Russia v. Ukraine Real Conflict Coming?

Posted on August 16, 2016August 16, 2016 by Denise Simon

For Putin, it is all financial and likely to flush out NATO operations if possible.

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BusinessInsider: Ukraine says it thinks Vladimir Putin is planning a new invasion, and it’s not hard to see why: the Russian leader has built up troops on its border and resumed the hostile rhetoric that preceded his annexation of Crimea two years ago.

But despite appearances, some experts say Putin is more likely seeking advantage through diplomacy than on the battlefield, at least this time around.

“It’s about sanctions,” Andrey Kortunov, director general of the Russian International Affairs Council, a Moscow-based foreign policy think tank close to the Russian Foreign Ministry, told Reuters.

“It looks like a way of increasing pressure on Western participants of the Minsk peace process,” he said of a peace deal set up for eastern Ukraine, where pro-Russian separatists have battled against government forces.

For two years, Russia has been under U.S. and EU sanctions over its annexation of Crimea and support for the separatists in eastern Ukraine. European leaders say the sanctions cannot be lifted unless the Minsk peace deal is implemented, but for now it looks moribund, with fighting occasionally flaring and both sides blaming each other for failing to implement truce terms. More here.

A Ukrainian paratrooper walks among the ruins of building destroyed by pro-Russian separatists shelling on August 14, 2016. Pro-Russian rebels allegedly have ramped up their shelling of one key village: the once quiet coastal resort village of Shyrokyne in Donetsk has turned into one of the bloodiest battlefields of the 27-month separatist revolt. (Photo by ALEKSEY FILIPPOV/AFP/Getty Images)

Forbes: The fog of war has become a Russian specialty. Did they invade Ukraine? Did they not? Did Crimeans vote for secession on their own volition? Did they not? In any event, the market seems to be ignoring the recent escalation of tensions between Ukraine and Russia. Tensions do not bode well for sanctions removal, even though it seems pretty certain to everyone that a Hillary Clinton presidency will keep sanctions in place come January.

The latest fiasco: a border skirmish in Crimea with Ukrainian forces led to the death of two Russian soldiers.

Nevertheless, the skirmish may not have even happened. The New York Times reported Monday from Moscow that Ukraine denied the killing of two soldiers. The official word from Kiev is that the Kremlin invented the story to escalate tensions in order to whip up nationalist passions ahead of parliamentary elections in September. A Russian television report documenting the arrest of a couple of Ukrainian commandos in Crimea included shots of a full moon at dusk, though the moon was waning on the date of the alleged incident, the Times reported. The shot may have been stock footage, however.

And while all this tit-for-tat was going on, the Market Vectors Russia (RSX) fund rose 2.27%, two times more than the MSCI Emerging Markets Index.

The jury is out as to why this is happening in Crimea. One theory is that Ukraine was the instigator. Ukraine has a strong, even existential, interest in ensuring that the U.S. continues to provide support. To this end, it is advantageous for Ukraine to paint Putin and Russia as bad guys, an increasingly easy task.

Pro-Russia political analyst Sergei Markov even says U.S. intelligence agencies and the Hillary Clinton campaign itself were behind it in order to make pro-Russia Republican Donald Trump look to be supportive of a rogue nation.

“An escalation of tensions between Russia and Ukraine would be highly expedient for Hillary Clinton, who has repeatedly issued sharp-worded, aggressive statements against Putin and Russia,” he was quoted as saying by the Khodorkovsky Center’s editorial writers on Monday.

RSX sold off only a tad late after market hours on Monday.

Why would Vladimir Putin want to cause more trouble in Ukraine than he already has? His United Russia party has very little opposition. His approval rating remains high. But a little bit of Russian firepower, especially where Russia is looked at as being picked on by Western back forces, plays well with United Russia fans.

Putin has state Duma elections coming up and he may take the view that both Europe and the U.S. are too weak to seriously punish him beyond extending sanctions, which is a given if in a Clinton presidency.

Putin may also take the view that a foreign policy distraction is a good pretext for a bit of political housecleaning at

home, explaining the exit of long-standing supporter, Chief of Staff Sergei Ivanov, notes Jan Dehn, head of research for emerging market investment firm Ashmore in London.

As for the investment implications, Russia’s ability and willingness to pay its debts to foreign banks remain solid. If bond spreads should blow out materially, buyers are likely to outweigh sellers in a rather short period of time. This happened back in November of 2014 when the central bank changed its currency trading band and raised interest rates three times in less than a month. Spreads were over 900 basis points over Treasurys. The Russian bond lords were the first to pile in.

That made Russia one of the best bond trades in the world and stood as evidence that the market has faith in Russia debt, at least. It will get paid. It actually yields. Holy lord…

Meanwhile, the Russian economy is turning a corner and investors are hoping to see GDP crack zero this year. Year on year growth rates were -0.6% in the second quarter from -1.2% in the first. Inflation is stabilizing but not enough yet for a rate cut. So long as inflation doesn’t go the other way, the central bank will cut rates and that will be supportive of equities.

The only thing to pull the rug out of Russia would be oil heading to the $30s again. It’s not unlikely. But it’s definitely not consensus.

Iran Executed the Nuclear Scientist, Mentioned in Hillary’s Emails

Posted on August 7, 2016August 7, 2016 by Denise Simon

Iran has executed a nuclear scientist it convicted of divulging state secrets to the U.S., its judiciary said Sunday.

Shahram Amiri had earlier been sentenced to death by a lower court, judiciary spokesman Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejehi told the official Islamic Republic News Agency. The sentence was “confirmed and carried out,” he said.

He was allegedly paid $5 million dollars for his information helping the United States.

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EXCLUSIVE: Iran Nuclear Scientist Defects to U.S. In CIA ‘Intelligence Coup’

2010/ABCNews: An award-winning Iranian nuclear scientist, who disappeared last year under mysterious circumstances, has defected to the CIA and been resettled in the United States, according to people briefed on the operation by intelligence officials.

The officials were said to have termed the defection of the scientist, Shahram Amiri, “an intelligence coup” in the continuing CIA operation to spy on and undermine Iran’s nuclear program.

A spokesperson for the CIA declined to comment. In its declassified annual report to Congress, the CIA said, “Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons though we do not know whether Tehran eventually will decide to produce nuclear weapons.”

Amiri, a nuclear physicist in his early 30s, went missing last June three days after arriving in Saudi Arabia on a pilgrimage, according to the Iranian government. He worked at Tehran’s Malek Ashtar University, which is closely connected to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, according to the Associated Press. More here.

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Upon the orders of the Iranian regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the regime’s executioners sent nuclear expert Shahram Amiri to the gallows after seven years of imprisonment. Shahram Amiri’s execution, whose news was published by his family, was carried out despite the fact that the mullahs’ judiciary had sentenced him to 10 years of imprisonment and five years of exile on the charge of “relationships with hostile governments”. More here.

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Cotton: Clinton discussed executed Iranian scientist on email

WashingtonExaminer: Hillary Clinton recklessly discussed, in emails hosted on her private server, an Iranian nuclear scientist who was executed by Iran for treason, Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., said Sunday.

“I’m not going to comment on what he may or may not have done for the United States government, but in the emails that were on Hillary Clinton’s private server, there were conversations among her senior advisors about this gentleman,” he said on “Face the Nation.” Cotton was speaking about Shahram Amiri, who gave information to the U.S. about Iran’s nuclear program.

The senator said this lapse proves she is not capable of keeping the country safe.

“That goes to show just how reckless and careless her decision was to put that kind of highly classified information on a private server. And I think her judgment is not suited to keep this country safe,” he said.

The revelation could cause further political damage to Clinton, who was already on the defensive Sunday after commenting oddly last week that she had “short-circuited” in a statement related to her honesty about the email scandal.

Republican nominee Donald Trump seized on the statement to question her mental stability.

Iran confirmed on Sunday that Amiri had been hanged for treason. He was convicted of spying charges in a death sentence case that was upheld on appeal, according to the Associated Press.

“This person who had access to the country’s secret and classified information had been linked to our hostile and No. 1 enemy, America, the Great Satan” a spokesman for the Iranian judiciary said. “He provided the enemy with vital and secret information of the country.”

His body was returned to his mother with rope marks around the neck.

It would appear possible that discussion on an unclassified — and quite possibly hacked — email system about a person who was hanged as a spy will have a chilling effect on others who might want to engage in espionage for the United States.

Amiri disappeared while on a religious pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia in 2009, but he then resurfaced a year later in the U.S., where he visited the Iranian interest section of the Pakistani embassy and demanded to be sent home to Iran. While Amiri told reporters that he was held against his will by both the Saudis and the Americans, U.S. officials said he was receiving millions of dollars for information he provided about Iran’s nuclear program.

The scientist shows up in Clinton’s emails back in 2010, just nine days before he returned to Iran.

“We have a diplomatic, ‘psychological’ issue, not a legal one. Our friend has to be given a way out,” the email by Richard Morningstar, a former State Department special envoy for Eurasian energy, read, according to the Associated Press. “Our person won’t be able to do anything anyway. If he has to leave so be it.”

Cotton Sunday also accused the Obama administration of “working like a gun cartel” by sending $400 million to Iran in what many regard as ransom for hostages.

Hillary Clinton’s vice presidential running mate Tim Kaine described the payment as “appropriate.”

Why Did Secretaries Gates, Hagel and Panetta Really Resign?

Posted on August 7, 2016August 7, 2016 by Denise Simon

What they were really saying is fighting a war under Baraq Obama became a behemoth bureaucracy and just as an added concept, so has local law enforcement. But to stay on topic and to understand why the enemies have the advantage whether on a battlefield or in any diplomatic efforts with other world leaders, the below text will blow your head off.

Bring in the lawyers, submit names for nomination as a militant or enemy, form a committee, have meetings, clear with more lawyers, challenge the evidence, seek advise from other agencies, get Obama off the golf course, meet again, see what the State Department has to say, collaborate with other world leaders, go back to the White House and hope the pen and phone are available and agree. Meanwhile, the high value target is where again?

(Please excuse the text formatting below, it is a conversion from a .pdf file)

The original document from the Justice Department is here.

May 22, 2013

PROCEDURES FOR APPROVING DIRECT ACTION AGAINST TERRORIST TARGETS

LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND AREAS OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES

From the Justice Department: This Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) establishes the standard operating procedures for when the United States takes direct action, which refers to lethal and non-lethal uses of force, including capture operations, against terrorist targets outside the United States and areas of active hosti lities.

Any direct action must be conducted lawfully and taken against lawful targets; wherever possible such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted]such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted]such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted]such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted]such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] plan. In particular, whether any proposed target would be a lawful target for direct action is a determination that will be made in the first instance by the nominating department’s or agency’s counsel (with appropriate legal review as provided below) based on the legal authorities of the nominating department or agency and other applicable law. Even if the proposed target is lawful, there remains a separate question whether the proposed target should be targeted for direct action as a matter of pol icy. That determination will be made pursuant to the interagency review process and policy standards set forth in this PPG. The most important policy objective. particularly informing consideration of lethal action, is to protect American lives.

Capture operations offer the best opportunity for meaningful intelligence gain from counterterrorism (CT) operations and the mitigation and disruption of terrorist threats. Consequently, the United States prioritizes. as a matter of policy. the capture of terrorist suspects as a preferred option over lethal action and will therefore require a feasibility assessment of capture options as a component of any proposal for lethal action. Lethal action should be taken in an effort to prevent terrorist attacks against U.S. persons only when capture of an individual is not feasible and no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat. Lethal action should not be proposed or pursued as a punitive step or as a substitute for prosecuting a terrorist suspect in a civilian court or a military commission. Capture is preferred even in circumstances where neither prosecution nor third-country custody are availab le disposition options at the time.

CT actions, including lethal action against designated terrorist targets. shall be as discriminating and precise as reasonably possible. Absent extraordinary circumstances, direct action against an identified high-value terrorist (HVT) will be taken only when there is near certainty that the individual being targeted is in fact the lawful target and located at the place where the action will occur. Also absent extraordinary circumstances, direct action will be taken only if there is near certainty that the action can be taken without injuring or killing non-combatants. For purposes of this PPG. non-combatants are understood to be individuals who may not be made the object of attack under the law of armed conflict. The term ·’non-combatant” does not include an individual who is targetable as part of a belligerent party to an armed conflict, an individual who is taking a direct part in hostilities, or an individual who is targetable in the exercise of national self-defense. Moreover, international legal principles. including respect for a state’s sovereignty and the laws of war, impose important constraints on the ability of the United States to act

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unilaterally-and on the way in which the United States can use force -in foreign territories.

Direct action should only be undertaken

As renected in the procedures contained in this PPG, whenever possible and appropriate, decisions regarding direct action will be informed by departments and agencies with relevant

expertise. knowledge, and equities . •••••••••••••••••••••••

•••••••••••

. as well as by coordinated interagc ncy intelligence analysis.

Such intcragency coordination and consultation will ensure that decisions on operational matters or such importance are well-informed and will racilitate de-confliction among departments and agencies addressing overlapping threat streams. uch coordination is not intended to interfere with the traditional command and control authority of departments and agencies conducting CT operations.

Lastly. when considering potential direct action against a U.S. person under this PPG, there are

additional questions that must be answered. The Depat1ment of Justice (DOJ ). for example.

must conduct a legal analysis to ensure that such action may be conducted against the individual

consistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States.

Based on the principles and priorities described above. Section I sets forth the procedure for

establishing

plan for taking direct action against terrorist targets.

Section 2 sets forth the approval process for the capture and long-term disposition of suspected terrorists. Section 3 sets forth the policy standard and procedure for designating identified I IYTs for lethal action. Section 4 sets forth the policy standard and procedure for approving kthal

force aga in st terrorist targets other than identified HVTs.

1 Section 5 sets forth the procedures for approving proposals that vary from the policy guidance otherwise set forth in this PPG. Section 6 sets forth the procedure for arter-action reports. Section 7 addresses congressional notification.

ection 8 sets forth general provisions.

SECTION 1. Procedure for Establishing a

Plan for taking

Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets

1.A Operational Plans for Taking Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets

Each of the operating agencies may propose a deta iled operational plan to govern their respective

direct action operations

against: (I) suspected terrorists who may

be lawfully detained: (2) identified HVTs who may be lawfully targeted for lethal action; or (3) lawful terrorist targets other than identilied I IYTs.

J.B lnteragency Review of Operational Plans

All operational plans to undertake direct action operations against terrorist targets···

•••••••••

must undergo a legal review b) the general counsel(s) or the operating

1 This PPG docs noL address ocherwise lawful and properly authorized activities !hat may have lethal effects. which are incidental to the primary purpose of the operation.

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agency executing the plan, and be submitted to the National Security Staff (NSS) for interagency review. All proposed operational plans must conform to the policy standards set forth in this

Section. All proposed operational plans to undertake direct action against terrorist targets •••••••••••

along with the conc lus ions of the General Counsel, sha ll be referred

to the NSS Legal Adviser. The NSS Legal Adviser and the General Counsel of the proposing operating agency shall consult with other department and agency counsels, as necessary and appropriate. The NSS Legal Adviser shall submit the relevant legal conclusions to the Deputies Committee to inform its consideration of the proposed operational plan. AII proposed

operational plans to undertake direct action against terrorist targets···········

•l

will be reviewed by appropriate members of the Deputies and Principals Committees of

the National Security Council (NSC) (defined in Presidential Policy Directive-I or any successor directive) before presentation to the President for decision.

l.C Guidelines for Operational Plans

Any operational plan for taking direct action against terrorist targets·········

–

shall. among other things. indicate with precision:

I) The S. CT objectives to be achieved; 2) The duration of time for which the authority is to remain in force:

3) The international legal basis for taking action •••••

4) The strike and surveillance assets that may be employed when taking action against an authorized objective;

5)

6) Any proposed stipulation related to the operational plan, including the duration ofauthority for such stipulation;

7) Any proposed variations from the policies and procedures set forth in this PPG; and

8) The conditions precedent for any operation, which shall include at a minimum the following: (a) near certainty that an identified HVT or other lawful terrorist target other than an identified HVT is present; (b) near certainty that non-combatants wi ll not be inJured or

killed: (c)

and (d) ir

lethal force is being employed: (i) an assessment that capture is not feasible at the time of the operation: (ii) an assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons; and (iii) an assessment that no other reasonable alternatives to lethal action exist to effectively address the threat to U.S. persons.

: Operational disagreements

shall be elevated to

Principals. The President will adjudicate any disagreement among or between Principals .

..,

.)

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l.D Additional Requirements When Requesting Authority for Directing Lethal Force Against Targets Other Than Identified HVTs

When requesting authority to direct lelhal force against lerrorist targets other than identi ficd

HVTs, the

plan shall also inc lude the following:

I) The types of targets that would qualify as appropriate targets pursuant lo Section 4 (Terrorist Targets Other Than Identified HVTs) for purposes of the proposed operational plan: and

2) A description of the operating agency” s internal process for nominating and approving the use of lethal force aga inst terrorist targets other than identified HYTs.

t.E Policies and Procedures

The operating agencies shall estab lish harmonized policies and procedures for assessing:

I) ear certainty that a lawful target is present:

2) Near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed; and

3) With respect to a proposal to lake direct action against terrorist targets other than identified HVTs, whether the target qualifies pursuant to the policy standard set forth in Section 4.A of this PPG and in the specific operational plan.

1.F When Using Lethal Action, E mploy All Reasonably Available Resources to Ascerta in the Identity of the Target

When the use of lethal action is deemed necessary. departments and agencies of the United Slates Government must employ all reasonably available resources to ascertain the identity of the target so that action can be taken, for example. aga inst identified HVTs in accordance with

ection 3 of this PPG. Verifying a target·s identity before taking lethal action ensures greater certainty of outcome that lethal action has been taken against identified I IVTs who satisfy Lhe policy standard for lethal action in ection 3.A.

l.G Principals and Deputies Review of Operational Plans for Taking Direct Action

Against Terrorists Targets···············

When considering a proposed operational plan, Principals and Deputies shall evaluate the following issues, along with any others they deem appropriate:

I) The implications for the broader regional and international political interests of the United States; and

2) For an operational plan that includes the option of lethal force against targets other than identified HVTs. an explanation of why authorizing direct action against targets other than identi fied HYTs is necessary to achieve U . . policy objectives.

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t.H Presentation to the President

I.H. I If Lhe Principal of the nominaling operating agency, after review by Principals and Deputies. continues to support Lhe operational plan, the plan shall be presented to the President for decision, along with the views expressed by departments and agencies during the NSC process.

I.H.2 An appropriate NSS official will communicate, in writing, the Presidenl’s decision, including any Lerms or conditions placed on any approval, to appropriale deparLmcnts and agencies.

1.1 Amendments or Modifications to Operational Plans

Excepl as described in Section 5, any amendments or modifications to an approved operalional

plan ror direct action

shall undergo the same review and approval

process oullined in this Section.

SECTION 2. Approval Process for Certain Captures and the Long-Term Disposition of Certain Suspects

This Section sets forth the approval process for nominating for capture suspected terrorists or individuals providing operational support to suspected terrorists (in this section, togeLhcr referred to as ·’suspects”): proposals to take custody of suspects, including pre-and post-capture

screening:

and

determining a long-term disposition for suspects.

Unless otherwise approved in an operational plan under Section I. the SS shal I coordinate for

interagency review under this PPG, as described below, the following: (I) operations intended to

result····································

(2) operations that result in United States Government personnel taking custody (through a capture or lransrer)3 of a suspect located overseas and outside areas oractive host ii ities; and (3) long-term disposition decisions wilh respect to such suspecls. The involvement of United Slates Government personnel in extraditions or transfers initiated for the purpose of prosecution in civi I ian court or those scenarios to which PPD-14 applies (i.e., circumslances in which an individual is arrested or otherwise taken into custody by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or another Federal law enforeemenl agency)4 are nol covered by this PPG.

Captures and Transfers by Foreign Governments: These procedures do not apply to U.S. law enrorcement requests for foreign governments to arrest or otherwise take into custody a suspecL

‘ ··custody:· as referred to here.

it is anticipated that the

United States Government will have temporar; or transitory custody ofthe individual(s) without the presence of officials ofthe foreign government maintaining custody of the detainee(s).

4 Consistent with existing policy and practice. DOJ will. as appropriate. continue to notify the SS. through the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG). ofplans to arrest. or seek the extradition or transfer of. a suspected terrorist. and where appropriate (e.g .. to consider other potential disposition options) the SS. in consultation with DOJ, may arrange for interagency consideration ofa request for extradition or transfer.

5

I

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or lo United States Government provision of training. funds, or equipment to enable a foreign government to capture a suspect. These procedures also do not apply to non-law enforcement United States Government requests to capture a suspect who will remain in the custody of the foreign government or to the provision of actionable intelligence to enable such captures. Every 6 months, departments and agencies shall notify the NSS of any requests made of a foreign government to capture a suspect in the preceding 6 months. Unless covered by the exceptions above or otherwise included in an operational plan under Section I, if United States Government

personnel

capture a suspect.

or an operation is intended to result in United States Government personnel taking custody of a suspect. the department or agency must submit a proposal through the NS for interagency

review. Operational plans

may include additional conditions

requiring interagency review of capture operalions involving United Slates Government personnel, depending on the policy consideration of the panicular country or region in which the

operations would occur. If United tales Government personnel are expected·····

•••••••••••••••••

to capture or transfer suspects in a particular

country or region on an ongoing basis. the department or agency involved should seek to include

a proposed plan for such activities in the operational plan approved under Section I.

2.A Nomination Process

2.A. I Any department or agency participating in the Deputies Committee review in Section 2.D may identify an individual for consideration, but only an operating agency or DOJ (“nominating agencies·· for purposes of Section 2 of this PPG) may forma lly request that a suspect be considered for capture or custody by U.S. personnel. Additionally, a department or agency that has captured a suspect, or that plans to capture or otherwise take custody of a suspect. shall, whenever practicable, propose a long-term disposition for such individual. Prior to requesling that an individual be considered for capture or custody by the United States, the nominating agency must confirm with its General Counsel that the operation can be conducted lawfully, but it i not neces ary to have resolved the long-term dispos ition plan prior to proposing a capture operation.

2.A.2 Whenever possible, the nominating agency shall notify the lnteragency Disposition Planning Group prior to such a request.

2.A.3 A nomination for custody, including capture, or a proposed long-term disposition under Section 2.A. I shall be referred to the NSS, which shall initiate the screening process described in Section 2.8.

2.A.4 In the event initial screening under Section 2.B has not taken place prior to U.S. personnel taking custody of a suspect. the process for screening after capture described in ection 2.C shall be initiated.

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2.B Screening Prior to a Capture Operation

2.8.1 The nominating agency shall prepare a profile for each suspect referred to the S for review of a proposal to capture or otherwise lake custody of the individual. The profile shall be developed based upon all relevant disseminated information available to the Intelligence Community (IC), as well as any other information needed Lo present as comprehensive and thorough a profile of the individual as possible. The profile should explain any difference of views among the IC and note. where appropriate. gaps in existing intelligence. as well as inconclusive and contradictory intelligence reports. At a minimum, each individual profile shall include the following in formation to the extent that such information exists:

2.B.2 Once the profile has been completed. the nominating agency shall provide the profile to the NSS Senior Director for Countcrterrorism.

2.B.3 Whenever time permits, the lnteragency Disposition Planning Group shall assess the availability. including the strengths and weaknesses. of potential disposition options.

2.B.4 All nominations under this Section for capturing or otherwise taking a suspect into custody must undergo a legal review by the General Counsel of the nominating agency to determine that the suspect may lawfully be captured or taken into custody by the United States and that the operation can be conducted in accordance with applicable law. The General Counsel’s conclusions shall be referred to the NSS Legal Adviser. The NSS Legal Adviser and the General Counsel of the nominating agency sh al I consult with other department and agency counsels, as necessary and appropriate. In addition, in the event that the suspect who has been

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2.C.3

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nominated is a U.S. person. DOJ shall conduct a legal analysis to ensure that the operation may be conducted consistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States. The NSS Legal Adviser shall submit the relevant legal conclusions to the Deputies Committee to inform its consideration of the nomination.

2.B.5 The NSS shall convene a Restricted Countcrterrorism Security Group (RCSG/’ for the purpose of reviewing and organizing material and addressing any issues related to the nomination of an individual for capture. custody, or long-term disposition. Before forward ing to the Deputies the nomination of a suspect for capture or to otherwise be taken into custody, the RCSG shall identify whether any other material is needed for Deputies’ consideration of the nomination and issue taskings to departments and agencies. as appropriate. For each nomination. the Swill request. and the ational Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) shall conduct. an assessment of the suspect and provide that assessment to the SS prior to consideration of the nomination or proposed long-term disposition by the Depmies Committee. and where feasible. prior to RCSG review. The SS will be responsible for ensuring that all necessary materials. including the profile developed by the nominating agency and th e CTC assessment, are included in the nomination package submitted to Deputies.

2.C Screening After Capture

2.C. I Whenever feasible. initial screening by the United States of suspects taken into U.S. custody should be conducted before the United States captures or otherwise takes custody of the suspect, as set out in Section 2.B.

2.C.2 In the event initial screening cannot be conducted before the United States takes custody of the individual. immediately after capturing or otherwise taking custody of the suspect, appropriate U.S. personnel shall screen the individual to ensure that the correct individual has been taken into custody and that the individual may be lawfully detained. Such screening shall be conducted consistent with the laws and policies applicable to the authorities pursuant to which

the individual is being detained. and

2.C.4 In the event that the suspect is detained pursuant to law of war authorities by the U. military and additional time is needed for purposes of intelligence collection or the development of a long-term disposition option. the Secretary of Defense or his designce, following appropriate intcragcncy consultations coordinated through the NSC process, may approve an extension of the

screening period

subject to the fo llowing:

~ The RCSG shall be chaired by the NSS Senior Director for Counterterrorism and shall include the following departments and agencies: the Department ofState, the Department of the Treasury. DOD. DOJ, the Department of

I lomeland Security (DHS) – .

Cir\. Joint Chiefs ofStaff(JCS).

and NCTC.

Additional departments and agencies may participate in the RCSG meetings. as appropriate.

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I) The suspect’s detention must be consistent with S. law and policy, as we ll as all applicable international law;

2)

3) The International Commillee of the Red Cross must be notified of. and prov ided timely access Lo. any suspect held by the U.S. military pursuant to law of war authorities; and

4) When po sible and consistent with the primary objective of collecting intelligence, intelligence will be collected in a manner that preserves the ava ilability of long-term disposition options. including prosecution.

2.D Deputies Review

2.D. I A nomination or disposition package for capture. custody, or long-term dispos ition forwarded to Lhe Deputies shall include the following:

I) The profile, produced by the nominating agency pursuant Lo Section B. l. for the suspect or suspects proposed for capture or long-term disposi tion;

2) Any assessment produced by NCTC pursuant to Section 2.B.5:

3) If appropriate. a description of the planned capture and screening operation and ••••

••••••

operational plan under which the capture would be conducted:

4) The deparLmenL(s) or agency or agencies that wou ld be responsible for carrying out the proposed operation. if nol already conducted:

5) A summary of the legal assessment prepared under ection 2.B.4: and

6) An assessment. including the strengths and weaknesses. of potential long-term disposition options.

2.D.2 The Deputies of the Department of State. the Treasury. DOD, DOJ, OHS. the Office of

the Director ofNational Intelligence (DNI) ••

, CIA, JCS, –

. NCTC. and any other

Deputies or officials a Deputy National Security Advisor (D SA) may invite to pa11icipate. shall promptly consider whether to reco mmend to the Principal of the nominating agency that a capture operation be conducted in the context of the proposed plan at issue, that the United States Government otherwise take custody of the indi vidual, or that a particular long-term dispos ition option be pursued.

2.D.3 When considering a proposed nomination. the Deputies shall evaluate the following issues, and any others deemed appropriate by the Deputies:

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l”OP ~ECRE1″11JOFORN

I) Whether the suspect’s capture would further the U.S. CT strategy; 2) The implications for the broader regional and international political interests of the United States; 3) Whether the proposed action would interfere with any intelligence collection or compromise

any intelligence sources or methods: 4) The proposed plan for the detention and interrogation of the suspect; 5) The proposed plan to capture the suspect. including the feasibility of capture and the risk to

U.S. personnel; 6) In the event that transfer to a third party or country is anticipated, the proposed plan for

obtaining humane treatment assurances from any country; 7) The long-term disposition options for the individual: and

8)

2.D.4 When considering the long-term disposition of a suspect who is already in U.S. custody. or whom a department or agency has already been aUlhorized to capture or take into custody, the Deputies ‘ discussion shall be guided by the following principles:

I) Whenever possible, third-country custody options that are consistent with . national security should be explored:

2) Where transfer to a third country is not feas ible or consistent with U.S. national security interests. the preferred long-term disposition option for suspects captured or otherwise taken into custody by the United States will be prosecution in a civilian court or, where ava ilable, a military commission. Consistent with that preference. wherever poss ible and consistent with the primary objective of collecting intelligence. intelligence will be collected in a manner that allows it to be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution: and

3) In no event wi ll additional detainees be brought to the detention facilities at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.

Following consideration and discussion by the Deputies. departments and agencies shall submit the final positions of their Principals within a time frame consistent with operational needs.

2.E Presentation to the President and the Principal of the Nominating Agency

2.E. I If the nominating agency, on behalf of its Principal. continues to support taking action, a D A shall inform the President of the views expressed by departments and agencies. As appropriate, the nomination shall be presented to the Pres ident for a decision or the nomination will be provided to the Principal of the appropriate operating agency for a decision. along with any views expressed by the President.

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II

2.E.2 An appropriate SS official will communicate in writing the decision taken. including any terms or conditions placed on such decisions. to the Deputies who participated in the Deputies Comminee review of the nomination.

SECTION 3. Policy Standard and Procedure for Designating Identified HVTs for Lethal Action

3.A Policy Standard for the Use of Lethal Action Against HVTs

Where the use of lethal action against I IVTs has been authorized ••••••••••••

an individual whose identity is known will only be eligible to be targeted. as a policy matter.

COnSiStent \Vi th the requirements Of the approved Operational plan

. if

the individual’s activities pose a con ti nu ing. imm i ncnt threat to U.S. persons.

3.B Necessary Preconditions for Taking Lethal Action

Lethal action requires that the individual may lawfully be targeted under existing authorities and that any conditions established in the appropriate operational plan. including those set forth in eclion I .C.8, are met. The preconditions ct forth in Section I .C.8 for the use of lethal force are as fo llows: (a) near certainly that an identified HVT is present; (b) near certainty that nonc1o1m1b1a1ta1n1ts1w1

1i111 n?(tdb)e injured or kil k d: (c) . r “bl h . f I . J( )

l ; an assessment L1iat capture 1s not 1eas1 eat t e time o tic operation: e

an assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is

contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons: and (f) an

assessment that no other reasonable alternatives to lethal action exist to effectively add ress the

threat to U.S. persons.

3.C lnteragency Review Process

3.C. I Any department or agency participating in the Deputies Committee review in Section 3.D may identify an individual for consideration. but only the operating agencies (also known as the ··nominating agencies .. for purposes of ection 3 of this PPG) may formally propose that an individual be nominated for lethal action following confirmation from the General Counsel of the nominating agency that the individual would be a lawful target.

3.C.2 The nominating agency shall prepare a profile for each individual nominated for lethal action. The profile shall be developed based upon all relevant disseminated information available to the IC. as well as any other information needed co prese nt as comprehensive and thorough a profile of the individual as possible. The profile shall note. where appropriate, gaps

7 Operational disagreements

are to be elevated to

Principals. The President will adjudicate any disagreement among or between Principals. ~ rhis process is designed to review nominations or individuals only where the capture or any individual at issue is not feasible. If. at any point during or after the approval process capture appears feasible. a capture option in

accordance with Section 2 of this PPG (or the relevant operational plan

) should be pursued.

If the individual has already been approved for lethal action when a capture option becomes feasible, the individual should be referred to the 155 Senior Director for Countcrterrorism and undergo an expedited Deputies review focused on idcmifying disposition options.

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in existing intelligence. as well as inconclusive and contradictory intelligence reports. At a minimum, each indi vidual profile shall include a summary of all relevant disseminated intelligence required to determine whether the policy standard set forth in Section 3.A for lethal action aga inst HYTs has been met, and include the following information lo the extent that such information is available:

3.C.3 The shall convene a meeting of the RCSG for the purpose of reviewing and organizing material. and addressing any issues. related to the nomination of an individual for lethal action.

3.C.4 Before forward ing the nom ination of an identified HVT for lethal action to Deputies. the RCSG shall identify other materials needed for Deputies· consideration of the nomination and shall issue such taskings to departments and agencies. as appropriate. For each nomination. the

SS will request. and NCTC shall conduct. an assessment of the nomination and provide that assessment to the NSS prior to consideration of the nomination by the Deputies Committee, and where feasible prior to RCSG review. The NSS will be responsible for ensuring that all necessary materials. including the profile developed by the nom inating agency and the NCTC assessment. arc included in the nomination package submitted to Deputies.

T@P ~ECRCT;~J@P@RH 12

3.C.5 All nominations for lethal action must undergo a legal review by the General Counsel of the nominating agency to ensure that the action contemplated is lawful and may be conducted in accordance with applicable law. The General Counsel’s conclusions shall be referred to the NSS Legal Adviser. In all events. the NSS Legal Adviser and the General Counsel of the nominating agency shall consult with DOJ. The S Legal Adviser and the General Counsel of the nominating agency shall also consult with other interagency lawyers depending on the particular nomination. In addition, in the event that the individual proposed for nomination is a U.S. person, DOJ shall conduct a legal analysis to ensure that lethal action may be conducted against that individual consistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States. The NSS Legal Adviser shall submit the relevant legal conclusions to the SS Senior Director for Counterterrorism for inclusion in the nom ination package to be submiued to Deputies.

3.C.6 If the proposal may be conducted lawfully, the nomination shall be referred to a DNSA. or another appropriate NSS official. to facilitate consideration by the Deputies Committee.

3.D Deputies Review

3.0.1 Upon completion of a nomination package, the NSS shall forward the nomination package to the Deputies Committee for consideration. A standard nomination package to be forwarded to the Deputies shall include, at a minimum, the following:

I) The profile, produced by the nominating agency pursuant to Section C.2, for the individual proposed for lethal action;

2) The assessment produced by CTC pursuant to Section 3.C.4;

3) A description

operational pl an to which the nomination would be

added. including the time frame. if any, in which the operation may be executed:

4) The operating agency or agencies that would be responsible for conducting the proposed lethal action;

5) A summary of the legal assessment: and

6) The determinations made by the nominating agency that capture is not currently feasible and that the relevant governmental authorilics in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons, as well as the underlying analysis for those determinations.

3.0.2 The Deputies of the Department of State. DOD, JCS, DOJ. DI IS. DNI, CIA, and CTC

shall promptly consider whether to recommend to the Principal of the nominating agency that

lethal action be taken against the proposed individual in the context··········

operational plan at issue. –

shall participate in the review process as

observers. A D SA may invite Deputies or other officials to participate as appropriate. Following consideration and discussion by the Deputies. departments and agencies shall submit to the NSS the final positions of their Principals within a timeframe consistent with operational needs.

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TOP SECRET1’fJOFOR~J

3.D.3 When considering each proposed nomination, the Deputies shall evaluate the following issues. and any oLhers deemed appropriate by the DepuLies:

1) WheLher the Deputies can conclude with confidence that che nominated individual qualifies under the policy standard in Section 3.A for lethal action, taking into account credib le information that may cast doubt on such a conclusion;

2) Whether the threat posed by the individual to U.S. persons can be minimized through a response short of lethal action;

3) The implications for the broader regional and international political interests of the United States:

4) Whether the proposed action would interfere with any intelligence collection or compromise any intelligence sources or methods;

5) Whether the individual, if captured, would likely result in the collection of va luable intelligence, notwithstanding an assessment that capture is not currently feasible; and

6)

E Presentation to the President and the Principal of the Nominating Agency

3.E.1 The Principal of the nominating agency may approve lethal action aga inst the proposed ind ividual if: ( 1) the relevant Principals unanimously agree that lethal action should be taken against the proposed individual. and (2) the Principal of the nominating agency has notified the Pres ident through a DNSA of his intention to approve lethal action and has received notice from a DNSA that the President has been apprised of that intention. The Principal of the nominating agency may not delegate his authority Lo approve a nomination.

3.E.2 ominations shall be presented to the President for decision. along with the views expressed by departments and agencies during the process, when: ( 1) the proposed individual is a

U.S. person, or (2) there is a lack of consensus among Principals regarding the nomination, but the Prine ipal of the nominating agency continues to support approving the nomination.

3.E.3 In either case, an appropriate NSS official will communicate in writing che decision, including any terms or conditions placed on any approva l. to the Deputies who participated in the Deputies Committee review of the nomination.

3.F Annual Review;·········

3.F. I The NSS, in conjunction with the nominating agency. shall coordinate an annual review of •••I

individuals authorized for possible lethal action to evaluate whether the intelligence

continues to upport a determination that the individuals

qualify for lethal action under

the standard set forth in Section 3.A. The SS shall refer the necessary information for the

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P1111u11.1h Ihe P1e~1dc:111 \\di :id.1utl11.. <1te <Ill) d1~.t!!l<‘<‘lll<‘lll ,1111011~ 01 bet\\<.'<.’ll P1m..:1p:il’ •

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annual review to the Deputies for cous1deration. Following Deputies re\·iew. the iufo1matio11. along with any recollllllendatious from Deputies. shall be forwarded 10 the Principal of the nominating agency for re\·iew. A separnre legal re\·iew will be conducted. as approp1iate. Au appropriate official from each nominating agency sl.iall inform a DNSA of what action. if any. the Principal of the norniuatiug agency takes in response to tlie re\·iew.

3.F.2

The Deputy of any clepcu1meut or agency pa11icipating in the Deputies Committee review

in Scctil)IJ ~.D may propo-,e at any time that an incli\”idunl be

for

lerhal action. 111 the en:>nt that such a propo:,al IS made. ~CTC :,hall updare the re -coordinated profile for the incli\·idual at issue and. as appropriate. the Deputies sball consider whether to propose that the indi\·idual be remo\”ed by lbe Principal of tbe nominating agency.

3.F.3 Following consideration and discussion by the Deputies in accordance with 3.F. l or 3.F.2. depa11ments and agencies sball submit tbe final pos1tio11s of tbeir Principals wirhin an appropriate timeframe detenniued by the NS .

. EC’TIO~ -t Policy Standard and Procedure for Approving Lethal Force Again’it Terrori<;t Targets Other Than Identified HYTs

-L\ Policy Standard for Directing Lethal Force Against Terrorist Targets Other Than Identified HVTs

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threat to U.. pen.ans.

4.B ::\ece<.<.ary Precondition for Directing Lethal Force rnder Thi<> ection

Directing lethal force under this Section 1equires that: (I) tbe target may lawfully be taTgeted and that any conditions established in the appropriate operational plan, including those set fo11b in Section l.C.8. are met. The preconditions set fo11b in Sectiou l.C.8 for the use of letbal force are as follows: (a) uear ce11ai11ty tbat a lawful te1rnrist target other than an identified If\.T i:,

p1 esent: (b) ner11 certainty that non-comlrntanh will not be injmed or killed: ( c)

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TOP ISEGR:fT ‘NOFORN 15

“FOP SEC RE”f1~40PORl4

threat lo U.S. persons: and (I) an assessment that no other reasonable alternatives to lethal action exist lo effectively address the threat to U.S. persons.

4.C Nomination and Review of Terrorist Targets Other Than Identified High-Value Individuals

Where an operating agency has been authorized to direct force against terrorist targets (including

•••••

property) other than identified HVTs

may

nominate specific terrorist targets to largel with lethal force consistent with the requirements of

the approved operational plan

. including the process required by the

plan for nom inating and approving such targets.

SECTION 5. Procedures for Approving Proposals that Vary from the Policy Guidance Otherwise Set Forth in th is PPG

5.A Already Authorized Targets: Variations from Operational Plan Requi rements When Fleeting Opportunities Arise

5.A. I

When direct action has been authorized under this PPG against identified HYTs or against

terrorist targets other than identified HYTs

, the operating agency

responsible for conducting approved operations. as a result of unforeseen circumstances and in the event of a nceting opportunity, may submit an individualized operational plan lo the NSS

that varies from the requirements of the operational plan

. In that event.

an appropriate official shall consult with other departments and agencies. as appropriate and a time permits. before submilling the proposal to the President for his decision.

5.A.2 All such variations from an operational plan must be reviewed by the General Counsel of the operating agency conducting the operation and the conclusions referred to the NSS Legal Adviser. In all cases. any operational plan must contemplate an operation that is in full compliance with applicable law. Absent extraordinary circumstances, these proposals shall:

I) Identify an international and domestic legal basis for taking action in the relevant country

2) Mandate that lethal action may only be taken if: (a) there is near certainty that the target is present: (b) there is near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed; (c) it has been determined that capture is not feas ible; (d) the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U .. persons; and (e) no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat to U.S. persons.

5.A.3 Any variation from an operational plan shall be presented to the President for decision. and an appropriate NSS official shall communicate the President’s decision, including any terms or conditions placed on any approval, to appropriate agencies.

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T’OP ~EC~E’f;140FOl04

5.B Extraordinary Cases: Variations from the Policy Guidance Otherwise Set Forth in this PPG

Nothing in this PPG shall be construed to prevent the Pres ident from exercising his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, as we ll as his statutory authority, to consider a lawful proposal from operating agencies that he authorize direct action that would fall outside of the policy guidance conta ined herein. including a proposal that he authorize lethal force against an individual who poses a continuing, imminent threat to another country’s persons. In extraordinary cases. such a proposal may be brought forward to the President for consideration as fo llows:

I) A proposal that varies from the policy guidance contained in this PPG may be brought forward by the Principal of one of the operating agencies through the interagency process described in Section 1 of this PPG, after a separate legal review has been undertaken to determine whether action may be taken in acco rdance with applicable law.

2) Where there is a fleeting opportunity, the Principal of one of the operating agencies may propose to the President that action be taken that would otherw ise vary from the guidance contained in this PPG, after a separate legal review has been undertaken to determine whether action may be taken in accordance with applicable law.

3) In all cases, any proposal brought forward pursuant to this subsection must contemp late an operation that is in full compliance with applicable law.

SECTION 6. Procedures for After Action Reports

6.A The department or agency that conducted the operation shall provide the following prel iminary information in writing to the NSS within 48 hours of taking direct action against any authorized target:

1) A description of the operation;

2) A summary of the basis for determining that the operation satisfied the applicable criteria conta ined in the approved operational plan;

3) An assessment of whether the operation achieved its objective;

4) An assessment of the number of combatants killed or wounded;

5) A description of any collateral damage that resulted from the operation;

6) A description of all munitions and assets used as part of the operation; and

7)

li8P SECREli/H8F8R?J 17

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6.B The department or agency that conducted the operation shall provide subsequent updates LO the SS on the outcome of the operation, as appropriate, including any intelligence collected as a result of the operation. The information prov ided to the NSS under this Section shall be made available lo appropriate officials al the departments and agencies taking part in the review under Sections 1 and 3 of this PPG.

SECTION 7. Congressional Notification

A congressional notification shall be prepared and promptly provided to the appropriate Members of the Congress by the department or agency approved to carry out such actions when:

I) A new operational plan for taking direct action•••••••••••

is approved:

2) Authority is expanded under an operational plan for directing lethal force aga inst lawfully targeted individuals and against lawful terrorist targets other than individuals; or

3) An operation has been conducted pursuant to such approval(s).

In addition, appropriate Members of the Congress will be provided, no less than every 3 months. updates on identified HVTs who have been approved for lethal action under Section 3. Each department or agency required to submit congressional notifications under this Section shall inform the NSS of how it intends to comply with this Section prior to providing any such notifications to Congress.

SECTION 8. General Provisions

8.A This PPG is not intended to. and does not. create any right or benefit. substantive or procedural. enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States. its departments, agencies. or entities, its officers. employees. or agents. or any other person.

8.B

8.C Twelve months after entry into force of this PPG, Principals shall review the implementation and operation of the PPG. including any lessons learned from evaluating the information provided under Section 6. and consider whether any adjustments are warranted.

18

Democrats Social Reconstruction in America via Putin

Posted on August 7, 2016August 7, 2016 by Denise Simon

Primer for this interview: Why did Baraq Obama put Chuck Hagel in as Secretary of Defense? Global Zero. Further, while everyone is caught up in the election cycle, it is important to know that Obama has removed our first strike option to deploy a nuclear weapon. Kinda don’t need that pesky nuclear football that is with Obama at all times.

This week, Trevor interviews Jeffrey R. Nyquist, geopolitical expert and author of “Origins of the Fourth World War: And the Coming Wars of Mass Destruction.” This particularly frightening episode of LoudonClear delves into what happened to the communists after the cold war, the Russian propaganda machine and Donald Trump’s Russian ties. Hat tip to NoisyRoom. Related reading:

Russia Weaponizing the Arctic

Hillary’s Relationship with Russia is Approved Espionage

Russian spies claim they can now collect crypto keys

The U.S. has had a Russian Problem of Espionage for Decades

The Games of Russia and the IRGC, that Kidnapped our Sailors

What you Need to Know About the Gerasimov Doctrine’

That should keep you busy for a while and provide an in sight into how the willing accomplices within our government are either carrying the baton for the Kremlin or are too stupid to know otherwise.

Has the WH or NSC Been Briefed at all on al Suri’s Strategy?

Posted on August 6, 2016August 6, 2016 by Denise Simon

Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri DVD Cover: Image Analysis

The image here is a DVD cover of a recording of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, a top jihadi strategist. He is described as “min alma‘ mufakkiri al-qa‘ida tamma rasd khamsat malayin dular min qibali al-hukuma al-amrikiyya lil-qabd ‘alayhi” (“one of al-Qa‘ida’s brightest thinkers for whom the American government has offered a sum of 5 million dollar for his capture”). The cover portrays the recording as “jalsa ma‘a shabab bilad al-haramayn; min akhtar ma qila ‘an al-wad‘ fi bilad al-haramayn wa-mustaqbal al-haraka al-jihadiyya” (“a meeting Saudi youth; one of the most interesting accounts of the situation in Saudi Arabia and the future of the jihadi movement”). CTC

Related reading: 4GW, Fourth Generation Warfare

The Strategist: How Abu Mus’ab al-Suri Inspired ISIS

TerrorismWatch: This paper takes a look into the life and work of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, jihadist theorist, and argues that he should be considered the architect of the extant Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This is done by way of an examination of his own writings, as well as secondary literature on al-Suri, al-Qaeda, and ISIS. A key point that emerges out of this analysis is that ISIS is likely to continue its two-pronged strategy: of individual attacks offshore, and consolidating territory in Iraq and Syria.

1. Introduction

In 1994 a young man of Syrian origin, who had then recently acquired Spanish citizenship, moved with his wife to Neasden, a dreary suburb of London. Neasden is home to immigrants of many nationalities (it has the largest Hindu temple outside of India), so it was not too strange for this young, cash-strapped family to have decided to relocate there from Madrid. The man’s wife – a Spanish-born Moreno – explained to her family that they were relocating to London as her husband had found a job there as an editor for a small newspaper. The young family’s daily life was not that different from other immigrants’ – it was not unheard of in Neasden to be broke and in debt, with a doting wife doing her best to support her bright, ambitious husband through careful house-holding and not infrequent penny-pinching. The life of the Setmariams could have been out of a Maupassant or a Zola story; except it was not.

Fast-forward to 31 October 2005, when Pakistani security forces stormed an Islamist front in Quetta in Balochistan, and arrested the man from Neasden as he waited for iftar with a colleague. That colleague was killed in the operation. The man – Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar, also known as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and 47 years old – carried a bounty of five million dollars as announced by the US government. In all likelihood, Pakistan transferred the custody of al-Suri to the US Central Intelligence Agency which, in turn, rendered him to Syria where he remains in prison till date.

Al-Suri impressed almost everyone who met him. Peter Bergen, the first western journalist to have interviewed Osama bin Laden (a meeting facilitated by al-Suri himself) described al-Suri as “intelligent, intense, and well informed and very very serious.” Bergen went on say that he came to “admire his intellect.”[1] The Norwegian counterterrorism expert Brynjar Lia – whose definitive book on al-Suri remains standard reading for counter-Islamist-terrorism analysts – described al-Suri as an autodidact intellectual in the classic mould:

An avid reader, with an encyclopaedic memory, he impressed acquaintances with his knowledge of literature, classical music, history, politics, and the sciences […][2]

Another journalist had described al-Suri as “possess(ing) of a romantic streak and surprised friends by doting on his Spanish-born spouse.”[3] Physically, wrote an AP reporter, he resembled “an Irish pub patron”.

For counterterrorism experts, al-Suri was notorious: he had been suspected of involvement in a number of terrorist attacks in Europe, including the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings, though these charges were never established mostly because he was not tried for the bombings, in the first place. Whether or not he had a hand in those bombings, what had rattled the Americans and their European counterparts was his role as al-Qaeda’s leading strategist, and the extent to which his guidance had influenced that group in general, and Osama bin Laden, in particular. One gauge of his influence is the consistent reference in many academic and popular writings of him as ‘architect’. Cruickshank and Hage Ali, for example, write: “[…] no other individual has done more to conceptualize al-Qaeda’s new strategy after 9/11.”[4] Lawrence Wright, meanwhile, identifies theorists like al-Suri as tutors to a “third generation of mujahideens” – as Al-Suri himself calls them – who, after having fought in Iraq – will “add their expertise to the new cells springing up in the Middle East, Central Asia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and many European nations.”[5]Jason Burke writes:

If al-Awlaki was the propagandist who did most to shape today’s threat against the West, and al-Zawahiri and al-Baghdadi are currently the most influential commanders, then al-Suri is the strategist of greatest relevance.[6]

As Burke indicates, al-Suri’s reach – and the efficacy of his strategy – far exceeds al-Qaeda, and could be seen as laying the foundations of the strategy that has been adopted by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Al-Suri’s book, The Global Islamic Resistance Call – key parts of which are excerpted in Lia’s book, and is available on the SITE intelligence website[7] – shows an eerie similarity with the strategic and tactical thinking of ISIS, going beyond al-Suri’s original concept of ‘individual-terrorism jihad’. Indeed, a close reading of al-Suri as an ISIS strategist has been absent in the discourse around the group – perhaps for the simple reason that in the mental framing of many analysts, al-Suri’s name conjures al-Qaeda more than any other group. (A notable exception is a short article in the Atlanticpublished late June this year.[8])

2. Fathers of Mu’sab

The goal of the present paper is to look at al-Suri’s book itself (as a primary source) as well as academic literature on his work, with ISIS’s ideology and modus operandi in mind. To better appreciate the intellectual influence of al-Suri on ISIS, a trace must first be made of actual links between the man and the group.

The story of the evolution of ISIS is beyond the scope of this paper; there is no dearth of literature on the subject. It suffices to say that the present-day ISIS evolved out of the rubble of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, and was largely driven by one man: Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian criminal-turned-terrorist, was influenced by jihadi ideologue Abdullah Azzam’s sermons enough to travel to Afghanistan for jihad against the Soviets in the early 1980s.[9] By 2005, al-Zarqawi was at his peak, leading his al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers. But by January 2006, he had amalgamated his group with other Islamist outfits to form the Mujahideen Shura Council of Iraq[10] which, after his death in a US air-strike in June 2006, morphed into the Islamic State of Iraq – the direct precursor of ISIS as the world knows the group today.

Al-Suri and al-Zarqawi’s paths first crossed in Afghanistan during the Taliban rule. Both controlled semi-independent camps there — al-Suri in Kabul and al-Zarqawi in Herat.[11] Both disdained bin Laden, and insisted on greater autonomy, something bin Laden resisted.[12] (This fissure would become full-blown much later. By October 2015, Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s successor, was directly challenging ISIS and the legitimacy of its self-proclaimed Caliph.[13]) By 2004, the US Central Command in Dubai suspected that al-Suri had joined al-Zarqawi in Iraq, “acting as deputy and mentor”, something al-Suri himself denied.[14]Nevertheless, the links between the two lasted long after the fall of the Taliban: Ameer Azizi, a protégé of al-Suri’s, is suspected to have travelled to Iraq to work with al-Zarqawi. The ideological link between the two was cemented by Jordanian/Palestinian cleric, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, al-Zarqawi’s “foremost spiritual mentor”[15] and who is considered an influence on al-Suri’s own thinking.[16] Al-Maqdisi’s student Turki al-Bin’ali, in turn, is now reputed to be a prominent authority in the Islamic state.[17] Finally, long after al-Suri was incarcerated, the first issue of ISIS’s flagship publication Dabiq indirectly acknowledged al-Suri’s influence on the organisation, by attributing al-Suri’s strategies to al-Zarqawi.[18]

Yet the affinity between the group and the man who influenced it does not end with ideology. As much as one face of al-Suri was that of a theorist, he was capable of great violence himself. Cruickshank and Hage Ali interviewed a former jihadi who knew al-Suri personally. According to this interviewee, al-Suri “personally tracked down and killed individuals” who had deserted his Kabul camp.[19] His exhortation to indiscriminate violence – “Kill wherever and don’t make a distinction between men, women and children” – and anti-Shia stance would all find resonance in later ISIS behaviour. Incidentally, as Burke notes, al-Qaeda had invested significantly in reducing fitna (discord) between Muslims and non-Muslims.[20] ISIS, al-Zarqawi, as well as al-Suri had no problems with the same – a marked departure from al-Qaeda’s stance. This had significant tactical advantages for al-Zarqawi. By opening up the sectarian Shia-Sunni divide, the group had hoped to capitalise on Sunni support. This was also buttressed by growing Shia influence in the post-war Iraq.

3. A Military Theory of ‘Jihad’

Al-Suri’s strategic thought was presented, as noted earlier, in his 1,600-page opus. Analysts who have had access to videotapes of his lectures in jihadist camps in Afghanistan have also discerned a few more themes related to that book’s overall thrust. When it comes to applicability of his thoughts to ISIS’s grand strategy, two key ideas emerge: “Individual-Terrorism Jihad”, and “Open-Front Jihad.” Al-Suri’s strategic theory also suggests a way to structure a jihadist organisation that meshes the two into one functional unit. But it is also important to situate al-Suri’s programme within the larger context of Islamist resistance.

3.1. Syed Qutb: Precursor theorist

Al-Suri started his career as an Islamist extremist under the umbrella of the Syrian Brotherhood. He would eventually have a falling-out with the Brotherhood, as he blamed it for the brutal crackdown under then-Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in 1982. Ideologically – and methodologically – the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was extremely close to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Ikhwan. In fact, al-Suri himself noted that his trainer “pledged allegiance to Sheikh Hassan al Bannah […] He accompanied Sayyid Qutb […].”[21]

Al-Banna and Qutb remain prominent ideological figures for both al-Qaeda and ISIS. Jihadi-salafism (commonly referred to as ‘jihadism’) is a mixture of two strains: the ideology of the Ikhwan, led by al-Banna (whose chief theoretician was Sayyid Qutb), and Wahhabism which promotes a version of Sunni exclusivism.[22] Initially these two strains were separate – the Brotherhood Ikhwan “not implacably hostile” towards Shi’ism[23] – but under the ideological influence of the theoretician Qutb – groups (which would serve as forerunners to al-Qaeda and ISIS) arose in the Arab Middle East that were influence by both.[24] Lia notes:

He studied the writings of Sayyid Qutb and Abdallah Azam, both of whom had significant influence on his subsequent development as a jihadi theorist. [emphasis added][25]

It is therefore important to situate al-Suri’s thinking within that of Qutb’s – a full-length work in itself. But even a cursory reading shows continuity and congruence between the two men’s thinking.

Sayyid Qutb’s formative years, 1919 to 1952, included a stay in the United States that was to prove extremely significant in his subsequent radicalisation in prison for almost a decade. The latter was for opposing Nasser and his conception of the Egyptian state – it was in 1952, the year Nasser assumed office, that Qutb developed the fundamental concept of jahilyya.[26] This concept is expansive is nature. Qutb himself defined it – in his influential work, Milestones, for which he was ultimately executed by Nasser[27] – as:

Jahilyyah […] is one man’s lordship over another, and in this respect it is against the system of the universe and brings the involuntary aspect of human life into conflict with its voluntary aspects.[28]

Jahilyyah can be understood as being in a state of ignorance about the need to surrender to God (the literal meaning of the word “Islam.”) This included the Western political-social order, as well as the pre-Islamic pagan society of which Qutb found Nasser’s Egypt to be an example.[29] Qutb and his followers saw Islam as a “complete and total system” which had no need for influence from the outside.[30]

Qutb’s call was to create a group which would “separate itself from jahili society,” and resist it from the outside.[31] This would be the central purpose of jihad. But jihad was to be, for Qutb and other Islamists after him, more that the “defence of the ‘homeland of Islam’” in a geographical sense of the term.[32] The geographical ‘homeland of Islam’ was merely a nerve-centre for the entire faith; the correct interpretation of the phrase ‘defence of the Islamic homeland’ was the “defence of the Islamic beliefs, the Islamic way of life, and the Islamic community.” Ultimately, it was jihad as resistance to obtain “the freedom of man from the servitude to other men” – one of the characteristic features of jahili societies – that was to influence later jihadi-theorists in a marked way, al-Suri included. Such servitude would, by definition, put some individuals above others. These individuals would include lawmakers and other secular authorities, according to Qutb and other theorists. The goal of the Islamist resistance project would be to oppose these individuals as disbelievers. Al-Suri writes:

There is very clear evidence, in the Qur’an and the Sunna, of the faithlessness of those who have given themselves the right to legislate laws in what is forbidden and permissible, and to change the laws, and to confront the sovereignty of God, to become worshipped gods.[33]

Like Qutb before him, al-Suri saw the fall of the Islamic Caliphate in 1924 as a watershed for political Islam – leading to the “catastrophe”[34] of a splintered Islamic state. Reversing this splintering would prove to be a major cause for him and for ISIS.

3.2. “System Not Organization”

The first, and perhaps most important, element of al-Suri’s thinking is that of jihad through Nizam la Tanzim – “System Not Organization.” In his book, al-Suri described his vision of al-Qaeda:

Al-Qaeda is not an organization, it is not a group, nor do we want it to be […] It is a call, a reference, a methodology.[35]

The etymology of the word ‘al-Qaeda’ helps us understand this statement to some extent. Al-Qaeda-al-sulbah “can also mean a precept, rule, principle, maxim, model, or pattern,”[36] other than the commonly-used meaning of “the base” (interpreted in a physical-geographical sense). To understand the strategic import of the statement is to – like al-Suri himself – appreciate that regional-secret-hierarchical tanzims did not fare well post the end of the Cold War and till right after the fall of the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001. Al-Suri writes:

Throughout the last decade of the 20th century, programs for fighting terrorism were able to disband those organizations security-wise, militarily defeat them, isolate them from their masses [of followers], damage their reputation, dry out their financial resources, make their elements homeless, and put them in a constant state of fear, starvation, and lack of funds and people.[37]

Not all of this was due to western agencies alone. One other factor was the changing geopolitics of the world following the end of the Cold War. As al-Suri explains, when the world was bipolar, one organisation that was proscribed under one pole could find shelter with another.[38] A case in point is the Afghan jihad of the 1980s which was supported by the United States. But local governments were also to be blamed for the fall of the secret-hierarchical tanzims.

For example, Al-Suri blames Hosni Mubarak’s regime in Egypt for putting “an end to all the jihadi organizations in Egypt, one after the other.”[39] Why – according to al-Suri – was this the case? In a lecture in 2000 at the Al Ghuraba training camp in Afghanistan for new al-Qaeda recruits, al-Suri drew the following diagram depicting the structure of these failed tanzims (modified by this author from a sketch in Cruickshank and Hage Ali[40]).

Figure 1: A Schematic Description of a Hierarchical Centralised Structure

In this structure – as depicted in figure 1 – if any one individual (nodes) is arrested or otherwise compromised, the whole network – which is hierarchical, top-down, and centralised – would be compromised. As al-Suri noted: “In case you are caught, they are all caught.”[41] But beyond this tradecraft consideration laid al-Suri’s deep distrust of centralisation of command – which had manifested in his not-infrequent run-ins with bin Laden. The goal of resistance through individual terrorism is not a struggle of the elite, al-Suri wrote.[42] He explained:

The Call is to convoy the idea in succinct and detailed ways in order to enable the youth, who are determined to fight a jihad, to enter this call and form their own Units independently.[43]

What al-Suri is referring to is not the same as what the press calls “lone wolves,” or “leaderless jihad.” Indeed, according to al-Suri, what connects these decentralised units responding to “the Call” to the larger System is an ideological link comprising of (1) a common aim, (2) common name, (3) common doctrinal jihadi program, and (4) a comprehensive educational program. Al-Suri requires his individual terrorists to commit to nothing “other than to believe in the idea, be absolutely certain in his intention, join the Call, and educate himself and those with him according to the Call’s program […].”[44] Tures – in a debunking of the lore of lone-wolf terrorism – writes:

These “lone wolves,” are therefore anything but “lone.” Though the media, government, and even terrorists like ISIS themselves use the term, these new terror recruits are still connected to the group, even if such people do not have face-to-face contact or fly to the Middle East or some domestic compound for training.[45]

Indeed, consider what happened in San Bernardino on 2 December 2015 where a married couple – self-radicalised (or “self-educated,” as al-Suri would have put it) killed 14 people. These were not “lone wolves”; rather, they were following a path al-Suri laid out for them. In other words, ISIS’s claim – that the couple were soldiers of the Caliphate[46] – is literally true if the organisation has taken a leaf out of al-Suri’s individual terrorism strategy. But for the de-centralised form of individual terrorism to be truly successful, al-Suri recognised the need for mass mobilisation. One way to mobilise Muslims, al-Suri suggested at the Al Ghuraba lecture, was to harangue on the “degeneracy of the Western world” with “its sins, gays and lesbians.”[47] [emphasis added] The attack on an Orlando gay nightclub in June this year – the worst mass-shooting in American history – seems to be right out of al-Suri’s Machiavellian playbook. The shooter, Omar Mateen, had pledged bay’at to ISIS.

The conception of nizam la tanzimand “individual-terrorism jihad” stands out in sharp relief to al-Qaeda. While the network structure of that organisation was known, bin Laden – according to many analysts – was seen as “promoting ‘a worldwide, religiously-inspired, professionally guided Islamist insurgency [emphasis added].”[48]Professional guidance for al-Suri for individuals responding to the ‘Resistance Call’ individually is limited in the sense of “education” being the individual’s initiative. However, al-Suri would advocate the spreading of the requisite “legal, political, military and other sciences and knowledge that the Mujahidun need in order to carry out Resistance operations,” without compromising the decentralised structure of the system.[49]Social media would prove handy for ISIS in implementing this tactic.

3.3. “Open-Front Jihad”

Al-Suri did recognise that the ultimate goal for the Islamic Resistance, as he called this putative global jihadi system, was holding physical territory. His conception of al-Qaeda had three key elements: a physical base (one meaning of Qaeda); a leadership; and a global world-view.[50] The importance of the first cannot be underestimated in al-Suri’s world-view: in fact, the “greatest loss,” from the ensuing US invasion of Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks, “was not the destruction of the terrorist organization but the downfall of the Taliban, which meant that al-Qaeda no longer had a place to train, organize, and recruit.”[51] Al-Suri was categorical on the importance of seizing territory in the ‘Resistance Call,’ which he called the “strategic goal” of the whole enterprise.[52] (His sub-theory of decentralised jihad, in contrast, was a tactical tool.) This is also something he shared with al-Qaeda’s then ‘Number Two’ Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who wrote:

If the successful operations against Islam’s enemies and the severe damage inflicted on them do not serve the ultimate goal of establishing the Muslim nation in the heart of the Islamic world, they will be nothing more than mere nuisance, regardless of their magnitude, that could be absorbed and endured, even if after some time, and with some losses.[53]

Al-Suri imagined that this physical territory that could be controlled by the Islamic resistance system would also serve as a site for “Open-Front Jihad,” where enemies could be drawn in for asymmetric warfare. In fact, he identifies areas in the greater Middle East, Central Asia, and North Africa for such activity – preconditions related to geography, population, and political factors.[54] Geography plays a particularly important role in his analysis – the ideal site for Open-Front jihad was to be “spacious in terms of area,” “varied with long borders,” “difficult to siege,” with inhospitable topography, and yet with sufficient resources for human sustenance.[55] But his analysis was not generic in identifying most of the places in this vast area as suitable for Open-Front jihad. In fact, his analysis showed that the vast majority of the 55 states in this area were unsuitable for this kind of activity in not meeting one or more of the preconditions he listed.[56]

He then goes on to identify the “Levant and Iraq,” as an ideal site for Open-Front jihad. “It has all the preconditions for the Open Fronts,” al-Suri writes.[57] His reading of the situation in that area was striking in his analysis – written long before the so-called Arab Spring, the series of protests and uprisings that erupted in the Arab world as 2010 came to an end. He wrote:

The now emerging American occupation has declared its determination to remain on a long-term basis. They also prepare to extend their aggression to Syria in order to control the whole Levant […][58]

In al-Suri’s strategic theory, such a move by the Americans will draw them into an un-winnable conflict where the ‘defenders’ (the putative Islamic resistance) would have tactical as well as strategic advantage. This seems to also be the guiding principle of ISIS. Victory in this asymmetric conflict would lead to:

[…] victory for the Muslims, that [front] will be the centre of an Islamic Emirate, which should be ruled by God’s sharia. It will be a centre and destination for those around it emigrating to fight jihad in the cause of the country.[59]

The extent of ISIS’s intended-Islamic State was mapped in March 2016 by the Financial Times (FT).[60] That map, along with another one drawn up by the Institute for Study of War in July 2016[61] show how remarkably close ISIS’s territory-control/territory-of-influence strategy has been to al-Suri’s geographical prescriptions. At the time of writing this paper, the core ISIS control zone has a filamentary structure which would make it exceedingly difficult to attempt to seize it using ground troops. The control zone is embedded in a support zone that is vast, geographically speaking, and stretches from Fallujah to Mosul (in Iraq), from Mosul to Ayn al-Arab (in Syria), and all the way to Dera on the border of Jordan. Most of the territory controlled by ISIS is also of relatively low-altitude, which makes manoeuvres, and obtaining supplies, relatively easy.

3.4 Organising the ‘Resistance Call’

Al-Suri conceptualises how both the tactical, de-centralised structure of individual jihad and the strategic structure of open-front/territorial jihad mesh in terms of concentric circles. The innermost circle (around the centre who is the putative Caliph) is that of the “centralized unit,” tasked with “guidance, counselling, and calling to jihad,” as well as maintaining military balance in Open-Front areas.[62]Essentially, this is the leadership circle.

The circle of “centralized unit” lies inside the circle of “de-centralized units” of fighters that are permitted to operate like a traditional secret organisation – trained directly, and to be “spread across the world.”[63] Essentially, one may call these the garden-variety ISIS jihadists who travel to Syria or Iraq for training and return to their homelands to carry out attacks when called to do so.

This circle, in turn, is embedded within the final “Da’wah” circle “who participates in the Resistance without any organizational links with the Centre [i.e. Centralized Unit].”[64]This circle has been responsible for most of the recent attacks in the US and Europe. The important point here is that authority radiates outwards from the centre – the Emir or the Caliph – and is managed through the institution of bay’at – the binding allegiance to the figurehead.

Figure 2 depicts al-Suri’s organisational-structure theory. The centralised unit is circle 1, the circle of de-centralised units is 2, and the Da’wah circle is 3, in that figure. Note that the entire structure is governed by the institution of bay’at (depicted by arrow B). Note, also, that as one moves from circles 1 to 3, individuals and units become more geographically dispersed (as depicted by arrow G). While individuals and units in circles 1 and 2 are allowed to communicate with each other and to their adjacent circles (depicted through connecting arrows), such is not the case with the outer circle 3.

How does al-Suri’s organisational structure match the typologies of attackers being advanced in light of the recent terrorist attacks in Europe? Gartenstein-Ross and Barr – in way of debunking the “myth of lone wolf terrorism,” advanced one such typology.[65] In their analysis, there are four kinds of attackers and attacks. In the first kind, attackers are sent by an outfit from abroad to carry out operations. In al-Suri’s jargon, these would be attackers in circle 2. Then there are attackers – in the Gartenstein-Ross and Barr typology – who are in touch with each other virtually, for purposes of coordination. In al-Suri’s structure, these would also be attackers in circle 2 – or between circles 2 and 3. The third category of attackers are ones “who are in contact with a militant group via online communications but do not receive specific instructions about carrying out an attack.” These would be – according to al-Suri – individuals in the Daw’ahcircle 3. Finally, in the Gartenstein-Ross and Barr typology, there are true lone wolves who act completely independently of the ‘parent’ network. This, too would be, according to al-Suri’s theory, individuals in circle 3 – only if they pledge allegiance to the Caliph or the Emir (who is al-Baghdadi, in case of ISIS). The similarity between the Gartenstein-Ross and Barr typology and al-Suri’s theory is remarkable.

Figure 2: A Schematic Description of Al-Suri’s Organisational Theory

4. Al-Suri’s ISIS: The Way Forward

If ISIS indeed operates out of al-Suri’s playbook, what is in store for that organisation?

One would expect to see the frequency of individual jihadistsattack to continue and keep pace, fuelled by self-radicalisation. Al-Suri, as this paper has explained, placed a premium on this tactic. One would also expect ISIS to continue to hold territory even at significant military costs. After all, as al-Suri explains, the whole point of the enterprise of Islamic Resistance is to control territory and establish an Islamic State. Therefore analysts who expect ISIS to completely morph into a de-centralised structure would be well-advised to rethink their assumptions.

Al-Suri had displayed a great interest in weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). A US government assessment of al-Suri puts him as “an expert in the use of poison.”[66] Individual expertise aside, al-Suri is known to have worked quite closely with al-Qaeda’s leading expert on unconventional weapons Abu Khabab al-Masri.[67] Al-Suri himself is said to have written on biological weapons, and has called for the use of WMDs against the US and allies “to reach a strategic decisive outcome.”[68]ISIS has already used chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq, but the real question is whether it would do so outside its own ‘territory’.[69] It is unlikely if most of the attacks outside Syria and Iraq are carried out by individual jihadists in the Daw’ah circle. Therefore the most likely ISIS WMD-use threat lies against American and allied troops in any possible ground invasion.

The most important point with the al-Suri-and-ISIS story is polemical. Blinded by indiscriminate violence, it is easy to conclude that ISIS is a nihilistic group driven by eschatological motives. It is rather more difficult to accept instinctively that there may be a concrete strategic theory behind their actions. But to strive to understand is not the same as to extend empathy. This paper has argued that the foundation of ISIS strategy was provided by one man – Abu Mus’ab al-Suri. Indeed, in order to dissect ISIS strategy, more research is needed about ideologues and theorists like al-Suri – without empathy, for sure, but not without curiosity.

The author thanks the two individuals who served as referees for their useful remarks which helped improve the quality of this paper. He also thanks Ms. Nisha Verma, ORF Librarian, for arranging research material at short notices.

[1] Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, “Abu Musab Al-Suri: Architect of the New al-Qaeda,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30 (2007), 5.

[2] Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri(London: Hurst & Company, 2007), 2.

[3] Craig Whitlock, “Architect of New War on the West,” Washington Post, May 23, 2006.

[4] Cruickshank and Hage Ali, “Abu Musab Al-Suri,” 1.

[5] Lawrence Wright, “The Master Plan: For the New Theorists of Jihad, al-Qaeda is Just the Beginning,” New Yorker, September 11, 2006.

[6] Jason Burke, The New Threat From Islamic Militancy (London: The Bodley Head, 2015), 164.

[7] Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, 347-484; “Abu Musab al-Suri’s Military Theory of Jihad,” SITE Intelligence Group, January 15, 2014, https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Articles-Analysis/suri-a-mili.html. This Paper will use the first source as primary material unless noted otherwise.

[8] Kathy Gilsinan, “ISIS: An Organization – and an Idea,” Atlantic, June 26, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/tunisia-kuwait-france-isis/396932/.

[9] Burke, The New Threat From Islamic Militancy, 61.

[10] Burke, The New Threat From Islamic Militancy, 69.

[11] Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, 267.

[12] Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, 268.

[13] Yaseer Okbi and Maariv Hashavua, “ISIS vs. al-Qaida: Zawahiri Says Baghdadi is Not the Leader of the Muslim World,” Jerusalem Post, June 10, 2015, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/ISIS-Threat/ISIS-vs-al-Qaida-Zawahiri-says-Baghdadi-is-not-the-leader-of-the-Muslim-world-421090.

[14] Cruickshank and Hage Ali, “Abu Musab Al-Suri,” 2.

[15] Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, 269.

[16] Joas Wagemakers, The Quietest Jihadist: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 177.

[17] Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State, 11.

[18] Michael W.S. Ryan, “Dabiq: What Islamic State’s New Magazine Tells Us about Their Strategic Direction, Recruitment Patterns and Guerrilla Doctrine,” The Jamestown Foundation, August 1, 2014, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42702&no_cache=1#.V44aCLh97IU.

[19] Cruickshank and Hage Ali, “Abu Musab Al-Suri,” 7.

[20] Burke, The New Threat From Islamic Militancy, 17.

[21] Cruickshank and Hage Ali, “Abu Musab Al Suri,” 3.

[22] Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State, Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Analysis Paper No. 19 (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2015), 7-8.

[23] Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State, 7.

[24] Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State, 9.

[25] Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, 85.

[26] Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 28.

[27] Alastair Crooke, Resistance: The Essence of the Islamist Revolution (New York: Pluto Press, 2009), 75.

[28] Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, originally published in 1964, 2005 web edition from majalla.org.

[29] Bruce Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology and Future (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2008), 17.

[30] Kepel, Jihad, 27.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Sarah E. Zabel, The Military Strategy of Global Jihad, Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy (Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 3.

[34]al-Suri, The Military Theory of the Global Islamic Resistance, pages 1355-1404, in Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, 370.

[35] Burke, The New Threat From Islamic Militancy, 164.

[36] Jason Burke, The 9/11 Wars(London: Allen Lane, 2011), 154.

[37] al-Suri, The Military Theory of the Global Islamic Resistance, pages 1355-1404, in Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, 352.

[38]

[39]al-Suri, The Military Theory of the Global Islamic Resistance, pages 1355-1404, in Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, 357.

al-Suri, The Military Theory of the Global Islamic Resistance, pages 1355-1404, in Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, 353.

[40] Cruickshank and Hage Ali, “Abu Musab Al-Suri,” 8.

[41] Ibid.

[42] al-Suri, The Military Theory of the Global Islamic Resistance, pages 1405-1413, in Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, 353.

[43]al-Suri, The Military Theory of the Global Islamic Resistance, pages 1405-1413, in Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, 444-445.

[44] Ibid.

[45]John A. Tures, “The Myth of the Lone-Wolf Terrorist,” Huffington Post, November 14, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.in/entry/the-myth-of-the-lone-wolf_b_8563886.

[46] Rukmini Callimachi, “Islamic State Says ‘Soldiers of Caliphate’ Attacked in San Bernardino, New York Times, December 5, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/world/middleeast/islamic-state-san-bernardino-massacre.html?_r=0.

Source http://www.orfonline.org/research/the-strategist-how-abu-musab-al-suri-inspired-isis/