Edward Snowden, Defending His Patriotism, Says Disclosures Helped Privacy

 © REUTERS/Andrew Kelly

Executive Summary of Review of the Unauthorized Disclosures of Former National Security Agency Contractor Edward Snowden

UNCLASSIFIED

In June 2013, former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden

perpetrated the largest and most damaging Public release of classified information in U.S.

intelligence history. In August 2014, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) directed Committee staff to carry out a

comprehensive review of the unauthorized disclosures. The aim of the review was to allow the

Committee to explain to other Members of Congress-and, where possible, the American

people-how this breach occurred, what the U.S. Government knows about the man who

committed it, and whether the security shortfalls it highlighted had been remedied.

Over the next two years, Committee staffrequested hundreds ofdocuments from the

Intelligence Community (IC), participated in dozens ofbriefings and meetings with IC

personnel, conducted several interviews with key individuals with knowledge of Snowden’s

background and actions, and traveled to NSA Hawaii to visit Snowden’s last two work locations.

The review focused on Snowden’s background, how he was able to remove more than 1.5

million classifled documents from secure NSA networks, what the 1.5 million documents

contained, and the damage their removal caused to national security.

The Committee’s review was careful not to disturb any criminal investigation or future

prosecution of Snowden, who has remained in Russia since he fled there on June 23, 2013.

Accordingly, the Committee did not interview individuals whom the Depatment of Justice

identified as possible witnesses at Snowden’s trial, including Snowden himself, nor did the

Committee request any matters that may have occurred before a grand jury. Instead, the IC

provided the Committee with access to other individuals who possessed substantively similar

knowledge as the possible witnesses. Similarly, rather than interview Snowden’s NSA

coworkers and supervisors directly, Committee staffinterviewed IC personnel who had reviewed

reports o finterviews with Snowden’s co-workers and supervisors. The Committee remains

hopeful that Snowden will retum to the United States to face justice.

The bulk of the Committee’s 36-page review, which includes 230 footnotes, must remain

classified to avoid causing further harm to national security; however, the Committee has made

a number of unclassified findings. These findings demonstrate that the public narrative

popularized by Snowden and his allies is rife with falsehoods, exaggerations, and crucial

omissions, a pattem that began befiore he stole 1.5 million sensitive documents.

First, Snowden caused tremendous damage to national security, and the vast

majority of the documents he stole have nothing to do with programs impacting individual

privacy interests-they instead pertain to military, defense? and intelligence programs of

great interest to America,s adversaries. A review ofthe materials Snowden compromised

makes clear that he handed over secrets that protect American troops overseas and secrets that

provide vital defienses against terrorists and nation-states. Some of Snowden’s disclosures

exacerbated and accelerated existing trends that diminished the IC’s capabilities to collect

against legitimate foreign intelligence targets, while others resulted in the loss of intelligence

streams that had saved American lives. Snowden insists he has not shared the full cache of 1.5

million classified documents with anyone; however, in June 2016, the deputy chairman of the

Russian parliaments defense and security committee publicly conceded that “Snowden did

share intelligence” with his govemment. Additionally, although Snowden’s professed objective

may have been to inform the general public, the infiormation he released is also available to

Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean govemment intelligence services; any terrorist

with Internet access; and many others who wish to do harm to the United States.

The full scope ofthe damage inflicted by Snowden remains unknown. Over the past

three years, the IC and the Department ofDefiense (DOD) have carried out separate

reviews with differing methodologies-fthe damage Snowden caused. Out of an abundance of

caution, DOD reviewed all 1.5 million documents Snowden removed. The IC, by contrast, has

carried out a damage assessment fior only a small subset ofthe documents. The Committee is

concerned that the IC does not plan to assess the damage ofthe vast majority of documents

Snowden removed. Nevertheless, even by a conservative estimate, the U.S. Govemment has

spent hundreds of millions of dollars, and will eventually spend billions, to attempt to mitigate

the damage Snowden caused. These dollars would have been better spent on combating

America’s adversaries in an increasingly dangerous world.

Second, Snowden was not a whistleblower. Under the law, publicly revealing

classifled information does not qualify someone as a whistleblower. However, disclosing

classified information that Shows fraud, Waste, Abuse, Or Other illegal activity to the

appropriate law enforcement or oversight personnel-including to Congressuloes make someone

a whistleblower and affords them with critical protections. Contrary to his public claims that he

notified numerous NSA officials about what he believed to be illegal intelligence collection, the

Committee found no evidence that Snowden took any official effort to express concems about

U.S. intelligence activities-legal, moral, or otherwise-to any oversight officials Within the

U.S. Govemment, despite numerous avenues for him to do so. Snowden was aware of these

avenues. His only attempt to contact an NSA attomey revolved around a question about the

legal precedence ofexecutive orders, and his only contact to the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) Inspector General (IG) revolved around his disagreements with his managers about

training and retention ofinfiormation technology specialists.

Despite Snowden’s later public claim that he would have faced retribution for voicing

concems about intelligence activities, the Committee found that laws and regulations in effect at

the time of Snowden’s actions afforded him protection. The Committee routinely receives

disclosures from IC contractors pursuant to the Intelligence Community Whistleblower

Protection Act of 1998 (IC WPA). If Snowden had been worried about possible retaliation for

voicing concerns about NSA activities, he could have made a disclosure to the Committee. He

did not. Nor did Snowden remain in the United States to flee the legal consequences of his

actions, contrary to the tradition of civil disobedience he professes to embrace. Instead, he fled

to China and Russia, two countries whose governments place scant value on their citizens’

privacy or civil liberties-and whose intelligence services aggressively collect information on

both the United States and their own citizens.

To gather the files he took with him when he left the country for Hong Kong, Snowden

infringed on the privacy of thousands of govemment employees and contractors. He obtained

his colleagues, security credentials through misleading means, abused his access as a systems

administrator to search his co-workers, personal drives, and removed the personally

identifiable information of thousands of IC employees and contractors. From Hong Kong he

went to Russia, where he remains a guest of the Kremlin to this day.

It is also not clear Snowden understood the numerous privacy protections that govern the

activities of the IC. He failed basic annual training for NSA employees on Section 702 of the

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and complained the training was rigged to be

overly difficult. This training included explanations of the privacy protections related to the

PRISM program that Snowden would later disclose.

Third, two weeks before Snowden began mass downloads of classified documents,

he was reprimanded after engaging in a workplace spat with NSA managers. Snowden was

repeatedly counseled by his managers regarding his behavior at work. For example, in June

2012, Snowden became involved in a fiery e-mail argument With a Supervisor about how

computer updates should be managed. Snowden added an NSA senior executive several levels

above the supervisor to the e-mail thread, an action that earned him a swift reprimand from his

contracting officer for failing to follow the proper protocol for raising grievances through the

chain of command. Two weeks later, Snowden began his mass downloads of classified

information from NSA networks. Despite Snowden’s later claim that the March 2013

congressional testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper was a “breaking

point” for him, these mass downloads predated Director Clapper’s testimony by eight months.

Fourth, Snowden was, and remains) a serial exaggerator and fabricator. A close

review of Snowden’s official employment records and submissions reveals a pattern of

intentional lying. He claimed to have left Army basic training because of broken legs when in

fact he washed out because of shin splints. He claimed to have obtained a high school degree

equivalent when in fact he never did. He claimed to have worked for the CIA as a “senior

advisor,” which was a gross exaggeration of his entry-level duties as a computer technician. He

also doctored his performance evaluations and obtained new positions at NSA by exaggerating

his resume and stealing the answers to an employment test. In May 2013, Snowden informed

his supervisor that he would be out of the office receive treatment for worsening epilepsy. In

reality, he was on his way to Hong Kong with stolen secrets.

Finally, the Committee remains concerned that more than three years after the start

of the unauthorized disclosures, NSA, and the IC as a whole, have not done enough to

minimize the risk of another massive unauthorized disclosure. Although it is impossible to

reduce the chance of another Snowden to zero, more work can and should be done to improve

the security of the people and computer networks that keep America’s most closely held secrets.

For instance, a recent DOD Inspector General report directed by the Committee found that NSA

has yet to effectively implement its post-Snowden security improvements. The Committee has

taken actions to improve IC information security in the Intelligence Authorization Acts for

Fiscal Years 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, and looks forward to working with the IC to continue

to improve security.