Smith, WeeklyStandard: Early last Wednesday, Iran released the ten American sailors it had detained to coincide with President Obama’s State of the Union address Tuesday night. The administration understood clearly that the Iranians were both trying to ruin Obama’s victory lap and sending a message—on the eve of implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—that Tehran will be calling the shots. So Obama made no mention of Iran’s capturing 10 Americans during his speech: No way were the Iranians going to get a rise out of him on his day.
The administration would prefer to forget the incident entirely—along with a series of other hostile acts by Iran since the nuclear deal was signed in July. In addition to its customary “Death to America” rallies, in the last few months the Islamic Republic has sentenced, in secret, Washington Post journalist Jason Rezaian; imprisoned U.S. citizen Siamak Namazi; tested ballistic missiles, in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions; fired rockets near a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Straits of Hormuz; and attacked two diplomatic missions belonging to longtime American ally Saudi Arabia. Detaining American sailors comports perfectly with this pattern.
Some American lawmakers aren’t willing to let it slide. Representative Mike Pompeo (R-Kan.) released a statement saying “we now must fully investigate Iran for possible violations of the Geneva Convention and ensure these sailors were treated properly.”
Pompeo is on solid ground. When the Iranians detained British sailors in 2007 and paraded them on television, Prime Minister Tony Blair rightly described it as a breach of the Geneva Conventions. Article 13 stipulates that “prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.” The first piece of evidence that the Iranians violated Geneva are the photographs and videos of the American sailors, especially those of them kneeling with their hands behind their heads, which were shown repeatedly in the Iranian media; further evidence is the coerced apology from the commanding officer.
It’s worth noting that Iran’s latest hostile action has given us a clearer picture of how the regime actually functions. As the event unfolded, CNN and other American media spoke of the “two Irans,” meaning the hardliners and the moderates. This has been the administration’s working theory, which holds that the former comprises the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The “moderates” in this view are figures like President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. In this scenario, it was the “hardliners” who were responsible for detaining the 10 Americans, and it was thanks to the diplomatic channel that John Kerry opened with Zarif while negotiating the nuclear deal that the sailors were freed without much delay. This theory posits that the hardliners kidnapped the Americans in an effort to embarrass the moderates, who want warmer relations with the White House. Therefore, the fact that the moderates prevailed signals a great victory for moderation and American diplomacy—for “principled diplomacy,” to use Obama’s phrase.
This scenario may be possible, but it isn’t likely. If there really is a split in the regime, why would the hardliners put themselves in a position to lose an intra-regime battle against the moderates? It would show the world that they’re not only weaker than the moderates, they’re also weaker than the moderates’ new partners, John Kerry and Barack Obama. Indeed, if it was the moderates who liberated the sailors from the grip of the extremists, it means the supreme leader himself required them to free the Great Satan’s seamen. Which would mean that the supreme leader has sided with the moderates and the Americans against the extremists.
That’s a stretch, to say the least. What is far more likely is that there is no such split between moderates and hardliners. The two camps—if there are indeed two camps—work in tandem. The hardliners take prisoners and the moderates negotiate the price of their release. Iran’s moderates are a ministry of bagmen sent out to collect on behalf of the hard men.
In short, the regime with which the White House has negotiated the future of American national security is still a regime that takes Americans hostage. Unless you believe that hijacking a U.S. Navy boat, humiliating its crew, photographing them with their hands above their heads, and broadcasting their apologies on state television is a demonstration of peaceful, moderate intentions.
Category Archives: UN United Nations Fraud Corruption
Who is Still Left at Gitmo, Names Provided
Of 93 detainees left at Gitmo, the Pentagon Press Secretary says 34 approved for transfer and 49 eligible for transfer review. 10 face criminal charges. By the way, the owner of this website, www.founderscode.com offers prayers and condolences to all those families who lost a warrior in the war on terror while capturing these detainees, including those sailors on the USS Cole.
Frankly, the whole mess of Ash Carter and the White House releasing these detainees is a political tragedy. Personally, we should all call for the resignation of Ash Carter.
Who’s still held at Guantánamo
Here is a list of 93 detainees currently held at Guantánamo.
McClatchy Newspapers and the Miami Herald consulted court and other public records as well as sources in tandem with secret U.S. military intelligence summaries provided by WikiLeaks to determine who was still being held there.
Clicking on the name will take you to a U.S. intelligence profile provided to McClatchy Newspapers by Wikileaks, an assessment of each captive drawn up by the prison that their attorneys generally dispute.
In many cases, the summary also includes a photo of the detainee.
In January 2010, a federal, Obama administration task force sorted the detainees into separate categories, whose status we’ve incorporated into this list and are updating with decisions of the 2013 and 2014 Periodic Review Boards.
Of the 93 captives, 34 are approved for transfer in one fashion or another.
Of the 93 captives, 34 are approved for transfer in one fashion or another and 49 others are in a continue-to-detain status but have not been charged with a crime.
The last 10 captives have cases being handled through military commission proceedings — two through plea bargains and one who had been convicted of war crimes that were overturned although he is still held as a convict serving a life sentence.
Note: No intelligence summary was available for two men listed below because they were processed at the prison after the era that the WikiLeaks documents captured. In their place we provide links to the Defense Department news releases announcing their arrival at Guantánamo.
Spellings of names may vary from other documents, reports. So we’ve included the U.S Internment Serial Number, or ISN, along with a form of each captive’s name.
ISN27 Uthman Abdul Rahim Mohammed Uthman, Yemeni. He won his habeas corpus lawsuit on Feb. 24, 2010 but lost after the U.S. government appealed to the U.S. Appeals Court for the District of Columbia Circuit, which overturned the release order on March 29, 2011. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee, a forever prisoner.
ISN28 Moath al Alwi, Yemeni. A federal judge upheld his indefinite detention on Dec. 30, 2008, denying his habeas corpus petition. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee, a forever prisoner. A national security parole panel, called a Periodic Review Board, upheld that status on Oct. 26, 2015.
ISN29 Mohammed al-Ansi, Yemeni. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee, a forever prisoner.
ISN30 Ahmed al-Hikimi, Yemeni. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN31 Mahmud al-Mujahid, Yemeni, arrived the day the prison opened, Jan. 11, 2002. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee. But a national security parole panel, called a Periodic Review Board, lifted the “forever prisoner” designation and declared him approved for transfer, with security arrangements, Jan. 9, 2014.
ISN33 Mohammed al-Adahi, Yemeni. He won his habeas corpus lawsuit on Aug. 17, 2009 but lost when the government appealed the decision and the U.S. Appeals Court for the District of Columbia Circuit overturned the decision on July 13, 2010, and lost again at the federal court Aug. 7, 2014. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN37 Abdel Malik Abdel Wahab al Rahabi, Yemeni, arrived the day the prison opened, Jan. 11, 2002, as a suspected Osama bin Laden bodyguard. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee. A national security parole panel, called a Periodic Review Board, upheld that status on March 5, 2014 but a subsequent review cleared him for release on Dec. 5, 2014, if conditions permit. The board recommended that, if he is resettled in a third country, he be joined by his wife and daughter, who was born after his capture.
ISN38 Ridah Bin Saleh al Yazidi, Tunisian, arrived the day the prison opened, Jan. 11, 2002. An Obama administration task force in January 2010 designated him as cleared for release.
ISN39 Ali Hamza al Bahlul, Yemeni, arrived the day the prison opened, Jan. 11, 2002. A military commission convicted him of war crimes on Nov. 3, 2008 and sentenced him to life at Guantánamo for working as Osama bin Laden’s media secretary in Afghanistan. His Pentagon appellate attorneys systematically got that conviction overturned, although the military would say after the decision whether he remained segregated as a convict at Guantánamo’s Camp 5 Convict’s Corridor.
ISN40 Abdelqadir al-Mudhaffari, Yemeni. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN41 Majid Abdu Ahmed, Yemeni. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee, a forever prisoner.
ISN44 Mohammed Ghanem, Yemeni, arrived the day the prison opened, Jan. 11, 2002. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee, a forever prisoner.
ISN63 Mohammed al-Qahtani, Saudi. He was subjected to such cruel “enhanced interrogation techniques” at Guantánamo that a senior Pentagon official, Susan Crawford, told The Washington Post’s Bob Woodward that she concluded he was tortured in U.S. custody, and in May 2008 dropped charges against him alleging he was a co-conspirator in the Sept. 11 plot. He’s been at the Guantánamo prison since February 2002, according to leaked military documents. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial.
ISN91 Abdel al-Saleh, Yemeni. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN115 Abdul Rahman Salih Nasir, Yemeni. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN128 Ghaleb Nasser Bihani, Yemeni. A federal judge upheld his indefinite detention on Jan. 28, 2008, denying his habeas corpus petition, and a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld that decision on Jan. 5, 2010. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee. But a national security parole panel, called a Periodic Review Board, lifted the “forever prisoner” designation and declared him approved for transfer, with security arrangements, on May 28, 2014.
ISN131 Salem bin Kanad, Yemeni who considers himself a Saudi. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee. A national security parole panel, called a Periodic Review Board, upheld that status on May 21, 2014.
ISN153 Fayiz Ahmad Yahia Suleiman, Yemeni. An Obama administration task force in January 2010 designated him as cleared for release.
ISN167 Ali Yahya Mahdi Abdo, Yemeni. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN178 Tariq Ba Odah, Yemeni. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN189 Falen Gherebi, also called Rafdat Muhammad Faqi Aljj-Saqqaf, a Libyan. An Obama administration task force in January 2010 designated him as cleared for release.
ISN223 Abd al-Rahman Abdu Abu Ghayth Sulayman, Yemeni. A federal judge upheld his indefinite detention on July 20, 2010, denying his habeas corpus petition. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN235 Saeed Ahmed Mohammed Abdullah Serem Jarabh, Yemeni. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee. But a national security parole panel, called a Periodic Review Board, lifted the “forever prisoner” designation and declared him approved for transfer, with security arrangements, March 5, 2015.
ISN240 Abdullah Yahia Yusif al Shibli, Saudi-born Yemeni. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN242 Khalid Ahmad Qasim, Yemeni. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee.
ISN244 Abdul Latif Nasir, Moroccan. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee.
ISN249 Muhammad Abdullah Muhammad al-Hamiri, Yemeni. An Obama administration task force in January 2010 designated him as cleared for release.
ISN257 Umar Bin Hamza Abdulayev, Tajik. Cleared for release through both Bush and Obama administration review processes, his lawyer notified the federal court that he fears for his life if repatriated. If a third country can’t be found to resettle him safely, he says, he’d rather spend his life in U.S. detention.
ISN309 Muieen Adeen al-Sattar, born in the United Arab Emirates. An Obama administration task force in January 2010 designated him as cleared for release.
ISN321 Ahmed Yaslam Saijid Kuman, Yemeni. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN324 Mashoor al Sabri, Yemeni. A federal judge upheld his indefinite detention Feb. 3, 2011, denying his habeas corpus petition. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee. But a national security parole panel, called a Periodic Review Board , lifted the “forever prisoner” designation and declared him approved for transfer, with security arrangements, April 17, 2015.
ISN434 Mustafa Abdul Qowi Abdul al-Shamiri, Yemeni. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee.
ISN440 Mohammed Ali Fowza, Yemeni. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN441 Mansoor Abdul Rahman al Dayfi, Yemeni. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee. But a national security parole panel, called a Periodic Review Board, lifted the “forever prisoner” designation and declared him approved for resettlement, with security arrangements, on Oct. 28, 2015.
ISN461 Abd Al-Rahman Mohammed Al-Taty, Yemeni. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN498 Muhammad Ahmad Said Haydar, Yemeni. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN508 Salman Yahya Hassan Muhammad Rabeii, Yemeni. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee.
ISN509 Muhammad Nasir Yahya Khusruf, Yemeni. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN522 Yassim Qasim Muhammad Ismail Qasim, Yemeni. A federal judge upheld his indefinite detention April 8, 2010, denying his habeas corpus petition, and a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld that decision on April 8, 2011. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee.
ISN535 Tariq Mahmud Ahmad el Sawah, Egyptian. In 2008, a Bush administration era Pentagon prosecutor swore out conspiracy and providing material support for terrorism military commissions charges for allegedly serving as an al Qaeda explosives expert in a now defunct version of the military commissions. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial. Subsequently, the war court’s chief prosecutor declared the material support charge no longer viable. Internal Defense Department documents showed that in late 2014 he was still considered a candidate for a war crimes trial. But on Feb. 12, 2015, a national security parole panel, called a Periodic Review Board declared him approved for transfer, “with appropriate support, including medical care” and security assurances.
ISN550 Walid Said Bin Said Zaid, Yemeni. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN560 Hajawali Mohmad, Afghan. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee.
ISN566 Masour Mohamed Mutaya Ali, Saudi-born Yemeni. An Obama administration task force in January 2010 designated him as cleared for release.
ISN569 Suhail Abdo Anam Shorabi, Yemeni. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial. He’s never been charged with a crime.
ISN576 Zahir Omar Hamis Bin Hamdoun, Yemeni. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee.
ISN578 Abdul Aziz al-Suwedy, Yemeni. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN682 Ghassan al-Sharbi, Saudi. During the Bush administration he was designated for trial by a now defunct version of the military commissions using a crime, providing material support for terror, that the war court prosecutor considers no longer viable. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial.
ISN685 Abdul Razak Ali, Algerian. A federal judge upheld his indefinite detention as June 23, 2011, denying the habeas corpus petition of this Taliban government media spokesman, governor and Cabinet minister. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial. He’s never been charged with a crime.
ISN694 Sufiyan Barhoumi, Algerian. During the Bush administration he was designated for trial by a now defunct version of the military commissions. A federal judge upheld his indefinite detention on Sept. 3, 2009, denying his habeas corpus petition, and a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld that decision detention on Jun. 22, 2010. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial.
ISN695 Omar Mohammed Khalif, Libyan. A federal judge upheld his indefinite detention May 28, 2010, denying his habeas corpus petition. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee. But a national security parole panel, called a Periodic Review Board, lifted the “forever prisoner” designation and declared him approved for transfer, with security arrangements, Aug. 20, 2015.
ISN696 Jubran Qahtani, Saudi. During the Bush administration he was designated for trial by a now defunct version of the military commissions using a crime, providing material support for terror, that the war court prosecutor considers no longer viable. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial.
ISN702 Ravil Mingazov, Russian. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial. He’s never been charged with a crime. He won his habeas corpus lawsuit on May 13, 2010. The U.S. government appealed to the U.S. Appeals Court for the District of Columbia Circuit, which in 2012 sent the habeas petition back to the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., for reconsideration. The case hasn’t been re-heard. His story has garnered more attention in the United States than many Guantánamo captive, in part because of offers by communities in western Massachusetts and Berkeley, Calif., to offer him asylum resettlement, were U.S. law to allow it.
ISN708 Ismael Ali Faraj al Bakush, Libyan. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee.
ISN728 Abdul Muhammad Ahmad Nassir al-Muhajari, Yemeni. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN753 Abdul Zahir, Afghan. In 2006, the Bush administration designated him for trial by military commissions in charges the Obama administration had dismissed without prejudice. Charges included attacking civilians, aiding the enemy and conspiracy for allegedly attacking a civilian vehicle, injuring three journalists, and supporting the Taliban and al Qaeda forces in hostilities against coalition forces in Afghanistan. Internal Defense Department documents showed that in late 2014 he was still considered a candidate for a war crimes trial. His lawyer is arguing in federal court that, with combat over in Afghanistan he should be released.
ISN760 Mohamedou Ould Slahi, a Mauritanian who got to Guantánamo Aug. 5, 2002. He won his habeas corpus lawsuit on March 22, 2010 but the U.S. government appealed to the U.S. Appeals Court for the District of Columbia Circuit, which on Nov. 5, 2010 ordered the lower court to review his detention with a different standard. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial. He’s never been charged with a crime. Little, Brown, the U.S. publishing house, released his memoirs based on declassified accounts written at the prison in southeast Cuba. Written in English, the book “Guantánamo Diary” was translated into about two dozen languages and distributed in that many countries.
ISN762 Obaidullah, Afghan. During the Bush administration he was designated for trial by a now defunct version of the military commissions. Attorney General Eric Holder has also approved his trial by the new revamped military commission. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial. A federal judge upheld his indefinite detention Oct. 19, 2010. His lawyer is arguing in federal court that, with combat over in Afghanistan he should be released.
ISN768 Ahmed Muhammed Haza al Darbi, Saudi. He pleaded guilty to terror charges Feb. 20, 2014 as an accomplice in the 2002 terrorist attack against the French oil tanker, MV Limburg, carried out while Darbi was already at Guantánamo. He agreed to testify at the war court in exchange for return to a Saudi prison in 2018 and a maximum 15-year sentence begun Feb. 20, 2014.
ISN836 Ayub Murshid Ali Salih, Yemeni who got to Guantánamo Oct. 28, 2002. A chart accompanying the so-called Senate Intelligence Committee ‘Torture Report’ indicates he was held by the CIA for 30 days or more, apparently separate and apart from his military detention. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee.
ISN837 Bashir Nasir Ali al-Marwalah, Yemeni who got to Guantánamo Oct. 28, 2002. A chart accompanying the so-called Senate Intelligence Committee ‘Torture Report’ indicates he was held by the CIA for 30 days or more, apparently separate and apart from his military detention. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee.
ISN838 Shawqi Awad Balzuhair, Yemeni who got to Guantánamo Oct. 28, 2002. A chart accompanying the so-called Senate Intelligence Committee ‘Torture Report’ indicates he was held by the CIA for 30 days or more, apparently separate and apart from his military detention. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee.
ISN839 Mussab Omar Ali al-Madhwani, Yemeni who got to Guantánamo Oct. 28, 2002. A chart accompanying the so-called Senate Intelligence Committee ‘Torture Report’ indicates he was held by the CIA for 30 days or more, apparently separate and apart from his military detention. A federal judge upheld his indefinite detention on Dec. 14, 2009, denying his habeas corpus petition., and a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld his indefinite detention on May 27, 2011. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee.
ISN840 Hayil al-Mithali, Yemeni who got to Guantánamo Oct. 28, 2002. A chart accompanying the so-called Senate Intelligence Committee ‘Torture Report’ indicates he was held by the CIA for 30 days or more, apparently separate and apart from his military detention. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee.
ISN841 Said Salih Said, Yemeni who got to Guantánamo Oct. 28, 2002. A chart accompanying the so-called Senate Intelligence Committee ‘Torture Report’ indicates he was held by the CIA for 30 days or more, apparently separate and apart from his military detention. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee.
ISN893 Tawfiq Nassar al-Bihani, Yemeni who got to Guantánamo Feb. 6, 2003. A federal judge upheld his indefinite detention on Sept. 22, 2010, denying his habeas corpus petition. A list included in the so-called Senate Intelligence Committee ‘Torture Report’ indicates he was held by the CIA for 50 days or more, apparently separate and apart from his military detention. His brother, Ghaleb, is ISN 128, also lost his unlawful detention case. In January 2010, a federal task force approved him for conditional return to his homeland, a third country or transfer to the United States if the prison camps in Cuba are closed. It said he was eligible for conditional release, if the security situation in Yemen improves — or a viable third-country settlement or rehabilitation program is found.
ISN975 Bostan Karim, Afghan. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee. His lawyer is arguing in federal court that, with combat over in Afghanistan he should be released.
ISN1017 Omar Mohammed Ali al-Rammah, Yemeni. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee.
ISN1045 Mohammed Kamin, Afghan. During the Bush administration, he was designated for trial by military commission. The Obama administration considered the case and in 2010 put him in the category of “Law of War detainee,” a forever prisoner, until the Periodic Review Board concluded in September 2015 that he can be released. His lawyer had argued in federal court that, with combat over in Afghanistan, he should be released.
ISN1094 Saifullah A. Paracha, Pakistan who got to Guantánamo Sept. 19, 2004. A former U.S. green card holder, he is also the eldest of the Guantánamo detainees, according to leaked detention center records. The U.S. Senate Intelligence Commitee ‘Torture Report’ says he was captured July 5, 2003 in an FBI orchestrated operation and while the CIA wanted to take custody of him and interrogated him with so-called enhanced interrogation techniques, the proposal was rejected. He was born in Aug. 17, 1947, and has a history of coronary artery disease. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial. He’s never been charged with a crime.
ISN1119 Haji Hamidullah, Afghan. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee. His lawyer is arguing in federal court that, with combat over in Afghanistan he should be released.
ISN1453 Sanad Yislam al-Kazimi, Yemeni who got to Guantánamo Sept. 19, 2004. A chart accompanying the so-called Senate Intelligence Committee ‘Torture Report’ indicates he was held by the CIA for 270 days or more, apparently separate and apart from his military detention. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial. He’s never been charged with a crime but internal Defense Department documents showed that in late 2014 he was still considered a candidate for a war crimes trial.
ISN1456 Hassan Ali Bin Attash,Yemeni who got to Guantánamo Sept. 19, 2004. According to leaked military records, he is the youngest of the current detainees. He is also the brother of high-value detainee Walid Bin Attash, held in a different camp. His lawyer says they’ve never seen each other at Guantánamo. A chart accompanying the so-called Senate Intelligence Committee ‘Torture Report’ indicates he was held by the CIA for 120 days or more, apparently separate and apart from his military detention. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial. He’s never been charged with a crime.
ISN1457 Abdu Ali Sharqawi, Yemeni known as Riyadh the Facilitator who got to Guantánamo Sept. 19, 2004. A chart accompanying the so-called Senate Intelligence Committee ‘Torture Report’ indicates he was held by the CIA for 120 days or more, apparently separate and apart from his military detention. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial. He’s never been charged with a crime but internal Defense Department documents showed that in late 2014 he was still considered a candidate for a war crimes trial.
ISN1460 Abdul Rahim Gulam Rabbani, Saudi-born Pakistani who got to Guantánamo Sept. 19, 2004. A chart accompanying the so-called Senate Intelligence Committee ‘Torture Report’ indicates he was held by the CIA for 550 days or more, apparently separate and apart from his military detention. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial. He’s never been charged with a crime.
ISN1461 Ahmed Ghulam Rabbani, Saudi-born Pakistani who got to Guantánamo Sept. 19, 2004. A chart accompanying the so-called Senate Intelligence Committee ‘Torture Report’ indicates he was held by the CIA for 550 days or more, apparently separate and apart from his military detention. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial. He’s never been charged with a crime.
ISN1463 Abdulsalam al Hela, Yemeni who got to Guantánamo Sept. 19, 2004. A chart accompanying the so-called Senate Intelligence Committee ‘Torture Report’ indicates he was held by the CIA for 590 days or more, apparently separate and apart from his military detention. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee.
ISN3148 Harun al Afghani, Afghan. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial. He’s never been charged with a crime.
ISN10011 Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi, Saudi who’s charged in death-penalty proceedings by military commission as an alleged co-conspirator in the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. The ICRC says Pakistani authorities arrested him March 1, 2003 in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. As a former CIA “black site” captive who was taken to Guantánamo in September 2006, he is held in a secret prison where the Pentagon segregates so-called high-value detainees. Hear him speak to a military panel at Guantánamo in March 2007. Transcript here.
ISN10013 Ramzi bin al Shibh, Yemeni who’s charged in death-penalty proceedings by military commission as an alleged co-conspirator in the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. The ICRC says Pakistani authorities arrested him Sept. 11, 2002 in Karachi, Pakistan. As a former CIA “black site” captive who was taken to Guantánamo in September 2006, he is held in a secret prison where the Pentagon segregates so-called high-value detainees. The so-called Senate Intelligence Committee ‘’Torture Report’ also says he was held previously at Guantánamo from September 2003 into April 2004. He went before a military panel at Guantánamo in March 2007 but chose to say nothing. You can hear it or read the transcript here.
ISN10014 Walid bin Attash, Yemeni who’s charged in death-penalty proceedings by military commission as an alleged co-conspirator in the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. The ICRC says Pakistani authorities arrested him on April 29, 2003 in Karachi, Pakistan. As a former CIA “black site” captive who was taken to Guantánamo in September 2006, he is held in a secret prison where the Pentagon segregates so-called high-value detainees. Hear him speak to a military panel at Guantánamo in March 2007. Transcript here.
ISN10015 Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Saudi who’s charged in death-penalty proceedings by military commission as an alleged conspirator in the October 2000 al Qaeda suicide bombing of the USS Cole off Aden, Yemen. The ICRC says he was arrested in October 2002 in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates. The so-called Senate Intelligence Committee “Torture Report” also says he was held previously at Guantánamo from September 2003 into April 2004. As a former CIA “black site” captive who was taken to Guantánamo in September 2006, he is held in a secret prison where the Pentagon segregates so-called high-value detainees. Hear him speak to a military panel at Guantánamo in March 2007. Transcript here.
ISN10016 Zayn al Abdeen Mohammed al Hussein, Palestinian known as Abu Zubaydah. The ICRC says he was arrested March 28, 2002 in Faisalabad, Pakistan. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial but he’s never been charged with a crime. Hear him speak to a military panel at Guantánamo in March 2007. Transcript here.
ISN10017 Mustafa Abu Faraj al Libi, Libyan. The ICRC says Pakistani authorities arrested him on May 2, 2005 in Mardan, Pakistan. As a former CIA “black site” captive who was taken to Guantánamo in September 2006, he is held in a secret prison where the Pentagon segregates so-called high-value detainees. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial but he’s never been charged with a crime.
ISN10018 Ammar al-Baluchi, Pakistani who’s charged in death-penalty proceedings by military commission as an alleged co-conspirator in the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. The ICRC says Pakistani authorities arrested him on April 29, 2003 in Karachi, Pakistan. As a former CIA “black site” captive who was taken to Guantánamo in September 2006, he is held in a secret prison where the Pentagon segregates so-called high-value detainees.
ISN10019 Riduan Isomuddin, Indonesian known as Hambali. The ICRC says he was arrested Aug. 11, 2003 in Bangkok, Thailand. As a former CIA “black site” captive who was taken to Guantánamo in September 2006, he is held in a secret prison where the Pentagon segregates so-called high-value detainees. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial but he’s never been charged with a crime. Internal Defense Department documents showed that in late 2014 he was still considered a candidate for a war crimes trial.
ISN10020 Majid Khan, Pakistani. The International Red Cross says this Baltimore area educated man was arrested March 5, 2003 in Karachi, Pakistan. As a former CIA “black site” captive, he was taken to Guantánamo in September 2006 and held in a secret prison where the Pentagon segregates so-called high-value detainees. He turned government witness and pleaded guilty to war crimes Feb. 29, 2012, and is held in a separate secret site for cooperating ex-CIA captive witnesses at Guantánamo. There is currently no other. Hear him speak to a military panel at Guantánamo in March 2007. Transcript here.
ISN10021 Mohd Farik Bin Amin, Malaysian known as Zubair. The ICRC says he was arrested June 8, 2003 in Bangkok, Thailand. As a former CIA “black site” captive who was taken to Guantánamo in September 2006, he is held in a secret prison where the Pentagon segregates so-called high-value detainees. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial but he’s never been charged with a crime. Internal Defense Department documents showed that in late 2014 he was still considered a candidate for a war crimes trial.
ISN10022 Bashir Lap, Malaysian known as Lilie. The ICRC says he was arrested Aug. 11, 2003 in Bangkok, Thailand. As a former CIA “black site” captive who was taken to Guantánamo in September 2006, he is held in a secret prison where the Pentagon segregates so-called high-value detainees. In January 2010, a federal task force recommended he be considered for trial but he’s never been charged with a crime. Internal Defense Department documents showed that in late 2014 he was still considered a candidate for a war crimes trial.
ISN10023 Hassan Guleed, Somali. The ICRC says he was arrested March 4, 2004 in Djibouti. As a former CIA “black site” captive who was taken to Guantánamo in September 2006, he is held in a secret prison where the Pentagon segregates so-called high-value detainees. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee, a forever prisoner.
ISN10024 Khalid Sheik Mohammad, Pakistani who’s charged in death-penalty proceedings by military commission as the alleged mastermind in the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. The ICRC says Pakistani authorities arrested him March 1, 2003 in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. As a former CIA “black site” captive who was taken to Guantánamo in September 2006, he is held in a secret prison where the Pentagon segregates so-called high-value detainees.
ISN10025 Abdul Malik, Kenyan. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee, a forever prisoner.
ISN10026 Abd al Hadi al Iraqi, Iraqi. The Pentagon announced that this former CIA captive was taken to Guantánamo on April 27, 2007. He is held in a secret prison where the Pentagon segregates so-called high-value detainees. He was arraigned June 18 and faces non-capital charges at the war court alleging he was commander of al-Qaida’s army between 2002 and 2004. If convicted, could be punished with a maximum of life in prison. No trial date has been set yet.
ISN10029 Muhammad Rahim al-Afghani, Afghan. The Pentagon announced that this former CIA captive was taken to Guantánamo on March 14, 2008. He is held in a secret prison where the Pentagon segregates so-called high-value detainees. A multi-agency federal task force classified him in January 2010 as “continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,” an indefinite detainee, a forever prisoner.
Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/article2203501.html#storylink=cpy
Military: NO RoE’s vs. Pentagon vs. White House
U.S. Forces Tied by Old Rules in Afghanistan
Lake, Bloomberg:Current and former U.S. military officials tell me that the U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan is almost entirely focused on the re-emergence of al Qaeda and that strikes against Islamic State leaders are scarce.
Afghan news media reported one such strike over the weekend in the province of Nangarhar. In July U.S. airstrikes reportedly killed Hafez Saeed, an Islamic State leader in what the group has called its Khoresan Province. But U.S. officials tell me the rules of engagement in Afghanistan are highly restrictive.
“There are real restrictions about what they can do against the ISIS presence in Afghanistan,” Mac Thornberry, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, told me about the rules of engagement for U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
Thornberry said that the rules of engagement, combined with what he called micro-management from the White House, have led military officers to tell him they have to go through several unnecessary and burdensome hoops before firing at the enemy. More here.
WASHINGTON ~ DefenseNews — US House Armed Services Chairman Rep. Mac Thornberry outlined his plans in the coming year to focus on the Pentagon’s strategy to maintain American dominance for the next 25 years, cyber, nuclear modernization and special operations.
“Our committee has spent more time over the last year on the issue of our eroding technological superiority than it has spent on any other issue,” the Texas Republican told an audience at the National Press Club today.
The chairman said while he applauded the Pentagon’s efforts “no one should be under the illusion that a handful of technology breakthroughs, even if they come, are going to guarantee our dominant position for many years ahead.” Technology changes too quickly, information moves too fast and the threats are too diverse. Therefore, “bigger change is required,” he added.
On cyber as a new domain in warfare, Thornberry acknowledged that technology is not the primary problem that needs to be solved to operate effectively in such a domain.
“Organizations, people are the most fruitful things,” he said. “We have to be able to fight and win in cyberspace so the committee is pushing issues related to people, organization, rules of engagement in that domain to try to make sure we close the gap between the threat and the policies we now have to deploy.”
Thornberry said “it may seem a little bit odd” to have nuclear deterrence listed as a priority. “But as events over the last week have shown nuclear know-how is spreading. Our own nuclear deterrent is the foundation for all our other defense efforts.”
Last week, North Korea claimed it successfully tested a hydrogen bomb. The US and its allies are working to determine within weeks whether North Korea’s nuclear test did in fact involve a hydrogen bomb or a far less powerful atomic bomb.
But while North Korea works to boost the capability of its weapons and Russia continues to advance its nuclear technology, “unfortunately our warheads and our delivery systems have all been neglected and are all aging out at about the same time,” Thornberry said.
“We have to put the resources, which studies show would never be more than 5 percent of the total defense budget, but we have to put the resources as well as the focused effort and the willpower into making sure that we have a nuclear deterrent that will continue to protect this country in the future,” he said, “not just a nuclear deterrent that was designed for a different age.”
Thornberry said he’d focus on how to best use special operations forces in the future.
“The world, including our enemies, has gotten a pretty good look at the enormous capability that our special operations forces brings,” he said.
Special operations forces have deployed most recently to Syria as part of a major overhaul of the US government’s strategy against the Islamic State group last November. President Barack Obama authorized the deployment of fewer than 50 special operations troops to northern Syria.
Also signaling the important role special operations will play in the Middle East in the coming years, it has been reported that Obama plans to tap Special Operations Command head Army Gen. Joseph Votel as the next leader for US Central Command.
“I have no doubt that we will continue to rely on them heavily in the future but there is a temptation, and we’ve seen it in other nations, to use SOF forces for everything,” Thornberry said, likening the use of such forces to “taking a sharp knife and raking it across the concrete. You keep doing that and it’s not so sharp anymore.”
The committee, Thornberry said, “will be both supportive but also protective of our SOF capabilities because some of them are absolutely vital for the security of our nation.”
One way the US Special Operations Forces excel, Thornberry noted, is its ability to work with other security forces.
“We will also be examining ways to help strengthen that capability because obviously we will be doing more of that in the future,” he said.
Thornberry, who pushed through many acquisition reform policies in his first year as HASC chairman, said he would build upon his efforts in acquisition reform this year.
The plan, he said, is to introduce a stand-alone bill on reform, most likely in late March. Following the release of the bill, feedback will be solicited and comments will be taken into account, according to Thornberry. Then the reform provisions will be folded into the fiscal 2017 defense authorization bill.
“One goal I have this year is to encourage more experimentation and prototyping,” Thornberry added. Experimentation is at the heart of all successful military innovations, he said.
Fostering more experimentation will help ensure that technology is mature before the start of production thus reducing the odds of running over budget during a program of record to try to get the technology right, which can often end in a canceled program.
Thornberry acknowledged that today it’s hard to get money for experimentation without it being attached to a program of record.
“Programs of record seems to be sacrosanct because once they get started they hardly ever get stopped. I want to look for ways to foster experimentation and prototyping both in developing technology and in their application and ensure that only mature technology goes into production,” he said.
“To do that a cultural shift is needed not only at DoD but within Congress. We have to accept regular small failures in order to have greater successes.”
POTUS in 2016, No Lame Duck, Cure Cancer?
What about what Barack Obama said at the 2015 State of the Union? Fact checking:
#LastSOTU FACT CHECK: A Disastrous Foreign PolicyJanuary 12, 2016|Speaker Ryan Press Office
State of the Union: President Obama pushes for cancer cure
CBS: |In his final State of the Union address, President Obama announced a new national effort to find a cure for cancer and put Vice President Joe Biden, who lost his son to the disease, “in charge of Mission Control.”
State of the Union 2016 ~ Mr. Speaker, Mr. Vice President, Members of Congress, my fellow Americans:
Tonight marks the eighth year I’ve come here to report on the State of the Union. And for this final one, I’m going to try to make it shorter. I know some of you are antsy to get back to Iowa.
I also understand that because it’s an election season, expectations for what we’ll achieve this year are low. Still, Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the constructive approach you and the other leaders took at the end of last year to pass a budget and make tax cuts permanent for working families. So I hope we can work together this year on bipartisan priorities like criminal justice reform, and helping people who are battling prescription drug abuse. We just might surprise the cynics again.
But tonight, I want to go easy on the traditional list of proposals for the year ahead. Don’t worry, I’ve got plenty, from helping students learn to write computer code to personalizing medical treatments for patients. And I’ll keep pushing for progress on the work that still needs doing. Fixing a broken immigration system. Protecting our kids from gun violence. Equal pay for equal work, paid leave, raising the minimum wage. All these things still matter to hardworking families; they are still the right thing to do; and I will not let up until they get done.
Who attended as the First Lady, Michelle Obama’s guests? Click here to find out. The DNC Chairwoman, Debbie Wasserman Schultz instructed several in Congress to bring a Muslim along as a guest and they did. A few of them were associated with terrorism.
The we have retired Army Colonel Allen West as he wrote his summary on the SOTU.
Townhall: My assessment is that Obama spoke much about nothing that is pertinent to where we find ourselves today in America. His defined policy objectives were criminal justice reform, heroin abuse, our immigration system (meaning amnesty for illegals), gun violence, equal pay, paid leave, and raising the minimum wage.
President Obama talked about giving everyone a “fair shot” at opportunity in a new economy. First of all, who defines what a “fair shot” is? It appears that this is just more coded language for government-guaranteed equality of outcomes. The “every kid gets a trophy mentality” is not what America is about. That ideology is what gave us Carter’s Community Reinvestment Act, and eventually, the financial crisis and meltdown. Government decided that it was their mandate to give a “fair shot” to everyone who wanted to buy a home, and it did not end well. Government works best when it creates the policies that advance individual sovereignty so individuals may pursue their own defined dreams, the pursuit of happiness. Anything else, as we have seen and as President Obama champions, is antithetical to who we are.
Somehow, President Obama failed to address the 40-year low workforce participation rate and the fact that more Americans have been dropped from the workforce under his “fair shot” policies. Obama said nothing about a national debt that threatens the future of America. The poverty and food stamp rolls have exploded in these past seven years. That is not the best of America. It is certainly not the best that we can do. We must grow this economy and we can do so, along with reforming government spending, and eliminating crony capitalism and corporate welfare.
Obama’s vision of the future is centered on an ideological agenda that puts in peril the hopes and aspirations of our children and grandchildren. They will have less economic freedom and certainly less liberty if the Islamic terrorists prevail.
I have additional concerns from President Obama’s final SOTU address. First of all, if our military was so very strong then why did we have 10 U.S. Navy Sailors detained by the Iranians because the engines on two riverine assault boats malfunctioned? That makes no real sense to me. Nor have we taken care of our Veterans. I wear a ring on my salute hand trigger finger to remind me about the 22 Veterans a day who are committing suicide in America. While we know there are problems in our VA system, no major reform has been made and many perpetrators of this heinous wrong still hold their positions.
Obama said nothing about the Taliban’s resurgence and their hold on more territory than any time since 2001. It was just last week that the Taliban had an American Special Forces team trapped in Helmand province, yet Obama cannot bring himself to refer to this as “combat.” Obama’s own former acting CIA Director Mike Morrell testified Tuesday during a House Armed Services Committee that ISIS affiliations have grown far more Al Qaeda’s and that they comprise a legitimate strategic threat to the world and our homeland. There was no mention of ISIS’ most recent attacks in Baghdad and Istanbul. Again, Obama just could not bring himself to say Islamic terrorists or jihadists. In Obama’s mind, they are just “killers and fanatics,” and shutting down GITMO will reduce their recruiting efforts. No, Mr. President, your fecklessness and exhibited weakness emboldens ISIS and their allies which are growing from Boko Haram in Nigeria to Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines. Obama asked for Congress to vote on an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) but first we need a strategic plan to defeat ISIS. He could have articulated that but chose more lofty rhetoric and lecturing instead.
Russia has expanded and is in Crimea, Ukraine and Syria. China is building manmade islands by destroying reef systems and landing planes on these islands. Where are the environmentalists? China is also about to open up its first military base in Africa in Djibouti, as we have announced we are departing. The Iranian nuclear deal is a failure and has only served to empower and fund the number one state sponsor of Islamic terrorism. Iran is now exploiting their new-found strength and becoming a regional hegemony. Hence, the very open schism between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
President Obama talks about “protecting the American people” yet we had the biggest Islamic terrorist attack since 9-11 on his watch, San Bernardino. Before that it was Ft. Hood. And in the U.S., the enemy attacks our men and women in uniform with impunity, such as at the Naval Reserve Support Facility in Chattanooga. In the last week, we have arrested former refugee ISIS supporters in Sacramento and Houston. And who can forget the video of the horrific attempt to assassinate Philadelphia Police Officer Hartnett by an admitted Islamic jihadist. The American people are kind and willing to open up our arms to embrace those fleeing persecution, such as the Assyrians, Chaldeans, Coptics, and Yazidis, but those were not mentioned by President Obama. What the American people will not allow is what is happening in Germany and the rest of Europe. We will not allow a war on our women, as we are seeing there due to a clash of civilizational values, principles, and morals.
I can only wish that President Obama saw the enemy for who it is, and not the ideologically driven “threat” of climate change. Please read his entire response here.
The Islamic State vs. al-Qaeda
The Islamic State vs. al-Qaeda: The War within the Jihadist Movement
WotR: The post-Arab Spring period has seen extraordinary growth in the global jihadist movement. In addition to the Islamic State seizing a vast swathe of territory spanning Syria and Iraq and al-Qaeda establishing itself as a potent military force in the Syrian civil war, instability and unfulfilled expectations in numerous countries — including Egypt, Libya, Mali, Tunisia, and Yemen — have presented jihadists with unprecedented opportunities.
But even as the jihadist movement experiences rapid growth, it has also endured unprecedented internal turmoil. The Islamic State’s emergence marks the first time that leadership over the global jihadist movement has been seriously contested. Since that group’s expulsion from the al-Qaeda network in February 2014, a fierce competition between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda has defined the militant landscape. The United States has an opportunity to exploit and aggravate fissures within the jihadist community, but to do so successfully, it is essential to understand the differences in the modus operandi of these two rival jihadist groups.
Two Models of Revolutionary Warfare
Though al-Qaeda and the Islamic State share the same ultimate goal — establishing a global caliphate ruled by an austere version of sharia (Islamic law) — each group maintains a distinct approach to revolutionary warfare. Al-Qaeda has come to favor covert expansion, unacknowledged affiliates, and a relatively quiet organizational strategy designed to carefully build a larger base of support before engaging in open warfare with its foes. By contrast, the Islamic State believes that the time for a broader military confrontation has already arrived, and has loudly disseminated its propaganda to rally as many soldiers as possible to its cause. The group combines shocking violence with an effective propaganda apparatus in an effort to quickly build its base of support.
The Maoist and focoist schools of revolutionary thought provide a useful framework for understanding these groups’ differing strategies. Al-Qaeda exhibits a revolutionary strategy that is both implicitly and explicitly based on the works of Mao Tse-tung, while the Islamic State’s approach is more consonant with the focoist writings of Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Régis Debray.
Interestingly, in 2010 Kenneth Payne published an article in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism arguing that al-Qaeda’s strategy was focoist in nature, based on a review of the group’s strategic literature and operations. Though al-Qaeda has exhibited both Maoist and focoist strands of thought, the fact that Payne’s argument was published in 2010 is significant: He wrote just on the cusp of the “Arab Spring” revolutions, which, as this article details, provided al-Qaeda the opportunity to make its Maoist-style turn that focused on the population more apparent. Ryan Evans’s argument, which was published in the CTC Sentinel the same year as Payne’s piece, has held up better over time. Evans discerned a shift in strategy between the efforts of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the later campaign of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and argued that AQAP’s more population-centric approach was forged by the group’s failures in Iraq. He noted that the shift in strategy in Yemen may herald “a larger turn for al-Qaeda globally toward a more Maoist attitude.”
Mao’s theory of revolution is rooted in the primacy of politics over warfare. In Mao’s view, a steadfast political foundation is necessary to allow guerrilla forces to create bases for logistics and operations and slowly build strength and momentum for the final conventional stage of warfare. Thus, according to Mao, before guerilla forces can initiate military action, they must first focus on “arousing and organizing the people,” and “achieving internal unification politically.” This stage is followed seamlessly by a stage of progressive expansion, followed by a third and final stage of decision — the destruction of the enemy.
Maoist revolutionaries continue to emphasize the political stage of organization and consolidation even as they pursue progressive expansion. Consistent with Maoist theory, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have focused on maintaining and expanding the group’s political support. Even in areas where al-Qaeda has engaged in open warfare, it has been somewhat restrained in its approach to civilian populations since the initiation of AQAP’s campaign in 2009 that Ryan Evans noted was a departure from the group’s Iraq model of insurgency. Thereafter, the group has adopted a phased implementation of its hardline version of sharia where it enjoys control or significant influence. The only one of al-Qaeda’s branches that explicitly did not fit this new model was AQI, which later was expelled from al-Qaeda’s network and adopted the new moniker of the Islamic State. (Al-Qaeda’s approach toward civilian populations can only be considered “restrained” in very relative terms, juxtaposed with the more oppressive and publicly violent tactics of the Islamic State, and al-Qaeda’s own previous approach.) Al-Qaeda’s adherence to a largely Maoist framework was shaped by its experience of being hunted by the United States and its allies for a decade and a half, and — as Evans argued — particularly by the defeat of its Iraqi affiliate. Al-Qaeda’s use of Maoist strategy is designed to be low-risk and to yield long-term results.
The focoist approach to revolutionary war contrasts sharply with the Maoist approach. First used successfully in Cuba in the early 1950s, focoism holds that the political foundation necessary for revolution can be crafted through violence. Guevara essentially flipped Mao’s theory by arguing that the use of violence against the state would inspire the peasants to rise up. Unlike Mao’s strategy, focoism accepts great risks in order to inspire support. The Islamic State has in many ways followed the focoist model; it believes in the power of violence to forge the political opinions of the Muslim masses. The Islamic State views al-Qaeda’s more deliberate approach as too slow. It appears happy to win today and lose tomorrow, as long as today’s win creates a large enough subject for propaganda.
This framework of Maoist versus focoist models of revolutionary warfare should not be seen as a complete explanation for either al-Qaeda or the Islamic State’s behavior. Neither group is perfectly Maoist or focoist, but using these models provides a useful paradigm for interpreting the strategic competition between the groups.
Al-Qaeda’s Population-Centric Approach
Al-Qaeda has taken advantage of two major opportunities driven by the unsuccessful revolution in Syria and the successful revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. The first opportunity is that the regional upheaval created a growth environment for jihadism, and al-Qaeda has established a significant presence in places where it had previously been suppressed. The second opportunity is that as al-Qaeda expanded into new areas, it perceived an opening to repair its global image that had been badly damaged by AQI. Al-Qaeda has implemented a population-centric approach to increase its base of popular support by employing gradualism and cooperation with local actors. Al-Qaeda has also made use of popular front groups in its expansion. This is intended to reduce the organization’s exposure to counterinsurgent forces, including the United States and the Middle East’s Sunni regimes, and to avoid frightening or alienating local populations.
Popular support has become essential to al-Qaeda. While the group once conceptualized itself as exclusively a vanguard movement, it has come to view itself in recent years as a popular movement that needs the support or acquiescence of the populace. This transformation had begun prior to the Arab Spring. In 2005, then al-Qaeda deputy emir Ayman al-Zawahiri explained in a letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, AQI’s reckless emir, that “the strongest weapon which the mujahedeen enjoy … is popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq, and the surrounding Muslim countries. So, we must maintain this support as best we can, and we should strive to increase it.” As previously noted, AQAP’s approach in its first year of operations reflected this paradigm. But the transformation of al-Qaeda into a more broad-based movement was supercharged by the Arab Spring, which provided a critical opening for jihadism.
In the wake of those revolutions, al-Qaeda’s senior leadership pushed hard to regain the trust and support of local populations and avoid the mistakes that marred AQI’s Iraq campaign. In an undated letter that al-Qaeda’s masul aqalim (head of regions) Atiyah Abd al-Rahman wrote to Nasir al-Wuhayshi, AQAP’s emir, he noted that “the people’s support to the mujahedin is as important as the water for fish,” referencing Mao’s famous adage that “the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.” Wuhayshi in turn transmitted a similar message to the leadership of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, illustrating al-Qaeda’s coordinated efforts.
The most significant example of these changes came in September 2013, when Zawahiri, who became al-Qaeda’s emir following Osama bin Laden’s death in May 2011, released a document entitled “General Guidelines for Jihad” that made public al-Qaeda’s new population-centric approach. Zawahiri instructed affiliates to avoid conflict with Middle Eastern governments when possible, asserting that conflict with local regimes would distract from efforts to build bases of support. Zawahiri also instructed affiliates to minimize violent conflict with Shia and non-Muslim populations, and to abstain from attacks that could result in Muslim civilian casualties. Consonant with these changes to al-Qaeda’s operations, the organization has also launched a “rebranding” campaign (a subject we have addressed previously at War on the Rocks) designed to present the group as a more reasonable — and perhaps controllable — alternative to the Islamic State, and as a potential bulwark against Iranian encroachment.
Al-Qaeda’s strategy of covert expansion — its use of front groups and its embrace of a relatively low-key public profile — is another critical element in the group’s post-Arab Spring approach. In a letter recovered from his Abbottabad compound, bin Laden explained the rationale for preferring a low profile. He noted that when a branch’s affiliation with al-Qaeda “becomes declared and out in the open,” the group’s enemies escalate their attacks on it.
Al-Qaeda’s efforts in Tunisia exemplified its early post-Arab Spring strategy. Its expansion was spearheaded by a front organization called Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST). Several high-profile salafi jihadists who had been released from prison when the regime of dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was overthrown established the group. AST initially focused its resources on dawa (evangelism) by organizing dawa events, holding public protests, and dominating physical spaces near places of worship. AST also provided services, including food, clothing, and medical care, to impoverished communities, and developed a social media apparatus to publicize its dawa activities.
AST’s emphasis on dawa was characteristic of al-Qaeda’s early post-Arab Spring strategy. The group’s ideologues understood that they would have unprecedented opportunities to disseminate salafi jihadist ideology to the public. While the old dictators placed strict restrictions on religious expression, strategists foresaw fewer restrictions in post-autocratic environments. This strategic logic was expressed by Atiyah, who in February 2011 exhorted jihadists in post-revolutionary states to “spring into action and initiate or increase their preaching, education, reformation and revitalization in light of the freedom and opportunities now available in this post revolution era.”
As AST’s dawa gained traction, the group also began to engage in hisba violence targeting those who violated salafist religious norms. AST was initially methodical in its use of violence, striking targets such as prostitutes and establishments that served alcohol — which would be widely considered acceptable by those inclined toward religious fundamentalism. Moreover, AST refrained from claiming responsibility for these hisba attacks, creating the perception that this violence was organic to the Tunisian people. Through this approach, AST ensured that its use of violence did not cross a line that would provoke a government crackdown.
As it became more entrenched, AST eventually embraced jihadist violence, first facilitating Tunisians’ travel to foreign battlefields like Syria, Libya and Mali before eventually turning its guns against the Tunisian state. AST members were implicated in the 2013 assassinations of secularist politicians Chokri Belaïd and Mohammed Brahmi. Less than a week after Brahmi’s July 2013 death, a jihadist ambush in Jebel el-Chaambi killed eight Tunisian soldiers, five of whom had their throats slit. These bloody incidents constituted a point of no return, and in August 2013 the government designated AST a terrorist organization and cracked down on the group.
It is not clear that AST’s leadership wanted the group’s violence to escalate so quickly. Indeed, it seems the group had not progressed far enough through Mao’s stages of revolutionary warfare by July 2013 to justify the initiation of open warfare. AST gave its local branches considerable autonomy, which may have contributed to violence escalating faster than the leadership wanted or anticipated. Despite this, al-Qaeda’s blueprint for Tunisia nonetheless demonstrates how its plans for the post-Arab Spring environment followed Maoist insurgent principles.
The Islamic State’s Bold, Boisterous Growth Model
The Islamic State’s strategy for supplanting al-Qaeda centers on two techniques. First, the group sought to portray al-Qaeda’s slower and more deliberate strategy as weakness and indecisiveness. Second, the Islamic State appealed to al-Qaeda’s affiliates by emphasizing its momentum and expansion with the aim of poaching groups, members, and potential recruits. In essence, the Islamic State’s approach is the opposite of al-Qaeda’s: While al-Qaeda has sought to minimize the amount of attention it receives in order to reduce its exposure to counterinsurgents, the Islamic State constantly seeks the spotlight, and touts its victories (real or invented) at every opportunity. The Islamic State is trying to transform al-Qaeda’s strategic methods into weaknesses.
One way the Islamic State has tried to distinguish itself from al-Qaeda is its approach to governance, particularly its implementation of sharia. The Islamic State’s ability to impose governance where it enjoys military power is essential to the caliphate’s legitimacy. Following its capture of territory in Iraq and Syria, the organization quickly set up governance structures and showcased its efforts to provide social services to local populations. Rather than building public support prior to fully enforcing its austere version of sharia, the Islamic State quickly implemented hudud punishments (sharia-prescribed corporal punishment). As such, coercive violence is a major component of the Islamic State’s governance. The organization has thrown people suspected of being gay off of roofs, beheaded those it deems traitors or apostates, cut off the hands of thieves, and stoned to death women accused of adultery.
By contrast, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have chosen a slower, more methodical imposition of sharia. The group’s guidelines emphasize a somewhat pragmatic approach aimed at winning over the population. Al-Qaeda leaders have instructed affiliates to tailor the implementation of sharia to local conditions, taking into consideration local customs and religious practices, and to implement sharia flexibly in its initial phases, forgiving minor transgressions during that period. Al-Qaeda’s gradualist approach has been on display in Syria, where its affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra has repealed bans on cigarette smoking, and has made public displays of punishing fighters who unjustly harm local residents. This approach should not be mistaken for moderation on Nusra’s part — there are compelling reports of the group’s continuing extremism, especially in its treatment of religious minorities — but Nusra has done a masterful job of concealing its atrocities and maintaining its local image as a populist entity.
Al-Qaeda’s population-centric approach has been a major target of derision for the Islamic State, which accuses al-Qaeda of abandoning true Islamic principles by giving “preference to popularity and rationalization.”
Overt and Covert Expansion
Military strategy is another area where the Islamic State and al-Qaeda differ. The Islamic State employs an aggressive approach to territorial conquest. The group’s willingness to employ force-on-force warfare enabled it to take major territory quickly: Overall, this tactic has borne fruit for the organization, but has also increased the Islamic State’s rate of attrition. As the Islamic State has experienced military setbacks, it has moved toward greater use of irregular warfare, a strategic shift that illustrates the group’s capacity for adaptation.
The Islamic State’s hybrid warfare strategy does not necessarily distinguish it from al-Qaeda, which has employed similar tactics in some theaters. What makes the Islamic State unique is the way it showcases its military operations, using virtually all of them as propaganda pieces. While one function of the Islamic State’s military actions is to showcase the group’s strength, al-Qaeda has systematically sought to conceal the size of its network and downplay its capabilities. The group has masked its involvement in emerging theatres of conflict and established covert relationships with unacknowledged affiliate organizations like AST.
Consequently, many analysts underestimate al-Qaeda’s strength, and counterinsurgent forces have allowed al-Qaeda front groups to thrive in some theaters. Concealing affiliates’ relationships with al-Qaeda allows these groups to gain public support and attract resources from individuals and entities that might otherwise be wary of assisting an overt al-Qaeda entity.
Al-Qaeda’s military approach and preference for more covert activities is shaped by its patient worldview. Ostentatious, tactical victories that expose the network to attack and undermine its long-term prospects are of little value to the organization from a strategic perspective. In an article published in al-Qaeda’s online magazine Resurgence, jihadist strategist Abu Ubaydah al-Maqdisi explained the rationale behind this policy of restraint:
A guerilla force may possess the capacity of inflicting huge blows on the enemy, but it may be better for it to restrain from doing so in situations when the reaction of the enemy may be overwhelming.
Essentially, al-Qaeda’s senior leadership wants the organization to slowly develop its capabilities and resources in preparation for a longer campaign. At the same time, al-Qaeda leadership instructs its affiliates to begin destabilizing state regimes. This two-pronged strategy of enhancing its capabilities and destabilizing enemy regimes positions al-Qaeda to capitalize on state weakness and collapse in the long term.
A New Jihadist Era
The Islamic State’s rise has reshaped the global jihadist landscape, which for nearly two decades was dominated by al-Qaeda. With the Islamic State seizing the world’s attention, the age of unipolarity within the jihadist movement is over, replaced by intense internal conflict. Each group is firm in the belief that its organizational model is superior to that of its opponent.
The transnational jihadist movement is likely to be shaped in the coming years by this competition. It is essential that the United States understand the two groups’ strategies and pay close attention as their approaches continue to evolve. The United States has tremendous opportunities to exploit the cleavages between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. But if we fail to understand the two organizations’ strengths, weaknesses, and strategic and tactical postures, the jihadist movement may emerge from this period of competition stronger than before.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and the chief executive officer of Valens Global, a consulting firm that focuses on violent non-state actors. Nathaniel Barr is the research manager at Valens Global, where Bridget Moreng is an analyst. This article was adapted from their report (co-authored with War on the Rocks senior editor Jason Fritz) Islamic State vs. Al-Qaeda: Strategic Dimensions of a Patricidal Conflict, which was published by the New America Foundation in December 2015.