Category Archives: Middle East

Egyptian Steals Carrier Secrets

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Clear and present dangers…

Under construction in Virginia, USS Ford is the lead ship in the Navy’s new class of carriers. The Ford stands 25 stories high and is three football fields long. Scheduled for delivery to the Navy in 2016, it is believed to be almost impossible to hurt.  However, every system has its weak spot and Awwad thought he had found one.
To sink an aircraft carrier is extremely hard. To sink it with one missile is believed to be impossible. On Oct. 9 FBI’s affidavit says, Awwad gave the undercover drawings of the aircraft carrier that he said were top secret. During the meeting, “Awwad discussed where to strike the vessel with a missile in order to sink it,” the affidavit says.

***

The question remains who vets and clears the background checks of those with foreign passports for domestic sensitive jobs within intelligence or the military? Short answer is no one doing it correctly or at all for the sake of political correctness. Where is the FBI? How many more moles or infiltrators do we have in America?

In the recordings, for example, Awwad spoke of the critical parts of an aircraft carrier that could cause the ship to sink if they were struck.

“Even if we are not able to make the carrier, you will be able to see how it can be hit and drowned,” Awwad told the FBI agent, according to DePadilla. “The bomb bay. The bomb storage area. That’s it. Bye-bye.”

Prosecutors: Egyptian took Navy job to steal secrets

By Scott Daugherty
The Virginian-Pilot
©

NORFOLK

A former Egyptian citizen told an undercover FBI agent earlier this year that he took a job with the Navy for the sole purpose of stealing military secrets and providing them to the Egyptian government, according to federal prosecutors.

Mostafa Ahmed Awwad – who worked as a civilian engineer at Norfolk Naval Shipyard until last week – told the undercover agent that it didn’t matter that he had surrendered his Egyptian passport. He said he still viewed himself as an Egyptian citizen and would do whatever he could to help his country: even hand over schematics to the aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford and hide homing beacons on U.S. submarines.

“I went to this place just for this reason,” Awwad told the agent, who posed as an Egyptian intelligence officer.

According to prosecutors, Awwad said he turned down a job with Lockheed Martin because the lower-paying Navy job allowed easier access to classified information.

“I don’t know what is wrong with this government. They hire the Chinese. They hire the Russians. They hire us,” Awwad said.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Joseph DePadilla argued in federal court Wednesday that Awwad should remain in jail pending trial.

“The evidence shows this man is a patriot for Egypt,” DePadilla told the court.

Magistrate Judge Douglas Miller ordered Awwad held, noting the strength of the government’s case.

Awwad – who received his security clearance four months ago – was arrested Friday on two counts of attempted exportation of defense articles and technical data.

The charges stemmed from a “false flag” operation orchestrated by the FBI and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. According to an FBI affidavit that at times reads like a Tom Clancy novel, Awwad handed over 10 computer-aided-design drawings of the Ford.

During one of their conversations, Awwad told the agent where to strike the vessel with a missile to sink it.

“I want to give this technology to my country,” Awwad told the agent, the prosecutor said.

DePadilla told the court that Awwad had given instructions to his mother in Egypt to kidnap his two sons, ages 2 and 11 months, and raise them there if anything happened to him. Awwad described his wife as a “problem” because she did not know about his desire to help Egypt and would not support it.

During the hearing, his wife sat a few feet behind him. Awwad did not look at her before leaving the courtroom, a sharp contrast to his tearful pleas to her on Friday when he asked her to call his mother.

The wife declined to comment before leaving the courthouse with her mother and a friend.

DePadilla said Wednesday that the FBI contacted Awwad after he approached the Egyptian embassy and offered his assistance to their government. He described Awwad as an “accomplished hacker” and said he told the agent during their first encounter that he had been secretly collecting classified information from his work computer for months.

Prosecutors filed a notice Wednesday morning that said federal agents sought help from the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court for unspecified electronic surveillance and physical searches in the investigation.

DePadilla said investigators recorded all of Awwad’s conversations with the undercover agent, as well as some conversations with his mother in Egypt.

The FBI affidavit also describes some of Awwad’s background. He was born in 1979 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. He married his wife, a U.S. citizen, in 2007 in Cairo. After that, he moved to the United States.

Assistant Federal Public Defender Keith Kimball, Awwad’s defense attorney, said his client became a citizen in June 2012.

Awwad attended Old Dominion University from August 2010 to December 2013, according to the school’s registrar. He graduated last year with a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering.

The affidavit said Awwad was hired in February to work as a civilian engineer at Norfolk Naval Shipyard in the nuclear engineering and planning department. His security clearance, received in August, gave him access to classified information up to the level of “secret.”

Awwad had access to information concerning the design, arrangement, development, maintenance and repair of the propulsion plants the Navy uses on nuclear-powered ships and prototypes, the affidavit said.

Kimball argued Wednesday for his client to be released to the custody of his wife, who has lived in Canada and the United States since she was 1. He added that while his client allegedly said a lot of things to the undercover agent, the veracity of many of the comments remains in question. Kimball pointed to Awwad’s false claim of “top secret” clearance.

“There seems to be a lot of exaggeration,” he said.

Covering for Hillary and the Shame of Hillary

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State Department delays turning over files on Hillary Clinton requested by media outlets  

The State Department has failed to turn over government documents covering Hillary Rodham Clinton’s tenure as secretary of state that The Associated Press and others requested under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act ahead of her presumptive presidential campaign. They include one request AP made four years ago and others pending for more than one year.

The agency already has missed deadlines it set for itself to turn over the material.

The State Department denied the AP’s requests, and rejected the AP’s subsequent appeals, to release the records sought quickly under a provision in the law reserved for journalists requesting federal records about especially newsworthy topics.

In its requests, the AP cited the likely prospect of Clinton entering the 2016 race. The former first lady is widely considered the leading Democratic contender hoping to succeed President Barack Obama. She has made scores of recent high-profile speeches and public appearances.

On Wednesday, the conservative political advocacy group Citizens United sued the State Department for failing to disclose flight records showing who accompanied Clinton on overseas trips.

Citizens United, which in 2009 mounted a legal battle that led to the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision overturning campaign finance limits, said the department unlawfully was withholding the records it sought nearly five months ago.

The State Department is among the U.S. government’s worst-performing federal agencies under the Freedom of Information Act. There is no direct evidence that political considerations in a Democratic presidential administration have delayed the release of files about the party’s leading contender for 2016. But the agency’s delays, unusual even by government standards, have stoked perceptions about what could be taking so long.

“There may not necessarily be political interference, but if the department went out of its way to speed these documents there would be no way for people to accuse them of it,” said Thomas Blanton, who has previously sued the State Department for access to records as director of George Washington University’s National Security Archive, a research organization.

The department “is stonewalling us,” said Citizen United’s president, David Bossie. He asserted that “these decisions are being made with Hillary Clinton’s intentions at heart,” but acknowledged he could provide no evidence of political interference.

Bossie, a former Republican congressional investigator who researched figures in the Clinton administration, said his group’s film unit wants the records for a sequel to its documentary about Clinton, which spurred the Citizens United court decision.

The group first asked Air Force officials for passenger lists from Clinton’s overseas trips but was told all flight records were under the State Department’s control. “These were Air Force flights and crews but State has the records?” he said, adding that his group has submitted 15 Clinton-related requests in the past six months.

The AP’s requests go further back.

The AP requested copies of Clinton’s full schedules and calendars from her four years as secretary of state; her department’s decision to grant a special position for longtime aide Huma Abedin; Clinton’s and the agency’s roles in the Osama bin Laden raid and National Security Agency surveillance practices; and her role overseeing a major Defense Department contractor. The AP made most of its requests last summer, although one was filed in March 2010.

State Department spokesman Alec Gerlach cited the department’s heavy annual load of FOIA requests _ 19,000 last year _ in saying that the department “does its best to meet its FOIA responsibilities.” He said the department takes requests “first in, first out,” but noted that timing depends on “the complexity of the request.” He declined to comment on Citizen United’s suit.

In a previous communication, a State Department official apologized for its own delays responding to AP’s records requests without offering any explanation for the delays.

“We sincerely regret the delay,” said Lela H. Ross of the Office of Information Programs and Services, which administers the agency’s requests. The official did not explain the delays but cited the agency’s “complex and lengthy administrative FOIA process.”

Last May, the State Department told the AP that its search for records pertaining to Clinton and the defense contractor would be completed by August. The agency said it now expects the files to be available later this month. Similarly, the agency said the Clinton and Abedin records would likely be completed in September. Now it says it will not finish until next April. The 4-year-old FOIA request still has no estimated completion date.

The agency’s pace responding to requests for Clinton-related files has frustrated news organizations, archivists and political groups trying to research her role at the State Department in the months before Clinton decides whether to formally enter the 2016 race.

At stake is the public’s access to thousands of documents that could help understand and define her activities as the nation’s chief diplomat under Obama.

Other major document repositories have released thousands of pages of files about Clinton’s private and public life.

Since February, lots of previously restricted records from her years as first lady to President Bill Clinton have been made public by the Clinton Presidential Library. Last month, the University of Virginia’s Miller Center presidential oral history collection unveiled dozens of interviews with key players from the Clinton White House.

The State Department generally takes about 450 days to turn over records it considers to be part of complex requests under the Freedom of Information Act. That is seven times longer than the Justice Department and CIA, and 30 times longer than the Treasury Department.

An inspector general’s report in 2012 criticized the State Department’s practices as “inefficient and ineffective,” citing a heavy workload, small staff and interagency problems. A study in March by the nonpartisan Center for Effective Government said the State Department was the worst-performing agency because of its delays and frequent failure to deliver the full number of files that people requested.

***

Meanwhile another Benghazi hearing occurred today 12/10/14.

Of particular note, the February 17 Brigade hired for supplemental security at the mission post were not only fully vetted, some members were on strike over pay disputes and even worse, the organization did not have a license to operate in Libya.

When asked by Congressman Jim Jordan why we were in Libya in the first place, he was told that the single point of contact for that question and decision to be in Libya was between Hillary Clinton and Ann Patterson. Not only was Patterson a major part of the failure during the Arab Spring in Egypt, but she was Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.

The witnesses included Greg Starr, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, left, and Steve Linick, State Department Inspector General and the questioning was narrowed to pre-attack security violations. The Inspector General delivered oral and written testimony stating that the Accountability Review Board recommendations have yet to be fully implemented after two years and waiver are often signed for non-compliance.

Recent Significant OIG Findings Concerning Security Issues
In addition to the ARB process review, OIG has issued a variety of reports covering significant security matters. I take this opportunity to highlight four areas of concern: (1) physical security deficiencies; (2) exceptions and waivers; (3) “stovepiping” of security issues within the Department; and (4) vetting of local guard forces protecting overseas facilities and personnel. P hysical S ecurity D eficiencies
Making Department personnel and facilities safe depends in large part on understanding and closing the gaps between established physical security requirements and the real world situations found at each post around the world. Recent OIG reports demonstrate that the Department is at increased risk because it lacks sufficient processes, planning, and procedures to ensure that the Department understands the security needs at posts around the world. For example, in March 2014, OIG reported, in its audit on requesting and prioritizing physical-security activities, that the Department lacked a comprehensive list of physical security deficiencies and funding requests at overseas posts.8 As a result, the Department could not ensure that the highest priority physical security needs at overseas posts were addressed and that the posts’ vulnerabilities to threats had therefore been reduced sufficiently.9 If the Department cannot identify security vulnerabilities, it cannot adequately implement or fund solutions.  In 2012, OIG conducted a series of audits and reviews of posts located in Europe, Latin America, and Africa, which identified physical security deficiencies at nine embassies and one consulate that required immediate attention.10 OIG auditors found that the posts were generally not in compliance with the Department’s physical and procedural security standards. Security deficiencies common among the posts included the failure to meet minimum compound perimeter requirements; to properly conduct inspections of vehicles before entering posts; to maintain functioning anti-ram barriers, as required; and to install and/or maintain functioning forced-entry/ballistic-resistant doors, as required. Some regional security officers (RSOs) at the audited posts stated that they were not aware of the security requirements, and one RSO explained that the deficiency in question was in place prior to the RSO’s arrival at post; however, no action had been initiated to remedy the security deficiency.  Exceptions and Waivers
Exceptions and waivers granted from compliance requirements of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act11 (SECCA) or the security standards established by the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) also contribute to increased security risks at posts.
8 Audit of the Process To Request and Prioritize Physical Security – Related Activities at Overseas Posts (AUD-FM-14-17, March 2014). 9 Ibid. 10 AUD-SI-13-32, June 2013, and AUD-HCI-13-40, September 2013. 11 Sec. 606(a) of H.R. 3427 of the 106th Congress (113 Stat. 1501A-454-255) (22 U.S.C. § 4865), incorporated by reference pursuant to sec. 1000(a)(7) of Pub. L. 106-113 as Appendix G (1999).
4
OIG has found conditions of non-compliance with security standards for which posts had not sought exceptions or waivers.12 A common example is the use of warehouse space for offices. Under the Department’s security rules, office space must meet more stringent physical security standards than warehouse space; Department employees who work in warehouse spaces, which do not meet required physical security standards for offices, are at risk.  OIG also found that a number of overseas posts had not maintained accurate exception and waiver records.13 In some cases, OIG inspectors found that RSOs were unable to locate an exception or waiver approval or denial that was on file with DS. When a new RSO, chief of mission, or deputy chief of mission arrives at post, accurate, up-to-date records can help ensure that the RSO and senior management have current knowledge of outstanding exception and waiver requests. Only in this manner can the RSO ensure that mitigating steps are understood and completed and that restrictions, such as building use, are enforced. To address these issues, OIG recommended that DS require overseas posts to: (1) submit an annual written certification that exceptions and waivers have been requested for all circumstances where standards cannot be met and (2) provide a statement of assurance signed by the chief of mission certifying that post is adhering to all stipulations in existing waivers and exceptions. To date, this recommendation remains unresolved.

But the U.S. State Department was much worse under Hillary Clinton than is reported.

CBS News’ John Miller reports that according to an internal State Department Inspector General’s memo, several recent investigations were influenced, manipulated, or simply called off. The memo obtained by CBS News cited eight specific examples. Among them: allegations that a State Department security official in Beirut “engaged in sexual assaults” on foreign nationals hired as embassy guards and the charge and that members of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s security detail “engaged prostitutes while on official trips in foreign countries” — a problem the report says was “endemic.”

The memo also reveals details about an “underground drug ring” was operating near the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and supplied State Department security contractors with drugs.

 

 

 

 

Rotation NATO Operation Atlantic Resolve

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Atlantic Resolve (OAR) Land Forces training mission Dec. 15 from the Texas-based 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, to the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, based in Vilseck, Germany.

The 2nd Cavalry Regiment assumes responsibility as the next rotational U.S. Army unit to take part in ongoing multinational land forces exercises across NATO’s eastern border to include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.

Advance elements of 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry regiment have already arrived in the Baltic nations and Poland to prepare for the arrival of the unit’s personnel and equipment. The squadron is expected to complete the deployment of its personnel and equipment to the four nations by the second week of January.

1/1 CAV will rotate back to its home base in Fort Hood, Texas, in time for the holiday season.

Operation Atlantic Resolve demonstrates U.S. commitment to NATO Allies following Russian aggressive actions in Ukraine.

“As the main enabler for NATO land forces in the U.S. European Command, we are absolutely committed to assuring and defending our NATO allies. We’ve been executing Army operations with a combination of forward stationed and rotational forces since early spring of 2014,” said Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, U.S. Army Europe commander. “Our commitment to each other and interoperability are stronger than ever. USAREUR is the leadership laboratory for the Army as we have the unique advantage of working side by side with our Allies and partners every day.”

In close coordination with the host nations, both allied and U.S. Army units will conduct a transitional period over the holiday break from mid December to early January to allow the flow of outbound and inbound unit equipment and for Soldiers to spend the holidays with family.

Meanwhile:

U.S. army may station tanks in Eastern Europe

The U.S. Army plans to deploy about 150 tanks and armored vehicles to NATO countries next year and some of the heavy armor may be stationed in Eastern Europe, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, Commander of U.S. Army Europe, said on Tuesday, cites LETA/AFP. 

The move is part of a U.S. effort dubbed “Operation Atlantic Resolve” in the Baltic states and Poland to reassure allies anxious about a resurgent Russia, with American troops deploying for several months at a time to conduct joint exercises.

Nearly 50 armored vehicles are already in place and another 100 “M1 Abrams” tanks and “Bradley” fighting vehicles will be pre-positioned in Germany and possibly elsewhere for the U.S. troops conducting drills with NATO partners, Hodges told AFP in a phone interview from Estonia.

“The troops will come over and train, and they’ll go back. The equipment will stay behind,” Hodges said.

The arrangement was “a lot cheaper” than transporting tanks across the Atlantic and more efficient for the training mission, the general said.

Hodges said he would soon make a recommendation on whether to store some of the tanks and armored vehicles among NATO’s eastern members.

“I’m going to look at options that would include distributing this equipment in smaller sets, company-size or battalion-size, perhaps in the Baltics, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, places like that,” he said.

The United States has about 29,000 forces permanently stationed in Germany, Italy and Belgium but has stepped up temporary deployments of troops for training and exercises designed to send a signal to Russia and NATO partners.

About 600 U.S. Army troops from the 1st Cavalry Division are to depart in mid-December after a three month stint in the Baltic countries and Poland. They will be replaced by soldiers from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment based in Vilseck, Germany, who then will hand over in the spring to members of the 3rd Infantry Division, he said.

Hodges said the troop rotations will continue through 2015 and into 2016.

Then Zerohedge reports: Having grown used to images and clips of “Russian” tanks rolling through Ukraine, crossing borders, and generally creating havoc, we thought the following clip was of note. With NATO and Russia rattling sabres ever louder, the site of a trainful of American tanks passing through Latvia will, we are sure, do nothing to calm both sides. Video is here.

As LiveLeak reports,

According to the representative of national armed forces of Latvia, till December 6 transportation of heavy military equipment of the first cavalry division of army of the USA from Adazhi and Estonia was carried out to Lithuania.

*  *  *

As NATO builds its forces…

Before:

After:

 

and “incidents” surge…

 

 




 

What You Should Know about BDS

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Anyone remember that Israel is still working diligently to defend herself? Anyone remember that the West is not only doing nothing to support Israel as an ally but in many cases is working against her as noted by SecState John Kerry dealing with Iran on the nuclear program which failed but then he is still using all back-channels with regard to a peace process with the Palestinians.

There are countless grass roots operations under Boycotts, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) that are also working against Israel. Businesses in America and even universities have joined the BDS network. Here is what you should know.

Boycotts, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS)
Overview

Boycotts, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) are the tactics of political warfare used against Israel, based on the exploitation of human rights, double standards, comparisons to apartheid South Africa, and false accusations of “war crimes.”
  • Definitions:
    •  Boycotts of products, culture, and academics – BDS activists lobby stores not to carry Israeli products and encourage others not to purchase them. They send letters to artists, musicians, authors, and academics, imploring them not to perform and appear in Israel or cooperate with Israeli institutions. Boycotts undermine liberal values, such as academic freedom and freedom of expression, by restricting openness and tolerance.
    • Divestment from companies that do business with Israel – Distorting the concept of ethical investing, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) accuse companies that conduct business in Israel of involvement in war crimes and violations of international law. The NGOs approach investors, primarily large banks and pension funds, and push for the exclusion of these companies.
    • Sanctions against self-defense measures – Anti-Israel activists demand that the international community enact comprehensive sanctions against Israel – treating Israel as a pariah state. The ultimate goal is legally enforced sanctions by the UN Security Council. Other forms of sanctions include arms embargoes, which are premised on baseless charges of war crimes. Similarly, legal proceedings are initiated against Israeli officials to punish Israel for defensive actions. 
  • BDS is the main component of the “Durban strategy,” which was adopted by dozens of NGOs at the 2001 UN Conference Against Racism held in Durban, South Africa, which crystallized the strategy of delegitimizing Israel as “an apartheid regime” through international isolation.
    • Other tactics of the Durban Strategy include “lawfare” campaigns against Israeli officials in international courts; lobbying international bodies, including the UN, EU, US and criminal courts; publishing false reports and accusations of “war crimes,” “ethnic cleansing,” and “apartheid”; organizing provocations such as flotillas and violent demonstrations under the guise of humanitarian operations and human rights.
  • The campaign seeks to end the “occupation and colonization of all Arab lands” and promotes the right of “Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties.” These goals undermine the fundamental right of the Jewish people to self-determination.
  • This campaign is financed and supported extensively by foreign governments, as well as foundations and religious charities, which provide frameworks for anti-Israel political influence. *See funding chart below.
  • Most of this money comes from Europe, usually involving taxpayer funds funneled through secret processes to organizations that operate under the banners of promoting human rights, humanitarian aid, democracy and peace.
  • BDS seeks the elimination of Israel as a Jewish state.
    • Co-founder of Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) Omar Barghouti (2004): “The current phase has all the emblematic properties of what may be considered the final chapter of the Zionist project. We are witnessing the rapid demise of Zionism, and nothing can be done to save it, for Zionism is intent on killing itself. I, for one, support euthanasia.”
    • As’ad Abu Khalil, a central activist in the U.S. (2012): “Justice and freedom for the Palestinians are incompatible with the existence of the State of Israel.”
    • Pro-BDS author Ahmed Moor: “OK, fine. So BDS does mean the end of the Jewish state…. I view the BDS movement as a long-term project with radically transformative potential….In other words, BDS is not another step on the way to the final showdown; BDS is The Final Showdown.”
  • BDS is not an established organization or movement, but comprised of dozens of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and radical activists.
  • In practice, the BDS campaign has little success on the ground, but its effectiveness lies in its ability to penetrate the public and political discourse and blur the lines between legitimate criticism of Israel and the complete de-legitimization of Israel in the international arena.
  • BDS activists utilize the threat of political, economic, academic and cultural isolation as a means of pressuring Israel, and seek to have this idea penetrate the public and political discourse, as a means of influencing governments and businesses to adopt BDS tactics.

Then when a retired General and a former director of the CIA puts out warnings with regard to BDS, sanctions and Israel, listening and action is prudent.

NEW YORK (JTA) — Former CIA director Gen. David Petraeus said that any nuclear deal with Iran should not include a significant decrease in sanctions on the country.

“No deal is better than a bad deal,” Petraeus told a crowd of over 1,700 Wall Street insiders on Monday night at the UJA-Federation of New York’s annual Wall Street Dinner, a fundraiser that broke last year’s record by raising more than $26 million. “And turning the screw on the sanctions is better in the end.”

At the dinner presentation, Marc Lipschultz, the global head of energy and infrastructure at the private equity firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, asked Petraeus, also the former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, about the Islamic State jihadist group and other global threats to Israel.

Petraeus responded that the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israel in Europe is potentially more dangerous to Israel than threats in the Middle East and “might keep more people awake at night than anything else.”

He also said that Hezbollah’s threat to Israel has largely been neutralized by the Iron Dome defense system.

 

 

Putin’s Secret Submarines and Strategy

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Russia has been placing, flying and deploying strategic military assets around the globe that appear in some curious locations, like aircraft near Newfoundland, aircraft near Alaska and ships near Nicaragua and Cuba.

Now it seems that a submarine that was detected and vanished has gained the attention of several countries.

Many countries are paying attention however, no one is saying if this is aggression, surveillance or part of a Putin Cold War Part 2 operation.

Few speak to the matter of Ukraine and even less when it comes to the risk of the Baltic States.

LONDON—The U.K. called in assistance to help hunt for a foreign submarine off the west coast of Scotland starting in late November.

Maritime patrol aircraft (MPAs) from France, Canada and the U.S. conducted patrols in conjunction with British surface warships in the search for the submarine in late November and the first week of December, operating out of RAF Lossiemouth in northern Scotland.

The incident began when a periscope was sighted in waters where U.K. and other submarines would normally surface as they head into or out of the Royal Navy’s submarine base at Faslane, home of the U.K.’s ballistic missile submarines.

At the height of the operation, aircraft involved in the hunt included two U.S. Navy P-3 Orions, a single CP-140 Aurora from the Royal Canadian Air Force and a Dassault Atlantique 2 of the French navy. Also involved was one of the U.K.’s Raytheon Sentinel radar-reconnaissance aircraft.

The U.K. defense ministry and the participating air arms have not confirmed they were hunting for a submarine. But a U.K. defense ministry spokesman told Aviation Week that Britain had “requested assistance from allied forces for basing of maritime patrol aircraft at RAF Lossiemouth for a limited period.

The aircraft are conducting Maritime Patrol activity with the Royal Navy; we do not discuss the detail of maritime operations.”

A spokesman for the Royal Canadian Air Force said: “Following a request for assistance from the United Kingdom, the Canadian Armed Forces deployed one CP-140 Aurora Aircraft to RAF Lossiemouth for a limited time.”

Maritime patrol aircraft are occasionally deployed to Scotland, mainly for NATO’s Joint Warrior exercise. Such exercises are usually announced in advance, but November’s deployment was unexpected, with the aircraft and supporting airlifters arriving around Nov. 26. The deployment appeared to end last last week.

The incident comes more than a month after Swedish authorities halted a search for a foreign submarine operating in its territorial waters in the Stockholm archipelago. While the Swedish search was unsuccessful, defense officials said there was no doubt that the country’s waters had been violated by a foreign power.

It is not clear whether the submarine being hunted by the U.K. and other Western nations had entered U.K. territorial waters, or if the maritime patrol aircraft successfully located the sub.

The Sentinel may have been using its radar to try to spot periscope-sized objects on the surface and then cue MPAs onto the target.

On Nov. 28, the U.K. reported it was tracking four Russian warships passing through the Strait of Dover and into the English Channel heading out into the Atlantic. The surface ships included a Ropucha-class landing ship and an Udaloy-class destroyer. These were shadowed by HMS Tyne, a Royal Navy offshore patrol vessel.

The U.K. retired its own fixed-wing maritime patrol capability provided by the Nimrod in 2010, and has been limited to the use of ships and helicopters for the anti-submarine mission.

Further, another look at Putin’s aggression and certain risks are worthy of immediate attention especially as the Russian currency is unstable due in part to the falling price of crude oil.

Russia and the West

The Geopolitical Nihilist

Jakub Grygiel

Putin’s Russia may be able to wreck the geopolitical status quo, but it doesn’t have the power to replace it.

Russia’s bold moves into Crimea and Eastern Ukraine give one the impression that a calculating strategist sits in the Kremlin. Putin’s own public pronouncements tell us that his apparent aim is to restore Muscovite power and influence over territories deemed by him to be historically Russian. Putin is thus feared to be a shrewd competitor willing to use all forms of Russian power—from nuclear innuendo to a superiority in conventional forces to relentless information warfare—in order to build methodically a new regional order. In other words, he may be a geopolitical master.

But there is another possibility. It’s plausible that he has no such well thought out vision of geopolitical reconstruction, and little or no planning for how to establish and maintain whatever new rules Moscow might impose. Even if Putin did have a new regional order in mind, he may be incapable of translating it into reality. By choice and by necessity, Putin may simply be eager to wreck the status quo with nary a thought given to what comes after. In other words, he may be a geopolitical nihilist.

Consider, for instance, that it is unclear what Putin’s desired “international order” would look like. His own statements on this subject are increasingly more detached from reality, rants fueled by his own propaganda. (He suggests, for instance, that Ukraine is oppressing Russians, or that the U.S. and the West more broadly have been aggressors against Russia for the better part of two decades.) Whether he believes this nonsense or not will never be known, but there is little in such harangues to suggest that he has a positive vision of an alternative political order. We know—and he knows—what he viscerally hates, but the destruction of what he hates does not imply a replacement.

Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, even if Putin has a long-term vision of the order he wants to establish, he may be unable to implement it. Weak and declining revisionist powers, such as today’s Russia, do not have the capacity to establish a stable regional order. They lack the strength necessary to maintain it, even though they may have a deep desire to demolish the existing one. The best they can do is to increase uncertainty about their behavior, flailing here and there, expanding their influence and control in weakly defended adjacent regions, and more broadly, increasing the perception of risk in the mind of their opponents. The result is a volatile and unpredictable situation—costly to all, but seen by the declining revisionist as perhaps more costly to its rivals (and thus in the selfish logic of relative gains, beneficial!). A declining revisionist power is a wrecker of order.

The inability to formulate and implement a cogent and viable alternative does not mean, however, that Putin’s Russia is not a serious menace to the security of Europe and the interests of the United States. Geopolitical nihilism is not the same as geopolitical passivity. Russia presents perhaps a greater problem than a strong revisionist state with clear and implementable plans for how to reorganize the international or regional order.

Russia has neither the power nor the authority to maintain an order, but it has plenty of force and abundant desire to destroy the existing one.

Russia is in fact still a formidable military power. It has a massive nuclear arsenal that is presented to the world as superior to the American one and as a symbol, if not a symptom, of great resilience and strength. As many analysts have observed, Russian conventional forces have undergone a dramatic, though still limited, improvement since the 2008 war in Georgia (and in any case, they are superior in size, firepower, and sophistication to those of Russia’s European and Central Asian neighbors). Yet the economy is in shambles, producing little of value and drawing wealth mostly from the extraction of natural resources. Moreover, Russia’s authoritarian political system is fragile, based on the so far unchallenged rule of Putin and his clan, a large propaganda apparatus fanning nationalist hysteria and resentment toward the West, and a good dose of violence targeted at political opponents and potential claimants to power. Russia is a ramshackle gas station run by a small group of well-armed, delusional gangsters.

This political, social, and economic fragility means that Russia cannot replace the existing order on Europe’s eastern frontier—an order that is based on exactly those pillars fraying or outright missing in Russia. But she can destroy it because of her military might. Russia cannot compete as an economic potentate or as a politically attractive entity, but can and does employ its military force to destabilize the region. It is not surprising therefore that Ukraine can be Western and European by the Ukrainians’ free choice but may still fall under Russian vassalage by the sheer brutality of Muscovite firepower. This is 21st century competition meeting 19th century extortion.

Extortion—brute force—creates an order that lasts as long as the fear it generates lasts. Were Russia a rising power, that fear and the resulting order might have some staying power. But today’s Russia is not China; neither is she the post-World War II superpower that could roll over a large swath of the Eurasian landmass and impose a bloody Soviet order. Whatever Moscow may establish in its immediate region through its armor, artillery, and nuclear threats will be backed by a flimsy state, seeking its own justification through invented myths of Western frauds, perversions, and belligerence.

The fact that Russia is unable to replace the existing order with her own stable and durable one does not mean therefore that the threat is nonexistent. On the contrary, the threat is more pronounced because the risks presented by Russia are higher. If Moscow had a clear idea of what it wanted to achieve—how far it wants to extend its influence, and what new rules of international behavior and domestic comportment it will enforce—the uncertainty would be smaller. We may, as we should, still deeply dislike and oppose the proposed order, but at a minimum the boundaries of the conflict would be well defined.

In this case, however, the vision seems to be nihilistic in the long term. Hence the on-and-off Russian interventions in Ukraine, the constant provocations in the Baltic regions, the boasts about nuclear capabilities and the willingness to use them, the Russian aerial forays from Alaska to the Gulf of Mexico, and so on. These are all attempts to shake the existing order. These actions have varied intensity and outcomes: While Ukraine is being broken apart by Russian artillery and armor, Alaska and Diego Garcia are safe from the occasional Tu-95s sputtering near their airspace. But the principle unifying all these actions is a negative one: to destabilize by introducing elements of greater risk.

Putin as the geopolitical nihilist is therefore different than the various tsars that he wants to emulate. In mostly unpleasant and violent ways, the past tsars built and rebuilt the Russian empire by expanding into adjacent lands while seeking some diplomatic arrangement with the more distant great powers. Putin expands into Russia’s southern and western neighborhood but with the aspiration to destroy the stability of the post-Cold War era. He seeks no grand diplomatic bargain that could underpin a new settlement.

What such a view of Russia entails is worrisome. Geopolitical nihilism indicates that a whole spectrum of actions, deemed unlikely because of the dangers they carry, is on the table. We now know, for instance, that Putin is willing to invade —not once, but twice (Georgia in 2008 preceded Ukraine). He is likely to continue that pattern and push farther westward irrespective of the costs. He has also engaged in nuclear saber-rattling for several years (for example, the Zapad 2009 military exercises ended with a simulated use of a nuclear weapon), and he is lowering the nuclear threshold. Nihilism is not order-building; it revels in destroying it. The spectrum of actions that establish an order is limited by their effectiveness at implementing the rules, whatever they may be, of behavior: their purposefulness is constraining. The spectrum of actions that destroy order, on the other hand, is much more open-ended.

The Western strategy of waiting Russia out through a 21st-century version of containment—a mix of economic sanctions, ostracism in global fora, and very modest, mostly rhetorical, shoring up of deterrence—will not suffice. Russia cannot be let to dwell on its internal decline and realize sooner or later its international ineptitude. Verbal rebukes and restatements of NATO’s Article 5 will not turn a geopolitical nihilist into a constructive partner or even into a rival with whom we can reach a negotiated settlement. Nothing in Putin’s statements and behavior suggests that Russia can be persuaded to accept the existing international rules and norms of behavior and to cease the belligerent posture it has adopted. On the contrary, this is a threat that is impossible to mitigate without a resolute and forceful policy that will physically stop and reverse the advance of Russian forces in Ukraine and be ready to do so in the future elsewhere. This can only be achieved now by arming Ukraine. The geopolitical nihilism of today’s Russia will not be persuaded or negotiated away or simply waited out. It has to be defeated.