was considering a military government, the telegram assesses that such a move could succeed but stops short of supporting it, concluding “the long-term costs would be heavy.” Go here for the full menu of documents.