Category Archives: Terror

General Shelton Slams Iran

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The summary below translates into a few questions. Why does Secretary of State John Kerry continue to legitimize Iran and to bring the country on equal footing globally as they are a rogue nation? The next question, will the White House continue to ignore Iran’s history of terrorism?

Iran is a dangerous ‘ally’ in Syria and Iraq

At the dawn of 2015, the U.S. has yet to articulate a comprehensive foreign-policy strategy to counter the influence and territorial gains of Islamic State, the terrorist group that emerged last year — and poses a dangerous and vexing threat to stability across the Middle East and North Africa. By the Pentagon’s admission, we neither understand the underlying ideology of the merciless group nor have a grasp of all the players in the region who have aggravated the crisis.

Indeed, the fog of war seems to have muddied Iran’s role in this dark chapter of regional affairs. Is Tehran an ally or a nemesis in the fight against Islamic State? At least initially, the U.S. believed that Iran could play a constructive role in combating a mutual adversary. Secretary of State John F. Kerry, touting the age-old axiom “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” suggested that Iran could be part of the solution.

The only trouble is that Iran is a major part of the challenges we face.

Islamic State, also known by the acronym ISIS, rose out of the sectarian conflict that exploded in Iraq in 2004, shortly after the U.S.-led occupation. Iran immediately backed Shiite Muslim militant factions with training, money, weapons and intelligence, sparking a vicious Sunni Muslim militant counter-reaction that nourished Al Qaeda and, later, ISIS. The rise to power of Nouri Maliki, an inept and corrupt Shiite prime minister with strong ties to Tehran, sealed Iraq’s fate not only as a breeding ground for Sunni extremism, but as an Iranian satellite state.

Iran now has more than 7,000 Revolutionary Guards and elite Quds Force members in Iraq, according to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an Iranian opposition organization. The killing of Iranian military advisor Hamid Taqavi, a brigadier general in the Revolutionary Guard, in December in Samarra put an exclamation point on the scope and significance of the Revolutionary Guard’s presence in Iraq. As the most senior commander of the Quds Force to die abroad since the Iran-Iraq war ended 26 years ago, Taqavi played a key role in Tehran’s training and control of Shiite militias in Iraq.

Amnesty International has pointed to the presence of Iran’s proxy militias in Iraq as a key source of instability and sectarian conflict there. In an October report called “Absolute Impunity, Militia Rule in Iraq,” Amnesty found that the growing power of Shiite militias has contributed to a “deterioration in security and an atmosphere of lawlessness” and that the Shiites “are ruthlessly targeting Sunni civilians … under the guise of fighting terrorism, in an apparent bid to punish Sunnis for the rise of the ISIS and for its heinous crimes.”

Iranian clerics’ paranoia over domestic discontent has made meddling in regional countries, Iraq in particular, a cornerstone of Tehran’s foreign policy and survival strategy. Speaking at Taqavi’s funeral, top Iranian security official Ali Shamkhani said, “Taqavi and people like him gave their blood in Samarra so that we do not give our blood in Tehran.”

Iran’s reasons for “fighting” ISIS diverge considerably from U.S. objectives. Whereas we seek a stable and nonsectarian government in Iraq, the mullahs’ interests are best served by the ascension of a subordinate Shiite leadership, enabling them to use the neighbor to the west as a springboard for their regional hegemonic, anti-Western designs. The Iranian government sees an opening in the turmoil in Iraq for consolidating its grip on that country, weakened by the ouster of Prime Minister Maliki.

Iran’s role in the civil war in Syria is following a similar dynamic: Through its proxy Hezbollah — the Shiite Muslim political and paramilitary organization — Iran has served as Syrian President Bashar Assad’s battering ram against his people, killing and enraging Sunnis and fueling ISIS’ exponential growth.

Aiding and abetting Iran’s destructive role in Iraq or Syria would be a strategic mistake for the U.S. that only exacerbates a profound crisis. It is a dangerous irony to even consider allying with Iran — which the U.S. State Department still considers the world’s most active state sponsor of terrorism — to fight the terrorism inspired by ISIS.

Iranian opposition leader Maryam Rajavi, who is well versed in the agenda and ambitions of Tehran’s mullahs, rightly describes a potential Western alliance with Iran against ISIS as akin to “jumping from the frying pan into the fire.” The eviction of the Iranian government from the region, especially from Syria and Iraq, must be part of the U.S. strategy for countering ISIS and resolving the sectarian divides that drive extremism throughout the region, Rajavi says.

She’s right. The U.S. must think beyond ISIS to what kind of region will be left in its smoldering wake. As the U.S. weighs its policy options, any scenario that leaves Iran in control of large swaths of the region must be rejected outright.
Gen. Hugh Shelton served as the 14th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

 

The Fallout of Qatar’s Reputation

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Qatar has had a long history of funding terrorism and taking in combatants as free refugees such as the Taliban 5. Qatar is denying funding terrorism and the Pentagon is playing stupid on the matter at the behest of the U.S. State Department all for the sake of nefarious diplomacy.

What is more, since the Arab Spring and the power shift in Egypt, al Sissi has moved to terminate the Muslim Brotherhood footprint once based in Cairo. Additionally, Egypt has moved to terminate al Jazeera media in Egypt.

Pressure has been applied to Qatar by several Gulf States recently including the United Arab Emirates as well as Saudi Arabia. Some pressure has also been applied by the U.S. Treasury which tracks terror funding.

Now comes the leader of Hamas.

Hamas leader Mashaal said deported from Qatar

Reconciling with key Arab countries against Brotherhood, Doha boots political chief; Israel welcomes news, Hamas denies it

Qatar has deported Hamas political leader Khaled Mashaal after hosting him for the past three years, Israel’s Foreign Ministry said Tuesday.

The move, first reported by a Turkish newspaper on Sunday, was swiftly denied by an official from the Islamist group.

According to a report in left-wing Turkish newspaper Aydınlık, Qatar has faced significant pressure from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to deport Mashaal, amid a diplomatic reconciliation process currently underway between the small Gulf state and the Arab world.

According to CNN, citing a Hamas-run news agency, Mashaal and other Muslim Brotherhood members were most likely to head to Turkey.

On December 20, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi met with Sheikh Mohammad bin Abdul Rahman, a special envoy of Qatari leader Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. The meeting apparently ended the longstanding enmity between the two states over Qatar’s support for Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood.

In a written message Tuesday, Israel’s Foreign Ministry congratulated Qatar for its decision to deport Mashaal.

“The Foreign Ministry, led by minister Avigdor Liberman, has advanced various moves to cause Qatar to carry out this step and stop aiding Hamas, directly and indirectly. To this end, minister Liberman and the ministry’s professional staff have acted in overt and covert tracks with Qatar and other states. We expect the Turkish government to now follow suit,” the Foreign Ministry’s message read.

But a Hamas official, Izzat al-Rishq, denied reports that Mashaal was in fact deported.

“There is no truth to reports by certain media concerning the departure of Khaled Mashaal from Qatar,” Rishq wrote on his Facebook page Tuesday afternoon.

According to Arab media reports, the deal between Egypt and Qatar included the closing of anti-Sissi Qatari news channel Al-Jazeera Mubasher Misr on December 22; the extradition of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood members from Qatar to Egypt; and a halt to Qatar’s funding of the Muslim Brotherhood.

If true, Mashaal’s departure from Qatar would mark the end of Hamas’s political presence in the Arab world. Expelled from Jordan in August 1999 and choosing to break ties with the Assad regime in Syria in January 2012, Mashaal has struggled — and failed — to foster political patrons in the tumultuous Arab Middle East.

Appearing before a gathering of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party in Konya December 27, Mashaal congratulated the people of Turkey “for having [Prime Minister Ahmet] Davutoğlu and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan” as heads of state, adding that “a strong Turkey means a strong Palestine … Inshallah, God is with us and with you on the road to victory.”

Qatar: “Worst” on Counterterroism in the Middle East?

On Sunday, WikiLeaks revealed a State Department cable last December that labeled Qatar, the tiny, oil-rich Gulf nation, as the Middle East’s “worst” participant in counterterrorism efforts, the New York Times reports. According to the cable, Qatari security was “hesitant to act against known terrorists out of concern for appearing to be aligned with the U.S. and provoking reprisals.”

Another cable from December 2009 stressed increased counterterrorism efforts as a talking point for the Emir’s January 2010 visit.

The details offered in these cables are particularly strange when compared with a 2008 Congressional Research Service report for Congress.

The U.S. State Department called Qatar’s terrorism support since 9/11 “significant,” according to the CRS report. Since the attacks, Qatar established both a Combating Terrorism Law and the Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities (QACA) in March of 2004. The QACA was meant to monitor the operations of all Qatari charity organizations and ostensibly make sure the charities weren’t funneling cash to terrorist organizations. But there was an asterisk: The Emir could stop the QACA from overseeing a particular organization’s activities whenever he wants.

“U.S. concerns regarding alleged material support for terrorist groups by some Qataris, including members of the royal family, have been balanced over time by Qatar’s counterterrorism and efforts and its broader, long-term commitment to host and support U.S. military forces being used in ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the global war on terrorism,” wrote Christopher M. Blanchard, the Middle East affairs analyst who authored the CRS report.

So what changed between 2008 and 2009?

Probably not much. The discrepancy in rhetoric is likely more an issue of what the United States is willing to say in public, and in private.

“Keeping U.S. basing rights in Qatar and ensuring the stable flow of oil and LNG gas [liquefied natural gas] are both more important than Qatar’s willingness to deal seriously with its citizens involvement in terrorism,” says Toby Jones, an assistant Middle East history professor at Rutgers University. “The cost of [the United States] pressuring them publicly to take counterterrorism seriously, it seems, might come at too high an economic cost.”

But U.S. officials may have reason to be suspicious of Qatar. Members of the royal family reportedly hosted Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the 9/11 mastermind, in the late ’90s and may have helped him evade U.S. capture. In 2005, officials discovered another link between Qatar and al Qaeda: Qatar paid al Qaeda (and some speculate it may still be paying) millions of dollars each year so al Qaeda wouldn’t attack it. Qatar struck the deal before the 2003 Iraq invasion and renewed it in March of 2005, when an Egyptian suicide bomber attacked a theater in Doha. Many believed the bomber was part of al Qaeda. “We’re not sure that the attack was carried out by al Qaeda, but we ratified our agreement just to be on the safe side,” a Qatari official said at the time. “We are a soft target and prefer to pay to secure our national and economical interests. We are not the only ones doing so.”

It’s true: Qatar is one of many nations that have allegedly funded Islamic movements to save their own citizens, and that funding was another topic of discussion slated for last January’s meeting. “Officials should make known USG concerns about the financial support to Hamas by Qatari charitable organizations and our concerns about the moral support Hamas receives from Yousef Al-Qaradawi,” the December, 2009 cable said. “It is also essential to stress that high-level Qatari political support is needed, if financial flows to terrorists are to stop.”

But in a region rife with secret terrorist ties and illicit deals, it may seem strange that the only nation to host a U.S. military base could earn the dubious-least-valuable player title.

Yet America’s chummy relationship with Qatar is a key reason for Doha’s hesitancy to comply with every U.S. demand and its apparent eagerness to appease threatening countries and organizations. That relationship is, partly, what makes Qatar such a ready target.

Because it hosts the Al Udeid airbase and Camp As Sayliyah, a pre-positioning facility of U.S. military equipment, Qatar is at greater risk of terrorist attacks than neighboring countries, whose ties to the U.S. are less tangible. Notably, Qatar pays for the upkeep of the American military bases in its borders; the U.S. pays no rent, and no utilities.

So while countries like Saudi Arabia and the emirate of Abu Dhabi have aligned themselves strongly with the U.S. counterterrorism strategy because they rely somewhat on U.S. power and protection, Qatar has no such dependence. “[Qatar isn’t] fully behind the United States in the same way that Abu Dhabi clearly is,” explains Dr. Christopher Davidson, a United Nations and Middle East Policy Council expert on the Gulf monarchies, and a professor at Durham University in England. “This explains why there’s been some criticism of Qatar not being tight enough on counterterrorism. ”

Beyond Qatar’s alleged funding of al Qaeda and its ties to Hamas and Iran, it has also tried to bolster its reputation by allowing money to flow freely through the country, no questions asked. Implementing more scrutiny would likely anger terrorist groups and put Qatar at greater risk.

“If the funding is cut, or if the Qatari authorities listen to America and try to tighten things up so money can’t flow as easily, then you have the real risk of jihad coming home to Qatar,” Davidson explains. “The smaller Gulf states have never really faced a stage of serious terror attacks like Saudi Arabia has, but they all certainly live in fear of that.”

 

 

 

What You Dont Know About the Tsarnaev Case

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Jury selection is occurring today for the Jokar Tsarneav case while his lawyers failed in their attempt to move the case to another court system. Since the Boston bombing, several items have surfaced. Remember, this WAS a terror attack again on America.

It’s the second, the sentencing phase, including a possible death sentence, that has been the subject of behind the scenes discussions.

Federal prosecutors and defense attorneys for Tsarnaev have held talks on a possible plea agreement but failed to reach one, U.S. officials familiar with the talks say.

The discussions in recent months have centered on the possibility of Tsarnaev pleading guilty and receiving a life sentence without parole, according to the officials.

A spokeswoman for the U.S. Attorney in Boston declined to comment. Attorney Judy Clarke, who represents Tsarnaev, didn’t respond to a request for comment.

The outcome so far is unusual for Clarke who helped negotiate plea deals that saved the lives of notorious criminals including 9/11 plotter Zacarias Moussaoui, Unabomber Ted Kaczynski and Jared Loughner, who carried out the mass shooting that killed six and gravely injured former Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords.

Boston Bomber Could Have Been Deported After 2009 Arrest

Updated 4 p.m. Friday related to arrest versus conviction issue:  One of the Chechen terrorists who carried out the Boston Marathon bombings could have been deported years ago after a criminal arrest and/or conviction and the other was granted American citizenship on the 11th anniversary of the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil.

Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the 26-year-old killed in a wild shootout with police, was a legal U.S. resident who nevertheless could have been removed from the country after a 2009 domestic violence arrest and conviction, according to a Judicial Watch source. That means the Obama administration missed an opportunity to deport Tsarnaev but evidently didn’t feel he represented a big enough threat.

Other reporting confirms Tsarnaev’s arrest for domestic violence but we’re seeking confirmation of a conviction. Nevertheless he would have been subject to removal for the arrest itself.

Adding insult to injury, the other bomber, little brother Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, was rewarded with American Citizenship on September 11, 2012 in Boston, according to JW’s source. The 19-year-old, who is still on the run, was granted asylum in Arlington Virginia on September 27, 2002, JW’s source reveals.

Years before these Chechen terrorists carried out the Boston Marathon bombings Judicial Watch uncovered critical intelligence documentsdetailing al Qaeda’s activities in Chechnya, including the creation of a 1995 camp—ordered by Osama bin Laden—to train “international terrorists” to carry out plots against Americans and westerners.

The goal, according to the once-classified documents obtained by JW in 2011, was to “establish a worldwide Islamic state capable of directly challenging the U.S., China, Russia, and what it views as Judeo-Christian and Confucian domination.” Further, radical Islamic regimes were to be established and supported everywhere possible, from “sea to sea,” including Chechnya. “Terrorist activities are to be conducted against Americans and westerners…” according to the report issued by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

In other words, it was only a matter of time before terrorists from the predominantly radical Islamic republic carried out an attack on U.S. soil. Chechnya declared independence from Russia in 1991 and Chechen militants are quite the savvy terrorists because they’ve successfully targeted Moscow with bombings and hostage plots for more than two decades.

In 2004 Chechen Islamic militants attacked a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, Russia and they murdered 380 children, parents, teachers and visitors after holding more than 1,000 captive for three days. Judicial Watch also obtained intelligence documents from the government detailing that terrorist attack. Jointly released by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the October 12, 2004, report analyzes the Beslan terrorist attack with a view toward gleaning lessons for potential attacks on schools in the United States.

There’s no telling how many of these Chechen terrorists have infiltrated the United States or how many opportunities the government has missed to protect the country by deporting them. Osama bin Laden specifically chose Chechnya as a terrorist training camp because it’s an “area unreachable by strikes from the west,” according to the intelligence report obtained by JW years ago.

The Associated Press is reporting that Khairullozhon Matanov, a friend of Boston marathon bomber Tamerlan Tsarnaev, used aliases to transfer over $70,000 overseas in the years leading up to the Apr. 15, 2013, attack. The source of the money has not been disclosed, but we know that the Tsarnaev brothers were the recipients of over $100,000 in public benefits from 2002 to 2012. The AP reports that one of the overseas transfers was made while Tsarnaev was travelling in Russia—the intimation being that the transfer may have been for or on behalf of Tsarnaev.

Were Matanov and Tsarnaev scratching each other’s backs?

…Agent Timothy McElroy said that between 2010 and 2013, Matanov sent more than $71,000 to 15 people in six countries. McElroy said agents determined that most of the money — about $56,590 — was sent to Matanov’s family, while the rest — about $14,800 — went to non-family.

Matanov’s lawyer, Edward Hayden, said the money transfers ‘had nothing to do with terrorism.’

‘He was uncomfortable sending all the money in his own name,’ he said.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Scott Garland said Matanov had repeatedly deceived authorities when questioned about his relationship with Tamerlan Tsarnaev in the days after the bombings. Garland said his “pattern of deceit” was also shown through Matanov’s use of aliases when sending money….

 

Islamic State has no Bureaucracy, We DO

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The media nor the Pentagon is reporting but:

U.S. troops serving at the Al Asad air base in Iraq are being targeted with “regular” mortar and rocket fire from Islamic State (IS) terrorists, according to the Pentagon.

The increasingly dangerous situation for the 320 U.S. troops serving at the base is raising concern among Pentagon officials, according to Defense Department spokesman Col. Steven Warren.

While no soldiers have been injured by the IS attacks, the rockets and mortars are landing around the base’s perimeter, according to CNN.

The Pentagon will not say if it is changing base security measures to account for the increased risk, according to CNN.

Raqqa is the defacto headquarters for Islamic State….has anyone questioned why no one including Assad has not bombed Raqqa? We have intelligence services globally that are watching all Islamic State operatives. Islamic extremist’s movements were easily trackable down to the building via geotags in his Twitter post.

People often are unaware that they’re accidentally posting their location on Facebook Inc. (FB) or Twitter Inc.’s (TWTR) social sites.  One would be ISIS jihadist from New Zealand found that out the hard way.

IBRABO, a Canadian open source intelligence research firm, posted details of how a would-be Jihadi calling himself the “Kiwi Jihadi” accidentally revealed his current location and his locations during the past few months of 2014, months he’s spent serving the so-called “Islamic State” (ISIS), a group behind much of the brutal violence in Syria in Iraq.

Posting to his Twitter account, @M_Taylor_Kiwi, the “Kiwi Jihadi” boasted of his exploits with ISIS.  But he also inadvertently shared months of maps detailing ISIS hideouts he spent time at.  He deleted the Tweets — more than 40 — when he grew wise that they were geotagged and might have revealed his location.  But iBrabo had already mapped his movements in glorious detail.

Fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as ISIL) is costing up to $10 million a day, the Pentagon has said. According to one estimate released this week, the fight could cost as much as $8.6 billion a year.

So far, that effort has been funded through a war budget that’s not subject to the same budget caps as the Defense Department’s base budget. It’s likely to continue to be funded this way, even though both Democrats and Republicans have referred to this fund as a “slush fund” for the Pentagon.

“Right now, the cost for operations in Iraq are coming out of Overseas Contingency Operations,” Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work said Tuesday at the Council on Foreign Relations. “For the foreseeable future, we believe that is the case.”

Work and others have made the case that funding the war against ISIS through the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget is the best option available since Congress has no plans this year to put an end to sequestration.

It gets worse….

Isis news: Caliphate unveils first annual budget of $2bn with $250m surplus war chest

Islamic State (Isis) has claimed it has an annual budget of $2bn (£1.31bn) for 2015 and an estimated surplus of $250m (£163m) which will act as the group’s war chest against the West.

In an interview with Arabic outlet Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, religious leader Naji Abdullah from Mosul claimed that the group is using the budget as part of wider plans to develop and expand its self-proclaimed “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria.

Another senior religious figure in the city of Mosul, Sheikh Abu Saad al-Ansari, said its first-ever budget would help those in poverty, the disabled and families of Islamic State (IS) fighters who have been killed in operations conducted by the US-led coalition or Iraqi forces.

According to The Economist, the group already pay its fighters a $400 a month, more than any Syrian rebel group or the Iraqi government pays its own fighters.

With the $250m surplus left after projected expenditure, the group plans to use the money to beef-up its fight against the US-led coalition which has been conducting air strikes against IS positions in both Iraq and Syria while arming Kurds in northern Iraq, according to The Washington Times.

As well as the announcement of an annual budget, the group has reportedly opened its own bank, known as the “Islamic Bank”, where customers are able to receive a loan or deposit their money.

Iraq expert Fouad Ali told Al-Araby that the announcement of a budget and an Islamic bank were propaganda tactics to “undermine the morale of the coalition and the Iraqi government”.

The group’s revenue is believed to come from kidnapping, taxes, oil revenues and extortion.

The announcement of the new budget or Islamic bank could not be independently verified by IBTimes UK.

In June last year, the militants launched an offensive across northern and western Iraq, capturing large swathes of land around vital cities such as Ramadi and Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, where they robbed $450m from the central bank.

Wartime President Fails on Afghan Exit Strategy

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The Assumptions behind a Strategy that Has Been a Long Time Dying

The reality, however, is that the strategy developed under General Stanley McCrystal has been dying for a long time and for many more reasons than the growing distrust between U.S. and ISAF personnel and the Afghans. It was already clear in 2009 that the odds of success were no better than 50 percent.
The key reasons shaping uncertainty as to whether the mission could be accomplished—whether it would be possible to create an Afghanistan that could largely stand on its own and be free of any major enclaves of terrorists or violent extremists—went far beyond the problems created by the insurgents.
It was clear that there were four roughly equal threats to success, of which the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani, and Hekmatyar were only the first. The second was the corruption and incompetence of the Afghan government. The third was the role of Pakistan and its tolerance and support of insurgent sanctuaries. The fourth was the United States and its allies.  The full report is here.

Afghanistan’s president has suggested that the U.S. “re-examine” its plan to withdraw all of the American-led coalition troops from the country by the end of 2016.

“Deadlines concentrate the mind. But deadlines should not be dogmas,” Ashraf Ghani told CBS’ “60 Minutes” in an interview that aired Sunday evening.

“If both parties, or, in this case, multiple partners, have done their best to achieve the objectives and progress is very real, then there should be willingness to re-examine a deadline,” he added.

When asked if he had made his view clear to President Barack Obama, Ghani said “President Obama knows me. We don’t need to tell each other.”

There was no immediate response from the White House, State Department, or Pentagon to Ghani’s remarks Sunday night.

The U.S. and its NATO allies marked the formal end of the U.S. combat mission in Afghanistan last week. On Thursday, 13,500 soldiers of the International Security Assistance Force, almost 11,000 of them American, transitioned to a supporting role for Afghanistan’s military.

The handover of primary responsibility for battling the Taliban represents the ultimate test for the 350,000 strong Afghan army. Critics have long questioned the local troops’ morale, discipline, and competence in the face of Taliban attacks. According to a United Nations report, 2014 was the deadliest year on record for non-combatants in Afghanistan, with at least 3,188 civilians killed in the intensifying war. By comparison, at least 4,600 members of the Afghan security forces were killed by fighting last year.

Ghani also told CBS that he was concerned about the possibility that Islamic State fighters could make their way to Afghanistan. However, that concern was refuted by ISAF commander Gen. John Campbell, who said that “This is not Iraq. I don’t see [Islamic State] coming into Afghanistan like they did into Iraq. The Afghan Security Forces would not allow that.”

Campbell also described the Afghan National Army as “the number one respected institution in Afghanistan. Couple years ago, I probably wouldn’t have said that, but today it is.”