Belgium: Spies, History and Reality

Posted on March 23, 2016August 13, 2024 by Denise Simon

In Brussels Attacks, Chronicle of a Disaster Foretold

Belgian spies said attacks were coming, but overwhelmed security forces were powerless to prevent terrorists from killing 34 and wounding hundreds more.

FP: Fears of a possible terrorist attack in Brussels have been running high for months. The Belgian government went so far as to lock down the capital last year after receiving specific intelligence that a group of extremists were plotting a bombing and gun assault in the style of the Nov. 13 attacks in Paris that killed 130 people.

The lockdown was lifted after four days, but the government’s performance fueled criticism that it was behind the curve on the terrorist threat. Belgian security services also came under fire for having monitored and tracked several of the Paris attackers without informing their French counterparts about the suspects.

Concerns about Belgium’s ability to counter the terrorist threat were reinforced after it took authorities four months to track down the most wanted man in Europe, Salah Abdelslam, who was hiding in the Molenbeek neighborhood of Brussels. Abdelslam is believed to be the last surviving member of the Islamic State cell that carried out the devastating attacks on Paris, and authorities had repeatedly raided the neighborhood before apprehending him.

After Abdelslam’s arrest last week, Belgian officials said they had uncovered a much larger network than initially suspected. But as authorities scrambled to try to roll up the militants, an Islamic State bomb ripped through the departure area of Brussels’s main airport on Tuesday. An hour later, another bomb detonated at the busy metro station near the European Union headquarters. The attacks killed 34 people and wounded nearly 200. The Islamic State claimed responsibility, singling out the “crusader” nation of Belgium and promised that more attacks were coming to countries allied against it.

As police in Brussels launched a manhunt for one of the suspected assailants, Belgium and its allies, including the United States, faced a number of crucial, unanswered questions in the wake of the attacks: Who is the suspected bomb-maker, or bomb-makers, behind the killings, and where are they located? How sophisticated were the ingredients used in the explosives? How did the extremists evade detection? And just how big is the terrorist network that helped fund, plan, and carry out the massacres?

Counterterrorism experts said Belgium now finds itself confronting a terrorist infrastructure that has planted deep roots in Belgian society as the war in Syria has escalated. According to figures assembled by Belgian terrorism researcher Pieter Van Ostaeyen, as many as 562 Belgians have fought in Iraq or Syria. At least 124 hail from Brussels. With a population of 11 million, Belgium has sent more fighters per capita than any country in Europe to the charnel house of the Syrian civil war. According to Van Ostaeyen’s figures, at least 75 Belgians have returned to the country — making it nearly impossible for the country’s small and under-budgeted security services to track them all.

“The bigger problem is that such a thriving terrorist infrastructure was allowed to establish itself in the first place,” said Bruce Hoffman, the director of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University and a counterterrorism scholar. He added that “key operatives and senior [Islamic State] commanders are based in Brussels,” where they’re able to draw “on a network of operatives and also sympathizers.”

Last year, a Belgian court convicted 45 members of the radical Salafi group Sharia4Belgium on terrorism charges. Judge Luc Potargent, presiding over one of the largest terrorist trials in Belgium’s history, found that the group’s leader, Fouad Belkacem, had “prepared young people physically and psychologically for armed combat” and sentenced him to 12 years in jail. According to Van Ostaeyen’s figures, 79 individuals with links to Sharia4Belgium have taken up arms in Syria and Iraq. The group has been identified as a main supplier of Belgian fighters to those two countries.

Another prominent recruiter, Khalid Zerkani, sent at least 45 individuals to fight in Iraq and Syria, according to Van Ostaeyen. Among his recruits was Abdelhamid Abaaoud, whom authorities describe as the ringleader of the November attacks in Paris. Last July, a Belgian court sentenced Zerkani to 12 years in jail for his role in sending fighters to Syria.

The alarming reach of the Islamic State has prompted soul-searching in Brussels and accusations that the government is flailing in its counterterrorism efforts. Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel last year pushed back at the criticism and announced a series of new security measures, including introducing ankle bracelets to monitor extremists and extending detention periods for terrorism suspects not yet charged in a crime.

In February, Belgian officials unveiled plans to double spending to about $446 million on law enforcement and intelligence. The plan also called for adding a thousand police officers by 2019 to a city district that includes Molenbeek, a working-class neighborhood that has become notorious for its role as a hub for Islamist militants.

Molenbeek poses a significant challenge to law enforcement officials, according to Matthew Levitt, a counterterrorism expert who recently traveled to Belgium to study its extremism problem. He said local authorities in Molenbeek lack the resources to get ahead of the “radicalization curve” in the densely packed district that suffers from high unemployment.

“It’s great that they have a counter-radicalization cell within the police, but it’s eight people,” he told reporters in a teleconference.

The Molenbeek police added 50 new officers following the Paris attacks, but Levitt noted that its total pool of officers had been down by 185 officers due to recruiting problems. “It’s hard to recruit people to go to work in Molenbeek,” he said. “It’s a tougher neighborhood.”

Levitt said authorities are spread thin given that Molenbeek alone has approximately 47 mosques and the vast majority of imams in Belgium do not speak local languages, making them less than ideal partners for counter-radicalization programs. Philippe Hayez, a former official with the DGSE, the French counterpart to the CIA, described the Belgian security services as a small but professional community, comprising fewer than 1,500 people.

With extremist networks having become entrenched over a period of years, Belgium and its neighbors are confronted by a threat beyond what security services had ever anticipated. “I think they have a deeper and more pervasive network than we’ve imagined in Europe, and it’s a network that operates according to its own timetable and seeks to take advantage of vulnerabilities and opportunities as they present themselves,” Hoffman said, reflecting on what the Brussels attacks have revealed about the Islamic State’s capabilities. Hayez called the problem “Euroterrorism nouvelle vague” that “isn’t only a threat from abroad like it was with al Qaeda but a mix of external and internal threats.”

Current and former senior U.S. national security officials said Belgium had been slow to wake up to the threat — until the Paris attacks, which were planned, in large part, from a Brussels cell. But they said it remained unclear whether recent intelligence warnings contained details of potential attacks or more general language that was too vague for police to act on.

After the November Paris attacks, a Belgian parliamentary committee launched an inquiry as to why security services were unable to “connect the dots” of information on the attackers.

Despite belated efforts to bolster resources to take on the Islamic State, Belgian authorities are facing a highly capable foe. Islamic State operatives in Europe have repeatedly shown a high proficiency in communications security, including the use of one-time, or “burner,” phones and the use of encrypted communication tools. They have relied on high-quality forgers to provide fake documents and used Europe’s open borders to freely travel the continent plotting mayhem. They have amassed stockpiles of weapons and explosives and have deployed their arsenal in meticulously planned suicide attacks.

“We were told by intelligence agencies that these types of attacks were a thing of the past, that enough red flags would go up when these guys were constructing their suicide vests that they would be noticed,” said Robin Simcox, a terrorism and intelligence expert at the Heritage Foundation. Rather, lone-wolf attacks by disaffected militants were supposed to be the terrorism phenomenon of the future. Mass casualty attacks requiring “broader networks” were so “operationally compromised” that they would be picked up by the police, Simcox said.

Or so the story went, anyway, Simcox said. “That was blown out of the water by Paris in November, and now it’s been hammered home today.”

Terrorism After Brussels

By Robin Simcox:

FA: The recent attacks in Brussels show that terrorists’ ability to strike at the heart of Europe remains apparently undiminished. Early reports suggest a death toll of around 31, with more than 100 injured. The Islamic State (ISIS) has claimed responsibility for the attack.

Belgium may seem an unlikely hub of jihadism, but despite being a small and peaceful nation, Belgian connections to militancy are long established. In the 1990s, bullets and guns made their way from local jihadi crooks in Brussels to the Groupe Islamique Armé, Algerian terrorists aiming to establish an Islamic state in Algeria. Throughout that decade, a smattering of Belgian residents headed off to fight in various foreign conflicts, including the one in Chechnya.

After 9/11, a major terrorism trial in Belgium led to the convictions of over 20 Islamists. Those jailed included Nizar Trabelsi, a former professional soccer player who had joined al Qaeda and planned to commit a suicide attack against a NATO air base. It also included Tarek Maaroufi, who was linked to the assassination of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the Afghan military leader whose death served as al Qaeda’s warm-up act two days before its main event.

More recently, as the war in Syria metastasized, Belgians were drawn there in significant numbers. Of the 5,000-6,000 Europeans who fought in Syria, up to 553 are believed to be Belgian. That makes the country the home of the highest number of foreign fighters in Syria, per capita, of any Western European country. Small wonder that even the country’s justice minister admits that his country has “a foreign fighters problem.” Some of those who arranged for the travel of these fighters to Syria were convicted of terrorism in a Belgian court in February 2015.

By most estimates, over 100 Belgians have now returned from the conflict. Although that is concerning enough, it must also be placed in the context of a broader issue. The Schengen Agreement allows for virtually unhindered freedom of movement throughout much of Europe, something that jihadists have taken advantage of time and again. A fighter from the Syrian jihad who is returning to Germany or France poses as much of a danger to Belgium as one who was born and bred in Brussels. The threat is continent-wide, and approximately 2,000 fighters are thought have returned to Europe.

Despite all this, there may still be some bewilderment about the choice of Belgium as a target of ISIS’ latest attack in Europe. It is not a leading military power like France or the United Kingdom. Yet Belgium is absolutely central to ISIS’ aims to carry out attacks in Europe in the hope of inspiring new recruits to their cause. After all, it was Brussels that first suffered casualties from the foreign fighters returning from Syria: Mehdi Nemmouche, who fought for ISIS in Syria, shot and killed four at the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014.

Belgium was also the site of the first attack in Europe directed by ISIS, as opposed to just being inspired by the group. It was in Verviers, eastern Belgium, last January that ISIS first displayed its talent for getting trained fighters back into Europe from Syria, loading them up with weapons and bombs, and directing them to attempt a major attack. The cell had acquired AK-47s, explosives, walkie-talkies, and GoPro cameras. A Belgian federal prosecutor commented that the cell was plotting “imminent terrorist attacks on a grand scale.” Fortunately, those plans were thwarted. The Belgians had been tracking the cell for weeks and after a dramatic shootout, killed two terrorists and captured another.

Factors relevant to both the Jewish Museum and Verviers plotters would reappear in the months following. The first was the presence of a Belgian national called Abdelhamid Abaaoud, whom investigators regarded as the link between ISIS’ leadership in Syria and their operations in Europe. Abaaoud was in contact with both Nemmouche and the Verviers cell.

The second was that the men all had ties to Molenbeek, the deprived district of Brussels that has been a constant feature in terrorism investigations. This district—an impoverished area rife with unemployment and heavily populated by immigrants—has come up time and again in ISIS-linked terror activities. Ayoub el-Khazzani, who tried to gun down passengers on a train destined for Paris last August, stayed in Molenbeek. Police launched a major raid there after the Paris attacks last November, since many of the perpetrators lived there. Salah Abdeslam, one of the plotters involved in that attack, was arrested after a raid in Molenbeek just days ago.

Abaaoud was killed last November in a raid in Paris. Yet the problems in Molenbeek go way beyond those posed by ISIS and speak to a broader European problem of multiculturalism and effectively integrating newcomers. At a time when Europe is taking in more than a million refugees and economic migrants a year, solving the problem cannot be treated urgently enough. It is a problem that may take generations to resolve.

In the short-term, then, the priority is to get a fix on the size of ISIS’ European network. The group has been allowed to lay down roots in multiple cities. ISIS, or groups and individuals inspired by it, has now struck in France on multiple occasions, and in Belgium and Denmark. Plots have been thwarted in Austria, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Intelligence agencies have had many successes after 9/11, but the number of attacks getting through is quickly increasing; another successful ISIS attack is almost inevitable. Yet all that European leaders can offer so far are regurgitations of the need for greater EU intelligence sharing.

ISIS has made a bet that Europe’s problems—concerns over the integration of Muslim populations throughout the continent, a lack of clear national identity, open borders, and an overwhelmed security apparatus—run very, very deep. It is wagering that the situation there will become so desperate that it can wage a war for the souls of European Muslims, presenting them with a binary choice of apostasy or support for their Caliphate. It is a bet they will surely lose. Yet the bloodshed that will take place on the way should make us fear what lies ahead for Europe in the years to come.

Assad has North Korean Troops in Syria

Posted on March 23, 2016March 23, 2016 by Denise Simon

Primer for consideration:

North Korea’s Next Missile Test Could Kill

Chang/DailyBeast: Firing back with ‘unprecedented’ provocations against joint South Korean and American annual military exercises, Kim Jung Un could make a dangerously wrong move.

On Monday, North Korea fired five short-range missiles eastward. The projectiles fell into the Sea of Japan, what Koreans call the East Sea. The provocation followed Friday’s launch of two Nodong medium-range missiles, which can put a dent anywhere in South Korea and parts of Japan.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has launched 15 projectiles on four separate occasions since early last month in apparent shows of anger.

Friday’s and Monday’s belligerent acts follow a series of threats to kill all the residents of Manhattan and launch “preemptive and offensive” nuclear strikes. The regime has also taken the unprecedented step of releasing photographs of leader Kim Jong Un standing next to what it implied is a thermonuclear device. Full article here.

North Korea troops fighting in Syrian civil war, delegate says
Asaad Al-Zoubi said “fatally dangerous” North Korean soldiers are fighting on behalf of President Bashar al-Assad.

GENEVA, Switzerland, March 22 (UPI) — Two North Korean military units are fighting on behalf of President Bashar al-Assad in the Syria conflict.

Asaad Al-Zoubi, the head of the Syrian opposition’s High Negotiations Committee delegation, told Russian news agency TASS that North Koreans have committed troops to the civil war.

According to Al-Zoubi, the two units are called Chalma-1 and Chalma-2.

The Syrian delegate provided the information as he attended Syria peace talks at the United Nations European headquarters in Geneva.

Al-Zoubi added there are fighters from Iran and Afghanistan fighting on behalf of Assad.

Russia’s Sputnik International also confirmed the Syrian representative’s statement on North Korean soldiers in the Middle East, and quoted Al-Zoubi as saying the “North Korean troops are fatally dangerous” during an explanation of the presence of foreign troops in the Syrian civil war.

The civil war has continued for five years, and the opposition and the Assad regime are at odds regarding the details of a peace negotiation.

But Pyongyang maintains friendly ties with the dictatorship in Damascus, and Russia has supported Assad’s rule.

North Korea’s presence in the Middle East conflict is unprecedented, but the two countries have cultivated military ties for many years.

North Korea has been a staunch ally of the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad, opposed by the Islamic State, and Pyongyang helped Syria build a nuclear facility destroyed by an Israeli air raid in 2007.

Last September Syria dedicated a park to former North Korean leader Kim Il Sung.

****** 2013:

38North: When Kim Jong Un assumed power two years ago, foreign observers predicted North Korea would cut its losses short and disengage from Syria in the wake of the overthrow of friendly regimes in Algeria, Egypt and Libya. But this proved to be wishful thinking. On the contrary, Kim Jong Un got off the fence and has joined the Assad government to actively fight against the anti-government rebels in Syria, many of whom are affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Indeed, the DPRK says it is its duty to help a legitimate sovereign government in the fight against international terrorism in Syria.

Careful reading of the DPRK Foreign Ministry’s latest tepid and contorted denial[1] of the persistent rumors that Pyongyang supplies weapons to Syria or flies pilots in anti-rebel air raids suggests that North Korean arms and military advisors may indeed be engaged on the battlefields of the Syrian civil war but not necessarily in the exact manner alleged by the rebels and Western media. Pyongyang is known for its penchant to split hairs: it knows the facts, and even if the rumors come close to the reality, but do not exactly match it, Pyongyang will hit back hard. The fact that it hasn’t suggests that indeed there is fire where there is smoke.

Why Did Kim Jong Un Come to Assad’s Rescue?

In 2013, North Korea’s young leader stepped up military support for his country’s long-time strategic partner, the Assad regime, in the nationwide civil war against the radical Sunni rebels backed by the Western liberal democracies in alliance with conservative Gulf monarchies. Why is North Korea fighting for Assad?

The well-entrenched Kim family came to the rescue of the faltering Assad family, exporting its trademark anti-American “revolutionary spirit of the offensive,” for four reasons. First, birds of a feather flock together. Both countries are former Soviet client states that lost their patron after the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s. The collapse resulted in the loss of the strategic support that the Soviets had provided them, forcing Pyongyang and Damascus to abandon the dream of “strategic parity” with Seoul and Tel Aviv, respectively, and to adopt a new formula of “strategic deterrence,” vis-a-vis the ROK and Israel, as well as their allies and like-minded countries. In that context, both face an acute security dilemma in their respective neighborhood since they are also divided countries fighting to force out foreign troops that occupy what they believe are their homelands, namely the U.S. forces in the southern half of the Korean peninsula and Israeli troops in the Golan Heights. Finally, both have also been branded as “rogue states” and are isolated in the international community. The United States considers them as “states sponsoring international terrorism” and engaged in “nuclear proliferation” and, therefore, has imposed broad-ranging political and economic sanctions on both countries.

In that context, Pyongyang and Damascus have similar worldviews as part of the anti-US, anti-imperialist united front. Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) Chairman Choe Tae Bok once said: “The unity of our two peoples fighting in the same trench against the common enemy is everlasting, though Syria and Korea are geographically far away from each other. Our bilateral relations of friendship and cooperation will grow stronger and stronger.”[2] When the DPRK’s nominal head of state Kim Yong Nam met with the Syrian Prime Minister Wael Nader Al Halqi in Tehran in August 2013, the latter said that “Syria regards the DPRK as a military power with tremendous military force and a country of comrades-in-arms struggling against the common enemy.”[3]

This close political relationship is reflected in a number of ways. Neither country has been willing to normalize relations with the other’s enemies. The DPRK rejected Israeli overtures in the early 1990s[4] seeking to establish diplomatic relations,[5] despite Israeli promises to pay considerable compensation (up to USD 500 million) if Pyongyang were to abandon Syria and terminate its missile sales to the Middle East.[6] Similarly, Syria rejected past ROK attempts to normalize relations, unlike the former Soviet Union and China, despite its growing trade and investment links with Seoul.[7] Pyongyang and Damascus also support each other in the United Nations and other international organizations. For example, upon cues from Damascus, Pyongyang denounces US proposals for the Middle East peace process, Lebanon situation, Palestinian problem, and Arab-Israeli settlement.[8] In turn, Syria supports the DPRK’s positions in various talks on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and inter-Korea reconciliation.[9]

State-to-state and party-to-party ties are well developed and based on extensive institutional links and personal affinities. Since the beginning of this year alone, Kim Jong Un has exchanged personal letters with Bashar Al-Assad on ten different occasions—more than with any other foreign leader, including Chinese. Many senior DPRK leaders have either visited Syria over the past two decades or worked closely with its government.[10] For instance, Kim Yong Nam traveled to Syria as President of the SPA Presidium in July 2002 and June 2000, and as Foreign Minister in July 1992. Former KPA Chief of General Staff hardline general Kim Kyok Sik served as North Korea’s military liaison to Syria in the tumultuous 1970s, coordinating the North’s military assistance to the Assad regime during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War and post-war rehabilitation of Syrian armed forces in the mid-1970s. He also managed North Korean military sales and military construction projects there for almost a decade. As a result, many North Korean leaders have some personal knowledge of Syria and its leaders, as well as a good understanding of Pyongyang’s stakes in its relationship with Damascus.

Second, in addition to being birds of a feather, geopolitical considerations also push Pyongyang to assist Damascus. As a strategic partner of both Syria and Iran, North Korea may have been contracted by Iran to defend their mutual ally in Damascus. It is also plausible that there may be some DPRK-Syria-Russia connections in the area of military-technical cooperation, probably, in the development of Syrian air defense capabilities. Pyongyang takes full advantage of all-out Russian and Iranian support for Damascus “to defend the frontline of the joint anti-American and anti-imperialist struggle” on the Syrian battlefield without fear of being depicted as a pariah or having to pay diplomatic or political price for its actions.

Third, North Korea’s intervention in Syria’s civil war is aimed at stopping the “hostile forces” and “colored revolutions” they export at the far-flung gates to ensure they will never reach North Korea’s shores. Kim Jong Un allegedly discussed how his government might be able to help the Assad regime fight back against the rebels with a visiting Syrian government delegation on July 24, 2013, when he was accompanied by party secretaries Kim Ki Nam (ideology) and Kim Yang Gon (South Korea), and first vice-foreign minister Kim Gye Gwan, the regime’s heavyweights known for their concern about the possible impact of the Arab Spring on the North.[11] The North’s official mouthpiece, Rodong Sinmun, often discusses “the reactionary ideology and culture of imperialists that can be as effective as military capability in realizing their hegemonic ambition,” stressing that “the youth is the main target of the imperialists’ offensive” because “young people played a large role in bringing about “Egyptian-style change,” “Libyan-style victory,” and “Syrian calamity.”

Kim Jong Un holds talks with the high-ranking visiting delegation of Syrian Arab Republic in Pyongyang, on July 24, 2013. (Photo: Rodong Sinmun, July 25, 2013)

Pyongyang may also seek to divert Washington’s attention and resources away from the Korean peninsula by waging a proxy war against the United States and its allies in Syria. The North Korean leadership is not ignorant or naive. It does understand that if the US gets sucked into another war in the Middle East during “sequestration,” not only will it undermine the short-to-mid-term credibility of its defense commitment to South Korea, but it will also buy time for Pyongyang to further build up its own nuclear arsenal and advance its war preparations against the South.

Fourth, while not a military alliance based on legally binding mutual defense obligations, North Korea and Syria have a long history of extensive bilateral military-to-military ties based on their close political relationship. These ties include:

Fraternal assistance in several Middle Eastern wars: Since Israel joined the UN coalition troops fighting in the Korean War, the DPRK government has never considered it inappropriate or unwise to send troops to aid the Syrian government in the Arab-Israeli wars in the Middle East. For instance, the DPRK sent 25 pilots to Syria to defend the air space over Damascus during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967.[12] In 1970, the DPRK dispatched 200 tank crewmen, 53 pilots, and 140 missile technicians to Syria. During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the DPRK dispatched 30 pilots to Egypt and Syria, who provided training for Syrian pilots to fight against Israel.[13] Moreover, the North Korean Air Force pilots themselves flew the Soviet-made Egyptian and Syrian airplanes during some key air battles. In 1975 and 1976, Pyongyang sent 75 Air Force instructors and 40 MIG pilots to Damascus, respectively. In 1982, during the Lebanese civil war, the DPRK government dispatched SOF (special operations forces) servicemen to Syria to provide training for guerrilla operations, some killed by the Israeli military. In 1984-1986 and 1990, 50 and 30 North Korean military instructors were sent to Syria, respectively.
Military Education and Training: In the mid-1980s, Kim Jong Il approved the request of the Syrian government for its military officers’ to be educated and trained at DPRK military educational institutions at the expense of North Korea. Since then, the North Korean military has been training Syrian military officers at the Kim Il Sung Military University (an analogue of US National Defense University). Officers at the colonel rank usually participate in the one-year high-level officers’ course. Syrian officers at the captain rank are also admitted to the four-year course. They are taught military strategy, operational art, and military tactics, including guerrilla operations. Kim Jong Il is said to have followed with interest the successful careers of the Syrian general officers who graduated from the university.
Foreign military sales: Beginning in the late 1970s through the 1980s, the DPRK supplied Syria with various conventional weapons such as rifles, guns, mortars, ammunition, bombs, armored vehicles, anti-tank missiles, radars, and even military uniforms. In particular, in 1978, the DPRK sold 300 recoilless guns to Syria. In 1982, when the civil war broke out in Syria, the Syrian military killed 20,000 civilians by firing “BM-11, 122mm MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System),” the weapon system imported from the DPRK. The Israel military snatched the notorious “BM-11” from Syria during the Lebanon war in 1982, killing 25 KPA soldiers who serviced it. In 1992, Pyongyang shipped 20 tons of bombs to Damascus.
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Delivery Systems: There is evidence to suggest that North Korea provided technical assistance to Syria in acquiring key nuclear-related technologies in China and Europe as well as in constructing a covert nuclear reactor at Al Kibar that was bombed by the Israeli Air Force in 2007. On ballistic missiles, cooperation began in the late 1980s, with the North selling Scud-C transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and cluster warheads to Syria, helping to construct two missile assembly plants in Hama and an electronic missile launch control facility near Aleppo and providing special training for Syrian missile technicians in North Korea. Aside from strengthening the self-defense potential of one of its anti-imperialist, anti-US allies, the North has earned good money doing it.[14] On chemical weapons, there is only limited evidence of cooperation, including the interception of DPRK ships heading for Syria carrying cargos that might be useful in defending against chemical attacks. There has also been speculation that the explosion on July 20, 2007, at a facility near the city of Halab was the result of an attempt by North Korean scientists working with Syrian officials to load a chemical warhead onto one of the North Korean missiles, likely the No-dong 1 model. On biological weapons, there is information about bilateral cooperation between the Ministries of Public Health, pharmaceutical companies, and university biotech research labs but little on weapons cooperation. Still, some observers have asserted that “Syria has a biological weapons research and development program, and it is seeking professional assistance from China and North Korea in this area.”[15]

The Syrian conflict provides the North Korean military with an opportunity to gain valuable “real world” experience. Reportedly, North Korean advisors provide technical assistance to Syria’s defense industry, especially factories southeast of Aleppo, in addition to engineering and construction assistance in repairing and rehabilitating destroyed military infrastructure. The KPA is also involved in operational planning and supervision of artillery warfare as demonstrated by the battle for Qusair.[16] The North Korean military advisors are probably involved in planning and execution of the air and air defense operations of the Syrian army as well as collecting battlefield intelligence on the combat use and performance of Western arms, especially those that can potentially be used in the Korean battlefield. Finally, the Syrian civil war offers the North Korean military planners the first-hand look at the combat tactics of anti-regime rebels trained and guided by the US and its allies. And for good measure, there is no doubt that North Korean military advisors are also tasked with erasing any traces of Pyongyang’s past assistance to Assad’s programs to build weapons of mass destruction just in case he does lose power.

The Bottom Line

Given the history of DPRK-Syrian relations, despite what the North might say in public, it would be surprising if the North had not dispatched a small contingent of military advisors and instructors to aid the brotherly Assad regime in its fight against the anti-government rebels. Although that assistance is probably limited and does not have the potential to fundamentally change the course of the civil war, North Korean military expertise can affect the outcomes of local tactical battles, adding to the winning momentum of the Assad forces. Moreover, North Korea’s involvement in Syria may be an indicator that the Kim regime discounts the likelihood of any possible breakthrough in relations with either Washington or Seoul in the near future and views the risk that its national policy goals will be adversely affected by increasing support for the Assad regime as manageable.

Pyongyang’s involvement in Syria characterizes Kim Jong Un more as a steady hand and traditional alliance manager than an erratic wanderer and opportunistic risk-taker. Although he is playing with fire in the shifting sands of far-flung lands like Syria, but he is simply staying the course set forth by his grandfather and upheld by his father, demonstrating continuity in North Korea’s foreign policy. Moreover, potential material and reputational rewards far outweigh possible security or diplomatic risks, especially if Kim’s bet on Assad’s eventual victory proves to be correct. The DPRK’s decision to cast its lot with Damascus may upset wealthy Gulf monarchies—like Kuwait and Qatar—sponsoring the anti-Assad rebel groups and cause them to rethink their employment of North Korean labor and services in construction and irrigation system development projects and their provision of low-interest funds for some of Pyongyang’s infrastructure projects.[17] On the other hand, it may help Pyongyang earn much greater financial or in-kind compensation from other states concerned, including Iran, Russia, and others, and develop new diplomatic clout in the Middle East if Assad eventually wins. Pyongyang’s support for Syria may provoke Jihadist elements to strike back, but it is more likely that the KPA will gain valuable combat experience against the new age enemy—irregular anti-government militia fighting in a suburban setting. Finally, North Korea’s support for Syria may provide new fodder for others to further demonize Pyongyang but it also offers the North a chance to stand by a long-time ally in need, to show its resolve to fight for state sovereignty and territorial integrity on the world stage, and to prove with deeds it is fighting against Al Qaeda and international terrorism, even when it might be more expedient to do otherwise.

He is Back in the Fight and a Leader

Posted on March 23, 2016March 23, 2016 by Denise Simon

Just a reminder:

Freed Guantánamo convict returns to the fight

Ibrahim al Qosi pleaded guilty to war crimes in exchange for certain release

U.S. Air Force delivered him to Khartoum in 2012; he’s in Yemen now

U.S. officials won’t confirm recidivist case, which comes as Pentagon weighs more Guantánamo releases

GUANTANAMO BAY NAVY BASE, Cuba

MiamiHerald: A former Guantánamo detainee who was released to Sudan after a war court guilty plea has emerged in a key position in Al-Qaida of the Arabian Peninsula, according to an expert on jihadist movements.

“He’s clearly a religious leader in the group,” said Aaron Zelin, senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy who edits the Jihadology blog. He found Guantánamo 2002-12 detainee Ibrahim al Qosi — his photo and his biography — on the latest video release from the offshoot of Osama bin Laden’s organization, “Guardians of Shariah.”

Guantánamo captive Ibrahim al Qosi shown in a prison camp recreation yard in an undated photo released by the Department of Defense.

Obama administration officials did not confirm or deny the apparent case of recidivism, which was first reported on the Long War Journal website Wednesday.

The video included Qosi’s biography and said he joined the jihad in Yemen in December 2014. It also said he was close to bin Laden “until he was imprisoned in Guantánamo in 2001.” Qosi, now 55, arrived at the detention center on Jan. 13, 2002, according to documents obtained by McClatchy Newspapers from the anti-secrecy group WikiLeaks. He pleaded guilty to foot soldier war crimes in 2010 in exchange for release in 2012.

Qosi’s former U.S. attorney, Paul Reichler, told the Miami Herald on Wednesday that he had not been in touch with the Sudanese man since Qosi left the U.S. Navy base prison for Sudan in July 2012.

“I was told by a Sudanese lawyer a year ago that al Qosi was working as a taxi driver in Khartoum,” Reichler said by email. “I have received no information about his activities since then, and I do not know what he has been doing, or where he is living.”

At the time of Qosi’s return to Sudan, Reichler said he looked forward to being reunited with his wife and family, including two daughters, “and live among them in peace, quiet and freedom.” His wife at the time was the daughter of a former chief bodyguard to bin Laden.

On the AQAP tape, Qosi opines in Arabic on the evolving globalization of jihad. His comments were translated for the Herald by a journalist who is fluent in Arabic.

“As the U.S. has waged war on us remotely as a solution to minimize its casualties, we have fought it remotely, as well by individual jihad,” he is heard saying. “And as the U.S. has killed our men, we have killed its people. But it is not the same. Our dead are in heaven and theirs are in the hellfire, and the war is not over yet.”

Qosi, an accountant, kept the books for a bin Laden business in Khartoum in the early ’90s, according to Pentagon documents made public by WikiLeaks. He then followed bin Laden to Afghanistan in 1996. Because the timeline for war crimes only covers the era in Afghanistan, Qosi pleaded guilty to foot-soldier crimes — sometimes driving for bin Laden, working at al-Qaida’s Star of Jihad compound in Jalalabad, and fleeing the post-Sept. 11 U.S. invasion to Tora Bora, armed with an AK-47 rifle.

The AQAP video biography mirrors much of that noting, “he participated in the famous battle of Tora Bora” with bin Laden “until the withdrawal.”

Qosi was also one of the first at Guantánamo to formally allege torture — the use of strobe lights, sleep deprivation, sexual humiliation, being wrapped in the Israeli flag — in an unlawful detention petition his Air Force attorney filed in federal court in 2004. It was never heard. Instead, he withdrew the habeas corpus suit as part of his 2010 plea agreement.

The disclosure comes at a complicated time: As Secretary of Defense Ash Carter is considering the release to repatriation or resettlement of as many as 17 detainees who have been cleared for transfer. Qosi got out on the war court guilty plea that saw him spend his last two years at the prison Convict’s Corridor separated from the majority of the detainee population.

Pentagon statement

“We take any incidence of re-engagement very seriously, but we don’t comment on specific cases. More than 90 percent of the detainees transferred under this Administration are neither confirmed nor suspected by the Intelligence Community of re-engagement. We work in close coordination through military, intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomatic channels to mitigate re-engagement and to take follow-on action when necessary.” — Navy Cmdr. Gary Ross

Additional reading

Click this, to read about the captive’s 2012 release from Guantánamo.

Meanwhile, Back in Cuba

Posted on March 22, 2016March 22, 2016 by Denise Simon

BREAKING: Group of FARC rebels including top leader was at Cuba-U.S. baseball game attended by Obama: FARC negotiator.

A contingent of 40 members of Colombia’s FARC rebels including their leader Rodrigo Londono were at a baseball game in Havana on Tuesday that was also attended by U.S. President Barack Obama at the end of his historic trip to the Communist-led island.

FARC negotiator Pastor Alape confirmed their attendance and said the game between the Tampa Bay Rays and a Cuban team was a “symbol of peace.” A Reuters witness also spotted the rebels there.

The representatives of the Marxist-led Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia are in Cuba for peace talks with the Colombian government.

U.S. Secretary of John Kerry met on Monday with the FARC negotiators and the team representing the Colombian government at the talks.

INJO: During an occasionally awkward press conference this afternoon in Havana, Cuban President Raoul Castro was flummoxed by questions about human rights.

Asked by CNN’s Jim Acosta why Cuba has political prisoners, Castro appeared indignant:

“Give me a list and I’ll release them,” said Castro, adding, “If we have those political prisoners they will be released before tonight ends.”

Many journalists and human rights’ advocates quickly tweeted lists of dozens of prisoner names.

Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation says it has a list of “Forgotten 51” political prisoners in Cuba. pic.twitter.com/xv0B4aY0gz

Later in the press conference, which took place after President Obama met privately with Castro to discuss matters, such as human rights, NBC News’ Andrea Mitchell again took a stab at getting Castro to talk about dissidents.

Castro deflected, pointing instead to issues he feels his country does well, like healthcare and education and equal pay—claiming those were more important than human rights.

He argued that not only does he not know of any political prisoners, he didn’t like the idea that an American journalist would broach the topic:

“It’s not right to ask me about political prisoners in general, please give me the name of a political prisoner.”

Shortly thereafter, the press conference came to an end, with this awkward misstep. Castro went for the hand-hold; Obama went for the the back slap.

ChicagoTribune in part: Capping his remarkable visit to Cuba, President Barack Obama on Tuesday declared an end to the “last remnant of the Cold War in the Americas” and openly urged the Cuban people to pursue a more democratic future for this communist nation 90 miles from Miami.

With Cuban President Raul Castro watching from a balcony, Obama said the government should not fear citizens who speak freely and vote for their own leaders. And with Cubans watching on tightly controlled state television, Obama said they would be the ones to determine their country’s future, not the United States.

“Many suggested that I come here and ask the people of Cuba to tear something down,” Obama said. “But I’m appealing to the young people of Cuba who will lift something up, build something new.”

On the streets of Havana, the president’s address sparked extraordinarily rare public discussions about democracy, and some anger with Cuba’s leaders. Cubans are used to complaining bitterly about economic matters but rarely speak publicly about any desire for political change, particularly in conversations with foreign journalists.

Documents: The Long Methodical Game of AQ

Posted on March 18, 2016March 18, 2016 by Denise Simon

No so much contained or decimated as Barack Obama claims regarding al Qaeda. So much recent attention has been applied to Islamic State, few give any deliberation to al Qaeda and associated terror groups globally.

Osama bin Laden’s ‘Bookshelf’ Reveals al Qaeda’s Long Game Captured documents released by the U.S. reveal the extent of al Qaeda’s strategy, which may include negotiated ‘truces’ in Syria

Gartenstein-Ross: When 113 new documents recovered in 2011 during the fatal raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, became publicly available earlier this month, perhaps the most noteworthy insight they offered was the extent of the strategic patience, to borrow a phrase from the Obama administration, possessed by al Qaeda.

Along with other captured documents, what the U.S. Director of National Intelligence calls “Bin Laden’s Bookshelf” reveals the cunning long-term planning that characterized the group’s approach at the time of bin Laden’s death, and that continues to guide it today, affecting not least the actions of its affiliate the al Nusra Front in Syria.

The record shows that the United States often has overlooked the extent of al Qaeda’s patient approach, sometimes mistaking its relative quiet for inactivity or collapse, and our failure to understand the group has helped it to gain critical operating space, and even worse, has sometimes caused us to blunder into its traps.

The broad outlines of al Qaeda’s strategy of attrition against the West are, at this point, generally well understood. Al Qaeda’s strategy, as initially formulated by bin Laden, was to wear down the United States militarily, politically, and economically.

This long-term approach contrasts with that of al Qaeda’s louder jihadist spin-off and competitor, the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), which already claims to have reestablished the caliphate. Al Qaeda, on the other hand, sees the United States as the “trunk of the tree,” as bin Laden put it in a letter addressed to the late al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) emir Nasir al-Wuhayshi. Al Qaeda wanted to wait to sever that tree trunk before moving on to the next stages in its campaign, including building an Islamic state, according to that captured document which was declassified in 2012.

The newly released Abbottabad documents show how strategic patience has shaped al Qaeda’s military operations and political activities. The jihadist group has proven willing to make compromises, sacrifice short-term victories, and even develop tactical alliances with adversaries in order to outlast its various foes. At the same time, the group looked for rear bases of support and safe havens where members could train, plan attacks, and prepare for future battles in the region.

Al Qaeda’s approach to the Mauritanian government illustrates this restraint and flexibility. In several newly declassified documents dating from about 2010, al Qaeda officials discussed the possibility of making a truce with Mauritania, in which al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb would refrain from military operations in the country.

What was in it for al Qaeda? The group discussed some demands that it had for Mauritania: the government would allow militants to operate freely in the country, release incarcerated al Qaeda members, and provide al Qaeda 10 to 20 million euros a year, protection money to ensure that al Qaeda didn’t kidnap tourists.

From al Qaeda’s perspective, the rationale for the deal was that it would allow militants to “focus on Algeria,” while placing its “cadres in safe rear bases available in Mauritania,” as now-deceased Ahmed Abdi Godane, emir of the Qaeda affiliated Somali al Shabaab, noted in a letter written in March 2010. It is not clear from the documents whether this offer was actually extended to Mauritania, nor what response al Qaeda received if the offer was made, but al Qaeda’s consideration of this approach attests to the group’s patience, and willingness to grant foes a temporary reprieve if there was an advantage to doing so.

The logic that influenced al Qaeda’s thinking on Mauritania could also be seen in Yemen. An al Qaeda strategy paper noted that the jihadist movement was thriving under the country’s then-president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, whose corruption had created “fertile ground” for jihadism. The author of the paper concluded that the best immediate option for al Qaeda was to allow Saleh to remain in power, rather than working to topple him.

Why was the author so suspicious of “ousting the apostate government and keeping the country in a state of chaos”? After all, chaos typically plays to the advantage of jihadists. The author reasoned that Saleh’s replacement likely would be more aggressive in targeting jihadists. Moreover, even if chaos prevailed, he noted that “we cannot spread our Dawah while there is chaos.” Dawah refers to proselytism: In other words, the author was concerned that the preparatory work for an eventual jihadist takeover in Yemen was not complete at that point.

The author even proposed a truce with Saleh, noting that even a unilateral agreement would allow al Qaeda to focus on the United States. This sentiment was echoed in a letter from bin Laden to Wuhayshi, declassified in 2012, in which al Qaeda’s emir explained that the jihadist movement was in a preparatory stage in Yemen, meaning that “it is not in our interest to rush in bringing down the regime.” (Bin Laden eventually changed his mind on this point, as events on the ground seemed to dictate a more aggressive posture.)

Al Qaeda’s thinking about Mauritania and Yemen is characteristic of the newly released documents. Throughout, the group’s leadership urges caution and occasional tactical cooperation with enemies. In a letter to Abu Ayyub al-Masri, al Qaeda in Iraq’s emir, a senior al Qaeda official warned against carrying out operations in Iran. Iran, he explained, had become al Qaeda’s “main artery for funds, personnel, and communication.” The official similarly advised al-Masri to refrain from striking Turkey and Lebanon, urging him to instead “devote your total resource to the fortification of the nation, and the fight against the crusaders and the apostates.”

These directives show that al Qaeda was preparing for the long haul. The group anticipated and prepared for setbacks, even catastrophic ones. In a letter to Ansar al-Islam, an Iraq-based militant group, a senior al Qaeda official (possibly bin Laden himself) explained that “Iraq is not the end of the road.” He stated that if al Qaeda were defeated in that theater, it would be a “catastrophe,” but nonetheless “we must always prepare ourselves for anything that might happen.”

The official noted that “jihad will continue with us or without us,” revealing an organizational belief that the struggle to reestablish the caliphate would persist long after al Qaeda’s founders had died.

This prediction has proven all too true. Al Qaeda has continued to adapt and thrive since bin Laden’s death, while adhering to its late emir’s methodical approach. The group’s strategy has survived several seismic developments that were widely viewed as the organization’s death knell.

The so-called “Arab Spring” was widely perceived as a mortal blow to al Qaeda, a repudiation of the group’s claim that only violent jihad could sweep away the Middle East’s authoritarian regimes. Instead, al Qaeda celebrated the revolutions. In a newly-released letter to one of bin Laden’s assistants, an al Qaeda official expressed his hope that the uprisings would “spread all over the Muslim homelands, which will accelerate the triumph and unity of all Muslims.”

Al Qaeda prepared itself to succeed in the post-revolution turmoil, using bin Laden’s model of preparation and strategic restraint. Al Qaeda covertly expanded its presence in countries like Libya and Tunisia, using front groups such as Ansar al-Sharia to conduct Da’wah and recruitment activities. Indeed, a previous batch of Abbottabad documents released for a criminal trial show that al Qaeda had established itself in Derna, Benghazi, and elsewhere in Libya even before bin Laden’s death.

In multiple theaters today, including Syria/Iraq and Yemen, al Qaeda has embedded itself in local communities, developing relationships.

After seizing control of the Yemeni port city of al-Mukalla, AQAP set up a group known as the “Sons of Hadramawt,” intended to appear as an indigenous force, and appointed a local council, the Hadhrami Domestic Council, to govern the city.
It has likewise sought to build coalitions in Syria, as evidenced by a secret directive issued in early 2015 by the group’s current emir Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri’s missive instructed Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, to work more closely with other rebel groups, strengthen ties with local communities, build sustainable safe havens, and cease planning for attacks against the West.

Al Qaeda’s strategic flexibility has also been on display in its response to the challenge posed by ISIS, whose emergence was another challenge that many analysts thought would cripple al Qaeda. While ISIS has challenged al Qaeda’s position within the jihadist community, it has also given al Qaeda a long-awaited opportunity to remake its image, which had been tarnished by failed governance experiments in Iraq and Mali, among other places. ISIS has become a convenient foil for al Qaeda in its efforts to gain greater operating space.

Time and again, al Qaeda has been able to mitigate setbacks, or even turn them to its advantage. The group’s vision of a multi-generational jihadist struggle has enabled it to think and act strategically, pursuing long-term objectives while passing up ephemeral or unsustainable victories.

Al Qaeda’s ability to think and plan for the long term stands in contrast with both ISIS and also the U.S. government. Election cycles, budgetary uncertainty, and inter-agency squabbles impede strategic thinking in the fight against al Qaeda. As we continue to overlook al Qaeda’s forward-looking approach, we underestimate the group and fall into its traps. At a time when al Qaeda is quietly gaining ground across the Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa, and benefiting from the international community’s myopic focus on the Islamic State, it is more important than ever that we fully appreciate al Qaeda’s long-term planning.