Category Archives: China aggression

U.S. Poised to Take on China Aggressions

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The Pentagon Readies Backup Island in Case of Chinese Missile Onslaught

Threat prompts the U.S. military to prepare a fallback option

WiB: The United States can no longer count on its Pacific air bases to be safe from missile attack during a war with China. On the contrary, a 2015 paper from the influential RAND Corporation noted that in the worst case scenario, “larger and accurate attacks sustained over time against a less hardened posture could be devastating, causing large losses of aircraft and prolonged airfield closures.”

Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, due to its relative proximity, would be hardest hit. To up the stakes, China in September 2015 publicly revealed its DF-26 ballistic missile, which can strike Andersen Air Force Base in Guam — nearly 3,000 miles away — from the Chinese mainland. Andersen and Kadena are among the U.S. military’s largest and most important overseas bases.

Enter Tinian. The lush, small island near Guam is emerging as one of the Air Force’s backup landing bases. On Feb. 10, the flying branch announced that it selected Tinian as a divert airfield “in the event access to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, or other western Pacific locations is limited or denied.”

In the Pentagon’s 2017 budget request, it asked for $9 million to buy 17.5 acres of land “in support of divert activities and exercise intiatives,” the Saipan Tribune reported. In peacetime, the expanded Tinian airfield will host “up to 12 tanker aircraft and associated support personnel for divert operations,” according to the Air Force.

7637127318_661f4e4d60_kAbove — Tinian’s West Field in 1945. At top — Tinian seen from the cockpit of a C-130H. U.S. Air Force photo

Tinian is now a sleepy place.

During World War II, the 4th and 2nd Marine Divisions captured the island, which later based the B-29 Superfortresses Enola Gay and Bockscar which took off from Tinian’s North Field and dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. An arsenal during the war, most of its airstrips are now abandoned and unused. The island’s other former air base, West Field, is a small, neglected international airport.

The Air Force first wanted Saipan for its airfield. Very close to Tinian, Saipan has 15 times the population, a larger airport and a harbor. But this proposal met opposition from local activists due to the effect on “coral, potable water, local transportation and socioeconomic factors on surrounding communities,” Stars and Stripes reported.

The opposition even included the pro-business Saipan Chamber of Commerce, which worried that Tinian’s rusty airport would miss out on the flood of Pentagon spending. Saipan’s airport is also overcrowded — with locals not happy about the prospect of hundreds of airmen flying in for military exercises lasting up to eight weeks ever year.

In a way, its a return to the past. The United States dispersed air bases to varying degrees — and in different parts of the world — during the Cold War, but as the threat of a Soviet missile attack evaporated and post-Persian Gulf War budget cuts hit hard in the 1990s, the trend shifted toward larger mega-bases that operate on economies of scale.

But dispersed bases are more survivable, RAND’s Alan Vick noted in his 2015 paper:

Dispersing aircraft across many bases creates redundancy in operating surfaces and facilities. This enhances basic safety of flight by providing bases for weather or inflight-emergency diverts. It also increases the number of airfields that adversary forces must monitor and can greatly complicate their targeting problem (in part by raising the prospect that friendly forces might move among several bases).

 

At the least, dispersal (because it increases the ratio of runways to aircraft) forces an attacker to devote considerably more resources to runway attacks than would be the case for a concentrated force. It also greatly increases construction and operating costs to spread aircraft across many major bases. To mitigate these costs, dispersal bases tend to have more-modest facilities and, at times, might be nothing more than airstrips.

Now China Deployed Fighter Jets to Disputed Islands

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EXCLUSIVE: China sends fighter jets to contested island in South China Sea

FNC: EXCLUSIVE: In a move likely to further increase already volatile tensions in the South China Sea, China has deployed fighter jets to a contested island in the South China Sea, the same island where China deployed surface-to-air missiles last week, two U.S. officials tell Fox News.

The dramatic escalation comes minutes before Secretary of State John Kerry was to host his Chinese counterpart, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, at the State Department.

Chinese Shenyang J-11s (“Flanker”) and  Xian JH-7s (“Flounder”) have been seen by U.S. intelligence on Woody Island in the past few days, the same island where Fox News reported exclusively last week that China had sent two batteries of HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles while President Obama was hosting 10 Southeast Asian leaders in Palm Springs.

Wang was supposed to visit the Pentagon Tuesday, but the visit was canceled. It was not immediately clear which side canceled the visit. Pentagon press secretary Peter Cook said a “scheduling conflict” prevented the meeting, when asked by Fox News at Tuesday’s press briefing.

When asked about the earlier Fox News story in Beijing, Wang said the deployment of the missiles was for “defensive purposes.”

Woody Island is the largest island in the Paracel chain of islands in the South China Sea.  It lies 250 miles southeast of a major Chinese submarine base on Hainan Island. China has claimed Woody Island since the 1950s, but it is contested by Taiwan and Vietnam.

Ahead of Wang’s visit to Washington, a spokeswoman likened China’s military buildup on Woody Island to the U.S. Navy’s in Hawaii.

“There is no difference between China’s deployment of necessary national defense facilities on its own territory and the defense installation by the U.S. in Hawaii,” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said Monday.

More than $5 trillion of worth of natural resources and goods transit the South China Sea each year.

Earlier Tuesday, the head of the U.S. military’s Pacific Command said China is “clearly militarizing” the South China Sea, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“You’d have to believe in a flat Earth to believe otherwise,” Admiral Harry Harris said.

China has sent fighter jets to Woody Island before. In November, Chinese state media published images showing J-11 fighter jets on the island, but this was the first deployment of fighter jets since the Chinese sent commercial airliners to test the runway at one of its artificial islands in the South China Sea.

The Pentagon sailed a guided-missile destroyer past a contested island in the South China Sea as a result.  Late last year, the U.S. military conducted a flight of B-52 bombers and another warship to conduct a “freedom of navigation” exercise.

The Chinese have protested the moves and vowed “consequences.”

On Monday, new civilian satellite imagery from CSIS showed a possible high frequency radar installation being constructed in late January.

The imagery shows radar installations on China’s artificial islands in the Spratley Island chain of reefs-Gaven, Hughes, Johnson South, and primarily on Cuarteron reefs—the outermost island in the South China Sea.

*** 

FNC: China apparently has been building radar facilities on some of the artificial islands it constructed in the South China Sea in a move to bolster its military power in the region, according to a report released Tuesday by a U.S.-based think tank.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) says the radars on the outposts of Gaven, Hughes, Johnson South and Cuarteron reefs in the disputed Spratly Islands “speak to a long-term anti-access strategy by China—one that would see it establish effective control over the sea and airspace throughout the South China Sea.”

The report was released one week after Fox News reported that China had deployed an advanced surface-to-air missile system as well as a radar system on Woody Island, part of the Paracel Island chain located north of the Spratlys.

The release of the report also coincides with the first day of a three-day visit to the U.S. by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during which the issue of competing South China Sea claims is expected to be discussed, as well as North Korea’s latest nuclear test.

Obama Secret Talks, World is Normalized with DPRK

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Upon Obama’s departure from  the Oval Office in January 2017, there will be no more rogue nations or enemies of America and the West.

Next up after Iran and Cuba is North Korea. (shhhh, but I predicted this)

TheHill: The White House had signaled to the Kim Jung Un regime that it is willing to cut a deal similar to that brokered with Iran to curtail its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.

But North Korea has expedited its plans to develop a nuclear bomb, which it sees as a valuable bargaining chip in eventual peace negotiations.

A long-range rocket launched by North Korea earlier this month triggered additional international sanctions, including a law signed Thursday by President Obama imposing steeper penalties.

Un, who took power at the end of 2011, has demanded additional conditions for a treaty with South Korea, 63 years after the Korean War ended with an armistice.

Obama Administration Secretly Approached North Korea About Diplomatic Talks Days Before Its Latest Nuclear Test: WSJ

Days before North Korea’s Jan. 6 nuclear test, the Obama administration clandestinely agreed to talks that would have formally ended the Korean War, the Wall Street Journal reported Sunday.

As part of the offer, reported to have been made at a U.N. meeting, the U.S. dropped its longstanding prerequisite that North Korea first make efforts to reduce its nuclear arsenal, instead calling for the military dictatorship to make its nuclear weapons program part of the talks. But the test ended those discussions.

North Korea began 2016 on a belligerent footing, even considering the unpredictable pariah state’s history. In addition to the January nuclear test, North Korea launched a rocket earlier this month, resulting in swift pushback from Japan and South Korea, which closed a joint industrial park that provided North Korea with valuable hard currency.

The most recent offer to North Korea was one of several overtures extended by the Obama administration, insiders told the Journal, which happened at the same time the administration was working on an ultimately successful diplomatic outreach to Iran. North Korea first tested a nuclear weapon in 2006, and its nuclear capabilities were confirmed in 2009. North and South Korea have technically been at war ever since the “hot” phase of the Korean War ended in 1953, but the North’s recent nuclear developments have increased the urgency to ultimately resolve the dispute diplomatically.

In addition to its unsanctioned nuclear activity, the North Korean regime is also alleged to operate a system of concentration camps where political prisoners are worked and starved to death. The U.N. released a 2014 report that suggested the regime’s security chiefs and leader Kim Jong Un should be prosecuted for crimes against humanity.

*** Note there is nothing about Unit 121, North Korea’s hacking division. Known since at least 2007.

CNet: North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) is in charge of both traditional and cyber operations, and is known for sending agents abroad for training in cyberwarfare. The RGB reportedly oversees six bureaus that specialize in operations, reconnaissance, technology, and cyber matters — and two of which have been identified as the No. 91 Office and Unit 121. The two bureaus in question comprise of intelligence operations and are based in China.

The RGB also reportedly oversees state-run espionage businesses located in 30 to 40 countries, often hosted in unsuspecting places such as cafes. Members of this espionage network reportedly “send more than $100 million in cash per year to the regime and provide cover for spies,” the report says.

In addition, the country’s Worker’s Party oversees a faction of ethnic North Koreans living in Japan. Established in 1955, the group — dubbed the Chosen Soren — refuse to assimilate in to Japanese culture and live in the country in order to covertly raise funds via weapons trafficking, drug trafficking, and other black market activities. The group also gathers intelligence for the country and attempts to procure advanced technologies.

Despite aging infrastructure and power supply problems, North Korea reportedly was able to gain access to 33 of 80 South Korean military wireless communication networks in 2004, and an attack on the US State Department believed to be approved by North Korean officials coincided with US-North Korea talks over nuclear missile testing in the same time period. In addition, a month later, South Korea claimed that Unit 121 was responsible for hacking into South Korean and US defense department networks.

 

Obama’s ASEAN Summit a Failure?

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A US-ASEAN South China Sea Failure at Sunnylands?

An assessment of how the issue was dealt with at the summit needs to take into account limitations and realities.

Prashanth Parameswaran, The Diplomat:  Following the end of the historic U.S.-ASEAN summit at Sunnylands, a number of accounts have criticized Washington and Southeast Asian states for their weak stance on the South China Sea issue. In particular, much has been made of the fact that the U.S.-ASEAN joint statement issued after the summit did not contain a specific reference to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.

This is hardly the first time an ASEAN-related meeting has been criticized for this, and it will not be the last. And to be sure, getting ASEAN to be more forward-leaning on the South China Sea is a frustrating process well-known to U.S. and Southeast Asian diplomats. But to those who have been following the summit’s planning and execution closely, the suggestion that the United States and ASEAN have somehow failed on the South China Sea issue at Sunnylands is seriously misguided. It reflects an ignorance of how ASEAN and the United States deal with the South China Sea issue, what both sides expected going into Sunnylands, what was eventually achieved, and how the outcome fits in with other ongoing developments.

First, the extent of agreement on the South China Sea question ought to be judged on the basis of what ASEAN is rather than what it ought to be, since that is the reality that policymakers have to contend with. For various reasons, including the fact that ASEAN operates on the basis of consensus and only four of the ten members have claims in the South China Sea disputes, the organization has generally tended to adopt a lowest common denominator approach to the issue. With such a diversity of views – from the Philippines, a claimant which filed a case against China at an international tribunal, to Cambodia, a not-so-interested party and close Chinese partner which infamously blocked the issuance of a joint communique over mention of the South China Sea issue – ASEAN’s statements as a bloc have not traditionally singled out China directly irrespective of Beijing’s actions, and it is rather unrealistic to expect that to change anytime soon (See: “Does ASEAN Have a South China Sea Position?”).

While ASEAN’s critics have continued to rail on the organization for its weakness on the South China Sea question, Southeast Asian and U.S. policymakers have long internalized the structural issues that prevent a stronger ASEAN position. That explains why they tend to push only for realistic agreements on broad principles within ASEAN as a grouping to uphold basic regional cohesiveness but also pursue more forward-leaning steps on a bilateral or unilateral basis. For instance, the Philippines has independently pursued a case against China with the United Nations arbitral tribunal at The Hague, and the United States has been quietly nudging individual Southeast Asian states to support Manila’s efforts outside of ASEAN, given the unwillingness of some of the grouping’s members to do so within the group (“Does the Philippines’ South China Sea Case Against China Really Matter?”).

Hence, while some parties naturally continue to push for more and others want less each time the issue is raised, realistically U.S. and ASEAN officials generally only expect broad agreement on a set of principles that claimants (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam), interested parties (Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand) and not-so-interested parties (Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar) could all adhere to. The true test of whether ASEAN has remained united on the South China Sea issue is thus not whether it suddenly achieves an unprecedented and unrealistic level of cohesion like calling out China in a joint communique, but if it manages to maintain agreement on basic principles that govern the issue in spite of any divisions within the grouping.

If one looks at the paragraphs in the U.S.-ASEAN joint statement issued at Sunnylands relating to the South China Sea, that modest but realistic expectation – broad agreement on a set of principles – was met. The paragraphs in the joint statement relating to the South China Sea articulate all the relevant principles, including the peaceful resolution of disputes, respect for international law including the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and commitment to freedom of navigation and overflight. This at the very least constitutes par for the course rather than a failure of any kind.

Second, while the language in the joint statement at Sunnylands may seem vague, it is important to contextualize what was agreed on the South China Sea question both in terms of the broader approach the Obama administration has adopted towards it as well as the nature of the summit itself.

With respect to the former, while some have tended to get lost in the weeds, barring a late start, the Obama administration has successfully framed the U.S. and ASEAN’s role in the South China Sea issue as not being just about China or how claims are resolved, but preserving the rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific (See: “Why the US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit Matters“). That is, what both sides have in common is upholding a set of common rules that applies to all countries big and small, whether it is preserving principles governing how vessels can navigate at sea in the case of the South China Sea in the security realm; pursuing policies that lead to openness and competitiveness in the economic sphere; or promoting the rule of law, good governance, accountable institutions and universal human rights. That makes sense rhetorically even if the reality in Southeast Asia is far from the ideal suggested in those principles.

It is through this prism – a shared commitment by both sides to the regional rules-based order – that U.S. officials approached the South China Sea question in the context of the broader joint statement at Sunnylands. As one official told The Diplomat ahead of the summit, the idea was to chart out a set of agreed principles on maritime security between the United States and ASEAN in full recognition of divisions between the bloc as well as the complexities of the South China Sea issue. That would seem to make sense – if two parties are claiming that their actions are motivated by a joint commitment to certain principles rather than targeting a single country, it is worth spelling out those principles. By contrast, singling out China would only seem to undermine the case being made that this is about principles rather than a particular nation.

The nature of the summit also matters for how one evaluates the outcome on the South China Sea question. Even before Sunnylands, U.S. officials had tirelessly pointed out that it would be unlike regular U.S.-ASEAN meetings, with a focus more on candid discussion among leaders rather than carefully prepared statements and tightly negotiated deliverables. Officials had also privately and publicly admitted that the outcome document would be more like a broad, short statement of principles rather than a traditional joint communique issued at ASEAN meetings or the more detailed, 14-page long U.S.-ASEAN plan of action to implement the strategic partnership issued last November (See: “US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit: What to Expect”). Given that the outcome document was much like what the Obama administration had envisioned even before the summit, it is bizarre to label it a failure.

Furthermore, owing to the format of the summit which U.S. officials had detailed, it is rather myopic to judge what was agreed on the South China Sea by just the joint statement alone. Accounts by those present suggest that the leaders naturally dived into much more detail in the closed door session on security issues on the second day of the summit, including on China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. As with most summits, what is said behind closed doors is as, if not more important, than what is written in a joint statement.

Third, even given these limitations and realities, judged both qualitatively and quantitatively, the specifics of what was achieved in terms of language on the South China Sea question are hardly inconsequential. Quantitatively, three of the 17 paragraphs of the entire U.S.-ASEAN joint statement addressed maritime security, more than any other single issue (See: “What Did the US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit Achieve?”). Most other fields either got one paragraph or were squeezed in among a laundry list of other related priorities. For those used to parsing ASEAN statements, this is hardly inconsequential and demonstrates the concern both the United States and Southeast Asian states place on the issue.

Beyond numbers, the qualitative aspect of what was achieved is also notable relative to the past. For instance, while the United States and more forward-leaning ASEAN members may not have been able to get full-throated and full support within the grouping for the Philippines’ ongoing case against China, the mention in paragraph seve of “full respect for legal and diplomatic processes without resorting to the threat or use of force” is the closest possible language to asking Beijing to abide by the court’s decision expected in May. The presence of such language this time around constitutes relative progress – this was missing from the joint statement on the U.S.-ASEAN strategic partnership issued last November (See: “US, ASEAN to Ink New Strategic Partnership”).

Similarly, in paragraph eight, “non-militarization and self-restraint in the conduct of activities” was added this time to the familiar refrain about the respect for freedom of navigation and overflight. The phrase “non-militarization” was absent in similar U.S.-ASEAN statements issued in November. Its inclusion this time around reflects both growing concerns about China’s behavior in this regard as well as successful efforts by the United States and some forward-leaning ASEAN countries in translating a commitment made by Chinese president Xi Jinping last year into a clear, joint call to get Beijing to do as it had pledged (though, true to form, China appears to have once again found a way to rhetorically finesse its way out of this glaring contradiction).

To be sure, U.S. officials would prefer an even stronger stance by ASEAN on the South China Sea. The point here is simply that what was achieved within constraints was still quite significant.

Fourth and lastly, irrespective of what was said or not said about China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, Beijing’s continued pursuit of destabilizing, unilateral actions there continue to speak for themselves. As it is, beyond joint statements, close regional observers know that it is difficult to arrive at a Southeast Asian capital today where there is not some degree of concern about China’s South China Sea behavior and its implications for regional stability, international law, and U.S.-China relations. With news this week that China has set up missile defense systems in the Paracel Islands – effectively beginning the militarization Xi had pledged not to undertake – those concerns will grow graver still. And while they may not manifest themselves in the boilerplate joint statements that are usually issued following ASEAN meetings, they will likely continue to do so in other more meaningful ways, including stronger security ties between Washington and individual Southeast Asian states as well as a louder diplomatic campaign against China following the court’s decision in May.

It is ultimately those clearer, more consequential signs – rather than communiques at multilateral meetings – that we should be looking at for indicators of the regional response to Beijing’s South China Sea assertiveness. Because contrary to the suggestion that the United States and ASEAN are failing on the South China Sea issue, it is Beijing’s determination to coerce other claimants and violate international law to secure its interests (while blaming the United States and Southeast Asian states for responding in any way) that seems to be the flawed, shortsighted approach that sacrifices long-term goodwill for short-term gain. For all China’s suggestions that the United States is seeking to contain it, with its own assertiveness abroad, it won’t be long before Beijing does a pretty good job of that itself.

Beyond the Bluster, Obama Missed a Major Deadline

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But Obama did play golf last weekend and it appears he is missing the funeral of Supreme Court Justice Antoine Scalia to play golf?

Last year, the White House held a summit on the matter, any achievements? Nah.

 

It appears that perhaps Obama and his national security team has left the matter up the Tony Blinken at the State Department and the Brookings Institute.

The United States has mobilized countries around the world to disrupt and defeat these threats to our common security—starting with Daesh and al-Qaeda and including Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, AQAP, and a number of other groups. Now, the most visible part of this effort is the battlefield and our increasingly successful effort to destroy Daesh at its core in Iraq and Syria. Working by, with, and through local partners, we have taken back 40 percent of the territory Daesh controlled a year ago in Iraq and 10 percent in Syria—killing senior leaders, destroying thousands of pieces of equipment, all the while applying simultaneous pressure against key chock points and isolating its bases in Mosul and Raqqa. In fact, we assess Daesh’s numbers are the lowest they’ve been since we began monitoring their manpower in 2014.

We have a comprehensive strategy includes training, equipping, and advising our local partners; stabilizing and rebuilding liberated areas; stopping the flow of foreign fighters into and out of Iraq and Syria; cutting off Daesh’s financing and countering its propaganda; providing life-saving humanitarians assistance; and promoting political accommodations so that our military success is sustainable.

In each of these areas, we are making real progress. These hard-fought victories undermine more than Daesh’s fighting force. They erode the narrative it has built of its own success—the perception of which remains one of Daesh’s most effective recruiting tools. For the danger from violent extremism has slipped past war’s frontlines and into the computers and onto the phones of citizens in every corner of the world. Destined to outlive Daesh, this pernicious threat is transforming our security landscape, as individuals are inspired to violent acts from Paris to San Bernardino to Jakarta.

So even as we advance our efforts to defeat Daesh on the frontlines, we know that to be fully effective, we must work to prevent the spread of violent extremism in the first place—to stop the recruitment, radicalization, and mobilization of people, especially young people, to engage in terrorist activities. Read all the comments and remarks here.

White House Misses Deadline to Deliver ISIS Strategy to Congress

Brown: (CNSNews.com) – The House Armed Services Committee noted Tuesday that the Obama administration missed their February 15 deadline to deliver a strategy to counter violent extremist groups in the Middle East, such as ISIS and al Qaeda, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act.

Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Texas), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, harshly criticized  President Obama’s failure to meet the deadline.

“I fear the President’s failure to deliver this report says far more about the state of his strategy to defeat terrorists than any empty reassurance he may offer from the podium,” Thornberry said in a statement.

“Unsurprisingly, the Administration cannot articulate a strategy for countering violent extremists in the Middle East. Time and again, the President has told us his strategy to defeat extremist groups like ISIS and al Qaeda is well underway,” Thornberry said, “yet, months after the legal requirement was established, his Administration cannot deliver that strategy to Congress.”

Thornberry also outlined the consequences of the administration’s failure, calling it “a lost opportunity” for Congress and the administration to come together for a common approach to respond to the threat.

“The Committee is working now to shape the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act and the Pentagon has already begun requesting authorities our troops need to defeat this enemy. Without a strategy, this amounts to leaving our troops in the wilderness with a compass, but no map,” he wrote.

“Failing to comply with the report deadline represents more than a failure of strategic vision for the White House,” Thornberry emphasized. “It is a lost opportunity for the Administration and Congress to work together on a common approach to face this threat.”

Section 1222 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY16, signed by President Obama in November, “requires the Secretaries of State and Defense to deliver a strategy for the Middle East and countering violent extremism no later than February 15, 2016” according to Thornberry’s statement.

It also requires the Administration to “lay out a number of elements needed to defeat terrorist groups like ISIS and al Qaeda, including a description of the role the U.S. military will play in such a strategy, a description of the coalition needed to carry out the strategy, and an assessment of efforts to disrupt foreign fighters traveling to Syria and Iraq.”

House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wisc.) sent the White House a reminder of the deadline on February 10, citing a recent testimony by Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, that ISIS “will probably attempt to conduct additional attacks in Europe, and attempt to direct attacks on the U.S. homeland in 2016.”

“We are aware of the report and are actively working with multiple interagency offices to complete this legal requirement per the NDAA and look forward to submitting the completed report to Congress in the near-term,” Army Lt. Col. Joe Sowers, a Department of Defense spokesman, told The Hill on Friday.

*** Just one reason why Obama being tardy is an issue:

The intercontinental nuclear missile threat arrives in America.

 

Americans have been focused on New Hampshire and Iowa, but spare a thought for Los Angeles, Denver and Chicago. Those are among the cities within range of the intercontinental ballistic missile tested Sunday by North Korea. Toledo and Pittsburgh are still slightly out of range, but at least 120 million Americans with the wrong zip codes could soon be targets of Kim Jong Un…

***

“We assess that they have the capability to reach the [U.S.] homeland with a nuclear weapon from a rocket,” U.S. Admiral Bill Gortney of the North American Aerospace Defense Command said in October, echoing warnings from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the U.S. commander in South Korea…

All of this vindicates the long campaign for missile defense. Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative helped win the Cold War, and North Korea is precisely the threat that continued to justify the cause after the Soviet Union’s collapse… 

You can thank the George W. Bush Administration for the defenses that exist, including long-range missile interceptors in Alaska and California, Aegis systems aboard U.S. Navy warships and a diverse network of radar and satellite sensors. The U.S. was due to place interceptors in Poland and X-Band radar in the Czech Republic, but in 2009 President Obama and Hillary Clinton scrapped those plans as a “reset” gift to Vladimir Putin.

Team Obama also cut 14 of the 44 interceptors planned for Alaska and Hawaii, ceased development of the Multiple Kill Vehicle… and defunded the two systems focused on destroying missiles in their early “boost” phase… By 2013 even Mr. Obama partially realized his error, so the Administration expanded radar and short-range interceptors in Asia and recommitted to the 14 interceptors for the U.S. West Coast. It now appears poised to install sophisticated Thaad antimissile batteries in South Korea.