President Trump and ZTE

There has to be an explanation for President Trump’s interest in saving jobs at ZTE.

In Concession, Trump Will Help China's ZTE 'Get Back Into ... photo

Could it be part of a trade issue with China to ensure China continues pressure on North Korea? Could it be to keep American intellectual property protected in some obscure plot where China continues to steal intelligence to eventually control all 5G?

The 2019 NDAA includes a provision to prohibit ZTE and Huawei use in the United States.

Reuters: “I hope the administration does not move forward on this supposed deal I keep reading about,” Republican Senator Marco Rubio said. Bilateral talks between the world’s two biggest economies resume in Washington this week.

The Wall Street Journal has reported Beijing would back away from threats to slap tariffs on U.S. farm goods in exchange for easing the ban on selling components to ZTE.

“They are basically conducting an all-out assault to steal what we’ve already developed and use it as the baseline for their development so they can supplant us as the leader in the most important technologies of the 21st century,” Rubio said at a Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Asia policy.

Trump had taken to Twitter on Sunday with a pledge to help the company, which has suspended its main operations, because the penalties had cost too many jobs in China. It was a departure for a president who often touts “America First” policies.

The Commerce Department in April found ZTE had violated a 2017 settlement created after the company violated sanctions on Iran and North Korea, and banned U.S. companies from providing exports to ZTE for seven years.

U.S. companies are estimated to provide 25 percent to 30 percent of components used in ZTE’s equipment, which includes smartphones and gear to build telecommunications networks.

The suggestion outraged members of Congress who have been pressing for more restrictions on ZTE. Some U.S. lawmakers have alleged equipment made by ZTE and other Chinese companies could pose a cyber security threat.

“Who makes unilateral concessions on the eve of talks after you’ve spent all this time trying to say, correctly in my view, that the Chinese have ripped off our technology?” Senator Ron Wyden, the senior Democrat on the Senate Finance Committee, which oversees trade policy, told Reuters.

Wyden, who is also on the Intelligence Committee, was one of 32 Senate Democrats who signed a letter on Tuesday accusing Trump of putting China’s interests ahead of U.S. jobs and national security.

The company has denied wrongdoing.

Republican Representative Mac Thornberry, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said at a Bloomberg event on Tuesday he did not expect lawmakers would seek to remove a ban on ZTE technology from a must-pass annual defense policy bill making its way through Congress.

“I confess I don’t fully understand the administration’s take on this at this point,” Thornberry said. “It is not a question to me of economics, it is a question of security.”

Consider:

Axios: President Trump’s desire to help save ZTE could set the tone for the treatment of another Chinese telecom company that’s under investigation for sanctions violations, Axios’ Erica Pandey writes.

The backdrop:

  • ZTE has been found guilty of breaking U.S. law three times, including violating sanctions by selling equipment with American parts to Iran and North Korea.
  • The Pentagon has banned the sale of ZTE and Huawei phones at retail stores on military bases, citing concerns that the companies are using their devices to spy on military personnel.
  • ZTE and Huawei are both key players in China’s race to dominate 5G and the future of mobile communication. The Chinese Communist Party is painting U.S. moves against the Chinese phone makers as efforts to knock China out of the 5G race.

Between the lines: “Ross had a color wheel of approaches [on ZTE] ranging from a handslap to breaking them as a company,” says Chris Johnson, a former CIA China analyst who’s now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

  • The Chinese might have stomached a slap on the wrist, but by banning American companies from selling parts to ZTE, Ross served up a punishment harsh enough to halt operations. China in turn made ZTE a top trade priority and used its massive leverage to potentially sway the president.

Why it matters: China could use Trump’s apparent pivot on ZTE as a stepping stone to free Huawei. Or the ZTE case could be a lesson for the U.S. in negotiating with China.

How the ZTE deal could fare:

  • “The U.S. and China are closing in on a deal that would give China’s ZTE Corp. a reprieve from potentially crippling U.S. sanctions in exchange for Beijing removing tariffs on billions of dollars of U.S. agricultural products, said people in both countries briefed on the deal,” the Wall Street Journal’s Lingling Wei and Bob Davis report.
  • Steven Mnuchin is leading the U.S. in negotiating a deal that puts the brakes on actions against ZTE in exchange for China buying down its trade surplus, reports Axios’ Jonathan Swan.
  • China’s trade negotiator, Liu He, is in DC today. Axios contributor Bill Bishop hears that Liu will arrive “with an open checkbook to buy down the deficit but that progress on anything structural will be much harder.”

The bottom line: Taking the toughest possible approach to China might not be the smartest when the Asian power is stronger than ever and prepared to fight back.

 

Trump Kim Talks now in Jeopardy, Developing

The United States and South Korea do military drills often and Kim Jung Un was well aware of those planned stating the drills were a rehearsal for an invasion. Further, North Korea has canceled talks with South Korea. The Kim regime is making yet another demand stating the United States must be careful about deliberations and the summit itself due to the ‘ruckus’ over the drills.

This all comes from the conclusion of the meeting that North Korea has with China.

Meanwhile:

Sperimentazione allertamento test nucleare ...

That nuclear test site that North Korea has declared inoperable and where media has been invited to see the dismantling of the site and tunnels may not be the only site and no one is speaking of other sites but should be. Why? Well Iran refuses to declared PMD (possible military dimension) sites that are part of the nuclear development plan. Since Iran and North Korea have long collaborated on nuclear programs, it stands to reason North Korea has other sites as well.

***

Ahead of the April 27 inter-Korean summit, NGA published a separate assessment that North Korea had started dismantling significant components and structures associated with nuclear test observation at Punggye-ri.

 

The North’s decision not only came before Kim Jong-un’s first meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae-in at Panmunjom, but also before the first-ever U.S.-North Korea summit meeting, scheduled for June 12 in Singapore.

Satellite imagery published by 38 North on Monday, May 14, provides open source corroboration of significant changes near the northern, western, and southern portals leading into the underground tunnel network that composes the Punggye-ri test site.

North Korea watchers Jeffrey Lewis and Dave Schmerler of the Monterey Institute of International Studies have also observed the dismantling of structures around the Punggye-ri test site. Lewis and his team created a 3D model offering an impression of the horizontal tunnel network at the Punggye-ri test site.

North Korea’s work to dismantle structures at the test site comes ahead of its announced intention to invite journalists and experts from China, Russia, South Korea, the United States, and the United Kingdom to observe the site’s dismantlement between May 23 and May 25.

A report published over the weekend by the country’s outward-facing state media, the Korean Central News Agency, said that the event would be to “ensure transparency of discontinuance of the nuclear test (sic).” U.S. President Donald Trump called Kim’s move a “very smart and gracious gesture” in a tweet.

The same report specified the process for the site’s disabling, which would include the collapsing of tunnels — presumably with explosives — and the removal of observation and research facilities. U.S. intelligence assessments suggest that much of the latter work will have been completed prior to the arrival of foreign observers.

The DIA and NGA assessments leave open the possibility that North Korea’s planned modifications to the test site next week could significantly extend the period of time necessary to restore Punggye-ri to a usable state.

Following Kim’s announcement that the Punggye-ri site will be shut down, international observers, including the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization’s (CTBTO) executive secretary, Lassina Zerbo, welcomed the announcement. Kim has not specified whether the CTBTO will be invited to verify the closure of the nuclear test site.

North Korea is the only country known to have conducted full-yield tests of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. Kim Jong-un has not expressed an interest in signing the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, which has yet to enter into force.

With six nuclear tests, North Korea likely has a useful set of data that it can use to continue refining its nuclear weapons designs. The U.S. intelligence community has, with consensus, determined as of mid-2017 that North Korea is capable of mounting compact nuclear weapons atop its larger ballistic missiles, including its intercontinental-range ballistic missiles that threaten the continental United States.

In the same report to the Workers’ Party of Korea’s 7th Central Committee where Kim first acknowledged that Punggye-ri’s mission had come to an end, that North Korean leader, for the first time, publicly acknowledged that North Korea had conducted sub-critical nuclear weapons testing.

North Korea has not made any concessions on its sub-critical testing program, which will likely continue at its Nuclear Weapons Institute. Continued sub-critical testing would allow North Korea to maintain its existing weapons and refine their performance.

RCD: With the location and date of the forthcoming summit between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong‑un now fixed, speculation has turned to what sort of agreement might be achievable. US National Security Advisor John Bolton recently suggested that the ‘Libyan model’ of nuclear disarmament—from 2003–2004—might offer a framework that could be applied to North Korea in 2018.

The suggestion received what might kindly be called a mixed reception, not least because the North Koreans believe that Muammar al-Qaddafi was a fool to abandon his nuclear program. Still, I’d like to explore the Libyan case here because it offers one of the few examples of ‘denuclearisation’ that we have.

True, the two cases are markedly dissimilar: Libya, unlike North Korea, had made relatively little progress towards nuclear weapons when its leadership took the strategic decision to abandon the program. The Libyans had no nuclear weapons. Yes, they had a small number of centrifuges—some still in their original packing—and a quantity of uranium hexafluoride (the feedstock for a centrifuge enrichment cascade).

More ominously, they had a nuclear weapon design, apparently obtained from the A.Q. Khan network—although some Libyans claimed that the design was a ‘bonus’ intended as a reward for their other purchases.

But when US officials appeared before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early 2004 to talk about the disarmament effort, senators were at least as interested in the detailed picture of the nuclear black market that the Libyan program revealed as they were in the program itself. While a raft of fascinating material about the program had suddenly spilled forth, it was the procurement trail, stretching from Libya to Pakistan and Malaysia, that the committee chairman, Senator Richard Lugar, referred to as ‘the treasure trove’.

While North Korea’s current indigenous capabilities are far stronger than Libya’s were 15 years ago, one suspects there would be similar interest in Washington today about Pyongyang’s proliferation links.

Further, there are some aspects of the Libyan model that the current US administration might want to replicate in any deal with North Korea. Two of those aspects concern access and relocation. US and British experts were given extraordinary access to the Libyan weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. See the statements made in 2004 by Paula DeSutter, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, to two congressional committees (here and here) and, separately, in an interview with Arms Control Today:

The Libyans said, ‘We are no longer going to have a nuclear weapons program.’ They invited the United States and the United Kingdom in. They gave the United States and the United Kingdom access to all facilities that we requested to see. They were willing to permit any tests that we wanted to conduct. They were willing to have their centrifuge program removed … They have been very forthcoming.

In the chemical weapons area, we assisted them in drafting their declaration to the OPCW [Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons]. They had the OPCW technical secretariat come in. On one occasion they said, ‘You know, we really hadn’t told the others that came before, but there are some other munitions we need to show you.’ They took us to a facility that we almost certainly would not have been able to identify independently and showed us the unfilled munitions there. That is transparency. That is the kind of access that we are given when a country has made a strategic commitment. They volunteer information.

Some sources suggest that the procedure was not quite as straightforward as that passage of text implies. William Tobey, for example, argues that Libyan commitment and transparency varied on a day-to-day basis, at least in the early months. (See Tobey’s five-part series in the Bulletin of the Atomic ScientistsPart 1Part 2Part 3Part 4 and Part 5, and his 2017 assessment of intelligence and policy cooperation in the Libyan disarmament case.)

It was because of that variability that the Americans wanted to relocate key parts of the WMD program quickly. The most proliferation-sensitive parts of the program—equipment and documents—were airlifted to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. The nuclear weapon design documents, revealed to the Americans on 20 January, were flown out of the country two days later.

During the night of 25–26 January 2004, an American C-17, its insignia painted over, landed at an air base near Tripoli, loaded its cargo—including advanced centrifuge rotors, five Scud‑C missile guidance sets and two tons of uranium hexafluoride—and took off again. Later, in March 2004, another 1,000 tons of materials and equipment were loaded aboard a US ship, the Industrial Challenger, its insignia again painted over, and taken to America.

Is that what President Trump is going to propose to Kim Jong‑un? Media sources say that the US has asked North Korea to ‘discard’ the data from its nuclear weapon development program and allow its nuclear scientists to emigrate. Of course, the manner—and direction—in which that data might be discarded is a non-trivial issue.

And emigration would, of course, be a humane solution to an intractable problem: that even after the weapons are gone and the data has been discarded, the knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles will still exist in the minds of North Korea’s scientists. I don’t imagine, though, that Washington wants those scientists heading to the Middle East. Russia and China might be acceptable destinations. People say that Tennessee is nice this time of year.

As was the case with the Libyan deal, the US is also arguing that this is an opportunity for North Korea to abandon not merely its nuclear program, but all of its WMD. Still, nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles seem likely to be the core of any deal.

On ballistic missiles, a key US objective in 2003–2004 was to ensure that Libya’s missile program was compliant with the thresholds set out in the Missile Technology Control Regime—namely, that its missiles were limited in their range to a maximum of 300 kilometres and in their payload to a maximum of 500 kilograms.

In short, the Libyan model sets high standards in relation to the exposure of proliferation linkages; provision of access to sites, personnel and materials; relocation of key items; and acceptance of international standards on WMD. Can an agreement with Pyongyang meet those standards? Frankly, it seems unlikely.

The Libyan model, after all, had one driver that might not be equally compelling in the North Korean case: the strategic commitment by the leadership to put aside WMD. Because of that commitment, the model unfolded quickly and the verification hurdles proved surmountable.

A similar level of strategic commitment on Kim Jong‑un’s part is what the Americans are hoping to find in Singapore on 12 June. The Trump administration is certainly signallingthat this is their desired approach.

 

Secretly John Kerry Traveling to Save the Iran Deal

Secret Diplomacy - Obama: The Price of Hope Video ... photo

DIPLOMACY WORKS is John Kerry’s operation. In February he spoke at the Munich Security Conference. While declaring he is a great friend of Israel and that Iran does present threats, Kerry declares we did not concede anything with regard to the missile components inside the agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Who are some of the ‘experts’ that collaborate on policy at Diplomacy Works?

Ernest Moniz, Siegfried Hecker, Federica Mogherini, Richard Lugar, and even Theresa May. We can add in Ephrai Halevy, Colin Powell and Mike Breen. On the ADVISORY COUNCIL at Diplomacy Works beyond John Kerry is Antony Blinken, Wendy Sherman, Nicholas Burns, Michele Flournoy, Puneet Talwar, Colin Kahl, Robert Malley, David Wade, Jon Finer, Jen Psaki and Jeff Prescott.

John Kerry and his team are working the channels hard to preserve the Iran nuclear deal and that includes having the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres on his side.

It is curious there is no mention of Global Zero or Ploughshares on the Diplomacy Works website, nor is Ben Rhodes or others from the Obama administration mentioned such as Susan Rice or John Brennan.

Iran sanctions lifted after Tehran complies with nuclear deal.

So, what about John’s travels? Given what the Boston Globe provided, it appears John is a commissioned paid sales representative to Iran….

WASHINGTON — John Kerry’s bid to save one of his most significant accomplishments as secretary of state took him to New York on a Sunday afternoon two weeks ago, where, more than a year after he left office, he engaged in some unusual shadow diplomacy with a top-ranking Iranian official.

He sat down at the United Nations with Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to discuss ways of preserving the pact limiting Iran’s nuclear weapons program. It was the second time in about two months that the two had met to strategize over salvaging a deal they spent years negotiating during the Obama administration, according to a person briefed on the meetings.

With the Iran deal facing its gravest threat since it was signed in 2015, Kerry has been on an aggressive yet stealthy mission to preserve it, using his deep lists of contacts gleaned during his time as the top US diplomat to try to apply pressure on the Trump administration from the outside. President Trump, who has consistently criticized the pact and campaigned in 2016 on scuttling it, faces a May 12 deadline to decide whether to continue abiding by its terms.

Kerry also met last month with German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and he’s been on the phone with top European Union official Federica Mogherini, according to the source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to reveal the private meetings. Kerry has also met with French President Emmanuel Macron in both Paris and New York, conversing over the details of sanctions and regional nuclear threats in both French and English.

The rare moves by a former secretary of state highlight the stakes for Kerry personally, as well as for other Obama-era diplomats who are dismayed by what they see as Trump’s disruptive approach to diplomacy, and who view the Iran nuclear deal as a factor for stability in the Middle East and for global nuclear nonproliferation. The pact, which came after a marathon negotiating session in Vienna that involved Iran and six world powers, lifted sanctions in return for Iran stopping its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

“It is unusual for a former secretary of state to engage in foreign policy like this, as an actual diplomat and quasi-negotiator,” said Michael O’Hanlon, a foreign policy expert at the Brookings Institution. “Of course, former secretaries of state often remain quite engaged with foreign leaders, as they should, but it’s rarely so issue-specific, especially when they have just left office.”

Kerry declined to be interviewed for this story. The quiet lobbying campaign — by him and others — is being conducted below the radar because he and his allies believe a high-profile defense of the deal by prominent Democrats would only backfire and provoke Trump, making it more likely the president would pull the United States out of the deal.

“Part of the equation is if Ernie [Ernest Moniz, the former US energy secretary] or John made a bold statement, [Trump] is . . . crazy, and he might do the opposite just to spite them,” said one source who has worked with Kerry. “You’re liable to spur this guy in a direction you don’t want him to go in, just to be spiteful.”

Moniz was a key part of the negotiating team, meeting with his Iranian counterpart as they determined some of the technical scientific details.

A former Obama White House official said there is little to be gained by aiming the effort directly at Trump.

“At least from our network, you’re not going to find messages aimed at him directly,” said the official. “It would be counterproductive. Anything with our brand attached to it, he’ll run in the opposite direction.”

Democratic lawmakers in Congress also have been relatively quiet, and not all share Kerry’s belief that the deal is essential for preventing a nuclear arms race in the volatile region. Kerry has quietly tried to bolster support in Congress. In recent weeks he’s placed dozens of phone calls and, often with Moniz by his side, has lobbied members of Congress, including House Speaker Paul Ryan. While he is not negotiating as he did as secretary of state, he is attempting through quiet advocacy to preserve what he accomplished.

Kerry supporters see in this campaign some of his trademark traits, especially his unflagging energy even in the face of potential failure. Critics see something else, a former office holder working with foreign officials to potentially undermine the policy aims of a current administration.

The White House did not respond to a request for comment.

Under terms of the deal, the United States is supposed to waive sanctions, which come up for review every three or four months, as long as Iran remains in compliance. Trump is threatening to reimpose sanctions on Iran when the next deadline comes on May 12, which would essentially mean the United States is pulling out of the deal. Trump has ridiculed Kerry for a deal that he says is not harsh enough on Iran, saying that inspectors should have broader access, portions of the deal should never expire, and that Iran’s ballistic missile program should also be curtailed.

Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu provided further ammunition for critics of the deal, unveiling documents that showed Iranian efforts to build its nuclear program before the 2015 deal was reached.

Kerry and others said the documents were nothing new, and illustrated the need for an inspections regime to make sure Iran is complying with the current agreement.

“Every detail PM Netanyahu presented yesterday was every reason the world came together to apply years of sanctions and negotiate the Iran nuclear agreement — because the threat was real and had to be stopped,” Kerry wrote on Twitter Tuesday. “It’s working!”

Kerry is coordinating his push with a group of officials who were his top advisers at the State Department, and who helped craft and negotiate the Iran deal in the first place. The group, called Diplomacy Works, has an advisory council that includes lead Iran-deal negotiator Wendy Sherman, former State Department chief of staff Jon Finer, and former spokeswoman Jen Psaki.

The group claims to be responsible for 100 news articles, 34 television and radio hits, and 37 opinion pieces on the Iran question. They do fact checks of criticisms of the agreement and blast them out to an e-mail list of nearly 4,000 policy makers and foreign policy experts.

But the group determined that the most influential voices would not be Democrats, and instead would focus on Europeans, Israelis, and nonpartisan experts to try and salvage the deal, according to a person involved in the effort. As a sign of the their success, Kerry has pointed to an April 25 letter signed by 26 former top-ranking Israeli military and security officials urging the United States to stay in the agreement.

“Our effort is self-aware,” said David Wade, a longtime Kerry adviser who was chief of staff at the State Department and is helping advise Diplomacy Works. “We are in uncharted waters. The bipartisan, traditional foreign policy community remains on the president’s enemies list from 2016. The president delights in dismissing anything accomplished under his predecessor, so we know traditional validators wouldn’t be compelling to him.”

“This isn’t President Obama’s agreement. It’s the world’s agreement,” he added. “Maybe Macron, Merkel, and Great Britain can persuade the administration, but if they can’t they’ll be even more essential to protecting the deal absent the United States. We know these voices are powerful. They have an audience with the president and our allies are popular at home.”

They are not ignoring the domestic audience.

Kerry and Moniz met in February with Ryan, who has been outspoken in his opposition to the Iran deal. Kerry also held a breakfast briefing last week with members of the House and Senate, which was designed to answer questions as well as underscore how, if Trump pulls out, Europe could hold the deal together.

Kerry’s activities could raise questions if they are perceived as a direct effort to counter current administration foreign policy.

The Trump administration got entangled with controversy when Michael Flynn, the incoming national security adviser, tried to undermine Obama policies in the administration’s last few weeks. His actions appeared to some legal experts to violate the Logan Act, an obscure 18th century law meant to crack down on private citizens acting on behalf of the United States during a dispute with foreign governments.

The Logan Act prohibits US citizens from having private correspondence with a foreign government “with intent to influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government . . . in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States.”

Stephen Vladeck, a law professor at the University of Texas, said the law is a red herring — since it’s never been used to prosecute anyone — and almost certainly would not apply to anything Kerry is doing.

“The act only applies to conduct that is designed to ‘defeat the measures of the United States’ or influence the conduct of foreign governments,” Vladeck said. “If all Kerry is doing is working to keep in place something that’s still technically a ‘measure of the United States,’ I don’t see how the statute would apply even if someone was crazy enough to try it.”

Most Democrats have remained fairly quiet about the Iran deal. Senate minority leader Chuck Schumer opposed the deal from the start, even though he’s not in favor of ripping it up now. Senator Robert Menendez, the top Democrat on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, has been consumed with his own troubles, having spent last year in a federal corruption trial that ended without a conviction. He was admonished last month by the Senate Ethics Committee for bringing “discredit upon the Senate.”

“No one has really led the charge. You could argue that’s what needs to be done by Obama, Kerry, Susan Rice, and the others who were involved,” said Daniel Kurtzer, who served as Bill Clinton’s ambassador to Egypt and George W. Bush’s ambassador to Israel. “But nobody knows how to deal with [Trump].”

The president doesn’t listen much to the voices of the foreign policy establishment. And they don’t really know how to reach him through conservative media.

“It’s a legitimate question to ask why is Obama not out front with the cognoscenti. But those aren’t the ones Trump cares about anyway,” Kurtzer said. “My guess is the phone has been ringing off the hook between European leaders and Obama. The Europeans are trying. They’re giving it their best shot.”

A spokeswoman for Obama declined to comment on whether the former president is doing anything to preserve the Iran deal.

Kurtzer said the most articulate public advocate for the pact right now is Moniz, although he said that the former energy secretary may not have the name recognition required to drive a national debate (Kurtzer himself initially could not correctly recall his name).

“He really knows his stuff,” he said. “He’s very calm . . . . The problem is, who knows who he is?”

Moniz declined several requests for an interview this week about his efforts.

Public support for the deal was initially low, with nearly 60 percent of those surveyed in August 2015 saying they were opposed, according to a survey from Morning Consult. Those numbers are now reversed, with 56 percent supporting it; the number opposed, 26 percent, is the lowest level since the group began polling on the Iran deal.

Democrats are strongly in favor, while Republicans are evenly split, according to the survey conducted from April 26 to May 1. Some on the left believe Trump has kept it alive for political reasons, to provide a convenient foil.

“It’s something that has been in Trump’s cross-hairs even before he was inaugurated,” said the former Obama administration official. “That we’re in May 2018 and still in ‘will-they-or-won’t-they’ speaks to the utility the administration has found in the Iran deal. Otherwise they would have been out of it on day one.

“A lot of us are somewhat skeptical,” the official added. “But we’ve been skeptical for the past 18 or 19 months now.”

Col. Kang Defects from North Korea, Manhunt Underway

Mr. Kang is likely under protection of the West and has offered key intelligence that has aided the United States, Japan and South Korea in the talks with the Kim regime.

One of North Korea’s most senior intelligence officials, who played a major role in building Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, has disappeared and is believed to have defected to France or Britain, according to sources. South Korean media identified the missing official as “Mr. Kang”, and said he is a colonel in North Korea’s State Security Department (SSD), also known as Ministry of State Security. Mr. Kang, who is in his mid-50s, enjoyed a life of privilege in North Korea, because he is related to Kang Pan-sok (1892-1932), a leading North Korean communist activist and mother to the country’s late founder, Kim Il-sung.

According to South Korean reports, Kang was in charge of North Korea’s counter-espionage operations in Russia and Southeast Asia, including China. He is also believed to have facilitated secret visits to Pyongyang by foreign nuclear scientists, who helped build North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In recent years, Kang was reportedly based in Shenyang, the largest Chinese city near the North Korean border, which is home to a sizeable ethnic Korean population. According to reports, Kang led Unit 121, an elite North Korean hacker group based in Shenyang, with the aim of carrying out cyber-attacks without implicating North Korea. The South Korean-based DailyNK website said on Wednesday that Kang had been based at the Zhongpu International Hotel in Shenyang (until recently named Chilbosan Hotel), which has historically been operated through a joint Chinese-North Korean business venture and is known to host numerous North Korean government officials.

Chilbosan Hotel Shenyang (Shenyang) photo

But according to DailyNK, Kang disappeared from Shenyang in February and is now believed to have defected, possibly “to France or Great Britain”. The Seoul-based website said Kang took “a lot of foreign currency with him” as well as “a machine capable of printing American dollars”. Following Kang’s disappearance, the government in Pyongyang launched a worldwide manhunt for him, sending at least 10 agents to assassinate him before he is given political asylum in the West, said DailyNK. Pang’s family, including his wife and children, are believed to still be in Pyongyang.

***

While it is reported that North Korea has released 3 Americans from a labor camp to detention at a hotel from observation and deprogramming. There is no word on full release however, there is more going on with behind the scenes and that includes this defection along with the unit this Colonel worked for while living and stationed in China.

***

The North Korean hackers hit the systems of the Israeli energy company to attempt to penetrate the best electronic protection systems, South Korea’s newspaper Naver reported. According to the company’s experts, the North Korean cyber actors have real capabilities to damage the infrastructure of the United States, Japan and other countries.

Last year, experts warned that the North Korean cyber army could be far more dangerous to global security than its nuclear missiles. “North Korean cyberattacks and other malicious cyber activities pose a risk to critical infrastructure in countries around the world and to the global economy,” the statement said.

Since 2011, Pyongyang has been scaling up its cyber capacities. The North Korean regime is suspected to be exploiting its cyber weapons for political purposes to intimidate its opponents as well as to steal crypto-currency.

North Korean hackers are involved in major cyber offensives
In 2013, the three largest broadcasting companies and two banking institutions of South Korea suffered a massive attack against their systems. According to Shinhan Bank and Nonghyup Bank representatives, about 32,000 computers were infected while internet banking and ATMs stopped working. While Pyongyang still denies any involvement, cybersecurity experts pointed to North Korean group Lazarus.

In August 2014, North Korea hacked the Channel 4 to prevent the production of a drama depicting the fictional story of a nuclear scientist kidnapped in the country.

However one of the most advanced attacks was the intrusion into the network of Sony Corporation in September 2014. The malware destroyed 70% of information stored in the company’s computers. According to Jim Lewis, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the attack turned out to be the worst of its type on a company on U.S. soil.

North Korean hackers raise funds for regime
International sanctions forced Kim Jong-un to look for alternative and illegal sources of financing. By late 2015, the North Korean hackers shifted their attention to the global financial system, according to researchers at BAE Systems, FireEye and Symantec.

In 2016, they were about to commit the most astonishing bank robbery in history. The cybercriminals were close to stealing a billion dollars from the Federal Reserve of New York and only a misprint in the word “foundation” kept them from it.

North Korean state-backed hackers have been also accused of the WannaCry ransomware attack that affected hundreds of thousands of computers worldwide in 2017. Taking into account large amounts of stolen money, it becomes clear that despite the growing political and economic pressure Pyongyang will be able to stay afloat for long.

“Winter is coming”
According to the commander of the US forces in South Korea, General Brooks, the North Korean military forces are currently capable of carrying out the most efficient and well-prepared cyber-attacks in the world.

Robert Hannigan, former director of the Center for Government Communication of Great Britain says that as of June 2017, North Korea had 1,700 state-sponsored hackers and more than 5,000 support staff personnel. They all operate under the Main Intelligence Department of North Korean Armed Forces, known as Unit 586. The so-called Bureau 121 is the main unit conducting cyberattacks abroad. The US Department of Homeland Security refers to this structure as Hidden Cobra, while private companies gave the common name Lazarus to all North Korean hackers. But no one exactly knows how many different subdivisions the North Korea’s cyber-army has.

Earlier this year, cybersecurity firm McAfee reported that hackers have targeted organizations involved in the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, which are set to start this week.  The malicious actors attempted to obtain passwords and sensitive financial data. Speculations have risen that the North could be responsible amid anti-North Korean demonstrations in the Korean Republic and increasingly hostile rhetoric between Pyongyang and Washington.

Some analysts believe that the ongoing talks between Pyongyang and Seoul are Kim Jong-un ruse aimed to distract attention from the North Korea’s nuclear program and its malicious activities in cyberspace. But even if talks go smoothly, Pyongyang will never give up further development of its cyber weapons.

North Korea’s advanced cyber warfare capabilities could be truly scaring and risk escalating the crisis. As international bodies consider enforcing sanctions, Pyongyang continues its campaign of outright theft. Korean Olympic detente won’t last forever.

Next time when Kim Jong-Un feels trapped or insulted his cyber army will be ready to wreak havoc.

 

Approval Process for Cyberwarfare Challenged

Cyber is a real battlefield and yet it gets almost zero ink in the media. The reason is due in part to exposing vulnerabilities, forced ransoms and stolen data.

NotPetya could be the beginnings of a new kind of ... photo

Just a couple of years ago: Chet Nagle, a former CIA agent and current vice president of M-CAM, penned an article in the Daily Caller, stating, “At FBI headquarters in July, the head of FBI counterintelligence, Randall Coleman, said there has been a 53% increase in the theft of American trade secrets, thefts that have cost hundreds of billions of dollars in the past year. In an FBI survey of 165 private companies, half of them said they were victims of economic espionage or theft of trade secrets — 95% of those cases involved individuals associated with the Chinese government.”

The threats all appear to have a foreign genesis and the United States does not have a real cyber policy due in part to debates over whether cyber attacks are acts of war. Can the United States fight back with her own cyber weapons? Not really, kinda, maybe.

Tracking the theft is left to the FBI, while responding is left to the U.S. Cyber Command. Army Lt. Gen. Paul Nakasone is the head of Cyber Command facing strategic threats from Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. During his confirmation hearings, Nakasone was grilled on how he would position the agencies to confront mounting Russian aggression in cyberspace, whether through attempted interference in U.S. elections or targeting the electric grid and other critical industrial systems.

Members of the White House’s National Security Council are pushing to rescind Presidential Policy Directive 20, an important policy memorandum that currently guides the approval process for government-backed cyberattacks, three current U.S. officials familiar with the matter tell CyberScoop.

The effort is driven in part by a desire from some NSC staff to create a more streamlined channel for military leaders to get their offensive cyber operations greenlit, insiders familiar with the matter said. The sources spoke under the condition of anonymity to freely discuss sensitive national security matters.

The move comes as lawmakers openly question whether U.S. Cyber Command, the nation’s premier cyber warfare unit, is hamstrung from responding to Russian meddling due to bureaucratic red tape. CyberScoop previously reported that multiple congressional committees are considering policies that could empower the military’s cyber mission.

But the push for change faces resistance from the intelligence community and several other federal agencies involved in cybersecurity.

Senior U.S. intelligence officials have expressed concerns over what rescinding the directive will mean for their own active computer spying missions. These covert operations, which are typically pursued by intelligence agencies like the CIA or NSA, could be exposed by the launch of “louder” disruptive-style attacks from the military. The presence of multiple hacking teams simultaneously targeting a single network often makes it easier for them all to be discovered by the victim.

Prior reporting by CyberScoop has shown that a long-running turf war exists between different federal agencies regarding the proper use of hacking tools in order to protect the homeland.

Even before Trump came to office though, the framework in question was considered a source of frustration inside the Pentagon.

Signed by President Barack Obama in 2012, the directive’s critics say that it was written in a confusing manner that leaves open-ended questions. In addition, critics tell CyberScoop that too many federal agencies are allowed to weigh in on proposed cyber operations, causing “even reasonable” plans to be delayed or outright rejected.

Insiders who are resistant to eliminating the directive admit that PPD-20 is flawed, but fear change because they’ve not seen a replacement plan.

“Better the devil you know, or something like that,” a former U.S. official said. “This is such a crucial decision because whatever comes next will dictate how arguments are settled inside government … you have the military on one side and the IC on the other.”

The NSC, CIA and Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment. The NSA referred CyberScoop to U.S. Cyber Command, who in turn did not respond to a request for comment.

Currently, PPD-20 requires U.S. government agencies to run approvals for offensive operations through a chain of command that stretches across the federal government. The process is largely focused on controlling those operations that go beyond the confines of everyday digital espionage, or computer exploitation, to simply collect information.

According to PPD-20, if an operation is considered “of significant consequence,” it requires the direct blessing of the president in addition to the interagency group. Hacking operations that, for example, shut down a power grid or cause equipment to explode would fit into such a description. But experts say it also includes less flashy tactics like deleting data or corrupting software in a destructive manner.

“This directive pertains to cyber operations, including those that support or enable kinetic, information, or other types of operations,” PPD-20 reads. “The United States has an abiding interest in developing and maintaining use of cyberspace as an integral part of U.S. national capabilities to collect intelligence and to deter, deny, or defeat any adversary.”

After coming under scrutiny last month, outgoing NSA Director Adm. Michael Rogers told lawmakers that there’s an “ongoing policy discussion” about redrawing the regulations looming over military cyber operations. Unlike conventional military activities, the internet makes it difficult for policymakers to draw clear cut boundaries. This challenges also runs up against longstanding laws that underpin, and therefore divide, the work of soldiers and spies.

Historically, intelligence agencies — empowered by Title 50 of the U.S. Code — have led the way on U.S.-backed hacking that occur in countries like Iran or China; where armed conflict is absent. Military operations fall under the purview of Title 10 of the U.S. Code.

It’s not clear whether giving military leaders more leeway to conduct hacking operations will ultimately make those units more effective at their missions. The details surrounding these activities are always classified, which inhibits the public from having a substantive policy debate.

Ultimately, the decision to eliminate PPD-20 falls solely to the executive branch. Sources tell CyberScoop no final decision has been made.

What makes PPD-20 difficult to analyze is the fact that it remains a classified document, despite it being leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden. The classification means current officials are barred from publicly commenting on it.

Thomas Rid, a professor of strategic studies at Johns Hopkins University, said that Snowden’s PPD-20 leak was notable because it revealed the U.S. government’s thought process behind “the rise of unwanted norms caused by escalatory cyberattacks.”

“Reading between the lines, the framework acknowledges the negative effect on global cyber norms that events like Stuxnet can cause because of escalation,” said Rid.

Rid also believes the directive was “naïvely constructed,” relying too much on the idea that cyberattacks only impact other machines, and not people.

“When you look at what’s happened in 2016, and really since then, it makes the people who wrote PPD-20 seem like they don’t understand the current threat environment where Russia, and to some degree Iran, are combining active measures with cyber to change public perception,” he told CyberScoop. “Russia is basically kicking the U.S.’ ass.”