You Afraid of Cryptocurrency?

It is a new term for alternative tangibles or intangibles of value but they have been around for centuries. Perhaps we are just fearing the unknown or rogue/fraudulent activities in instruments of value and the volatility of that value. Okay, that part is a good thing for sure. But give competition what it deserves, a chance.

What is cryptocurrency?

John Berlau did an exceptional job at this summary and after having an extended chat with Mr. Berlau, there is more to come on the topic. Meanwhile, enjoy his synopsis. Your comments are invited.

Why Speculative Consumer Goods Are Not “Securities”

Many questions are being asked about cryptocurrency. Is it a major innovation that will improve standards of living in ways we cannot yet imagine? Or is it a trendy phenomenon that will result in a speculative bubble of volatile assets? The answer to these questions may be: both of the above. New technologies have often produced bubbles that result in large disruptive busts. But after the bubble has burst and the dust has settled, the benefits of the innovation survive and lead to new, unforeseen benefits.

Yet, for all the talk about its novelty, the concept behind cryptocurrency has been around since the dawn of civilization. Cryptocurrency adds an electronic dimension to the privately issued currency and tokens that have existed through much of world history, as various items took on the role of money without government playing much, if any, role. For example, cowry shells, the shells of large snails, circulated as a medium of exchange from the 13th century B.C. to the 20th century in large parts of Africa and Asia and in scattered areas in Europe.[1]

In the American colonies and in the early days of the republic, tobacco warehouse receipts, also called tobacco notes, circulated as money. Promissory notes that were good at a number of tobacco warehouses throughout the original American states soon began to be used to purchase other items.[2] During the early-to-mid 19th century, thousands of currencies from banks and other business circulated in the U.S. For instance, the Howard Banking Company issued a bank note emblazoned with the image of Santa Claus in the 1850s that was redeemable for $5 worth of gold or silver.[3]

So in one sense, cryptocurrency is part of a long tradition of privately issued money, but it is also much more.[4] Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are peer-to-peer networks driven by consensus that make electronic cash for remote transactions without bank-like intermediaries.[5] Unfortunately, its promise for transformative innovation could come to a screeching halt under the weight of burdensome regulation.

SEC Threatens Regulation. Among federal financial regulatory agencies, none poses a greater threat to cryptocurrency and the associated blockchain technologies than the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Created in the 1930s to police “securities” such as stocks, bonds, and mutual funds, it was inevitable that the SEC regulation would come to interact with cryptocurrency. The SEC has jurisdiction over the financial statements of U.S. stock exchange-listed companies that issue cryptocurrency or accept payment in cryptocurrency, as well as over investment firms that hold cryptocurrency firms or cryptocurrency in their portfolios. The SEC has authority under the securities laws to ensure that companies accurately describe to investors the particulars of a firm’s cryptocurrency-related activities. However, over the past few years, the SEC has singled out firms dealing with cryptocurrency for more stringent treatment and has claimed jurisdiction over cryptocurrency products that was never granted to it by Congress. Further, the theory SEC Chairman Jay Clayton is pushing to deem cryptocurrencies as securities stretches the definition of “security” so broadly that even items such as collectible comic books could come under SEC jurisdiction.

Even before cryptocurrency came on the scene, the increasingly heavy hand of SEC regulation has come under scrutiny for stifling opportunities for startup entrepreneurs to raise capital and for middle class investors to get better returns on their investments. The SEC, as well as the securities laws it enforces, have come under bipartisan criticism from academics, entrepreneurs, investors, and members of Congress for creating red tape that makes it difficult both for entrepreneurs to raise capital in the public markets and for investors to find wealth-building opportunities. This concern prompted Congress to pass regulatory relief overwhelmingly in the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, which was signed by President Obama in 2012. In 2018, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill allowing further relief, the Jobs and Investor Confidence Act, with only four dissenting votes.[6]

The JOBS Act eased some burdens on entrepreneurs and investors by lifting bans on advertising in private companies and by exempting small and “emerging growth” companies from some of the costly burdens of securities laws like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. The law seemed like a good foundation for reforming financial regulation in order to make it less burdensome for startup entrepreneurs innovating in new areas of technology and for informed investors willing to take risks.

So there were grounds for optimism when President Trump nominated Jay Clayton to serve as the chairman of the SEC, saying he hoped that Clayton would “undo many regulations which have stifled investment in American businesses, and restore oversight of the financial industry in a way that does not harm American workers.”[7] Rather than focus on this call for easing regulatory burdens, Clayton has spent much of his time expanding the SEC’s reach to go after firms and products that Congress has never given it the authority to regulate. Clayton is stretching the term “securities”—traditionally defined as stocks, bonds, and investment contracts—to cover issuances of cryptocurrency and bring them under the SEC’s jurisdiction, using the cryptocurrency “bubble” as a justification.

The prospect of this innovation coming under the same smothering SEC regulation that exists for publicly traded firms has made the cryptocurrency market even more volatile and created uncertainty for the development of associated blockchain technologies, which in most cases rely on cryptocurrency as an incentive for developers to keep them running.

Clayton’s worries about bubbles in the technology industry are misplaced. The dot-com bubble of the early 2000s is a perfect example of what the renowned Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter called “creative destruction.”[8] The stock market value of many high-flying Internet firms did indeed vanish as quickly as it had risen. However, when the dust settled, innovations of the Internet era, such as e-commerce and search engines, were still around and thriving, along with giants-to-be like Google and Amazon. By 2006, more than 80 million Americans, or 42 percent of households, had broadband access, a figure that has now grown to 92 percent.[9] Meanwhile, online shopping transformed retailing.[10]

From Cryptocurrency to Blockchain. Could cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology lay the groundwork for innovation as consequential as the railroad and the Internet? Strong evidence indicates the answer is yes, particularly from the link between cryptocurrency and blockchain. Revolutions may well be occurring not just in money, but in ledgers and recordkeeping as well. But the process of innovation is following the similar bumpy route of previous technologies.

Before the development of Bitcoin, the first cryptocurrency, all remote payment transactions had to be conducted through central intermediaries that process the payment and keep a record of the transaction. This is largely to keep track of the money and avoid double spending by, for example, creating multiple electronic images of the same $10 bill.[11] Since it is very easy to copy a digital item, cheaters may try to buy multiple goods with one currency unit.[12] Simply emailing computer files as payment would give no reliable verification that cash had moved. Therefore, banks and other intermediaries kept a centralized registry of transactions that determined if the payer had rights to the funds in question.

Cryptocurrency has changed all this with the creation of scarce digital tokens validated by a peer-to-peer-network of the tokens’ users called “blockchain.” (The term is used without article in the plural, when referring to many “blockchains” listing different transactions.)

When Bitcoin was first developed as a digital asset and medium of exchange around 2009, its inventor, or group of inventors, the presumably pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto, created a blockchain ledger to ensure that Bitcoin’s distribution could be managed in a decentralized, peer-to-peer fashion, made possible by the science of cryptography, rather than a central authority in business or government. Nakamoto declared: “What is needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party. Transactions that are computationally impractical to reverse would protect sellers from fraud, and routine escrow mechanisms could easily be implemented to protect buyers.”[13] [Emphasis added]

Blockchain works as a distributed ledger, in which multiple users keep encrypted records of a transaction. Each block of the chain stores numerous transactions with all relevant data, which are added to the chain and linked to the previous block. As explained by the Nakamoto white paper, blockchain is like a “timestamp server” in which “each timestamp includes the previous timestamp, … forming a chain, with each additional timestamp reinforcing the ones before it.” The timestamp is then distributed through “a peer-to-peer network using proof-of-work to record a public history of transactions that quickly becomes computationally impractical for an attacker to change.”[14]

Since this technology greatly improves records management, it has potential functions well beyond cryptocurrency. Already, it is being used in applications such as medical recordkeeping, land registry, and identity theft prevention.[15] Its potential is being explored in a variety of areas to solve longstanding problems. In January 2017, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration announced a collaboration with Watson, IBM’s machine learning division, to use a blockchain platform to securely share data from electronic health records and clinical trials. Blockchain achieves the seemingly contradictory goals of enhanced data security and privacy and the ability to rapidly access medical records by authorized medical professionals. It allows patients to consult doctors and nurses, with the confidence that their data are being protected from potential hackers.[16]

The capabilities of blockchain technology may be instrumental in land reform as well. The renowned development economist Hernando de Soto has said that blockchain could be so transformative in securing property rights in the developing world that, “I feel a great moral obligation to refocus my life around” the technology.[17] De Soto and the Lima, Peru-based Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD), which he leads, are currently working with blockchain technology firm Bitfury on establishing a land registry in the Republic of Georgia.[18] DeSoto is also seeking to set up similar blockchain-based registries in countries in Africa, South America, and Asia.[19] The ILD projects aim to record locally recognized land assets into a blockchain utilizing cryptocurrency in order to create a public ledger that would record and legitimize the land and water rights both the interests of both small farmers and miners and multinational companies.

Even cryptocurrency critics such as former Federal Reserve Governor Kevin Warsh concede that blockchain-based technology may be beneficial. However, they argue it could be divorced from cryptocurrency and its supposed problems.[20] But cryptocurrencies, or digital tokens, are essential to maintaining blockchain-based ledgers by incentivizing its record keepers to perform their crucial roles.

How Government Overreach Stifles Innovation and Worsens Bubbles. From trial and error comes success. Therefore, much of the fate of the technology depends on government policy. Fraud must be punished, but government should not overreach with one-size-fits-all rules that could halt innovation in its tracks. The world will never know the full potential of cryptocurrency and blockchain if heavy-handed government regulation hinders entrepreneurs from experimenting with novel approaches and applications.

Protecting entrepreneurs from government overreach is important not only to ensure that society gains from beneficial innovation, but also to moderate the kind of volatility that arises from government intervention.

In the case of the tech bubble, one often overlooked factor behind the crash was the Clinton Justice Department’s antitrust case against Microsoft. On April 3, 2000, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson ruled that Microsoft had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, siding with the government that Microsoft’s integration of its Web browser with its operating system constituted an illegal “restraint of trade” against its competitors. Microsoft’s stock fell nearly 15 percent upon news of this ruling. But surprisingly to some, nearly all major tech firms, including Microsoft’s competitors, also saw their stocks fall upon news of the ruling. The NASDAQ Stock Market dropped 350 points that day, losing 8 percent of its value.[21] Tech stocks as a group continued to decline for the next two years. Of course, the dot-com crash is too complex a phenomenon to attribute to a single cause, but the government’s prosecution of Microsoft clearly did not help.

Much of cryptocurrency’s apparent bust appears to be caused by the threat of government overreach as well. At the beginning of 2017, the price of Bitcoin, the world’s largest-circulating cryptocurrency, had yet to reach $1,000.[22] By the end of that year, it was trading at more than $13,000,[23] after reaching a high of nearly $20,000 a few weeks earlier on the CoinDesk Bitcoin Price Index.[24]

Other cryptocurrencies, such as Ether and Litecoin, tracked Bitcoin’s rise in price in 2017 and tumbled along with it in early 2018. Since the end of 2018, Bitcoin has been trading on most exchanges at slightly less than $4,000, until it rallied to more than $5,000 at the beginning of April 2019. While much of the drop can be attributed to an overheated market that was finally cooling down, fear of government crackdowns likely played a significant role in this decline. When news first broke that China might ban certain cryptocurrency exchanges, the price of Bitcoin dropped by 10 percent in one day. When China actually banned these exchanges five months later in February 2018, the price sank by a similar amount.[25]

In the U.S., hostility toward cryptocurrency has come from across the political spectrum. Some pundits, like former Federal Reserve Governor Warsh—who was appointed by President George W. Bush and often comments on cryptocurrency in the financial press, including The Wall Street Journal and CNBC—have acknowledged the currency’s innovations, but have called for the Federal Reserve issue its own digital currency and essentially stamp out private alternatives.[26] Rep. Brad Sherman (D-Calif.) has stated that “blockchain is a good technology,” but favored its exclusive monetary use with central bank currency. “There is nothing that can be done with cryptocurrency that cannot be done with sovereign currency that is meritorious and helpful to society,” he said.[27]

Since early 2017, the SEC has rejected more than 10 separate proposals by investment companies to sell Bitcoin-holding exchange-traded funds (ETFs) to retail investors.[28] A July 2018 Bitcoin ETF rejection drew a strong dissent from Commissioner Hester Peirce, who called out the SEC for singling out cryptocurrency investment vehicles with more stringent rules than those for other ETFs. The SEC’s rejection, she said, “signals an aversion to innovation that may convince entrepreneurs that they should take their ingenuity to other sectors of our economy, or to foreign markets, where their talents will be welcomed with more enthusiasm.” Above all, the SEC should concern itself with a firm’s accurate disclosure and not act as a “gatekeeper to innovation.” Peirce also warned that this action would put a potentially safer Bitcoin investment out of reach of middle class investors, who can buy the currency on cryptocurrency exchanges out of the SEC’s reach—for now. “This disapproval therefore unintentionally undermines investor protection,” she said. “It precludes investors from accessing bitcoin through an exchange-listed avenue that offers predictability, transparency, and ease of entry and exit.”[29]

Most Cryptocurrencies Are Not Securities. The SEC’s answer to this “investor protection” problem would place even more restrictions on investor choice, by expanding the SEC’s jurisdiction to cryptocurrency itself and to cryptocurrency exchanges, such as Coinbase, that match buyers and sellers. Without changes in the law, stated intent of Congress, or even a formal rule, the SEC has been sending signals through enforcement actions and statements from officials and that new issuers of cryptocurrency may need to go through the same cumbersome securities registration process as do issuers of stocks and bonds.

The SEC first weighed in on whether cryptocurrency could be deemed a security in a July 2017 public report on its investigation of a cryptocurrency-using platform called “The DAO.” To use this platform, participants purchased DAO tokens with the cryptocurrency Ether, and the tokens entitled participants to voting rights and “rewards.” A DAO co-creator likened the platform to “buying shares in a company and getting … dividends.”[30] The SEC labeled DAO tokens as illegal unregistered “securities,” but did not bring an enforcement action, which may have been in part because The DAO had shut down and participants had already been refunded by the time the investigation was concluded.[31] Because of the explicit promotion of the DAO system as an investment platform—a unique characteristic absent from the issuance of most cryptocurrencies—the SEC’s report was not widely seen at the time as potentially threatening the broader cryptocurrency market.[32]

However, soon after it issued the DAO report, the SEC began issuing desist orders not only to entities offering cryptocurrency as part of an investment structure, but also to entrepreneurs who had not made any promise of an investment return. It deemed as a “security” the digital Munchee coin, even though it was not promoted as an investment, but offered as a reward for contributors to a restaurant review app of the same name. After they completed a certain number of reviews, writers would get tokens that could be redeemed for complimentary or discounted meals. Nevertheless, the SEC went after these coins because of the possibility of a speculative “secondary market,” and the restaurant review app agreed to stop offering them in late 2017.[33]

SEC Chairman Clayton then stated to Congress in early 2018 that he has never seen a coin or token offering that in his mind was not a “security.”[34] According to the cryptocurrency news site Bitcoin.com, hundreds of cryptocurrency creators “are reportedly being ‘secretly’ targeted” by the SEC, and that these firms and individuals “are now scrambling to clarify whether their token constituted a security, and, if so, whether it was properly registered with or exempted by the SEC.”[35]

Deeming cryptocurrency as a “security” could put cryptocurrency out of the reach of middle-class investors because of the same red tape—both from SEC regulations and from financial regulation laws such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010—that has hindered small investors’ access to stock in early stage growth companies. By forcing the documenting of minutiae for public companies, securities laws such as Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank have quadrupled auditing costs and made it prohibitively expensive for new firms to go public. Thus, most companies going public today are large, dominant firms. Wealthy “accredited investors” were the only ones who prospered during their early growth stages.[36] “Everyone involved the field is nervously watching” the SEC, writes renowned technology writer George Gilder in his 2018 book, Life After Google. “The danger is that it will extend the doldrums into which it has led the entrepreneurial economy and drive industry out of the country.”[37]

There are also dangers to the functioning of blockchain technology—and all the transformative innovation that could flow from it—were the SEC to deem cryptocurrency a “security.” An influential law journal article by Jeffrey Alberts and Bertrand Fry, partners at Pryor Cashman LLP who specialize in financial technology (FinTech), argues that applying securities law to cryptocurrency could mean that thousands of members of peer-to-peer blockchain networks may have to register with the SEC as securities “issuers.”[38] This could also be the case even for a blockchain that is not utilized primarily for cryptocurrency. If those who maintain such blockchain are reimbursed with some type of cryptocurrency or digital tokens, as is current practice in many blockchain technology operations, they may still need to register as securities “issuers” depending on what rules are applied.

Many commentators have found the SEC’s deeming of cryptocurrency as a “security” to be a stretch of the securities’ laws’ original intentions. As Gilder writes: “Tokens represent not ownership shares of a company but rather various goods, services, gift cards, and other elements of a company’s value proposition. … Companies sell goods and services all the time in a variety of ways without any thought of the SEC.”[39]

Aside from the DAO, the SEC is not claiming that most cryptocurrency resembles stocks or bonds. By itself, cryptocurrency does not grant either ownership stakes in a company or a promised rate of interest or return on investment. Instead, the SEC is deeming many new issuances of cryptocurrency as securities because it argues that they fit a broad definition of the term “investment contract.” In June 2018, SEC Director of Corporation Finance Bill Hinman claimed that while established currencies such as Bitcoin and Ether are not securities now, they may have been when they were first created.[40] In a March 7, 2019 letter to Rep. Ted Budd (R-N.C.), Clayton said that he agreed with Hinman’s claim that a cryptocurrency that was “initially … a security” may “no longer meet that definition.” But, unlike Hinman, Clayton did not specify which cryptocurrencies he believed did not qualify as securities. Clayton signaled no major change to the SEC’s stance on cryptocurrency offerings. Instead, he argued that the SEC was simply carrying out federal securities laws that “define ‘security’ broadly to encompass virtually any instrument that may be sold as an investment.”[41]

Maintaining that most cryptocurrency is bought for speculative purposes, the SEC is relying on a Supreme Court case decided more than 70 years ago, SEC v. Howey (1946), which found that shares in orange groves were securities when paired with service contracts.[42] “The transactions in this case clearly involve investment contracts as so defined,” the Supreme Court declared. “The respondent companies are offering something more than fee simple interests in land, something different from a farm or orchard coupled with management services. They are offering an opportunity to contribute money and to share in the profits of a large citrus fruit enterprise managed and partly owned by respondents.”[43]

In the DAO report and other publications, the SEC has pointed to the “Howey test,” which stems from the Supreme Court case, as giving it the power to regulate many cryptocurrencies as securities. In Howey, the Court wrote, “The test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.”[44]

Yet even under the broad reading of “investment contracts” from the Howey test, cryptocurrency appears to fall outside the statutory definition of “securities.” In Howey, the service contracts obligated the original owner to maintain the orange groves for a number of years. The court stated that “there is ordinarily no right to specific fruit” for the owners of shares in the grove.[45] There are no such maintenance obligations in most cryptocurrency contracts, and consumers individually own the “fruit”—or coins—from day one.[46]

In a recent letter to the SEC that likely signals a looming legal challenge, attorneys for the popular Canadian social network Kik maintain that the SEC “has stretched the definition of a ‘security’—and, in particular, the definition of an ‘investment contract’ that the Supreme Court adopted over 70 years ago in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946)—beyond its original meaning and intent.”[47] The letter was in response to an SEC preliminary determination that Kik violated securities laws when it offered a cryptocurrency called Kin to members of the social network. According to Kik’s letter, the SEC has never alleged that Kik committed any type of fraud in the offering, so the issue is purely one of issuing cryptocurrency without going through the red tape of a “securities” offering.[48] The letter concludes that “we believe the proposed enforcement action would exceed the Commission’s statutory authority and, as such, would fail.”[49] The letter cites an admonition from a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that “while the subjective intent of the purchasers may have some bearing on the issue of whether they entered into investment contracts, we must focus our inquiry on what the purchasers were offered or promised.”[50]

In early April, the SEC issued a guidance document in response to demands from lawmakers and the cryptocurrency community to provide clarity on how it plans to apply securities laws apply to cryptocurrencies. But the guidance, “Framework for ‘Investment Contracts’ Analysis of Digital Assets,” appears to stretch the Howey Test even further and broadens greatly what products could be considered securities.[51] Georgia Quinn, a prominent FinTech attorney and general counsel at CoinList, said, “This stretches the test of what is a security from the three prongs of the Howey test to more than 40 prongs.”[52] It is worth noting that the guidance document was issued by SEC staff; it is not a rule voted on by the commissioners, but may still influence enforcement actions.[53]

One of the new factors the SEC seems to consider to deem a cryptocurrency a security is the existence of a secondary market—a characteristic that previously had played no part in the Howey test. Whether the oranges from the Howey groves could be sold in different markets was never at issue in the 1946 Supreme Court case. The Court deemed the interests in the groves to be securities because of participants’ right to a share of the profits and provisions in the specific service contracts that obligated the original owner to maintain the groves for the participants’ benefit. Nevertheless, the SEC guidance mentions the term “secondary market” seven times. The guidance advises that even in cases where coins can be used in a functional market for goods and services, “there may be securities transactions if … there are limited or no restrictions on reselling those digital assets.”[54]

The SEC’s expanded definition of a “security” to be “virtually any instrument that may be sold as an investment,” in Clayton’s words, or a product for which a “secondary market” exists, poses a threat to both cryptocurrency and many business sectors. Quinn says, “After reading this, I think airline miles and retailer points could be considered securities,” noting that some brands of these items are transferrable and therefore could be deemed to have a “secondary market.[55] For example, the site Points.com enables users to not only manage reward points, but also exchange them.

There are also many physical goods, from wine to comic books, which consumers buy both for enjoyment and for speculative purposes and which the SEC could claim to regulate as “securities” under its rationale for regulating cryptocurrency. With comic books, for instance, there was even a major industry bubble in the 1980s and 1990s, when publishers printed many new special editions, in part to please collectors and speculators. Many comic book retailers and issuers suffered from a wave of bankruptcies when the bubble burst in the mid-1990s. Yet there was no call for the SEC to regulate the comic book market—or the market for baseball cards, for that matter.[56]

There are plenty of federal and state agencies that have much clearer jurisdiction than the SEC to police cryptocurrency fraud. In fact, digital currencies have been called by one observer “one of the most regulated sectors within FinTech.” The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Federal Trade Commission, and various state agencies already have asserted jurisdiction over cryptocurrencies.[57] Congress can also update laws on the books to more clearly and narrowly define federal agencies’ jurisdiction. For cryptocurrency and other new technologies to flourish, consumers, investors and entrepreneurs must be protected from the overreach of the SEC.

Both cryptocurrency and blockchain are entering their second decade. As with many emerging young technologies, they have accomplished much in their first decade, but have yet to bloom fully into adulthood. That is all the more reason to protect them from what Nobel Laureate economist Milton Friedman called the “invisible foot” of government regulation, and instead let their growth be guided by the thousands of invisible hands of the marketplace.[58]

Notes


[1] “Cowry Shells: a Trade Currency,” National Bank of Belgium, https://www.nbbmuseum.be/en/2007/01/cowry-shells.htm. Boban Docevski, “Cowry Shell Coins: an Ancient Monetary System Based on Sea Shells Used on Almost Every Continent,” The Vintage News, January 21, 2018, https://www.thevintagenews.com/2018/01/21/cowry-shell-coins/.

[2] Sharon Ann Murphy, “Early American Colonists Had a Cash Problem. Here’s How They Solved It,” Time, February 27, 2017, http://time.com/4675303/money-colonial-america-currency-history/.

[3] “The Birth of the Dollar Bill,” Planet Money, Episode 421, National Public Radio, December 7, 2012, https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=166747693.

[4] For more on this tradition, see Friedrich A. Von Hayek, Denationalisation of Money: An Analysis of the Theory and Practice of Concurrent Currencies (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1976).

[5] Peter Van Valkenburgh, “Exploring the Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Ecosystem,” Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, October 11, 2018, p. 47, https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Van%20Valkenburg%20Testimony%2010-11-18.pdf.

[6] John Berlau, “Let Middle-Class Investors Join the ‘Accredited’ Club,” Forbes.com, August 27, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnberlau/2018/08/27/let-middle-class-investors-join-the-accredited-club/#457d26414641

[7] “Trump Nominates Jay Clayton Chairman of the SEC,” Reuters, January 4, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-trump-sec-idUSW1N1D10DU.

[8] Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1975) [orig. pub. 1942], pp. 82-85, Literature and the Culture of Information, http://transcriptions-2008.english.ucsb.edu/archive/courses/liu/english25/index.html. Schumpeter wrote that the “process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in.”

[9] 2018 Broadband Deployment Report, Federal Communications Commission, https://www.fcc.gov/reports-research/reports/broadband-progress-reports/2018-broadband-deployment-report

[10] Daniel Gross, “The Bubbles that Built America,” CNN Money, undated, accessed February 4, 2019, https://money.cnn.com/galleries/2007/news/0705/gallery.bubbles/jump.html.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson, and Jason Potts, “What Does the Blockchain Mean for Government? Cryptocurrencies in the Australian Payments System,” RMIT Blockchain Innovation Hub, p. 3, https://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/226020/subdr061-financial-system.pdf.

[13] Satoshi Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,” White Paper, Undated but circa 2008, p. 1, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.

[14] Nakamoto, pp. 2-8.

[15] John Berlau,”Let’s Keep Cryptocurrency Mines Running in Human Achievement Hour and Every Hour,” Forbes.com, March 24, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnberlau/2018/03/24/lets-keep-cryptocurrency-mines-running-in-human-achievement-hour-every-hour/#63e2f8b267f8.

[16] Crypt Bytes Tech, “Medicalchain—A blockchain for electronic health records,” Medium.com, November 16, 2017, https://medium.com/crypt-bytes-tech/medicalchain-a-blockchain-for-electronic-health-records-eef181ed14c2.

[17] Gillian Tett, “Bitcoin, blockchain and the fight against poverty,” Financial Times, December 27, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/60f838ea-e514-11e7-8b99-0191e45377ec.

[18] Richard Kastelein, “Georgia to Store Real Estate Documents in Blockchain System with Bitfury Group and Hernando de Soto,” Blockchain News, January 10, 2017, https://www.the-blockchain.com/2017/01/10/georgia-store-real-estate-documents-blockchain-system-bitfury-group-hernando-de-soto/.

[19] Andrew Nelson, “De Soto Inc.: Where Eminent Domain Meets the Blockchain,” Bitcoin Magazine, May 5, 2018, https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/de-soto-inc-where-eminent-domain-meets-blockchain/.

[20] Ana Alexandre, “Former US Federal Reserve Governor Says Federal Digital Currency Deserves Consideration,” Cointelegraph, May 5, 2018, https://cointelegraph.com/news/former-us-federal-reserve-governor-says-federal-digital-currency-deserves-consideration.

[21] Jake Ulick, “NASDAQ sinks 350 points,” CNN Money, April 3, 2000, https://money.cnn.com/2000/04/03/markets/markets_newyork/.

[22] Pete Rizzo, “Bitcoin Price Tops $1,000 in First Day of 2017 Trading, Coindesk, January 1, 2017, https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-price-1000-january-1-2017/.

[23] “Historical Snapshot–December 31, 2017,” CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/historical/20171231/

[24] Stan Higgins, “From $900 to $20,000: Bitcoin’s Historic 2017 Price Run Revisited,” CoinDesk, December 29, 2017,

https://www.coindesk.com/900-20000-bitcoins-historic-2017-price-run-revisited/.

[25] Diego Zuluaga, “Should Cryptocurrencies Be Regulated like Securities,” CMFA Briefing Paper No. 1, Cato Institute, June 25, 2018, pp. 3-4, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/cmfa-briefing-paper-1-updated.pdf.

[26] Alexandre.

[27] “The Future of Money: Digital Currency,” Hearing before the House Financial Services Committee Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade, July 18, 2018,

https://www.c-span.org/video/?448611-1/house-panel-examines-digital-currency.

[28] Nikhilesh DeStan Higgins, and Muyao Shen, “SEC Rejects 9 Bitcoin ETF proposals,” CoinDesk, August 22, 2018, https://www.coindesk.com/sec-rejects-7-bitcoin-etf-proposals. Simon Chandler, “A Brief History of the SEC’s Reviews of Bitcoin ETF Proposals,” CoinTelegraph, April 1, 2019, https://cointelegraph.com/news/a-brief-history-of-the-secs-reviews-of-bitcoin-etf-proposals.

[29] Hester Peirce, Dissent to Release No. 34-83723; File No. SR-BatsBZX-2016-30, July 26, 2018,

https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/peirce-dissent-34-83723.

[30] Securities and Exchange Commission, “Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO,” Release No. 81207, July 25, 2017, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf.

[31] C. Thea Pitzen, “SEC Issues Warning on Token and Digital Currency Use,” American Bar Association, January 4, 2018, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation-news/top-stories/2018/sec-issues-warning-token-digital-currency-use/.

[32] Samuel Falcon, “The Story of the DAO—Its History and Consequences,” Medium, December 24, 2017, https://medium.com/swlh/the-story-of-the-dao-its-history-and-consequences-71e6a8a551ee.

[33] Katherine Cooper, “SEC Munchee Order a Recipe for Securities Violations,” CoinDesk, December 22, 2017, https://www.coindesk.com/secs-munchee-order-recipe-securities-law-violations.

[34] Stan Higgins, “SEC Chief Clayton: Every ICO I’ve Seen Is a Security,” CoinDesk, February 6, 2018, https://www.coindesk.com/sec-chief-clayton-every-ico-ive-seen-security.

[35] C. Edward Kelso, “Hundreds of ICOs Being Secretly Investigated by SEC, Claims Report,” Bitcoin.com, October 9, 2018, https://news.bitcoin.com/hundreds-of-icos-being-secretly-investigated-by-sec-claims-report/

[36] John Berlau, “Let Middle-Class Investors Join ‘Accredited’ Club,” Forbes.com, August 27, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnberlau/2018/08/27/let-middle-class-investors-join-the-accredited-club/#697411946416.

[37] George Gilder, Life After Google (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 2018), p. 181.

[38] Jeffrey E. Alberts and Bertrand Fry, “Is Bitcoin a Security,” Trustees of Boston University, https://www.bu.edu/jostl/files/2016/01/21.1_Alberts_Final_web.pdf.

[39] Ibid. Zuluaga. Paul Paray, “No, Not All ICOs Are Securities,” Coindesk, February 18, 2018, https://www.coindesk.com/no-not-icos-securities.

[40] William Hinman, “Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary,” Speech at Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto, Securities and Exchange Commission, June 14, 2018,

https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418.

[41] Letter from Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Jay Clayton to Representative Ted Budd, March, 7, 2019, https://coincenter.org/files/2019-03/clayton-token-response.pdf.

[42] Chitra Ragavan, “How a 1920s Florida Citrus Land Baron Created the Acid Test for Crypto Tokens,” Forbes.com, November 14, 2017,

https://medium.com/swlh/the-story-of-the-dao-its-history-and-consequences-71e6a8a551ee.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/chitraragavan/2017/11/14/how-a-1920s-florida-citrus-land-baron-created-the-acid-test-for-crypto-tokens/#9b7b47c4a3c4.

[43] SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/328/293.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Alberts and Fry, “Is Bitcoin a Security?” https://www.bu.edu/jostl/files/2016/01/21.1_Alberts_Final_web.pdf

[47] Letter (“Wells Submission”) from Kik Interactive, Inc., and the Kin Ecosystem Foundation to the Securities and Exchange Commission, December 10, 2018, p. 2, http://kinecosystem.org/wells_response.pdf.

[48] Ibid, p. 14.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid., p. 17, citing Warfield v. Alaniz, 569 F.3d 1015, 1021.

[51] “Framework for ‘Investment Contracts’ Analysis of Digital Assets,” Securities and Exchange Commission, April 3, 2019, https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets.

[52] Telephone Interview with Georgia Quinn, April 5, 2019.

[53] The guidance can be considered what CEI’s Wayne Crews has termed “regulatory dark matter,” defined as agency issuances that are not officially “rules” but nevertheless carry regulatory weight. Clyde Wayne Crews, “Mapping Washington’s Lawlessness: An Inventory of Regulatory Dark Matter 2017 Edition,” Issue Analysis 2017 No. 4, Competitive Enterprise Institute, March 2017, https://cei.org/content/mapping-washington%E2%80%99s-lawlessness-2017.

[54] Framework, p. 11.

[55] Quinn.

[56] Jonathan V. Last, “The Crash of 1993,” Weekly Standard, June 13, 2011, https://www.weeklystandard.com/jonathan-v-last/the-crash-of-1993.

[57] “Virtual Currency: Financial Innovation and National Security Implications,” Hearing before House Financial Services Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism and Illicit Finance, June 8, 2017, p. 29 (Q&A with Rep. Warren Davidson questioning witness Jerry Brito), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/115-22.pdf.

[58] Emily Parker and Joseph Rago, Eds., “Friedman’s Sampler,” Wall Street Journal, November 18, 2006, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122522361412777111.

Pompeo Hits Cuba with Helms Burton due to roles in Venezuela

Helms-Burton was passed in 1996 as legislation, signed by President Clinton,  that further tightens the economic blockade on Cuba, but Title III, which allows lawsuits to be filed in federal courts over properties nationalized by the revolutionary government, was suspended every six months by all the administrations of that country from then until recently, when President Donald Trump began to threaten and give deadlines for its application.

Image result for helms burton act

In part from the McClatchy: The Trump administration will postpone its decision on whether to fully implement the Helms-Burton Act for two weeks. The move actually increases pressure on companies — primarily from Spain, Canada and the United States — because they could potentially be sued for “trafficking” in properties confiscated by the Cuban government as much as 60 years ago.

The decision, announced Wednesday, comes amid intense criticism of the government of Cuba for its role in supporting Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.

In a notice sent to Congress, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the U.S. “continues to examine human rights conditions in Cuba, including ongoing repression of the rights of the Cuban people to free speech, free expression and free assembly.” He added that the State Department “is also monitoring Cuba’s continued military, security, and intelligence support” to Maduro, “who is responsible for repression, violence, and a man-made humanitarian crisis in Venezuela.”

The subject of fully implementing Helms-Burton began to make its rounds on social media earlier this week.

“The regime in #Cuba is the single biggest reason why the Maduro regime is still able to repress, jail, torture and kill the people of Venezuela,” Florida Republican Sen. Marco Rubio posted on Twitter on Monday. Then he added the hashtag “#HelmsBurton,” without giving more details.

National Security Adviser John Bolton, who also tweeted on Monday, posted: “The U.S. will hold Cuba accountable for its subversion of democracy in Venezuela and direct hand in Maduro’s ongoing repression of the Venezuelan people.”

President Donald Trump broke with the practice from previous administrations of suspending the Title III provision of the Helms-Burton Act every six months, which allows Americans to file lawsuits in U.S. courts to seek compensation for property that was confiscated by the Cuban government after Fidel Castro seized power in 1959. The Helms-Burton Act codified the Cuban embargo into law.

Since Jan. 16, when it issued a 45-day waiver, the administration has been shortening the suspension period of the provision, signaling that is willing to tighten the embargo.

In early March, the administration partially implemented the provision to allow lawsuits against some 200 Cuban companies with ties to the military that now control properties confiscated by the Cuban government. But it postponed for a month a decision on whether to allow foreign companies on the island to be sued, too, amidst negotiations to seek international support to oust Maduro.

Spain, Canada and France would be among the countries most affected by a full implementation of Title III, as they have investments in tourism and mining on the island. The routine six-month suspension of this provision was the response to the complaints of U.S. allies, which protested the extraterritorial effects of the law. More details here.

 

Where did Some of Venezuela’s Gold Show up?

Uganda?

Remember that Venezuelan president, Nicolas Maduro is a virtual puppet of Cuba. Going back years, during the 50th anniversary of the Cuban revolution, Chavez hosted President Yoweri Museveni, then president of Uganda. Cuba was known over the years to give scholarships to Ugandans. The relationship is long and deep.

Then as recently as February of 2019, the Kampala is allegedly investigating that top Venezuelan politicians are using Ugandan passports to smuggle key people out of Venezuela into China and possibly other countries that stand with the Maduro regime.

Further, Venezuela attempted to removed some of their gold reserves parked in Britain, worth an estimated $1.2 billion, were denied at the behest of the United States. The 8 tons gold residing in Venezuela was in fact removed this past February to an unknown location. However, in 2018, at least 23 tonnes of mined gold was transported from Venezuela to Turkey by plane.

Maduro is attempting to sell gold on the international market to pay for basic needs for his country’s elite. Last February, an Abu Dhabi company known as Noor Capital bought 3 tons of Venezuelan gold. Since oil production in Venezuela has dropped significantly and sales on the global market have dropped, gold is the next avenue to generate immediate funds.

Venezuela Gold Reserves

Venezuela Gold Reserves

China and Russia are looking for exclusive oil deals from Venezuela due to the US sanctions. In fact, PDVSA, the Venezuelan oil operation is opening an office in Russia.

Ugandan authorities are investigating unexplained imports of 7.4 tonnes of gold worth US$300 million that is suspected of originating with President Maduro’s regime in Venezuela.

goldAnalysts claim Uganda is a gold smuggling hub (Photo: Agnico-Eagle, CC-Zero)The investigation is centred on African Gold Refinery (AGR), the country’s largest refinery, Reuters reported on Wednesday. AGR confirmed that the gold arrived from South America but rejected claims of smuggling.

“All our transactions are legal and well documented,” the company said in a statement to OCCRP, dismissing the allegations as “fake news.”

Fred Enanga, a spokesman for Uganda’s police, told Reuters that AGR received two shipments of 3.8 and 3.6 tonnes at the beginning of March however neither passed through official customs entry points.

Police raided AGR premises on March 7 but found the lighter batch had disappeared.

Flights this month from Caracas to Entebbe have raised suspicions that Nicolas Maduro’s government is smuggling gold out of the country and selling it to traders in Africa and the Middle East in an attempt to prop up its sanctions-hit economy.

An airline source told The Times that a European charter company was contracted to fly four tonnes of gold from Caracas to Entebbe early this year.

The Venezuelan opposition previously claimed a jet owned by Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza transported gold to Greece. Alexis Tsipras, Greece’s prime minister, is one of the few European leaders still supporting Maduro.

Venezuela’s ambassador to Greece, Freddy Fernández, denied the reports.

“It is foolish to believe that the Venezuelan foreign minister himself was taking the gold out of the country. The story is part of a concerted attack against our country,” he told the Greek news outlet Efimerida ton Syntakton.

Investigators are looking to establish where the gold came from, who owns it and how it was shipped into the country, he said.

Uganda has become a regional smuggling hub for gold with corruption and widespread mismanagement proving profitable for officials and international investors, a report from Global Witness claims.

AGR was accused of facilitating gold smuggling from conflict regions in the Democratic Republic of Congo in an investigation by The Sentry, an African financial investigations organization co-founded by actor George Clooney.

AGR Chief Executive Officer, Alain Goetz denied the accusations, calling it “yet another pathetic attempt to destroy the much-needed reforms and changes needed in the African gold industry.”

Action Plan for NoKo’s Nuclear Program Same as 1991/2

So, in Hanoi, Vietnam, President Trump is meeting for two days with Kim Jung Un.

Il prossimo meeting tra Kim Jong-Un e Donald J. Trump ...

The White House said Trump would meet Kim at Hanoi’s French-colonial-era Metropole Hotel at 6:30 p.m. (1130 GMT) and have a 20-minute one-on-one conversation before a dinner scheduled to last just over an hour and a half.

Meanwhile, the democrats are telegraphing that Trump is going to give up too much in order to get a deal with North Korea. How do they know? Further, the mainstream media is also broadcasting that Trump will not get anything accomplished during this second summit. Which is it exactly?

Well, it is worth looking at archived documents going back to at least 1991-1992. Remember the U.S. had a different president and military leaders, while North Korea did not have lil Kim. The issue with North Korea and the nuclear program goes back at least 25-30 years. At least under the Trump administration, there are direct talks, summits that did not happen with the top leaders of the two countries…..has the mainstream media explained any of this or for context, the previous action plans and why?

So….skim through documents 6 and 7.

 Document 06

1991-12-13
Source: Freedom of Information Act release
This briefing book provides an invaluable and detailed look at how the Bush I administration deliberated over the critical next steps in confronting the North Korea nuclear program, as well as concerns held by the Pentagon about the approach recommended by the State Department. This briefing book was prepared for a NSC/Deputies’ Committee meeting to be held on December 17. The Deputies’ Committee was composed of high-ranking representatives below the Cabinet level from the State Department, the Secretary of Defense and JCS, the CIA and ACDA, as well as other agencies as required, and met to discuss policy issues that cut across the agencies’ briefs. The level of detail found in this briefing book regarding the various negotiating goals and approaches defies easy summarization, and the materials should be read closely to capture all the nuances and factors entering into the U.S. diplomatic efforts aimed at halting Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The contents of the briefing book, with comments on significant points, include: (page numbers refer to the PDF copy):

A) Cover memo, table of contents and agenda (pages 1-3)

B) Meeting objectives memorandum (page 4)

The purpose of the meeting was to consider a “gameplan” to bring North Korea’s nuclear weapons program under control. Specific steps to be considered included preliminary contact with North Korea at the deputy assistant secretary level. This would be accompanied by an approach by Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy in Beijing to invite North Korea to send a high-level official to meet with a U.S. counterpart in New York before President Bush visited Seoul in early January. Also under consideration were talking points for these meetings and demarches to countries with relations or potential influence in Pyongyang informing them of the U.S. concerns about the DPRK nuclear program.

C) Memorandum for ASD/ISA James R. Lilley, Subject DC Meeting on North Korea Nuclear Program, ca. December 12, 1991 (pages 5-6)

This memorandum summarizes the key points in the gameplan and lays out the Pentagon’s concerns that the talking points are too “forward-leaning” with respect to offering the prospect of normalized relations with North Korea at this early point in the process. The Pentagon was already concerned that South Korea had rushed ahead in talks with North Korea about a non-aggression agreement while putting the nuclear issue off to the side. ACDA Director Ronald Lehman in his recent visit to Seoul (see 5 and 6 below) had sought to bolster South Korea’s determination to press Pyongyang on this issue by agreeing to the idea of a North-South inspection regime. The Pentagon agreed with the key point of the gameplan, which was a high-level meeting to make sure Kim Il Sung knew directly about U.S. concerns regarding North Korea’s nuclear program and that, for real progress, signing the IAEA safeguards agreement was not sufficient but the DPRK should reciprocate Roh Tae Woo’s November 8 non-nuclear declaration foreswearing the development, including reprocessing and enrichment, of nuclear weapons. But the Pentagon strongly held that the U.S. side should not offer too much by way of a possible normalization of relations in these early contacts. In its view, the mere fact that these two meetings might take place were carrot enough, and the U.S. should make any second meeting conditional on North Korea signing and implementing safeguards, and agreeing to a reciprocal non-nuclear policy with Seoul and to at least trial inspections.

This memorandum has the following attachments:

1) Suggested Talking Points for Mr. Lilley (page 7) – This paper summarizes the main points Lilley should make in the Deputies’ Committee meeting to drive home the Pentagon’s concerns: keep the pressure on South Korea to push North Korea on the nuclear issue in its bilateral talks and to avoid prematurely raising the prospect of normalized relations in the initial meetings with North Korea, which should focus on making clear the U.S. concerns and benchmarks for progress on the nuclear issue.

2) Strategy for Dealing with North Korean Nuclear Issue (Gameplan paper) (pages 8-15) – This is the State Department paper laying out the diplomatic, political, and economic steps the U.S. should adopt as it works to resolve the North Korea nuclear problem, along with a timeline. The basic components of the plan were: continued international efforts to press North Korea; ensuring that Seoul press Pyongyang at the North-South talks on the nuclear issue; and clearly stating the U.S. position on a peninsula-wide ban on reprocessing and enrichment, both to the world and especially to the DPRK in proposed initial and follow-up, high-level meetings. While there were current signs of movement and success in building international pressures on the DPRK, the paper also sounded a number of warnings, noting that “there is a well-established history of Pyongyang raising expectations . . . only to back off at the last minute with additional demands,”

The paper acknowledges that the odds may be against the U.S. in pursuing the gameplan. It was entirely possible that North Korea had no intention of changing course, and would aim to “delay, diffuse international pressure, and use any opportunity to seem forthcoming, without making meaningful concessions.” Adding to the uncertainties were the gaps in intelligence regarding North Korea’s processing of nuclear material at Yongbyon. There were also signs that North Korea might try to move and hide its processing facilities before agreeing to inspections. The proposed plan for the next few months was to combine increased international pressure with concrete incentives for North Korea to take the steps needed to rein in its nuclear program. The international campaign would be waged on a number of fronts, including with Japan, China, Russia, the IAEA, and the UN. The latter posed particular issues, such as possibly inviting “invidious comparisons” to other unsafeguarded nuclear programs, such as Israel’s. China also posed its own set of possibilities and concerns. The U.S. hoped Beijing would provide more reliable information about the North Korean nuclear program as well as exert its influence. But the U.S. could not be “absolutely certain of PRC motives … and it is unlikely they would be prepared to take any measures they perceived as putting the survival of the Pyonguang regime in question.”

These efforts needed to be coordinated with two other key arenas of discussion: the North-South dialogue and bilateral U.S.-DPRK contacts. The North-South channel was crucial to solution of the nuclear issue and other Korean problems. A meeting to discuss a ROK/DPRK non-nuclear agreement that incorporated a ban on reprocessing and enrichment as well as a bilateral inspection regime was planned for December 20. In support of this initiative, Secretary of Defense Cheney had told Seoul that the U.S. could consider inspections of U.S. bases in South Korea under the right circumstances; i.e., inspections must be reciprocal, simultaneous and involve both civil and military facilities, and should come after the public commitment from both Koreas to a non-nuclear policy. ACDA Director Lehman had elaborated on this position during his visit to Seoul. The North/South talks also carried the risk that South Korea might not be willing to pay the political price of taking tougher steps towards North Korea if needed.

The bilateral U.S.-DPRK dialogue raised the points at issue in the NSC/Deputies’ Committee meeting regarding what should be said at these sessions. They would provide a venue for sending a critical message to the top North Korean leadership: should the U.S., at any point, “learn the DPRK is developing nuclear weapons or producing weapons-usable nuclear material, we would be unable to proceed further in the direction of dialogue and normalization.” This stick would be paired with the carrot of a possible easing of tensions and moves towards normalization of relations in a step-by-step fashion as North Korea met specific benchmarks in bringing its nuclear program under international safeguards and inspections. Another potential stick was explicitly taken off the table, however: Cheney had told South Korean and Japanese leaders that the U.S. should not consider “military measures” as such discussion could jeopardize the current diplomatic strategy.

3) State Department Talking Points – Preliminary Contact with DPRK (pages 16-17) – This and the following document provide talking points that address U.S. concerns about the North Korean nuclear program and the necessary steps to address them, as discussed in the document above. Notable are the marginal notes, assumed to be by a Pentagon official, that would underscore the need to discuss the nuclear issue, and that called for deleting the talking point about possible normalization of relations between the U.S. and North Korea.

4) State Department Talking Points for High-Level Meeting (pages 18-23) – Again, these talking points elaborate on the U.S. concerns and position regarding North Korea’s nuclear program, to be presented at a high-level gathering following the initial meeting. The points are familiar, taken from the gameplan document; of particular interest are the Pentagon marginal notes. The Pentagon remained focused on making it clear to North Korea that its nuclear program was unacceptable and on laying out the steps North Korea must take to bring this program under international review and inspection.

5) Memorandum, Col. Eden Y. Woon (OSD/ISA) for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Subject: ACDEA Director Lehman Visit to Korea on Nuclear Issue, ca. December 30, 1991 (pages 24-26) – This memorandum reports on the interagency team that ACDA Director Lehman took to Seoul on December 6-9. The team consisted of representatives from ACDA, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs, and the office of the Secretary of Defense. After stressing to the South Koreans that the North Korea nuclear issue should be “front and center” in the upcoming North/South ministerial meetings, the U.S. delegation then focused on revising serious problems with a draft joint declaration Seoul planned to propose to Pyongyang at these meetings. Key among these concerns was keeping North Korea’s international obligation regarding IAEA safeguards separate from bilateral nuclear agreements; insuring that a North/South inspection regime included both military and civilian sites, as IAEA inspections alone might not be able to detect a covert weapons program at Yongbyon and other suspected sites; and avoiding any statement that the purpose of a bilateral inspection regime was “to check on the presence of nuclear weapons.” The U.S. feared this would come too close to sounding like checking for U.S. weapons, whereas the purpose of the inspections should be to verify both Koreas are abiding by any joint nuclear declaration.

The U.S. team had to counter serious South Korean resistance to making changes to address these concerns, fearing it would make the joint declaration too tough for North Korea to accept. More worrisome for Seoul was that it would be hard to pressure North Korea on inspecting reprocessing facilities since reprocessing was legal. Fighting back against what the Americans saw as a reversion to old thinking, which the U.S. thought had disappeared with Roh’s November 8 announcement of non-nuclear principles, the U.S. delegation spent the better part of the meeting explaining the inadequacies of IAEA inspections alone, the need to press North Korea to stop reprocessing and the requirement for persuading North Korea to reciprocate Roh Tae Woo’s powerful non-nuclear policy.

In the end, the U.S. delegation persuaded the South Koreans to make the necessary changes in the draft joint declaration. Looking ahead, it was clear Washington needed to do more to reassure South Korea that international pressure on North Korea would not ease once the DPRK signed the IAEA safeguards agreement. To this end, the U.S. would have to send out a “core demarche” cable to its friends and allies stating the American goal of persuading North Korea to reciprocate Roh’s non-nuclear policy and stop reprocessing, and declaring its position that merely signing the IAEA safeguards agreement was insufficient to address international concerns. Sending this cable would also serve to shield the United States from criticism that it was “moving the goalposts” in its demands on North Korea. And again, Washington needed to engage with China, possibly through high-level talks in the near future, to secure its role in putting pressure on North Korea, a role that would increase if the issue had to move to the U.N. Finally, the U.S. and South Korea needed to make a decision on whether to hold the 1992 Team Spirit joint military exercises, a matter on which South Korean views were divided.

6) Cable, Amembassy Seoul 13075 to SecState, Subject: Lehman Visit:

ROKG Proposal for a N/S Non-Nuclear Joint Declaration, December 9, 1991 (pages 27-30) – This cable summarizes the results of the U.S.-ROK meeting on nuclear issues that is the focus of the preceding memorandum. As noted above, these issues were distinguishing between IAEA inspections and any bilateral North/South inspection agreement, the need to include civil sites in any bilateral agreement, the U.S. opposition to having the stated purpose of bilateral inspections include checking for the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons, as well as the need to include trial inspections as a goal of the North/ South talks. The South Koreans accepted the U.S. changes, which would be incorporated into the draft Seoul would present to the DPRK at the ministerial discussions beginning on December 10. The cable reiterates the South Korean agreement that the nuclear issue should be “front and center” at these talks and that the draft joint declaration will be used to “attack” North Korea’s position on nuclear weapons. The South Koreans expected this strategy to lead to a “major confrontation” on the nuclear issue, with Seoul determined to come out of the fight this round as “top dog.” The rest of the cable gives the text of the revised draft joint declaration.

7) Cable, Amembassy Seoul 13322 to SecState, Subject: Prime Ministers Sign Joint Agreement on Reconciliation and Nonaggression: “The Most Comprehensive North-South Document Since the Division of the Peninsula, December 13, 1991 (pages 31-33) – This cable reports that on December 13, North and South Korea’s prime ministers signed the “Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Cooperation and Exchanges,” and provides details on a briefing that Assistant Foreign Minister Lee See Young gave the diplomatic corps on the agreement and the negotiations leading to it. Lee said that Seoul had put strong emphasis on the nuclear issue throughout the negotiations, pressing the DPRK to accept nuclear inspections and halt nuclear weapons development, and calling for agreement to end all reprocessing and enrichment to insure nuclear weapons would not be produced on the peninsula. South Korea had also pushed for North Korea to accept that trial inspections of military and civilian facilities, one of the confidence-building measures, be carried out within the month. Regarding the ROK draft declaration on a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, North Korea had initially responded by repeating its call for a nuclear-free zone, but Seoul had pushed to have further talks on a joint nuclear declaration work from the South Korean draft. Lee also noted the “unexpectedly flexible” North Korean stance at the talks, but felt that Pyongyang may need more concrete proof of progress in the North/South dialogue as a step towards improving its international standing and ending its political and economic isolation. For its part, Seoul held that further moves towards normalizing relations with North Korea should wait to ensure the DPRK followed through on implementing the agreement and its continued stand on the nuclear issue. Summing up, Lee asserted that the joint agreement was the most comprehensive North-South document since the division of the peninsula,” which could bring about “a major change in North-South relations.”

 

Document 07
1992-03-12
Source: Freedom of Information Act release
“Our basic policy remains that nuclear weapons in North Korean hands are intolerable.” The state of play in avoiding this outcome is the focus of this memorandum, prepared for a meeting of the North Korea Deputies’ Committee. It was a “testing period” for the DPRK, in which the U.S. and its allies waited for Pyongyang to carry out its promise to ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement reached in January, having already failed to meet a commitment to do this in February. While there were promising signs that North Korea might still ratify the IAEA agreement in April, and talks were underway to establish a Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) to monitor the North-South non-nuclear agreement, the North’s intentions remained unclear. There were signs of an internal debate possibly slowing decisions, as the DPRK might see some political advantage in delay, or it might be playing for time so that it could “destroy, dismantle, or convert sensitive facilities,” even to hide its nuclear weapons program or produce and then hide “significant amounts of plutonium before allowing inspections. Or perhaps it might plan not to accept meaningful inspections at all.

South Korea and Japan agreed with the U.S. that improved political relations with North Korea were off the table until the nuclear issue was resolved. Seoul had made progress on this issue a prerequisite for movement in other North-South talks, going so far as to postpone a summit meeting and would likely postpone the next round of prime ministerial talks in May absent real progress. Even if the DPRK did ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement and negotiated a bilateral inspection regime, the next test would be the completeness of North Korea’s declarations to the IAEA. A further complicating factor was the willingness of some countries, especially China and Russia, to give the DPRK the benefit of the doubt for “plausible delay.” Absent undeniable proof that the DPRK did not intend to carry out its promises, it would be difficult to mobilize international pressure in the near term. A “worst case” scenario in which North Korea delayed action on its IAEA commitments until October was attached to the memorandum.

For the moment, the U.S. had to walk a fine line between accepting that North Korea would meet its obligations and maintaining international concern, while at the same time laying the basis for action that could enable it to narrow North Korea’s freedom of action and tighten international pressure. The key challenge was “to minimize DPRK “wiggle room,” by building international support for a reasonable deadline for initial IAEA inspections at all the DPRK’s nuclear facilities, which would in turn lay the basis for international action if it became necessary to coerce Pyongyang. A best case scenario (also attached) would find the DPRK submitting its nuclear inventory in late May, laying the basis for initial inspections in early June. Future U,S. diplomacy needed to focus on bolstering support for the best-case scenario, while not giving North Korea grounds to charge the U.S. was “pressuring” it. A critical target of this diplomacy would be China, which had the most influence with North Korea. Washington was to stress with Beijing that the U.S. timetable was “critical” and urge the Chinese to “make it happen,” emphasizing China’s national interest and the U.S. determination to pursue tough international steps, which Beijing should support, if Pyongyang “fails to perform.” Other venues at which the U.S. should press its case were the IAEA, the UN and in U.S.-DPRK counselors talks in Beijing. Should coercive steps be needed, these could be pursued through economic sanctions under the UN aegis, in concert with like-minded nations, or unilaterally if need be.

U.S. is Presently Under 31 National Emergency Orders

Of particular note is during the peaceful transfer of power from Obama to Trump, Obama told Trump the number one threat to the United States and her interests is North Korea. Notice that Obama never made any declaration regarding North Korea. Notice too that under Obama, the Sinaola Cartel, the narco terror organization that killed thousands in Mexico and many in the United States was not part of any declaration. But….Obama did declare a national emergency due to the socialist revolution in Venezuela and hence that has caused 3 million Venezuelans to flee.

Oh yeah….nothing from Obama either regarding Islamic State and Syria or Iraq…..or Russia considering Moscow’s intrusion into our 2016 election systems…..

Image result for presidential emergency powers

***

According to the Federal Register, 58 national emergencies have been declared since the National Emergency Act of 1976 was signed into law by President Gerald Ford.

And 31 have been annually renewed and are currently still in effect, as listed in the Federal Register.

Here’s a list of the presidents who declared still ongoing national emergencies.

President Jimmy Carter

 

Nov 14, 1979: The National Emergency With Respect to Iran, in response to the Iran hostage crisis.

President Bill Clinton

Nov 14, 1994: The National Emergency With Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, that combined two previous national emergencies focused on weapons of mass destruction.

Jan. 2, 1995: The National Emergency With Respect to Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process placed economic sanctions in response to the Jerusalem bombing.

March 15, 1995: The National Emergency With Respect to Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources was an effort to prevent potential deals between oil companies.

October 21, 1995: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions with Significant Narcotics Traffickers Centered in Colombia was declared after increased reports of drug cartels laundering money through American companies.

March 1, 1996: The National Emergency With Respect to Regulations of the Anchorage and Movement of Vessels with Respect to Cuba was after civilian planes were shot down near Cuba

November 3, 1997: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Sudan implemented economic and trade sanctions.

President George W. Bush

 

June 26, 2001: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans imposed sanctions on those aiding Albanian insurgents in Macedonia

Aug 17, 2001: The National Emergency With Respect to Export Control Regulations renewed presidential power to control exports in a national emergency since the Export Administration Act of 1979 lapsed.

Sept 14, 2001: The National Emergency with Respect to Certain Terrorist Attacks was in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States.

Sept 23, 2001: The National Emergency With Respect to Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism was in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

March 6, 2003: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Zimbabwe was an effort to punish associates of Robert Mugabe.

May 22, 2003: The National Emergency With Respect to Protecting the Development Fund for Iraq and Certain Other Property in Which Iraq has an Interest was issued following the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

May 11, 2004: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to Syria was in response to Syria supporting terrorist activity in Iraq.

June 16, 2006: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus was in response to charges of fraud in the Belarus presidential election.

Oct 27, 2006: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was in response to violence around the Congolese presidential election runoff.

Aug 1, 2007: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Persons Undermining the Sovereignty of Lebanon was in response to a breakdown of the rule of law in Lebanon.

June 26, 2008: The National Emergency With Respect to Continuing Certain Restrictions with Respect to North Korea cited the risk of proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material. President Trump renewed this June 22, 2018 citing the “existence and risk of proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material on the Korean Peninsula and the actions and policies of the Government of North Korea continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat.”

President Barack Obama

April 12, 2010: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Somalia was in respect to threats posed by Somali pirates.

February 25, 2011: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain Transactions Related to Libya froze the assets of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.

July 25, 2011: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Transnational Criminals was in response to the rise in crime by specific organizations: Los Zetas (Mexico), The Brothers’ Circle (former Soviet Union countries), the Yakuza (Japan), and the Camorra (Italy).

May 16, 2012: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Persons Threatening the Peace, Security, or Stability of Yemen addressed political unrest within the Yemen government.

March 16, 2014: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine was in response to the Russian invasion of Crimea.

April 3, 2014: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to South Sudan was in response to the ongoing civil war.

May 12, 2014: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in the Central African Republic was in response to violence towards humanitarian aid workers.

March 8, 2015: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela was in response to human rights violations.

April 1, 2015: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities was in response to Chinese cyber attacks on the U.S.

Nov 23, 2015: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Burundi was declared after a failed coup.

President Donald Trump

 

Dec 20, 2017: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption imposed sanctions on the Myanmar general for his role persecuting Rohingya Muslims.

Sept 12, 2018: The National Emergency With Respect to Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election attempted to prevent any meddling with the 2018 midterm elections amid the ongoing investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election.

Nov 27, 2018: The National Emergency With Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Nicaragua was declared by President Trump in response to violence and the Ortega regime’s “systematic dismantling and undermining of democratic institutions and the rule of law” that constitutes an “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”