North Korea and Iran Hint at Deeper Military Cooperation

WI: Pyongyang has emerged as a critical partner in Tehran’s ‘Axis of Resistance,’ and officials warn that their joint efforts may extend to weapons of mass destruction.

High-level meetings between North Korean and Iranian officials in recent months are stoking concerns inside the U.S. government about the depth of military ties between the two American adversaries. In September, President Trump ordered U.S. intelligence agencies to conduct a fresh review of any potential bilateral nuclear collaboration. Yet officials in Washington, Asia, and the Middle East who track the relationship indicate that Pyongyang and Tehran have already signaled a commitment to jointly develop their ballistic missile systems and other military/scientific programs.

North Korea has vastly expanded its nuclear and long-range missile capabilities over the past year, developing intercontinental ballistic missiles that could potentially target the western United States with nuclear warheads. Over the same period, U.S. intelligence agencies have spotted Iranian defense officials in Pyongyang, raising the specter that they might share dangerous technological advances with each other. “All of these contacts need to be better understood,” said one senior U.S. official working on the Middle East. “This will be one of our top priorities.”

SUSPICIOUS MEETINGS

In early August, Kim Yong-nam, North Korea’s number two political leader and head of its legislature, departed Pyongyang amid great fanfare for an extended visit to Iran. The official reason was to attend the inauguration of President Hassan Rouhani, but the length of the visit raised alarm bells in Washington and allied capitals. North Korean state media said the trip lasted four days, but Iranian state media said it was ten, and that Kim was accompanied by a large delegation of other top officials.

Kim had last visited Tehran in 2012 to attend a gathering of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Cold War-era body composed of developing nations that strived to be independent of Washington and the Kremlin. Yet he skipped most of the events associated with that conference, instead focusing on signing a bilateral scientific cooperation agreement with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. According to U.S. intelligence officials, that pact looked very similar to the one Pyongyang inked with Syria in 2002; five years later, Israeli jets destroyed a building in eastern Syria that the United States and UN believe was a nearly operational North Korean-built nuclear reactor. Notably, one of the Iranian officials who attended the 2012 gathering with Kim was Atomic Energy Organization chief Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, who was sanctioned by Washington and the UN for his alleged role in nuclear weapons development.

Similarly, Kim’s latest trip focused on more than just lending support to Rouhani, according to North Korean and Iranian state media. Kim and Vice Foreign Minister Choe Hui-chol inaugurated their country’s new embassy in Tehran, a symbol of deepening ties between the two governments. They also held a string of bilateral meetings with foreign leaders, many from countries that have been significant buyers of North Korean weapons in recent decades (e.g., Zimbabwe, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Namibia). The Trump administration has been intensifying diplomatic pressure on all these countries to cut their economic and military ties with Pyongyang in response to the regime’s barrage of nuclear and missile tests this year.

Regarding missile development, Iran and North Korea presented a united front against Washington during Kim’s stay. Like Pyongyang, Tehran has moved forward with a string of ballistic missile tests in recent months, despite facing UN Security Council resolutions and condemnation by the Trump administration. After meeting with Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani on August 4, Kim declared, “Iran and North Korea share a mutual enemy [the United States]. We firmly support Iran on its stance that missile development does not need to be authorized by any nation.”

COVERT CONTACTS

The meetings that have gone unreported in state media are even more worrisome for allied governments. In recent years, U.S. and South Korean intelligence services have tracked a steady stream of Iranian and North Korean officials visiting each other in a bid to jointly develop their defense systems. Many of the North Koreans are from defense industries or secretive financial bodies that report directly to dictator Kim Jong-un, including Offices 39 and 99 of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea.

Last year, U.S. authorities reported that missile technicians from one of Iran’s most important defense companies, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, had traveled to North Korea to help develop an eighty-ton rocket booster for ballistic missiles. One of the company’s top officials, Sayyed Javad Musavi, has allegedly worked in tandem with the Korea Mining Development Trading Corp. (KOMID), which the United States and UN have sanctioned for being a central player in procuring equipment for Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. For example, Shahid Hemmat has illegally shipped valves, electronics, and measuring equipment to KOMID for use in ground testing of space-launch vehicles and liquid-propellant ballistic missiles.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

North Korea has emerged as a critical partner in the alliance of states, militias, and political movements known as the “Axis of Resistance,” which Tehran developed to challenge U.S. power in the Middle East. Pyongyang has served as an important supplier of arms and equipment to Iran’s most important Arab ally, Syria’s Assad regime, during the country’s ongoing war. And Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have procured weapons from North Korea in their efforts to topple the internationally recognized government in Yemen, according to current and former U.S. officials.

Moreover, Kim Yong-nam’s August trip appeared to have official support from Russia and China. On his way to Iran, he first flew to Vladivostok on Air Koryo, the North Korean airline that the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned in December 2016 for financially aiding the Kim regime and its ballistic missile program. He then flew on to Tehran via Russia’s state carrier, Aeroflot, passing through Chinese airspace.

Going forward, the most pressing question is whether a smoking gun will emerge proving direct nuclear cooperation between Iran and North Korea. The U.S. government and the International Atomic Energy Agency say they have yet to see such conclusive evidence. But Iranian opposition groups allege that senior regime officials have visited North Korea to observe some of its six nuclear weapons tests. Chief among these officials, they add, is Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, an Iranian general whom the UN has accused of working closely with Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani on secret nuclear weapons research. Current and former U.S. intelligence officials say these accusations cannot be ruled out, so all known contacts between the two regimes need to be scrutinized closely.

Related image Abbasi-Davani

***Going back in history with evidence:

In 2010, the Assad regime transferred Scud-D missiles,[7] as well as a number of M-600 missiles (that have a 250Km range and carry a 500Kg warhead) – a clone of the Iranian Fateh-110. Syria provided Hezbollah operatives with training on using the Scuds at a base near Damascus.[8]

The Assad regime procured systems from Russia, which were to be partially or fully transferred to Hezbollah. Those included advanced Russian anti-air defense systems– such as the Pantsir S1-E and SA-17 BUK systems – as well as sophisticated anti-ship systems, like the Yakhont P-800.[9] It was believed that Hezbollah was the end user for some of these systems, which were kept in the group’s weapons depots on the Syrian side of the border.[10] Prior to the 2006 war, Syria also transferred Russian-made Kornet anti-tank weapons to Hezbollah, which then used these weapons against Israel.[11] As the war in Syria has intensified, Hezbollah began moving some of these advanced systems out of Syria. In January, according to media reports,[12] the Israeli Air Force struck a convoy inside Syria that was likely attempting to transfer SA-17 anti-aircraft systems to Hezbollah.

Cutout Arms Purchases from Russia

Such Syrian straw purchases, as well as other arms deals with Russia for the Syrian military itself, appear to have been bankrolled by Iran.[13] As part of this deal, some of the weapons that Damascus procured were then passed on to Tehran. This is an old practice dating back to the Iraq-Iran war, when the Assad regime purchased weapons from the Soviet bloc on Iran’s behalf and Iranian planes transferred them to Tehran.

For instance, in 2007, Jane’s Defence Weekly reported that Syria agreed to send Iran at least 10 Pantsir air-defense systems that Damascus was buying from Russia. This deal was part of “the military and technological cooperation mechanism stipulated in a strategic accord signed by both countries in November 2005.”[14] Sources indicate that Syria may have received and installed the systems in August 2007, or one month before the Israeli attack on the Syrian nuclear facility at al-Kibar.[15]

Also in 2007, the Russian daily Kommersant revealed that Moscow’s Rosoboronexport arms export company was to deliver five MiG-31E fighter jets and an unspecified number of MiG-29M/M2 fighter bombers to Syria. Iran paid for the purchase may have been the intended end-user.[16] That particular deal seems never to have materialized. However it did reveal an important and dangerous aspect of the Iranian-Syrian partnership – one that extends well beyond cutout purchases of conventional weapons.

Aside from Russia, the principal strategic partner of the Iranian and Syrian regimes has been North Korea.

North Korean assistance has been instrumental in developing both Iran and Syria’s ballistic missile programs. Pyongyang’s cooperation with Tehran is particularly close, so much so that the two countries have been described as maintaining “in effect a joint missile development program.”[17] Iranian teams have regularly attended North Korea’s long-range missile tests, and Tehran has received North Korean technology. Iran’s Shahab-3 missile (1,300-1,500Kms), for example, is based on North Korea’s Nodong missile, the development program which was reportedly financed by Iran.[18]

In 2010, there was a debate on whether Pyongyang had sold Tehran BM-25 missiles that could hit Western Europe. At the time, a senior US intelligence official said that while he was unaware of any sale of a complete BM-25, there was probably a transfer of kits, made up of missile components. “There has been a flow of knowledge and missile parts” from North Korea to Iran, he said.[19] Iran’s quest for a first strike capability and delivery systems for its nuclear weapons program suggests that cooperation with North Korea will only grow.

Pyongyang and Iran have helped Syria develop its ballistic missile program. Syria relied on North Korean technology to upgrade its Scuds. In 2005, Syria tested Scud-D missiles, but the test ended in failure, as the missile fell apart over Turkey. Another test in 2007 was successful, thanks to technological assistance from North Korea that further improved the Scud-D and extended its range. In the early 1990’s, the North Koreans helped the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) construct missile complexes in Aleppo and Hama. The Aleppo facility was also used for fitting chemical warheads on Scud missiles. An explosion at the facility in July 2007 shed further light on the Syrian-Iranian-North Korean triangle.

The explosion took place as the Syrian regime was attempting to weaponize Scud-C missiles with chemical agents. According to a report in Jane’s Defence Weekly at the time, the explosion resulted in the death of “dozens” of Iranian engineers.[20] The Japanese daily Sankei Shimbun also claimed that three North Korean engineers were among the dead.[21]

Jane’s described the weaponization effort as part of a joint program with Iran. According to the weekly, Iran helped Syria in “the planning, establishment and management” of five facilities designed for the “indigenous production of CW [chemical weapons] precursors.” The presence of North Korean personnel at the site indicates that this was in fact a trilateral collaboration. More here.

Cottage Industry in U.S. for Refugee Resettlement

There was a time when the U.S. State Department along with associated agencies including USAID and the CIA would work to migrate countries from communism to democracies. After the rise of militant Islam and terror attacks around the world, countless gestures have been launched to destroy terror including of course war. Stable countries are now vulnerable and susceptible to radical migrant refugees and migrants.

Europe is in the worst condition and the United States is functioning in much the same manner. We constantly hear that the United States was built on immigrants and we invite legal immigration. Few conceive the notion that immigrants would not seek out America if there home countries were stable, democratic and functioning especially when the United States sends billions each year offshore for assistance and stability.

Meanwhile, America continues to budget and appropriate funds for migrants and refugees in the United States and more coming.

Image result for Reception and Placement Programphoto

For an exact sample on how the states operate, this site provided some great insight using Michigan.

Do you wonder what the total and comprehensive costs are for refugee resettlement? Well, the General Accounting Office is to report those costs, yet there seems to be no recent report. Meanwhile see pages 8-9 for the resettlement numbers by state by clicking here.

FY 2017 Notice of Funding Opportunity for Reception and Placement Program

Funding Procedures

Under current funding procedures, each agency with which the Bureau enters into a Cooperative Agreement (CA) is provided $2,025 for each refugee it sponsors who arrives in the United States during the period of the CA and is verified to have been placed and assisted by the agency. The funding is intended to supplement private resources available to the applicant and may be used at the local affiliates at which refugees are resettled and only for the direct benefit of refugees and for the delivery of services to refugees in accordance with program requirements as described in the CA. In addition, the Bureau funds national R&P Program management costs according to separately negotiated and approved budgets based on the applicant’s sponsorship capacity.

The annual ceiling for refugee admissions will be established by the President following consultations with the Congress towards the end of FY 2016. The FY 2017 appropriation and refugee ceiling have not yet been determined. For planning purposes, applicants should use the following refugee admissions projections as a baseline, although they may not necessarily be the regional or total ceilings that will be set by the President for FY 2017. Projections by region are as follows:

Africa — 30,000

East Asia — 12,000

Europe and Central Asia — 5,000

Latin America and the Caribbean — 5,000

Near East and South Asia — 44,000

Unallocated Reserve — 4,000

In addition, applicants should include 7,000 Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) recipients in their planning.

As in previous years, applicants should base their placement plans provided to PRM in response to this notice of funding opportunity on the capacity of their network of local affiliates, which will have consulted with resettlement partners in their communities in order to ensure that the placement plans are reasonable and appropriate. Should the FY 2017 Presidential Determination and appropriation processes result in ceilings that are different from the total capacity that has been proposed by all approved applicants, the Bureau will work with approved applicants, as necessary, to develop a revised plan, as it has in previous years. If you can stand it, continue the stipulations and grant procedures here.

***

It has become a cottage industry with almost zero checks and balances and your tax dollars? Well glad you asked. Check it:

Requirements to resettle refugees
To be selected as an R&P program agency, a non-governmental organization must apply to the PRM, which stipulates they meet three requirements:
1. Applicants must be “well-established social service providers with demonstrated case management expertise and experience managing a network of affiliates that provide reception and placement or similar services to refugees or other migrant populations in the United States;
2. (they must) have been in operation for at least three full years in non-profit status;
3. and document the availability of private financial resources to contribute to the program” (FY 2012 Funding Opportunity Announcement for Reception and Placement Program).

How it works 
Each agency enters into a Cooperative Agreement (CA) with the PRM and is provided $1800 per refugee it sponsors who arrives in the U.S. during the period of the CA. Resettlement agencies have voluntary agreements with the Office of Refugee Resettlement within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (US DHHS). The resettlement agencies generally receive seven to ten days notice prior to the arrival of a refugee so that they can assign a case manager, find housing, furniture, and purchase necessary household items. If the refugee has a relative or other tie already living in the U.S. (called an “anchor”), the resettlement agency usually establishes an agreement before the refugees arrive to determine the role the relative or tie will have in assisting the newly arrived refugee in accessing core services.

Service period & basic services
The R&P service period is thirty days long, but can be extended to up to ninety days if more time is necessary to complete delivery of R&P services, although some service agencies allow extensions of assistance based on a client’s needs. Basic support consists of the provision of:
1. Decent, safe, sanitary, and affordable housing
2. Essential furnishings
3. Appropriate food and food allowances
4. Necessary clothing
5. Assistance in applying for social security cards
6. Assistance in registering children in school
7. Transportation to job interviews and job training
8. At least two home visits
9. An initial housing orientation visit by a designated R&P representative or case manager
10. Assistance in obtaining health screening and mental health services
11. Obtaining employment services
12. Obtaining appropriate benefits
13. Referrals to social service programs
14. Enrollment in English as a Second Language instruction.
15. Pre-arrival processing & reception planning
16. Airport pickup
17. Hot meal on night of arrival
18. General case management
19. Development and implementation of a resettlement plan
20. Cultural orientation classes
21. Employment assessment and possible enrollment in UST’s employment program
22. Referrals to UST internal programs
23. Advocacy within government and social services agencies
24. Coordination of community volunteers that provide additional adjustment assistance
25. Follow up and basic needs support

If refugees are still in need of assistance after this 30-90 day period, they can seek aid from public benefit programs for up to seven years. Refugees retain their status as such for one year, and then are considered permanent residents for four years. After that, they can apply for U.S. citizenship.

Other services listed on our website are also accessible to our clients.  Some services are subject to office location.

 

Saudi Arabia says Lebanon Declares War

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It is all about Iran….

Arabia reveals list of wanted members of the terrorist militias in the region including

What did President Trump know or what was he told?

Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Hariri of Lebanon in Joint Press Conference

Saudi Arabia says Lebanon declares war, deepening crisis

BEIRUT (Reuters) – Saudi Arabia accused Lebanon on Monday of declaring war against it because of aggression by the Iran-backed Lebanese Shi‘ite group Hezbollah, a dramatic escalation of a crisis threatening to destabilize the tiny Arab country.

Lebanon has been thrust to the center of regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran since the Saudi-allied Lebanese politician Saad al-Hariri quit as prime minister on Saturday, blaming Iran and Hezbollah in his resignation speech.

Saudi Gulf affairs minister Thamer al-Sabhan said the Lebanese government would “be dealt with as a government declaring war on Saudi Arabia” because of what he described as aggression by Hezbollah.

Faulting the Hariri-led administration for failing to take action against Hezbollah during a year in office, Sabhan said “there are those who will stop (Hezbollah) and make it return to the caves of South Lebanon”, the heartland of the Shi‘ite community.

In an interview with Al-Arabiya TV, he added: “Lebanese must all know these risks and work to fix matters before they reach the point of no return.”

He did not spell out what action Saudi Arabia might take against Lebanon, a country with a weak and heavily indebted state that is still rebuilding from its 1975-90 civil war and where one-in-four people is a Syrian refugee.

There was no immediate comment from the Lebanese government.

Hezbollah is both a military and a political organization that is represented in the Lebanese parliament and in the Hariri-led coalition government formed last year.

Its powerful guerrilla army is widely seen as stronger than the Lebanese army, and has played a major role in the war in neighboring Syria, another theater of Saudi-Iranian rivalry where Hezbollah has fought in support of the government.

Lebanese authorities said on Monday the country’s financial institutions could cope with Hariri’s resignation and the stability of the Lebanese pound was not at risk.

But the cash price of Lebanon’s U.S. dollar-denominated bonds fell, with longer-dated maturities suffering hefty losses as investors took a dim view of the medium- to longer-term outlook for Lebanon.

HARIRI FREE TO TRAVEL, SAUDI FM SAYS

Hariri cited a plot to assassinate him during his unexpected resignation speech broadcast from Saudi Arabia which caught even his aides off guard. He also slammed Hezbollah and Iran, accusing them of sowing strife in the Arab world.

Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah has said he will not comment on Hariri’s speech, calling it a “Saudi statement” and saying Riyadh had forced Hariri to resign.

The sudden nature of Hariri’s resignation generated speculation in Lebanon that his family’s Saudi construction business had been caught up in an anti-corruption purge and he had been coerced into resigning. More here.

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Western intelligence services warned Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri of an assassination plot against him, thus prompting him to resign on Sunday, according to Saudi news media. Hariri is a Saudi-born Lebanese politician, reputed to be one of the world’s wealthiest people. He is the second son of the late Rafiq Hariri, who ruled Lebanon for much of the 1990s but was assassinated in 2005. Saad al-Hariri spent most of his life in Saudi Arabia, the United States and France, but returned to Lebanon in 2014 to lead the Future Movement, a center-right political party supported by Sunni Muslims and some Christians. He became prime minister in 2016.

On Friday, Hariri flew from Beirut to Riyadh for a scheduled high-level visit. But on Sunday he shocked the Arab world by announcing his resignation from the post of prime minister. He did so in a surprise television address from the Saudi capital, which was broadcast live in Lebanon. Hariri told stunned Lebanese audiences that he was resigning in order to protect himself from a plot that was underway to assassinate him. He added that the political climate in Lebanon was intolerably tense and reminded him of the conditions that led to the assassination of his father 12 years ago. He also accused Iran and Hezbollah of acting as the primary destabilizing factors in Lebanon and much of the Middle East. Hariri and his supporters believe that Hezbollah was behind his father’s assassination in 2005. There was intense speculation in Lebanon on Monday that Hariri would remain in Saudi Arabia for the foreseeable future, fearing for his life if he returned to Lebanon.

On Sunday, the Saudi-based newspaper Asharq al-Awsatclaimed that Hariri decided to resign after he “received warnings from Western governments” that there would be an assassination plot against him. The newspaper did not name the Western governments, nor did it identify those who are allegedly trying to kill Hariri. Later on Sunday, Saudi television station al-Arabiya al-Hadath alleged that an assassination attempt against Hariri had been stopped at the last minute in the Lebanese capital Beirut earlier in the week. Both news media cited “sources close” to the Lebanese leader, but did not provide specific information, nor did they give details of the alleged plot or plots. It is worth noting, however, that Lebanese security officials denied these reports from Riyadh. Lebanese media quoted senior security official Major General Abbas Ibrahim as saying that no information about assassination plots had been uncovered. Major Ibrahim, who heads Lebanon’s General Directorate of General Security, said that his agency had no information about attempts to kill Hariri or other Lebanese political figures.

This could mean that the information about a possible assassination plot against Hariri was given directly to him by Western intelligence agencies, probably because the latter fear that Lebanese security agencies are infiltrated by Hezbollah sympathizers. Or it could mean that the Saudi media reports are inaccurate. Lebanon is now awaiting further details by Hariri regarding the alleged assassination plot against him. In the meantime, the already fragile political life of Lebanon appears to be entering a period of prolonged uncertainty.

IAEA not Allowed to Inspect Iran Sites per Moscow

But Obama and Kerry told us they could….is there more than one version of the JCOA?

As the Trump administration calls for stricter monitoring of the Iranian nuclear agreement, officials in Iran insist they are complying with its terms and will not allow international inspectors into military sites.

Iran, which agreed in 2015 to grant inspectors broad access to nuclear-related facilities in exchange for the removal of severe economic sanctions, accuses President Trump of trying to sabotage what he has called the United States’ “worst deal.”

Trump has argued that Iran is violating the agreement struck under President Obama, although he has offered no evidence to support his claim and his administration has twice certified to Congress that Iran is in compliance.

But Trump administration officials looking for a way to increase pressure on Iran have begun to zero in on military facilities that they say could be used for nuclear-related activities barred under the agreement.

The IAEA, in its most recent report in June, said Iran was meeting its obligations under the pact. Experts say inspectors rely on intelligence reports and other information to determine whether sites they have not visited are being used for potentially illicit purposes. More here.

*** What about those snapback sanctions Obama told us about? The NYT’s wrote that the snapback sanctions were easy. What is the response of those American lobby groups that Obama hired on behalf of the Iran deal.

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***

Map of Iran's nuclear sites photo and more on each location courtesy of BBC

Inspectors with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations organization tasked with monitoring Iran’s nuclear facilities, have not requested access to military sites since the agreement went into effect, according to experts monitoring the process.

The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister refers to Section T – while ignoring that, as the Former Deputy Director General of the IAEA, Olli Heinonen notes, the IAEA has the authority under UN Security Council resolution 2231 to request access to sites and equipment associated with Section T.

This resolution “requests the Director General of the IAEA
to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s
nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under
the JCPOA.” In addition, the resolution states: “The International Atomic
Energy Agency will be requested to monitor and verify the voluntary
nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA.”
An excerpt from his article follows the TASS item.]

Fuss around IAEA inspections of Iranian military facilities contrived –
Russian diplomat
If the other participants are eager to discuss the issue, Moscow “will be
ready to discuss it” presenting its stance, Sergei Ryabkov said
Russian Politics & Diplomacy
October 22, 0:10 UTC+3
http://tass.com/politics/971962

 

MOSCOW, October 22. /TASS/. Certain countries substitute notions in talks on
expanding inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at
the Iranian military facilities creating contrived fuss around the issue.
However, Russia says that the IAEA is not authorized to carry out such
inspections, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told TASS on
Saturday.

“I would like to say absolutely clear and directly that acquiring some false
topicality the theme of the IAEA work on Section T (about Iran’s military
facilities – TASS) of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) over
the Iran nuclear program has no topicality for us although it is a talking
point now,” he said.

In particular, Moscow says that the IAEA “has not been authorized to carry
out such inspections and cannot be tasked because Section T highlights the
issues out of the agency’s competence,” Ryabkov said.

“Nevertheless, we can hear another thing. As in the issue of the Iran
missile program, some of our counterparts prefer to call black white and
vice versa,” the high-ranking diplomat said. “We cannot get them to
understand this evident logic and obvious truth.”

“Since they are insisting, we say if you cannot do without discussions on
the theme, it should be raised at the Joint Commission when the next session
is convened,” Ryabkov said.

If the other participants are eager to discuss the issue, Moscow “will be
ready to discuss it” presenting its stance, he said.

JPCOA and US

On July 14, 2015, Iran and six international mediators (the United Kingdom,
Germany, China, Russia, the United States, and France) reached a deal on
Iran’s nuclear program. On January 16, 2016, the parties to the deal
announced beginning of its implementation. Under the deal, Iran undertakes
to curb its nuclear activities and place them under total control of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in exchange of abandonment of the
sanctions imposed previously by the United Nations Security Council, the
European Union and the United States over its nuclear program.

Last week, US President Donald Trump announced Washington’s new strategy
against Teheran. Thus, it says that the United States will seek to offset
Iran’s destabilizing influence and will call on the international community
to get consolidated for exerting pressure on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard (IRGC, Iran’s most powerful security and military organization). Apart
from that, the US blacklisted the IRGC as an organization supporting
terrorism. Donald Trump refused to confirm Iran observed the agreement on
the nuclear program and promised changes to the document.
========================
Verifying Section T of the Iran Nuclear Deal: Iranian Military Site Access
Essential to JCPOA Section T Verification
by David Albright and Olli Heinonen
August 31, 2017
http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/verifying-section-t-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal

The IAEA has the authority under UN Security Council resolution 2231 to
request access to sites and equipment associated with Section T. This
resolution “requests the Director General of the IAEA to undertake the
necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments
for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA.” In addition,
the resolution states: “The International Atomic Energy Agency will be
requested to monitor and verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as
detailed in this JCPOA.”

Recommendations

 

The United States should assemble, if it has not already done so, its own
lists of equipment and locations relevant to Section T. It should also
prepare lists suitable for sharing with the IAEA or Joint Commission.
Similarly, U.S. allies should share relevant information with the IAEA. If
it has not done so, the IAEA should create a baseline of Section T
activities and equipment.

The United States and its allies should press the IAEA to develop and
establish an effective, credible verification regime under Section T that
includes requests to access military sites. The United States and the EU3
should also raise Section T and the likely need for approvals of such
equipment and activities by Iran at the next Joint Commission meeting.
Toward that goal, Iran should declare to the IAEA its sites and equipment
subject to Section T verification and approvals.
========
Olli Heinonen is Former Deputy Director General of the IAEA and head of its
Department of Safeguards. He is a Senior Advisor on Science and
Nonproliferation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Iran Nuclear Deal has a Complaint Commission

It is known as the Annex IV – Joint Commission

The Joint Commission will meet on a quarterly basis and at any time upon request of
a JCPOA participant to the Coordinator. The Coordinator will convene a meeting of
the Joint Commission to be held no later than one week following receipt of such a
request, except for consultations in accordance with Section Q of Annex I and any
other matter that the Coordinator and/or a JCPOA participant deem urgent, in which
case the meeting will be convened as soon as possible and not later than three
calendar days from receipt of the request.

Except as provided in Section 6 of this Annex which will be subject to the
confidentiality procedure of the UN, the work of the Joint Commission is confidential
and may be shared only among JCPOA participants and observers as appropriate,
unless the Joint Commission decides otherwise.
Based on where Congress takes this JCPOA with action and or clarity. the Iranian Supreme leader is turning once again to European leaders as he threatens to perhaps even shred it.
***
ANKARA (Reuters) – Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Wednesday Tehran would stick to its 2015 nuclear accord with world powers as long as the other signatories respected it, but would “shred” the deal if Washington pulled out, state TV reported.

Khamenei spoke five days after U.S. President Donald Trump adopted a harsh new approach to Iran by refusing to certify its compliance with the deal, reached under Trump’s predecessor Barack Obama, and saying he might ultimately terminate it.

“I don’t want to waste my time on answering the rants and whoppers of the brute (U.S.) president,” Khamenei said in a speech to students in Tehran quoted by state television.

“Trump’s stupidity should not distract us from America’s deceitfulness … If the U.S. tears up the deal, we will shred it … Everyone should know that once again America will receive a slap in its mouth and will be defeated by Iranians.”

Trump’s move put Washington at odds with other parties to the accord – Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China and the European Union – who say Washington cannot unilaterally cancel an international accord enshrined by a U.N. resolution.

Khamenei, who has the final say on Iran’s state matters, welcomed European support but said it was not sufficient.

“European states stressed their backing for the deal and condemned Trump … We welcomed this, but it is not enough to ask Trump not to rip up the agreement. Europe needs to stand against practical measures (taken) by America.”

Under the deal, Iran agreed to curb its disputed uranium enrichment program in return for relief from international sanctions that crippled its economy, and U.N. nuclear inspectors have repeatedly certified Tehran’s compliance with the terms.

Trump accuses Iran of supporting terrorism and says the 2015 deal does not do enough to block its path to acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran says it does not seek nuclear arms and in turn blames the growth of militant groups such as Islamic State on the policies of the United States and its regional allies.

In decertifying the nuclear deal last week, Trump gave the U.S. Congress 60 days to decide whether to reimpose economic sanctions on Tehran that were lifted under the pact.

“DO NOT INTERFERE”

In a major shift in U.S. policy, Trump also said Washington will take a more confrontational approach to Iran over its ballistic missile program and its support for extremist groups in the Middle East.

Tehran has repeatedly pledged to continue what it calls a defensive missile capability in defiance of Western criticism. The United States has said Iran’s stance violates the 2015 deal in spirit as missiles could be tipped with nuclear weapons.

Tehran has said it seeks only civilian nuclear energy from its enrichment of uranium, and that the program has nothing to do with missile development efforts.

EU foreign ministers on Monday urged U.S. lawmakers not to reimpose sanctions on Tehran but also discussed Iran’s missile program, which they want to see dismantled.

“They must avoid interfering in our defense program … We do not accept that Europe sings along with America’s bullying and its unreasonable demands,” Khamenei said.

“They (Europeans) ask why does Iran have missiles? Why do you have missiles yourselves? Why do you have nuclear weapons?”

The Trump administration has imposed new unilateral sanctions targeting Iran’s missile activity. It has called on Tehran not to develop missiles capable of delivering nuclear bombs. Iran says it has no such plans.