Libya: Operation Sophia, When?

Posted on February 18, 2016February 18, 2016 by Denise Simon

The EU anti-migrant smuggling operation in the Mediterranean sea – known as ‘EUNAVFOR Med’ or ‘Operation Sophia’ – is now entering its operational phase, aimed at boarding and seizing on the high seas vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling and trafficking. This follows a first phase of intelligence gathering on smuggling networks and is intended to precede operations due to take place within the territorial waters of Libya as well as coercive actions against the smugglers – including on Libyan soil.

This military component of the EU response to the migrant and refugee crisis is innovative in different ways. Following the anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden (Atalanta), EUNAVFOR Med confirms the maritime dimension of CSDP in the management of new types of security threats. The operation also brings CSDP closer to the EU internal security portfolio and its Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) agenda. Full document here.

New Leak Expose EU Plan For Military Engagment In Libya

According to the operation’s commander, it’s a question of when, not if, the EU will enter Libya.

MintPress/Vice: The European Union is planning an extension of its military operation against human traffickers, known as Sophia, which could eventually include sending ground troops to war-torn Libya. According to a confidential document shared with VICE Alps and with Wikileaks by a highly-placed source in a EU member nation, who requested anonymity, the Sophia mission is ready to move into Libyan territorial waters to stop people smugglers there, but it will not do so until it is invited by Libyan authorities.

However, Libya does not have a unified national authority that can extend such an invitation, torn as it is between two rival governments and other armed groups.

The document, a report addressed to the European Union Military Committee as well as the Political and Security Committee and written by the Italian officer commanding the Sophia force, also makes mentions of a “phase 3” of the operation. That may refer to the eventual presence of EU troops in Libya — again, once a national government to work with has been estabilished.

The report by rear admiral Enrico Credendino, dated January 29, explains that the mission has been since last October in phase 2A, using 16 ships and aircraft from various EU nations to stop smugglers in international waters. Credendino calls that mission a success, saying his force has arrested 46 smugglers and destroyed 67 boats. People on the boats are rescued and taken to refugee centers generally located in Italy.

46 smugglers in custody may not seem like a large number in a crisis that has brought almost a million people to Europe last year, but according to the report, the Sophia operation has had a profound effect. Smugglers now choose to transport most people towards the European Union from the east through Greece instead of Libya, where Sophia is focused.

“Prior to the start of the operation there was an even split between the people using the central route and the eastern route, whereas now 16% (of) migrants use the central route, with almost 83% of migrants using the eastern route,” the report says, referencing the smuggling corridors through Libya and Southeastern Europe respectively.

“From a military perspective, I am ready to move to phase 2B in Libyan Territorial Waters,” Credendino wrote in the report. That would mean moving closer to the Libyan coast to arrest smugglers, “but there are a number of political and legal challenges that must be addressed before I can recommend such a transition,” the officer wrote.

Until there is a legal decision on “our powers to apprehend suspected smugglers in Territorial Waters and who will prosecute any suspected smugglers detained there,” the European forces (22 out of 28 EU nations are contributing) will stay out of Libyan waters.

According to the operation’s commander, it’s a question of when, not if, Sophia will move to Libya.

“When Operation SOPHIA progresses into phases 2B and 3, the smugglers will again most likely adapt quickly to the changing situation,” Credendino wrote. “Following the progress of Op SOPHIA into Libyan TTW or onto Libyan soil there will possibly be a greater risk of smugglers trying to counter the operation’s efforts in order to secure in their income from the activity,” he added, indicating that there are indeed plans for a possible move onto Libyan soil.

But the operation cannot do that until it has more ships and aircraft — which Credendino wrote in the report he would request this month — and most of all until there’s a government with the authority to ask the European forces to come to Libya.

Right now there are two rival bodies in the country, resulting from the 2014 election that has followed the toppling of Muammar Ghadafi’s regime in 2011. The internationally-recognized parliament is based in Tobruk, in the east, while the capital Tripoli hosts another one where Islamist factions dominate and which also claims to be the legitimate parliament. Adding to those entities and the forces they control is the Islamic State group, which has existed in Libya since 2014, originally in Derna where local militias pledged allegiance to it, and now in Sirte, a major city which the group now says is its Libyan capital. The United Nations has brokered a peace deal between the two rival parliaments, but a national unity government is nowhere near yet.

An image of the Sophia report from EUNAVFOR MED, the acronym of “European Union Naval Forces in the Mediterranean”

According to the EU source, both combating local authorities have said they would not tolerate a possible European operation on Libyan soil.

A way to get an invitation would be, the report said, to offer training for the Libyan Navy and Coast guard, through which “we will be able to give the Libyan authorities something in exchange for their cooperation in tackling the irregular migration issue. This collaboration could represent one of the elements of the EU comprehensive approach to help secure their invitation to operate inside their territory during Phase 2 activities.”

“Moreover, training together during phase 2 could also be a key enabler to build confidence and facilitate the conduct of Phase 3 operations jointly with the Libyan authorities,” Credendino wrote.

The EU source claimed, however, that according to Frontex, the European Union agency in charge of the EU’s external borders, training Libyan naval forces and the local Coast Guard would actually mean training the leaders of the smuggling networks.

Obama’s ASEAN Summit a Failure?

Posted on February 18, 2016February 18, 2016 by Denise Simon

A US-ASEAN South China Sea Failure at Sunnylands?

An assessment of how the issue was dealt with at the summit needs to take into account limitations and realities.

Prashanth Parameswaran, The Diplomat: Following the end of the historic U.S.-ASEAN summit at Sunnylands, a number of accounts have criticized Washington and Southeast Asian states for their weak stance on the South China Sea issue. In particular, much has been made of the fact that the U.S.-ASEAN joint statement issued after the summit did not contain a specific reference to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.

This is hardly the first time an ASEAN-related meeting has been criticized for this, and it will not be the last. And to be sure, getting ASEAN to be more forward-leaning on the South China Sea is a frustrating process well-known to U.S. and Southeast Asian diplomats. But to those who have been following the summit’s planning and execution closely, the suggestion that the United States and ASEAN have somehow failed on the South China Sea issue at Sunnylands is seriously misguided. It reflects an ignorance of how ASEAN and the United States deal with the South China Sea issue, what both sides expected going into Sunnylands, what was eventually achieved, and how the outcome fits in with other ongoing developments.

First, the extent of agreement on the South China Sea question ought to be judged on the basis of what ASEAN is rather than what it ought to be, since that is the reality that policymakers have to contend with. For various reasons, including the fact that ASEAN operates on the basis of consensus and only four of the ten members have claims in the South China Sea disputes, the organization has generally tended to adopt a lowest common denominator approach to the issue. With such a diversity of views – from the Philippines, a claimant which filed a case against China at an international tribunal, to Cambodia, a not-so-interested party and close Chinese partner which infamously blocked the issuance of a joint communique over mention of the South China Sea issue – ASEAN’s statements as a bloc have not traditionally singled out China directly irrespective of Beijing’s actions, and it is rather unrealistic to expect that to change anytime soon (See: “Does ASEAN Have a South China Sea Position?”).

While ASEAN’s critics have continued to rail on the organization for its weakness on the South China Sea question, Southeast Asian and U.S. policymakers have long internalized the structural issues that prevent a stronger ASEAN position. That explains why they tend to push only for realistic agreements on broad principles within ASEAN as a grouping to uphold basic regional cohesiveness but also pursue more forward-leaning steps on a bilateral or unilateral basis. For instance, the Philippines has independently pursued a case against China with the United Nations arbitral tribunal at The Hague, and the United States has been quietly nudging individual Southeast Asian states to support Manila’s efforts outside of ASEAN, given the unwillingness of some of the grouping’s members to do so within the group (“Does the Philippines’ South China Sea Case Against China Really Matter?”).

Hence, while some parties naturally continue to push for more and others want less each time the issue is raised, realistically U.S. and ASEAN officials generally only expect broad agreement on a set of principles that claimants (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam), interested parties (Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand) and not-so-interested parties (Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar) could all adhere to. The true test of whether ASEAN has remained united on the South China Sea issue is thus not whether it suddenly achieves an unprecedented and unrealistic level of cohesion like calling out China in a joint communique, but if it manages to maintain agreement on basic principles that govern the issue in spite of any divisions within the grouping.

If one looks at the paragraphs in the U.S.-ASEAN joint statement issued at Sunnylands relating to the South China Sea, that modest but realistic expectation – broad agreement on a set of principles – was met. The paragraphs in the joint statement relating to the South China Sea articulate all the relevant principles, including the peaceful resolution of disputes, respect for international law including the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and commitment to freedom of navigation and overflight. This at the very least constitutes par for the course rather than a failure of any kind.

Second, while the language in the joint statement at Sunnylands may seem vague, it is important to contextualize what was agreed on the South China Sea question both in terms of the broader approach the Obama administration has adopted towards it as well as the nature of the summit itself.

With respect to the former, while some have tended to get lost in the weeds, barring a late start, the Obama administration has successfully framed the U.S. and ASEAN’s role in the South China Sea issue as not being just about China or how claims are resolved, but preserving the rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific (See: “Why the US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit Matters“). That is, what both sides have in common is upholding a set of common rules that applies to all countries big and small, whether it is preserving principles governing how vessels can navigate at sea in the case of the South China Sea in the security realm; pursuing policies that lead to openness and competitiveness in the economic sphere; or promoting the rule of law, good governance, accountable institutions and universal human rights. That makes sense rhetorically even if the reality in Southeast Asia is far from the ideal suggested in those principles.

It is through this prism – a shared commitment by both sides to the regional rules-based order – that U.S. officials approached the South China Sea question in the context of the broader joint statement at Sunnylands. As one official told The Diplomat ahead of the summit, the idea was to chart out a set of agreed principles on maritime security between the United States and ASEAN in full recognition of divisions between the bloc as well as the complexities of the South China Sea issue. That would seem to make sense – if two parties are claiming that their actions are motivated by a joint commitment to certain principles rather than targeting a single country, it is worth spelling out those principles. By contrast, singling out China would only seem to undermine the case being made that this is about principles rather than a particular nation.

The nature of the summit also matters for how one evaluates the outcome on the South China Sea question. Even before Sunnylands, U.S. officials had tirelessly pointed out that it would be unlike regular U.S.-ASEAN meetings, with a focus more on candid discussion among leaders rather than carefully prepared statements and tightly negotiated deliverables. Officials had also privately and publicly admitted that the outcome document would be more like a broad, short statement of principles rather than a traditional joint communique issued at ASEAN meetings or the more detailed, 14-page long U.S.-ASEAN plan of action to implement the strategic partnership issued last November (See: “US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit: What to Expect”). Given that the outcome document was much like what the Obama administration had envisioned even before the summit, it is bizarre to label it a failure.

Furthermore, owing to the format of the summit which U.S. officials had detailed, it is rather myopic to judge what was agreed on the South China Sea by just the joint statement alone. Accounts by those present suggest that the leaders naturally dived into much more detail in the closed door session on security issues on the second day of the summit, including on China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. As with most summits, what is said behind closed doors is as, if not more important, than what is written in a joint statement.

Third, even given these limitations and realities, judged both qualitatively and quantitatively, the specifics of what was achieved in terms of language on the South China Sea question are hardly inconsequential. Quantitatively, three of the 17 paragraphs of the entire U.S.-ASEAN joint statement addressed maritime security, more than any other single issue (See: “What Did the US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit Achieve?”). Most other fields either got one paragraph or were squeezed in among a laundry list of other related priorities. For those used to parsing ASEAN statements, this is hardly inconsequential and demonstrates the concern both the United States and Southeast Asian states place on the issue.

Beyond numbers, the qualitative aspect of what was achieved is also notable relative to the past. For instance, while the United States and more forward-leaning ASEAN members may not have been able to get full-throated and full support within the grouping for the Philippines’ ongoing case against China, the mention in paragraph seve of “full respect for legal and diplomatic processes without resorting to the threat or use of force” is the closest possible language to asking Beijing to abide by the court’s decision expected in May. The presence of such language this time around constitutes relative progress – this was missing from the joint statement on the U.S.-ASEAN strategic partnership issued last November (See: “US, ASEAN to Ink New Strategic Partnership”).

Similarly, in paragraph eight, “non-militarization and self-restraint in the conduct of activities” was added this time to the familiar refrain about the respect for freedom of navigation and overflight. The phrase “non-militarization” was absent in similar U.S.-ASEAN statements issued in November. Its inclusion this time around reflects both growing concerns about China’s behavior in this regard as well as successful efforts by the United States and some forward-leaning ASEAN countries in translating a commitment made by Chinese president Xi Jinping last year into a clear, joint call to get Beijing to do as it had pledged (though, true to form, China appears to have once again found a way to rhetorically finesse its way out of this glaring contradiction).

To be sure, U.S. officials would prefer an even stronger stance by ASEAN on the South China Sea. The point here is simply that what was achieved within constraints was still quite significant.

Fourth and lastly, irrespective of what was said or not said about China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, Beijing’s continued pursuit of destabilizing, unilateral actions there continue to speak for themselves. As it is, beyond joint statements, close regional observers know that it is difficult to arrive at a Southeast Asian capital today where there is not some degree of concern about China’s South China Sea behavior and its implications for regional stability, international law, and U.S.-China relations. With news this week that China has set up missile defense systems in the Paracel Islands – effectively beginning the militarization Xi had pledged not to undertake – those concerns will grow graver still. And while they may not manifest themselves in the boilerplate joint statements that are usually issued following ASEAN meetings, they will likely continue to do so in other more meaningful ways, including stronger security ties between Washington and individual Southeast Asian states as well as a louder diplomatic campaign against China following the court’s decision in May.

It is ultimately those clearer, more consequential signs – rather than communiques at multilateral meetings – that we should be looking at for indicators of the regional response to Beijing’s South China Sea assertiveness. Because contrary to the suggestion that the United States and ASEAN are failing on the South China Sea issue, it is Beijing’s determination to coerce other claimants and violate international law to secure its interests (while blaming the United States and Southeast Asian states for responding in any way) that seems to be the flawed, shortsighted approach that sacrifices long-term goodwill for short-term gain. For all China’s suggestions that the United States is seeking to contain it, with its own assertiveness abroad, it won’t be long before Beijing does a pretty good job of that itself.

Saudi Testing that Nuke?

Posted on February 18, 2016February 18, 2016 by Denise Simon

Saudi Political Analyst Dahham Al-‘Anzi: KSA Has Obtained Nuclear Bomb. Test May Be Held Soon

Saudi political analyst Dahham Al-‘Anzi spoke on Russia Today Arabic TV channel on February 15 and claimed that Saudi Arabia has obtained a nuclear bomb. Al-‘Anzi said that the Saudis have acquired the bomb two years ago and that a nuclear test is expected soon. “The superpowers know about this,” he added.

TribuneIndia: SAUDI ARABIA’S foreign minister Adel al-Jubeir faced some difficult questions in Washington on January 20, following a meeting with Secretary of State John Kerry. The visit to Washington took place amidst reports that the desert kingdom was set to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan, in response to perceived threats from Iran. Just a day earlier, Kerry had warned both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia against partnering in any transfer or deployment of Pakistani nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia. He bluntly stated that there would be “all kinds of NPT consequences” if any such transfer took place. Responding to queries on Kerry’s comments, Jubeir retorted: “I will not discuss these things in a public forum, certainly not on television.” While not ruling out a Pakistani nuclear umbrella to guarantee his country’s security, Jubeir averred: “Saudi Arabia is committed to two things. I always say two things we do not negotiate over — our faith and our security. Saudi Arabia will do what it takes in order to protect its security.” Referring to his discussions with Kerry, Jubeir said: “I discussed the bilateral relationship with Pakistan, which is a strategic one. We discussed the regional situation and ways to promote security and stability in the region.

We discussed the negative and aggressive Iranian interference and the affairs of the region.” He predictably lashed out at Iran, saying: “Iran should cease support for terrorism. Iran should cease to assassinate diplomats and blow up embassies.” (This was perceived as a condemnation of alleged Iranian attacks on Israeli diplomatic missions.) For good measure, Jubeir added: “Iran should cease its negative propaganda in the region,” while adding that the nuclear deal with Iran would “release billions of dollars” for funding its “nefarious activities”.The concerns expressed by Kerry came after meetings that Saudi Arabia’s deputy crown prince and defence minister Mohammad bin Sultan had with General Raheel Sharif and Prime Minister Nawaz on January 10. After meeting Prince Salman in his office in Rawalpindi, Raheel Sharif warned that any threat to Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity would evoke a strong response from Pakistan. Raheel Sharif’s nominal boss, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, was more circumspect, telling Prince Salman that the “people of Pakistan will always stand by the people of Saudi Arabia”, while holding that defence ties with Saudi Arabia were held in “high esteem”.

Saudi Arabia has, however, rejected a Pakistani offer to promote dialogue with Iran, though the Pakistani offer has been welcomed in Washington and Moscow. Saudi Arabia has been assiduously wooing Pakistan, ever since it found out that it had landed itself in a military quagmire in Yemen, where its relentless bombing campaign has led to the displacement of 2.5 million Yemenis. About 78 per cent of the Yemeni population is today in desperate need of water, food and medical assistance. Despite the fierce and unrelenting bombing, the resistance to the Saudis, spearheaded by the Shia Houthi population and former President Abdullah Saleh is resolute in preventing Yemen’s takeover by a Saudi nominee, like former President Mansur Hadi. Saudi diplomatic woes have been compounded by the US led deal to end global sanctions on Iran and stern warning by President Putin that “Saudi Arabia will be utterly destroyed and annihilated” if it falls out of line, with military intervention in Syria. Shortly after the Saudi intervention in Yemen commenced, Nawaz Sharif was welcomed personally at the Riyadh Airport on March 3, 2015, by King Salman bin Abdul Aziz, together with Crown Prince Mukri and the entire Saudi cabinet. This was rare honour, especially for a country, which has depended for decades on Saudi doles and handouts. But the Saudis obviously had high expectations from Nawaz Sharif, whom they saved from possible execution and sheltered, after the Musharraf coup, in October 1999.

More important, was a low-key visit to Riyadh, a few weeks earlier, by Pakistan’s seniormost military officer, who oversees the Strategic (Nuclear) Forces Command — the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff committee, General Rashad Mahmoud. Subsequent developments have made it clear that Pakistan will be unable to commit forces for backing the Saudi military misadventure in Yemen. But nuclear ties between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia go back decades, commencing with the Saudi financing of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions in the 1970s. Saudi defence minister Prince Salman was given unprecedented access to the Kahuta uranium enrichment and missile facilities headed by Dr AQ Khan, popularly described as the chairman of “Pakistan’s nuclear Walmart”, just prior to Pakistan’s nuclear tests. Khan thereafter paid visits to Saudi Arabia. Significantly, just after the visits of General Mahmud and Nawaz Sharif to Riyadh, Pakistan tested its 2,750-km range Shaheen 3 missile, which could well replace the obsolescent CSS 2 missiles supplied by Beijing to Riyadh, in the 1980s. The Chinese missiles have an adequate range to target Tehran. Pakistan’s Shaheen missiles are originally of Chinese design. The visits of President Xi Jinping to Saudi Arabia and Tehran clearly demonstrate the dexterity of Chinese diplomacy in the oil-rich Gulf region.

Saudi insecurities resulting from the virtual U-turn in American policies following the nuclear deal with Iran are being addressed by China, with Beijing’s “all-weather friend” Pakistan, signaling that it has missiles that can replace the obsolescent Chinese missiles. Differences between Iran and Pakistan over Afghanistan will likely continue, as a Wahhabi oriented, Taliban dominated, Pakistan sponsored regime in Kabul will be seen as threatening in Iran and neigbouring Central Asian republics. It remains to be seen if the Saudis return to their earlier policies of support for a Pakistan sponsored, Taliban dominated setup in Kabul. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have pledged to treat China as their “most favoured customer” for oil supplies. This should not cause undue concern in India, given the global glut in oil supplies and the reemergence of Iraq, as a growingly significant player in world energy markets. India will, however, have to move much faster in dealing with crucial projects like the development of the Chabahar Port in Iran, and in the development of undersea gas pipelines. We have to recognise that the inexcusable delays in the implementation of projects abroad, like the Kaladan Corridor in Myanmar and the Parliament building in Kabul have tarnished our image and reputation.

***

2013 ~ BBC: Saudi Arabia has invested in Pakistani nuclear weapons projects, and believes it could obtain atomic bombs at will, a variety of sources have told BBC Newsnight.

While the kingdom’s quest has often been set in the context of countering Iran’s atomic programme, it is now possible that the Saudis might be able to deploy such devices more quickly than the Islamic republic.

Earlier this year, a senior Nato decision maker told me that he had seen intelligence reporting that nuclear weapons made in Pakistan on behalf of Saudi Arabia are now sitting ready for delivery.

Last month Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israeli military intelligence, told a conference in Sweden that if Iran got the bomb, “the Saudis will not wait one month. They already paid for the bomb, they will go to Pakistan and bring what they need to bring.”

Since 2009, when King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia warned visiting US special envoy to the Middle East Dennis Ross that if Iran crossed the threshold, “we will get nuclear weapons”, the kingdom has sent the Americans numerous signals of its intentions.

Beyond the Bluster, Obama Missed a Major Deadline

Posted on February 18, 2016February 18, 2016 by Denise Simon

But Obama did play golf last weekend and it appears he is missing the funeral of Supreme Court Justice Antoine Scalia to play golf?

Last year, the White House held a summit on the matter, any achievements? Nah.

It appears that perhaps Obama and his national security team has left the matter up the Tony Blinken at the State Department and the Brookings Institute.

The United States has mobilized countries around the world to disrupt and defeat these threats to our common security—starting with Daesh and al-Qaeda and including Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, AQAP, and a number of other groups. Now, the most visible part of this effort is the battlefield and our increasingly successful effort to destroy Daesh at its core in Iraq and Syria. Working by, with, and through local partners, we have taken back 40 percent of the territory Daesh controlled a year ago in Iraq and 10 percent in Syria—killing senior leaders, destroying thousands of pieces of equipment, all the while applying simultaneous pressure against key chock points and isolating its bases in Mosul and Raqqa. In fact, we assess Daesh’s numbers are the lowest they’ve been since we began monitoring their manpower in 2014.

We have a comprehensive strategy includes training, equipping, and advising our local partners; stabilizing and rebuilding liberated areas; stopping the flow of foreign fighters into and out of Iraq and Syria; cutting off Daesh’s financing and countering its propaganda; providing life-saving humanitarians assistance; and promoting political accommodations so that our military success is sustainable.

In each of these areas, we are making real progress. These hard-fought victories undermine more than Daesh’s fighting force. They erode the narrative it has built of its own success—the perception of which remains one of Daesh’s most effective recruiting tools. For the danger from violent extremism has slipped past war’s frontlines and into the computers and onto the phones of citizens in every corner of the world. Destined to outlive Daesh, this pernicious threat is transforming our security landscape, as individuals are inspired to violent acts from Paris to San Bernardino to Jakarta.

So even as we advance our efforts to defeat Daesh on the frontlines, we know that to be fully effective, we must work to prevent the spread of violent extremism in the first place—to stop the recruitment, radicalization, and mobilization of people, especially young people, to engage in terrorist activities. Read all the comments and remarks here.

White House Misses Deadline to Deliver ISIS Strategy to Congress

Brown: (CNSNews.com) – The House Armed Services Committee noted Tuesday that the Obama administration missed their February 15 deadline to deliver a strategy to counter violent extremist groups in the Middle East, such as ISIS and al Qaeda, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act.

Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Texas), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, harshly criticized President Obama’s failure to meet the deadline.

“I fear the President’s failure to deliver this report says far more about the state of his strategy to defeat terrorists than any empty reassurance he may offer from the podium,” Thornberry said in a statement.

“Unsurprisingly, the Administration cannot articulate a strategy for countering violent extremists in the Middle East. Time and again, the President has told us his strategy to defeat extremist groups like ISIS and al Qaeda is well underway,” Thornberry said, “yet, months after the legal requirement was established, his Administration cannot deliver that strategy to Congress.”

Thornberry also outlined the consequences of the administration’s failure, calling it “a lost opportunity” for Congress and the administration to come together for a common approach to respond to the threat.

“The Committee is working now to shape the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act and the Pentagon has already begun requesting authorities our troops need to defeat this enemy. Without a strategy, this amounts to leaving our troops in the wilderness with a compass, but no map,” he wrote.

“Failing to comply with the report deadline represents more than a failure of strategic vision for the White House,” Thornberry emphasized. “It is a lost opportunity for the Administration and Congress to work together on a common approach to face this threat.”

Section 1222 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY16, signed by President Obama in November, “requires the Secretaries of State and Defense to deliver a strategy for the Middle East and countering violent extremism no later than February 15, 2016” according to Thornberry’s statement.

It also requires the Administration to “lay out a number of elements needed to defeat terrorist groups like ISIS and al Qaeda, including a description of the role the U.S. military will play in such a strategy, a description of the coalition needed to carry out the strategy, and an assessment of efforts to disrupt foreign fighters traveling to Syria and Iraq.”

House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wisc.) sent the White House a reminder of the deadline on February 10^,citing a recent testimony by Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, that ISIS “will probably attempt to conduct additional attacks in Europe, and attempt to direct attacks on the U.S. homeland in 2016.”

“We are aware of the report and are actively working with multiple interagency offices to complete this legal requirement per the NDAA and look forward to submitting the completed report to Congress in the near-term,” Army Lt. Col. Joe Sowers, a Department of Defense spokesman, told The Hill on Friday.

*** Just one reason why Obama being tardy is an issue:

The intercontinental nuclear missile threat arrives in America.

Americans have been focused on New Hampshire and Iowa, but spare a thought for Los Angeles, Denver and Chicago. Those are among the cities within range of the intercontinental ballistic missile tested Sunday by North Korea. Toledo and Pittsburgh are still slightly out of range, but at least 120 million Americans with the wrong zip codes could soon be targets of Kim Jong Un…

***

“We assess that they have the capability to reach the [U.S.] homeland with a nuclear weapon from a rocket,” U.S. Admiral Bill Gortney of the North American Aerospace Defense Command said in October, echoing warnings from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the U.S. commander in South Korea…

All of this vindicates the long campaign for missile defense. Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative helped win the Cold War, and North Korea is precisely the threat that continued to justify the cause after the Soviet Union’s collapse…

You can thank the George W. Bush Administration for the defenses that exist, including long-range missile interceptors in Alaska and California, Aegis systems aboard U.S. Navy warships and a diverse network of radar and satellite sensors. The U.S. was due to place interceptors in Poland and X-Band radar in the Czech Republic, but in 2009 President Obama and Hillary Clinton scrapped those plans as a “reset” gift to Vladimir Putin.

Team Obama also cut 14 of the 44 interceptors planned for Alaska and Hawaii, ceased development of the Multiple Kill Vehicle… and defunded the two systems focused on destroying missiles in their early “boost” phase… By 2013 even Mr. Obama partially realized his error, so the Administration expanded radar and short-range interceptors in Asia and recommitted to the 14 interceptors for the U.S. West Coast. It now appears poised to install sophisticated Thaad antimissile batteries in South Korea.

ISIS is losing territory, hardly….

Posted on February 17, 2016February 17, 2016 by Denise Simon

We keep hearing that Islamic State is losing territory. But where exactly? Iraq? Perhaps but ISIS has 7000 fighters in Libya where some are leaving for countries deeper into Africa.

Groups of Islamic State fighters are quitting their bases in Libya fearing Western air strikes and heading south, posing a new threat to countries in Africa’s Sahel region including Nigeria, Niger and Chad, officials and intelligence sources said.

The ultra-hardline movement that has seized large areas of Syria and neighbouring Iraq has also amassed thousands of fighters along a coastal strip in Libya, where it has taken the city of Sirte and attacked oil infrastructure.

African and Western governments fear that the vast, lawless Sahel band to the south will become its next target, and say any large regional presence could be used as a springboard for wider attacks.

“ISIS (Islamic State) are moving towards southern Libya to avoid the likely air strikes from the European coalition,” said Colonel Mahamane Laminou Sani, director of documentation and military intelligence for Niger’s armed forces. More here.

Then there is Indonesia…..

February 15, 2016: Indonesia is the latest nation to learn that sending Islamic terrorists to regular prisons and allowing them to mix with non-terrorist criminals simply results in many of common criminals being radicalized and turned into Islamic terrorists. This was discovered as information Indonesian counter-terrorism forces obtained from captured Islamic terrorists was added to what was discovered then the backgrounds of dead Islamic terrorists were investigated and added to a database. It was found that a growing number of new recruits were coming from prisons where men with obvious criminal tendencies were often easily influenced by imprisoned Islamic terrorists and radicalized by that experience. Since 2001 most Islamic terrorist organizations have not only recognized this form of recruiting but encouraged it.

For a long time it was thought that this was mainly a phenomenon in Western nations where Moslems were a minority. But now Moslem majority nations are also finding prisons are increasingly effective for radicalizing Moslem criminals and turning them into Islamic terrorists. Prison officials in Moslem nations tend to be more corrupt than elsewhere and Islamic terror groups found that it paid to bribe prison guards to get recruiting materials into prisons.

Another problem is the growing number of new converts to Islam who encountered Islam while in prison and were radicalized there as well but when released did not become Islamic terrorists. Instead these Western recruits were employed to radicalize civilians and passing them on to Islamic terrorist organizations for further training. The best tactic here was detecting and monitoring radicalized prisoners after release and going after those found to have turned into Islamic terrorist recruiters.

Meanwhile all nations with Moslem inmates are seeking a fix for this problem. One solution that works is to isolate imprisoned Islamic terrorists from non-radicalized prisoners and each other. This is expensive in the short term but pays off in fewer Islamic terrorists in the long term.

Prisons have become a major source of new Islamic terrorist recruits and this method, along with greater use of the Islamic terrorists to recruit is replacing more traditional sources. For long time the Islamic boarding schools were the prime training ground for potential terrorists. It was difficult to deal with this problem in Moslem countries because most students of these schools do not become radicalized. The police found that an effective technique was to monitor these schools more carefully and then only raiding the ones where there was clear evidence of Islamic terrorist recruiting and training. In colleges Islamic radicals were succeeding in radicalizing college students and this was handled by infiltrating Islamic radical college student organizations and then going after the leaders and the advanced radicalized students who were heading for active Islamic terror activities.

Whatever solutions are developed to cripple efforts to radicalize Moslems the Islamic terror organizations have, so far, proved effective at coming up with new recruiting methods.

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Indonesian military are on high alert after reports emerged of ISIS attempts to acquire cyanide in the country

ISIS are threatening a mass murder using cyanide to poison food supplies, warns Indonesia’s security minister

Minister Luhut Pandjaitan claimed ISIS was seeking stocks of cyanide
He suggested police and military were at particular risk of ISIS attack
Indonesia has arrested some 20 suspected ISIS terrorists in recent weeks
ISIS is attempting to recruit new Jihadis from Indonesia’s prison population

DailyMail: ISIS terrorists in Indonesia are planning to target the nation’s food and water supplies with cyanide according to the country’s security chief.

Minster Luhut Pandjaitan warned that Islamic terrorists were especially keen on targeting the supplies of the police and army in an effort to destabilise the state.

Speaking to reporters, Pandjaitan claimed: ‘IS is now using cyanide to terrorise. They are using cyanide to poison food.’

He continued: ‘We have considered various forms of threats and we are prepared to face such a possibility (of cyanide poisoning).’

Indonesia is trying to crackdown on Islamic fanatics, including terrorists who have aligned themselves with ISIS. According to IBT.com, Indonesia’s police chief General Badrodin Haiti claimed ISIS had taken the idea from a recent murder in Jakarta where the victim drank coffee laced with cyanide.

In recent weeks, Indonesian police have arrested 20 suspected terrorists linked to ISIS. Many of those who were detained had close links to three leading Indonesian members of the terror group who are currently in Syria.

Authorities also believe ISIS sympathisers have infiltrated the nation’s prison system where they are seeking to recruit hardened criminals to their cause.

One cell busted south of Jakarta had recruited an inmate trusted by jail wardens to steal guns and ammunition from the police armoury behind bars. A police source said his girlfriend hid the weapons in an insulated lunchbox and smuggled them to militants on the outside.