Category Archives: History

IAEA not Allowed to Inspect Iran Sites per Moscow

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But Obama and Kerry told us they could….is there more than one version of the JCOA?

As the Trump administration calls for stricter monitoring of the Iranian nuclear agreement, officials in Iran insist they are complying with its terms and will not allow international inspectors into military sites.

Iran, which agreed in 2015 to grant inspectors broad access to nuclear-related facilities in exchange for the removal of severe economic sanctions, accuses President Trump of trying to sabotage what he has called the United States’ “worst deal.”

Trump has argued that Iran is violating the agreement struck under President Obama, although he has offered no evidence to support his claim and his administration has twice certified to Congress that Iran is in compliance.

But Trump administration officials looking for a way to increase pressure on Iran have begun to zero in on military facilities that they say could be used for nuclear-related activities barred under the agreement.

The IAEA, in its most recent report in June, said Iran was meeting its obligations under the pact. Experts say inspectors rely on intelligence reports and other information to determine whether sites they have not visited are being used for potentially illicit purposes. More here.

*** What about those snapback sanctions Obama told us about? The NYT’s wrote that the snapback sanctions were easy. What is the response of those American lobby groups that Obama hired on behalf of the Iran deal.

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***

Map of Iran's nuclear sites photo and more on each location courtesy of BBC

Inspectors with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations organization tasked with monitoring Iran’s nuclear facilities, have not requested access to military sites since the agreement went into effect, according to experts monitoring the process.

The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister refers to Section T – while ignoring that, as the Former Deputy Director General of the IAEA, Olli Heinonen notes, the IAEA has the authority under UN Security Council resolution 2231 to request access to sites and equipment associated with Section T.

This resolution “requests the Director General of the IAEA
to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s
nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under
the JCPOA.” In addition, the resolution states: “The International Atomic
Energy Agency will be requested to monitor and verify the voluntary
nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA.”
An excerpt from his article follows the TASS item.]

Fuss around IAEA inspections of Iranian military facilities contrived –
Russian diplomat
If the other participants are eager to discuss the issue, Moscow “will be
ready to discuss it” presenting its stance, Sergei Ryabkov said
Russian Politics & Diplomacy
October 22, 0:10 UTC+3
http://tass.com/politics/971962

 

MOSCOW, October 22. /TASS/. Certain countries substitute notions in talks on
expanding inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at
the Iranian military facilities creating contrived fuss around the issue.
However, Russia says that the IAEA is not authorized to carry out such
inspections, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told TASS on
Saturday.

“I would like to say absolutely clear and directly that acquiring some false
topicality the theme of the IAEA work on Section T (about Iran’s military
facilities – TASS) of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) over
the Iran nuclear program has no topicality for us although it is a talking
point now,” he said.

In particular, Moscow says that the IAEA “has not been authorized to carry
out such inspections and cannot be tasked because Section T highlights the
issues out of the agency’s competence,” Ryabkov said.

“Nevertheless, we can hear another thing. As in the issue of the Iran
missile program, some of our counterparts prefer to call black white and
vice versa,” the high-ranking diplomat said. “We cannot get them to
understand this evident logic and obvious truth.”

“Since they are insisting, we say if you cannot do without discussions on
the theme, it should be raised at the Joint Commission when the next session
is convened,” Ryabkov said.

If the other participants are eager to discuss the issue, Moscow “will be
ready to discuss it” presenting its stance, he said.

JPCOA and US

On July 14, 2015, Iran and six international mediators (the United Kingdom,
Germany, China, Russia, the United States, and France) reached a deal on
Iran’s nuclear program. On January 16, 2016, the parties to the deal
announced beginning of its implementation. Under the deal, Iran undertakes
to curb its nuclear activities and place them under total control of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in exchange of abandonment of the
sanctions imposed previously by the United Nations Security Council, the
European Union and the United States over its nuclear program.

Last week, US President Donald Trump announced Washington’s new strategy
against Teheran. Thus, it says that the United States will seek to offset
Iran’s destabilizing influence and will call on the international community
to get consolidated for exerting pressure on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard (IRGC, Iran’s most powerful security and military organization). Apart
from that, the US blacklisted the IRGC as an organization supporting
terrorism. Donald Trump refused to confirm Iran observed the agreement on
the nuclear program and promised changes to the document.
========================
Verifying Section T of the Iran Nuclear Deal: Iranian Military Site Access
Essential to JCPOA Section T Verification
by David Albright and Olli Heinonen
August 31, 2017
http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/verifying-section-t-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal
…
The IAEA has the authority under UN Security Council resolution 2231 to
request access to sites and equipment associated with Section T. This
resolution “requests the Director General of the IAEA to undertake the
necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments
for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA.” In addition,
the resolution states: “The International Atomic Energy Agency will be
requested to monitor and verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as
detailed in this JCPOA.”
…
Recommendations

 

The United States should assemble, if it has not already done so, its own
lists of equipment and locations relevant to Section T. It should also
prepare lists suitable for sharing with the IAEA or Joint Commission.
Similarly, U.S. allies should share relevant information with the IAEA. If
it has not done so, the IAEA should create a baseline of Section T
activities and equipment.

The United States and its allies should press the IAEA to develop and
establish an effective, credible verification regime under Section T that
includes requests to access military sites. The United States and the EU3
should also raise Section T and the likely need for approvals of such
equipment and activities by Iran at the next Joint Commission meeting.
Toward that goal, Iran should declare to the IAEA its sites and equipment
subject to Section T verification and approvals.
========
Olli Heinonen is Former Deputy Director General of the IAEA and head of its
Department of Safeguards. He is a Senior Advisor on Science and
Nonproliferation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Trump Sanctions IRGC, Iran’s Terror History

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For a list of sanctions placed on Iran, Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, go here.

Today, President Trump delivered his talk about formally decertifying the JCPOA and naming all of the IRGC a terror organization, finally. This is a significant decision and it puts countries like Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon on notice to purge all IRGC from their territories.

Earlier this week, the Trump administration was laying the groundwork as it related to Hezbollah by offering a reward for 2 Hezbollah leaders.

None of these actions are without future conflict and militancy by Iran. Just in recent days, the Iranian militia in Iraq it appears has been planting advanced EFP’s, where one did in fact kill an American military soldier that was on a major road in Salahuddin province, north of Baghdad

“It was a classic ambush spot,” White said of the assault site, adding that the penetrator used was steel. Operation Inherent Resolve spokesman Army Col. Ryan Dillon did not cast blame on any particular actor on the battlefield telling the Washington Post, “investigations are continuing into the type and quality of the bomb to better determine where it originated. To say whether or not ISIS did it or not — we have not determined that yet. We are not ruling anything out.”

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford told Congress in 2015, “I know the total number of soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines that were killed by Iranian activities, and the number has been recently quoted as about 500,” in a reference to EFP use in Iraq.

“What makes E.F.P.’s so deadly is that they form “slugs” at detonation that maintain their shape over distances of over 100 yards or more, traveling at speeds of nearly a mile per second. This allowed insurgent forces to hide these weapons far from the road, better camouflaging them and making them far more deadly,” The New York Times explained in 2013. More here.

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Related reading: Trump Decertifying and Re-tooling Iran Nuclear Deal

Treasury Designates the IRGC under Terrorism Authority and Targets IRGC and Military Supporters under Counter-Proliferation Authority

10/13/2017

​

WASHINGTON – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) pursuant to the global terrorism Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 and consistent with the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.  OFAC designated the IRGC today for its activities in support of the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), which was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 25, 2007, for providing support to a number of terrorist groups, including Hizballah and Hamas, as well as to the Taliban.  The IRGC has provided material support to the IRGC-QF, including by providing training, personnel, and military equipment.
Additionally, today OFAC designated four entities under E.O. 13382, which targets weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters, for their support to the IRGC or Iran’s military.
“The IRGC has played a central role to Iran becoming the world’s foremost state sponsor of terror.  Iran’s pursuit of power comes at the cost of regional stability, and Treasury will continue using its authorities to disrupt the IRGC’s destructive activities,” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin.  “We are designating the IRGC for providing support to the IRGC-QF, the key Iranian entity enabling Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s relentless campaign of brutal violence against his own people, as well as the lethal activities of Hizballah, Hamas, and other terrorist groups. We urge the private sector to recognize that the IRGC permeates much of the Iranian economy, and those who transact with IRGC-controlled companies do so at great risk.”
IRGC
The IRGC was designated today for the activities it undertakes to assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF.  The IRGC, which is the parent organization of the IRGC-QF, was previously designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on October 25, 2007, in connection with its support to Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs, and pursuant to E.O. 13553 on June 9, 2011 and E.O. 13606 on April 23, 2012, in connection with Iran’s human rights abuses.
The IRGC has provided material support to the IRGC-QF, including by providing training, personnel, and military equipment.  The IRGC has trained IRGC-QF personnel in Iran prior to their deployments to Syria, and has deployed at least hundreds of personnel from its conventional ground forces to Syria to support IRGC-QF operations.  IRGC personnel in Syria have provided military assistance to the IRGC-QF, and have been assigned to IRGC-QF units on the battlefield, where they provide critical combat support, including serving as snipers and machine gunners.
Additionally, the IRGC has recruited, trained, and facilitated the travel of Afghan and Pakistani nationals to Syria, where those personnel are assigned to, and fight alongside, the IRGC-QF.  The IRGC also has worked with the IRGC-QF to transfer military equipment to Syria.  The IRGC used both IRGC bases and civilian airports in Iran to transfer military equipment to Iraq and Syria for the IRGC-QF.
Further, while it is group think to bid Senator Corker good riddance, there is yet a fact that Corker introduced in 2015 INARA, legislation that Trump is advancing and included in his talking points regarding Iran.

Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015

(Sec. 2) This bill amends the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to direct the President, within five days after reaching an agreement with Iran regarding Iran’s nuclear program, to transmit to Congress:

  • the text of the agreement and all related materials and annexes;
  • a related verification assessment report of the Secretary of State;
  • a certification that the agreement includes the appropriate terms, conditions, and duration of the agreement’s requirements concerning Iran’s nuclear activities, and provisions describing any sanctions to be waived, suspended, or otherwise reduced by the United States and any other nation or entity, including the United Nations; and
  • a certification that the agreement meets U.S. non-proliferation objectives, does not jeopardize the common defense and security, provides a framework to ensure that Iran’s nuclear activities will not constitute an unreasonable defense and security risk, and ensures that Iran’s permitted nuclear activities will not be used to further any nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive purpose, including any related research.

The Secretary is directed to prepare a report assessing:

  • the Secretary’s capacity to verify Iran’s compliance with the agreement,
  • the adequacy of the agreement’s safeguards to ensure that Iran’s permitted activities will not be used to further any nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive purpose, including research; and
  • the International Atomic Energy Agency’s capacity to implement the required verification regime.

In preparing a report the Secretary shall assume that Iran could:

  • use all measures not expressly prohibited by the agreement to conceal activities that violate its obligations under the agreement; and
  • alter or deviate from standard practices in order to impede verification efforts.

The foreign relations committees shall hold hearings and briefings to review an agreement during the 30-day period following the President’s transmittal of such agreement.

The congressional review period shall be 60 days for an agreement, including all materials required to be transmitted to Congress, that is transmitted between July 10, 2015, and September 7, 2015.

The President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran or refrain from applying sanctions pursuant to an agreement prior to and during the transmission period and during the congressional review period.

The President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran or refrain from applying sanctions pursuant to an agreement for:

  • 12 days after the date of passage of a congressional joint resolution of disapproval, and
  • 10 days after the date of a presidential veto of a congressional joint resolution of disapproval.

Specified deferrals, waivers, or other suspensions of statutory sanctions are excepted from such prohibitions.

It is the sense of Congress that:

  • the sanctions regime imposed on Iran by Congress is primarily responsible for bringing Iran to the table to negotiate on its nuclear program;
  • these negotiations are a critically important matter of national security and foreign policy for the United States and its closest allies;
  • this Act does not require a vote by Congress for the agreement to commence;
  • this Act provides for congressional review, including for approval, disapproval, or no action on statutory sanctions relief under an agreement; and
  • even though the agreement may commence, because the sanctions regime was imposed by Congress and only Congress can permanently modify or eliminate that regime, it is critically important that Congress have the opportunity to consider and take action affecting the statutory sanctions regime.

An action involving statutory sanctions relief by the United States pursuant to an agreement or the Joint Plan of Action:

  • may be taken if, during the review period, Congress enacts a joint resolution stating that Congress favors the agreement;
  • may not be taken if, during the review period, Congress enacts a joint resolution stating that Congress does not favor the agreement; or
  • may be taken if, following the review period, there is not enacted any such joint resolution.

The President shall keep Congress fully and currently informed of all aspects of Iranian compliance with respect to an agreement.

The President shall:

  • within 10 days of receiving information relating to a potentially significant breach or compliance incident by Iran submit it to Congress;
  • within 30 days after submitting such information determine whether it constitutes a material breach or compliance incident and report that determination to Congress as well as Iran’s action or failure to act that led to the material breach, actions necessary for Iran to cure the breach, and the status of Iran’s efforts to cure the breach; and
  • at least every 180 days thereafter report to Congress on Iran’s nuclear program and compliance with the agreement.

The President shall keep Congress fully informed of any initiative or negotiations with Iran concerning Iran’s nuclear program, including any new or amended agreement.

The President shall, at least every 90 days, determine whether the President is able to certify that:

  • Iran is fully implementing the agreement,
  • Iran has not committed a material breach of the agreement,
  • Iran has not taken any action that could significantly advance its nuclear weapons program, and
  • suspension of sanctions against Iran is appropriate and proportionate to measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program and vital to U.S. national security interests.

It is the sense of Congress that:

  • U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under an agreement;
  • issues not addressed by an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, including compensation for Americans held in captivity after the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran, in 1979, the freedom of Americans held in Iran, the human rights abuses of the government of Iran against its own people, and the continued support of terrorism by the government of Iran, are matters critical to ensure justice and U.S. national security, and should be addressed;
  • the President should determine the agreement in no way compromises the U.S. commitment to Israel’s security, nor its support for Israel’s right to exist; and
  • in order to implement any long-term agreement reached between the P5+1 countries and Iran, it is critically important that Congress have the opportunity to review any agreement and take action to modify the statutory sanctions regime imposed by Congress.

If the President does not submit such certification or has determined that Iran has materially breached an agreement, Congress may initiate within 60 days expedited consideration of legislation reinstating statutory sanctions against Iran. Sets forth House and Senate provisions regarding such expedited consideration.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed as:

  • modifying the President’s authority to negotiate, enter into, or implement executive agreements, other than the restrictions on implementation of the agreements specifically covered by this Act;
  • allowing any new waiver, suspension, reduction, or other relief from statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision of law, or allowing the President to refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement during the period for congressional review;
  • revoking or terminating any statutory sanctions imposed on Iran; or
  • authorizing the use of military force against Iran.

U.S. to Say So Long to UNESCO, Finally, but not UNESCO

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But, the Trump administration is leaving yet one major piece of business undone and that is UNRWA.

This Palestinian refugee claims that even though UNRWA was created in order to help Palestinian refugees, UNRWA hires foreigners and some of them earn wages that are high enough to support 20 local Palestinians: “An UNRWA employee can earn $10,000 per month. Others earn more. They have luxury cars and apartments. Some have villas for free. Meanwhile, local Palestinian teachers hired by UNRWA earn $700 to $800 per month. The people from abroad get 10 times more. The more the refugees suffer, these people live a more luxurious life. I blame them for me being a refugee.”  Read more here.

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To see how much money the United States gives to UNRWA, go here. It is a chart of the top donors as of December 31, 2016. See where that money allegedly goes exactly and why by clicking here.

UNESCO photo

Primer:

Economist: IT MUST have felt like déjà vu for Rami Hamdallah, the Palestinian prime minister, as he crossed the heavily-fortified border into Gaza on October 2nd. It was his first visit in two-and-a-half years. There were speeches, rallies and lofty promises to end the schism that has paralysed Palestinian politics for more than a decade. It was like a replay of a trip he made in 2014 to inaugurate a new unity government— which fell apart within weeks.

The Palestinian territories split in 2007, a year after Hamas, the militant Islamist group, won a majority in parliament. It seized control of Gaza after months of bloody fighting with its nationalist rival, Fatah. Since then Hamas has run the coastal strip as a separate fief, with its own civil servants and police. The two parties have signed six reconciliation deals meant to end the split, but none held. Hamas was loth to give up its enclave.

Now it seems more amenable. It has agreed to cede control of the civilian ministries in Gaza. Over the coming year it will add 3,000 police officers from the Palestinian Authority (PA), which runs the West Bank and is dominated by Fatah. Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s number two, said he would “break the neck” of anyone who opposes reconciliation. (That may not be an idle threat: in the 1980s his job was to kill Palestinians who collaborated with Israel.)

Hamas has few alternatives at this point. Life in Gaza has been grim for a decade, amid three wars and a blockade imposed by both Israel and Egypt. Conditions worsened further this spring when Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, slapped his own sanctions on the territory to press Hamas into a deal. Most of Gaza’s 2m people receive just four hours of electricity a day. Tap water is equally scarce and when it is available it is brackish and polluted. Nearly two-thirds of young people cannot find work. In dingy, crowded hospitals, basic medicines are in short supply. Hamas is keen to put someone else in charge of the misery.

So are regional powers. Qatar, the main sponsor of Hamas, is under embargo by Egypt and three of its Gulf neighbours, which want the emirate to cut ties with Islamists. It has not halted aid to Hamas, but it has quietly urged the group to reconcile with Fatah. The United Arab Emirates has dangled the prospect of massive investment in a post-Hamas Gaza. It is working closely with Muhammad Dahlan, an ex-Fatah security boss who was banished by Mr Abbas and now lives in Abu Dhabi.

The greatest pressure has come from Egypt, which controls Rafah, the sole border crossing accessible to most Palestinians. It has been largely closed since 2013. Egypt accuses Hamas of working with jihadists who are fighting a bloody insurgency in Sinai. Though the charges are exaggerated, Hamas has indeed allowed dozens of wanted Egyptian militants to seek refuge in Gaza. The generals in Cairo would be happy to see Mr Abbas’s men back on the border.

Hamas has not agreed to that. It may let Mr Abbas run the schools and hospitals, but it will not give up a militia that boasts tens of thousands of fighters and a cache of rockets. “This will never be up for discussion,” says Moussa Abu Marzouk, a top Hamas official. So this effort is likely to fail for the same sorts of reasons as the past six. Mr Abbas cannot accept a well-armed group operating under his nose. It would be a threat to the unpopular president’s tenuous rule.

It could also bankrupt his government. Israel would probably withhold the tax revenue on which the PA depends, and some Western countries might suspend foreign aid. “If someone from Hamas has a weapon, I’ll put him in prison,” Mr Abbas told Egyptian television. He may not get the chance.

***

The State Department on Thursday announced America’s withdrawal from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. As with everything that President Trump does, the move provoked journalistic anger and agony. Prepare for years of sob stories about UNESCO heritage sites neglected and aspiring developing-world scientists unfunded, all due to Trumpian unilateralism.

Yet this was a sound and overdue step that will help advance peace and U.N. reform.

In its statement, the State Department cited “continuing anti-Israel bias” at UNESCO, among other things. The Paris-based agency is far from the only U.N. outfit to single out the Jewish state for opprobrium. But UNESCO’s anti-Israel stances have been egregious even by this global body’s debased standards, especially since 2011. That was the year the Palestinian Authority sought and won admission to UNESCO as a full member-state. As Jonathan Schanzer of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies told me, “The Palestinians targeted UNESCO early as part of their Palestine-194 strategy”–the PA effort to win recognition as a state in U.N. halls rather than through talks with Israel. “UNESCO has played a role in this strategy, and it isn’t done yet.”

The Obama administration denounced the PA’s admission, with then-State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland calling it “regrettable, premature” and harmful to “our shared goal to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace.” Washington cut off American dollars for UNESCO under a Bill Clinton-era law that prohibits the U.S. government from funding any U.N. agency that admits a non-state as a member. American funding, once accounting for more than one-fifth of UNESCO’s budget, hasn’t been restored since 2011. The agency has lost out on some $600 million as a result.

UNESCO only doubled down on its anti-Israel agitation in the years that followed, however, passing a raft of resolutions that denied the Jewish (and Christian) connection to Jerusalem and other holy sites in Israel.

A resolution on Jerusalem passed in May described Israel as the “occupying power,” denying the Jewish state’s claim to its own capital. Another Jerusalem resolution, approved last year, referred to the Western Wall and the Temple Mount by their Muslim names only. The agency thus attached the U.N.’s name to the odious Arab project to de-Judaize the City of David. That move prompted then U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to distance himself from “any perceived undertaking to repudiate the undeniable common reverence for these sites.” Even UNESCO’s left-leaning chief, Irina Bokova, criticized the text.

Yet anti-Israelism and–it must be said–anti-Semitism are part of UNESCO’s diplomatic culture. When, in July this year, Israel’s ambassador to UNESCO called for a minute of silence for Holocaust victims, Cuba’s envoy objected: “Only the Chair can request a minute of silence. So with your indulgence, let me request Mr. Chairman, that we stand for a minute of silence for all of the Palestinians who have died in the region.” Footage of the scene, available on the website of the indispensable U.N. Watch, shows numerous delegates standing up and clapping in favor of the Cuban motion.

It was this black record that impelled the Trump administration to withdraw from UNESCO. The decision, by the way, is not without precedent. President Carter withdrew the U.S. from the International Labor Organization for three years and didn’t rejoin until the ILO took steps to reform itself. The Reagan administration in 1983 pulled the U.S. out of UNESCO over its “hostility toward the basic institutions of a free society.” President Reagan was worried about a creepy UNESCO proposal to have the agency and its authoritarian members license and regulate foreign reporters. Washington returned to UNESCO in 2002, under George W. Bush.

By withdrawing from UNESCO (once more), the Trump administration is sending an important message to the U.N. mandarins: that America doesn’t have infinite patience for international institutions that function as platforms for Jew-hatred. Long before Donald Trump came on the scene, that used to be a bipartisan American position.

S Korea Pursuit of the Blackout Weapon

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As the United States flew B1 Lancers based out of Guam in exercises with South Korea and Japan over the Korean Peninsula, the Trump White House was meeting with Pentagon officials on expanded details and strategies with regard to North Korea.

Meanwhile, China continues to demand that all sides tone down the threatening talk and military activities. Has anyone asked China if they are accepting North Korea’s nuclear weapons as a standard condition?

Additionally, more sanctions are taking place including naming four cargo ships under North Korea’s authority from being received in several ports due to hidden illicit cargo transports as recently exposed in Egypt.

Moving to preemptive strategies, South Korea is developing a new weapon called a ‘blackout weapon’ which is not to be confused with an EMP. This blackout weapon, known as a graphite ordnance was developed and used by the United States during the first Gulf War and later in the Balkans.

The purpose of this weapon is to destroy the power grid in hostile nations as a part of the tactics applied where military actions are likely to escalate.

Known as “blackout bombs,” the warheads can be dropped by a plane over power stations. A form of cluster bombs, they split into several canister-like “sub-munitions,” which in turn release carbon graphite filaments that short-circuit the electricity supplies.

South Korea is adding the weapons to its arsenal as part of one of its recently-developed military programs, the so-called “Kill Chain,” which aims to detect an imminent missile attack from the North and react with a pre-emptive strike.

No shots are actually fired and there is no injury or death component to using the blackout bombs. The objective is the merely destroy power stations by short circuiting the systems.

The BLU-114 was developed as a highly classified weapon intended to effectively neutralize electrical power infrastructure without destroying it. This weapon also has been referred to as the ‘soft-bomb’ or the ‘graphite bomb’. Like many other cluster bombs it can be released from virtually any tactical aircraft operated by the United States or allied countries.

The BLU-114 disperses large numbers of chemically treated carbon graphite filaments which short-circuit electrical power distribution equipment such as transformers and switching stations. Used in large numbers it can even shut down the entire power grid of a given country. This weapon represents an excellent sample of non-lethal weaponry with near zero collateral damage.

The CBU-94 Blackout Bomb is the main application for the BLU-114 warhead. It was reported to be employed during the conflict of the former Yugoslavia in 1999 short-cincturing the electrical power infrastructure of Serbia during operation Allied Force. It has been suggested that the BLU-114 or a very similar warhead was integrated into the Tomahawk missile and the AGM-154 JSOW standoff weapon.

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A tactic known as a ‘kill chain’ does not represent death but rather it is a pillar as part of a first strike mission to begin the process of neutralizing battle-space.

Applying all intelligence including satellite reconnaissance as well as cyber and signals intelligence is part of the operations in the stepped process to execute war strategies.

The second and third prongs of South Korea’s defense strategy include missile defense and retaliatory strikes from aircraft in the event North Korea launches a missile. They include the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, and the Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMRR) plan. KAMD is a controversial plan to develop a system to intercept short-range missiles. KMRR is a concept for destroying Pyongyang in the event of a North Korean nuclear first strike.

But it is the first and most dangerous part of the new military strategy – the “Kill Chain” – that has diplomatic observers worried. Such a pre-emptive strike would almost certainly lead to war – and not just any war, but regional nuclear war.

 

Refugee Proposal to Congress for 2018

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Click here to see the report and numbers filed for previous years including locations.

 

 

(Reuters) – The United States will admit a maximum of 45,000 refugees during the 2018 fiscal year, President Donald Trump said in a memorandum to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and released by the White House on Friday.

The cap, the lowest in decades, was proposed by the administration in a report to Congress on Wednesday.

Refugee advocates say the lower limit ignores growing humanitarian crises around the world that are causing people to flee their native countries in greater numbers, and represents a departure from U.S. global leadership.

The Trump administration says the lower cap is necessary so that U.S. officials can address a growing backlog of people applying for asylum inside the United States, and to do better vetting of refugees.

In its report to Congress, which was reviewed by Reuters, the administration said it may assess refugees on their “likelihood of successful assimilation and contribution to the United States.”

***

Then there is DACA:

A major deadline for recipients of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals policy, or DACA, has arrived as the Trump administration continues to press forward in rolling back the Obama-era program for young undocumented immigrants.

Under the program, these immigrants, who entered the U.S. as children have been able to receive renewable two-year deferred action from deportation so that they can work or go to school.

As part of the wind-down process announced by Attorney General Jeff Sessions last month and under the leadership of the Department of Homeland Security, those eligible for DACA had until Thursday to properly file for a renewal request and other associated applications for employment authorization to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).

After Thursday, young undocumented immigrants will not be able to apply for renewal of their DACA status.

According to DHS, eligible individuals are DACA recipients whose DACA and work authorization expire between Sept. 5, 2017, and March 5, 2018, inclusive. Of the approximately 154,200 individuals whose DACA is set to expire between Sept. 5, 2017, and March 5, 2018, just over 106,000 either have renewal requests currently pending with USCIS, or have already had USCIS adjudicate their renewal request.

Acting Secretary of DHS Elaine Duke released a memo on Wednesday urging all those still eligible to request a renewal of their DACA status as soon as possible if they have not done so already.

“I urge you to make this a priority. The renewal process is quicker than an initial request and requires minimal documentation, so take the time now to fill out and properly file your renewal request.  It is imperative that USCIS physically receives your request by October 5th,” said Duke.

USCIS has also been frequently updating applicants over social media, urging followers to file their requests in order to get their case adjudicated in time.

But in light of the recent devastation in Puerto Rico, which left millions without power, food or shelter, Duke said she has directed USCIS to consider on a “case-by-case basis DACA requests received from U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico residents.”

“As of today, fewer than 20 current recipients from the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico have yet to renew with USCIS,” she added.

Since the announcement, several lawmakers have made moves on drafting legislation to serve as a temporary fix to the DACA program as the roll back allowed for six months of adjudication, time that Congress could use to develop new immigration laws.

President Trump hosted a dinner last month with Democratic leaders Nancy Pelosi and Chuck Schumer which caused an uproar after the two Democrats issued a statement saying they had they had agreed to finalize a law “quickly” that would protect DACA recipients, and that the law would also include border security, “excluding the wall.” More here.