U.S. is Presently Under 31 National Emergency Orders

Of particular note is during the peaceful transfer of power from Obama to Trump, Obama told Trump the number one threat to the United States and her interests is North Korea. Notice that Obama never made any declaration regarding North Korea. Notice too that under Obama, the Sinaola Cartel, the narco terror organization that killed thousands in Mexico and many in the United States was not part of any declaration. But….Obama did declare a national emergency due to the socialist revolution in Venezuela and hence that has caused 3 million Venezuelans to flee.

Oh yeah….nothing from Obama either regarding Islamic State and Syria or Iraq…..or Russia considering Moscow’s intrusion into our 2016 election systems…..

Image result for presidential emergency powers

***

According to the Federal Register, 58 national emergencies have been declared since the National Emergency Act of 1976 was signed into law by President Gerald Ford.

And 31 have been annually renewed and are currently still in effect, as listed in the Federal Register.

Here’s a list of the presidents who declared still ongoing national emergencies.

President Jimmy Carter

 

Nov 14, 1979: The National Emergency With Respect to Iran, in response to the Iran hostage crisis.

President Bill Clinton

Nov 14, 1994: The National Emergency With Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, that combined two previous national emergencies focused on weapons of mass destruction.

Jan. 2, 1995: The National Emergency With Respect to Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process placed economic sanctions in response to the Jerusalem bombing.

March 15, 1995: The National Emergency With Respect to Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources was an effort to prevent potential deals between oil companies.

October 21, 1995: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions with Significant Narcotics Traffickers Centered in Colombia was declared after increased reports of drug cartels laundering money through American companies.

March 1, 1996: The National Emergency With Respect to Regulations of the Anchorage and Movement of Vessels with Respect to Cuba was after civilian planes were shot down near Cuba

November 3, 1997: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Sudan implemented economic and trade sanctions.

President George W. Bush

 

June 26, 2001: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans imposed sanctions on those aiding Albanian insurgents in Macedonia

Aug 17, 2001: The National Emergency With Respect to Export Control Regulations renewed presidential power to control exports in a national emergency since the Export Administration Act of 1979 lapsed.

Sept 14, 2001: The National Emergency with Respect to Certain Terrorist Attacks was in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States.

Sept 23, 2001: The National Emergency With Respect to Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism was in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

March 6, 2003: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Zimbabwe was an effort to punish associates of Robert Mugabe.

May 22, 2003: The National Emergency With Respect to Protecting the Development Fund for Iraq and Certain Other Property in Which Iraq has an Interest was issued following the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

May 11, 2004: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to Syria was in response to Syria supporting terrorist activity in Iraq.

June 16, 2006: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus was in response to charges of fraud in the Belarus presidential election.

Oct 27, 2006: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was in response to violence around the Congolese presidential election runoff.

Aug 1, 2007: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Persons Undermining the Sovereignty of Lebanon was in response to a breakdown of the rule of law in Lebanon.

June 26, 2008: The National Emergency With Respect to Continuing Certain Restrictions with Respect to North Korea cited the risk of proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material. President Trump renewed this June 22, 2018 citing the “existence and risk of proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material on the Korean Peninsula and the actions and policies of the Government of North Korea continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat.”

President Barack Obama

April 12, 2010: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Somalia was in respect to threats posed by Somali pirates.

February 25, 2011: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain Transactions Related to Libya froze the assets of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.

July 25, 2011: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Transnational Criminals was in response to the rise in crime by specific organizations: Los Zetas (Mexico), The Brothers’ Circle (former Soviet Union countries), the Yakuza (Japan), and the Camorra (Italy).

May 16, 2012: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Persons Threatening the Peace, Security, or Stability of Yemen addressed political unrest within the Yemen government.

March 16, 2014: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine was in response to the Russian invasion of Crimea.

April 3, 2014: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to South Sudan was in response to the ongoing civil war.

May 12, 2014: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in the Central African Republic was in response to violence towards humanitarian aid workers.

March 8, 2015: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela was in response to human rights violations.

April 1, 2015: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities was in response to Chinese cyber attacks on the U.S.

Nov 23, 2015: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Burundi was declared after a failed coup.

President Donald Trump

 

Dec 20, 2017: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption imposed sanctions on the Myanmar general for his role persecuting Rohingya Muslims.

Sept 12, 2018: The National Emergency With Respect to Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election attempted to prevent any meddling with the 2018 midterm elections amid the ongoing investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election.

Nov 27, 2018: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Nicaragua was declared by President Trump in response to violence and the Ortega regime’s “systematic dismantling and undermining of democratic institutions and the rule of law” that constitutes an “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”

The Lima Group vs. Maduro

It is a matter of time that Maduro flees somewhere and likely with stolen money of which it appears the U.S. Treasury and the Swift Banking System is watching carefully. The United States is listing those rogue companies and countries and people evade sanctions and are helping Maduro move money for various reasons, money that belongs to Venezuela and to her people. Keep a watchful eye of South Africa, Russia, Cuba, Turkey, Syria and Iran. More punitive sanctions may be bubbling to the surface.

Contrary to many democrats, it was not President Trump that began is Venezuelan revolution or the eventual ouster of Maduro. In fact, it was The Lima Group joined by the Organization of American States.

PressTV-Mexico urges Lima Group not to meddle in Venezuela ...

 

Back in January of 2019:

Thirteen members of the Lima Group of nations said they will not recognize Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro as the legitimate leader of his nation when he takes office on Thursday for a new six-year term, threatening to ratchet up sanctions and international pressure.

Foreign ministers from the Lima Group said they will not recognize the presidency of Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro when he begins a new six-year term on Jan. 10. Missing from Friday’s group statement was Mexico, a founding member of the bloc of 14 nations.

In a statement issued Friday in Peru, the foreign ministers of the bloc said that Venezuela’s snap presidential elections on May 20, which led to Maduro’s disputed victory, did not “provide the guarantees or meet the international standards necessary for a free, just and transparent process.”

The group also said it would bar Venezuelan officials from traveling to their nations and might impose financial sanctions — including barring those officials from using the local banking system.

The Lima Group said Maduro should hand over the reins of government to the opposition-controlled National Assembly, the only branch of government it recognizes as legitimate.

Maduro, who came to power in 2013 after the death of his mentor Hugo Chávez, is unlikely to be moved by the new round of condemnation. He often accuses Washington and its allies in the region — particularly Colombia — of trying to topple his “socialist revolution” and waging an “economic war” against the once wealthy but now struggling nation. In recent years, more than 3 million people have fled Venezuela due to hunger, violence and political turmoil.

The countries that signed Friday’s statement are: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and St. Lucia.

No one is more current or has a more cogent assessment of Venezuela that Senator Marco Rubio. The Heritage Foundation hosted the Senator for his view, facts and summary of events in Venezuela.

Yup, Iran/Hezbollah Really is in Venezuela

Primer:

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – The U.S. military is prepared to protect U.S. personnel and diplomatic facilities in Venezuela if needed, the U.S. admiral in charge of American forces in South America said on Thursday.

“We are prepared to protect U.S. personnel and diplomatic facilities if necessary,” Navy Admiral Craig Faller, the head of U.S. Southern Command, said during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.

He did not provide any details on how the U.S. military might respond.

Elliott Abrams, Washington’s special envoy on Venezuela, said the aid effort was being coordinated with Guaido’s team but that the aid would not be forced into Venezuela.

“Let it in, that’s what we’re asking, let it in,” Abrams told reporters at a State Department briefing, calling on members of Venezuela’s armed forces to persuade Maduro to step down or to disobey his orders.

He said the supplies would be delivered to Venezuelans when it was “logistically safe” to do so.

The Latest: Venezuelan man urges military to let in US aid ...

Meanwhile:

Ghazi Nasr Al-Din fundraisers for and with Hezbollah. He also is a player in operational issues which includes a Hizbollah community center and operations office in Venezuela. He speaks Arabic and Spanish. Born in Beirut, Lebanon, he has been on the FBI Most Wanted List for several years.

Al Din along with Fawzi Kan’an are based in Venezuela and have been since at least 2008.

GHAZI NASR AL DIN

Ghazi Nasr al Din is a Venezuela-based Hizballah supporter who has utilized his position as a Venezuelan diplomat and the president of a Caracas-based Shi’a Islamic Center to provide financial support to Hizballah. Nasr al Din served until recently as Charge d’ Affaires at the Venezuelan Embassy in Damascus, Syria, and was subsequently appointed the Director of Political Aspects at the Venezuelan Embassy in Lebanon.

Nasr al Din has counseled Hizballah donors on fundraising efforts and has provided donors with specific information on bank accounts where the donors’ deposits would go directly to Hizballah.

Ghazi Nasr al Din has met with senior Hizballah officials in Lebanon to discuss operational issues, as well as facilitated the travel of Hizballah members to and from Venezuela. In late January 2006, Nasr al Din facilitated the travel of two Hizballah representatives to the Lebanese Parliament to Caracas to solicit donations for Hizballah and to announce the opening of a Hizballah-sponsored community center and office in Venezuela. The previous year, Nasr al Din arranged the travel of Hizballah members to attend a training course in Iran.

AKAs: Haj Ghazi Nasseredine

Ghazi Nassereddine

Gazi Nasseridine

Gazi Nasser El-Din

Ghazil Nasser Al-Din

Haj Ghazzi Nassereddine

Ghassan Attef Salame Nasserddine

Ghassan Nasr El Din Ghassan

Ghazi Nasserddine

Ghazi `Atef Nasraldine

Atef Salameh Nasserdine Ghasan

Hajj Ghazi `Atif Nasr al-Din

Venezuelan Cedula: 18.190.527

Venezuelan Passport: B-0472561

DOB: 13DEC 1962

POB: Lebanon

FAWZI KAN’AN

Fawzi Kan’an is a Venezuela-based Hizballah supporter and a significant provider of financial support to Hizballah. Kan’an has facilitated travel for Hizballah members and sent money raised in Venezuela to Hizballah officials in Lebanon.

Kan’an has met with senior Hizballah officials in Lebanon to discuss operational issues, including possible kidnappings and terrorist attacks. Further, Kan’an has also traveled with other Hizballah members to Iran for training.

 

AKAs: Fazi Canaan

Faouzi Can’an

Fouzi Kanan

Fauzi Kanaan

Fawzi Kan’an

Fauzi Ganan

Maustaf Fawzi (Faouzi) Kanaan

DOB1: 7 June 1943
DOB 2: February 1943
DOB3: l June l943
POB 1: Lebanon
POB 2: Baalbeck, Lebanon
POB 3: Betechelida, Lebanon
Passport no: 0877677
Nationality: Venezuelan (Naturalized)
Naturalization no.: 2108, 16 December 1977
Identification no: V-6.919.272
Residence 1: Calle 2, Residencias Cosmos, Fifth Floor, Apartment 5D,
La Urbina Caracas, Venezuela
Residence 2: Esquina Bucare, Building 703, Second Floor, Apartment 20
Caracas, Venezuela

BIBLOS TRAVEL AGENCY

Biblos Travel Agency is a Venezuela-based travel agency owned and operated by Fawzi Kan’an, which he has used to courier funds to Lebanon.

 

AKAs: Biblios Travel
Biblos Travel CA
Biblos Travel, C.A.
Location: Avenida Baralt, Esquina Maderero, Edificio Santa Isabel II,
PB, Loc. 1 Caracas, Venezuela

HILAL TRAVEL AGENCY

 

Formed in April 2001, Hilal Travel Agency is a Venezuela-based travel agency owned and operated by Fawzi Kan’an.

 

AKAs: Hilal Travel C.A.
Address: Avenida Baralt, Esquina Maderero, Edificio Santa Isabel
Caracas, Venezuela
Business ID no.: 80074366

Shall we go back to 2011?

A recent New York Times front-page article (December 14, 2011) revealed the extensive and intricate connections between Hezbollah and South American cocaine trafficking. Far from being the passive beneficiaries of drug-trafficking expats and sympathizers, Hezbollah has high-level officials directly involved in the South American cocaine trade and its most violent cartels, including the Mexican gang Los Zetas. The “Party of God’s” increasing foothold in the cocaine trade is facilitated by an enormous Lebanese diaspora. As I wrote in my May 2011 e-note, in 2005, six million Muslims were estimated to inhabit Latin American cities. However, ungoverned areas, primarily in the Amazon regions of Suriname, Guyana, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, present easily exploitable terrain over which to move people and material. The Free Trade Zones of Iquique, Chile; Maicao, Colombia; and Colón, Panama, can generate undetected financial and logistical support for terrorist groups. Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru offer cocaine as a lucrative source of income. In addition, Cuba and Venezuela have cooperative agreements with Syria, Libya, and Iran.

Some shocking revelations into the global interconnectedness of Latin American governments and Middle Eastern terrorist groups have come from Walid Makled, Venezuela’s latter-day Pablo Escobar, who was arrested on August 19, 2010 in Cúcuta, a town on the Venezuelan-Colombian border. A Venezuelan of Syrian descent known variously as “El Turco” (“The Turk”) or “El Arabe” (“The Arab”), he is allegedly responsible for smuggling 10 tons of cocaine a month into the US and Europe—a full 10 percent of the world’s supply and 60 percent of Europe’s supply. His massive infrastructure and distribution network make this entirely plausible, as well as entirely implausible the Venezuelan government did not know. Makled owned Venezuela’s biggest airline, Aeropostal, huge warehouses in Venezuela’s biggest port, Puerto Cabello, and bought enormous quantities of urea (used in cocaine processing) from a government-owned chemical company.

After his arrest and incarceration in the Colombian prison La Picota, Makled gave numerous interviews to various media outlets. When asked on camera by a Univisión television reporter whether he had any relation to the FARC, he answered: “That is what I would say to the American prosecutor.” Asked directly whether he knew of Hezbollah operations in Venezuela, he answered: “In Venezuela? Of course! That which I understand is that they work in Venezuela. [Hezbollah] make money and all of that money they send to the Middle East.” A prime example of the importance of the Lebanese diaspora in triangulating amongst South American cocaine and Middle Eastern terrorists, is Ayman Joumaa, a Sunni Muslim of the Medellín cartel with deep ties with Shiites in the Hezbollah strongholds of southern Lebanon. His indictment made public on Tuesday “charges him with coordinating shipments of Colombian cocaine to Los Zetas in Mexico for sale in the United States, and laundering the proceeds” (NY Times, Dec. 14, 2011).

The growing routes linking South American cocaine to Middle Eastern terrorists are primarily from Colombia through Venezuela. According to an April 2011 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is the most prominent country of origin for direct cocaine shipments to Europe, with the cocaine coming mainly from Colombia, primarily the FARC and ELN terrorist groups. Shipments to Africa, mostly West Africa, gained in importance between 2004 and 2007, resulting in the emergence of a new key trans-shipment hub: centered on Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, stretching to Cape Verde, The Gambia and Senegal, thus complementing the already existing trafficking hub of the Bight of Benin, which spans from Ghana to Nigeria. As the cocaine is transported through Africa and into Europe, its safe passage is guaranteed (much as it was in Latin America) by terrorist groups—most prominently, Al Qaeda and Hezbollah. The cocaine can also travel from Latin America’s Tri‐Border Area (TBA)—bounded by Puerto Iguazu, Argentina; Ciudad del Este, Paraguay; and Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil—to West Africa (particularly Benin, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, with its poor governance and vast archipelagos) and then north into Europe through Portugal and Spain or east via Syria and Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s traditional continental home has been the TBA, where a large, active Arab and Muslim community consisting of a Shi’a majority, a Sunni minority, and a small population of Christians who emigrated from Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and the Palestinian territories about 50 years ago. The TBA, South America’s busiest contraband and smuggling center, has long been an ideal breeding ground for terrorist groups, including Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda—the latter since 1995 when Osama bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad first visited.

Hezbollah is still active in the TBA, according to Argentine officials. They maintain that with Iran’s assistance, Hezbollah carried out a car‐bomb attack on the main building of the Jewish Community Center (AMIA) in Buenos Aires on July 18, 1994, protesting the Israeli‐Jordanian peace agreement that year. Today, one of the masterminds of those attacks, the Iranian citizen and Shia Muslim teacher, Mohsen Rabbani, remains not only at large, but extremely active in recruiting young Brazilians, according to reports in Brazilian magazine Veja. This region, the third in the world for cash transactions (behind Hong Kong and Miami), continues to be an epicenter for the conversion and recruitment of a new generation of terrorists who then train in the Middle East and pursue their activities both there and in the Americas.

According to Lebanon’s drug enforcement chief, Col. Adel Mashmoushi, as cited in The New York Times, a main transportation route for terrorists, cash and drugs was aboard a flight commonly referred to as “Aeroterror,” about which I wrote in my May 2011 e-note for FPRI. According to my own secret sources within the Venezuelan government, the flight had the route Tehran-Damascus-Caracas-Madrid, where it would wait for 15 days, and flew under the direct orders of the Venezuelan Vice-President, according to the captain. The flight would leave Caracas seemingly empty (though now it appears it carried a cargo of cocaine) and returned full of Iranians, who boarded the flight in Damascus, where they arrived by bus from Tehran. The Iranian ambassador in Caracas would then distribute the new arrivals all over Venezuela.smilelaugh

US intelligence warns of ‘ever more diverse’ threats

Traditional adversaries will continue attempts to gain and assert influence, taking advantage
of changing conditions in the international environment—including the weakening of the
post-WWII international order and dominance of Western democratic ideals, increasingly isolationist
tendencies in the West, and shifts in the global economy. These adversaries pose challenges within
traditional, non-traditional, hybrid, and asymmetric military, economic, and political spheres. Russian
efforts to increase its influence and authority are likely to continue and may conflict with U.S. goals
and priorities in multiple regions. Chinese military modernization and continued pursuit of economic
and territorial predominance in the Pacific region and beyond remain a concern, though opportunities exist to work with Beijing on issues of mutual concern, such as North Korean aggression and continued
pursuit of nuclear and ballistic missile technology.
Despite its 2015 commitment to a peaceful nuclear program, Iran’s pursuit of more advanced missile
and military capabilities and continued support for terrorist groups, militants, and other U.S. opponents will continue to threaten U.S. interests. Multiple adversaries continue to pursue capabilities to inflict potentially catastrophic damage to U.S. interests through the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which includes biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
In addition to these familiar threats, our adversaries are increasingly leveraging rapid advances in
technology to pose new and evolving threats —particularly in the realm of space, cyberspace,
computing, and other emerging, disruptive technologies. Technological advances will enable
a wider range of actors to acquire sophisticated capabilities that were previously available only to
well-resourced states.
No longer a solely U.S. domain, the democratization of space poses significant challenges for the United States and the IC. Adversaries are increasing their presence in this domain with plans to reach or exceed parity in some areas. For example, Russia and China will continue to pursue a full range
of anti-satellite weapons as a means to reduce U.S. military effectiveness and overall security.
Increasing commercialization of space now provides capabilities that were once limited to global powers to anyone that can afford to buy them. Many aspects of modern society—to include our ability to conduct military operations—rely on our access to and equipment in space. Full report here.

Strategy Promotes Integration, Innovation, Partnerships, and Transparency
for the 17 Intelligence Elements

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: Joint Statement from ...

Director of National Intelligence Daniel R. Coats unveiled the 2019 National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) today. The NIS is the guiding strategy for the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and will drive the strategic direction for the Nation’s 17 IC elements for the next four years.

https://cdn.tuoitre.vn/2018/12/22/us-dni-dan-coats-afp-15454354274791453938449.jpg

The 2019 strategy is the fourth iteration for the NIS and seeks to make our nation more secure by driving the IC to be more integrated, agile, resilient, and innovative.

“This strategy is based on the core principle of seeking the truth and speaking the truth to our policymakers and the American people in order to protect our country,” said Director Coats. “As a Community, we must become more agile, build and leverage partnerships, and apply the most advanced technologies in pursuit of unmatched insights. The 2019 NIS provides a roadmap to achieve this end.”

The NIS is one of the most important documents for the IC, as it aligns IC efforts to the National Security Strategy, sets priorities and objectives, and focuses resources on current and future operational, acquisition, and capability development decisions. Also, the NIS provides the IC with the opportunity to communicate those national priorities to the IC workforce, partners, oversight, customers, and fellow citizens.

The 2019 NIS focuses on:

 

  • Integration – harnessing the full talent and tools of the IC by bringing the right information, to the right people, at the right time.
  • Innovation – making the IC more agile by swiftly enabling the right people and leveraging the right technology and using them efficiently to advance the highest priorities.
  • Partnerships – leveraging strong, unique, and valuable partnerships to support and enable national security outcomes.
  • Transparency – earning and upholding the trust and faith of the IC’s customers and the American people.

The NIS was developed in response to rapid advances made by our adversaries and the ODNI’s recognition that the IC needs to change to more effectively respond to those challenges.

In his 2019 NIS opening message, the DNI states, “We face a significant challenge in the domestic and global environment; we must be ready to meet 21st century challenges and to recognize emerging threats and opportunities. To navigate today’s turbulent and complex strategic environment, we must do things differently.”

To guide the IC in facing these challenges, the NIS identifies and explains the IC’s objectives – both what the Community must accomplish (mission objectives) and what capabilities the Community must build in order to do so (enterprise objectives).

The seven mission objectives are 1) strategic intelligence; 2) anticipatory intelligence; 3) current operations intelligence; 4) cyber threat intelligence; 5) counterterrorism; 6) counterproliferation; and 7) counterintelligence and security.

The seven enterprise objectives are 1) integrated mission management; 2) integrated business management; 3) people; 4) innovation; 5) information sharing and safeguarding; 6) partnerships; and 7) privacy, civil liberties, and transparency.

“These objectives will allow the IC to continue the crucial work of supporting our senior policymakers, warfighters, and democracy while increasing transparency and protecting privacy and civil liberties,” said Director Coats.

The NIS includes the seven Principles of Professional Ethics for the Intelligence Community: 1) mission; 2) truth; 3) lawfulness; 4) integrity; 5) stewardship; 6) excellence; and 7) diversity. The NIS also includes the Principles of Intelligence Transparency for the Intelligence Community.

“Transparency will be our hallmark, and I cannot stress this enough – this is not a limitation on us,” said Director Coats. “Transparency will make us stronger. It is the right thing to do, across the board. This is the reason we publish the NIS at the unclassified level.”

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence oversees the coordination and integration of the 17 federal organizations that make up the Intelligence Community. The DNI sets the priorities for and manages the implementation of the National Intelligence Program, which is the IC’s budget. Additionally, the DNI is the principal advisor to the President and the National Security Council on all intelligence issues related to national security.

 

More to the Venezuela Revolution, Carnet de la Patria

SOCIAL CONTROL

Let lil miss Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in please on a few of these details:

Sorta president Nicolas Maduro blames the United States for leading the mission to remove him from office. He has cut off diplomatic relations with the United States, while calling for the expulsion of our diplomatic staff. Only non-essential personnel of the United States has been told to leave Venezuela.

Presently, a self declared president is in hiding for his own safety it seems, Juan Guaido. Guaido has been approved and recognized not only by the United States, but Europe and Canada as other countries in the region have done the same.

On January 10, 2019, the Organization of American States, a Latin American council have all agreed to not recognize the legitimacy of Nicolas Maduro’s new term, hence any political action he has taken since the beginning of 2019 has also been deemed as illegitimate.

Maduro put simply is a killer, criminal and globally corrupt.

It is also important to note Maduro’s #2 man in country, Tareck Zaidan El Aissami Maddah. He was born in Venezuela to a Lebanese mother and Syrian father. He is just as corrupt as noted by the United States.

According to PanAm Post, US prosecutors have alleged that El Aissami was Venezuela’s “liaison” with Hezbollah and has provided passports to “terrorist organizations.” A report by the Center for a Secure Free Society released in 2014 alleged that El Aissami has “developed a sophisticated financial network and multi-level networks as a criminal-terrorist pipeline to bring Islamic militants to Venezuela and neighboring countries, and to send illicit funds from Latin America to the Middle East.” The alleged “pipeline” consists of 40 shell companies which have bank accounts in Venezuela, Panama, Curacao, St. Lucia, Miami and Lebanon and is also involved in drug smuggling.

Most all of the El Aissami family worked for Saddam Hussein and the Baathist Party including in Iraq and in Venezuela.

Meanwhile, with the previous Venezuelan president Chavez and through Maduro, Venezuela has been under the multi track influence of China, Russia, Syria, Cuba and Iran.

While much political and national security debate in the United States has included Huawei, other other telecom threat is ZTE. ZTE along with Huawei have both been banned from any government use by legislation signed by President Trump.

ZTE is important to understand as millions of U.S. cell phones in use are manufactured by ZTE. There is spy intrusion technology inside these phones. But there is something much more nefarious about China, ZTE and Venezuela and that is the ‘carnet de la patria’ otherwise known as the ‘fatherland card’.

This application was created and is in use today in China so Venezuela is doing the same. Read on for the nastiness and here is what lil Ms. Ocasio-Cortez along with the rest of the socialists in Congress are subscribing to.

***  Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro wins reelection, officials say ...

Caracas (Reuters) – In April 2008, former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez dispatched Justice Ministry officials to visit counterparts in the Chinese technology hub of Shenzhen. Their mission, according to a member of the Venezuela delegation, was to learn the workings of China’s national identity card program.

Chavez, a decade into his self-styled socialist revolution, wanted help to provide ID credentials to the millions of Venezuelans who still lacked basic documentation needed for tasks like voting or opening a bank account. Once in Shenzhen, though, the Venezuelans realized a card could do far more than just identify the recipient.

There, at the headquarters of Chinese telecom giant ZTE Corp, they learned how China, using smart cards, was developing a system that would help Beijing track social, political and economic behavior. Using vast databases to store information gathered with the card’s use, a government could monitor everything from a citizen’s personal finances to medical history and voting activity.

“What we saw in China changed everything,” said the member of the Venezuelan delegation, technical advisor Anthony Daquin. His initial amazement, he said, gradually turned to fear that such a system could lead to abuses of privacy by Venezuela’s government. “They were looking to have citizen control.”

The following year, when he raised concerns with Venezuelan officials, Daquin told Reuters, he was detained, beaten and extorted by intelligence agents. They knocked several teeth out with a handgun and accused him of treasonous behavior, Daquin said, prompting him to flee the country.

Government spokespeople had no comment on Daquin’s account.

The project languished.

But 10 years after the Shenzhen trip, Venezuela is rolling out a new, smart-card ID known as the “carnet de la patria,” or “fatherland card.” The ID transmits data about cardholders to computer servers. The card is increasingly linked by the government to subsidized food, health and other social programs most Venezuelans rely on to survive.

And ZTE, whose role in the fatherland project is detailed here for the first time, is at the heart of the program.

As part of a $70 million government effort to bolster “national security,” Venezuela last year hired ZTE to build a fatherland database and create a mobile payment system for use with the card, according to contracts reviewed by Reuters.

A team of ZTE employees is now embedded in a special unit within Cantv, the Venezuelan state telecommunications company that manages the database, according to four current and former Cantv employees.

The fatherland card is troubling some citizens and human-rights groups who believe it is a tool for Chavez’s successor, President Nicolas Maduro, to monitor the populace and allocate scarce resources to his loyalists.

Opposition and drivers reject vehicle census in Venezuela ...

“It’s blackmail,” Hector Navarro, one of the founders of the ruling Socialist Party and a former minister under Chavez, said of the fatherland program. “Venezuelans with the cards now have more rights than those without.”

In a phone interview, Su Qingfeng, the head of ZTE’s Venezuela unit, confirmed ZTE sold Caracas servers for the database and is developing the mobile payment application. The company, he said, violated no Chinese or local laws and has no role in how Venezuela collects or uses cardholder data.

“We don’t support the government,” he said. “We are just developing our market.”

An economic meltdown in Venezuela is causing hyperinflation, widespread shortages of food and medicines, and a growing exodus of desperate citizens. Maduro has been sanctioned by the United States and is criticized by governments from France to Canada as increasingly autocratic.

In that, critics say, Maduro has an ally. The fatherland card, they argue, illustrates how China, through state-linked companies like ZTE, exports technological know-how that can help like-minded governments track, reward and punish citizens.

The database, according to employees of the card system and screenshots of user data reviewed by Reuters, stores such details as birthdays, family information, employment and income, property owned, medical history, state benefits received, presence on social media, membership of a political party and whether a person voted.

So far, the government’s disclosure of ZTE’s involvement in the fatherland project has been limited to a passing reference in a February 2017 press release that credited the company with helping to “fortify” the underlying database.

Venezuela’s government didn’t respond to requests for comment for this article. Nadia Perez, a spokeswoman for Cantv, the state-run telecoms firm, declined to comment and Manuel Fernandez, the company’s president, didn’t respond to emails or text messages from Reuters. China’s Justice Ministry and its embassy in Caracas didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Although ZTE is publicly traded, a Chinese state company is its largest shareholder and the government is a key client. ZTE has run afoul of Washington before for dealings with authoritarian governments.

The company this year paid $1 billion to settle with the U.S. Commerce Department, one of various penalties after ZTE shipped telecommunications equipment to Iran and North Korea, violating U.S. sanctions and export laws. The Commerce action was sparked by a 2012 Reuters report that ZTE sold Iran a surveillance system, which included U.S. components, to spy on telecommunications by its citizens.

Legal experts in the United States said it is unclear whether ZTE and other companies that supply the fatherland system are violating U.S. sanctions on Venezuelan leaders by providing tools that critics believe strengthen the government’s grip on power.

Fernandez, the Cantv president, is one of the targets of those sanctions because of the telecom company’s censorship of the internet in Venezuela, according to a U.S. Treasury Department statement. But the prohibitions thus far are meant primarily to thwart business with Maduro and other top officials themselves, not regular commerce in Venezuela.

Still, U.S. lawmakers and other critics of Maduro’s rule are concerned about ZTE’s role in Venezuela. “China is in the business of exporting its authoritarianism,” U.S. Senator Marco Rubio told Reuters in an email. “The Maduro regime’s increasing reliance on ZTE in Venezuela is just the latest example of the threat that Chinese state-directed firms pose to U.S. national security interests.”

To understand how the fatherland card works and how it came to be, Reuters reviewed confidential contracts and internal government documents related to its development. Reporters also interviewed dozens of current and former employees of ZTE, Venezuela’s government and Cantv, or Compania Anonima Nacional Telefonos de Venezuela, as the company is formally known.

They confirmed details of the project and the outlines of Daquin’s account of its origins.

“AN ATTEMPT TO CONTROL ME”

Maduro for the past year has urged citizens to sign up for the new card, calling it essential to “build the new Venezuela.” As many as 18 million people, over half the population, already have, according to government figures.

“With this card, we are going to do everything from now on,” Maduro said on state television last December.

To encourage its adoption, the government has granted cash prizes to cardholders for performing civic duties, like rallying voters. It has also given one-time payouts, such as awarding moms enrolled in the card a Mother’s Day bonus of about $2. The payment, last May, was nearly a monthly minimum wage – enough to buy a carton of eggs, given the current pace of inflation.

Maduro is also taking steps to force the card’s adoption. The government now says Venezuelans need it to receive public benefits including medicine, pensions, food baskets and subsidized fuel. In August, retirees protested outside social security offices and complained the fatherland rule limits access to hard-won pensions.

Benito Urrea, a 76-year-old diabetic, told Reuters a state doctor recently denied him an insulin prescription and called him “right wing” because he hasn’t enrolled. Like some other Venezuelan citizens, especially those who oppose the Maduro administration, Urrea sees the card with suspicion.

“It was an attempt to control me via my needs,” Urrea said in his Caracas apartment. Reuters was unable to contact the doctor.

Using the servers purchased from ZTE, the government is creating a database some citizens fear is identifying Venezuelans who support the government and those who don’t.

Some of the information, such as health data, is gathered with card usage. Some is obtained when citizens enroll. Cardholders and local human rights groups told Reuters that administrators ask questions about income, political activities and social media profiles before issuing the card.

Civil servants are facing particular pressure to enroll, according to more than a dozen state workers.

When scanning their cards during a presidential election last May, employees at several government offices were told by bosses to message photos of themselves at polls back to managers, they said. A Justice Ministry document reviewed by Reuters featured a list of state employees who didn’t vote.

After Chavez became president in 1999, he sought to empower “invisible” Venezuelans who couldn’t access basic services. In the following years, more citizens received documentation, but the cards were fragile and easily forged, according to a 2007 Justice Ministry report.

The report, reviewed by Reuters, recommended a new, microchip-enabled card that would be harder to counterfeit. No such effort got underway.

That December, after nearly a decade of soaring popularity, Chavez suffered his first electoral defeat, losing a referendum to scrap term limits. Oil prices plummeted shortly thereafter, hammering the economy.

Chavez worked to appease his working-class base, including throngs still lacking identity credentials. He sent Daquin, the top information security advisor at the Justice Ministry, to China.

The technology Daquin and colleagues learned about in Shenzhen underpinned what would become China’s “Social Credit System.”

The still-evolving system, part of which uses “smart citizen cards” developed by ZTE, grades citizens based on behavior including financial solvency and political activity. Good behavior can earn citizens discounts on utilities or loans. Bad marks can get them banned from public transport or their kids blocked from top schools.

ZTE executives showed the Venezuelans smart cards embedded with radio-frequency identification, or RFID, a technology that enables monitors through radio waves to track location and data. Other cards used so-called Quick Response, or QR, codes, the matrix barcodes now commonly used to store and process information.

After the trip, Venezuela turned to Cuba, its closest ally, and asked for help creating its own version of RFID cards. “The new goal was Big Data,” Daquin said.

In June 2008, Venezuela agreed to pay a Cuban state company $172 million to develop six million of the cards, according to a copy of the contract. Cuban government officials didn’t respond to questions about the agreement.

By 2009, Daquin grew uneasy about the potential for abuses of citizens’ privacy.

He expressed those concerns to officials including Vladimir Padrino, a general at the time and now Venezuela’s defense minister. The Defense Ministry didn’t respond to phone calls, emails or a letter presented by Reuters for comment.

On the morning of Nov. 12, at his local Caracas bakery, six armed officials in uniforms of Venezuela’s national intelligence agency awaited Daquin, he told Reuters.

They showed him photos of his daughter and forced him to drive east toward the town of Guatire. Off a back road, Daquin said, they beat him with pistols, forced a handgun into his mouth and dislodged several teeth, still missing.

“Why are you betraying the revolution?” one asked.

They demanded $100,000 for his release, Daquin said.

Daquin, who says he had been saving for years to buy property, went home, pulled cash from a safe and delivered it to the men. That evening, he booked a flight for himself, his wife and their three children to the United States, where he has lived since, working as an information security consultant.

His brother, Guy, who also lives in the United States, confirmed Daquin’s account. Documentation reviewed by Reuters corroborates his role at the ministry, and people familiar with Daquin’s work confirmed his involvement in the card project.

After Daquin fled, the Cuban contract went nowhere, according to another former advisor.

In March 2013, Chavez died. Maduro, his heir as Socialist Party candidate, was elected president the next month. The lingering oil crash dragged Venezuela into recession.

“WE’LL FIND OUT”

With hunger increasing, the government in 2016 launched a program to distribute subsidized food packages. It hired Soltein SA de CV, a company based in Mexico, to design an online platform to track them, according to documents reviewed by Reuters. The platform was the beginning of the database now used for the fatherland system.

Soltein’s directors, according to LinkedIn profiles, are mostly former Cuban state employees. A person who answered a telephone listed for Soltein denied the firm worked on the fatherland system. A woman at the company’s registered address in the resort city of Cancun told Reuters she had never heard of Soltein.

The system worked. Nearly 90 percent of the country’s residents now receive the food packages, according to a study published in February by Andres Bello Catholic University and two other universities.

Now more satisfied with its ability to track handouts, the government sought to know more about the recipients, according to people involved in the project. So it turned back to ZTE.

The Chinese company, now in Venezuela for about a decade, has over 100 employees working in two floors of a Caracas skyscraper. It first worked with Cantv, the telecommunications company, to enable television programming online.

Like many state enterprises in Venezuela, Cantv has grown starved for investment. ZTE became a key partner, taking on many projects that once would have fallen to Cantv itself, people familiar with both companies said.

ZTE is helping the government build six emergency response centers monitoring Venezuela’s major cities, according to a 2015 press release. In 2016, ZTE began centralizing video surveillance for the government around the country, according to current and former employees.

In its final push for the fatherland cards, the government no longer considered RFID, according to people familiar with the effort. The location-tracking technology was too costly.

Instead, it asked ZTE for help with QR codes, the black-and-white squares smartphone users can scan to get directed to web sites. ZTE developed the codes, at a cost of less than $3 per account, and the government printed the cards, linking them to the Soltein database, these people said.

In a phone call with Reuters in September, Su, the head of ZTE’s Venezuela business, confirmed the company’s card deal with Cantv. He declined to answer follow-up questions.

Maduro introduced the cards in December 2016. In a televised address, he held one up, thanked China for lending unspecified support and said “everybody must get one.”

The ID system, still running on the Soltein platform, hadn’t yet migrated to ZTE servers. Disaster soon struck. In May 2017, hackers broke into the fatherland database.

The hack was carried out by anonymous anti-Maduro activists known as TeamHDP. The group’s leader, Twitter handle @YoSoyJustincito, said the hack was “extremely simple” and motivated by TeamHDP’s mission to expose Maduro secrets.

The hacker, who spoke to Reuters by text message, declined to be identified and said he is no longer in Venezuela. A Cantv manager who later helped migrate the database to ZTE servers confirmed details of the breach.

During the hack, TeamHDP took screenshots of user data and deleted the accounts of government officials, including Maduro. The president later appeared on television scanning his card and receiving an error message: “This person doesn’t exist.”

Screenshots of the information embedded in various card accounts, shared by TeamHDP with Reuters, included phone numbers, emails, home addresses, participation at Socialist Party events and even whether a person owns a pet. People familiar with the database said the screenshots appear authentic.

Shortly after the hack, Maduro signed a $70 million contract with Cantv and a state bank for “national security” projects. These included development of a “centralized fatherland database” and a mobile app to process payments, such as the discounted cost of a subsidized food box, associated with the card.

“Imperialist and unpatriotic factions have tried to harm the nation’s security,” the contract reads.

It says an undisclosed portion of the funding would come from the Venezuela China Joint Fund, a bilateral financing program. A related contract, also reviewed by Reuters, assigns the database and payment app projects to ZTE. The document doesn’t disclose how much of the $70 million would go to the Chinese company.

ZTE declined to comment on financial details of its business in Venezuela. Neither the Venezuelan nor the Chinese government responded to Reuters queries about the contracts.

In July 2017, Soltein transferred ownership of fatherland data to Cantv, project documents show. A team of a dozen ZTE developers began bolstering the database’s capacity and security, current and former Cantv employees said.

Among other measures, ZTE installed data storage units built by U.S.-based Dell Technologies Inc, according to one ZTE document. Dell spokeswoman Lauren Lee said ZTE is a client in China but that Dell doesn’t sell equipment to ZTE in Venezuela. She said Dell reviewed its transactions in Venezuela and wasn’t aware of any sale to Cantv, either.

“Dell is committed to compliance with all applicable laws where we do business,” Lee said in an email. “We expect our customers, partners and suppliers to follow these same laws.”

In May, Venezuela held elections that were widely discredited by foreign governments after Maduro banned several opposition parties.

Ahead of the vote, ruling party officials urged voters to be “grateful” for government largesse dispensed via the fatherland cards. They set up “red point” kiosks near voting booths, where voters could scan their cards and register, Maduro himself promised, for a “fatherland prize.”

Those who scanned their cards later received a text message thanking them for supporting Maduro, according to several cardholders and one text message reviewed by Reuters. The prizes for voting, however, were never issued, cardholders and people familiar with the system said.

Current and former Cantv employees say the database registers if, but not how, a person voted. Still, some voters were led to believe the government would know. The belief is having a chilling effect.

One organizer of a food handout committee in the west-central city of Barinas said government managers had instructed her and colleagues to tell recipients their votes could be tracked. “We’ll find out if you voted for or against,” she said she told them.

State workers say they are a target.

An internal Cantv presentation from last year said the system can feed information from the database to ministries to help “generate statistics and take decisions.” After the vote, government offices including Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo, a state bank, sent Cantv lists with employees’ names to determine whether they had voted, according to the manager who helped set up the servers.

Banco Bicentenario didn’t respond to a request for comment. Officials at the Economy Ministry, which the bank reports to, didn’t respond to requests, either.

With personal data now so available, some citizens fear they can lose more than just their jobs, said Mariela Magallanes, an opposition lawmaker who headed a commission that last year investigated how the fatherland card was being linked to the subsidized food program.

The government, the commission said in a report, is depriving some citizens of the food boxes because they don’t possess the card. “The government knows exactly who is most vulnerable to pressure,” she said.