DPRK: What Barack/Hillary Knew and When

Posted on September 4, 2017September 4, 2017 by Denise Simon

Hey China…what gives? France, you have a call holding on line 4.

None of this would have been in Obama’s, Hillary’s or John Kerry’s emails? Hillary did not use ANY official government email platform…just say’n.

John Kerry under the instruction of the Obama White House negotiated the Joint Plan of Action with Iran on the nuclear development program. Purposely many things were overlooked including the nefarious activities between Iran and North Korea.

Imagine the developments are cables since 2009.

Countries that were part of the long negotiations were the P5+1, which included:

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the EU3) also offered Iran several proposals to resolve the nuclear issue during negotiations with Iran in 2004 and 2005. China, Russia, and the United States joined the three European countries in 2006 to offer “P5+1” proposals to Iran.

North Korean front companies operate inside China with impunity.

The extent of Chinese companies’ role in enabling North Korea’s evasion of sanctions is detailed deep in the fine print of the still unpublished 105-page report. For instance, North Korea’s Daedong Credit Bank (DCB) and Korea Daesong Bank, both subject to U.S. and U.N. sanctions, continue to operate in the Chinese cities of Dalian, Dandong, and Shenyang in violation of U.N. resolutions. The panel suspects that one of the banks, Daedong, may in fact be majority-owned by Chinese shareholders, citing July 2011 documents indicating the sale of a controlling stake, 60 percent, to a Chinese firm. More here.

So, when it comes to France, what did they know via the MTCR?

Background

Formal discussions on controlling missile proliferation began in 1983 among France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They were later joined by Canada and Japan, and in 1985, an interim agreement to control the proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, including dual-use missile items, was reached. A nuclear-capable missile was defined as one capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms (kg) to a range of 300 kilometers (km) or more. The G-7 States formally announced the Missile Technology and Control Regime (MTCR) on 16 April 1987.

Since then, membership has expanded to the present 34 States, the additional members being Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. Some other States, including China, India, Israel, Romania, and Slovakia, have pledged to abide by the MTCR Guidelines.

Regime Goal

The regime goal is to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons) by controlling the transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons.

Regime Guidelines

The regime guidelines consist of national control laws and procedures; a two-category common control list; information-sharing on any denied cases to ensure no commercial advantage; no impediment to national space programs; presumption of denial of any transfers in terms of nuclear weapon delivery systems development; and no retransfers without authorization.

Equipment and Technology Annex

Category I items of the Equipment and Technology Annex include complete rocket and unmanned-air-vehicle delivery systems and subsystems. The transfer of Category I items is subject to a strong presumption of denial. The transfer of production technology for Category I items is prohibited.

Category II items include propulsion and propellant components, launch and ground support equipment, as well as the materials for the construction of missiles. The transfer of Category II items is less restricted, but still requires end-use certification or verification where appropriate. More here.

So, to answer the question in the title of this article, here is a WikiLeaks cable providing background:

***

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): NORTH KOREA,S MISSILE PROGRAM
Date: 2009 October 6, 13:14 (Tuesday)	Canonical ID: 09STATE103755_a
Original Classification: SECRET	Current Classification: SECRET
In the metadata of the Kissinger Cables this field is called ‘Previous Handling Restrictions’. Cablegate does not originally have this field. We have given it the entry ‘Not Assigned’. Citations for acronyms used are available here.” data-hasqtip=”true” oldtitle=”Handling Restrictions” title=””>Handling Restrictions — Not Assigned —	Character Count: 14817
Executive Order: — Not Assigned —	Locator: TEXT ONLINE
TAGS: BR – Brazil \| ETTC – Trade and Technology Controls \| FR – France \| KSCA – Science Counselors and Attachés \| MNUC – Military and Defense Affairs–Military Nuclear Applications \| MTCRE – Missile Technology Control Regime \| PARM – Political Affairs–Arms Controls and Disarmament \| TSPA – Technology and Science–Space Activities	Concepts: — Not Assigned —
Enclosure: — Not Assigned —	Type: TE – Telegram (cable)
Office Origin: — N/A or Blank — Office Action: — N/A or Blank —	Archive Status: — Not Assigned —
From: Secretary of State	Markings: — Not Assigned —
To: France Paris \| Missile Technology Control Regime

Original cable: Reasons: 1.4 (B), (D), (H). 1. (U)

This is an action request.

Please see paragraph 2. 2. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests Embassy Paris provide the interagency cleared paper “North Korea,s Missile Program” in paragraph 3 below to the French Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Point of Contact (POC) for distribution to all Partners.

Info addressees also may provide to host government officials as appropriate. In delivering paper, posts should indicate that the U.S. is sharing this paper as part of our preparation for the Information Exchange that will be held in conjunction with the MTCR Plenary in Rio, November 9-13, 2009. NOTE: Additional IE papers will be provided via septels. END NOTE.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER: (SECRET REL MTCR) North Korea’s Missile Program Introduction North Korea continues to make progress in its ballistic missile development efforts. We expect both the new Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and the solid-propellant Toksa short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) to be fielded in the coming years, and as demonstrated by North Korea,s April 5th launch of the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) space launch vehicle (SLV)/intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in a failed attempt to place a satellite into orbit, the pursuit of longer-range systems remains a DRPK priority. North Korea’s deployed forces include hundreds of Scud and No Dong short and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBM/MRBM), seven of which it launched in 2009.

North Korea remains one of the world’s leading suppliers of ballistic missiles and technology, and continues to provide assistance to both Iran’s and Syria’s ballistic missile programs. North Korea, since the 1980s, has supplied a variety of customers with ballistic missiles, missile components, and missile-related technology. These sales have included complete Category I missile systems, as well as production technology and expertise.

North Korea has maintained its right to sell ballistic missiles and continues to market its systems to countries in the Middle East while seeking to expand its missile marketing activities worldwide. North Korea this year probably resumed ballistic missile-related cooperation with Yemen, and may have recently reached an agreement with Burma to provide Rangoon with ballistic missile technology.

North Korea has developed most of the necessary capability and infrastructure to produce and assemble its ballistic missiles. However, while North Korea continues to make progress in its missile development efforts, it remains reliant on outside suppliers for a range of missile-related raw materials and components. While most of these materials are for direct application to its missile program, North Korea may procure some items in support of its missile customers.

Program History North Korea’s ballistic missile program started in the early-1980s, when it reverse-engineered Soviet-made 300km-range Scud B SRBMs acquired from Egypt. This Scud B technology went on to form the basis for the DPRK,s Scud B, Scud C, No Dong, Taepo Dong-l (TD-1), and TD-2 systems. In return for the Scud Bs, North Korea assisted Egypt’s efforts to domestically produce Scuds. Building on this success, the DPRK began designing the 500 km- range Scud C in the mid-1980s.

These Scuds have been exported to customers in the Middle East and are deployed in North Korea. Given its 20 years experience working with Scud technology, North Korea is able to design and produce extended-range variants of the Scud, capable of delivering payloads of over 500 kg to ranges up to 1,000 km.

North Korea also used Scud technology to develop the No Dong medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) that is deployed as part of North Korea’s missile forces. The No Dong has a range of 1,300 km with a 500 kg payload, which could strike all of South Korea and Japan. Scud and No Dong technology also form the basis of North Korea’s TD-1 and TD-2 systems. In 1998, North Korea tested the Taepo Dong-1, which probably utilized a No Dong first stage and Scud second stage. Although launched as an SLV, the TD-1 launch showed that North Korea had successfully developed many of the essential technologies for staged missile systems vital for ICBM development.

The DPRK has also developed the follow-on system for the TD-1, the TD-2. Although a more advanced design than the TD-l, the TD-2 still relies on Scud and No Dong technology, with probably clustered No Dong engines powering the first stage, and either a Scud or No Dong-based second stage. In a two stage configuration, the TD-2 would have a range of over 9,000 km with a substantial weapons payload of approximately 500 kg.

In a three stage configuration, such as that launched in April 2009, the TD-2 could deliver the same sized payload up to 15,000 km, which could reach all of the United States and Europe, although likely with very poor accuracy.

The first stage of the April 2009 launch fell into the Sea of Japan, and the upper stages landed in the Pacific. This demonstrates progress since the 2006 test, which flew only about 40 seconds. Recently, North Korea has developed a new land-mobile IRBM –called the Musudan by the United States.

The Musudan is a single-stage missile and may have a range of up to 4,000 km with a 500 kg payload. The Musudan is derived from the SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and represents a substantial advance in North Korea’s liquid propellant technology, as the SS-N-6 had a much more advanced engine and used more energetic propellants — unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (N204) — than those used in Scud-type missiles. Development of the Musudan with this more advanced propulsion technology allows North Korea to build even longer-range missiles — or shorter range missiles with greater payload capacity — than would be possible using Scud-type technology. As the Scud market nears saturation, North Korea also has started to develop its own solid-propellant missile systems, as evidenced by its development of a new solid propellant SRBM based on the SS-21 SRBM.

This new missile — called the Toksa by the United States — has a range of 120 km with a payload as large as 500 kg. This is a disturbing development since North Korea can apply its experience in producing this missile to other, longer- range, solid propellant missile designs. Solid propellant ballistic missiles are preferred by many countries due to their lesser logistics requirements and shorter launch times, making them more survivable than liquid propellant missiles. North Korea,s advances — in both its liquid and solid propellant programs — have come despite a self-imposed missile launch moratorium, that limited North Korea’s ability to verify new designs or modifications to its missile systems during the 1999-2006 timeframe.

North Korea ended the moratorium with its July 5, 2006 Scud, No Dong, and Taepo Dong-2 launches. Program Activities On April 5, 2009, North Korea — despite UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which requires the suspension of all activities related to its ballistic missile program — conducted the second launch of the TD-2. Although the April 5th TD-2 launch failed to place a satellite in orbit, the launch was much more successful than the first TD-2 launch in 2006, demonstrating that North Korea is making progress in developing technology that can directly contribute to the production of ICBMs. Subsequently, and despite the adoption on June 12, 2009 of UNSCR 1874, which reaffirmed the provisions of UNSCR 1718 related to North Korea,s ballistic missile activities, North Korea tested seven Scud SRBMs and No Dong MRBMs on July 4th.

The April 5th TD-2 launch also demonstrated that North Korea continues to pursue the development of longer-range missile systems and that long range missile development probably remains a priority. North Korea’s next goal may be to develop a mobile ICBM that would be capable of threatening targets around the world, without requiring the lengthy — and potentially vulnerable — launch preparation time required by the TD-2. Technology Supplier The DPRK continues to sell ballistic missile-related technology to countries in the Middle East, while seeking to re-engage with former customers in the region. North Korea is probably also pursuing new markets for its missiles, including in regions such as Southeast Asia and Africa.

North Korea offers a wide-range of ballistic missile services, almost certainly is willing to offer any missile design in its inventory for sale to customers interested in complete systems, and can design missiles to meet specific customer needs. For customers with established missile programs or otherwise lacking interest in complete systems, North Korea provides missile refurbishment and technical expertise, ground support equipment and launchers, and production technology. North Korea can also broker precision machine tools and other missile-related raw materials from third-parties for customers through its extensive procurement network. Iran Iran is one of North Korea’s key missile customers.

Since the late 1980s, the DPRK has exported complete Scud B and Scud C missiles to Iran, as well as their production technology. The Scud and other missile technology acquired from North Korea form the basis for the Iranian Shahab-3, which is based on North Korea’s No Dong. North Korea has probably provided Iran an MRBM variant, called the BM-25, of its Musudan IRBM.

This technology would provide Iran with more advanced missile technology than currently used in its Shahab-series of ballistic missiles and could form the basis for future Iranian missile and SLV designs. North Korea also provided assistance to Iran’s SLV program. On February 2nd, Iran successfully orbited the Omid satellite, using its Safir SLV, the first stage of which was based on the Shahab-3 (No Dong). Pyongyang’s assistance to Iran’s SLV program suggests that North Korea and Iran may also be cooperating on the development of long-range ballistic missiles. Syria Syria is another of North Korea’s key missile customers. North Korea has provided Syria with 500 km-range Scud C missiles and technology as well as technology for a 700 km-range Scud variant, referred to in Syria as the “Scud D.”

The missiles came initially in either partially or completely knocked-down kit form, but were produced in North Korea. Syria has since achieved a domestic production capability, probably with extensive assistance from Pyongyang. North Korea has also provided a range of other missile-related services to Syria, including production technology, ground support equipment, raw material, components, technical assistance, and know-how.

North Korea probably provided assistance to Syria’s development of a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) for its Scud ballistic missiles. Yemen In December 2002, Yemen received a shipment of Scud missiles, which Sanaa claimed to have bought from North Korea for defensive purposes and pledged would not be retransferred to any third party. North Korea probably resumed ballistic missile cooperation with Yemen in 2009.

Burma The mid-2009 voyage of the North Korean ship, Kang Nam 1, probably was associated with North Korea’s primary arms export entity — suggesting that the cargo was most likely weapons-related. The ship returned to North Korea prior to reaching its destination, which was most likely Burma.

The Kang Nam 1 probably was carrying ballistic missiles or conventional weapons. A November 2008 visit by a senior Burmese official to a North Korean ballistic missile production facility suggests that the two sides probably have been discussing a ballistic missile deal, and that the cargo may have been related to these discussions.

Foreign Assistance North Korea operates a vast network of embassy personnel, front companies, and commercial entities run by ethnic Koreans in other countries to obtain key technologies and materials needed to support both its own and its customers’ missile programs. Members of this network often do not reveal their affiliation with North Korea, or North Korea as the end-user of critical goods; they utilize entities in Europe, China, East Asia, and South Asia to establish reliable routes for the transfer of controlled items. Most foreign procurement by the North Korean missile program includes material North Korea finds too costly or too advanced to manufacture domestically, such as missile component testing equipment, heat-resistant materials for re-entry vehicles, heavy-duty vehicle chassis, missile tracking technologies, precision machine tools, specialty steels and aluminums, ball bearings, precision gyroscopes, solid-propellant precursor chemicals, and liquid-propellant precursors. Although important for its own program, North Korea also uses this network to broker missile-related raw materials for its missile export customers.

Conclusion North Korea will continue to develop missiles with increasing range, payload capacity, and sophistication. In support of these efforts, North Korea will continue to seek critically-needed components from foreign suppliers — most commonly China-based, given their proximity and access to technology that would be beneficial to North Korea,s missile program. In light of its past missile technology acquisition practices, we remain vigilant for any attempts by North Korea to acquire material or technology associated with missile systems other countries — including MTCR Partners — have retired. International pressure against North Korea and its customers have had a significant impact on North Korea,s missile sales.

However, despite such pressure, North Korea continues missile cooperation with its core clients and continues to offer MTCR Category I missile systems, their production technology, and missile maintenance and support services to all interested customers. END TEXT OF PAPER.

4. (U) Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR issues for ISN/MTR.

A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON

Chinese Operative(s) Working for N Korea in New York?

Posted on August 23, 2017August 23, 2017 by Denise Simon

Primer:

Yesterday, this site published the FBI related story. If You Don’t Think the FBI is Busy, N Korea Investigation

Still, our State Department and White House appears to think that we can have honest dialogues with China regarding North Korea? Additionally, it was just reported a month ago that Beijing has a major spy network in the United States with up to 25,000 Chinese intelligence officers and 15,000 recruited agents.

Not feeling confident on this, are you? Perhaps some expulsions are in order…

Did Owner of Million-Dollar U.S. Home Help North Korea Evade Sanctions?

GREAT NECK, N.Y. — The five-bedroom house in New York’s Long Island suburbs — listed for nearly $1.3 million — boasts a southern exposure and proximity to a country club.

But here’s what’s more interesting: The seller, a Chinese national named Sun Sidong, has been linked by American security experts to a network of Chinese companies under Treasury sanctions for helping companies and individuals who support North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

According to Chinese corporate filings, Sun is the listed owner of Dandong Dongyuan Industrial Co., which has shared an email address with another Chinese company, Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co., a coal exporter suspected of helping North Korea evade sanctions.

For the NBC video go here.

The coal company and “four related front companies” were targeted by a federal search warrant allowing prosecutors to secretly monitor their financial transactions at eight U.S. banks, seizing any funds stemming from illegal sanctions-busting, according to a May federal court ruling.

The ruling, by U.S. District Judge Beryl Howell of Washington, D.C., said the eight American financial institutions — Bank of America, Wells Fargo, BNY Mellon, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, and Standard Chartered Bank — had already processed upwards of $700 million in prohibited transactions involving North Korea since 2009. The ruling does not allege any wrongdoing by any of the banks.

The Great Neck, N.Y., home purchased by Sun Sidong in December 2016. Google Maps

On Tuesday, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co. and its primary shareholder in response to “attempted evasion of U.S. sanctions.”

That shareholder, a Chinese businessman named Chi Yupeng, was also named in a civil complaint filed Tuesday by the Justice Department seeking a money laundering penalty against the firm, as well as the seizure of $4 million in funds allegedly laundered for North Korea’s ruling party. The complaint alleges that front companies controlled by Chi Yupeng comprise one of the largest financial facilitators for North Korea.

Chi Yupeng hung up on NBC News several times when asked for comment.

The Justice Department also moved to seize nearly $7 million from a Singapore firm over similar allegations, and Treasury levied sanctions against a number of other Chinese and Russian entities — 16 in total — it accused of helping North Korea evade sanctions.

WATCH: At China-North Korea Border, Business as Usual Despite Sanctions

The government’s investigation was supported by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), a non-profit U.S. think tank, as part of a new get-tough approach to North Korean sanctions that began in the Obama administration and is accelerating under President Trump, current and former U.S. officials say.

Chi Yupeng is the majority owner of Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co. A civil complaint filed by the Justice Department Tuesday alleges that companies he controls helped North Korea evade sanctions. Bohai University

While it’s widely assumed that North Korea has for years been subjected to punishing international pressure as it defied the world and advanced toward a nuclear missile capability, the sanctions against North Korea have been full of holes, experts say — far less restrictive, for example, than the measures that brought Iran to the nuclear bargaining table.

Sun’s Great Neck house is an example of how the alleged sanction-busting networks can stretch around the globe, even to the luxe suburbs of Long Island. “The fact that you have somebody who’s engaged in trade that is potentially not just sanctioned, but dangerous, and that individual then invests in real estate in the United States reflects that there are holes in the system,” NBC News National Security Analyst Juan Zarate said.

The North Korea sanctions targeted specific military technology, “but what you didn’t see until quite recently are these kind of broader sanctions to go after the North Korean economy as a whole,” said Peter Harrell, who was the deputy assistant secretary for counter threat finance and sanctions in the State Department from 2012 to 2014.

The Friendship Bridge crosses the Yalu River and connects Dandong, China with Sinuiju, North Korea. David Lom / NBC News

Nor was there an aggressive enforcement effort against banks and individuals doing business with Pyongyang. As a result, the North Korean economy has grown steadily over the last decade, analysts say. And while the country as a whole remains extremely poor, the elite live relatively well amid a building boom of gleaming skyscrapers in the capital.

“Until February of 2016, U.N. sanctions against North Korea were strong on paper but poorly enforced, and U.S. sanctions against North Korea were comparatively weak — weaker than our sanctions against Belarus and Zimbabwe,” said Joshua Stanton, a North Korea expert and former Army officer.

Now, that is changing — though it may be too late. North Korea tested a missile that many experts say could strike the U.S. mainland, and American intelligence officials say the country may be months away from being able to mount a nuclear warhead on such a missile.

Still, aided by new sanctions imposed in the past year, the Trump administration is moving to increase economic pressure on North Korea, by targeting the Chinese companies that have for years helped the North fund its military activities.

“Justice is stepping it up by going after the Chinese banks,” said Anthony Ruggiero, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, who served as the nonproliferation advisor to the U.S. delegation to the 2005 Six-Party Talks on North Korea.

In June, the U.S. Treasury Department designated China’s Bank of Dandong — based in a city on the North Korean border that serves as a center of trade between the two countries — to be a “primary money laundering concern.” It said the small bank “acts as a conduit for illicit North Korean financial activity.” Two Chinese individuals were also targeted in the government’s action.

Last September, the Justice Department charged Dandong-based businesswoman Ma Xiaohong with evading sanctions and laundering millions of dollars for North Korea. Ma has not made a court appearance and her whereabouts are unclear.

Sen. Cory Gardner, R-Colo., recently introduced a bill that would cut off entities that do business in North Korea, including the top ten Chinese importers of North Korean goods, from using the American financial system.

This photo taken July 5, 2017 shows the Bank of Dandong, a Chinese bank accused of laundering money for North Korea. Kyodo

In August, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed new sanctions meant to pressure Pyongyang’s export revenue. They crack down on North Korea’s primary exports — including iron, iron ore, coal, lead, lead ore and seafood — and target banks and joint ventures with foreign companies.

C4ADS, which focuses on international security, uses sophisticated software and business records to map links between companies involved with North Korea.

In June, the group published a report — titled “Risky Business” — naming Sun, who owns the Great Neck house, as part of a network that may be exporting technology that could be used in North Korea’s missile program.

Chinese business records cited by C4ADS show Sun owns 97 percent of Dandong Dongyuan Industrial Co. Ltd., a general-purpose trading firm whose businesses include the sale of automobiles, machinery, natural resources, and general household products, the report says. NBC News confirmed that the records show Sun as primary shareholder.

Related: North Korea Already Has a Devastating Weapon: Cyberattacks

Customs records indicate the firm has exported to three countries: North Korea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the United States. From 2013 to 2016, the company sent $28 million worth of material to North Korea, the records show.

For example, Dandong Dongyuan Industrial Co. sent North Korea a shipment of radio navigational aid apparatus valued at nearly $800,000 in June 2016, the C4ADS report said. Experts at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies concluded that “this category might contain guidance devices for ballistic missiles.”

NBC News reviewed shipment data from Panjiva, which tracks global trade. It shows more than 60 shipments of items by Sun’s company to North Korea that fall into the category of “nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof.” This broad category is set by the country of origin, in this case the Chinese government. Experts say dual-use items like these help the Kim regime evade sanctions that are explicitly designed to prevent its nuclear capability.

“The danger with the export of dual-use items is that they appear to be legitimate. These are things that could be used for normal purposes,” Zarate said. “You have parties that are willing to export what are really dangerous items to a regime that has been sanctioned, and trying to use the cloak of legitimate commerce in order to do that.”

Parts for approximately 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades, manufactured in North Korea and seized in Egyptian waters, hidden under 2,300 tons of iron ore. UN Security Council Panel of Experts

C4ADS also links Sun to a ship carrying arms from North Korea to an unknown destination. In August 2016, a cargo vessel flying a Cambodian flag was intercepted by Egyptian authorities entering the Suez Canal with parts for 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades aboard. The grenade parts were hidden under 2,300 tons of iron ore, which is one of the newly banned mineral exports targeted by the U.N.’s recent sanctions program.

According to shipping records reviewed by NBC News, one of Sun Sidong’s companies owned the vessel from April 2012 until August 2014, when ownership was transferred to a company controlled by Sun Sihong, who according to C4ADS is Sun’s sister.

In 2015, Sun registered a New York-based company called Dongyuan Enterprise USA. On March 2, it received a shipment of “used furniture” from Dandong Dongyuan Industrial Co., Sun’s Chinese company. Originally shipped from Dandong, the cargo traveled to the U.S. from Busan, South Korea, according to its bill of lading.

The real estate agent who brokered the sale of the Great Neck home to Sun recalled that the family was expecting furniture to arrive from China.

An assembled rocket-propelled grenade intercepted in the Jie Shun shipment. The ship’s bill of lading misidentified the parts as pieces of an underwater pump. UN Security Council Panel of Exp

Sun, whose U.S. company operates out of a New York City address he does not own, bought the Great Neck property near the country club for $1.1 million in December 2016.

The house is already on the market again. Sun’s U.S. real estate broker told NBC News that’s because Sun “doesn’t want to do business here.”

One lesson of Sun’s activities is that targeting a small number of key actors could put a severe dent in North Korean’s effort to evade sanctions, according to David Johnson, the executive director of C4ADS.

“The networks that perpetrate sanctions evasion for North Korea are limited, centralized, and vulnerable,” Johnson said. “That is, we can touch them, there are very few pressure points, and we can make a major impact.”

Is Your Teenager a Money Mule for Gangs?

Posted on August 16, 2017August 16, 2017 by Denise Simon

The lure begins in Facebook

It is a growing phenomenon not only in the United States but in Europe. If your teenager does end up being a money mule and gets arrested then you could need to contact lawyers like this firm in Hudson County, NJ. Are you watching your teenagers or are parents encouraging this?

In south Texas, Mexican cartels often use teenagers – many just middle school-aged – to smuggle drugs. The cartels entice kids in impoverished Texas border towns into trafficking huge loads of marijuana or cocaine by promising quick cash. Then of course they leave them hanging when they’re caught by Border Patrol or local law enforcement. Teens end up doing serious time in south Texas juvenile detention centers. And when they finally get out, they leave with criminal records that make it even harder to find jobs in depressed areas of the Rio Grande Valley.

The story of Elias, a Falfurrias teen, isn’t all that unusual.

Elias’ uncle made it sound easy: just hop in the car, drive it from point A to point B, and get rewarded with $6,000 in cash. To sweeten the deal, if he made it, he got to keep the car – a quick little Chevy pick-up with a Camaro engine. Elias was 14 years-old, still too young to even qualify for his learner’s permit.
“Alright. I drove the truck from here in [Falfurrias] to Corpus, to a strip club,” Elias says. “The first time I did, I made it. I liked the money, I was young. My dad had just died. I was struggling with my mom. We never had a car; we never had nothing badass. It sucks, you know? So that’s what I got into,”

Mexican cartels are increasingly leaning on south Texas teenagers like Elias to handle their smuggling work north of the border. It’s an area that is, by far, the busiest stretch of border in the U.S. for the passage of drugs.

Cartels recruit teens through family members or friends and use them as drivers for cars loaded down with hundreds, sometimes thousands of pounds of drugs. For many boys along the border, it feels like an offer they can’t refuse, paying them at a lucrative per pound rate of between $10 and $50, according to 79th Judicial District Attorney Carlos Garcia.

“It’s definitely the money,” Garcia says. “They can make a lot of money in a short period of time. There’s not a lot of opportunities, especially in rural communities. Usually the opportunities find them. Once somebody’s been in the business for several years, maybe they’ve already aged out or they’re not juveniles anymore, but they’ll go and try to recruit some to come in.”

Using juveniles carries advantages for cartels, Garcia says.

“They’re going to look for where there’s the least amount of risk. When the juvenile’s involved, everything’s going to stop. Law enforcement knows – there are specific rules that keep them from talking to this juvenile,” he says.

The connections between cartels and juveniles aren’t new. In a particularly striking example, two Laredo teens became prolific assassins for the Zeta cartel in the mid-2000s. Dan Slater published a book last September about them titled “Wolf Boys.”

“The way I’d seen the cartel wars depicted in the media was through the stories of the cartel bosses, the people we see on the front of The New York Times. The Chapo Guzmáns… The more I learned about the drug war, the more I learned those stories really had nothing at all to do with the reality of the drug war. The reality was more about young men, and often boys, slaughtering each other,” Slater says.

Remedies have been few and far between. In 2012 Eagle Pass opened the Border Hope Restorative Justice Center, intended specifically for kids recruited into the drug trade. But the state shut down the center a year later and the juvenile probation officer who spearheaded the initiative resigned last year amid pressure.

Meanwhile, the problem persists.

The cartels bribe Border Patrol agents to get drugs across the Rio Grande, then turn to Texas teens like Elias to act as mules to get the drugs through the major inland checkpoints and into urban areas upstate. Elias knew he was a small pawn in this big web, but a pawn that made really good money – too good he says for him to pass up.

“I shouldn’t have been doing what I was doing, but to be honest, around here that’s all there is. I kept moving [expletive deleted] for my uncle,” Elias says. “I was 14 years-old. I moved out of my mom’s house. I was giving her $1,000 a week. I was doing good. [Expletive deleted] still going to school. I had my dumbass friends who were dropped out selling for me,” he says.

A few months into his work for the cartel, Elias was introduced to synthetic marijuana, also known as spice or K2. It’s a drug that’s rapidly growing in popularity among America’s poor because of its relative cheapness and potency. Elias had more money than he knew what to do with, and started smoking his supply. He would only sober up when his uncle told him he had another job for him. Then things got even worse. He saw blue and red lights as he was taking a load to Corpus.

“That time they lit me up here in Fal,” he says. “I had my truck. I wasn’t going to stop. I took off. I figured – it was just the Border Patrol. I had always ran from Border Patrol. By the time I came through the backroads of Fal, I had state troopers on me… I lost them going into San Diego. I burned them [expletive deleted]. They caught me again in SD coming out the other side going to Freer. I was trying to go Beeville to hide out in the hills. I flipped over on the curves. I just grabbed the [expletive deleted] and started running into the monte. I broke my leg. They found me sooner or later. I was just on the floor. The vato said, ‘We found you because you had a white trail following you.’”

The cops caught Elias with several hundred pounds of cocaine and some K2. If he hadn’t run, he might have been OK. Brooks County Sheriff Benny Martinez says that often when kids get caught at the checkpoint, officers treat them with “soft-hands,” seizing the drugs and letting the boys go. But Elias did run, and so he was sent to serve time in the juvenile center in San Diego.

That’s one place Texas sends kids caught and charged with a felony-level drug crimes in south Texas.

“To manipulate a child to do it is very easy,” says Lionel Ibarra, who is in charge of the San Diego Juvenile Detention Center. “They paint a real beautiful picture to these kids, and they fall in the trap. How can you tell a kid you need to go find a job at McDonald’s for $8.50 [per hour] when they can make $850 dealing drugs in the same hour?”

The San Diego Juvenile Detention Center has 22 beds. They’re often full.

“You see these kids that are so – they have so much of a future ahead of them,” Ibarra says. “And all of a sudden they turn the wrong way, and it’s downhill after that. Especially in a little community like ours. In a little community like this, everybody knows everybody.”

The other place teens in south Texas are sent for felony drug crimes is the Starr County Juvenile Detention Center in Rio Grande City. Doralisa Saenz oversees the 12 beds and in the basement of the Starr County courthouse.

“Before we used to have several kids from Mexico that would get caught on this side,” Saenz says. “That is on the decrease. But we’ve seen they’ve used local kids to smuggle drugs.”

Saenz and Garcia agree that relaxed punishment from local district attorneys for juveniles involved in smuggling is in part driving the increase. But the teens that do get involved still face consequences.

“Law enforcement can still see your juvenile record at any time in your life,” Saenz says. “We’ve had kids come back and say, ‘This is affecting me for financial aid. For little jobs.’ Local Whataburger, HEB, do criminal background checks. It affects them. They carry that for a while.”

I met former Kleberg County judge Pete de la Garza at a Mexican restaurant in Riviera, 30 miles east of Falfurrias. He’s now the main juvenile defender in Falfurrias and has defended kids as young as 11. He’s pushed hard to keep kids out of juvenile centers, which he calls just a smaller version of prison. He says reforms are badly needed.

“It all boils down to money,” de la Garza says. “And money is what the state of Texas doesn’t have. We need more juvenile centers, we need more bootcamps. We need a lot of places they can get psychological help. There are so many that a lot of times they slip through the cracks. You send them to a psychologist – the psychologist will take to them maybe three times – and that’s it.”

Elias had a rough time in the San Diego Detention Center. And since his release, he’s been struggling to stay straight. He got kicked out of school for fighting his principal and is trying to get a GED. His girlfriend also got pregnant and had a son. The week before I met him he says she took all of his belongings, and their nine-month-old son, and vanished.

“For my son I’ve been trying to stay out of trouble, but I haven’t been able to see my son or nothing,” he says. “I’ve been going back to what I was doing before. [expletive deleted], it’s extra hard. I [expletive deleted] went and applied everywhere. Walmart told me straight up: you have a clear history. So they wouldn’t hire me. [expletive deleted]. I’ve even gotten clean for jobs. Piss clean and everything. It’s [expletive deleted] hard to get a job, it really is. You can’t find [expletive deleted] around here. I would love to be able to get what I can for my son. To do for my family. And just can’t. I’ve tried so hard. And it just doesn’t happen. It’s not as easy as it sounds.”

He’s learned the hard way that the easy way to make money in the Rio Grande Valley, isn’t that easy after all.

Gangs force thousands of teens to become ‘money mules’

Youngsters have been approached with violent threats if they did not consent, say police

The number of young people targeted by criminals to be “money mules” – people who let their bank accounts be used to launder money – has doubled, according to a fraud prevention service.

Cifas, which aims at reducing financial crime in the UK, said that the number of “misuse of facility” frauds involving those under 21 years of age, has risen sharply.

There were 4,222 cases in the first half of 2017, compared with 2,143 in the first part of 2916, the fraud prevention service said.

It also reported that 65 per cent of the 17,040 incidents in the UK in the first six months of 2017 were committed by those under 30.

This type of fraud normally sees an individual allowing their bank account to be used in transferring money, according to Cifas, making it more difficult for authorities to monitor.

The organisation has also called for children to receive fraud education in the national curriculum.

“We are trying to prevent young people from getting involved in something that could end up being quite damaging,” said Sandra Peaston, Cifas, assistant director. “Not just the repercussions of laundering money but getting involved in organised crime can get very nasty.”

Ms Peaston added that criminals were advertising on social media, offering cash if youngsters allow them to use their bank accounts.

The Metropolitan Police has sent out warnings to parents through London schools after worries that school children are being approached outside school gates. There have been several cases recorded outside of London according to The Times.

Youngsters have been approached with violent threats if they did not consent, say police.

Parents were warned to talk to their children so they are on alert concerning these money laundering schemes, as they may not be aware that this is a criminal offence and could damage their credit status in the future.

Operation Falcon, the Met police’s fraud department sent out a letter explaining how youngsters are lured in. “This is either done by force or for a financial incentive. We need your support to help educate young people around this issue.

Bank accounts are private and must only be used by the account holder. Any misuse could not only be criminal but could cause serious credit issues for the account holder.”

Children as young as 13 now have bank accounts, said Detective Chief Inspector Gay Miles, and they now have “access to money that they didn’t have before.”

EB-5 Abusers go to Jail, Need More of This

Posted on August 15, 2017August 15, 2017 by Denise Simon

When money buys citizenship, the honor, pride and loyalty fades fast.

Sounded good in theory at the time back in 1990 perhaps, then of course abuse set in:

EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program

USCIS administers the EB-5 Program. Under this program, entrepreneurs (and their spouses and unmarried children under 21) are eligible to apply for a green card (permanent residence) if they:

Make the necessary investment in a commercial enterprise in the United States; and

Plan to create or preserve 10 permanent full-time jobs for qualified U.S. workers.

This program is known as EB-5 for the name of the employment-based fifth preference visa that participants receive.

Congress created the EB-5 Program in 1990 to stimulate the U.S. economy through job creation and capital investment by foreign investors. In 1992, Congress created the Immigrant Investor Program, also known as the Regional Center Program. This sets aside EB-5 visas for participants who invest in commercial enterprises associated with regional centers approved by USCIS based on proposals for promoting economic growth.

There was a time this top democrat said: “I don’t believe that America should be selling visas and eventually citizenship,” said Sen. Dianne Feinstein, a Democrat of California. China is the biggest applicant to the program and no one can produce how many jobs are actually created.

In 2015 for instance, a Chinese national was arrested after investigators found he had obtained an EB-5 visa using stolen money. A 2013 Homeland Security investigation found that an Iranian who was arrested and involved in the EB-5 program had ties to Iranian intelligence operatives, The Times reported.

There has not been a congressional hearing dedicated to EB-5 abuse for more than a year, go here to watch the last one. Shocking.

The 2017 budget, which will continue funding the U.S. government until October, includes the extension of the EB-5 visa program, as lawmakers slipped the extension of the program into the spending bill.

After years of writing about the numerous and substantial frauds in the EB-5 program, I now can report that two people are going to jail for immigrant investor program crimes.

Each of the cases involved more than $100 million in misused EB-5 investments, with the actual thefts involving more than $10 million each. The cases had nothing to do with each other, but both show how badly the EB-5 program is managed by the Department of Homeland Security, an agency whose skill set does not include regulating high finance.

The EB-5 program currently gives a family-sized set of green cards to alien investors who place half-million-dollar investments through a DHS-approved regional center. The program, which keeps getting renewed by Congress for short periods, is due to sunset again on September 30. But the middlemen who benefit from the program (including some of the president’s in-laws) are likely to secure the program’s renewal again without any of the reforms it needs so badly. I hope I am wrong about that.

Earlier this month, Lobsang Dargey, said to be a former Tibetan monk, was sentenced to four years in prison for his crimes as part of a plea agreement. In addition to prison, Dargey agreed, along with associated firm Path Othello LLC, to disgorge $18.4 million. In these cases the question of deportation is handled separately and years later.

Dargey talked scores of investors, mostly from China, into buying into his Seattle real estate ventures.

Earlier in the year a similar conman was sentenced to three years in jail for an even bigger swindle in Chicago. This one was so dramatic that it reached the cover of Fortune magazine, even before sentencing. The promoters said it would be the:

“World’s First Zero Carbon Platinum LEED-certified and 100% Allergen Free convention center and hotel complex.” Lest anyone doubt its global eco-import, the project’s developer was branding it as a “Kyoto Protocol Centre.” At a projected cost of $913 million, it was to include three connected towers — 14, 17, and 19 stories tall — containing five upscale hotels with 995 suites and rooms, four levels of convention space, a green roof with a spa and yoga studio, a miniature golf course, and a 1,720-car “automatic robotic” parking garage.

The man behind the scam, Anshoo Sethi, now in jail, had told his gullible investors (and the equally gullible U.S. government) that he was investing $177.5 million worth of real estate in the project. However, that investment consisted of a modest motel, occupying two-plus acres near Chicago’s O’Hare Airport, that had been purchased by Sethi’s family for $10 million, a fact that any of the investors — or any DHS employee — could have discovered in the city’s land records. But no one checked until years later.

One hopes that these sentences will discourage other would-be EB-5 fraudsters, but while there have been dozens of accounts of similar schemes (as shown on a CIS-created map), so far these are the first to have led to well-deserved prison sentences.

Sergey Shoigu Planned with Maduro to Stop NATO in Latin America

Posted on August 14, 2017August 14, 2017 by Denise Simon

And Venezuela needs the money, too bad Maduro capitulated on oil rights for power.

Shoigu’s Successes

Sergey has many successes on his resume, all of which make him a possible candidate for President. Here are some:

– Russia’s military success in Crimea, East Ukraine, Syria, South Ossetia, Chechnya, and down the border of NATO countries, Sergey and Russia were viewed as force well protected that can show effectiveness and efficiency in military actions

– Shoigu was minister in the Ministry of emergency situations for almost 22 years. During that time, he efficiently used the advantages of Russian bureaucracy and legalism to gather power and popularity, all while not making a single enemy

– Sergey showed pragmatic approach in addressing former American defense secretary Chuck Hagel with his personal name, not with his surname, which was practice before

Militarization of Russia

Since 2013, Russia and Moscow were heavily criticized for spending large amounts of money on armed forces. Many Western leaders thought that Putin is the man pulling the strings, and that it was his idea to spend so much money, despite his weak economy that is too much oil-dependent. However, what few people outside of Russia knew until lately is that Sergey Shoigu, the Russian defense minister is the one responsible for the huge expansion. More here.

In April of this year, Maduro’s Defense Minister paid an interesting visit to Moscow. Vladimir Padrino Lopez the Defense Minister would meet his Russian counterpart, Sergey Kuzhugetovich Shoygu, at a conference of international defense.

“I have come (to Moscow) upon the orders of President Nicolás Maduro,” Padrino said in the video. He added: “I bring a very interesting, a very important point (to the conference), which is NATO’s projection in Latin America, its consequences and risks.”

Beyond the excuse of the conference, why is Maduro’s Defense Minister, the man who “pulls the strings of power behind the scenes” in Venezuela according to García Otero, visiting Moscow precisely when massive citizen protests are posing an existential threat to the Chavista regime? The answer may have to do with what is perhaps the least analyzed aspect of the Venezuelan crisis: the geostrategic implications of a failed state in Venezuela from the point of view of the world’s great powers.

There certainly has been a shift in Washington’s attitude toward the Venezuelan regime since Donald Trump arrived at the White House. As the PanAm Post explained in 2016, the Obama administration carried out a three-pronged strategy in Latin America, its aims being:

Achieving the dangerous pact between Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and the communist FARC guerrillas.

Renewing diplomatic and commercial relations with the Castros’ Cuba after more than five decades since the Cuban embargo was put in place.

Appeasing the Maduro regime in Venezuela in order to guarantee the success of the Santos-FARC pact while preventing the implosion of the Cuban economy, which depends on Venezuelan oil for its survival (Obama wanted to avoid a Mariel Boatlift-type humanitarian crisis on the coasts of Florida).

Yes, there is some indication that NATO may begin cultivating members nations in Latin America, Putin is on the move using Iran, Cuba and Venezuela. Now you know why Vice President Pence is on a tour in Latin America.

When President Trump mentioned just a few days ago about a military option in Venezuela, he had something in mind due to the above meetings and building Russian influence in the region. Beginning in Columbia Pence discussions began this way:

Colombia is one of the United States’ closest allies in the Western Hemisphere, yet, as he stood next to Pence, Santos denounced Trump’s threat of military action, and told the visiting vice president that such a possibility “shouldn’t even be considered” and would be “unacceptable.”

“Every country in Latin America would not favor any form of military intervention, and that is why we are saying we are intent on looking into other measures, some of which are already underway and others to be implemented in the future,” Santos said.

The concerns build as Maduro’s Vice President, El Aissami has deep ties to Hezbollah of Iran and he was responsible for those tens of thousands of passports illegally issued for Syrians. Of course Putin is running Assad of Syria with the aid of Iran. Weapons abound globally. Vladimir Padrino Lopez is the mastermind and driver of the region.

The ideology of Venezuela’s minister of defense, Vladimir Padrino López, is captured in a 2015 photo of him kneeling before Fidel Castro. But he is reputed to be even closer to the Kremlin. This January, Venezuela launched a series of civil-military exercises around the country, dubbed Plan Zamora, under the guidance of advisers from Iran, Russia and Cuba.

Russia supplies arms to Venezuela. In November the Kremlin sent new aviation and air-defense technology to Caracas. Reuters reported in May that Venezuela now has “5,000 Russian-made MANPADS surface-to-air weapons,” representing “the largest known stockpile in Latin America.” More here from the WSJ.

For a comprehensive timeline and names, go here, excellent work going back to 2015 investigating the Russian, Cuban, Iranian and Venezuelan operation.

Category Archives: Industry Jobs Oil Economics

DPRK: What Barack/Hillary Knew and When

Background

Regime Goal

Regime Guidelines

Equipment and Technology Annex