European Courts Rule Against Thought and Free Speech

BERLIN (AP) — The European Court of Human Rights says an Austrian woman’s conviction for calling the prophet of Islam a paedophile didn’t breach her freedom of speech.

The Strasbourg-based ECHR ruled Thursday that Austrian courts had “carefully balanced her right to freedom of expression with the right of others to have their religious feelings protected.”

The woman in her late 40s, identified only as E.S., claimed during two public seminars in 2009 that the Prophet Muhammad’s marriage to a young girl was akin to “pedophilia.” A Vienna court convicted her in 2011 of disparaging religious doctrines, ordering her to pay a 480-euro ($547) fine, plus costs. The ruling was later upheld by an Austrian appeals court.

The ECHR said the Austrian court’s decision “served the legitimate aim of preserving religious peace.”

*** European Court of Human Rights Ruling: Free Speech Bows to ...

Free speech in Europe has stipulation according to the high court. It is important to know that the European Union rules over all laws and legal cases for each country in the European Union. Hence at least one reason for Brexit.

Isn’t speech a human right? Nope, not in Europe. Anyone remember the Magna Carta? You know the cornerstone of liberty in England. Seems it does not apply to any basis in Europe or England and it is being challenged all over here in the United States where the Magna Carta was the basis of the U.S. Bill of Rights.

1929 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, of the US Supreme Court, outlines his belief in free speech: ‘The principle of free thought is not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought we hate.’

1948 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is adopted virtually unanimously by the UN General Assembly. It urges member nations to promote human, civil, economic and social rights, including freedom of expression and religion.

With the horrific massacre at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh against Jews, blame is being pointed to President Trump causing the anger. But yet Louis Farrakhan attacks Jews all the time and then there is the pesky organization known as BDS, Boycott, Divest and Sanction has representation across U.S. college campuses and they too preach hate against Jews but that is okay? Huh?

Meanwhile, back to that European Court of Human Rights….check it out, but submit your complaint application first.

Proceedings before the Court

Proceedings before the Court are conducted primarily in writing; public hearings are rare.

There is no cost associated with submitting an application and the applicant may apply for legal aid to cover expenses that arise later in the proceeding.

While a lawyer is not necessary to lodge a complaint, applicants should have representation after the case is declared admissible, and must be represented by a lawyer in any hearing before the Court.

Applications to the ECtHR go through two phases: admissibility and merits. The specific nature of the case will dictate the speed and course of the proceedings. However, it may be months or years before an applicant receives a decision or judgment.

Admissibility

When the Court receives an application, the Court must determine if it meets all of the admissibility requirements. An admissibility decision may be made by a single judge, a three-judge committee, or a seven-judge chamber. To be declared admissible, an application must meet the following criteria:

  1. Exhaustion of domestic remedies
  2. Six-month application deadline (from the final domestic judicial decision)
  3. Complaint against a State party to the European Convention on Human Rights
  4. Applicant suffered a significant disadvantage

If an application fails to meet any of these requirements, it will be declared inadmissible and cannot proceed any further. There is no appeal from a decision of inadmissibility.

Applicants may use the ECHR’s Online Admissibility Checklist to determine if their complaint satisfies the requirements.  Additionally, the Court has created a short video on Admissibility Conditions.

Merits

If an application is not struck from the list or declared inadmissible at an earlier stage, it will be assigned to one of the ECtHR’s five sections and the State will be notified of the complaint. At this time, both parties will have the opportunity to submit observations to the Court. These observations may contain specific information requested by the Chamber or President of the Section, or any other material that the parties decide is relevant. The Chamber has the option to consider admissibility and merits separately or concurrently, but it must notify the parties if it plans to consider admissibility and merits together.

When a Chamber issues a judgment on the merits, there is a three-month period before the decision becomes final. During this period, either or both of the parties may request that the application be referred to the Grand Chamber. However, the Grand Chamber only hears a limited number of exceptional cases.

If the Court ultimately decides a case in favor of the applicant, it may award just satisfaction (monetary compensation for the damages suffered) and require the State to cover the cost of bringing the case. If the Court finds that there has been no violation, then the applicant is not liable for the State’s legal expenses.

The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe is responsible for enforcing the Court’s judgments. States are bound by the decisions of the Court and must execute them accordingly. Often this means amending legislation to ensure that the violation does not continue to occur. However, the Court does not have the authority to overrule a national decision or annul national laws.

Friendly Settlement

Prior to a decision on the merits, the Court will try to facilitate the arrangement of a friendly settlement.  If a friendly settlement cannot be reached, the Court will then deliver a judgment on the merits.  In instances where the Chamber hearing the case decides to issue an admissibility decision in conjunction with a judgment on the merits, the parties may include information about friendly settlements in the observation they submit to the Court.

Interim Measures

In exceptional cases, the Court may grant applicants “interim measures,” which are designed to protect the applicant from further harm while the case proceeds before the Court. Requests for interim measures are only granted when there is an imminent risk of irreparable harm such as death or torture. They are most often granted in extradition and deportation cases.

 

 

 

When Will the US Begin to Sanction China?

Last week, Defense Secretary Mattis said:

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis this week voiced new U.S. opposition to China’s continued militarization of islands in the South China Sea.

“We remain highly concerned with continued militarization of features in the South China Sea,” Mattis told reporters on Monday as he traveled to Vietnam.

Mattis also said China is using predatory economics to seek control over other nations.

The Chinese are engaged in a global infrastructure development plan called the Belt and Road Initiative that U.S. officials have said is being used by Beijing to expand influence and control abroad, and expand Chinese military bases around the world.

Mattis said the predatory economic policies include loans “where massive debt is piled on countries that fiscal analysis would say they are going to have difficulty, at best, repaying in the smaller countries.”

The defense secretary, echoing the new U.S. hardline policy toward China, said the United States is not seeking to “contain” China but wants more reciprocal relations.

USA: China's militarisation of the South China Sea ... In part from Newsweek:

“Beijing can now deploy military assets, including combat aircraft and mobile missile launchers to the Spratly Islands at any time,” said the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) on Monday in a report that included images of the three man-made islands—Fiery Cross reef, Subi, and Mischief. Its director Greg Poling told Voice of America that new antennas had been spotted on Subi and Fiery Cross, so he expected deployments there soon.

The Spratly Islands are around 500 miles from the coast of China, and Fiery Cross Reef about 740 miles from mainland China. It is approximately 170 miles off the coast of Vietnam. Why did China build these islands and how did they manage to make land out of sea?

***

But media is not paying attention.

It gets worse.

Researchers have mapped out a series of internet traffic hijacks and redirections that they say are part of large espionage and intellectual property theft effort by China.

China systematically hijacks internet traffic: researchers

The researchers, Chris Demchak of the United States Naval War College and Yuval Shavitt of the Tel Aviv University in Israel, say in their paper that state-owned China Telecom hijacked and diverted internet traffic going to or passing through the US and Canada to China on a regular basis.

Tel Aviv University researchers built a route tracing system that monitors BGP announcements  and which picks up on patterns suggesting accidental or deliberate hijacks and discovered multiple attacks by China Telecom over the past few years.

In 2016, China Telecom diverted traffic between Canada and Korean government networks to its PoP in Toronto. From there, traffic was forwarded to the China Telecom PoP on the US West Coast and sent to China, and finally delivered to Korea.

Normally, the traffic would take a shorter route, going between Canada, the US and directly to Korea. The traffic hijack lasted for six months, suggesting it was a deliberate attack, Demchak and Shavitt said.

Demchak and Shavitt detailed other traffic hijacks, including one that saw traffic from US locations to a large Anglo-American bank’s Milan headquarters being terminated in China, and never delivered to Italy, in 2016.

During 2017, traffic between Scandinavia and Japan, transiting the United States, was also captured by China Telecom, ditto data headed to a mail server operated by a large Thai financial company.

China Telecom is able to divert the traffic by announcing bogus routes via the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) that governs data flows between Autonomous Systems, the large networks operated by telcos, internet providers and corporations.

After the traffic was copied by China Telecom for encyption breaking and analysis, it was delivered to the intended networks with only small delays. Demchak and Shavitt said.

Such hijacking is difficult to detect as China Telecom has multiple points of presence (PoPs) in North America and Europe that are physically close to the attacked networks, causing almost unnoticeable traffic delivery delays despite the lengthened routes.

China in comparison does not allow overseas telcos to establish PoPs in the country, and has only three gateways into the country, in Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong. This isolation protects the country’s domestic and transit traffic from foreign hijacking.

BGP hijacking of internet traffic is a common phenomenon, one which requires the support of large network operators to exploit at scale.

While the US and China agreed in 2015 to not hack one another’s computer networks, the deal did not cover hijacking of internet backbones, Demchak and Shavitt pointed out.

The researchers suggest the allied democratic nations establish an “access reciprocity” policy for internet PoPs located in their countries, to address the traffic hijacking.

Under the access reciprocity policy US telcos and providers should be allowed to set up PoPs in China, Demchak and Shavitt said.

If access reciprocity is refused, “then an appropriate defence policy in response could state that no traffic to or from the US or ally is allowed to enter a China Telecom PoP in the US or in the ally’s networks,” the researchers suggested.

Such a policy could be inserted into BGP routing tables as required for automatic implementation.

Afghanistan Then and Now

Primer:In September of 1963, the King and Queen of Afghanistan visited Washington DC as guests of President Kennedy.

55 years later, this month, the United States and allies have entered the 17th year of military conflict in Afghanistan. The target is the Taliban. Under the Obama regime, several attempts were made to normalize relationship with the Taliban leadership including swapping one treasonous soldier for 5 senior Taliban leaders from Guantanamo. At the same time, the United States coordinated with Qatar to pay for a Taliban consulate operation in Qatar. It remains today.

Under the Trump administration, the same kind of talks are taking place with Zalmay Khalilzad leading the U.S. envoy.

Zalmay Khalilzad, the Afghan-born U.S. adviser and former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, briefed Ghani and Abdullah on October 13 about his meetings with senior ministers and top diplomats in four countries as part of a diplomatic mission aimed at bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table.

Since Khalilzad last visited Kabul on October 4, his tour has taken him to Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.

A statement sent to journalists on October 13 by Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said Khalilzad met Taliban representatives on October 12 in Qatar’s capital, Doha, to discuss ending the Afghan conflict.

Mujahid said the Taliban representatives told Khalilzad that the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan was a “big obstacle” to peace and that both sides “agreed to continue such meetings.”

Another senior Taliban member said the U.S. envoy had asked the Taliban leadership to declare a cease-fire in Afghanistan for six months, in time for the planned October 20 parliamentary elections.

“Both sides discussed prospects for peace and the U.S presence in Afghanistan,” another Taliban official said.

The Taliban in exchange are seeking the release of their fighters from Afghan jails and the removal of foreign troops currently aiding Afghan security forces.

“Neither side agreed to accept the other’s demands immediately, but they agreed to meet again and find a solution to the conflict,” said a Taliban official who asked not to be identified.

A statement about Khalilzad’s diplomatic tour released by the U.S. Embassy in Kabul did not confirm his meeting with the Taliban. More here.

After 17 years, there are still more Taliban fighters? How is that possible?

Let’s go back many years shall we?

BEFORE THE AMERICAN invasion, before the Russian war, and before the Marxist revolution, Afghanistan used to be a pretty nice place.

An astonishing collection of photos from the 1960s was recently featured by the Denver Post.

To see the full photo essay, go here.

Trump Admin Trying to Get a Cyber Doctrine

October is national cyber awareness month, frankly every month and every day should be an awareness day.

octo | Office of the Chief Technology Officer

So, back in late 2017, the House passed by a voice vote H.R. 3559 – Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2017. As you may guess, it is stalled in the Senate.

Meanwhile, in an effort to mobilize and consolidate cyber operations for the United States, there is no consensus within Congress. Should every government agency has a cyber division? Should the United States be able to perform counter cyber attacks? What kind of a cyber attack on the United States constitutes an act of war?

Just last month, Politico published a piece stating in part:

Recent reports that Russia has been attempting to install malware in our electrical grid and that its hackers have infiltrated utility-control rooms across America should constitute a significant wakeup call. Our most critical infrastructure systems are vulnerable to malicious foreign cyberactivity and, despite considerable effort, the collective response has been inadequate. As Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats ominously warned, “The warning lights are blinking red.”

A successful attack on our critical infrastructure — power grids, water supplies, communications systems, transportation and financial networks — could be devastating. Each of these is vital to our economy, health and security. One recent study found that a single coordinated attack on the East Coast power grid could leave parts of the region without power for months, cause thousands of deaths due to the failure of health and safety systems, and cost the U.S. economy almost $250 billion. Cyberattacks could also undermine our elections, either by altering our voter registration rolls or by tampering with the voting systems or results themselves.

The op-ed was written by retired General and former CIA Director David Petraeus who is arguing: “Our grab-bag approach isn’t working. Gen. David Petraeus says it’s time to go big.”

Actually, I agree with General Petraeus on his position. Last month also, John Bolton on the White House National Security Council declared that the U.S. is going on the offensive. Yet in an interesting article, Forbes offers a point and counter-point to that argument.

Last week, President Trump spoke to world leaders about how China is interfering in U.S. elections via the cyber realm. While no evidence has been offered, that is not to say there is no evidence, it is a common tactic of China. Additionally, the United States is offering robust assistance to NATO allies.

Acting to counter Russia’s aggressive use of cyberattacks across Europe and around the world, the U.S. is expected to announce that, if asked, it will use its formidable cyberwarfare capabilities on NATO’s behalf, according to a senior U.S. official.

The announcement is expected in the coming days as U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis attends a meeting of NATO defense ministers on Wednesday and Thursday.

Katie Wheelbarger, the principal deputy assistant defense secretary for international security affairs, said the U.S. is committing to use offensive and defensive cyber operations for NATO allies, but America will maintain control over its own personnel and capabilities.

The decision comes on the heels of the NATO summit in July, when members agreed to allow the alliance to use cyber capabilities that are provided voluntarily by allies to protect networks and respond to cyberattacks. It reflects growing concerns by the U.S. and its allies over Moscow’s use of cyber operations to influence elections in America and elsewhere.

“Russia is constantly pushing its cyber and information operations,” said Wheelbarger, adding that this is a way for the U.S. to show its continued commitment to NATO.

Wheelbarger told reporters traveling to NATO with Mattis that the move is a signal to other nations that NATO is prepared to counter cyberattacks waged against the alliance or its members.

Much like America’s nuclear capabilities, the formal declaration of cyber support can help serve as a military deterrent to other nations and adversaries.

The U.S. has, for some time, considered cyber as a warfighting domain, much like air, sea, space and ground operations. In recent weeks the Pentagon released a new cybersecurity strategy that maps out a more aggressive use of military cyber capabilities. And it specifically calls out Russia and China for their use of cyberattacks.

China, it said, has been “persistently” stealing data from the public and private sector to gain an economic advantage. And it said Russia has use cyber information operations to “influence our population and challenge our diplomatic processes.” U.S. officials have repeatedly accused Moscow of interfering in the 2016 elections, including through online social media.

“We will conduct cyberspace operations to collect intelligence and prepare military cyber capabilities to be used in the event of a crisis or conflict,” the new strategy states, adding that the U.S. is prepared to use cyberwarfare along with other military weapons against its enemies when needed, including to counter malicious cyber activities targeting the country. Read more here.

Not to be left out is North Korea.

The Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the Treasury, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have identified malware and other indicators of compromise used by the North Korean government in an ATM cash-out scheme—referred to by the U.S. Government as “FASTCash.” The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.

For more information, see:

Yup, in closing…..we agree with General Petraeus….it is long overdue to go big and go NOW.

Well, the Report Declares 22 Million Not 11 Million Illegals

State by State: The Cost of Illegal Immigration ...

Foreign nationals are increasingly gaining the ability to influence American elections more directly. They’re being granted the right to vote.

From Boston, where the city council is debating the move, to San Francisco, where noncitizens gained the right earlier this month in school-board elections, jurisdictions are looking to expand the boundaries of the electorate beyond its citizens.

***

Primer: This was compiled by Yale and MIT. Have you considered how many U.S. House Representatives exist from districts where illegals and foreign nationals are the majority? 20? 10? 40?

Context: The Democrats on the Dreamer thing were and are willing to sacrifice the interests of 325 million Americans in order to gain unconditional amnesty for 3.4 million illegal aliens.

The number of undocumented immigrants in the United States: Estimates based on demographic modeling with data from 1990 to 2016

In part: Our analysis has two main outputs. First, we generate what we call our conservative estimate, using parameter values that intentionally underestimate population inflows and overestimate population outflows, leading to estimates that will tend to underestimate the number of undocumented immigrants. Our conservative estimate for 2016 is 16.7 million, well above the estimate that is most widely accepted at present, which is for 2015 but should be comparable. Our model as well as most work in the literature indicates that the population size has been relatively stable since 2008; thus 2015 and 2016 are quite comparable. For our second step, recognizing that there is significant uncertainty about population flows, we simulate our model over a wide range of values for key parameters. These parameter values range from very conservative estimates to standard values in the literature. We sample values for each key parameter from uniform distributions over the ranges we establish. In our simulations, we also include Poisson population uncertainty conditional on parameter values, thus addressing the inherent variability in population flows. Our simulation results produce probability distributions over the number of undocumented immigrants for each year from 1990 to 2016. The results demonstrate that our conservative estimate falls towards the bottom of the probability distribution, at approximately the 2.5th percentile. The mean of the 2016 distribution is 22.1 million, which we take as the best overall estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants based on our modeling approach and current data. We also show the variability in our model based on the simulations for each year from 1990 through 2016.

***

Population inflows

Population inflows are decomposed into two streams: (I) undocumented immigrants who initially entered the country legally but have overstayed their visas; and (II) immigrants who have illegally crossed the border without being apprehended. We describe our approach for each source, explain the basis for our assumptions and why they are conservative, and list parameter ranges for the simulation.

(I) Visa overstays are estimated using Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data for 2016, the first year for which visa overstays were comprehensively measured [5]. To apply this data in our context we also gather data for non-immigrant visas issued for all years from 1990 [6]. For our conservative estimate we assume that for each year the rate of overstays was equal to the 2016 rate. Calibration of our model shows that this assumption is in fact quite conservative. In particular, approximately 41% of undocumented immigrants based on the current survey data approach are visa overstayers [7], which translates to a visa overstay population of 4.6 million in 2015. Our model however predicts the number of overstayers to be less than this (even though our overall estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants is higher). That is, in our model most undocumented immigrants are not overstayers, and the model produces an estimate of the number of overstayers below the estimate produced in the conventional approach based on survey data. We compute that we would need to set the visa overstay rate above the DHS 2016 rate, specifically 1.1 times that rate, for our conservative estimate to generate as many overstayers as the 4.6 million in the 11.3 million estimate. Since many overstayers leave or adjust their status within a few months of their visa expiration date, we make a further conservative adjustment and count as overstayers only those individuals who have overstayed more than 1 year. For the simulation, we set the visa overstay rate equal to the 2016 rate multiplied by a uniform draw from the range [0.5,1.5]; consistent with the discussion above, this is a relatively conservative range.

(II) Illegal Border Crossers: We estimate illegal border crossers through application of the standard repeated trials (capture-recapture) model [810]. The model requires as inputs statistics on the total number of border apprehensions, the number of individuals apprehended more than once in a year (recidivist apprehensions), and estimates of the deterrence rate—the fraction of individuals who give up after being apprehended and do not attempt another crossing. Given these inputs, the repeated trials model generates estimates of: (i) the apprehension rate—the probability an individual is caught trying to cross the border; and (ii) the total number of individuals who are not apprehended (they may be caught one or more times but cross successfully on a later attempt) and enter the interior of the country illegally—the number of illegal border crossers in a year. We discuss data sources and potential weaknesses of this approach here; more information and mathematical details are provided in the Supporting Information.

DHS [10, 11] provide figures for the total number of border apprehensions for every year in our timespan. They also provide information on the number of recidivist apprehensions and estimates of the deterrence rate for every year from 2005. Based on these figures and estimates they provide an estimate of the apprehension rate for each year from 2005 to 2015. Their estimate is 35% for 2005 and increases steadily, to above 50% by the end of the sample period. From their estimates we are able to derive directly estimates of the number of illegal border crossers for each of these years. For earlier years (1990 to 2004) we must make further assumptions. Our assumptions are about the apprehension and deterrence rates, since these have been addressed in the literature; in turn we are able to generate estimates of the number of illegal border crossers in earlier years based on these assumptions (see the Supporting Information for analytic details).

Most experts agree that the apprehension rate was significantly lower in earlier years [12, 13]. A recent study [12] using data from the Mexican Migration Project estimates this rate for every year from 1990 to 2010; estimates in the 1990’s begin from the low twenties and range upwards to approximately 30%. A second study estimates the rate for 2003 at around 20% [13]. Given these estimates, and the general view that apprehension rates have risen, for our conservative estimate we assume that the apprehension rate in years 1990-2004 was equal to the average rate in years 2005-10 or 39%; this is well above the rates discussed in the literature for earlier years and thus tends to reduce our estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants since it implies a larger fraction are apprehended at the border. For our simulation we assume a uniform distribution over the range [0.25,0.40] for the earlier years, still above the average rates in the literature for these years.

Additional facts support the view that the apprehension rate has increased in recent years. The number of border agents has increased dramatically over the timespan of our analysis [14], and the number of hours spent by border agents patrolling the immediate border area has increased by more than 300% between 1992- 2004 [15]. Further, new infrastructure (e.g., fences) and technologies (e.g., night vision equipment, sensors, and video imaging systems) were also introduced during this period [15]. Thus the apprehension rate we use for earlier years almost certainly overstates the actual apprehension rate and therefore underestimates the number of successful crossings. However, we note that these additional border resources may have been concentrated in certain locations and it remains a possibility that apprehension rates were higher in earlier years. We note finally that in using data only on Southern Border crossings we again are conservative in our approach, not accounting for illegal crossings along other borders.

Notwithstanding our view that we make conservative choices in setting up our model and parameter values, we acknowledge that border apprehension rates for the 1990’s are not based on as well-developed data sources as estimates for more recent years. Thus it remains a possibility that these rates are higher than we believe. One aspect of this uncertainty concerns deterrence. When deterrence is higher border crossings will fall. Most researchers believe deterrence has increased in recent years [8, 12]. We note that reference [12] estimates that the probability of eventual entry after multiple attempts on a single trip in the 1990s is close to one, indicating almost no deterrence in the earlier period. One piece of evidence in support of this is data on the voluntary return rate, which refers to the percentage of individuals apprehended at the border who are released back to their home country without going through formal removal proceedings and not being subjected to further penalties. Voluntary returns are thus not “punished” and thus are less likely to be deterred from trying to cross the border in the future, compared with individuals who are subjected to stronger penalties. The voluntary return rate has fallen in recent years, from 98% between 2000 and 2004 to 84% between 2005 and 2010. Thus, at least based on this measure deterrence efforts have increased. However, this does not conclusively demonstrate that deterrence was lower in earlier years and it remains a possibility that it was higher, which would tend to reduce our estimates of the number of undocumented immigrants. In conclusion we note that although there is much uncertainty about the border apprehension rate, it would have to be very high, above 60% for earlier years, in order to generate estimates of the 2015 population of undocumented immigrants in the range of the current widely accepted estimate of just over 11 million (this is based on analyzing our model using the conservative estimate values for all other parameters). This seems implausible based on our reading of the literature.

Population outflows

Population outflows are broken into four categories: (I) voluntary emigration; (II) mortality; (III) deportation; and (IV) change of status from unauthorized to lawful.

(I) Voluntary emigration rates are the largest source of outflow and the most uncertain based on limited data availability. It is well accepted that voluntary emigration rates decline sharply with time spent in the country [16]; thus we employ separate emigration rates for those who have spent one year or less in the U.S., 2-10 years, or longer. We use the following values for our conservative estimate. First, for those who have spent one year or less we assume a voluntary emigration rate of 40%. This estimate is based on data for the first-year visa overstay exit rate (the fraction of overstayers who left the country within one year from the day their visa expired) for 2016 [17], which is in the lower thirty percent range (the rate for 2015 is similar). We note that the rate for visa overstayers is very likely a substantial overestimate for illegal border crossers, who are widely viewed as having a lower likelihood of exiting in the first year, especially in more recent years [12]. The 40% first-year emigration rate that we assume is well above the standard values in the literature [4, 12, 16, 18], which range from 1% to 25%. Hence this assumption contributes to making our estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants in the country a conservative one. For years 2-10 we assume a rate of 4% per year. This is the upper bound among estimates in the literature, which lie between 0.01 to 0.04 [4, 16, 18]. Lastly, for years 10 and above, published estimates of the emigration rate typically fall around 1%; we set this rate to 1% per year in line with these estimates. Note that given the extremely high 40% emigration rate that we assume for those who have only been in the country for one year or less, overall annual emigration rates in our model simulation are significantly higher than those found in the literature or government sources. To further enhance the conservatism of our model, we assume that all undocumented immigrants present at the beginning of 1990 have been here for only one year. Read the whole report here.