Gen. Flynn, Bijan Rafiekian, and Carter Page, Yikes

It is a matter of procedure to investigate these kinds of activities and the people involved in them. In the case of national security and protocol violations, the checks and balances are required and this includes agencies such as the State Department, the FBI, the Justice Department and the Department of Homeland Security.

Bijan Rafiekian is Chairman, President, CEO and Secretary of the Flynn Intel Group, Inc. Other officers are Michael Flynn and Philip A Oakley.

–> 2 Items UPDATE:

1. More important names in the Flynn affair: Former FBI agent and Admiral

2. Supplemental Lobby Registration document

The Delaware filed NSD/FARA registration document is here. It was filed on March 7, 2017.

Further and quite curious is just how was Flynn lobbying Congress? Here is a document filed to the Senate as well along with payments.

12/21/16, Intelligence Online: “When he was a private consultant, Flynn worked for Inovo, a Dutch firm owned by Kamil Ekim Alptekin, the Turkish chairman of the U.S.-Turkey Business Council (USTBC) and a close advisor to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Alptekin is very well-connected to the Turkish government security apparatus. He is the chairman of the board of ATH Defence and Security Solutions Co, which sells monitoring and intelligence equipment. According to our sources, ATH supplies materiel to the Turkish intelligence service MIT (Milli Istihbarat Teskilati, and the Turkish police force’s intelligence units.”

12/15/16: Bloomberg: “[Flynn Intelligence Group] worked as a lobbyist for Inovo BV, a Dutch company with close ties to Turkish President Recep Erdogan.”

11/29/16, Al-Ahram Weekly: “[Trump’s] national security adviser, Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, a former head of the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), has been outed for signing a contract with a Dutch company operating as a front for a Turkish government contractor with close ties to the Erdogan regime.”

11/19/16, AP: “[Flynn’s] his private consulting firm has lobbied for a company headed by a Turkish businessman tied to Turkey’s authoritarian, Islamist-leaning government, which cracked down on dissent and jailed thousands of opponents after a failed coup in July against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.”

11/19/16, CNN: “According to the official document, Kelley was working on behalf of Inovo BV, a Dutch firm owned by Turkish businessman, Kamil Ekim Alptekin.
Alptekin told CNN in an email that the firm works to strengthen ‘the transatlantic relationship and Turkey’s future in that alliance.'”  More here.

***

Bijan Rafiekian was a member of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States and earlier in his career, he was president of GLOBTEL and Greezone Systems, Inc. At the Export-Import Bank, Rafiekian was assigned to work deals to export coal to third world countries.

Flynn’s company was paid $535,000 by Alpetkin between September of November of 2016 with an assigned focus to take on Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish cleric living in exile in Pennsylvania. If Trump and his White House press spokesperson declared they did not know about General Flynn’s outside lobby work, it is strains the fact that Bijan Rafiekian actually was named to the Trump transition team. Further, through this process, Flynn hired SGR LLC to do the public affairs work on the Inovo project. In all fairness however, all parties involved here were against Hillary Clinton winning the presidency. More here.

*** Another reason there is scrutiny of members of the early Trump team includes Carter Page.

WASHINGTON (AP) — At Moscow’s New Economic School, the annual graduation ceremony often features a prominent political figure. President Barack Obama addressed graduates at the prestigious institution in 2009. The former presidents of Mexico and the Czech Republic have spoken at recent ceremonies.

Last year, the university invited Carter Page, a little-known former investment banker and foreign policy adviser to then-U.S. presidential hopeful Donald Trump. It wouldn’t be the last time Page would draw unexpected — and some say outsized — attention for his relationship to Trump, his entanglements in Russia and the murky nexus between the two.

Page, who left the campaign before the election, has emerged as a key figure in the controversy surrounding Trump associates’ connections to Russia. The New York Times has reported that Page is among the Trump associates whose potential contacts with Russia are being investigated by the FBI. Congressional committees probing Russia’s hacking during the election and Trump campaign ties have asked Page to preserve materials related to their investigations.

 

For those who contend the scrutiny of Trump is overblown, Page is the sort of figure often associated with an understaffed presidential campaign that struggled to recruit policy advisers and spent little time vetting those who did join the team. But to those who believe Trump’s campaign was colluding with Russia as it hacked Democratic groups, Page may be the key link between the candidate and Moscow. Page contends he’s the target of a plot hatched by Trump’s former rival Hillary Clinton and allies who engaged in “severe election fraud in the form of disinformation, suppression of dissent, hate crimes and other extensive abuses.”

Page’s appearance at the Russian university immediately raised eyebrows.

For an adviser to an American presidential hopeful speaking overseas, his message was strikingly critical of the U.S. It came as Trump’s calls for warmer relations with the Kremlin were a source of criticism from Democrats and alarm from some fellow Republicans.

Washington had a “hypocritical focus on ideas such as democratization, inequality, corruption and regime change” in its dealings with Russia, Page said at the school.

Page and former Trump campaign officials say he made the trip in a personal capacity and not as a representative of the campaign. But university officials have been clear that Page’s connections and insight into the Trump campaign were the draw.

“We were interested in what was going on — already then, Trump’s candidacy raised eyebrows, and everyone was really curious,” said Shlomo Weber, the academic director at the New Economic School, in an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda radio station.

A newsletter announcing Page’s visit read. “You are invited to a lecture by Carter Page, foreign policy adviser for Donald Trump’s election campaign.”

Page has said he asked for, and received, permission from the Trump campaign to appear in a personal capacity.

Page has offered contradictory answers about his contacts with Russian officials during his visit. On Thursday, he told The Associated Press he did not meet with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich, who also spoke at the graduation. But in September, he told The Washington Post that he did speak with Dvorkovich briefly.

Back in the U.S. a few days later, Page talked with Russia’s ambassador to the U.S. at an event on the sidelines of the Republican National Convention, according to a person with knowledge of the meeting. Attorney General Jeff Sessions spoke with the Russian envoy at the same event, a conversation he failed to reveal when asked about contacts with Russians during his Senate confirmation hearings.

Page, a former Merrill Lynch investment banker who worked out of its Moscow office for three years, now runs Global Energy Capital, a firm focused on energy sectors in emerging markets. According to the company’s website, he has advised on transactions for Gazprom and RAO UES, a pair of Russian entities.

In December, Page returned to Moscow, where he noted he had “the opportunity to meet with an executive from Rosneft,” the Russian oil giant, according to a video clip of his remarks posted on YouTube. Rosnet’s chairman, Igor Sechin, a close associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin, has been targeted by U.S. sanctions, though Page says he was not referring to Sechin in his remarks.

Some of the suspicion surrounding Page stems from the fact that no one who worked for the campaign can quite explain how he ended up on Trump’s list of foreign policy advisers. Page has also sidestepped those questions, saying he doesn’t want to put others “in the same damaged pot as myself.”

One campaign official said Page was recruited by Sam Clovis, an Iowa Republican operative who ran the Trump campaign’s policy shop and is now a senior adviser at the Agriculture Department. Clovis did not respond to messages from The Associated Press.

Trump has distanced himself from Page, saying he never met him. Those who served on the campaign’s foreign policy advisory committee also said they had limited contact with Page.

“Only met him once very briefly,” said George Papadopoulos, the director of the Center for International Energy and Natural Resources Law and Security in London.

But in a letter late Wednesday to the Senate Intelligence Committee, Page cast himself as a regular presence in Trump Tower, where the campaign was headquartered.

“I have frequently dined in Trump Grill, had lunch in Trump Café, had coffee meetings in the Starbucks at Trump Tower, attended events and spent many hours in campaign headquarters on the fifth floor last year,” Page wrote. He also noted that his office building in New York “is literally connected to the Trump Tower building by an atrium.”

Page stopped advising the campaign sometime around the end of summer, though the exact circumstances of the separation are unclear. After the campaign, Trump’s lawyers sent Page at least two cease and desist letters, according to another campaign official, who like others, insisted on anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the matter publicly.

_

AP writers Jim Heintz in Moscow and Maria Danilova contributed to this report.

 

Operation Foal Eagle/Key Resolve 2017, B52 Bombers Prepare

Foal Eagle 2017

Members of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy Underwater Dive Team examine an X-ray image of a possible mine in Jinhae, ROK, March 6, 2017, as part of exercise Foal Eagle 2017. Foal Eagle is an annual, bilateral training exercise designed to enhance the readiness of U.S. and ROK forces and their ability to work together during a crisis. (U.S. Navy Combat Camera photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Alfred A. Coffield)

Key Resolve = RSOI, which stands for Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, Integration (and even earlier as Team Spirit). It is an annual command post exercise (CPX) held by United States Forces Korea, and conducted with the Republic of Korea Armed Forces.

Operation Foal Eagle is under way

Related reading: North Korea fires four ballistic missiles

***

January of 2016, days after North Korea claimed it tested a hydrogen bomb, the United States responded with a display of military might on the Korean Peninsula.

A B-52 bomber jet from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam flew over Osan, South Korea, on Sunday “in response to a recent nuclear test by North Korea,” United States Pacific Command said.
The B-52 was flanked by South Korean F-15 fighter jets and U.S. F-16 fighter jets.
“This was a demonstration of the ironclad U.S. commitment to our allies in South Korea, in Japan, and to the defense of the American homeland,” said PACOM Commander. More here from CNN.
***
A press report is telling us:
(KUNA) South Korea’s military said Thursday the joint annual exercise with the US will continue as planned, one day after China requested a halt according to Yonhap New Agency. The Chinese Foreign Minister Wany Yi proposed North Korea suspend its nuclear and missile activities in return for a halt to the war drills. This was rejected.
Image result for b52 nuclear bomber to south korea
Another press report from a source in the UK reports:

Donald Trump set to send B-52 NUCLEAR BOMBERS to South Korea after North fires missiles at Japan and US warns of ‘overwhelming’ response

Secretary of Defence James Mattis said the US “remains steadfast in its commitment” to the defence of its allies

Now US military chiefs are reportedly planning to fly in B-1 and B-52 bombers – built to carry nuclear bombs – to show America has had enough, according to the Korea Times.

South Korea and the US have also started their annual Foal Eagle military exercise sending a strong warning to North Korea over its actions.

A military official said 300,000 South Korean troops and 15,000 US personnel are taking part in the operation. Washington is also expected to deploy a series of strategic assets from the US as well as from military bases in Guam and Japan, reports the Korea Times.

The USS Carl Vinson, a Nimitz-class supercarrier, will join the Foal Eagle exercise after departing from San Diego.

The nuke-powered aircraft carrier will carry dozens of fighter jets, early warning aircraft and anti-sub craft.

It will be accompanied by the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Champlain (CG-57) and two Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers.

From the US Marine Corps in Japan, F-35B stealth fighters will be deployed to the peninsula for the first time.

“An F-35B is capable of evading anti-aircraft radar and making preemptive strikes,” a military official said. More details here.

***

“The USS Carl Vinson is expected to arrive in Busan around March 15 to participate in the Foal Eagle exercise,” a USFK spokesman told reporters.

The South Korean and U.S. militaries on Wednesday kicked off the two-month field training exercise involving ground, air and naval forces. The U.S. supercarrier will make use of its air assets, as well as its escort ships in the maneuvers that aims to deter North Korean aggression.

Separately, the allies plan to start the Key Resolve computer-simulated command post exercise on March 13 for a two-week run. The U.S. is expected to deploy other strategic assets, such as the B-1B and B-52 bombers, with the tiltrotor V-22 Osprey to make an appearance, in a show of force against the North, which has stepped up its nuclear and missile threats. More here.

 

WikiLeaks Releases CIA Cyber Docs, Problem?

Primer: Steve Bannon works for President Trump in the White House.

Steve Bannon is a star – for Al-Qaeda, that featured him on the cover of their newspaper

steve-bannon-is-a-star---for-al-qaeda-that-featured-him-on-the-cover-of-their-paper

Then this headline….

The new scandal headlines for today is WikiLeaks, telling us they published the largest cache of secret CIA documents relating to the CIA’s ability to hack, break encryption and install malware. This is a problem? The problem is not the tools the CIA has, the problem is that someone inside the agency stole them and delivered them to WikiLeaks.

It is a good thing that the agency has these resources, why you ask?

Well….try this…The threat is real from Russians, Chinese, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Ukraine, al Qaeda and Islamic State…

Image result for stuxnet

Remember Stuxnet? This was a successful joint program under the Bush presidency with Israel to infect the Iranian nuclear program and it was to forces the centrifuges to spin out of control, which they did. Ultimately, it caused the progress of the Iranian infrastructure to be delayed substantially. It was in fact later uncovered by cyber scientists working for Siemens, the hardware and software platform used as the operating system. Good right? Yes.

Image result for u.s. cyber command

Well, there is more…

In recent years, Iran and North Korea have been sharing nuclear scientists and engineers, parts, testing and missile collaboration. So far, the missiles launched by North Korea for the most part have been unsuccessful, or at least did not achieve the ultimate objective and that is an official target strike. Why? Because of the United States. How so you ask?

Over the weekend, North Korea fired off 4 missiles in succession toward Japan. They did not reach the mainland but did reach the waterway that is part of the Japanese economic zone for maritime operations. We have American cyberwarriors that are doing effective work causing the missiles to fly off course or to technically fail. The objective is to use non-explosive weaponry to foul the North Korea and hence Iran’s missile program and while North Korea is not especially connected to the internet, some related systems are connected and then there is electronic warfare.

Image result for foreign hacking omb

We know that Islamic State is a terror operation that has militant cells in an estimated 30 countries. While they have depraved methods of murder, rape and terror, they too have a cyber operation.

The Will to Act

One question is whether ISIS will be consumed with the protection and continued expansion of its immediate fighting fronts, i.e., the “near enemy,” or whether its scope of vision includes America’s homeland. The Economist advances a strong case that desire for such expansion not only exists but will be exercised: “With its ideological ferocity, platoons of Western passport holders, hatred of America and determination to become the leader of global jihadism, ISIS will surely turn, sooner or later, to the ‘far enemy’ of America and Europe.”

And perhaps any doubt the militant’s sights are on America was removed by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Sept. 22 call for jihadists to not wait for the order but to rise, take up arms, and “kill Americans and other infidels” wherever they are. Clearly the group is showing no hesitancy in its desire to strike the U.S. heartland on a personal scale.

Cyber Operations Capability?

As to whether ISIS will have the capability to mount cyber operations against the U.S., David DeWalt, head of cybersecurity firm FireEye, believes that ISIS will follow in the footsteps of the Syrian Electronic Army and the Iran-based Ajax Security Team to target the United States and other Western nations.

“We’ve begun to see signs that rebel terrorist organizations are attempting to gain access to cyber weaponry,” DeWalt stated recently. He added that booming underground markets dealing in malicious software make offensive cyber weapons just an “Internet transaction” away for groups such as ISIS. More here.

Is there more to this that we should know? Yes…

There is the Middle East and we have a major vested interest in the region.

***

Cybersecurity in the Gulf: The Middle East’s Virtual Frontline

Cybersecurity is often discussed in relation to the major global powers: China’s economic espionage, Russian influence operations, and U.S. dragnet global surveillance to thwart terrorism.

However, as other countries move to digitize their economies, cybercriminals are zeroing in on these new and lucrative targets while regional players are quickly incorporating cyber capabilities into their own arsenals for achieving strategic ends.

The Middle East, particularly the Gulf states, are quickly recognizing the urgent need for better cybersecurity, while regional adversaries such as Iran have begun weaponizing code as an extension of broader strategic goals within the region. What, though, is the Gulf’s current cybersecurity atmosphere, and how does Iran’s emerging use of offensive cyber capabilities fit into its broader strategy in the Middle East?

Wajdi Al Quliti, the Director of Information Technology at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, notes that “the region’s dramatic strides towards digitization—expected to add over $800 billion to GDP and over 4 million jobs by 2020—is making the Gulf a major target for fast evolving cyber threats.” Much like other regions, the Gulf is finding it difficult to sufficiently create criminal deterrence due to segmented laws and difficulties in attribution. Al Quliti argues “cross-border cooperation and common cybersecurity structures could prove to be a game-changing advantage in the fight against cybercrime.” However, “the elephant in the room,” according to Al Quliti, “is the issue of state-sponsored hacking, in which case harmonized laws are unlikely to make a difference.”

A critical point in nation-state hacking in the Middle East begins with the Stuxnet worm. Discovered in 2010 burrowed deep in Iranian networks, the worm had slowly been sabotaging Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Then in 2011 CrySyS Lab discovered Duqu, a cyber espionage tool tailored to gather information from industrial control systems, and in 2012, Kaspersky Labs identified Flame, another espionage tool, targeting various organizations in the Middle East. Both Duqu and Flame are associated with Stuxnet and attributed back to the Equation Group, widely considered an arm of the National Security Agency.

In 2012, Iranian officials found a wiper virus erasing files in the network of the Oil Ministry headquarters in Tehran, leading the ministry to disconnect all oil terminals from the Internet to prevent the virus from spreading. It is uncertain who was behind the attacks, but a mere four months later, Saudi Arabia’s largest oil company, Saudi Aramco, was hit with a similar wiper virus known as Disttrack—possibly coopted from the previous attack on Iran’s oil industry.

The data-erasing malware sabotaged three-quarters, some 35,000 of the company’s computers while branding screens with an image of a burning American flag. A few months later, another wiper virus attacked Qatar’s RasGas.

Al Quliti identifies “the region’s heavy dependence on oil and gas—as well as the oil and gas-powered desalination plants that provide much of the region’s fresh water”—as “a source of cyber vulnerability,” adding that “any cyber attack on these installations could prove catastrophic and might result in a humanitarian disaster.”

The sabotage operations against the Gulf’s oil industry have been attributed by various cybersecurity firms—but not officially by any government—to a group called Shamoon, thought to be an arm of the Iranian government.

Michael Eisenstadt, the Director of the Military and Security Studies Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, notes that “cyber allows Iran to strike at adversaries globally, instantaneously, and on a sustained basis, and to potentially achieve strategic effects in ways it cannot in the physical domain.” For example, in March 2016, the Justice Department indicted seven Iranian Revolutionary Guard members for distributed denial of service attacks against U.S. banks in 2012 in retaliation for Iran sanctions imposed the previous year, as well as for infiltrating the systems of a small New York dam in 2013—a possible testing ground for penetrating larger pieces of U.S. critical infrastructure. In 2014, the same year North Korea set its sights on Sony Pictures, Iran’s cyber capabilities again reached into the United States, using another wiper virus to sabotage the operations of the Las Vegas Sands casino, whose chief executive, a staunch supporter of Israel, had suggested detonating a nuclear bomb in the heart of Tehran.

Last November, right before a major OPEC meeting, a variation of the Disttrack wiper used against Saudi Aramco struck again, now fitted with a picture of Alan Kurdi, the drowned Syrian toddler who washed up in Turkey in 2015. The virus targeted six Saudi organizations, most notably the Saudi General Authority of Civil Aviation, delivering its payload at the close of business on a Thursday, the start of the Islamic weekend, for maximum impact. Some experts speculate the November attack could have also been a false-flag operation to derail the Iranian nuclear deal.

Interestingly, for both the 2012 and 2016 Shamoon attacks, the wiper came fitted with stolen login credentials that Symantec now believes could have been gleaned from a cyber espionage tool, known as Greenbug, found on one of the administrator computers of a Saudi organization targeted in November. The potential link between Greenbug and the Shamoon group opens up possible investigations into the group’s involvement in a host of other Greenbug attacks throughout the Middle East, including breaches in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, Turkey, and even Iran—though likely for domestic surveillance on dissidents. Just last week, another wiper virus hit 15 Saudi organizations, including the Ministry of Labor, prompting the government to issue an urgent warning of pending Shamoon attacks.

Eisenstadt points out that “Iran’s cyber activities show that a third-tier cyber power can carry out significant nuisance and cost-imposing attacks,” and “its network reconnaissance activities seem to indicate that it is developing contingency plans to attack its enemies’ critical infrastructure.” According to Eisentadt, is now seems that “in the past decade, Iran’s cyber toolkit has evolved from a low-tech means of lashing out at its enemies by defacing websites and conducting DDoS attacks, to a central pillar of its national security concept.”

Beginning to understand why the CIA and the other agencies are building cyber command war-rooms?

 

FBI to Pay Former Spy for Trump Intel

FBI Plan to Pay Ex-Spy for Trump Intel during Campaign Sparks Questions of Obama Admin’s Use of Federal Authorities for Political Gain

Mar 06, 2017
Author of unsubstantiated dossier was also researching Trump for Clinton campaign associates when FBI sought to hire him
WASHINGTON– Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley today is seeking details on the FBI’s reported plans to hire former British spy Christopher Steele to investigate Donald Trump during the presidential campaign, even though the FBI was aware that he was being paid by Democrat political operatives to conduct opposition research on Trump.  Steele is the author of the controversial dossier that includes unsubstantiated claims alleging ties between the Trump campaign and the Russian government.
In a letter today to FBI Director James Comey, Grassley is requesting a briefing on the agreement as well as the FBI use of the material in Steele’s memos.  Grassley also wants to know whether the FBI ever independently verified the memos’ claims.
“The idea that the FBI and associates of the Clinton campaign would pay Mr. Steele to investigate the Republican nominee for President in the run-up to the election raises further questions about the FBI’s independence from politics, as well as the Obama administration’s use of law enforcement and intelligence agencies for political ends.  It is additionally troubling that the FBI reportedly agreed to such an arrangement given that, in January of 2017, then-Director Clapper issued a statement stating that ‘the IC has not made any judgment that the information in this document is reliable, and we did not rely upon it in any way for our conclusions,’” Grassley said in the letter.
In the letter, Grassley is requesting records related to the reported agreement.  He is also seeking answers to a number of questions, including who was involved in decisions related to hiring Steele and using his memos, whether the FBI used materials in the memo as the basis for seeking warrants and other investigative tools, and if the FBI has been able to independently verify allegations made in the memos.
Full text of Grassley’s letter to Comey follows:
March 6, 2017
VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION
The Honorable James B. Comey, Jr.
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20535
Dear Director Comey:
On February 28, 2017, the Washington Post reported that the FBI reached an agreement a few weeks before the Presidential election to pay the author of the unsubstantiated dossier alleging a conspiracy between President Trump and the Russians, Christopher Steele, to continue investigating Mr. Trump.[1]  The article claimed that the FBI was aware Mr. Steele was creating these memos as part of work for an opposition research firm connected to Hillary Clinton.  The idea that the FBI and associates of the Clinton campaign would pay Mr. Steele to investigate the Republican nominee for President in the run-up to the election raises further questions about the FBI’s independence from politics, as well as the Obama administration’s use of law enforcement and intelligence agencies for political ends.  It is additionally troubling that the FBI reportedly agreed to such an arrangement given that, in January of 2017, then-Director Clapper issued a statement stating that “the IC has not made any judgment that the information in this document is reliable, and we did not rely upon it in any way for our conclusions.”According to the Washington Post, the FBI’s arrangement with Mr. Steele fell through when the media published his dossier and revealed his identity.
The Committee requires additional information to evaluate this situation.  Please provide the following information and respond to these questions by March 20, 2017.  Please also schedule a briefing by that date by FBI personnel with knowledge of these issues.
  1. All FBI records relating to the agreement with Mr. Steele regarding his investigation of President Trump and his associates, including the agreement itself, all drafts, all internal FBI communications about the agreement, all FBI communications with Mr. Steele about the agreement, all FBI requests for authorization for the agreement, and all records documenting the approval of the agreement.
  1. All records, including 302s, of any FBI meetings or interviews with Mr. Steele.
  1. All FBI policies, procedures, and guidelines applicable when the FBI seeks to fund an investigator associated with a political opposition research firm connected to a political candidate, or with any outside entity.
  1. All FBI records relating to agreements and payments made to Mr. Steele in connection with any other investigations, including the reported agreements relating to his investigation of FIFA.
  1. Were any other government officials outside of the FBI involved in discussing or authorizing the agreement with Mr. Steele, including anyone from the Department of Justice or the Obama White House?  If so, please explain who was involved and provide all related records.
  1. How did the FBI first obtain Mr. Steele’s Trump investigation memos?  Has the FBI obtained additional memos from this same source that were not published by Buzzfeed?  If so, please provide copies.
  1. Has the FBI created, or contributed to the creation of, any documents based on or otherwise referencing these memos or the information in the memos?  If so, please provide copies of all such documents and, where necessary, clarify which portions are based on or related to the memos.
  1. Has the FBI verified or corroborated any of the allegations made in the memos?  Were any allegations or other information from the memo included in any documents created by the FBI, or which the FBI helped to create, without having been independently verified or corroborated by the FBI beforehand?  If so, why?
  1. Has the FBI relied on or otherwise referenced the memos or any information in the memos in seeking a FISA warrant, other search warrant, or any other judicial process?   Did the FBI rely on or otherwise reference the memos in relation to any National Security Letters?  If so, please include copies of all relevant applications and other documents.
  1. Who decided to include the memos in the briefings received by Presidents Obama and Trump? What was the basis for that decision?
  1. Did the agreement with Mr. Steele ever enter into force?  If so, for how long?  If it did not, why not?
  1. You have previously stated that you will not comment on pending investigations, including confirming or denying whether they exist.  You have also acknowledged that statements about closed investigations are a separate matter, sometimes warranting disclosures or public comment.  Given the inflammatory nature of the allegations in Mr. Steele’s dossier, if the FBI is undertaking or has undertaken any investigation of the claims, will you please inform the Committee at the conclusion of any such investigations as to what information the investigations discovered and what conclusions the FBI reached?  Simply put, when allegations like these are put into the public domain prior to any FBI assessment of their reliability, then if subsequent FBI investigation of the allegations finds them false, unsupported, or unreliable, the FBI should make those rebuttals public.
I anticipate that your responses to these questions may contain both classified and unclassified information.  Please send all unclassified material directly to the Committee.  In keeping with the requirements of Executive Order 13526, if any of the responsive documents do contain classified information, please segregate all unclassified material within the classified documents, provide all unclassified information directly to the Committee, and provide a classified addendum to the Office of Senate Security.  Although the Committee complies with all laws and regulations governing the handling of classified information, it is not bound, absent its prior agreement, by any handling restrictions or instructions on unclassified information unilaterally asserted by the Executive Branch.
Thank you for your prompt attention to this important matter.  If you have any questions, please contact Patrick Davis of my Committee staff at (202) 224-5225.
Sincerely,
Charles E. Grassley
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
cc:
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Ranking Member
Senate Committee on the Judiciary

[1] Tom Hamburger and Rosalind Helderman, FBI Once Planned to Pay Former British Spy Who Authored Controversial Trump Dossier, The Washington Post (Feb. 28, 2017).

Rule Violations Meeting with Foreign Agents

Members of Congress meet with foreign diplomats and agents all the time. These encounters happen in Washington DC in government buildings or at social events. This also goes for journalists. When members of government travel abroad, they coordinate the travel with the State Department before and after their meetings. This is a long standing rule. All members of government meeting with foreign personnel must have an additional personnel in these interactions for witness reasons, checks and balances and there are strict conditions that are applied to these confabs. It is not uncommon for security personnel, a CIA representative or liaison officer to be included officially or in a cover role.

All U.S. officials, members of academia, think tanks and heads of domestic corporations follow a set of rules related to their contact with foreign officials. There are strict rules and prohibitions against contact with officials from countries with which we do not have official relations. North Korea and Iran for instance. Syria, Sudan, Lebanon, Afghanistan and China along with Russia have a second set of rules surrounding contact. Any U.S. official or military personnel meeting say with Russia, they are required to include the office of security and counterintelligence. Documenting the encounters are mandatory and the FBI and CIA are to be consulted for reasons of action or intentions.

Further, there is countless training and retraining that occurs for all U.S. personnel where any interaction with foreign services is required. Diplomatic settings, protocol and responsibilities are unique to countries due to relationships, culture, current policy objectives and respective titles of foreign agents.

For a view of foreign protocol, click here.

This brings us to meetings mentioned recently with the Russian ambassador, Sergey Kislyak by Trump representatives and those Democrats as well. If the rules are followed, there are records of the encounters. It is unclear whether those records are easily obtainable or access requires a FOIA request.

Image result for flynn dinner putin

So regarding General Flynn:

The Pentagon hasn’t found any documents indicating that Mike Flynn received authorization to accept money from a foreign government before traveling to Moscow in 2015 for a paid Russian state TV event, according to a letter from the acting Secretary of the Army.

The Pentagon finding came after lawmakers raised questions about whether the former White House national security adviser and retired U.S. Army general violated Pentagon rules that require retired officers to report income from foreign states.

Mr. Flynn accepted an invitation to Moscow in late 2015 to give a paid, sit-down interview with Russian state television network RT and to attend the channel’s 10-year anniversary gala, where he sat beside President Vladimir Putin.

The Department of the Army conducted “a thorough records search, and has not found any documents,” Acting Secretary of the Army Robert Speer said in a Feb. 14 letter in response to Rep. Elijah Cummings, a ranking Democrat on the House Oversight Committee, who asked the Pentagon whether Mr. Flynn received approval.

Image result for pelosi russia dinner

Yet we also have Nancy Pelosi, Steny Hoyer, Clair McCaskill, Chuck Schumer in addition to Jeff Sessions having sessions with the Russian ambassador. Were all of these interactions reported and did they too follow the diplomatic protocol rules? This is unclear.

Image result for pelosi russia Business Insider

As for the Trump advisory team, JD Gordon, Carter Page and Jared Kushner all had either formal or information meetings with the Russian ambassador. Since Rex Tillerson assumed the position of Secretary of State, there have been no daily press briefings where media can ask further questions in regard to read-outs on meetings. It has been radio silence at Foggy Bottom since Tillerson took over the State Department, but that is to change in coming days. It is unclear whether the resuming briefings will be on camera or in closed settings.

Tillerson is making his presence felt behind the scenes. He “has had 32 separate phone conversations with representatives of various countries, 15 in-person meetings with foreign interlocutors here in the United States, as well as calls and meetings with U.S. government personnel, showing a deep commitment to coordinating with the White House and other federal agencies and obtaining a diversity of perspectives on issues of public concern,” a spokesman said. The department also issues the occasional comment under Tillerson’s name, including congratulations to other countries on their national days. More here.