Category Archives: NSA Spying

Behpajooh and John Kerry

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At least four secret letters have been dispatched from the White House and sent to Iran. The full contents of the letters are still unknown except the most recent was revealed by the Wall Street Journal containing two items, points of collaboration over the ISIS war in Iraq and striking a final deal on the Iranian nuclear program.

Denials have been made by the White House that the United States was not working with Iran on the matter of Iraq as noted here. ‘Appearing on NBC’s “Meet the Press” last month, National Security Adviser Susan Rice said the U.S. wasn’t working with Iran on the fight against the Islamic State. “We are not in coordination or direct consultation with the Iranians about any aspect of the fight against ISIL,” Rice said, using an alternate acronym for the jihadist group. “It is a fact that, in Iraq, they also are supporting the Iraqis against ISIL, but we are not coordinating. We are doing this very differently and independently.”

After doing some deep research, it was found that under SecState John Kerry, nothing else matters when it comes to Iraq, Syria, Russia or Iran except gaining a nuclear deal with the help of the P5+1, a deal that has excluded the U.S. Congress and ALL allies in the Middle East.

The United States under the G. W. Bush administration worked a stealthy mission to halt the Iran program in coordination with Israel by creating and infecting the Iranian nuclear program with an undetected virus into the computers controlling the spinning centrifuges. Outside companies were identified and sanctions and later targeted via a thumb drive to infect the computer network to bring a halt to the cascading centrifuge system.

One such company was Behpajooh and there are many more, but all of these associated firms have been ignored by the State Department, Treasury, the interagency and the envoy working in cadence with John Kerry giving freedom to Iran to continue their program.

The betrayal of the State Department and the White House of allies and Congress is epic in nature, when this could lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, a long future of hostilities with Daesh and a much sooner launch of a nuclear weapon by Iran on their targeted enemies the little Satan and the big Satan, Israel and the United States.

Here is the story on how Stuxnet came to be. Clearly, the Bush administration and Israel were clandestine in this regard and the mission was successful. It now begs the question, will it happen again if a deal is reached by the November 24 deadline?

An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon

In January 2010, inspectors with the International Atomic Energy Agency visiting the Natanz uranium enrichment plant in Iran noticed that centrifuges used to enrich uranium gas were failing at an unprecedented rate. The cause was a complete mystery—apparently as much to the Iranian technicians replacing the centrifuges as to the inspectors observing them.

Five months later a seemingly unrelated event occurred. A computer security firm in Belarus was called in to troubleshoot a series of computers in Iran that were crashing and rebooting repeatedly. Again, the cause of the problem was a mystery. That is, until the researchers found a handful of malicious files on one of the systems and discovered the world’s first digital weapon.

Stuxnet, as it came to be known, was unlike any other virus or worm that came before. Rather than simply hijacking targeted computers or stealing information from them, it escaped the digital realm to wreak physical destruction on equipment the computers controlled.

Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon, written by WIRED senior staff writer Kim Zetter, tells the story behind Stuxnet’s planning, execution and discovery. In this excerpt from the book, which will be released November 11, Stuxnet has already been at work silently sabotaging centrifuges at the Natanz plant for about a year. An early version of the attack weapon manipulated valves on the centrifuges to increase the pressure inside them and damage the devices as well as the enrichment process. Centrifuges are large cylindrical tubes—connected by pipes in a configuration known as a “cascade”—that spin at supersonic speed to separate isotopes in uranium gas for use in nuclear power plants and weapons. At the time of the attacks, each cascade at Natanz held 164 centrifuges. Uranium gas flows through the pipes into the centrifuges in a series of stages, becoming further “enriched” at each stage of the cascade as isotopes needed for a nuclear reaction are separated from other isotopes and become concentrated in the gas.

As the excerpt begins, it’s June 2009—a year or so since Stuxnet was first released, but still a year before the covert operation will be discovered and exposed. As Iran prepares for its presidential elections, the attackers behind Stuxnet are also preparing their next assault on the enrichment plant with a new version of the malware. They unleash it just as the enrichment plant is beginning to recover from the effects of the previous attack. Their weapon this time is designed to manipulate computer systems made by the German firm Siemens that control and monitor the speed of the centrifuges. Because the computers are air-gapped from the internet, however, they cannot be reached directly by the remote attackers. So the attackers have designed their weapon to spread via infected USB flash drives. To get Stuxnet to its target machines, the attackers first infect computers belonging to five outside companies that are believed to be connected in some way to the nuclear program. The aim is to make each “patient zero” an unwitting carrier who will help spread and transport the weapon on flash drives into the protected facility and the Siemens computers. Although the five companies have been referenced in previous news reports, they’ve never been identified. Four of them are identified in this excerpt.

The Lead-Up to the 2009 Attack

The two weeks leading up to the release of the next attack were tumultuous ones in Iran. On June 12, 2009, the presidential elections between incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and challenger Mir-Hossein Mousavi didn’t turn out the way most expected. The race was supposed to be close, but when the results were announced—two hours after the polls closed—Ahmadinejad had won with 63 percent of the vote over Mousavi’s 34 percent. The electorate cried foul, and the next day crowds of angry protesters poured into the streets of Tehran to register their outrage and disbelief. According to media reports, it was the largest civil protest the country had seen since the 1979 revolution ousted the shah and it wasn’t long before it became violent. Protesters vandalized stores and set fire to trash bins, while police and Basijis, government-loyal militias in plainclothes, tried to disperse them with batons, electric prods, and bullets.

That Sunday, Ahmadinejad gave a defiant victory speech, declaring a new era for Iran and dismissing the protesters as nothing more than soccer hooligans soured by the loss of their team. The protests continued throughout the week, though, and on June 19, in an attempt to calm the crowds, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei sanctioned the election results, insisting that the margin of victory—11 million votes—was too large to have been achieved through fraud. The crowds, however, were not assuaged.

The next day, a twenty-six-year-old woman named Neda Agha-Soltan got caught in a traffic jam caused by protesters and was shot in the chest by a sniper’s bullet after she and her music teacher stepped out of their car to observe.

Two days later on June 22, a Monday, the Guardian Council, which oversees elections in Iran, officially declared Ahmadinejad the winner, and after nearly two weeks of protests, Tehran became eerily quiet. Police had used tear gas and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, and most of them were now gone from the streets. That afternoon, at around 4:30 p.m. local time, as Iranians nursed their shock and grief over events of the previous days, a new version of Stuxnet was being compiled and unleashed.

Recovery From Previous Attack

While the streets of Tehran had been in turmoil, technicians at Natanz had been experiencing a period of relative calm. Around the first of the year, they had begun installing new centrifuges again, and by the end of February they had about 5,400 of them in place, close to the 6,000 that Ahmadinejad had promised the previous year. Not all of the centrifuges were enriching uranium yet, but at least there was forward movement again, and by June the number had jumped to 7,052, with 4,092 of these enriching gas. In addition to the eighteen cascades enriching gas in unit A24, there were now twelve cascades in A26 enriching gas. An additional seven cascades had even been installed in A28 and were under vacuum, being prepared to receive gas.

The performance of the centrifuges was improving too. Iran’s daily production of low-enriched uranium was up 20 percent and would remain consistent throughout the summer of 2009. Despite the previous problems, Iran had crossed a technical milestone and had succeeded in producing 839 kilograms of low-enriched uranium—enough to achieve nuclear-weapons breakout capability. If it continued at this rate, Iran would have enough enriched uranium to make two nuclear weapons within a year. This estimate, however, was based on the capacity of the IR-1 centrifuges currently installed at Natanz. But Iran had already installed IR-2 centrifuges in a small cascade in the pilot plant, and once testing on these was complete and technicians began installing them in the underground hall, the estimate would have to be revised. The more advanced IR-2 centrifuges were more efficient. It took 3,000 IR-1s to produce enough uranium for a nuclear weapon in one year, but it would take just 1,200 IR-2 centrifuges to do the same.

Cue Stuxnet 1.001, which showed up in late June.

The Next Assault

To get their weapon into the plant, the attackers launched an offensive against computers owned by four companies. All of the companies were involved in industrial control and processing of some sort, either manufacturing products and assembling components or installing industrial control systems. They were all likely chosen because they had some connection to Natanz as contractors and provided a gateway through which to pass Stuxnet to Natanz through infected employees.

To ensure greater success at getting the code where it needed to go, this version of Stuxnet had two more ways to spread than the previous one. Stuxnet 0.5 could spread only by infecting Step 7 project files—the files used to program Siemens PLCs. This version, however, could spread via USB flash drives using the Windows Autorun feature or through a victim’s local network using the print-spooler zero-day exploit that Kaspersky Lab, the antivirus firm based in Russia, and Symantec later found in the code.

Based on the log files in Stuxnet, a company called Foolad Technic was the first victim. It was infected at 4:40 a.m. on June 23, a Tuesday. But then it was almost a week before the next company was hit.

The following Monday, about five thousand marchers walked silently through the streets of Tehran to the Qoba Mosque to honor victims killed during the recent election protests. Late that evening, around 11:20 p.m., Stuxnet struck machines belonging to its second victim—a company called Behpajooh.

It was easy to see why Behpajooh was a target. It was an engineering firm based in Esfahan—the site of Iran’s new uranium conversion plant, built to turn milled uranium ore into gas for enriching at Natanz, and was also the location of Iran’s Nuclear Technology Center, which was believed to be the base for Iran’s nuclear weapons development program. Behpajooh had also been named in US federal court documents in connection with Iran’s illegal procurement activities.

Behpajooh was in the business of installing and programming industrial control and automation systems, including Siemens systems. The company’s website made no mention of Natanz, but it did mention that the company had installed Siemens S7-400 PLCs, as well as the Step 7 and WinCC software and Profibus communication modules at a steel plant in Esfahan. This was, of course, all of the same equipment Stuxnet targeted at Natanz.

At 5:00 a.m. on July 7, nine days after Behpajooh was hit, Stuxnet struck computers at Neda Industrial Group, as well as a company identified in the logs only as CGJ, believed to be Control Gostar Jahed. Both companies designed or installed industrial control systems.

electrical systems for the oil and gas industry in Iran, as well as for power plants and mining and process facilities. In 2000 and 2001 the company had installed Siemens S7 PLCs in several gas pipeline operations in Iran and had also installed Siemens S7 systems at the Esfahan Steel Complex. Like Behpajooh, Neda had been identified on a proliferation watch list for its alleged involvement in illicit procurement activity and was named in a US indictment for receiving smuggled microcontrollers and other components.

About two weeks after it struck Neda, a control engineer who worked for the company popped up on a Siemens user forum on July 22 complaining about a problem that workers at his company were having with their machines. The engineer, who posted a note under the user name Behrooz, indicated that all PCs at his company were having an identical problem with a Siemens Step 7 .DLL file that kept producing an error message. He suspected the problem was a virus that spread via flash drives.

When he used a DVD or CD to transfer files from an infected system to a clean one, everything was fine, he wrote. But when he used a flash drive to transfer files, the new PC started having the same problems the other machine had. A USB flash drive, of course, was Stuxnet’s primary method of spreading. Although Behrooz and his colleagues scanned for viruses, they found no malware on their machines. There was no sign in the discussion thread that they ever resolved the problem at the time.

It’s not clear how long it took Stuxnet to reach its target after infecting machines at Neda and the other companies, but between June and August the number of centrifuges enriching uranium gas at Natanz began to drop. Whether this was the result solely of the new version of Stuxnet or the lingering effects of the previous version is unknown. But by August that year, only 4,592 centrifuges were enriching at the plant, a decrease of 328 centrifuges since June. By November, that number had dropped even further to 3,936, a difference of 984 in five months. What’s more, although new machines were still being installed, none of them were being fed gas.

Clearly there were problems with the cascades, and technicians had no idea what they were. The changes mapped precisely, however, to what Stuxnet was designed to do.

Reprinted from Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon Copyright © 2014 by Kim Zetter. Published by Crown Publishers, an imprint of Random House LLC.

 

No Definition for Terror

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I have no connections to anyone currently employed by the FBI but I do have several with former FBI’ers. Our formal and non-formal discussions are chilling when it comes to operations, assignments and investigations at the agency.

So FBI, here is a tip, this website http://islamophobia.org/ has listed names and organizations they deem as a threat to Islam. Is this some kind of hit list? What criteria creates such a list and is this approved by the FBI?

But take note FBI, those that are paying attention don’t feel safe in America. Your agency is doing little to sway our fears. Share that same sentiment with Jeh Johnson at DHS please.

It was a few years ago after doing some research and gathering evidence that I attempted to have a dialogue with the local FBI office, the agent on duty asked me if I was an Islamophobe and them hung up on me. It was clearly the time when the FBI was given an edict to be politically correct when it comes to investigations on Islam and all the manuals were stripped from the operating and training systems.

 

FBI Director Robert Mueller in 2012 capitulated with the American Muslim and Arab American lobby groups and announced that more than 700 documents and 300 presentations from training materials. Abed Ayoub was able to take a meeting with Mueller who represented groups including the Islamic Society of North America, Muslim Public Affairs Council, MPAC and CAIR. Included in the dialogue was also Thomas Perez of the DoJ’s Civil Rights Division. It all goes a step further as law enforcement agencies around the country are required to do Muslim outreach in a robust campaign of political correctness. No one in America is allowed to have independent thought regarding Islam, Muslims or terror as it is deemed offensive to Islam.

So in the meantime, America sadly has endured domestic terror attacks but government refuses to apply the term ‘terrorism’ instead using ‘work place violence’ as is noted in the Ft. Hood shooting by Major Nidal Hasan and beheading of Colleen Hufford in Moore, Oklahoma at the hands of Alton Nolen. The mosques are connected by a network of imams that are devoted followers of Anwar al Awlaki killed by an American drone in Yemen a few years ago. We cannot overlook the Tsarneav brothers the killers of the Boston bombing.

While we do have many that have left the shores of America to join Daesh we also witness the black flags and ISIS graffiti in many locations around the country. America also has agreements with many countries in a VISA waiver program, making it easier to made round trip journeys to rogue states like Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Yemen and Afghanistan.

So terror is here America and yet what does the FBI have to say or do about it? Crickets…

So when it comes to defining terror, here is a formal summary of the term. We can only hope that the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice will take note and behave and investigate accordingly.

Terrorism Defies Definition

by Daniel Pipes and Teri Blumenfeld The Washington Times October 24, 2014

http://www.meforum.org/4877/terrorism-defies-definition

 

Defining terrorism has practical implications because formally certifying an act of violence as terrorist has important consequences in U.S. law.

Terrorism suspects can be held longer than criminal suspects after arrest without an indictment They can be interrogated without a lawyer present. They receive longer prison sentences. “Terrorist inmates” are subject to many extra restrictions known as Special Administrative Measures, or SAMs. The “Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002” gives corporate victims of terrorism special breaks (it is currently up for renewal) and protects owners of buildings from certain lawsuits. When terrorism is invoked, families of victims, such as of the 2009 Ft. Hood attack, win extra benefits such as tax breaks, life insurance, and combat-related pay. They can even be handed a New York City skyscraper.

Despite the legal power of this term, however, terrorism remains undefined beyond a vague sense of “a non-state actor attacking civilian targets to spread fear for some putative political goal.” One study, Political Terrorism, lists 109 definitions. American security specialist David Tucker wryly remarks that “Above the gates of hell is the warning that all that who enter should abandon hope. Less dire but to the same effect is the warning given to those who try to define terrorism.” The Israeli counterterrorism specialist Boaz Ganor jokes that “The struggle to define terrorism is sometimes as hard as the struggle against terrorism itself.”

This lack of specificity wreaks chaos, especially among police, prosecutors, politicians, press, and professors.

“Violence carried out in connection with an internationally sanctioned terrorist group” such as Al-Qaeda, Hizbullah, or Hamas has become the working police definition of terrorism. This explains such peculiar statements after an attack as, “We have not found any links to terrorism,” which absurdly implies that “lone wolves” are never terrorists.

The whole world, except the U.S. Department of the Treasury, sees the Boston Marathon bombings as terrorism.

If they are not terrorists, the police must find other explanation to account for their acts of violence. Usually, they offer up some personal problem: insanity, family tensions, a work dispute, “teen immigrant angst,” a prescription drug, or even a turbulent airplane ride. Emphasizing personal demons over ideology, they focus on an perpetrator’s (usually irrelevant) private life, ignoring his far more significant political motives.

But then, inconsistently, they do not require some connection to an international group. When Oscar Ramiro Ortega-Hernandez shot eight rounds at the White House in November 2011, the U.S. attorney asserted that “Firing an assault rifle at the White House to make a political statement is terrorism, plain and simple” – no international terrorist group needed. Similarly, after Paul Anthony Ciancia went on a shooting spree at Los Angeles International Airport in November 2013, killing a TSA officer, the indictment accused him of “substantial planning and premeditation to cause the death of a person and to commit an act of terrorism.”

This terminological irregularity breeds utter confusion. The whole world calls the Boston Marathon bombings terrorism – except the Department of the Treasury, which, 1½ years on “has not determined that there has been an ‘act of terrorism’ under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act.” The judge presiding over the terrorism trial in January 2014 of Jose Pimentel, accused of planning to set off pipe bombs in Manhattan, denied the prosecution’s request for an expert to justify a charge of terrorism. Government officials sometimes just throw up their hands: Asked in June 2013 if the U.S. government considers the Taliban a terrorist group, the State Department spokeswoman replied “Well, I’m not sure how they’re defined at this particular moment.”

The U.S. Department of State has yet to figure out whether the Taliban are or are not terrorists.

A May 2013 shooting in New Orleans, which injured 19, was even more muddled. An FBI spokeswoman called it not terrorism but “strictly an act of street violence.” The mayor disagreed; asked if he considered it terrorism, he said “I think so,” because families “are afraid of going outside.” Challenged to disentangle this contradiction, a supervisory special agent in the FBI’s New Orleans field made matters even more opaque: “You can say this is definitely urban terrorism; it’s urban terror. But from the FBI standpoint and for what we deal with on a national level, it’s not what we consider terrorism, per se.” Got that?

This lack of clarity presents a significant public policy challenge. Terrorism, with all its legal and financial implications, cannot remain a vague, subjective concept but requires a precise and accurate definition, consistently applied.

After releasing the Taliban 5, matters are worse when it comes to Afghanistan, Syria Yemen, Qatar and Iraq. We witnessed carefully the hostilities between Israel and Hamas and then we watched the demonstrations in America and Europe of those standing in solidarity with Hamas. So, hey, FBI, if you are going to do outreach, it should be to those in America that don’t trust you or the lack of security we feel. Your agenda is misplaced and sadly I would think any agents would be demanding a pro-active objective against jihad in America have long memories. This is shameful.

 

 

 

Islamic State: Tech Savvy, Tactical, Barbaric

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We know that Islamic terror groups have been using chemical weapons to kill. We know they have been using prison tactics of the Holocaust to kill. We know they have been shooting with weapons to kill and we know they have been torturing and beheading without hesitation.

We need to know beyond the use of sophistication of global social media by al Nusra, al Qaeda and Daesh (ISIS), we must also come to understand the wide range of their knowledge and use of all internet applications against their enemies.

1. The terror networks know what countries pay ransom, how much they pay and who specifically to reach for negotiations.

2. The terror networks know how to match photos with dates and locations using Google features.

3. The terror networks know how to use LinkedIn, PowerPoint, Bots, thumb-drives.

4. The terror networks use an all cash financial system to avoid global banking tracing and tracking.

5. The terror networks know how to build address books, alter usernames and passwords on the fly and hide IP addresses.

6. The terror networks have members, fighters, technicians, tech geeks, bomb-makers, engineers, pilots, software programmers, tactical war-planners and smuggling access to anything.

7. The terror networks are effective at kidnapping, theft, buying and selling, investments, pysops, torture and have a tremendous knowledge of history.

8. The terror networks are smarter than you and smarter than you give them credit for being. They are adaptive, flexible, mobile, crafty and patient.

When it comes to kidnapping, torture, prison, waterboarding and beheading, this is a must read.

 

 

The Horror Before the Beheadings

ISIS Hostages Endured Torture and Dashed Hopes, Freed Cellmates Say

By RUKMINI CALLIMACHI

The hostages were taken out of their cell one by one.

In a private room, their captors asked each of them three intimate questions, a standard technique used to obtain proof that a prisoner is still alive in a kidnapping negotiation.

James Foley returned to the cell he shared with nearly two dozen other Western hostages and collapsed in tears of joy. The questions his kidnappers had asked were so personal (“Who cried at your brother’s wedding?” “Who was the captain of your high school soccer team?”) that he knew they were finally in touch with his family.

It was December 2013, and more than a year had passed since Mr. Foley vanished on a road in northern Syria. Finally, his worried parents would know he was alive, he told his fellow captives. His government, he believed, would soon negotiate his release.

What appeared to be a turning point was in fact the start of a downward spiral for Mr. Foley, a 40-year-old journalist, that ended in August when he was forced to his knees somewhere in the bald hills of Syria and beheaded as a camera rolled.

His videotaped death was a very public end to a hidden ordeal.

The story of what happened in the Islamic State’s underground network of prisons in Syria is one of excruciating suffering. Mr. Foley and his fellow hostages were routinely beaten and subjected to waterboarding. For months, they were starved and threatened with execution by one group of fighters, only to be handed off to another group that brought them sweets and contemplated freeing them. The prisoners banded together, playing games to pass the endless hours, but as conditions grew more desperate, they turned on one another. Some, including Mr. Foley, sought comfort in the faith of their captors, embracing Islam and taking Muslim names.

Their captivity coincided with the rise of the group that came to be known as the Islamic State out of the chaos of the Syrian civil war. It did not exist on the day Mr. Foley was abducted, but it slowly grew to become the most powerful and feared rebel movement in the region. By the second year of Mr. Foley’s imprisonment, the group had amassed close to two dozen hostages and devised a strategy to trade them for cash.

It was at that point that the hostages’ journeys, which had been largely similar up to then, diverged based on actions taken thousands of miles away: in Washington and Paris, in Madrid, Rome and beyond. Mr. Foley was one of at least 23 Western hostages from 12 countries, a majority of them citizens of European nations whose governments have a history of paying ransoms.

Their struggle for survival, which is being told now for the first time, was pieced together through interviews with five former hostages, locals who witnessed their treatment, relatives and colleagues of the captives, and a tight circle of advisers who made trips to the region to try to win their release. Crucial details were confirmed by a former member of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, who was initially stationed in the prison where Mr. Foley was held, and who provided previously unknown details of his captivity.

The ordeal has remained largely secret because the militants warned the hostages’ families not to go to the news media, threatening to kill their loved ones if they did. The New York Times is naming only those already identified publicly by the Islamic State, which began naming them in August.

Officials in the United States say they did everything in their power to save Mr. Foley and the others, including carrying out a failed rescue operation. They argue that the United States’ policy of not paying ransoms saves Americans’ lives in the long run by making them less attractive targets.

Inside their concrete box, the hostages did not know what their families or governments were doing on their behalf. They slowly pieced it together using the only information they had: their interactions with their guards and with one another. Mostly they suffered, waiting for any sign that they might escape with their lives.

The Grab

It was only a 40-minute drive to the Turkish border, but Mr. Foley decided to make one last stop.

In Binesh, Syria, two years ago, Mr. Foley and his traveling companion, the British photojournalist John Cantlie, pulled into an Internet cafe to file their work. The two were no strangers to the perils of reporting in Syria. Only a few months earlier, Mr. Cantlie had been kidnapped a few dozen miles from Binesh. He had tried to escape, barefoot and handcuffed, running for his life as bullets kicked up the dirt, only to be caught again. He was released a week later after moderate rebels intervened.

They were uploading their images when a man walked in.

“He had a big beard,” said Mustafa Ali, their Syrian translator, who was with them and recounted their final hours together. “He didn’t smile or say anything. And he looked at us with evil eyes.”

The man “went to the computer and sat for one minute only, and then left directly,” Mr. Ali said. “He wasn’t Syrian. He looked like he was from the Gulf.”

Mr. Foley, an American freelance journalist filing for GlobalPost and Agence France-Presse, and Mr. Cantlie, a photographer for British newspapers, continued transmitting their footage, according to Mr. Ali, whose account was confirmed by emails the journalists sent from the cafe to a colleague waiting for them in Turkey.

More than an hour later, they flagged a taxi for the 25-mile drive to Turkey. They never reached the border.

The gunmen who sped up behind their taxi did not call themselves the Islamic State because the group did not yet exist on Nov. 22, 2012, the day the two men were grabbed.

But the danger of Islamic extremism was already palpable in Syria’s rebel-held territories, and some news organizations were starting to pull back. Among the red flags was the growing number of foreign fighters flooding into Syria, dreaming of establishing a “caliphate.” These jihadists, many of them veterans of Al Qaeda’s branch in Iraq, looked and behaved differently from the moderate rebels. They wore their beards long. And they spoke with foreign accents, coming from the Persian Gulf, North Africa, Europe and beyond.

A van sped up on the left side of the taxi and cut it off. Masked fighters jumped out. They screamed in foreign-accented Arabic, telling the journalists to lie on the pavement. They handcuffed them and threw them into the van.

They left Mr. Ali on the side of the road. “If you follow us, we’ll kill you,” they told him.

Over the next 14 months, at least 23 foreigners, most of them freelance journalists and aid workers, would fall into a similar trap. The attackers identified the locals whom journalists hired to help them, like Mr. Ali and Yosef Abobaker, a Syrian translator. It was Mr. Abobaker who drove Steven J. Sotloff, an American freelance journalist, into Syria on Aug. 4, 2013.

“We were driving for only 20 minutes when I saw three cars stopped on the road ahead,” he said. “They must have had a spy on the border that saw my car and told them I was coming.”

The kidnappings, which were carried out by different groups of fighters jousting for influence and territory in Syria, became more frequent. In June 2013, four French journalists were abducted. In September, the militants grabbed three Spanish journalists.

Checkpoints became human nets, and last October, insurgents waited at one for Peter Kassig, 25, an emergency medical technician from Indianapolis who was delivering medical supplies. In December, Alan Henning, a British taxi driver, disappeared at another. Mr. Henning had cashed in his savings to buy a used ambulance, hoping to join an aid caravan to Syria. He was kidnapped 30 minutes after crossing into the country.

The last to vanish were five aid workers from Doctors Without Borders, who were plucked in January from the field hospital in rural Syria where they had been working.

The Interrogation

At gunpoint, Mr. Sotloff and Mr. Abobaker were driven to a textile factory in a village outside Aleppo, Syria, where they were placed in separate cells. Mr. Abobaker, who was freed two weeks later, heard their captors take Mr. Sotloff into an adjoining room.

Then he heard the Arabic-speaking interrogator say in English: “Password.”

It was a process to be repeated with several other hostages. The kidnappers seized their laptops, cellphones and cameras and demanded the passwords to their accounts. They scanned their Facebook timelines, their Skype chats, their image archives and their emails, looking for evidence of collusion with Western spy agencies and militaries.

“They took me to a building that was specifically for the interrogation,” said Marcin Suder, a 37-year-old Polish photojournalist kidnapped in July 2013 in Saraqib, Syria, where the jihadists were known to be operating. He was passed among several groups before managing to escape four months later.

“They checked my camera,” Mr. Suder said. “They checked my tablet. Then they undressed me completely. I was naked. They looked to see if there was a GPS chip under my skin or in my clothes. Then they started beating me. They Googled ‘Marcin Suder and C.I.A.,’ ‘Marcin Suder and K.G.B.’ They accused me of being a spy.”

Mr. Suder — who was never told the name of the group holding him, and who never met the other hostages because he escaped before they were transferred to the same location — remarked on the typically English vocabulary his interrogators had used.

During one session, they kept telling him he had been “naughty” — a word that hostages who were held with Mr. Foley also recalled their guards’ using during the most brutal torture.

It was in the course of these interrogations that the jihadists found images of American military personnel on Mr. Foley’s laptop, taken during his assignments in Afghanistan and Iraq.

“In the archive of photographs he had personally taken, there were images glorifying the American crusaders,” they wrote in an article published after Mr. Foley’s death. “Alas for James, this archive was with him at the time of his arrest.”

A British hostage, David Cawthorne Haines, was forced to acknowledge his military background: It was listed on his LinkedIn profile.

The militants also discovered that Mr. Kassig, the aid worker from Indiana, was a former Army Ranger and a veteran of the Iraq war. Both facts are easy to find online, because CNN featured Mr. Kassig’s humanitarian work prominently before his capture.

The punishment for any perceived offense was torture.

“You could see the scars on his ankles,” Jejoen Bontinck, 19, of Belgium, a teenage convert to Islam who spent three weeks in the summer of 2013 in the same cell as Mr. Foley, said of him. “He told me how they had chained his feet to a bar and then hung the bar so that he was upside down from the ceiling. Then they left him there.”

Mr. Bontinck, who was released late last year, spoke about his experiences for the first time for this article in his hometown, Antwerp, where he is one of 46 Belgian youths on trial on charges of belonging to a terrorist organization.

At first, the abuse did not appear to have a larger purpose. Nor did the jihadists seem to have a plan for their growing number of hostages.

Mr. Bontinck said Mr. Foley and Mr. Cantlie had first been held by the Nusra Front, a Qaeda affiliate. Their guards, an English-speaking trio whom they nicknamed “the Beatles,” seemed to take pleasure in brutalizing them.

Later, they were handed over to a group called the Mujahedeen Shura Council, led by French speakers.

Mr. Foley and Mr. Cantlie were moved at least three times before being transferred to a prison underneath the Children’s Hospital of Aleppo.

It was in this building that Mr. Bontinck, then only 18, met Mr. Foley. At first, Mr. Bontinck was a fighter, one of thousands of young Europeans drawn to the promise of jihad. He later ran afoul of the group when he received a text message from his worried father back in Belgium and his commander accused him of being a spy.

The militants dragged him into a basement room with pale brown walls. Inside were two very thin, bearded foreigners: Mr. Foley and Mr. Cantlie.

For the next three weeks, when the call to prayer sounded, all three stood.

Mr. Foley converted to Islam soon after his capture and adopted the name Abu Hamza, Mr. Bontinck said. (His conversion was confirmed by three other recently released hostages, as well as by his former employer.)

“I recited the Quran with him,” Mr. Bontinck said. “Most people would say, ‘Let’s convert so that we can get better treatment.’ But in his case, I think it was sincere.”

Former hostages said that a majority of the Western prisoners had converted during their difficult captivity. Among them was Mr. Kassig, who adopted the name Abdul-Rahman, according to his family, who learned of his conversion in a letter smuggled out of the prison.

Only a handful of the hostages stayed true to their own faiths, including Mr. Sotloff, then 30, a practicing Jew. On Yom Kippur, he told his guards he was not feeling well and refused his food so he could secretly observe the traditional fast, a witness said.

Those recently released said that most of the foreigners had converted under duress, but that Mr. Foley had been captivated by Islam. When the guards brought an English version of the Quran, those who were just pretending to be Muslims paged through it, one former hostage said. Mr. Foley spent hours engrossed in the text.

His first set of guards, from the Nusra Front, viewed his professed Islamic faith with suspicion. But the second group holding him seemed moved by it. For an extended period, the abuse stopped. Unlike the Syrian prisoners, who were chained to radiators, Mr. Foley and Mr. Cantlie were able to move freely inside their cell.

Mr. Bontinck had a chance to ask the prison’s emir, a Dutch citizen, whether the militants had asked for a ransom for the foreigners. He said they had not.

“He explained there was a Plan A and a Plan B,” Mr. Bontinck said. The journalists would be put under house arrest, or they would be conscripted into a jihadist training camp. Both possibilities suggested that the group was planning to release them.

One day, their guards brought them a gift of chocolates.

When Mr. Bontinck was released, he jotted down the phone number of Mr. Foley’s parents and promised to call them. They made plans to meet again.

He left thinking that the journalists, like him, would soon be freed.

A Terrorist State

The Syrian civil war, previously dominated by secular rebels and a handful of rival jihadist groups, was shifting decisively, and the new extremist group had taken a dominant position. Sometime last year, the battalion in the Aleppo hospital pledged allegiance to what was then called the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Other factions of fighters joined forces with the group, whose tactics were so extreme that even Al Qaeda expelled it from its terror network. Its ambitions went far beyond toppling Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s president.

Late last year, the jihadists began pooling their prisoners, bringing them to the same location underneath the hospital. By January, there were at least 19 men in one 20-square-meter cell (about 215 square feet) and four women in an adjoining one. All but one of them were European or North American. The relative freedom that Mr. Foley and Mr. Cantlie had enjoyed came to an abrupt end. Each prisoner was now handcuffed to another.

More worrying was the fact that their French-speaking guards were replaced by English-speaking ones. Mr. Foley recognized them with dread.

Continue Reading here.

Kerry, Pro-Centric Mission Centrifuges

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Nothing else matters to the White House or to John Kerry than that of coming away with a nuclear deal with Iran as summarized here.

As November 24, the deal expiration dates gets closer, Iran continues to enjoy more red-carpet treatment rolled out by John Kerry and his hand-selected team.

Meanwhile, it is important to know what Iran is really doing while all these talks go on and get extended.

 

Iran began installing two cascades of advanced centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz. As of August 28, 2011, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran had installed 136 IR-2m centrifuges in cascade 5 and 27 IR-4 centrifuges in cascade 4. Iran started feeding 54 of the 136 IR-2m centrifuges with natural uranium hexafluoride.1  Each of these cascades is designed to contain 164 centrifuges. Iran first told the IAEA in January 2011 that it intended to install these two cascades, and it is unclear why Iran waited nearly eight months before starting to install them.

Installation of the IR-2m centrifuges is now complete. Installation of the IR-4 centrifuges could finish anytime.

The IR-2m and the IR-4 centrifuges have the same length and diameter. They are derived from the Pakistani P2 centrifuge design that A.Q. Khan sold Iran in the 1990s. Iran subsequently modified this design (see figures 1 and 2). The IR-2m rotor is made of two carbon fiber rotor sections or tubes and a maraging steel bellows. The IR-4 has two carbon fiber tubes connected by a carbon fiber bellows, an unusual choice likely reflecting a shortage of maraging steel.  Both centrifuge designs use a top and bottom bearing and a motor taken from the P2 design.

Khan found that the P2 design worked considerably better than the P1 centrifuge, suffering far fewer failures. Similarly, the IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges are expected to have fewer breakdowns than the IR-1 centrifuges currently at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant that are copies of the P1 centrifuge. However, as is discussed below, these centrifuges may not perform as expected.

 

It must also be understood, however that the talks with Iran should such an agreement be reach, will not be under the title of treaty or agreement such that it would go to Congress to be approved and members of Congress already know this. They are worried to the point that several have introduced legislation to prevent advancement of the Iranian nuclear program and are poised to re-install many sanctions that the Obama administration has suspended. The White House and the State Department are looking for methods to completely excluded allies but most of all our own Congress from the comprehensive details of the nuclear deal and from subsequently voting on accepting or opposing the deal completely. This speaks to the Obama administration having its own exclusive authority. In fact it is so disturbing, even the New York Times spells it out with concerns.

WASHINGTON — No one knows if the Obama administration will manage in the next five weeks to strike what many in the White House consider the most important foreign policy deal of his presidency: an accord with Iran that would forestall its ability to make a nuclear weapon. But the White House has made one significant decision: If agreement is reached, President Obama will do everything in his power to avoid letting Congress vote on it.

But Mr. Obama cannot permanently terminate those sanctions. Only Congress can take that step. And even if Democrats held on to the Senate next month, Mr. Obama’s advisers have concluded they would probably lose such a vote.

“We wouldn’t seek congressional legislation in any comprehensive agreement for years,” one senior official said.

White House officials say Congress should not be surprised by this plan. They point to testimony earlier this year when top negotiators argued that the best way to assure that Iran complies with its obligations is a step-by-step suspension of sanctions — with the implicit understanding that the president could turn them back on as fast as he turned them off.

Nothing on the other side of the horizon is more dangerous than Kerry and his army right now leading the charge to get a pen in the hands of Iran.

 

It is Qatar, Stupid: Part 2

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If you live in Houston, the person next to you may be a Qatari either in country for medical care or working for a petroleum company either owned or partially owned by Qatar like Golden Pass Products.

If you live in Chicago, you may have dinner at the Radisson Blu Aqua Hotel, owned by the Qatar Investment Authority. If you live in Washington DC, you may work or live at City Center, a fully owned Qatar real estate development.

If you walk through airports in Houston, Washington DC, New York or Chicago, you will see arrival and departure gates for Qatar Airlines. If your children are in university and want to learn Arabic, they are doing so with foreign language departments paid for in full by Qatar. In other classes, your son or daughter may be sitting next to a Qatari student or your child may have never been accepted to the school of their choice as that place was handed over to a foreign student instead getting in-State tuition. It should be noted that Sheik al Mayassa al Thani was educated both at Duke University and Columbia. He runs the Qatari Foundation that has it’s headquarters at City Center in Washington DC.

If you happen to work at a cargo port or two or more that imports natural gas, you may be employed by Qatar. One reason for terminating the Export Import Bank is due in part that the U.S. invests $2 billion in loan guarantees in a country that has an established wealth within the top world ranking, yet the bank supports operations for natural gas in Qatar that supplies Japan, India and the UK, such that the United Kingdom has enjoyed a $33 billion investment by Qatar that Great Britain received 85% of their natgas from Qatar.

 

Now, the United States has had a relationship with Qatar since the 1990’s and since that time, the al Thani monarchy has toggled their foreign policy relationships for many years, meaning they are manipulating for the sake of moving into a higher regional power.

This toggle/manipulation agenda is described as removing Bashir al Assad from power but yet Qatar works diligently with Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Taliban and Barack Obama has and is deferring all negotiations with those terror groups to the al Thani monarchy.

With a population of just 2.0 million, it should be noted that each resident is way above the norm for wealth and the style of living is so luxurious that up to 20% of those that live in Qatar are foreign nationals.

Qatar maintains a Shura council for day to day domestic policy and law enforcement. Political parties in Qatar are forbidden completely and their own Constitution is thin on substance, checks and balances and protections except for the monarchy ruling family and party.

When it comes to the United States and the ‘defensive’ component, sure America has CENTCOM part two there but another key military asset is al Udeid base that is designed to support efforts in Afghanistan, and this base has been expanded from the original footprint by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Secretary Chuck Hagel just recently extended a joint military cooperation agreement with Qatar for another ten years. At this location, the United States trains the Qatari military paid for by U.S. grants.

 

France is the largest exporter of arms to Qatar and Qatar maintains a large inventory of ‘stinger’ missiles which are sold, traded and smuggled through a black market. There are real questions that need to be answered as to why Qatar has received and bought huge numbers of various and high tech-based military assets for a military that is quite small in scale and without knowing the real outside threat to their sovereignty and safety.

While that U.S. State Department has maintained a very wide, deep and comprehensive list of terror groups, it is well known by the State Department that Qatar has key people that support these terror groups and coordinate donations from outside sources. Due in part to negotiations of the Iranian nuclear program, the Taliban, Gitmo and al Qaeda, Secretary Hillary Clinton and now John Kerry only mention these matters in passing to Qatar just to get it on the record, but otherwise nothing outside a feeble attempt to pinpoint these illicit activities has created any traction as our NSC and State needs Qatar for nefarious objectives as has been noted least of which is the Taliban 5.

The illicit activities include the facts that the Taliban 5 live in ClubMed conditions, Khalid Sheik Mohammed was provided safe haven in Qatar, Khaled Mashaal, the leader of Hamas lives fully protected in Doha and Yusuf al Qaradawi, a very old man, lives in Qatar running the Syrian and Egyptian Islamic jihad. Only recently did Qatar dispel a few Muslim Brotherhood leaders to Syria but they are well protected and other Muslim Brotherhood leadership remains in Qatar with funding continuing as it began during the Arab Spring from the elitists in Qatar. At the core of support for the Muslim Brotherhood objectives in Qatar is Emir Tamin bin Hamad. These objectives include construction projects in Gaza including electrical power plants.

Then in closing there is yet another satellite headquarters for Qatari investments that is located in Switzerland named the al Karana Foundation. This effort is led by Abdelrahman bin Umayer al Nuaymi and is well known to the global banking system(s) while no one dares to either challenge or exam the connections, transactions or causes that mostly will translate to funding going to terror groups that includes al Nusra and the Ennahda Party in Tunisia.

So you see ladies and gentlemen, dollars and terrorism is in fact a global enterprise that occurs even in alleged neutral countries, or are they in fact neutral?

First article on Qatar:  https://founderscode.com/?p=738