Category Archives: FBI

He is Missing, Bank Hack of $90 Billion

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HackerNews: Tanvir Hassan Zoha, a 34-year-old security researcher, who spoke to media on the $81 Million Bangladesh Bank cyber theft, has gone missing since Wednesday night, just days after accusing Bangladesh’s central bank officials of negligence.

Zoha was investigating a recent cyber attack on Bangladesh’s central bank that let hackers stole $81 Million from the banks’ Federal Reserve bank account.
Though the hackers tried to steal $1 Billion from the bank, a simple typo prevented the full heist.
During his investigation, Zoha believed the Hackers, who are still unknown, had installed Malware on the bank’s computer systems few weeks before the heist that allowed them to obtain credentials needed for payment transfers.
With the help of those credentials, the unknown hackers transferred large sums from Bangladesh’s United States account to fraudulent accounts based in the Philippines and Sri Lanka.
However, at the same time, Zoha accused senior officials at Bangladesh central bank of gross negligence and weak security procedures that eventually facilitated the largest bank heist in the country.
The Central bank’s governor Atiur Rahman, along with two of his deputy governors, had to quit his job over the scandal, hugely embarrassing the government and raising alarm over the security of Bangladesh’s foreign exchange reserves of over US$27 Billion.
However, when the investigation was still going on, Zoha disappeared Wednesday night, while coming home with one of his friends, according to sources close to Zoha’s family.
While speaking to media in the wake of the massive cyber attack, Zoha identified himself as the ICT (Information and Communication Technology) Division’s cyber security expert who had worked with various government agencies in the past.
Soon after Zoha’s disappearance, the government officials put out a statement but did not provide more details besides the fact that they opened an investigation.

Zoha’s family members suspect that the comments Zoha made about the carelessness of bank’s officials on the Bank heist to the press on March 11 are the cause of his disappearance.
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(Reuters) – The SWIFT messaging system plans to ask banks to make sure they are following recommended security practices following an unprecedented cyber attack on Bangladesh’s central bank that yielded $81 million, a spokeswoman for the group told Reuters on Sunday.

Brussels-based SWIFT, a cooperative owned by some 3,000 global financial institutions, will issue a written warning on Monday asking banks to review internal security, the spokeswoman said.

SWIFT staff will also begin calling banks to highlight the importance of reviewing security measures after the attack in Bangladesh, she added.

“Our priority at this time is to encourage customers to review and, where necessary, to reinforce their local operating environments,” the spokeswoman added.

Unknown hackers breached the computer systems of Bangladesh Bank and in early February attempted to steal $951 million from its account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which it uses for international settlements. Some attempted transfers were blocked, but $81 million was transferred to accounts in the Philippines in one of the largest cyber heists in history.

SWIFT has so far said little about the attack, except that it was related to “an internal operational issue” at Bangladesh Bank and that there was no compromise in its core messaging system.

SWIFT prepared a summary of previously issued recommendations for implementing security measures to thwart hackers, which advises members to pay close attention to best practices, the spokeswoman added.

A confidential interim report on the investigation, which forensics experts submitted to the bank on Wednesday, said that attackers took control of the bank’s network, stole credentials for sending SWIFT messages and used “sophisticated” malicious software to attack the computers it uses to process and authorize transactions.

Investigators said in the report, which was reviewed by Reuters, that they believe the attackers have targeted other financial institutions.

The report was prepared by FireEye Inc and World Informatix, which were hired by Bangladesh’s central bank to investigate the massive theft.

The investigators did not identify other victims or name the hackers, but said that forensic evidence suggests they were also behind other recent cyber attacks on financial institutions.

“FireEye has observed these same suspected FIN threat actors within other customer networks in the financial industry, where these threat actors appear to be financially motivated, and well organized,” said an interim report sent to the bank last week.

Representatives of Bangladesh Bank and FireEye declined to comment on the confidential report and their probe into the Feb. 4 heist.

World Informatix Chief Executive Rakesh Asthana told Reuters via email that he could not discuss the investigation, but that he expected Bangladesh Bank to issue a news release on Monday.

Details from the confidential report were previously reported by Bloomberg News and a Bangladesh publication, The Daily Star.

Benghazi: The Attackers Used the Consulate Phones

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Validates the movie #13 Hours

Bravo Alert Status, this is a reminder of Benghazi 9-11

US spy agencies heard Benghazi attackers using State Dept. cell phones to call terrorist leaders  

By James Rosen, Bret Baier  

 

The terrorists who attacked the U.S. consulate and CIA annex in Benghazi on September 11, 2012 used cell phones, seized from State Department personnel during the attacks, and U.S. spy agencies overheard them contacting more senior terrorist leaders to report on the success of the operation, multiple sources confirmed to Fox News.

 

The disclosure is important because it adds to the body of evidence establishing that senior U.S. officials in the Obama administration knew early on that Benghazi was a terrorist attack, and not a spontaneous protest over an anti-Islam video that had gone awry, as the administration claimed for several weeks after the attacks.

 

Eric Stahl, who recently retired as a major in the U.S. Air Force, served as commander and pilot of the C-17 aircraft that was used to transport the corpses of the four casualties from the Benghazi attacks – then-U.S. Ambassador to Libya Chris Stevens, information officer Sean Smith, and former Navy SEALs Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods – as well as the assault’s survivors from Tripoli to the safety of an American military base in Ramstein, Germany.

 

In an exclusive interview on Fox News’ “Special Report,” Stahl said members of a CIA-trained Global Response Staff who raced to the scene of the attacks were “confused” by the administration’s repeated implication of the video as a trigger for the attacks, because “they knew during the attack…who was doing the attacking.” Asked how, Stahl told anchor Bret Baier: “Right after they left the consulate in Benghazi and went to the [CIA] safehouse, they were getting reports that cell phones, consulate cell phones, were being used to make calls to the attackers’ higher ups.”

 

A separate U.S. official, one with intimate details of the bloody events of that night, confirmed the major’s assertion. The second source, who requested anonymity to discuss classified data, told Fox News he had personally read the intelligence reports at the time that contained references to calls by terrorists – using State Department cell phones captured at the consulate during the battle – to their terrorist leaders. The second source also confirmed that the security teams on the ground received this intelligence in real time.

 

Major Stahl was never interviewed by the Accountability Review Board, the investigative panel convened, pursuant to statute, by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, as the official body reviewing all the circumstances surrounding the attacks and their aftermath. Many lawmakers and independent experts have criticized the thoroughness of the ARB, which also never interviewed Clinton.

 

In his interview on “Special Report,” Stahl made still other disclosures that add to the vast body of literature on Benghazi – sure to grow in the months ahead, as a select House committee prepares for a comprehensive probe of the affair, complete with subpoena power. Stahl said that when he deposited the traumatized passengers at Ramstein, the first individual to question the CIA security officers was not an FBI officer but the senior State Department diplomat on the ground.

 

“They were taken away from the airplane,” Stahl said. “The U.S. ambassador to Germany [Philip D. Murphy] met us when we landed and he took them away because he wanted to debrief them that night.” Murphy stepped down as ambassador last year. A message left with Sky Blue FC, a private company in New Jersey with which Murphy is listed online as an executive officer, was not immediately returned.

 

Stahl also contended that given his crew’s alert status and location, they could have reached Benghazi in time to have played a role in rescuing the victims of the assault, and ferrying them to safety in Germany, had they been asked to do so. “We were on a 45-day deployment to Ramstein air base,” he told Fox News. “And we were there basically to pick up priority missions, last-minute missions that needed to be accomplished.”

 

“You would’ve thought that we would have had a little bit more of an alert posture on 9/11,” Stahl added. “A hurried-up timeline probably would take us [an] hour-and-a-half to get off the ground and three hours and fifteen minutes to get down there. So we could’ve gone down there and gotten them easily.”

Movement from Below be Neutralized? More than Soros

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Primer: Corey Lewandowski, Trump’s campaign manager is a GOP delegate from New Hampshire. Conflict much?

CNN: Donald Trump campaign manager Corey Lewandowski will be among the Republican front-runner’s delegates at the party’s national convention this summer in Cleveland.

A New Hampshire resident, Lewandowski confirmed to CNN Wednesday that he will maintain both roles at the convention. The New York Times first reported that he had listed himself among Trump’s 11 New Hampshire delegates and alternates in a signed letter to the secretary of state.

What will the coming days look like? Will all college campuses go back in history like Kent State?

I am not a supporter of Trump for several reasons as noted by previous articles on this website, however there are larger implications here. For sure conservatives and Republicans alike should never give into clandestine and nefarious people, organizations or objectives, so describe how to neutralize this and bring the whole country together….as much as possible.

Digging deeper and beyond George Soros:

Notorious Washington consultant behind anti-Trump campaign, OpenSecrets:

Donald Trump, the prohibitive favorite for the Republican presidential nomination, just added a fistful of primaries to his string of victories and knocked the GOP establishment’s favorite son, Sen. Marco Rubio (Fla.), out of the race. To beat Trump now, it seems, someone thinks it’s time to get evil.

Dr. Evil, to be exact. Washington consultant Rick Berman, whom CBS News christened with that title in 2007, runs a public relations consulting company in Washington known for deploying surreptitious tactics on behalf of major industry clients. Berman’s firm has now contracted with a group Berman runs, the Enterprise Freedom Action Committee, in connection with a $315,000 (so far) campaign against Trump waged via Google and Facebook ads.

Berman earned the Austin Powers moniker in part by deploying tactics like “shooting the messenger.” As he told CBS: “Shooting the messenger means getting people to understand that this messenger is not as credible as their name would suggest.”

In practice, that means Berman starts his own nonprofit groups with their own credible-sounding names and their donors kept secret to discredit reports about everything from the health dangers of mercury in fish to trans-fats. The strategy has the effect of distorting debates in Washington with nameless corporate money, encouraging hyperbolic misinformation that confuses voters and muddles policy debates.

Enter Donald Trump. A veritable monarch of misinformation, Trump as recently as last weekend claimed that a would-be attacker at one of his rallies had ties to Islamic State and, when pressed on the statement’s inaccuracy, replied: “All I know is what’s on the Internet.”

Berman may have met his messenger match.

A spokeswoman for Berman and Company declined to answer questions sent via email on Thursday, including this centeral one: Who, exactly, has called on the consultant’s expertise this time? Because the organization attacking Trump, Enterprise Freedom Action, is a dark money nonprofit, it never has to publicly identify the sources of its funding.

The group has several past incarnations: Since 2007, it’s been anti-union, anti-Senate Democrats and anti-Barack Obama.

In 2008, the organization hit its spending peak. With nearly $17 million in receipts that year, it laid out close to $16 million, per its tax forms. None of that, the group maintained in a filing with the IRS, was political spending. At that time, Enterprise Freedom Action primarily was buying advertisements advocating for “democratic union elections.”

It’s a hallmark of Berman’s operations for money to go from one of his organizations to another, keeping as much of it as possible in the family. Berman’s firm made $892,931 in 2008 from its work for Enterprise Freedom Action, of which Berman himself served as president and director.

This time, the firm has, so far, received only $4,800 from the nonprofit in connection with the anti-Trump campaign, and it’s unclear whether more money will follow. Political spending against Donald Trump can seem like a fool’s errand: Before Tuesday’s contest, outside groups spent about $8.7 million on TV ads attacking him in Florida, while Trump himself spent only $2.4 million in the state, according to the International Business Times — and Marco Rubio knows what happened there.

 

Declaring Genocide: Does it Mean Anything?

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John Kerry and Barack Obama finally declared ‘genocide’ with regard to Islamic State but why stop with ISIS? What about Bashir al Assad but mostly what about Mahmoud Abbas? For the Obama White House, Iran certainly does not matter either.

Obama did finally declare genocide after the lawyers reviewed and advised him. But does it matter?

The Genocide Convention says it does matter.

 

In 2009, Barack Obama in Oslo accepting the Nobel Peace Prize award.

THE PRESIDENT:  Your Majesties, Your Royal Highnesses, distinguished members of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, citizens of America, and citizens of the world:

I receive this honor with deep gratitude and great humility.  It is an award that speaks to our highest aspirations — that for all the cruelty and hardship of our world, we are not mere prisoners of fate.  Our actions matter, and can bend history in the direction of justice.

And yet I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the considerable controversy that your generous decision has generated.  (Laughter.)  In part, this is because I am at the beginning, and not the end, of my labors on the world stage.  Compared to some of the giants of history who’ve received this prize — Schweitzer and King; Marshall and Mandela — my accomplishments are slight.  And then there are the men and women around the world who have been jailed and beaten in the pursuit of justice; those who toil in humanitarian organizations to relieve suffering; the unrecognized millions whose quiet acts of courage and compassion inspire even the most hardened cynics.  I cannot argue with those who find these men and women — some known, some obscure to all but those they help — to be far more deserving of this honor than I.

But perhaps the most profound issue surrounding my receipt of this prize is the fact that I am the Commander-in-Chief of the military of a nation in the midst of two wars.  One of these wars is winding down.  The other is a conflict that America did not seek; one in which we are joined by 42 other countries — including Norway — in an effort to defend ourselves and all nations from further attacks.

Still, we are at war, and I’m responsible for the deployment of thousands of young Americans to battle in a distant land.  Some will kill, and some will be killed.  And so I come here with an acute sense of the costs of armed conflict — filled with difficult questions about the relationship between war and peace, and our effort to replace one with the other. Full speech here.

What is worse a war, nuclear weapon or genocide? Dead is dead.

May: In the Yemeni port city of Aden earlier this month, Islamists attacked a Catholic home for the indigent elderly. The militants, believed to be soldiers of the Islamic State, shot the security guard, then entered the facility where they gunned down the old people and their care-givers, including four nuns. At least 16 people were murdered. Such atrocities are no longer seen as major news events. Most diplomats regard them – or dismiss them — as “violent extremism,” a phrase that describes without explaining. On America’s campuses, “activists” are deeply concerned about “trigger warnings” and “microaggressions.” Massacres of Christians in Muslim lands, by contrast, seem to trouble them not at all. More here.

Sure they do get it right on Islamic State, when Germany is forecasted as a future target as a matter of sampling.

GateStoneInstitute:

  • Hans-Georg Maaßen, the head of Germany’s domestic intelligence agency (BfV), warned that the Islamic State was deliberately planting jihadists among the refugees flowing into Europe, and reported that the number of Salafists in Germany has now risen to 7,900. This is up from 7,000 in 2014 and 5,500 in 2013.
  • “Salafists want to establish an Islamic state in Germany.” — Hans-Georg Maaßen, director, BfV, German intelligence.
  • More than 800 German residents — 60% of whom are German passport holders — have joined the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Of these, roughly one-third have returned to Germany. — Federal Criminal Police Office.
  • Up to 5,000 European jihadists have returned to the continent after obtaining combat experience on the battlefields of the Middle East. — Rob Wainwright, head of Europol.

Going back to 2013: BBC: UN implicates Bashar al-Assad in Syria war crimes, “The UN’s human rights chief has said an inquiry has produced evidence that war crimes were authorised in Syria at the “highest level”, including by President Bashar al-Assad. It is the first time the UN’s human rights office has so directly implicated Mr Assad. Commissioner Navi Pillay said her office held a list of others implicated by the inquiry. The UN estimates more than 100,000 people have died in the conflict.”

 

 

Documents: The Long Methodical Game of AQ

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No so much contained or decimated as Barack Obama claims regarding al Qaeda. So much recent attention has been applied to Islamic State, few give any deliberation to al Qaeda and associated terror groups globally.

Osama bin Laden’s ‘Bookshelf’ Reveals al Qaeda’s Long Game Captured documents released by the U.S. reveal the extent of al Qaeda’s strategy, which may include negotiated ‘truces’ in Syria

Gartenstein-Ross: When 113 new documents recovered in 2011 during the fatal raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, became publicly available earlier this month, perhaps the most noteworthy insight they offered was the extent of the strategic patience, to borrow a phrase from the Obama administration, possessed by al Qaeda.

Along with other captured documents, what the U.S. Director of National Intelligence calls “Bin Laden’s Bookshelf” reveals the cunning long-term planning that characterized the group’s approach at the time of bin Laden’s death, and that continues to guide it today, affecting not least the actions of its affiliate the al Nusra Front in Syria.

The record shows that the United States often has overlooked the extent of al Qaeda’s patient approach, sometimes mistaking its relative quiet for inactivity or collapse, and our failure to understand the group has helped it to gain critical operating space, and even worse, has sometimes caused us to blunder into its traps.

The broad outlines of al Qaeda’s strategy of attrition against the West are, at this point, generally well understood. Al Qaeda’s strategy, as initially formulated by bin Laden, was to wear down the United States militarily, politically, and economically.

This long-term approach contrasts with that of al Qaeda’s louder jihadist spin-off and competitor, the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), which already claims to have reestablished the caliphate. Al Qaeda, on the other hand, sees the United States as the “trunk of the tree,” as bin Laden put it in a letter addressed to the late al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) emir Nasir al-Wuhayshi. Al Qaeda wanted to wait to sever that tree trunk before moving on to the next stages in its campaign, including building an Islamic state, according to that captured document which was declassified in 2012.

The newly released Abbottabad documents show how strategic patience has shaped al Qaeda’s military operations and political activities. The jihadist group has proven willing to make compromises, sacrifice short-term victories, and even develop tactical alliances with adversaries in order to outlast its various foes. At the same time, the group looked for rear bases of support and safe havens where members could train, plan attacks, and prepare for future battles in the region.

Al Qaeda’s approach to the Mauritanian government illustrates this restraint and flexibility. In several newly declassified documents dating from about 2010, al Qaeda officials discussed the possibility of making a truce with Mauritania, in which al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb would refrain from military operations in the country.

What was in it for al Qaeda? The group discussed some demands that it had for Mauritania: the government would allow militants to operate freely in the country, release incarcerated al Qaeda members, and provide al Qaeda 10 to 20 million euros a year, protection money to ensure that al Qaeda didn’t kidnap tourists.

From al Qaeda’s perspective, the rationale for the deal was that it would allow militants to “focus on Algeria,” while placing its “cadres in safe rear bases available in Mauritania,” as now-deceased Ahmed Abdi Godane, emir of the Qaeda affiliated Somali al Shabaab, noted in a letter written in March 2010. It is not clear from the documents whether this offer was actually extended to Mauritania, nor what response al Qaeda received if the offer was made, but al Qaeda’s consideration of this approach attests to the group’s patience, and willingness to grant foes a temporary reprieve if there was an advantage to doing so.

The logic that influenced al Qaeda’s thinking on Mauritania could also be seen in Yemen. An al Qaeda strategy paper noted that the jihadist movement was thriving under the country’s then-president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, whose corruption had created “fertile ground” for jihadism. The author of the paper concluded that the best immediate option for al Qaeda was to allow Saleh to remain in power, rather than working to topple him.

Why was the author so suspicious of “ousting the apostate government and keeping the country in a state of chaos”? After all, chaos typically plays to the advantage of jihadists. The author reasoned that Saleh’s replacement likely would be more aggressive in targeting jihadists. Moreover, even if chaos prevailed, he noted that “we cannot spread our Dawah while there is chaos.” Dawah refers to proselytism: In other words, the author was concerned that the preparatory work for an eventual jihadist takeover in Yemen was not complete at that point.

The author even proposed a truce with Saleh, noting that even a unilateral agreement would allow al Qaeda to focus on the United States. This sentiment was echoed in a letter from bin Laden to Wuhayshi, declassified in 2012, in which al Qaeda’s emir explained that the jihadist movement was in a preparatory stage in Yemen, meaning that “it is not in our interest to rush in bringing down the regime.” (Bin Laden eventually changed his mind on this point, as events on the ground seemed to dictate a more aggressive posture.)

Al Qaeda’s thinking about Mauritania and Yemen is characteristic of the newly released documents. Throughout, the group’s leadership urges caution and occasional tactical cooperation with enemies. In a letter to Abu Ayyub al-Masri, al Qaeda in Iraq’s emir, a senior al Qaeda official warned against carrying out operations in Iran. Iran, he explained, had become al Qaeda’s “main artery for funds, personnel, and communication.” The official similarly advised al-Masri to refrain from striking Turkey and Lebanon, urging him to instead “devote your total resource to the fortification of the nation, and the fight against the crusaders and the apostates.”

These directives show that al Qaeda was preparing for the long haul. The group anticipated and prepared for setbacks, even catastrophic ones. In a letter to Ansar al-Islam, an Iraq-based militant group, a senior al Qaeda official (possibly bin Laden himself) explained that “Iraq is not the end of the road.” He stated that if al Qaeda were defeated in that theater, it would be a “catastrophe,” but nonetheless “we must always prepare ourselves for anything that might happen.”

The official noted that “jihad will continue with us or without us,” revealing an organizational belief that the struggle to reestablish the caliphate would persist long after al Qaeda’s founders had died.

This prediction has proven all too true. Al Qaeda has continued to adapt and thrive since bin Laden’s death, while adhering to its late emir’s methodical approach. The group’s strategy has survived several seismic developments that were widely viewed as the organization’s death knell.

The so-called “Arab Spring” was widely perceived as a mortal blow to al Qaeda, a repudiation of the group’s claim that only violent jihad could sweep away the Middle East’s authoritarian regimes. Instead, al Qaeda celebrated the revolutions. In a newly-released letter to one of bin Laden’s assistants, an al Qaeda official expressed his hope that the uprisings would “spread all over the Muslim homelands, which will accelerate the triumph and unity of all Muslims.”

Al Qaeda prepared itself to succeed in the post-revolution turmoil, using bin Laden’s model of preparation and strategic restraint. Al Qaeda covertly expanded its presence in countries like Libya and Tunisia, using front groups such as Ansar al-Sharia to conduct Da’wah and recruitment activities. Indeed, a previous batch of Abbottabad documents released for a criminal trial show that al Qaeda had established itself in Derna, Benghazi, and elsewhere in Libya even before bin Laden’s death.

In multiple theaters today, including Syria/Iraq and Yemen, al Qaeda has embedded itself in local communities, developing relationships.

After seizing control of the Yemeni port city of al-Mukalla, AQAP set up a group known as the “Sons of Hadramawt,” intended to appear as an indigenous force, and appointed a local council, the Hadhrami Domestic Council, to govern the city.
It has likewise sought to build coalitions in Syria, as evidenced by a secret directive issued in early 2015 by the group’s current emir Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri’s missive instructed Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, to work more closely with other rebel groups, strengthen ties with local communities, build sustainable safe havens, and cease planning for attacks against the West.

Al Qaeda’s strategic flexibility has also been on display in its response to the challenge posed by ISIS, whose emergence was another challenge that many analysts thought would cripple al Qaeda. While ISIS has challenged al Qaeda’s position within the jihadist community, it has also given al Qaeda a long-awaited opportunity to remake its image, which had been tarnished by failed governance experiments in Iraq and Mali, among other places. ISIS has become a convenient foil for al Qaeda in its efforts to gain greater operating space.

Time and again, al Qaeda has been able to mitigate setbacks, or even turn them to its advantage. The group’s vision of a multi-generational jihadist struggle has enabled it to think and act strategically, pursuing long-term objectives while passing up ephemeral or unsustainable victories.

Al Qaeda’s ability to think and plan for the long term stands in contrast with both ISIS and also the U.S. government. Election cycles, budgetary uncertainty, and inter-agency squabbles impede strategic thinking in the fight against al Qaeda. As we continue to overlook al Qaeda’s forward-looking approach, we underestimate the group and fall into its traps. At a time when al Qaeda is quietly gaining ground across the Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa, and benefiting from the international community’s myopic focus on the Islamic State, it is more important than ever that we fully appreciate al Qaeda’s long-term planning.