Russia Prepared for War, What we Should Know

I have been asked several times in the last month if we are prepared for nuclear war with Russia. My responses have consistently been yes but the United States is always prepared and the likelihood of a nuclear conflict is slim. Sure, there is always that threat, yet it is just that, a threat.

 Jamestown.0rg

Related reading:  Russia’s Use of Military Power in Ukraine

This site has published countless items in recent months regarding Russia and the most important of all of them is the Gerasimov Doctrine, a paper that very few have read. Okay, while it is important, below will summarize some items in cliff note fashion.

In July 2015, Putin stated that:

recent events show that we cannot hope that some of our geopolitical opponents will change their hostile course any time in the foreseeable future … we must respond accordingly to this situation … and take additional systemic measures in all key areas … [to] preserve our country’s social, political and economic stability. Much here will depend on consolidating the efforts of our state institutions and civil society and concentrating resources in priority areas.117  (Chatham House)  

Steps to a war footing: Recently, Moscow ordered an nationwide military drill for several important reasons. 1. It needed it as a test to determine flaws. 2. The drill was part of the normal propaganda machine where, your government cares deeply about you.

There have been bunkers built and tours provided, there has been training for school children and the applications gas masks, directions throughout the country and who is in charge and has authority, the movement of nuclear weapons to other locations and missile testing.

***** But with all this chatter, are we at a point of a Cuban missile crisis? Well…all the symptoms are there and increasing for sure and American citizens should take notice. However….go slow, be measured and understand more of what needs to be understood and that is Russia itself. She is not a big threat to America as she is to Eastern Europe and Europe proper.

 

A recent NewsMax article noted that Russia has deployed warships to the English Channel and that Russia was on a economic war-footing. What is an economic war-footing? It has several definitions but most is can this country feed the hungry during a prolonged conflict and Russia will inflict financial damage to her adversaries. Ukraine and regions of Europe could be sacrificial lambs due to stopping energy resources such as gas and oil.

Let’s look closer at Russia:

****

Military and security mobilization

In part from Chatham House: The military aspects of Russia’s mobilization include the transition of the military and civil defence forces on to a war footing.37 This is largely a task concerned with complex administration – storing supplies and equipment; organizing and concentrating forces; coordinating men, equipment and transport with their missions; and deploying these assets as needed.

But it is also about the evolving conceptualization of the structure and role of the Russian armed forces. Thus the theme of mobilization sheds light on some enduring questions for the Russian leadership that go beyond the simple idea that mobilization is administration and ‘a staff problem’.

Indeed, mobilization has traditionally been related to how Moscow thinks about contemporary and future war. It has long been associated with the modernization of Russia’s armed forces, as the leadership has sought to work out the kind of force structures necessary to minimize the country’s weaknesses and maximize its advantages over opponents.

Facing a Turbulent Time:

Mobilization, with Difficulty Gerasimov’s brief discussion of mobilization in his February 2013 article has been almost entirely overlooked in the Western debate about Russian actions. Yet it is revealing, and offers a means of understanding the thinking of the Russian leadership and its actions during the past five years, and the direction in which it is taking Russia. Indeed, the ‘Gerasimov doctrine’ is best understood as a portent not of ‘hybrid’ warfare, but of Russian state mobilization. It discussed moving the economy on to a war footing, and pointed to the discussion of mobilization as preparedness, even readiness, proceeding before the outbreak of war.

At heart, Russian state mobilization is, in effect, grand strategy in emergency circumstances. Its implementation reflects a deliberate attempt to generate power and an acknowledgment of the problems that Moscow faces, both in terms of a complex and potentially hostile international environment and the dysfunctionalities of the Russian system. Mobilization is also about conceptualizing contemporary and future war, and preparing for the many and multifaceted challenges it poses. In current circumstances, this means both military combat readiness and the resilience and coordination of the wider system, including the MVD, security and investigation services, and other ministries.

Where are we, then, in terms of Russian mobilization? Given the definitions above, it appears that the Russian leadership is currently operating in the ‘mobilization preparation’ phase. It is taking measures to mobilize the economy, armed forces and state institutions, including explicitly stated actions to prepare Russia for the transition to war. In this it is moving towards a ‘mobilization readiness’ framework. In early 2014 Gerasimov stated that the General Staff had received additional powers for the coordination of federal organs, and that, ‘just in case’, a range of measures had been developed to ‘prepare the country for the transition to conditions of war’.113 Putin had used the same terminology following the Zapad-2013 exercises, and even earlier.114

This process has been under way for some time. If many in the West see relations with Russia in a post-Ukraine, post-2014 context, the Russian leadership is operating in a longer time frame that, though it has roots stretching back over a decade, is perhaps best depicted as a post-Arab Spring context. It is worth restating Gerasimov’s line in his article in February 2013 that ‘mobilization and concentration is not part of the period after the onset of the state of war, as in 1914, but rather unnoticed, proceeds long before that’.115 It is important to read this whole summary for context and perspective.

******  One last item and most significant, don’t underestimate the pro-active measures and defense systems of the United States. It is about the Navy and this summary will offer some comfort. You ask about the weakness of Obama making any decisions and signing his authorization? Sure, he is weak, but there are some thresholds he cannot ignore as Commander in Chief. It is the Pentagon and the Intelligence community that will prove the next measure to the National Security Council along with the House and Senate Arms Services Committee.

 

 

The Search and Destroy History of Hillary Clinton

While America and actually the world is witnessing this National Enquirer headline presidential campaign for both Donald and Hillary, the one item that seems to be omitted completely is the Bill Clinton/Sandy Berger theft of documents from the National Archives. In case you need a reminder and a refresher including documents, a sampling is below, that is a compilation of FOIA requests.

nara-foia-sandy-berger

How about this? WikiLeaks Podesta email selection: It seems there could be some classified material in this communication.

Re: Here’s what I mentioned

Date: 2014-08-19 11:21
Subject: Re: Here’s what I mentioned
Agree but there may be opportunities as the Iraqi piece improves. Also, any idea whose fighters attacked Islamist positions in Tripoli, Libya? Worth analyzing for future purposes.
From: John Podesta [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2014 09:19 AM
To: H Subject: Re: Here’s what I mentioned Hit send too soon.
Meant to say Syria elements are vexing.
On Aug 19, 2014 9:17 AM, “John Podesta” <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
I think we are headed down this path in Iraq, but the Syria elements are
On Aug 17, 2014 3:50 PM, “H” <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Note: Sources include Western intelligence, US intelligence and sources in the region. 1. With all of its tragic aspects, the advance of ISIL through Iraq gives the U.S. Government an opportunity to change the way it deals with the chaotic security situation in North Africa and the Middle East. The most important factor in this matter is to make use of intelligence resources and Special Operations troops in an aggressive manner, while avoiding the old school solution, which calls for more traditional military operations. In Iraq it is important that we engage ISIL using the resources of the Peshmerga fighters of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), and what, if any, reliable units exist in the Iraqi Army. The Peshmerga commanders are aggressive hard fighting troops, who have long standing relationships with CIA officers and Special Forces operators. However, they will need the continued commitment of U.S. personnel to work with them as advisors and strategic planners, the new generation of Peshmerga commanders being largely untested in traditional combat. That said, with this U.S. aid the Kurdish troops can inflict a real defeat on ISIL. 2. It is important that once we engage ISIL, as we have now done in a limited manner, we and our allies should carry on until they are driven back suffering a tangible defeat. Anything short of this will be seen by other fighters in the region, Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, as an American defeat. However, if we provide advisors and planners, as well as increased close air support for the Peshmerga, these soldiers can defeat ISIL. They will give the new Iraqi Government a chance to organize itself, and restructure the Sunni resistance in Syria, moving the center of power toward moderate forces like the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In addition to air support, the Peshmerga also need artillery and armored vehicles to deal with the tanks and other heavy equipment captured from the Iraqi army by ISIL. 3. In the past the USG, in an agreement with the Turkish General Staff, did not provide such heavy weapons to the Peshmerga, out of a concern that they would end up in the hands of Kurdish rebels inside of Turkey. The current situation in Iraq, not to mention the political environment in Turkey, makes this policy obsolete. Also this equipment can now be airlifted directly into the KRG zone. 4. Armed with proper equipment, and working with U.S. advisors, the Peshmerga can attack the ISIL with a coordinated assault supported from the air. This effort will come as a surprise to the ISIL, whose leaders believe we will always stop with targeted bombing, and weaken them both in Iraq and inside of Syria. At the same time we should return to plans to provide the FSA, or some group of moderate forces, with equipment that will allow them to deal with a weakened ISIL, and stepped up operations against the Syrian regime. This entire effort should be done with a low profile, avoiding the massive traditional military operations that are at best temporary solutions. While this military/para-military operation is moving forward, we need to use our diplomatic and more traditional intelligence assets to bring pressure on the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which are providing clandestine financial and logistic support to ISIL and other radical Sunni groups in the region. This effort will be enhanced by the stepped up commitment in the KRG. The Qataris and Saudis will be put in a position of balancing policy between their ongoing competition to dominate the Sunni world and the consequences of serious U.S. pressure. By the same token, the threat of similar, realistic U.S. operations will serve to assist moderate forces in Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, where insurgents are increasingly fascinated by the ISIL success in Iraq. 6. In the end the situation in Iraq is merely the latest and most dangerous example of the regional restructuring that is taking place across North Africa, all the way to the Turkish border. These developments are important to the U.S. for reasons that often differ from country to country: energy and moral commitment to Iraq, energy issues in Libya, and strategic commitments in Jordan. At the same time, as Turkey moves toward a new, more serious Islamic reality, it will be important for them to realize that we are willing to take serious actions, which can be sustained to protect our national interests. This course of action offers the potential for success, as opposed to large scale, traditional military campaigns, that are too expensive and awkward to maintain over time. 7. (Note: A source in Tripoli stated in confidence that when the U.S. Embassy was evacuated, the presence of two U.S. Navy jet fighters over the city brought all fighting to a halt for several hours, as Islamist forces were not certain that these aircraft would not also provide close ground support for moderate government forces.) 8. If we do not take the changes needed to make our security policy in the region more realistic, there is a real danger of ISIL veterans moving on to other countries to facilitate operations by Islamist forces. This is already happening in Libya and Egypt, where fighters are returning from Syria to work with local forces. ISIL is only the latest and most violent example of this process. If we don’t act to defeat them in Iraq something even more violent and dangerous will develop. Successful military operations against these very irregular but determined forces can only be accomplished by making proper use of clandestine/special operations resources, in coordination with airpower, and established local allies. There is, unfortunately, a narrow window of opportunity on this issue, as we need to act before an ISIL state becomes better organized and reaches into Lebanon and Jordan. 9. (Note: It is important to keep in mind that as a result of this policy there probably will be concern in the Sunni regions of Iraq and the Central Government regarding the possible expansion of KRG controlled territory. With advisors in the Peshmerga command we can reassure the concerned parties that, in return for increase autonomy, the KRG will not exclude the Iraqi Government from participation in the management of the oil fields around Kirkuk, and the Mosel Dam hydroelectric facility. At the same time we will be able to work with the Peshmerga as they pursue ISIL into disputed areas of Eastern Syria, coordinating with FSA troops who can move against ISIL from the North. This will make certain Basher al Assad does not gain an advantage from these operations. Finally, as it now appears the U.S. is considering a plan to offer contractors as advisors to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, we will be in a position to coordinate more effectively between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi Army.)     

Boston: The Details of the Firefight that Wounded Two Police Officers

Ft. Knox confirms Kirk Figueroa spent time in service with US Army Reserve. Kirk Figueroa, killed in firefight, had Florida gun license that expired in Feb. But no records of him having a license in Mass. Florida denied him a private investigator’s license. More here.

BOSTON —5 Investigates uncovered several aliases used by Kirk Figueroa, the man killed by Boston Police after he shot two officers on Wednesday night in East Boston. He took on one of them as he experienced what he called an Islamic “rebirth” in Africa.

It’s a picture of contradictions uncovered by Five Investigates, where Figueroa, 33, who started at least three companies in Florida and other states focused on security and protection is now the man who nearly killed two officers responding to a domestic violence call.

5 Investigates uncovered a job posting for “Police Protection” for one of those companies named Bailrunners. In it, Figueroa identifies himself as Muhummed Isa Al Mahdi. The ad said Al Mahdi was looking for people interested in helping him “hunt down fugitives and bring them to justice.”

5 Investigates also discovered a posting from Muhummed Isa on a website guide for Mosques from October 2012. Isa wrote about his “rebirth as a baby into the Nation of Islam” following a trip to an area of Ethiopia and a Mosque in South Africa.

Isa went on, writing that his unique and blessed journey was prepared and guided by Allah.

Most recently, Figueroa was using the name Kocoa Xango on social media, identifying himself as a police constable. His last post under that name came just a few hours before the fatal shooting.

Documents obtained by 5 Investigates also found criminal trouble for Figueroa dating back to at least 2005 when he was arrested in Georgia for impersonating a police officer.

That case was dismissed, but trouble came again in 2010, when he pleaded guilty to arson after setting a car on fire.

5 Investigates found that the arson case later kept him from obtaining a private investigators license in Florida.

Figueroa’s work history scattered in the years that followed, including a stint for about a week as a correction officer in West Virginia in 2014.

Feeney explained that the police department is responsible for the application and background checks of prospective constables before they are submitted to the City Council for approval.

In order to become a constable, you must have at least three years of documented experience as a licensed constable or provide a certificate that shows that he or she received constable training.

In the state of Massachusetts, a constable can take custody of prisoners or property, if a warrant for a person’s arrest is directed to him. The constable then has permission to apprehend the suspect in any place across the Commonwealth.

Evans compared the work of a constable to a mailman and said that the job did not come with a license to carry a firearm.

How Much has Russia Penetrated America and Policy?

A couple of items, then one wonders if either presidential candidate will mention any part of these items before the election……nah

Beginning with the Department of Justice:

Brooklyn Resident And Two Russian Nationals Arrested In Connection With Scheme To Illegally Export Controlled Technology To Russia

Defendants Used Brooklyn-Based Front Companies to Procure Sophisticated Military and Satellite Technology on Behalf of Russian End-Users

Earlier today, Alexey Barysheff of Brooklyn, New York, a naturalized citizen of the United States, was arrested on federal charges of illegally exporting controlled technology from the United States to end-users in Russia.  Simultaneously, two Russian nationals, Dmitrii Aleksandrovich Karpenko and Alexey Krutilin, were arrested in Denver, Colorado, on charges of conspiring with Barysheff and others in the scheme.[1]  Federal agents also executed search warrants at two Brooklyn locations that were allegedly used as front companies in Barysheff’s illegal scheme.

Barysheff is scheduled to make his initial appearance today at 2:00 p.m. at the United States Courthouse, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York, before Chief United States Magistrate Judge Roanne L. Mann.  Karpenko and Krutilin are scheduled to make their initial appearances today at the United States Courthouse in Denver, Colorado, where the government will seek their removal in custody to the Eastern District of New York.

The arrests and charges were announced by U.S. Attorney Robert L. Capers of the Eastern District of New York; Assistant Attorney General for National Security John P. Carlin; Special Agent in Charge Angel M. Melendez, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) for New York; FBI Assistant Director in Charge William F. Sweeney, Jr., New York Field Office; Special Agent in Charge Jonathan Carson, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Export Enforcement, New York Field Office; and Craig Rupert, Special Agent in Charge of the Department of Defense, Defense Criminal Investigative Service, North East Field Office.

The complaints allege that Barysheff, Karpenko, Krutilin, and others were involved in a conspiracy to obtain technologically cutting-edge microelectronics from manufacturers and suppliers located within the United States and to export those high-tech products to Russia, while evading the government licensing system set up to control such exports.  The Department of Commerce, pursuant to authority granted by the President of the United States, has placed restrictions on the export and re-export of items that it has determined could make a significant contribution to the military potential and weapons proliferation of other nations and that could be detrimental to the foreign policy and national security of the United States.  The microelectronics shipped to Russia included, among other products, digital-to-analog converters and integrated circuits, which are frequently used in a wide range of military systems, including radar and surveillance systems, missile guidance systems, and satellites.  These electronic devices required a license from the Department of Commerce to be exported to Russia and have been restricted for anti-terrorism and national security reasons.

As further detailed in the complaints, in 2015 Barysheff registered the Brooklyn, New York-based companies BKLN Spectra, Inc. (Spectra) and UIP Techno Corp. (UIP Techno).  Since that time, the defendants, and others have used those entities as U.S.-based front companies to purchase, attempt to purchase, and illegally export controlled technology.  To induce U.S.-based manufacturers and suppliers to sell them high-tech, export-controlled microelectronics and to evade applicable controls, the defendants and their co-conspirators purported to be employees and representatives of Spectra and UIP Techno and provided false end-user information in connection with the purchase of the items, concealed the fact that they were exporters, and falsely classified the goods they exported on records submitted to the Department of Commerce.  To conceal the true destination of the controlled microelectronics from the U.S. suppliers, the defendants and their co-conspirators shipped the items first to Finland and subsequently to Russia.

“U.S. export laws exist to prevent potentially dangerous technology from falling into the wrong hands,” said U.S. Attorney Capers.  “Those who seek to evade the scrutiny of U.S. regulatory and law enforcement agencies by operating in the shadows present a danger to our national security and our allies abroad.  We will continue to use all of our available national security options to hold such individuals and corporations accountable.”

“According to the complaints, Barysheff, Karpenko, and Krutilin conspired among themselves and with others to send sensitive U.S. technology surreptitiously to Russia in violation of U.S. export law,” said Assistant Attorney General Carlin.  “These laws are in place to protect the national security, and we will spare no effort in pursuing and holding accountable those who seek to harm the national security by illegally procuring strategic commodities for foreign entities.”

“Had law enforcement not interceded, the alleged perpetrators would have exported materials that are known to be used in a wide range of military devices,” said Melendez, Special Agent in Charge for HSI New York.  “HSI will continue to partner with other law enforcement agencies while focusing its efforts on national security and stopping the illegal flow of sensitive technology.”

“Export controls were established to prevent certain individuals, organizations, or nations from obtaining protected technology and information.  When the laws are evaded, we become vulnerable to the many threats posed by our adversaries.  The FBI will continue to protect our national security assets as we work with our partners to prevent the exportation of restricted materials,” said Sweeney, FBI Assistant Director in Charge, New York Field Office.

“Today’s arrest is a collaborative effort among law enforcement agencies.  I commend our colleagues for their efforts,” said Special Agent in Charge Carson, U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Export Enforcement, New York Field Office. “The Office of Export Enforcement will continue to use our unique authorities as the regulator and enforcer of our nation’s export control laws to keep the most dangerous goods out of the most dangerous hands.”

“The attempted theft of restricted U.S. technology by foreign actors severely threatens the United States’ defensive posture,” said Special Agent in Charge Craig Rupert, DCIS Northeast Field Office.  “DCIS will continue to pursue these investigations with our Federal partners to shield America’s investment in national defense.”

If convicted of the charges, the defendants face up to 25 years in prison and a $1 million fine.

The case is being handled by the Office’s National Security and Cybercrime Section.  Assistant U.S. Attorneys Craig R. Heeren and Peter W. Baldwin are in charge of the prosecution, with assistance from Trial Attorney Matthew Walczewski of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section.

The Defendants:

ALEXEY BARYSHEFF
Age: 36
Brooklyn, New York

DMITRII ALEKSANDROVICH KARPENKO
Age: 33
Russia

ALEXEY KRUTILIN
Age: 27
Russia

E.D.N.Y. Docket Nos. 16-893-M, 16-894-M

Then:

Again, Syria, again. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will meet yet again in Switzerland on Saturday, despite the ceasefire deal in Syria having fallen apart and Kerry suggesting that Russia was carrying out war crimes by bombing civilians in Aleppo. Putin brushes it all off. But Russian President Vladimir Putin said in an interview with French television TF1 on Wednesday that accusations of Russian war crimes are simply “political rhetoric that doesn’t make a lot of sense and doesn’t take account of the reality in Syria.” He added, “I am deeply convinced that it’s our Western partners, and especially the United States, that are responsible for the situation in the region in general and Syria in particular.” At an event in Moscow on Wednesday, Putin also insisted Russia won’t give in to “blackmail and pressure” over its military offensive in Syria and accused the U.S. and its allies of whipping up “anti-Russian hysteria.” Cyber front. The FBI believes that the hacking and leaking of Hillary Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta’s emails was carried out by Russian intelligence, anonymous officials tell the Wall Street Journal. The emails have been leaked to outlets such as the Intercept and WikiLeaks and show political deliberations of the Clinton campaign as well as transcripts of Clinton’s private speeches. The Department of Homeland Security is also helping states look for evidence of breaches and harden their networks following break-ins at a number of state electoral databases, similarly attributed to Russia. “The whole hysteria is aimed at making the American forget about the manipulation of public opinion,” Putin added Wednesday. “No one is talking about that, everyone wants to know who did that, what is important is what is inside and what that information is about.”

SCOTUS to Decide to Hear Case on Post 9/11 Case on FBI

Justices Will Hear Post-Sept. 11 Claims Against Ashcroft, Mueller

 Photo, BBC

NationalLawJournal: The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed to decide whether a 14-year-old suit should go forward against former George W. Bush attorney general John Ashcroft and former FBI director Robert Mueller III based on their roles in the post-Sept. 11 roundup and detention of Muslim, Arab and South Asian men.

In Ashcroft v. Turkmen, the Obama administration had asked the high court to review a June 2015 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that reinstated claims by eight men and a potential class of 80. The plaintiffs alleged the former Bush officials purposely and unconstitutionally directed their detentions in harsh and abusive conditions due to their race, religion or national origin.

Justices Sonia Sotomayor, a former Second Circuit judge, and Elena Kagan, a former U.S. solicitor general, did not participate in the high court’s decision to review the case. Their potential recusals from the case could set the stage for a six-justice court to decide the outcome if the vacancy caused by the death of Justice Antonin Scalia remains unfilled through early next year.

The justices on Tuesday also added another potentially high profile case: Hernandez v. Mesa, a challenge stemming from a U.S. Border Patrol agent’s shooting of a 15-year-old Mexican boy on Mexican soil.

In the Ashcroft petition, the Obama administration argued that the Second Circuit was wrong—in the context of the Sept. 11 investigations—to allow Ashcroft, Mueller and other Justice department officials to be sued in their individual capacities for violations of constitutional rights under the 1971 high court decision Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.

The Second Circuit is “the first circuit to permit such a damages remedy to be pursued ‘against executive branch officials for national security actions taken after the 9/11 attacks,’” then-Solicitor General Donald Verrilli Jr. wrote in the petition.

The Obama administration also challenges the appellate court’s ruling that Ashcroft and Mueller, now a partner at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, were not entitled to qualified immunity for their alleged role in the treatment of those detained. The government also contends the allegations that the former officials personally condoned the detentions because of “invidious animus” against Arabs and Muslims are not “plausible.”

The justices set the plausibility standard in a similar case, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, in 2009. The court ruled 5-4 then that Javaid Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim and post Sept. 11-detainee, failed to plead sufficient facts to support his claim of intentional, unlawful discrimination.

From Verrilli’s petition:

Based on conclusory allegations and after-the-fact inferences drawn in the chambers of appellate judges, the court of appeals concluded that the nation’s highest-ranking law-enforcement officers—a former Attorney General of the United States and former Director of the FBI—may be subjected to the demands of litigation and potential liability for compensatory and even punitive damages in their individual capacities because they could conceivably have learned about and condoned the allegedly improper ways in which their undisputedly constitutional policies were being implemented by lower-level officials during an unprecedented national-security crisis.

Representing the Turkmen plaintiffs, Rachel Meeropol of the Center for Constitutional Rights, had urged the justices to deny review.

“The petitions instead boil down to a request for a new and remarkable form of immunity, one in which the clearly unconstitutional actions of federal officials are untouchable so long as they occur in temporal proximity to a national tragedy,” Meeropol wrote.

The justices also granted review in two related petitions raising similar issues. Ballard Spahr’s William McDaniel Jr. filed a petition on behalf of former Immigration and Naturalization Service commissioner James Ziglar, and  MoloLamken’s Jeffrey Lamken filed on behalf of former wardens of the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn.

The Second Circuit decision stemmed from a lawsuit filed in 2002 by the Center for Constitutional Rights. The center charged that the plaintiffs and other detainees were placed in solitary confinement, some for up to eight months, even though they were only charged with civil immigration violations like overstaying a visa or working without authorization.

The lawsuit has yet to go to trial.

Fourth Amendment at the border

In Hernandez, the border shooting case, the parents of Sergio Hernandez, represented by Deepak Gupta of Washington’s Gupta Wessler, are asking the high court to overturn a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The appeals court said the Fourth Amendment’s protection against excessive deadly force did not apply because their son was a Mexican citizen with no significant voluntary connection to the United States and he was killed on Mexican territory.

The justices have directed the parties also to brief whether Hernandez’s claim against border patrol agent Jesus Mesa could be brought under their 1971 decision in Bivens.

The Obama administration had urged the justices to deny review.