Category Archives: China aggression

Chilling Details of the Sony Hack, Reported

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These Are the Cyberweapons Used to Hack Sony

MotherBoard: In late November 2014, a mysterious group of hackers calling itself “God’sApstls” sent an ominous and jumbled email to a few high-level Sony Pictures executives.

“The compensation for it, monetary compensation we want,” the hackers wrote. “Pay the damage, or Sony Pictures will be bombarded as a whole.”

The executives at the Hollywood studio, which was about to release the controversial James Franco and Seth Rogen’s comedy The Interview, ignored the email. Just three days later, the hackers’ followed through with their threat and breached the studio’s systems, displaying a message on the computer screen of every employee: “Hacked by #GOP [Guardians of Peace].”

The hackers not only defaced employee’s computers, they then wiped their hard disks, crippling Sony Pictures for weeks, and costing the company $35 million in IT damages, according to its own estimate.

Now, more than a year later, several security researchers are still hunting down the hackers behind the attack, which the FBI officially identified as North Korean government-employed hackers. And despite the fact that the group is apparently still alive and well, a coalition of security researchers believes they can now disrupt them by exposing their extensive malware arsenal.

On Wednesday, a group of companies led by Novetta released a report detailing the Sony hackers’ long history of operations, as well as its large stock of malware. It’s perhaps the most detailed and extensive look at the group behind what might be the most infamous cyberattack ever.

Andre Ludwig, the senior technical director at Novetta Research and Interdiction Group, said that the investigation started from four hashes (values that uniquely identify a file) that the Department of Homeland security published after the attack. With those few identifying strings, and after months of sleuthing, the researchers found 2,000 malware samples, both from online malware portal VirusTotal, as well as from antivirus companies. Of those, they manually reviewed and catalogued 1,000, and were able to identify 45 unique malware strains, revealing that the Sony hackers had an arsenal more sophisticated and varied than previously thought.

The researchers hope that by shedding light on the hackers’ toolkit, the group, which the researchers called “Lazarus Group,” will be forced to adapt, spending resources and time, and perhaps even lose capabilities after antivirus companies and potential targets put up new defenses.

“There is no more shadows to hide in for these tools.”

“If all of a sudden you have antivirus signatures that detect and delete all the group’s arsenal, boom!” Jaime Blasco, the chief scientist at AlienVault Labs and one of the researchers who investigated the Sony hackers, told Motherboard. “They lose access to all the victims’ they got before.”

As Ludwig put it, “there is no more shadows to hide in for these tools.”

As it turns out, the hackers’ arsenal contains not only malware capable of wiping and destroying files on a hard disk like the Sony hack, but also Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) tools, tools that allow for remotely eavesdropping on a victim’s computer, and more, according to the report. The researchers tracked some of this tools in cyberattacks and espionage operations that go as far as back as 2009, perhaps even 2007, showing the hackers that hit Sony have a long history.

While others suspected this before, Blasco said that nobody demonstrated it as conclusively until now.

Novetta researchers and their partners, which include AlienVault and Kaspersky Lab, don’t get into saying who the hackers really are, but they also don’t question the FBI’s controversial claim that North Korea was behind the attack.

The main reason, LaMontagne explained, is that the new data they found discredits the alternative theories that the hackers were actually a disgruntled former employee or just an independent hacktivist group.

A former Sony system administrator is unlikely to have built more than 45 malware tools in the span of more than seven years, LaMontagne told me. And the same time, he added, it’s also unlikely that a previously unheard of hacktivist group would pop up, claim responsibility for such a high-profile attack, and then disappear.

“They’re extremely motivated, regimented, organized, and they can definitely execute.”

“We have no reason to dispute what the US government and other governments have asserted as the threat being North Korean,” Peter LaMontagne, the CEO of Novetta, told me.

And as it turns out, those hackers have been around for longer than anyone thought—wielding sophisticated weapons. This, according to the researchers, shows the group was much more seasoned than anyone believed.

“Their motivation and operational execution, it’s impressive,” Ludwig said. “They’re extremely motivated, regimented, organized, and they can definitely execute.”

Now that their methods and tools are exposed, however, the researchers hope that they won’t be as effective.

The head-scratcher is sanctions are only for the missile test?

US to present UN sanctions resolution on North Korea

United Nations (United States) (AFP) – The United States will on Thursday present a draft UN resolution toughening sanctions on North Korea after reaching agreement with China on a joint response to Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test and a rocket launch.

The UN Security Council will meet at 2:00 pm (1900 GMT) to discuss the draft text detailing a new package of measures to punish North Korea, but there will be no immediate vote.

US Ambassador Samantha Power “intends to submit for consideration by the Security Council a draft sanctions resolution in response to the DPRK’s recent nuclear test and subsequent proscribed ballistic missile launch,” US spokesman Kurtis Cooper said, using the abbreviation for North Korea’s formal name.

“We look forward to working with the Council on a strong and comprehensive response to the DPRK’s latest series of tests aimed at advancing their nuclear weapons program.”

UN diplomats said a vote was expected as early as Friday.

U.S. Poised to Take on China Aggressions

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The Pentagon Readies Backup Island in Case of Chinese Missile Onslaught

Threat prompts the U.S. military to prepare a fallback option

WiB: The United States can no longer count on its Pacific air bases to be safe from missile attack during a war with China. On the contrary, a 2015 paper from the influential RAND Corporation noted that in the worst case scenario, “larger and accurate attacks sustained over time against a less hardened posture could be devastating, causing large losses of aircraft and prolonged airfield closures.”

Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, due to its relative proximity, would be hardest hit. To up the stakes, China in September 2015 publicly revealed its DF-26 ballistic missile, which can strike Andersen Air Force Base in Guam — nearly 3,000 miles away — from the Chinese mainland. Andersen and Kadena are among the U.S. military’s largest and most important overseas bases.

Enter Tinian. The lush, small island near Guam is emerging as one of the Air Force’s backup landing bases. On Feb. 10, the flying branch announced that it selected Tinian as a divert airfield “in the event access to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, or other western Pacific locations is limited or denied.”

In the Pentagon’s 2017 budget request, it asked for $9 million to buy 17.5 acres of land “in support of divert activities and exercise intiatives,” the Saipan Tribune reported. In peacetime, the expanded Tinian airfield will host “up to 12 tanker aircraft and associated support personnel for divert operations,” according to the Air Force.

7637127318_661f4e4d60_kAbove — Tinian’s West Field in 1945. At top — Tinian seen from the cockpit of a C-130H. U.S. Air Force photo

Tinian is now a sleepy place.

During World War II, the 4th and 2nd Marine Divisions captured the island, which later based the B-29 Superfortresses Enola Gay and Bockscar which took off from Tinian’s North Field and dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. An arsenal during the war, most of its airstrips are now abandoned and unused. The island’s other former air base, West Field, is a small, neglected international airport.

The Air Force first wanted Saipan for its airfield. Very close to Tinian, Saipan has 15 times the population, a larger airport and a harbor. But this proposal met opposition from local activists due to the effect on “coral, potable water, local transportation and socioeconomic factors on surrounding communities,” Stars and Stripes reported.

The opposition even included the pro-business Saipan Chamber of Commerce, which worried that Tinian’s rusty airport would miss out on the flood of Pentagon spending. Saipan’s airport is also overcrowded — with locals not happy about the prospect of hundreds of airmen flying in for military exercises lasting up to eight weeks ever year.

In a way, its a return to the past. The United States dispersed air bases to varying degrees — and in different parts of the world — during the Cold War, but as the threat of a Soviet missile attack evaporated and post-Persian Gulf War budget cuts hit hard in the 1990s, the trend shifted toward larger mega-bases that operate on economies of scale.

But dispersed bases are more survivable, RAND’s Alan Vick noted in his 2015 paper:

Dispersing aircraft across many bases creates redundancy in operating surfaces and facilities. This enhances basic safety of flight by providing bases for weather or inflight-emergency diverts. It also increases the number of airfields that adversary forces must monitor and can greatly complicate their targeting problem (in part by raising the prospect that friendly forces might move among several bases).

 

At the least, dispersal (because it increases the ratio of runways to aircraft) forces an attacker to devote considerably more resources to runway attacks than would be the case for a concentrated force. It also greatly increases construction and operating costs to spread aircraft across many major bases. To mitigate these costs, dispersal bases tend to have more-modest facilities and, at times, might be nothing more than airstrips.

Now China Deployed Fighter Jets to Disputed Islands

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EXCLUSIVE: China sends fighter jets to contested island in South China Sea

FNC: EXCLUSIVE: In a move likely to further increase already volatile tensions in the South China Sea, China has deployed fighter jets to a contested island in the South China Sea, the same island where China deployed surface-to-air missiles last week, two U.S. officials tell Fox News.

The dramatic escalation comes minutes before Secretary of State John Kerry was to host his Chinese counterpart, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, at the State Department.

Chinese Shenyang J-11s (“Flanker”) and  Xian JH-7s (“Flounder”) have been seen by U.S. intelligence on Woody Island in the past few days, the same island where Fox News reported exclusively last week that China had sent two batteries of HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles while President Obama was hosting 10 Southeast Asian leaders in Palm Springs.

Wang was supposed to visit the Pentagon Tuesday, but the visit was canceled. It was not immediately clear which side canceled the visit. Pentagon press secretary Peter Cook said a “scheduling conflict” prevented the meeting, when asked by Fox News at Tuesday’s press briefing.

When asked about the earlier Fox News story in Beijing, Wang said the deployment of the missiles was for “defensive purposes.”

Woody Island is the largest island in the Paracel chain of islands in the South China Sea.  It lies 250 miles southeast of a major Chinese submarine base on Hainan Island. China has claimed Woody Island since the 1950s, but it is contested by Taiwan and Vietnam.

Ahead of Wang’s visit to Washington, a spokeswoman likened China’s military buildup on Woody Island to the U.S. Navy’s in Hawaii.

“There is no difference between China’s deployment of necessary national defense facilities on its own territory and the defense installation by the U.S. in Hawaii,” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said Monday.

More than $5 trillion of worth of natural resources and goods transit the South China Sea each year.

Earlier Tuesday, the head of the U.S. military’s Pacific Command said China is “clearly militarizing” the South China Sea, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“You’d have to believe in a flat Earth to believe otherwise,” Admiral Harry Harris said.

China has sent fighter jets to Woody Island before. In November, Chinese state media published images showing J-11 fighter jets on the island, but this was the first deployment of fighter jets since the Chinese sent commercial airliners to test the runway at one of its artificial islands in the South China Sea.

The Pentagon sailed a guided-missile destroyer past a contested island in the South China Sea as a result.  Late last year, the U.S. military conducted a flight of B-52 bombers and another warship to conduct a “freedom of navigation” exercise.

The Chinese have protested the moves and vowed “consequences.”

On Monday, new civilian satellite imagery from CSIS showed a possible high frequency radar installation being constructed in late January.

The imagery shows radar installations on China’s artificial islands in the Spratley Island chain of reefs-Gaven, Hughes, Johnson South, and primarily on Cuarteron reefs—the outermost island in the South China Sea.

*** 

FNC: China apparently has been building radar facilities on some of the artificial islands it constructed in the South China Sea in a move to bolster its military power in the region, according to a report released Tuesday by a U.S.-based think tank.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) says the radars on the outposts of Gaven, Hughes, Johnson South and Cuarteron reefs in the disputed Spratly Islands “speak to a long-term anti-access strategy by China—one that would see it establish effective control over the sea and airspace throughout the South China Sea.”

The report was released one week after Fox News reported that China had deployed an advanced surface-to-air missile system as well as a radar system on Woody Island, part of the Paracel Island chain located north of the Spratlys.

The release of the report also coincides with the first day of a three-day visit to the U.S. by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during which the issue of competing South China Sea claims is expected to be discussed, as well as North Korea’s latest nuclear test.

Obama Secret Talks, World is Normalized with DPRK

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Upon Obama’s departure from  the Oval Office in January 2017, there will be no more rogue nations or enemies of America and the West.

Next up after Iran and Cuba is North Korea. (shhhh, but I predicted this)

TheHill: The White House had signaled to the Kim Jung Un regime that it is willing to cut a deal similar to that brokered with Iran to curtail its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.

But North Korea has expedited its plans to develop a nuclear bomb, which it sees as a valuable bargaining chip in eventual peace negotiations.

A long-range rocket launched by North Korea earlier this month triggered additional international sanctions, including a law signed Thursday by President Obama imposing steeper penalties.

Un, who took power at the end of 2011, has demanded additional conditions for a treaty with South Korea, 63 years after the Korean War ended with an armistice.

Obama Administration Secretly Approached North Korea About Diplomatic Talks Days Before Its Latest Nuclear Test: WSJ

Days before North Korea’s Jan. 6 nuclear test, the Obama administration clandestinely agreed to talks that would have formally ended the Korean War, the Wall Street Journal reported Sunday.

As part of the offer, reported to have been made at a U.N. meeting, the U.S. dropped its longstanding prerequisite that North Korea first make efforts to reduce its nuclear arsenal, instead calling for the military dictatorship to make its nuclear weapons program part of the talks. But the test ended those discussions.

North Korea began 2016 on a belligerent footing, even considering the unpredictable pariah state’s history. In addition to the January nuclear test, North Korea launched a rocket earlier this month, resulting in swift pushback from Japan and South Korea, which closed a joint industrial park that provided North Korea with valuable hard currency.

The most recent offer to North Korea was one of several overtures extended by the Obama administration, insiders told the Journal, which happened at the same time the administration was working on an ultimately successful diplomatic outreach to Iran. North Korea first tested a nuclear weapon in 2006, and its nuclear capabilities were confirmed in 2009. North and South Korea have technically been at war ever since the “hot” phase of the Korean War ended in 1953, but the North’s recent nuclear developments have increased the urgency to ultimately resolve the dispute diplomatically.

In addition to its unsanctioned nuclear activity, the North Korean regime is also alleged to operate a system of concentration camps where political prisoners are worked and starved to death. The U.N. released a 2014 report that suggested the regime’s security chiefs and leader Kim Jong Un should be prosecuted for crimes against humanity.

*** Note there is nothing about Unit 121, North Korea’s hacking division. Known since at least 2007.

CNet: North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) is in charge of both traditional and cyber operations, and is known for sending agents abroad for training in cyberwarfare. The RGB reportedly oversees six bureaus that specialize in operations, reconnaissance, technology, and cyber matters — and two of which have been identified as the No. 91 Office and Unit 121. The two bureaus in question comprise of intelligence operations and are based in China.

The RGB also reportedly oversees state-run espionage businesses located in 30 to 40 countries, often hosted in unsuspecting places such as cafes. Members of this espionage network reportedly “send more than $100 million in cash per year to the regime and provide cover for spies,” the report says.

In addition, the country’s Worker’s Party oversees a faction of ethnic North Koreans living in Japan. Established in 1955, the group — dubbed the Chosen Soren — refuse to assimilate in to Japanese culture and live in the country in order to covertly raise funds via weapons trafficking, drug trafficking, and other black market activities. The group also gathers intelligence for the country and attempts to procure advanced technologies.

Despite aging infrastructure and power supply problems, North Korea reportedly was able to gain access to 33 of 80 South Korean military wireless communication networks in 2004, and an attack on the US State Department believed to be approved by North Korean officials coincided with US-North Korea talks over nuclear missile testing in the same time period. In addition, a month later, South Korea claimed that Unit 121 was responsible for hacking into South Korean and US defense department networks.

 

Obama’s ASEAN Summit a Failure?

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A US-ASEAN South China Sea Failure at Sunnylands?

An assessment of how the issue was dealt with at the summit needs to take into account limitations and realities.

Prashanth Parameswaran, The Diplomat:  Following the end of the historic U.S.-ASEAN summit at Sunnylands, a number of accounts have criticized Washington and Southeast Asian states for their weak stance on the South China Sea issue. In particular, much has been made of the fact that the U.S.-ASEAN joint statement issued after the summit did not contain a specific reference to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.

This is hardly the first time an ASEAN-related meeting has been criticized for this, and it will not be the last. And to be sure, getting ASEAN to be more forward-leaning on the South China Sea is a frustrating process well-known to U.S. and Southeast Asian diplomats. But to those who have been following the summit’s planning and execution closely, the suggestion that the United States and ASEAN have somehow failed on the South China Sea issue at Sunnylands is seriously misguided. It reflects an ignorance of how ASEAN and the United States deal with the South China Sea issue, what both sides expected going into Sunnylands, what was eventually achieved, and how the outcome fits in with other ongoing developments.

First, the extent of agreement on the South China Sea question ought to be judged on the basis of what ASEAN is rather than what it ought to be, since that is the reality that policymakers have to contend with. For various reasons, including the fact that ASEAN operates on the basis of consensus and only four of the ten members have claims in the South China Sea disputes, the organization has generally tended to adopt a lowest common denominator approach to the issue. With such a diversity of views – from the Philippines, a claimant which filed a case against China at an international tribunal, to Cambodia, a not-so-interested party and close Chinese partner which infamously blocked the issuance of a joint communique over mention of the South China Sea issue – ASEAN’s statements as a bloc have not traditionally singled out China directly irrespective of Beijing’s actions, and it is rather unrealistic to expect that to change anytime soon (See: “Does ASEAN Have a South China Sea Position?”).

While ASEAN’s critics have continued to rail on the organization for its weakness on the South China Sea question, Southeast Asian and U.S. policymakers have long internalized the structural issues that prevent a stronger ASEAN position. That explains why they tend to push only for realistic agreements on broad principles within ASEAN as a grouping to uphold basic regional cohesiveness but also pursue more forward-leaning steps on a bilateral or unilateral basis. For instance, the Philippines has independently pursued a case against China with the United Nations arbitral tribunal at The Hague, and the United States has been quietly nudging individual Southeast Asian states to support Manila’s efforts outside of ASEAN, given the unwillingness of some of the grouping’s members to do so within the group (“Does the Philippines’ South China Sea Case Against China Really Matter?”).

Hence, while some parties naturally continue to push for more and others want less each time the issue is raised, realistically U.S. and ASEAN officials generally only expect broad agreement on a set of principles that claimants (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam), interested parties (Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand) and not-so-interested parties (Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar) could all adhere to. The true test of whether ASEAN has remained united on the South China Sea issue is thus not whether it suddenly achieves an unprecedented and unrealistic level of cohesion like calling out China in a joint communique, but if it manages to maintain agreement on basic principles that govern the issue in spite of any divisions within the grouping.

If one looks at the paragraphs in the U.S.-ASEAN joint statement issued at Sunnylands relating to the South China Sea, that modest but realistic expectation – broad agreement on a set of principles – was met. The paragraphs in the joint statement relating to the South China Sea articulate all the relevant principles, including the peaceful resolution of disputes, respect for international law including the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and commitment to freedom of navigation and overflight. This at the very least constitutes par for the course rather than a failure of any kind.

Second, while the language in the joint statement at Sunnylands may seem vague, it is important to contextualize what was agreed on the South China Sea question both in terms of the broader approach the Obama administration has adopted towards it as well as the nature of the summit itself.

With respect to the former, while some have tended to get lost in the weeds, barring a late start, the Obama administration has successfully framed the U.S. and ASEAN’s role in the South China Sea issue as not being just about China or how claims are resolved, but preserving the rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific (See: “Why the US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit Matters“). That is, what both sides have in common is upholding a set of common rules that applies to all countries big and small, whether it is preserving principles governing how vessels can navigate at sea in the case of the South China Sea in the security realm; pursuing policies that lead to openness and competitiveness in the economic sphere; or promoting the rule of law, good governance, accountable institutions and universal human rights. That makes sense rhetorically even if the reality in Southeast Asia is far from the ideal suggested in those principles.

It is through this prism – a shared commitment by both sides to the regional rules-based order – that U.S. officials approached the South China Sea question in the context of the broader joint statement at Sunnylands. As one official told The Diplomat ahead of the summit, the idea was to chart out a set of agreed principles on maritime security between the United States and ASEAN in full recognition of divisions between the bloc as well as the complexities of the South China Sea issue. That would seem to make sense – if two parties are claiming that their actions are motivated by a joint commitment to certain principles rather than targeting a single country, it is worth spelling out those principles. By contrast, singling out China would only seem to undermine the case being made that this is about principles rather than a particular nation.

The nature of the summit also matters for how one evaluates the outcome on the South China Sea question. Even before Sunnylands, U.S. officials had tirelessly pointed out that it would be unlike regular U.S.-ASEAN meetings, with a focus more on candid discussion among leaders rather than carefully prepared statements and tightly negotiated deliverables. Officials had also privately and publicly admitted that the outcome document would be more like a broad, short statement of principles rather than a traditional joint communique issued at ASEAN meetings or the more detailed, 14-page long U.S.-ASEAN plan of action to implement the strategic partnership issued last November (See: “US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit: What to Expect”). Given that the outcome document was much like what the Obama administration had envisioned even before the summit, it is bizarre to label it a failure.

Furthermore, owing to the format of the summit which U.S. officials had detailed, it is rather myopic to judge what was agreed on the South China Sea by just the joint statement alone. Accounts by those present suggest that the leaders naturally dived into much more detail in the closed door session on security issues on the second day of the summit, including on China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. As with most summits, what is said behind closed doors is as, if not more important, than what is written in a joint statement.

Third, even given these limitations and realities, judged both qualitatively and quantitatively, the specifics of what was achieved in terms of language on the South China Sea question are hardly inconsequential. Quantitatively, three of the 17 paragraphs of the entire U.S.-ASEAN joint statement addressed maritime security, more than any other single issue (See: “What Did the US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit Achieve?”). Most other fields either got one paragraph or were squeezed in among a laundry list of other related priorities. For those used to parsing ASEAN statements, this is hardly inconsequential and demonstrates the concern both the United States and Southeast Asian states place on the issue.

Beyond numbers, the qualitative aspect of what was achieved is also notable relative to the past. For instance, while the United States and more forward-leaning ASEAN members may not have been able to get full-throated and full support within the grouping for the Philippines’ ongoing case against China, the mention in paragraph seve of “full respect for legal and diplomatic processes without resorting to the threat or use of force” is the closest possible language to asking Beijing to abide by the court’s decision expected in May. The presence of such language this time around constitutes relative progress – this was missing from the joint statement on the U.S.-ASEAN strategic partnership issued last November (See: “US, ASEAN to Ink New Strategic Partnership”).

Similarly, in paragraph eight, “non-militarization and self-restraint in the conduct of activities” was added this time to the familiar refrain about the respect for freedom of navigation and overflight. The phrase “non-militarization” was absent in similar U.S.-ASEAN statements issued in November. Its inclusion this time around reflects both growing concerns about China’s behavior in this regard as well as successful efforts by the United States and some forward-leaning ASEAN countries in translating a commitment made by Chinese president Xi Jinping last year into a clear, joint call to get Beijing to do as it had pledged (though, true to form, China appears to have once again found a way to rhetorically finesse its way out of this glaring contradiction).

To be sure, U.S. officials would prefer an even stronger stance by ASEAN on the South China Sea. The point here is simply that what was achieved within constraints was still quite significant.

Fourth and lastly, irrespective of what was said or not said about China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, Beijing’s continued pursuit of destabilizing, unilateral actions there continue to speak for themselves. As it is, beyond joint statements, close regional observers know that it is difficult to arrive at a Southeast Asian capital today where there is not some degree of concern about China’s South China Sea behavior and its implications for regional stability, international law, and U.S.-China relations. With news this week that China has set up missile defense systems in the Paracel Islands – effectively beginning the militarization Xi had pledged not to undertake – those concerns will grow graver still. And while they may not manifest themselves in the boilerplate joint statements that are usually issued following ASEAN meetings, they will likely continue to do so in other more meaningful ways, including stronger security ties between Washington and individual Southeast Asian states as well as a louder diplomatic campaign against China following the court’s decision in May.

It is ultimately those clearer, more consequential signs – rather than communiques at multilateral meetings – that we should be looking at for indicators of the regional response to Beijing’s South China Sea assertiveness. Because contrary to the suggestion that the United States and ASEAN are failing on the South China Sea issue, it is Beijing’s determination to coerce other claimants and violate international law to secure its interests (while blaming the United States and Southeast Asian states for responding in any way) that seems to be the flawed, shortsighted approach that sacrifices long-term goodwill for short-term gain. For all China’s suggestions that the United States is seeking to contain it, with its own assertiveness abroad, it won’t be long before Beijing does a pretty good job of that itself.