Category Archives: #StopIran

The UK Looks like Belgium, Anyone Notice?

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While all attention with good reason has been directed to Brussels, Belgium, it was determined earlier in the week that the UK is working to stop a larger 10 target plot. After reading this piece, it may be prudent to look around your own neighborhood or city and questions may come to mind.

Then earlier this year, this site published an article about SERCO, one of the most powerful companies across the globe, a company no one knows about.

Serco once again comes into focus, this time in the UK.

Outrage as hotel homes 300 asylum seekers – without telling anyone

HUNDREDS of asylum seekers have been housed in a major hotel without informing anyone.

Asylum seekers and the hotel

The Britannia Group has agreed to house 306 immigrants at its hotel near Manchester Airport

City council bosses are embroiled in a war of words after Home Office contractor Serco placed more than 300 migrants into hotels, in what the authorities claim is on the sly.

Officials are now taking action after a “material” change to the hotel’s planning permission.

Currently, 271 asylum seekers are at the Britannia Hotel near Manchester Airport, and another 35 are in the branch in nearby leafy Didsbury.

But now Britannia, in agreement with Serco, want to take people out of Didsbury and into the airport.

Manchester has one of the highest numbers of asylum seekers in the UK, looking after a little under 1,000.

Paul Andrews, the council’s lead member for adult health and wellbeing, admitted his surprise the authority had not been told about the decision.

Asylum seekers waiting to be moved to the hotel

ZENPIX: Refugees were taken to the hotel as locals voiced their concerns

He said: “Manchester City Council has today been made aware that the Britannia Hotel located at the airport in Northenden have agreed for the Home Office sub-contractor Serco to increase the level of asylum seekers they accommodate there.

We believe that this amounts to a material change of use, and as such we will be taking appropriate action with the Britannia hotel chain, Paul Andrews

“We believe that this amounts to a material change of use, and as such we will be taking appropriate action with the Britannia hotel chain regards to planning restrictions.

“We have also made it clear to Serco that failing to notify the council in advance of this action having been taken is completely unacceptable.

The Home Office sign

GETTY: The Home Office outsources accommodation for asylum seekers to Serco

“Manchester City Council has had no direct responsibility for providing accommodation and support to asylum seekers living within our communities since 2012.

“The responsibility lies with the Home Office and Serco, their sub-contractor for north west England.”

Jenni Halliday, Serco’s contract director for Compass, said: “Due to the continuing increase in the number of these vulnerable asylum seekers being placed in our care in the North West, over the past few months we have been using several hotels including this one, to accommodate them.”

“The availability of individual hotels changes, sometimes at very short notice and when that happens we work hard to make sure that we can make alternative arrangements to safely accommodate the asylum seekers and keep the local authorities informed.”

*****

Meanwhile in other news regarding the UK:

Pair Face Jail Over Drive-By Terror Plot

Two home-grown terrorists planned to kill soldiers, police officers and civilians in Islamic State-inspired shootings.

Terror plot court case

A picture of Tarik Hassane with a gun was found on Majeed’s mobile phone

Two men are facing lengthy prison terms over a drive-by gun attack plot to target police and soldiers on the streets of London.

It can be disclosed that the plan to attack officers and soldiers outside a police station and army barracks was both inspired and funded by Islamic State from Syria.

The attack was to be led by Tarik Hassane, a medical student known to his friends as “The Surgeon” and the son of a Saudi diplomat.

Another plotter, student Suhaib Majeed, has now been found guilty by an Old Bailey jury of helping co-ordinate the plan in the UK.

Two others, Nyall Hamlett and Nathan Cuffy, were found not guilty of the main terrorism charge but have already admitted supplying the weapon and ammunition to be used in the attack.

Both men claimed they had no knowledge of the fact the weapon was to be used in a terrorist attack.

Scotland Yard Commanders have described the attack plan as a “significant step-up in complexity and ambition” compared to other recent plots, like the murder of soldier Lee Rigby in southeast London in 2013.

Head of Scotland Yard’s Counter Terror Command, SO15 Commander Dean Haydon, said: “This was a very determined bunch of individuals, they were four very dangerous men.”

He said the plot represented an “elevation in complexity” adding: “This is about acquiring a moped, acquiring a firearm, silencer and ammunition and in broad daylight, targeting police officers, the military and members of the public and making good their escape.

“That is a real concern to me and certainly a real concern to SO15 Counter-terrorism Command. It draws parallels in a way to Paris. The attackers in this case were intent on murder, intent on using a firearm, intent on causing fear, stress, disorder in a particular part of west London.”

The plot, according to the authorities, was not to be a martyrdom operation. The attackers would open fire on an unsuspecting police officer or soldier and drive off, free to scout their next targets. It would have been a cycle of killing which could have claimed many lives.

When MI5 uncovered the plot in early September 2014, they launched the largest surveillance operation since the transatlantic airlines plot to blow up eight aircraft using bombs in soft drinks bottles in 2006.

The main instigator of the plot, Hassane, 22, had failed to get onto a medical course at university in London and instead moved to Sudan to study there.

He masterminded the plot from Sudan and during brief visits back home to London, where he was pictured by undercover officers as he met with his fellow plotters.

Hassane’s father was the Saudi Ambassador to Uzbekistan, it can be revealed, but had left him to grow up on a council estate in the Ladbroke Grove area of west London with his aunt.

His school friend, Majeed, 21, a physics undergraduate at King’s College, London  was the main co-ordinator in the UK, organising, researching and acting as the communications expert.

Majeed used an encryption programme called Mujahideen Secrets on his laptop as he passed and received instructions on the ongoing plot.

He was tasked with picking up the firearm, finding a moped for the drive-by and renting a lock-up to store the moped close to the target.

Hamlett, 25, the ‘middleman’ with the gun supplier, lived in the same area of west London and was friends with both Hassane and Majeed.

He was able to put them in touch with the main gun supplier and the man who acted as armourer, Cuffy, 26, who was storing five handguns in his father’s council flat.

The plot is the first example of Islamist terrorists in Britain obtaining a working firearm and sources say the plan has “unnerving echoes” of the Paris plot 16 months later.

It represents a “dangerous cross-over” between Islamist terrorists and the world of gangs and drug dealing which enabled them to get hold of a weapon, according to sources.

They fear that terrorists are now able to get hold of weapons that were previously out of bounds because gangland armourers did not want to be dragged into terrorism.

However, the suppliers in the latest case were all converts who were still involved in drug dealing but also had a large amount of radical material on their phones and computers, including IS recruitment videos.

Officers moved in to arrest the three London-based plotters in September 2014, after Cuffy had handed a self-loading pistol, ammunition and a silencer onto Hamlett and Majeed.

Hassane was still in Sudan at that time, but detectives used the cover of an operation against gangs in London to try to lull him into a false sense of security that he was safe to return to Britain after his friends’ arrest.

When he did return he was put under surveillance as he visited an internet cafe where he was observed looking at articles about kidnapping in the Middle East.

When his home was raided, police discovered he had been using an iPad to research Shepherd’s Bush police station and the Parachute Regiment’s Territorial Army base in White City using Google Street View

Hassane pleaded guilty to masterminding the plot, just before he was due to give evidence in the three-month trial.

All four men will be sentenced at a later date.

 

Breaking: ISIS had Deployed 400 Fighters to Europe

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ISIS trains 400 fighters to attack Europe in wave of bloodshed

PARIS: Security officials have told The Associated Press that ISIS has trained at least 400 attackers and sent them into Europe for attacks.

The network of interlocking, agile and semiautonomous cells shows the reach of the extremist group in Europe even as it loses ground in Syria. The officials, including European and Iraqi intelligence officials and a French lawmaker who follows the extremist networks, describe camps designed specifically to train for attacks against the West.

The officials say the fighters have been given orders to find the right time, place and method to carry out their mission.

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BRUSSELS (AP) — The Latest on the attacks in Brussels and related investigations (all times local):

8:15 p.m.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says Israelis know what Belgians are enduring and offered them his country’s expertise in combating attacks.

Netanyahu said at a news conference on Wednesday night that he had spoken with the Belgian prime minister and the EU foreign minister and wished Belgians a speedy recovery to the wounded in the name of the Israeli people.

Netanyahu said that “if there is one people in the world who knows what they are going through, it is the citizens of Israel who have bravely and heroically faced terror attacks for many years.”

He said that “I offered them full Israeli assistance in the struggle against terror, intelligence and security assistance.”

He said the world needs to unite and act against terrorism.

****

The U.S. State Department must have some intelligence coming into their OpsRooms:

Worldwide Caution

Last Updated: March 3, 2016

The Department of State is updating the Worldwide Caution with information on the continuing threat of terrorist actions and violence against U.S. citizens and interests throughout the world. Current information suggests that ISIL, al-Qa’ida, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and other terrorist groups continue to plan terrorist attacks in multiple regions.  Recent terrorist attacks, whether by those affiliated with terrorist entities, copycats, or individual perpetrators, serve as a reminder that U.S. citizens need to maintain a high level of vigilance and take appropriate steps to increase their security awareness.  This replaces the Worldwide Caution dated July 29, 2015.

In August 2014, after the United States and regional partners commenced military action against ISIL, ISIL called on supporters to attack foreigners wherever they are.  Authorities believe there is a continued likelihood of reprisal attacks against U.S., Western, and coalition partner interests throughout the world, especially in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and Asia.

U.S. citizens continue to be at risk of kidnappings and hostage events as ISIL, al-Qa’ida, and their affiliates attempt to finance their operations through kidnapping-for-ransom operations.  U.S. citizens have been kidnapped and murdered by members of terrorist and violent extremist groups.  ISIL, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are particularly effective with kidnapping for ransom and are using ransom money to fund their activities.

Extremists may use conventional or non-conventional weapons and target both official and private interests. Examples of such targets include high-profile sporting events, residential areas, business offices, hotels, clubs, restaurants, places of worship, schools, public areas, shopping malls, and other tourist destinations both in the United States and abroad where U.S. citizens gather in large numbers, including during holidays.  In the past year, major extremist attacks occurred in countries including Tunisia, France, Nigeria, Turkey, Egypt, and Mali.

U.S. citizens are reminded of the potential for terrorists to attack public transportation systems and other tourist infrastructure.  Extremists have targeted and attempted attacks on subway and rail systems, aviation, and maritime services.

U.S. citizens considering maritime travel also should review information at the websites of the National Geospatial Agency, the Maritime Administration, and the U.S. Coast Guard for information related to maritime and port security globally.  Current areas of concern include the Caribbean, Gulf of Guinea, Horn of Africa, and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore ‎as a result of maritime crimes including smuggling, human trafficking, and piracy.

The information provided below offers select regional or country examples.  Please check travel.state.gov for additional information.

EUROPE:  Credible information indicates terrorist groups such as ISIL and al-Qa’ida and its affiliates continue to plot near-term attacks in Europe.  All European countries remain vulnerable to attacks from transnational terrorist organizations.

European authorities continue to warn of the possibility of attacks conducted by lone individuals inspired by extremist organizations that could occur with little to no warning.  Extremists have targeted large sporting events, theatres, open markets, aviation services, transportation systems, and public venues where people congregate.  Authorities believe there is a high likelihood terror attacks in Europe will continue as European members of ISIL return from Syria and Iraq.  European governments are taking action to guard against terrorist attacks; however, all European countries remain potentially vulnerable.

 

MIDDLE EAST and NORTH AFRICA:  Credible information indicates terrorist groups also seek to continue attacks against U.S. interests in the Middle East and North Africa.  The U.S. government remains highly concerned about possible attacks against U.S. citizens, facilities, businesses, and perceived U.S. and Western interests.  Private U.S. citizens are strongly discouraged from traveling to any country to join in armed conflict.  U.S. citizens are reminded that fighting on behalf of or providing other forms of support to designated terrorist organizations, including ISIL, can constitute the provision of material support for terrorism, which is a serious crime that can result in penalties including prison time and large fines.

In Syria, the security situation remains dangerous and unpredictable as a civil war between government and armed anti-government groups continues throughout the country.  Groups such as ISIL, al-Nusrah Front (ANF) and al-Qa’ida operate there.  In recent years, Westerners have been kidnapped and several have been killed by terrorist groups in Syria.

U.S.-designated terrorist groups operating in Lebanon include Hizballah, ISIL, ANF, Hamas, and the Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB).  U.S. citizens have been the target of terrorist attacks in Lebanon in the past, and the threat of anti-Western terrorist activity remains.

In Iraq, ISIL controls significant territory in northern, western, and central Iraq, and continues to attack Iraqi security forces and civilians in those areas.

In Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria, groups affiliated with ISIL, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and other terrorist groups have conducted attacks against both foreign and local targets.

In Yemen, the security situation has deteriorated greatly since 2014, necessitating the suspension of operations of the U.S. Embassy in February 2015.  Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIL remain threats to U.S. citizens in Yemen.

 

AFRICA:  Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Murabitun remain active in northern Mali and Niger, and recently conducted major attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso in which U.S. citizens were killed.  Terrorist groups have stepped up their rhetoric, calling for additional attacks or kidnapping attempts on Westerners and others, particularly those linked to support for international military intervention.

The terrorist group AQIM has declared its intention to attack Western targets in the Sahel (an area that stretches across the African continent between the Atlantic Ocean and the Red Sea to include Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Sudan, and Eritrea).  It has claimed responsibility for kidnappings, attempted kidnappings, and the murder of several Westerners throughout the region.

Al-Shabaab assassinations, suicide bombings, hostage taking, and indiscriminate attacks in civilian-populated areas are frequent in Somalia.  Al-Shabaab retains its demonstrated capability to carry out attacks in government-controlled territory in Somalia and in neighboring countries such as Kenya and Djibouti.

Boko Haram, an extremist group based in northeast Nigeria, has claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks, mainly in northern Nigeria.  Boko Haram also has targeted women and children for kidnapping, reportedly kidnapping women in northern states for marriage as “slave brides.” Boko Haram has carried out attacks in Cameroon’s Far North Region, western Chad, and southern Niger, targeting foreign expatriates, tourists, and government leaders.

 

SOUTH ASIA:  The U.S. government assesses terrorist groups in South Asia may be planning attacks in the region, possibly against U.S. facilities, citizens, and interests.  The presence of al-Qa’ida, Taliban elements, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, indigenous sectarian groups, and other terrorist organizations, many of which are on the U.S. government’s list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, poses a potential danger to U.S. citizens in the region.

Although the Government of Pakistan maintains heightened security measures, particularly in the major cities, terrorist attacks have occurred against civilian, government, and foreign targets.  Attacks have included armed assaults on heavily guarded sites, including Pakistani military installations and airports.  Terrorists and criminal groups also have resorted to kidnapping for ransom.

No province in Afghanistan should be considered immune from violence and crime, and the strong possibility exists throughout the country for hostile acts, either targeted or random, against U.S. and other foreign nationals at any time.  Taliban and other extremist organizations remain active in every province of the country and frequently target both Afghan government and foreign interests.

India continues to experience terrorist and insurgent activities which may affect U.S. citizens directly or indirectly.  Anti-Western terrorist groups active in India include Islamist extremist groups such as Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami, Harakat ul-Mujahidin, Indian Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Lashkar-e Tayyiba.  Past attacks have targeted public places, including some frequented by Westerners, such as luxury and other hotels, trains, train stations, markets, cinemas, mosques, and restaurants in large urban areas.

Since September 2015, Bangladesh has experienced a series of increasingly sophisticated violent attacks.  These include the murders of two foreign nationals, as well as bombs and other attacks against gatherings of religious groups and security forces.  ISIL publicly claimed credit for many of these attacks.  Additionally, groups claiming to represent al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) asserted responsibility for a series of threats and terrorist attacks targeting writers, publishers, and others in the media, including the murder of a U.S. citizen blogger.

 

CENTRAL ASIA:  Supporters of terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, al-Qa’ida, and the Islamic Jihad Union remain active in Central Asia.  These groups have expressed anti-U.S. sentiments and may attempt to target U.S. government interests.

 

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC:  Information from credible sources suggests that there is a continued risk of armed terrorist and criminal groups operating and planning attacks against foreigners, including U.S. citizens, in the East Asian and Pacific region.  Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group, have cells operating throughout Southeast Asia and JI is linked to al-Qa’ida and other regional terrorist groups.

There is a risk of travel to the southern Philippines, specifically related to kidnapping threats in the Sulu Archipelago and the ongoing threat of violence on the island of Mindanao, particularly in Central Mindanao. Foreigners in the Eastern Sabah province of Malaysia are also targets for kidnappings for ransom.  Criminal or terrorist bands may attempt to intercept boats ferrying tourists in the area as well.

Indonesian counterterrorism efforts have prevented terrorists from conducting large-scale attacks in recent years.  The January 14, 2016, attack in central Jakarta, however, shows that extremists in Indonesia still have the ability to carry out small-scale violent attacks.

U.S. government facilities worldwide remain at a heightened state of alert.  These facilities may temporarily close or periodically suspend public services to assess their security posture.  In those instances, U.S. embassies and consulates will make every effort to provide emergency services to U.S. citizens.  U.S. citizens abroad are urged to monitor the local news and maintain contact with the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate.

Belgium: Spies, History and Reality

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In Brussels Attacks, Chronicle of a Disaster Foretold

Belgian spies said attacks were coming, but overwhelmed security forces were powerless to prevent terrorists from killing 34 and wounding hundreds more.

FP: Fears of a possible terrorist attack in Brussels have been running high for months. The Belgian government went so far as to lock down the capital last year after receiving specific intelligence that a group of extremists were plotting a bombing and gun assault in the style of the Nov. 13 attacks in Paris that killed 130 people.

The lockdown was lifted after four days, but the government’s performance fueled criticism that it was behind the curve on the terrorist threat. Belgian security services also came under fire for having monitored and tracked several of the Paris attackers without informing their French counterparts about the suspects.

Concerns about Belgium’s ability to counter the terrorist threat were reinforced after it took authorities four months to track down the most wanted man in Europe, Salah Abdelslam, who was hiding in the Molenbeek neighborhood of Brussels. Abdelslam is believed to be the last surviving member of the Islamic State cell that carried out the devastating attacks on Paris, and authorities had repeatedly raided the neighborhood before apprehending him.

After Abdelslam’s arrest last week, Belgian officials said they had uncovered a much larger network than initially suspected. But as authorities scrambled to try to roll up the militants, an Islamic State bomb ripped through the departure area of Brussels’s main airport on Tuesday. An hour later, another bomb detonated at the busy metro station near the European Union headquarters. The attacks killed 34 people and wounded nearly 200. The Islamic State claimed responsibility, singling out the “crusader” nation of Belgium and promised that more attacks were coming to countries allied against it.

As police in Brussels launched a manhunt for one of the suspected assailants, Belgium and its allies, including the United States, faced a number of crucial, unanswered questions in the wake of the attacks: Who is the suspected bomb-maker, or bomb-makers, behind the killings, and where are they located? How sophisticated were the ingredients used in the explosives? How did the extremists evade detection? And just how big is the terrorist network that helped fund, plan, and carry out the massacres?

Counterterrorism experts said Belgium now finds itself confronting a terrorist infrastructure that has planted deep roots in Belgian society as the war in Syria has escalated. According to figures assembled by Belgian terrorism researcher Pieter Van Ostaeyen, as many as 562 Belgians have fought in Iraq or Syria. At least 124 hail from Brussels. With a population of 11 million, Belgium has sent more fighters per capita than any country in Europe to the charnel house of the Syrian civil war. According to Van Ostaeyen’s figures, at least 75 Belgians have returned to the country — making it nearly impossible for the country’s small and under-budgeted security services to track them all.

“The bigger problem is that such a thriving terrorist infrastructure was allowed to establish itself in the first place,” said Bruce Hoffman, the director of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University and a counterterrorism scholar. He added that “key operatives and senior [Islamic State] commanders are based in Brussels,” where they’re able to draw “on a network of operatives and also sympathizers.”

Last year, a Belgian court convicted 45 members of the radical Salafi group Sharia4Belgium on terrorism charges. Judge Luc Potargent, presiding over one of the largest terrorist trials in Belgium’s history, found that the group’s leader, Fouad Belkacem, had “prepared young people physically and psychologically for armed combat” and sentenced him to 12 years in jail. According to Van Ostaeyen’s figures, 79 individuals with links to Sharia4Belgium have taken up arms in Syria and Iraq. The group has been identified as a main supplier of Belgian fighters to those two countries.

Another prominent recruiter, Khalid Zerkani, sent at least 45 individuals to fight in Iraq and Syria, according to Van Ostaeyen. Among his recruits was Abdelhamid Abaaoud, whom authorities describe as the ringleader of the November attacks in Paris. Last July, a Belgian court sentenced Zerkani to 12 years in jail for his role in sending fighters to Syria.

The alarming reach of the Islamic State has prompted soul-searching in Brussels and accusations that the government is flailing in its counterterrorism efforts. Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel last year pushed back at the criticism and announced a series of new security measures, including introducing ankle bracelets to monitor extremists and extending detention periods for terrorism suspects not yet charged in a crime.

In February, Belgian officials unveiled plans to double spending to about $446 million on law enforcement and intelligence. The plan also called for adding a thousand police officers by 2019 to a city district that includes Molenbeek, a working-class neighborhood that has become notorious for its role as a hub for Islamist militants.

Molenbeek poses a significant challenge to law enforcement officials, according to Matthew Levitt, a counterterrorism expert who recently traveled to Belgium to study its extremism problem. He said local authorities in Molenbeek lack the resources to get ahead of the “radicalization curve” in the densely packed district that suffers from high unemployment.

“It’s great that they have a counter-radicalization cell within the police, but it’s eight people,” he told reporters in a teleconference.

The Molenbeek police added 50 new officers following the Paris attacks, but Levitt noted that its total pool of officers had been down by 185 officers due to recruiting problems. “It’s hard to recruit people to go to work in Molenbeek,” he said. “It’s a tougher neighborhood.”

Levitt said authorities are spread thin given that Molenbeek alone has approximately 47 mosques and the vast majority of imams in Belgium do not speak local languages, making them less than ideal partners for counter-radicalization programs. Philippe Hayez, a former official with the DGSE, the French counterpart to the CIA, described the Belgian security services as a small but professional community, comprising fewer than 1,500 people.

With extremist networks having become entrenched over a period of years, Belgium and its neighbors are confronted by a threat beyond what security services had ever anticipated. “I think they have a deeper and more pervasive network than we’ve imagined in Europe, and it’s a network that operates according to its own timetable and seeks to take advantage of vulnerabilities and opportunities as they present themselves,” Hoffman said, reflecting on what the Brussels attacks have revealed about the Islamic State’s capabilities. Hayez called the problem “Euroterrorism nouvelle vague” that “isn’t only a threat from abroad like it was with al Qaeda but a mix of external and internal threats.”

Current and former senior U.S. national security officials said Belgium had been slow to wake up to the threat — until the Paris attacks, which were planned, in large part, from a Brussels cell. But they said it remained unclear whether recent intelligence warnings contained details of potential attacks or more general language that was too vague for police to act on.

After the November Paris attacks, a Belgian parliamentary committee launched an inquiry as to why security services were unable to “connect the dots” of information on the attackers.

Despite belated efforts to bolster resources to take on the Islamic State, Belgian authorities are facing a highly capable foe. Islamic State operatives in Europe have repeatedly shown a high proficiency in communications security, including the use of one-time, or “burner,” phones and the use of encrypted communication tools. They have relied on high-quality forgers to provide fake documents and used Europe’s open borders to freely travel the continent plotting mayhem. They have amassed stockpiles of weapons and explosives and have deployed their arsenal in meticulously planned suicide attacks.

“We were told by intelligence agencies that these types of attacks were a thing of the past, that enough red flags would go up when these guys were constructing their suicide vests that they would be noticed,” said Robin Simcox, a terrorism and intelligence expert at the Heritage Foundation. Rather, lone-wolf attacks by disaffected militants were supposed to be the terrorism phenomenon of the future. Mass casualty attacks requiring “broader networks” were so “operationally compromised” that they would be picked up by the police, Simcox said.

Or so the story went, anyway, Simcox said. “That was blown out of the water by Paris in November, and now it’s been hammered home today.”

Terrorism After Brussels

By Robin Simcox:
FA: The recent attacks in Brussels show that terrorists’ ability to strike at the heart of Europe remains apparently undiminished. Early reports suggest a death toll of around 31, with more than 100 injured. The Islamic State (ISIS) has claimed responsibility for the attack.
Belgium may seem an unlikely hub of jihadism, but despite being a small and peaceful nation, Belgian connections to militancy are long established. In the 1990s, bullets and guns made their way from local jihadi crooks in Brussels to the Groupe Islamique Armé, Algerian terrorists aiming to establish an Islamic state in Algeria. Throughout that decade, a smattering of Belgian residents headed off to fight in various foreign conflicts, including the one in Chechnya.
After 9/11, a major terrorism trial in Belgium led to the convictions of over 20 Islamists. Those jailed included Nizar Trabelsi, a former professional soccer player who had joined al Qaeda and planned to commit a suicide attack against a NATO air base. It also included Tarek Maaroufi, who was linked to the assassination of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the Afghan military leader whose death served as al Qaeda’s warm-up act two days before its main event.
More recently, as the war in Syria metastasized, Belgians were drawn there in significant numbers. Of the 5,000-6,000 Europeans who fought in Syria, up to 553 are believed to be Belgian. That makes the country the home of the highest number of foreign fighters in Syria, per capita, of any Western European country. Small wonder that even the country’s justice minister admits that his country has “a foreign fighters problem.” Some of those who arranged for the travel of these fighters to Syria were convicted of terrorism in a Belgian court in February 2015.
By most estimates, over 100 Belgians have now returned from the conflict. Although that is concerning enough, it must also be placed in the context of a broader issue. The Schengen Agreement allows for virtually unhindered freedom of movement throughout much of Europe, something that jihadists have taken advantage of time and again. A fighter from the Syrian jihad who is returning to Germany or France poses as much of a danger to Belgium as one who was born and bred in Brussels. The threat is continent-wide, and approximately 2,000 fighters are thought have returned to Europe.
Despite all this, there may still be some bewilderment about the choice of Belgium as a target of ISIS’ latest attack in Europe. It is not a leading military power like France or the United Kingdom. Yet Belgium is absolutely central to ISIS’ aims to carry out attacks in Europe in the hope of inspiring new recruits to their cause. After all, it was Brussels that first suffered casualties from the foreign fighters returning from Syria: Mehdi Nemmouche, who fought for ISIS in Syria, shot and killed four at the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014.
Belgium was also the site of the first attack in Europe directed by ISIS, as opposed to just being inspired by the group. It was in Verviers, eastern Belgium, last January that ISIS first displayed its talent for getting trained fighters back into Europe from Syria, loading them up with weapons and bombs, and directing them to attempt a major attack. The cell had acquired AK-47s, explosives, walkie-talkies, and GoPro cameras. A Belgian federal prosecutor commented that the cell was plotting “imminent terrorist attacks on a grand scale.” Fortunately, those plans were thwarted. The Belgians had been tracking the cell for weeks and after a dramatic shootout, killed two terrorists and captured another.
Factors relevant to both the Jewish Museum and Verviers plotters would reappear in the months following. The first was the presence of a Belgian national called Abdelhamid Abaaoud, whom investigators regarded as the link between ISIS’ leadership in Syria and their operations in Europe. Abaaoud was in contact with both Nemmouche and the Verviers cell.
The second was that the men all had ties to Molenbeek, the deprived district of Brussels that has been a constant feature in terrorism investigations. This district—an impoverished area rife with unemployment and heavily populated by immigrants—has come up time and again in ISIS-linked terror activities. Ayoub el-Khazzani, who tried to gun down passengers on a train destined for Paris last August, stayed in Molenbeek. Police launched a major raid there after the Paris attacks last November, since many of the perpetrators lived there. Salah Abdeslam, one of the plotters involved in that attack, was arrested after a raid in Molenbeek just days ago.
Abaaoud was killed last November in a raid in Paris. Yet the problems in Molenbeek go way beyond those posed by ISIS and speak to a broader European problem of multiculturalism and effectively integrating newcomers. At a time when Europe is taking in more than a million refugees and economic migrants a year, solving the problem cannot be treated urgently enough. It is a problem that may take generations to resolve.
In the short-term, then, the priority is to get a fix on the size of ISIS’ European network. The group has been allowed to lay down roots in multiple cities. ISIS, or groups and individuals inspired by it, has now struck in France on multiple occasions, and in Belgium and Denmark. Plots have been thwarted in Austria, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Intelligence agencies have had many successes after 9/11, but the number of attacks getting through is quickly increasing; another successful ISIS attack is almost inevitable. Yet all that European leaders can offer so far are regurgitations of the need for greater EU intelligence sharing.
ISIS has made a bet that Europe’s problems—concerns over the integration of Muslim populations throughout the continent, a lack of clear national identity, open borders, and an overwhelmed security apparatus—run very, very deep. It is wagering that the situation there will become so desperate that it can wage a war for the souls of European Muslims, presenting them with a binary choice of apostasy or support for their Caliphate. It is a bet they will surely lose. Yet the bloodshed that will take place on the way should make us fear what lies ahead for Europe in the years to come.

Assad has North Korean Troops in Syria

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Primer for consideration:

North Korea’s Next Missile Test Could Kill

Chang/DailyBeast: Firing back with ‘unprecedented’ provocations against joint South Korean and American annual military exercises, Kim Jung Un could make a dangerously wrong move.

On Monday, North Korea fired five short-range missiles eastward. The projectiles fell into the Sea of Japan, what Koreans call the East Sea. The provocation followed Friday’s launch of two Nodong medium-range missiles, which can put a dent anywhere in South Korea and parts of Japan.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has launched 15 projectiles on four separate occasions since early last month in apparent shows of anger.

Friday’s and Monday’s belligerent acts follow a series of threats to kill all the residents of Manhattan and launch “preemptive and offensive” nuclear strikes. The regime has also taken the unprecedented step of releasing photographs of leader Kim Jong Un standing next to what it implied is a thermonuclear device. Full article here.

North Korea troops fighting in Syrian civil war, delegate says
Asaad Al-Zoubi said “fatally dangerous” North Korean soldiers are fighting on behalf of President Bashar al-Assad.

GENEVA, Switzerland, March 22 (UPI) — Two North Korean military units are fighting on behalf of President Bashar al-Assad in the Syria conflict.

Asaad Al-Zoubi, the head of the Syrian opposition’s High Negotiations Committee delegation, told Russian news agency TASS that North Koreans have committed troops to the civil war.

According to Al-Zoubi, the two units are called Chalma-1 and Chalma-2.

The Syrian delegate provided the information as he attended Syria peace talks at the United Nations European headquarters in Geneva.

Al-Zoubi added there are fighters from Iran and Afghanistan fighting on behalf of Assad.

Russia’s Sputnik International also confirmed the Syrian representative’s statement on North Korean soldiers in the Middle East, and quoted Al-Zoubi as saying the “North Korean troops are fatally dangerous” during an explanation of the presence of foreign troops in the Syrian civil war.

The civil war has continued for five years, and the opposition and the Assad regime are at odds regarding the details of a peace negotiation.

But Pyongyang maintains friendly ties with the dictatorship in Damascus, and Russia has supported Assad’s rule.

North Korea’s presence in the Middle East conflict is unprecedented, but the two countries have cultivated military ties for many years.

North Korea has been a staunch ally of the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad, opposed by the Islamic State, and Pyongyang helped Syria build a nuclear facility destroyed by an Israeli air raid in 2007.

Last September Syria dedicated a park to former North Korean leader Kim Il Sung.

****** 2013:

38North: When Kim Jong Un assumed power two years ago, foreign observers predicted North Korea would cut its losses short and disengage from Syria in the wake of the overthrow of friendly regimes in Algeria, Egypt and Libya. But this proved to be wishful thinking. On the contrary, Kim Jong Un got off the fence and has joined the Assad government to actively fight against the anti-government rebels in Syria, many of whom are affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Indeed, the DPRK says it is its duty to help a legitimate sovereign government in the fight against international terrorism in Syria.

Careful reading of the DPRK Foreign Ministry’s latest tepid and contorted denial[1] of the persistent rumors that Pyongyang supplies weapons to Syria or flies pilots in anti-rebel air raids suggests that North Korean arms and military advisors may indeed be engaged on the battlefields of the Syrian civil war but not necessarily in the exact manner alleged by the rebels and Western media. Pyongyang is known for its penchant to split hairs: it knows the facts, and even if the rumors come close to the reality, but do not exactly match it, Pyongyang will hit back hard. The fact that it hasn’t suggests that indeed there is fire where there is smoke.

Why Did Kim Jong Un Come to Assad’s Rescue?

In 2013, North Korea’s young leader stepped up military support for his country’s long-time strategic partner, the Assad regime, in the nationwide civil war against the radical Sunni rebels backed by the Western liberal democracies in alliance with conservative Gulf monarchies. Why is North Korea fighting for Assad?

The well-entrenched Kim family came to the rescue of the faltering Assad family, exporting its trademark anti-American “revolutionary spirit of the offensive,” for four reasons. First, birds of a feather flock together. Both countries are former Soviet client states that lost their patron after the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s. The collapse resulted in the loss of the strategic support that the Soviets had provided them, forcing Pyongyang and Damascus to abandon the dream of “strategic parity” with Seoul and Tel Aviv, respectively, and to adopt a new formula of “strategic deterrence,” vis-a-vis the ROK and Israel, as well as their allies and like-minded countries. In that context, both face an acute security dilemma in their respective neighborhood since they are also divided countries fighting to force out foreign troops that occupy what they believe are their homelands, namely the U.S. forces in the southern half of the Korean peninsula and Israeli troops in the Golan Heights. Finally, both have also been branded as “rogue states” and are isolated in the international community. The United States considers them as “states sponsoring international terrorism” and engaged in “nuclear proliferation” and, therefore, has imposed broad-ranging political and economic sanctions on both countries.

In that context, Pyongyang and Damascus have similar worldviews as part of the anti-US, anti-imperialist united front. Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) Chairman Choe Tae Bok once said: “The unity of our two peoples fighting in the same trench against the common enemy is everlasting, though Syria and Korea are geographically far away from each other. Our bilateral relations of friendship and cooperation will grow stronger and stronger.”[2] When the DPRK’s nominal head of state Kim Yong Nam met with the Syrian Prime Minister Wael Nader Al Halqi in Tehran in August 2013, the latter said that “Syria regards the DPRK as a military power with tremendous military force and a country of comrades-in-arms struggling against the common enemy.”[3]

This close political relationship is reflected in a number of ways. Neither country has been willing to normalize relations with the other’s enemies. The DPRK rejected Israeli overtures in the early 1990s[4] seeking to establish diplomatic relations,[5] despite Israeli promises to pay considerable compensation (up to USD 500 million) if Pyongyang were to abandon Syria and terminate its missile sales to the Middle East.[6] Similarly, Syria rejected past ROK attempts to normalize relations, unlike the former Soviet Union and China, despite its growing trade and investment links with Seoul.[7] Pyongyang and Damascus also support each other in the United Nations and other international organizations. For example, upon cues from Damascus, Pyongyang denounces US proposals for the Middle East peace process, Lebanon situation, Palestinian problem, and Arab-Israeli settlement.[8] In turn, Syria supports the DPRK’s positions in various talks on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and inter-Korea reconciliation.[9]

State-to-state and party-to-party ties are well developed and based on extensive institutional links and personal affinities. Since the beginning of this year alone, Kim Jong Un has exchanged personal letters with Bashar Al-Assad on ten different occasions—more than with any other foreign leader, including Chinese. Many senior DPRK leaders have either visited Syria over the past two decades or worked closely with its government.[10] For instance, Kim Yong Nam traveled to Syria as President of the SPA Presidium in July 2002 and June 2000, and as Foreign Minister in July 1992. Former KPA Chief of General Staff hardline general Kim Kyok Sik served as North Korea’s military liaison to Syria in the tumultuous 1970s, coordinating the North’s military assistance to the Assad regime during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War and post-war rehabilitation of Syrian armed forces in the mid-1970s. He also managed North Korean military sales and military construction projects there for almost a decade. As a result, many North Korean leaders have some personal knowledge of Syria and its leaders, as well as a good understanding of Pyongyang’s stakes in its relationship with Damascus.

Second, in addition to being birds of a feather, geopolitical considerations also push Pyongyang to assist Damascus. As a strategic partner of both Syria and Iran, North Korea may have been contracted by Iran to defend their mutual ally in Damascus. It is also plausible that there may be some DPRK-Syria-Russia connections in the area of military-technical cooperation, probably, in the development of Syrian air defense capabilities. Pyongyang takes full advantage of all-out Russian and Iranian support for Damascus “to defend the frontline of the joint anti-American and anti-imperialist struggle” on the Syrian battlefield without fear of being depicted as a pariah or having to pay diplomatic or political price for its actions.

Third, North Korea’s intervention in Syria’s civil war is aimed at stopping the “hostile forces” and “colored revolutions” they export at the far-flung gates to ensure they will never reach North Korea’s shores. Kim Jong Un allegedly discussed how his government might be able to help the Assad regime fight back against the rebels with a visiting Syrian government delegation on July 24, 2013, when he was accompanied by party secretaries Kim Ki Nam (ideology) and Kim Yang Gon (South Korea), and first vice-foreign minister Kim Gye Gwan, the regime’s heavyweights known for their concern about the possible impact of the Arab Spring on the North.[11] The North’s official mouthpiece, Rodong Sinmun, often discusses “the reactionary ideology and culture of imperialists that can be as effective as military capability in realizing their hegemonic ambition,” stressing that “the youth is the main target of the imperialists’ offensive” because “young people played a large role in bringing about “Egyptian-style change,” “Libyan-style victory,” and “Syrian calamity.”

Kim Jong Un holds talks with the high-ranking visiting delegation of Syrian Arab Republic in Pyongyang, on July 24, 2013. (Photo: Rodong Sinmun, July 25, 2013)

Pyongyang may also seek to divert Washington’s attention and resources away from the Korean peninsula by waging a proxy war against the United States and its allies in Syria. The North Korean leadership is not ignorant or naive. It does understand that if the US gets sucked into another war in the Middle East during “sequestration,” not only will it undermine the short-to-mid-term credibility of its defense commitment to South Korea, but it will also buy time for Pyongyang to further build up its own nuclear arsenal and advance its war preparations against the South.

Fourth, while not a military alliance based on legally binding mutual defense obligations, North Korea and Syria have a long history of extensive bilateral military-to-military ties based on their close political relationship. These ties include:

  • Fraternal assistance in several Middle Eastern wars: Since Israel joined the UN coalition troops fighting in the Korean War, the DPRK government has never considered it inappropriate or unwise to send troops to aid the Syrian government in the Arab-Israeli wars in the Middle East. For instance, the DPRK sent 25 pilots to Syria to defend the air space over Damascus during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967.[12] In 1970, the DPRK dispatched 200 tank crewmen, 53 pilots, and 140 missile technicians to Syria. During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the DPRK dispatched 30 pilots to Egypt and Syria, who provided training for Syrian pilots to fight against Israel.[13] Moreover, the North Korean Air Force pilots themselves flew the Soviet-made Egyptian and Syrian airplanes during some key air battles. In 1975 and 1976, Pyongyang sent 75 Air Force instructors and 40 MIG pilots to Damascus, respectively. In 1982, during the Lebanese civil war, the DPRK government dispatched SOF (special operations forces) servicemen to Syria to provide training for guerrilla operations, some killed by the Israeli military. In 1984-1986 and 1990, 50 and 30 North Korean military instructors were sent to Syria, respectively.
  • Military Education and Training: In the mid-1980s, Kim Jong Il approved the request of the Syrian government for its military officers’ to be educated and trained at DPRK military educational institutions at the expense of North Korea. Since then, the North Korean military has been training Syrian military officers at the Kim Il Sung Military University (an analogue of US National Defense University). Officers at the colonel rank usually participate in the one-year high-level officers’ course. Syrian officers at the captain rank are also admitted to the four-year course. They are taught military strategy, operational art, and military tactics, including guerrilla operations. Kim Jong Il is said to have followed with interest the successful careers of the Syrian general officers who graduated from the university.
  • Foreign military sales: Beginning in the late 1970s through the 1980s, the DPRK supplied Syria with various conventional weapons such as rifles, guns, mortars, ammunition, bombs, armored vehicles, anti-tank missiles, radars, and even military uniforms. In particular, in 1978, the DPRK sold 300 recoilless guns to Syria. In 1982, when the civil war broke out in Syria, the Syrian military killed 20,000 civilians by firing “BM-11, 122mm MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System),” the weapon system imported from the DPRK. The Israel military snatched the notorious “BM-11” from Syria during the Lebanon war in 1982, killing 25 KPA soldiers who serviced it. In 1992, Pyongyang shipped 20 tons of bombs to Damascus.
  • Weapons of Mass Destruction and Delivery Systems: There is evidence to suggest that North Korea provided technical assistance to Syria in acquiring key nuclear-related technologies in China and Europe as well as in constructing a covert nuclear reactor at Al Kibar that was bombed by the Israeli Air Force in 2007. On ballistic missiles, cooperation began in the late 1980s, with the North selling Scud-C transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and cluster warheads to Syria, helping to construct two missile assembly plants in Hama and an electronic missile launch control facility near Aleppo and providing special training for Syrian missile technicians in North Korea. Aside from strengthening the self-defense potential of one of its anti-imperialist, anti-US allies, the North has earned good money doing it.[14] On chemical weapons, there is only limited evidence of cooperation, including the interception of DPRK ships heading for Syria carrying cargos that might be useful in defending against chemical attacks. There has also been speculation that the explosion on July 20, 2007, at a facility near the city of Halab was the result of an attempt by North Korean scientists working with Syrian officials to load a chemical warhead onto one of the North Korean missiles, likely the No-dong 1 model. On biological weapons, there is information about bilateral cooperation between the Ministries of Public Health, pharmaceutical companies, and university biotech research labs but little on weapons cooperation. Still, some observers have asserted that “Syria has a biological weapons research and development program, and it is seeking professional assistance from China and North Korea in this area.”[15]

The Syrian conflict provides the North Korean military with an opportunity to gain valuable “real world” experience. Reportedly, North Korean advisors provide technical assistance to Syria’s defense industry, especially factories southeast of Aleppo, in addition to engineering and construction assistance in repairing and rehabilitating destroyed military infrastructure. The KPA is also involved in operational planning and supervision of artillery warfare as demonstrated by the battle for Qusair.[16] The North Korean military advisors are probably involved in planning and execution of the air and air defense operations of the Syrian army as well as collecting battlefield intelligence on the combat use and performance of Western arms, especially those that can potentially be used in the Korean battlefield. Finally, the Syrian civil war offers the North Korean military planners the first-hand look at the combat tactics of anti-regime rebels trained and guided by the US and its allies. And for good measure, there is no doubt that North Korean military advisors are also tasked with erasing any traces of Pyongyang’s past assistance to Assad’s programs to build weapons of mass destruction just in case he does lose power.

The Bottom Line

Given the history of DPRK-Syrian relations, despite what the North might say in public, it would be surprising if the North had not dispatched a small contingent of military advisors and instructors to aid the brotherly Assad regime in its fight against the anti-government rebels. Although that assistance is probably limited and does not have the potential to fundamentally change the course of the civil war, North Korean military expertise can affect the outcomes of local tactical battles, adding to the winning momentum of the Assad forces. Moreover, North Korea’s involvement in Syria may be an indicator that the Kim regime discounts the likelihood of any possible breakthrough in relations with either Washington or Seoul in the near future and views the risk that its national policy goals will be adversely affected by increasing support for the Assad regime as manageable.

Pyongyang’s involvement in Syria characterizes Kim Jong Un more as a steady hand and traditional alliance manager than an erratic wanderer and opportunistic risk-taker. Although he is playing with fire in the shifting sands of far-flung lands like Syria, but he is simply staying the course set forth by his grandfather and upheld by his father, demonstrating continuity in North Korea’s foreign policy. Moreover, potential material and reputational rewards far outweigh possible security or diplomatic risks, especially if Kim’s bet on Assad’s eventual victory proves to be correct. The DPRK’s decision to cast its lot with Damascus may upset wealthy Gulf monarchies—like Kuwait and Qatar—sponsoring the anti-Assad rebel groups and cause them to rethink their employment of North Korean labor and services in construction and irrigation system development projects and their provision of low-interest funds for some of Pyongyang’s infrastructure projects.[17] On the other hand, it may help Pyongyang earn much greater financial or in-kind compensation from other states concerned, including Iran, Russia, and others, and develop new diplomatic clout in the Middle East if Assad eventually wins. Pyongyang’s support for Syria may provoke Jihadist elements to strike back, but it is more likely that the KPA will gain valuable combat experience against the new age enemy—irregular anti-government militia fighting in a suburban setting. Finally, North Korea’s support for Syria may provide new fodder for others to further demonize Pyongyang but it also offers the North a chance to stand by a long-time ally in need, to show its resolve to fight for state sovereignty and territorial integrity on the world stage, and to prove with deeds it is fighting against Al Qaeda and international terrorism, even when it might be more expedient to do otherwise.

 

 

ISIS Tradecraft and Expanding Ability

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Everything will be fine and okay after June 20, 2016?

Brussels Bombings Reflect ISIS’ Growing ‘Attack Capability’

‘When you are dealing with terrorists, absolutely the best defense is a strong offense,’ says Michael Morell, a former Deputy Director of the CIA

Reuters/Christian Hartmann)

AtlanticCounci/NATO: The bombings in Brussels on March 22 are a reflection of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s growing “attack capability” in Europe, according to Michael Morell, a former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who serves on the Atlantic Council’s board of directors.

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) claimed responsibility for the attacks that left dozens dead in Brussels on March 22.

“The big picture here to me is that ISIS has put together an attack capability in Europe that is enlarging by degree and very sophisticated,” said Morell. “What happened today is at its most base level a reflection of that capability and reflection of the fact that that capability has not been degraded.”  

Attack on Brussels

A US-led coalition has been conducting airstrikes on ISIS targets in Syria with a mission set by US President Barack Obama to degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group.

The challenge facing the United States and Europe is to gather enough information to thwart such attacks in the future, said Morell.

“If you are not inside these cells, if you don’t have the intelligence, if you don’t get to see their communications you don’t get to see the attack coming,” he said.

Michael Morell spoke in an interview with the New Atlanticist’sAshish Kumar Sen. Here are excerpts from our interview.

Q: French President François Hollande said that through the Brussels attack all of Europe has been hit. What are the implications of this attack for Europe?

Morell: The big picture here to me is that ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham] has put together an attack capability in Europe that is enlarging by degree and very sophisticated. What happened today is at its most base level a reflection of that capability and reflection of the fact that that capability has not been degraded.

There are two implications. The first is that the Europeans have to do a much better job of defending themselves. What we saw today in the airport, for example, was an attack on the left side of security. They didn’t go through airport security, they conducted their attacks in the ticket area where people don’t have to go through security. The Europeans are going to have to adjust their security protocols to reflect what these guys are doing, which is attacking soft targets. They have to completely rethink their defensive posture here. With regard to that, they have to resource their police, intelligence, and security services to reflect the threat that they are facing.

The fact that different European security services are not able to track all the [suspects] that they know about because they simply don’t have the resources is a real problem. This has got to be addressed.

But the most important point I’d make regarding implication is that when you are dealing with terrorists, absolutely the best defense is a strong offense. You have got to take the fight to them. The only way attacks in Europe end—and by the way, these attacks are going to come [to the United States] at some point, no doubt about it—is to remove their leadership from the battlefield and take away their safe haven and their caliphate. There has got to be a serious rethinking in Europe, in Washington, and in the Middle East about how do we deal with the bigger problem here. [ISIS] is under pressure in Iraq and Syria, no doubt about it, but they still have their safe haven and their leadership is still protected.

Q: Do you think Belgium let down its guard after the Paris suspect was arrested last week?

Morell: I don’t think so. In fact, I think their guard was up. There is no doubt in my mind that the timing of this attack reflected that arrest. I think what happened here is that the cell in Brussels that Salah Abdeslam was working had attacks planned and this was one of them. When he was arrested on Friday the guys who were left decided to accelerate the attacks because they were concerned that he would talk to law enforcement authorities and that their attack would get disrupted. I truly think that, when they made the arrest on Friday, they knew of the security risks going forward and they actually raised their security level. But if you are not inside these cells, if you don’t have the intelligence, if you don’t get to see their communications you don’t get to see the attack coming. That’s why this is so dangerous and complicated.

Q: In light of the terrorist attacks in Europe—Paris and now Brussels—in what areas could security cooperation and intelligence sharing between the United States and Europe be expanded?

Morell: After Paris there were all sorts of comments by senior government officials that we should enhance information sharing. When I was Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, we shared everything we had with the relevant European authorities, and they shared what they had with us. So there is very good sharing. Information sharing is not the problem, getting enough information is the problem.

To disrupt individual attacks, you need very specific intelligence and that intelligence has got to come from discussions that you pick up in Iraq and Syria, or discussions that you pick up from the cell itself. You have to attack both of those from an intelligence and security perspective, and you have to do both at the same time so you can get the intelligence you need to disrupt the attacks. It is very difficult work. It takes resources and it takes time. There are a lot of things happening on the technology front that make it more difficult for us to disrupt these things. When these guys use apps with commercial encryption that no one can read they can stay under the radar screen.

Q: What lessons can Europe learn from the United States’ experience in preventing terrorist attacks on US soil?

Morell: You have got to take the fight to them. In an American football context, you can’t play prevent defense. You have to take the fight to Iraq and Syria. You have to take away their ability to operate security, you have got to take away their sense of invincibility, the sense that they are winning, their sense that time is on their side. The only way to do that is to take the fight to them. We are doing to that some extent, but clearly we are not doing enough.

Q: Why has Belgium become a hot bed for Islamic terrorism?

Morell: It is not just Belgium, it is also France, it is also, to some extent, London. It is anywhere that you have got a very large Muslim population and there are recent immigrants from Muslim countries who flop down in these largely Muslim neighborhoods and the countries do a horrible job of bringing them into their society. The kids don’t get the best education. They feel isolated. They are probably bullied in the schools they go to. They turn to look for a sense of community and a sense of belonging and look for something bigger and they find it in the ISIS and al Qaeda narrative. That’s why we see this in Paris and Brussels where there are a lot of these neighborhoods.

Everybody is focused on this particular event [the Brussels attacks] and how you stop these guys. We are not having enough of a conversation at all about how do you stop people from becoming terrorists in the first place? How do we deal with the social, economic, and religious issues that give rise to all this stuff in the first place? Our lack of attention to that is not surprising given that we tend to be focused on people who are trying to kill us now. But we are not really going to get our arms around this problem until we as the international community—the United States, Europe and every Muslim country in the world—gets together and figures out how do we deal with the bigger problem here? How do we stop the creation of these terrorists in the first place? I am not optimistic that we are going to do that, and that’s why I say to people that my kids’ generation and my grandkids’ generation are still going to be fighting this fight.

**** Meanwhile, enter the U.S. State Department:

Europe Travel Alert
LAST UPDATED: MARCH 22, 2016
The State Department alerts U.S. citizens to potential risks of travel to and throughout Europe following several terrorist attacks, including the March 22 attacks in Brussels claimed by ISIL.  Terrorist groups continue to plan near-term attacks throughout Europe, targeting sporting events, tourist sites, restaurants, and transportation.  This Travel Alert expires on June 20, 2016.

U.S. citizens should exercise vigilance when in public places or using mass transportation. Be aware of immediate surroundings and avoid crowded places. Exercise particular caution during religious holidays and at large festivals or events.

U.S. citizens should also:

Follow the instructions of local authorities, especially in an emergency.
Monitor media and local information sources and factor updated information into personal travel plans and activities.
Be prepared for additional security screening and unexpected disruptions.
Stay in touch with your family members and ensure they know how to reach you in the event of an emergency.
Register in our Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP).
European governments continue to guard against terrorist attacks and conduct raids to disrupt plots. We work closely with our allies and will continue to share information with our European partners that will help identify and counter terrorist threats.