Do the Democrats Know this is an Emergency and a Crisis?

US Border Crisis Rebounding? Unaccompanied Child Migration ...

Primer: In part from 2014 by NRP/

We, for example, visited a shelter in northern Mexico – in Nogales, Sonora, the Mexican state of Sonora – where one woman said her entire trip north was effectively a sexual assault. She was brought across the border by a man under false pretenses, taken to the city of Atlanta and, she says, used as a prostitute for years. Now, she’s back in northern Mexico. That’s where we found her.

Under Speaker Pelosi’s leadership, the House votes to block Trump’s national emergency declaration. She said it is a binary choice, either vote for the block out of patriotism or vote with Trump. Even if this passes the senate, Trump will veto. So….we have to wonder if those House democrats have this report or read it.

Based on how the democrats support live birth abortions and Planned Parenthood, it is obvious they have little regard for sexual exploitation unless it suits them under that #MeToo hashtag…where is Senator Kirsten Gillibrand or Cory Booker on this? Anyone?

Frankly, this sounds precisely like all the sexual predator scandals across the globe by United Nations peacekeepers.

So, read on.

Thousands of migrant youth allegedly suffered sexual abuse in U.S. custody

Thousands of allegations of sexual abuse against unaccompanied minors (UAC) in the custody of the U.S. government have been reported over the past 4 years, according to Department of Health and Human Services documents given to Axios by Rep. Ted Deutch’s office.

Data: Dept. of Health and Human Services; Note: The type of perpetrator is only known for cases ORR reported to DOJ; Chart: Harry Stevens/Axios

Allegations against staff members reported to the DOJ included everything from rumors of relationships with UACs to showing pornographic videos to minors to forcibly touching minors’ genitals.

By the numbers: From October 2014 to July 2018, the HHS’ Office of Refugee Resettlement received 4,556 complaints, and the Department of Justice received 1,303 complaints. This includes 178 allegations of sexual abuse by adult staff.

What they’re saying: Deutch said these documents were included in HHS’ response to a House Judiciary Committee request for information made in January.

  • “This behavior — it’s despicable, it’s disgusting, and this is just the start of questions that HHS is going to have to answer about how they handle these and what’s happening in these facilities,” Deutch told Axios.

HHS’ response, per spokeswoman Caitlin Oakley:

  • “The safety of minors is our top concern when administering our unaccompanied alien children program. Each of our grantees running standard shelters is licensed by the respective state for child care services. In addition to other rigorous standards put in place by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) at HHS’ Administration for Children and Families, background checks of all facility employees are mandatory.”
  • “These are vulnerable children in difficult circumstances, and ORR fully understands its responsibility to ensure that each child is treated with the utmost care. When any allegations of abuse, sexual abuse, or neglect are made, they are taken seriously and ORR acts swiftly to investigate and respond.”

Details: One of the documents given to Axios, embedded below, gives some detail about the allegations, although it only includes descriptions of the incidences for fiscal years 2015 and 2016. We also don’t know what happened to the accused staffers in fiscal years 2017 and 2018.

  • Based on the information provided in the documents, it’s unclear whether there’s overlap between allegations reported to ORR and those made to DOJ. Axios assumed that some OOR allegations are referred to DOJ, so the numbers included in our chart are conservative.
  • All allegations referred to DOJ are also referred to HHS, according to the documents.
  • In many cases, the staff members were removed from duty and ultimately fired.

ORR’s sexual assault policy

Details on the sexual abuse allegations

Action Plan for NoKo’s Nuclear Program Same as 1991/2

So, in Hanoi, Vietnam, President Trump is meeting for two days with Kim Jung Un.

Il prossimo meeting tra Kim Jong-Un e Donald J. Trump ...

The White House said Trump would meet Kim at Hanoi’s French-colonial-era Metropole Hotel at 6:30 p.m. (1130 GMT) and have a 20-minute one-on-one conversation before a dinner scheduled to last just over an hour and a half.

Meanwhile, the democrats are telegraphing that Trump is going to give up too much in order to get a deal with North Korea. How do they know? Further, the mainstream media is also broadcasting that Trump will not get anything accomplished during this second summit. Which is it exactly?

Well, it is worth looking at archived documents going back to at least 1991-1992. Remember the U.S. had a different president and military leaders, while North Korea did not have lil Kim. The issue with North Korea and the nuclear program goes back at least 25-30 years. At least under the Trump administration, there are direct talks, summits that did not happen with the top leaders of the two countries…..has the mainstream media explained any of this or for context, the previous action plans and why?

So….skim through documents 6 and 7.

 Document 06

1991-12-13
Source: Freedom of Information Act release
This briefing book provides an invaluable and detailed look at how the Bush I administration deliberated over the critical next steps in confronting the North Korea nuclear program, as well as concerns held by the Pentagon about the approach recommended by the State Department. This briefing book was prepared for a NSC/Deputies’ Committee meeting to be held on December 17. The Deputies’ Committee was composed of high-ranking representatives below the Cabinet level from the State Department, the Secretary of Defense and JCS, the CIA and ACDA, as well as other agencies as required, and met to discuss policy issues that cut across the agencies’ briefs. The level of detail found in this briefing book regarding the various negotiating goals and approaches defies easy summarization, and the materials should be read closely to capture all the nuances and factors entering into the U.S. diplomatic efforts aimed at halting Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The contents of the briefing book, with comments on significant points, include: (page numbers refer to the PDF copy):

A) Cover memo, table of contents and agenda (pages 1-3)

B) Meeting objectives memorandum (page 4)

The purpose of the meeting was to consider a “gameplan” to bring North Korea’s nuclear weapons program under control. Specific steps to be considered included preliminary contact with North Korea at the deputy assistant secretary level. This would be accompanied by an approach by Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy in Beijing to invite North Korea to send a high-level official to meet with a U.S. counterpart in New York before President Bush visited Seoul in early January. Also under consideration were talking points for these meetings and demarches to countries with relations or potential influence in Pyongyang informing them of the U.S. concerns about the DPRK nuclear program.

C) Memorandum for ASD/ISA James R. Lilley, Subject DC Meeting on North Korea Nuclear Program, ca. December 12, 1991 (pages 5-6)

This memorandum summarizes the key points in the gameplan and lays out the Pentagon’s concerns that the talking points are too “forward-leaning” with respect to offering the prospect of normalized relations with North Korea at this early point in the process. The Pentagon was already concerned that South Korea had rushed ahead in talks with North Korea about a non-aggression agreement while putting the nuclear issue off to the side. ACDA Director Ronald Lehman in his recent visit to Seoul (see 5 and 6 below) had sought to bolster South Korea’s determination to press Pyongyang on this issue by agreeing to the idea of a North-South inspection regime. The Pentagon agreed with the key point of the gameplan, which was a high-level meeting to make sure Kim Il Sung knew directly about U.S. concerns regarding North Korea’s nuclear program and that, for real progress, signing the IAEA safeguards agreement was not sufficient but the DPRK should reciprocate Roh Tae Woo’s November 8 non-nuclear declaration foreswearing the development, including reprocessing and enrichment, of nuclear weapons. But the Pentagon strongly held that the U.S. side should not offer too much by way of a possible normalization of relations in these early contacts. In its view, the mere fact that these two meetings might take place were carrot enough, and the U.S. should make any second meeting conditional on North Korea signing and implementing safeguards, and agreeing to a reciprocal non-nuclear policy with Seoul and to at least trial inspections.

This memorandum has the following attachments:

1) Suggested Talking Points for Mr. Lilley (page 7) – This paper summarizes the main points Lilley should make in the Deputies’ Committee meeting to drive home the Pentagon’s concerns: keep the pressure on South Korea to push North Korea on the nuclear issue in its bilateral talks and to avoid prematurely raising the prospect of normalized relations in the initial meetings with North Korea, which should focus on making clear the U.S. concerns and benchmarks for progress on the nuclear issue.

2) Strategy for Dealing with North Korean Nuclear Issue (Gameplan paper) (pages 8-15) – This is the State Department paper laying out the diplomatic, political, and economic steps the U.S. should adopt as it works to resolve the North Korea nuclear problem, along with a timeline. The basic components of the plan were: continued international efforts to press North Korea; ensuring that Seoul press Pyongyang at the North-South talks on the nuclear issue; and clearly stating the U.S. position on a peninsula-wide ban on reprocessing and enrichment, both to the world and especially to the DPRK in proposed initial and follow-up, high-level meetings. While there were current signs of movement and success in building international pressures on the DPRK, the paper also sounded a number of warnings, noting that “there is a well-established history of Pyongyang raising expectations . . . only to back off at the last minute with additional demands,”

The paper acknowledges that the odds may be against the U.S. in pursuing the gameplan. It was entirely possible that North Korea had no intention of changing course, and would aim to “delay, diffuse international pressure, and use any opportunity to seem forthcoming, without making meaningful concessions.” Adding to the uncertainties were the gaps in intelligence regarding North Korea’s processing of nuclear material at Yongbyon. There were also signs that North Korea might try to move and hide its processing facilities before agreeing to inspections. The proposed plan for the next few months was to combine increased international pressure with concrete incentives for North Korea to take the steps needed to rein in its nuclear program. The international campaign would be waged on a number of fronts, including with Japan, China, Russia, the IAEA, and the UN. The latter posed particular issues, such as possibly inviting “invidious comparisons” to other unsafeguarded nuclear programs, such as Israel’s. China also posed its own set of possibilities and concerns. The U.S. hoped Beijing would provide more reliable information about the North Korean nuclear program as well as exert its influence. But the U.S. could not be “absolutely certain of PRC motives … and it is unlikely they would be prepared to take any measures they perceived as putting the survival of the Pyonguang regime in question.”

These efforts needed to be coordinated with two other key arenas of discussion: the North-South dialogue and bilateral U.S.-DPRK contacts. The North-South channel was crucial to solution of the nuclear issue and other Korean problems. A meeting to discuss a ROK/DPRK non-nuclear agreement that incorporated a ban on reprocessing and enrichment as well as a bilateral inspection regime was planned for December 20. In support of this initiative, Secretary of Defense Cheney had told Seoul that the U.S. could consider inspections of U.S. bases in South Korea under the right circumstances; i.e., inspections must be reciprocal, simultaneous and involve both civil and military facilities, and should come after the public commitment from both Koreas to a non-nuclear policy. ACDA Director Lehman had elaborated on this position during his visit to Seoul. The North/South talks also carried the risk that South Korea might not be willing to pay the political price of taking tougher steps towards North Korea if needed.

The bilateral U.S.-DPRK dialogue raised the points at issue in the NSC/Deputies’ Committee meeting regarding what should be said at these sessions. They would provide a venue for sending a critical message to the top North Korean leadership: should the U.S., at any point, “learn the DPRK is developing nuclear weapons or producing weapons-usable nuclear material, we would be unable to proceed further in the direction of dialogue and normalization.” This stick would be paired with the carrot of a possible easing of tensions and moves towards normalization of relations in a step-by-step fashion as North Korea met specific benchmarks in bringing its nuclear program under international safeguards and inspections. Another potential stick was explicitly taken off the table, however: Cheney had told South Korean and Japanese leaders that the U.S. should not consider “military measures” as such discussion could jeopardize the current diplomatic strategy.

3) State Department Talking Points – Preliminary Contact with DPRK (pages 16-17) – This and the following document provide talking points that address U.S. concerns about the North Korean nuclear program and the necessary steps to address them, as discussed in the document above. Notable are the marginal notes, assumed to be by a Pentagon official, that would underscore the need to discuss the nuclear issue, and that called for deleting the talking point about possible normalization of relations between the U.S. and North Korea.

4) State Department Talking Points for High-Level Meeting (pages 18-23) – Again, these talking points elaborate on the U.S. concerns and position regarding North Korea’s nuclear program, to be presented at a high-level gathering following the initial meeting. The points are familiar, taken from the gameplan document; of particular interest are the Pentagon marginal notes. The Pentagon remained focused on making it clear to North Korea that its nuclear program was unacceptable and on laying out the steps North Korea must take to bring this program under international review and inspection.

5) Memorandum, Col. Eden Y. Woon (OSD/ISA) for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Subject: ACDEA Director Lehman Visit to Korea on Nuclear Issue, ca. December 30, 1991 (pages 24-26) – This memorandum reports on the interagency team that ACDA Director Lehman took to Seoul on December 6-9. The team consisted of representatives from ACDA, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs, and the office of the Secretary of Defense. After stressing to the South Koreans that the North Korea nuclear issue should be “front and center” in the upcoming North/South ministerial meetings, the U.S. delegation then focused on revising serious problems with a draft joint declaration Seoul planned to propose to Pyongyang at these meetings. Key among these concerns was keeping North Korea’s international obligation regarding IAEA safeguards separate from bilateral nuclear agreements; insuring that a North/South inspection regime included both military and civilian sites, as IAEA inspections alone might not be able to detect a covert weapons program at Yongbyon and other suspected sites; and avoiding any statement that the purpose of a bilateral inspection regime was “to check on the presence of nuclear weapons.” The U.S. feared this would come too close to sounding like checking for U.S. weapons, whereas the purpose of the inspections should be to verify both Koreas are abiding by any joint nuclear declaration.

The U.S. team had to counter serious South Korean resistance to making changes to address these concerns, fearing it would make the joint declaration too tough for North Korea to accept. More worrisome for Seoul was that it would be hard to pressure North Korea on inspecting reprocessing facilities since reprocessing was legal. Fighting back against what the Americans saw as a reversion to old thinking, which the U.S. thought had disappeared with Roh’s November 8 announcement of non-nuclear principles, the U.S. delegation spent the better part of the meeting explaining the inadequacies of IAEA inspections alone, the need to press North Korea to stop reprocessing and the requirement for persuading North Korea to reciprocate Roh Tae Woo’s powerful non-nuclear policy.

In the end, the U.S. delegation persuaded the South Koreans to make the necessary changes in the draft joint declaration. Looking ahead, it was clear Washington needed to do more to reassure South Korea that international pressure on North Korea would not ease once the DPRK signed the IAEA safeguards agreement. To this end, the U.S. would have to send out a “core demarche” cable to its friends and allies stating the American goal of persuading North Korea to reciprocate Roh’s non-nuclear policy and stop reprocessing, and declaring its position that merely signing the IAEA safeguards agreement was insufficient to address international concerns. Sending this cable would also serve to shield the United States from criticism that it was “moving the goalposts” in its demands on North Korea. And again, Washington needed to engage with China, possibly through high-level talks in the near future, to secure its role in putting pressure on North Korea, a role that would increase if the issue had to move to the U.N. Finally, the U.S. and South Korea needed to make a decision on whether to hold the 1992 Team Spirit joint military exercises, a matter on which South Korean views were divided.

6) Cable, Amembassy Seoul 13075 to SecState, Subject: Lehman Visit:

ROKG Proposal for a N/S Non-Nuclear Joint Declaration, December 9, 1991 (pages 27-30) – This cable summarizes the results of the U.S.-ROK meeting on nuclear issues that is the focus of the preceding memorandum. As noted above, these issues were distinguishing between IAEA inspections and any bilateral North/South inspection agreement, the need to include civil sites in any bilateral agreement, the U.S. opposition to having the stated purpose of bilateral inspections include checking for the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons, as well as the need to include trial inspections as a goal of the North/ South talks. The South Koreans accepted the U.S. changes, which would be incorporated into the draft Seoul would present to the DPRK at the ministerial discussions beginning on December 10. The cable reiterates the South Korean agreement that the nuclear issue should be “front and center” at these talks and that the draft joint declaration will be used to “attack” North Korea’s position on nuclear weapons. The South Koreans expected this strategy to lead to a “major confrontation” on the nuclear issue, with Seoul determined to come out of the fight this round as “top dog.” The rest of the cable gives the text of the revised draft joint declaration.

7) Cable, Amembassy Seoul 13322 to SecState, Subject: Prime Ministers Sign Joint Agreement on Reconciliation and Nonaggression: “The Most Comprehensive North-South Document Since the Division of the Peninsula, December 13, 1991 (pages 31-33) – This cable reports that on December 13, North and South Korea’s prime ministers signed the “Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Cooperation and Exchanges,” and provides details on a briefing that Assistant Foreign Minister Lee See Young gave the diplomatic corps on the agreement and the negotiations leading to it. Lee said that Seoul had put strong emphasis on the nuclear issue throughout the negotiations, pressing the DPRK to accept nuclear inspections and halt nuclear weapons development, and calling for agreement to end all reprocessing and enrichment to insure nuclear weapons would not be produced on the peninsula. South Korea had also pushed for North Korea to accept that trial inspections of military and civilian facilities, one of the confidence-building measures, be carried out within the month. Regarding the ROK draft declaration on a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, North Korea had initially responded by repeating its call for a nuclear-free zone, but Seoul had pushed to have further talks on a joint nuclear declaration work from the South Korean draft. Lee also noted the “unexpectedly flexible” North Korean stance at the talks, but felt that Pyongyang may need more concrete proof of progress in the North/South dialogue as a step towards improving its international standing and ending its political and economic isolation. For its part, Seoul held that further moves towards normalizing relations with North Korea should wait to ensure the DPRK followed through on implementing the agreement and its continued stand on the nuclear issue. Summing up, Lee asserted that the joint agreement was the most comprehensive North-South document since the division of the peninsula,” which could bring about “a major change in North-South relations.”

 

Document 07
1992-03-12
Source: Freedom of Information Act release
“Our basic policy remains that nuclear weapons in North Korean hands are intolerable.” The state of play in avoiding this outcome is the focus of this memorandum, prepared for a meeting of the North Korea Deputies’ Committee. It was a “testing period” for the DPRK, in which the U.S. and its allies waited for Pyongyang to carry out its promise to ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement reached in January, having already failed to meet a commitment to do this in February. While there were promising signs that North Korea might still ratify the IAEA agreement in April, and talks were underway to establish a Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) to monitor the North-South non-nuclear agreement, the North’s intentions remained unclear. There were signs of an internal debate possibly slowing decisions, as the DPRK might see some political advantage in delay, or it might be playing for time so that it could “destroy, dismantle, or convert sensitive facilities,” even to hide its nuclear weapons program or produce and then hide “significant amounts of plutonium before allowing inspections. Or perhaps it might plan not to accept meaningful inspections at all.

South Korea and Japan agreed with the U.S. that improved political relations with North Korea were off the table until the nuclear issue was resolved. Seoul had made progress on this issue a prerequisite for movement in other North-South talks, going so far as to postpone a summit meeting and would likely postpone the next round of prime ministerial talks in May absent real progress. Even if the DPRK did ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement and negotiated a bilateral inspection regime, the next test would be the completeness of North Korea’s declarations to the IAEA. A further complicating factor was the willingness of some countries, especially China and Russia, to give the DPRK the benefit of the doubt for “plausible delay.” Absent undeniable proof that the DPRK did not intend to carry out its promises, it would be difficult to mobilize international pressure in the near term. A “worst case” scenario in which North Korea delayed action on its IAEA commitments until October was attached to the memorandum.

For the moment, the U.S. had to walk a fine line between accepting that North Korea would meet its obligations and maintaining international concern, while at the same time laying the basis for action that could enable it to narrow North Korea’s freedom of action and tighten international pressure. The key challenge was “to minimize DPRK “wiggle room,” by building international support for a reasonable deadline for initial IAEA inspections at all the DPRK’s nuclear facilities, which would in turn lay the basis for international action if it became necessary to coerce Pyongyang. A best case scenario (also attached) would find the DPRK submitting its nuclear inventory in late May, laying the basis for initial inspections in early June. Future U,S. diplomacy needed to focus on bolstering support for the best-case scenario, while not giving North Korea grounds to charge the U.S. was “pressuring” it. A critical target of this diplomacy would be China, which had the most influence with North Korea. Washington was to stress with Beijing that the U.S. timetable was “critical” and urge the Chinese to “make it happen,” emphasizing China’s national interest and the U.S. determination to pursue tough international steps, which Beijing should support, if Pyongyang “fails to perform.” Other venues at which the U.S. should press its case were the IAEA, the UN and in U.S.-DPRK counselors talks in Beijing. Should coercive steps be needed, these could be pursued through economic sanctions under the UN aegis, in concert with like-minded nations, or unilaterally if need be.

The Left’s Tactic: Attack Christians

2nd Lady, Karen Pence decided to take a part time job teaching art at a DC Christian school. Out comes the left and in a bigger way. The hashtag dejour is #ExposeChristianSchools. Anyone paying attention?

Over the weekend, included in the whole matter was the fake media scandal of a Covington Catholic student allegedly confronting a Native American playing his drum. That is hardly what happened at all. But the media and some members of Congress ran with the false narrative. Sheesh.

Ah but there is more to this attack on Christians and religious education. We had those like Congressman Ted Lieu slamming this privileged education. Then we also had Congressman John Yarmuth demanding that kids be banned from wearing MAGA hats, stating that they seem to be poisoning young minds.

But wait, let us go back a few months shall we?

How about Senator(s) Mazie Hirono and Kamala Harris? Harris just announced her intention to run for president in 2020. Ahem…

Just a few months ago, Trump nominated Brian Buescher for a Federal court vacancy in Nebraska. During that confirmation hearing, both Senators attacked Mr. Buescher for his membership with the Knights of Columbus. In fact, Senator Hirono demanded that Buescher drop his membership in the Knights. Senator Harris made a big point that the Catholic organization was all male and the Judge would need to recuse himself over any case involving abortion or touched legal matters dealing with challenging Roe v. Wade.

The Knights of Columbus is the single larges Catholic service organization in the country. Services to communities include be ushers during mass, charitable work and visiting those in prison. But hold on….let’s go back a little further shall we to Dianne Feinstein and her questions to Judge Amy Coney Barrett. Senator Feinstein does like Christians or Catholics either.

So, anyway, after the Judge Buescher exchange, Senator Ben Sasse took to the senate floor.

Ah , but the GOP in the senate passed an interesting resolution introduced by Senator Sasse. See the 2 page resolution here.

Guess what….that resolution passed without opposition last Wednesday following his floor speech. This was a formal rebuke of Senator Hirono and Harris and rightly so. Remember this as lil Ms. Harris begins her presidential campaign. One last item…

Article VI of the U.S. Constitution forbids the imposition of a religious test for any office holder.

Furthermore, let us not forget the 1st Amendment:

Amendment I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

****

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression from government interference. It prohibits any laws that establish a national religion, impede the free exercise of religion, abridge the freedom of speech, infringe upon the freedom of the press, interfere with the right to peaceably assemble, or prohibit citizens from petitioning for a governmental redress of grievances. It was adopted into the Bill of Rights in 1791. The Supreme Court interprets the extent of the protection afforded to these rights.

 

PG&E Heads to Bankruptcy Due to Wildfire Liabilities

PG&E is the largest power company in the United States and is giving employees a 15 day notice of intent to file Chapter 11.

California Wildfires Force Hollywood Stars, Sets, Studio ...

The catastrophic fires of 2017 and 2018 in California could reach upwards of $30 billion in damages and liability. The CEO has announced his exit and has been replaced on a temporary basis by the corporate lawyer, John Simon. PG&E serves 16 million customers and this legal process is not supposed to impact services for electric power or natural gas.

California fires: Death toll rises to 17 - CNN

The November Camp fire that swept through a mountain community in California, killed 86 people and the property and business damage has yet to be estimated. It is estimated that PG&E has $1.5 billion in liquidity and could take as much as two years to recover from Chapter 11.

Meanwhile, there was quite the travel and play junket to Hawaii as those fires burned. What you say?

California lawmakers are no different from those in Congress taking little vacations at really bad times in the worst of bad judgement. (30+ Hispanic lawmakers, part of the BOLD PAC took a multi-lobby paid vacation to Puerto Rico during the government shutdown)

***

FNC: A group of California lawmakers took a trip to Hawaii with utility companies last year as wildfires wreaked havoc in their state.

During the junket, representatives from utility companies discussed with the bipartisan group of lawmakers just how much responsibility they should bear for wildfires – even as Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (PG&E) could be on the hook for several billions of dollars in damages for fires it caused over the past few years.

The utility companies are pushing for a new state law that would raise electricity prices to offset costs incurred from wildfires, according to The New York Times.

The annual event, hosted by the nonprofit Independent Voter Project, was held in Maui in November. PG&E executives did not attend the conference because of the wildfires, but representatives from San Diego Gas and Electric and Southern California Edison did, KABC-TV reported.

Those in attendance at the Wailea conference included California Assembly members Frank Bigelow, Bill Brough, Ian Calderon, Jim Cooper, Tom Daly, Heath Flora, Jim Frazier, Reggie Jones-Sawyer, Freddie Rodriguez and Blanca Rubio. State Sens. Ben Hueso and Cathleen Galgiani also attended, nonprofit Consumer Watchdog reports.

Bigelow and Brough are Republicans. The rest of the group are Democrats.

Thanks to Consumer Watchdog, a non-profit that is dedicated to being a consumer advocate with regard to protecting taxpayers and taking on special interests regardless of party. Ah but take caution, keep an eye on a possible financial bailout of PG&E. There are some energy billionaires out there that will lobby for financial assistance for PG&E.

It was just last June that a report was published revealing that PG&E has the makings of another Enron. For the highlights of that report, go here.

 

New Committee Chair Cummings has 64 Subpoenas for Trump

Yup, Maryland Congressman Elijah Cummings will become the Oversight Committee Chairman in the new Congress and he has readied 64 subpoenas for Trump and his family over conflicting business deals, the hotel and more.

Meanwhile, the democrats are likely going to work to cut funding for the military, ICE and DHS. They will advance legislation to move the Federal minimum wage to $15.00 an hour and will continue to bail out health insurers to save Obamacare.

Ah but this democrat agenda can become more contentious and nasty if the democrats want to play a legal warfare game as the republicans can take some major counter-measures. Of course none of this is really good for the country but as President Trump declared more than once, we will restore law and order and those who violated law should in fact receive a consequence.

So, what should the republicans consider?

  1. Declassify and release all Fast and Furious documents.
  2. Declassify and release all HolyLand Foundation trial documents.
  3. Declassify and release and IRS targeting scandal documents and subpoena emails and documents of Lois Lerner, Eric Holder, Doug Shulman, John Koskinen, Steven T. Miller, Daniel Werfel, Peter Kadzik, Elijah Cummings among others.
  4. Department of Justice to formally open a case on Debbie Wasserman Schultz and the Pakistan IT scandal.
  5. Announce a formal investigation into Dianne Feinstein’s Chinese operative employed in her California office and to demand Feinstein submit her investments in Chinese corporations/organizations.
  6. Defund Planned Parenthood.
  7. Defund Export Import Bank.
  8. Investigate Maxine Waters and her use of campaign funds employing her daughter’s company.
  9. Investigate newly elected congresswoman Debbie Muscarel Powell and her association(s) with Ihor Kolomoisky, a corrupt Ukrainian oligarch.
  10. Open formal investigation into Keith Ellison.
  11. Re-open criminal case against New Jersey Senator Robert Menendez.
  12. Refer Bernie Sanders to the Senate Ethics Committee on loan scandal.
  13. Release all the text messages and emails of Peter Strzok and Lisa Page.
  14. Open a formal and announced investigation into the Clinton Foundation and release what is in the file now.
  15. Need we explain the Hillary email server thing? Git ‘er done.
  16. Comey, McCabe, Ohr, and that crowd with the FISA warrant, communications and the dossier.
  17. Investigate Sheila Jackson Lee’s office for the staffer’s doxxing operation.
  18. How about Uranium One, Rosemont Capital and Vistria?
  19. Then there is John Podesta, Tony Podesta, Huma Abedin, Cheryl Mills and all of that.
  20. But we cannot overlook the tarmac meeting and the role Loretta Lynch and her DoJ played in the coverup.
  21. Benghazi? Was that ever resolved or the billions to Iran?
  22. How about release of details on the side deals or payments for the Taliban 5 and Bergdahl or the Iran nuclear deal? Include Susan Rice and Ben Rhodes in these details.
  23. Release communications on why Obama and the Justice Department canceled Operation Cassandra.
  24. Release full report on John Brennan, former Director of the CIA and his role in ‘spygate’ along his spying on member of the senate.
  25. Declare via Treasury and DHS, ANTIFA a domestic terror organization.
  26. Release all payments made by Office of Compliance due to congressional member’s misconduct.

There of course are many other things to add to this list. You are invited to include some of your own ideas in the comments.